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This article is written by Gautam Badlani, a student at Chanakya National Law University, Patna. This article examines the objective and significance of the National Security Act, 1980, thereby providing an overview of the Act and analysing the landmark judicial pronouncements on the Act. It further analyses the preventive detention laws in other countries.  

This article has been published by Sneha Mahawar.​​ 

Introduction

Entry 9 of List I (the Union List) and Entry 3 of List III (the Concurrent List) empower the Central Government and State Governments, respectively, to frame laws concerning preventive detention. Thus, it is clear that the makers of the Constitution deemed it necessary to expressly provide the Government with the power to frame preventive detention laws. 

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Section 151 of the Code of Criminal Procedure also stipulates a preventive detention mechanism and empowers a police officer to arrest any person without a warrant or order of a magistrate if the officer believes that an offence is likely to be committed which cannot be prevented otherwise than by such arrest.  

The National Security Act was passed in the year 1980 with the aim of maintaining law and order in the country. For this purpose, it also authorises the preventive detention of any person. This article gives an overview of the Act and analyses the various judicial pronouncements related to the Act. The article further discussed the preventive detention laws in other countries and suggests ways to improve the effectiveness of the National Security Act, 1980. 

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Historical Background

The history of preventive detention laws in India can be traced back to the East India Company Act, 1784, which permitted the authorities to detain any person who was acting in a manner prejudicial to the British interests and British possessions. Preventive detention was used by the British during the two World Wars, and it was justified as being necessary to deal with extraordinary circumstances arising out of the World Wars. 

After Independence, the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 was passed, which placed extraordinary powers in the hands of the government to detain a person for the purpose of preventing him from committing any unlawful act. It is pertinent to note that the majority of the provisions of the National Security Act are inspired by the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act. This Act remained in force until 1969.

Subsequently, the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, was passed. There have been allegations of blatant misuse of this Act during the emergency period. This Act was repealed in 1978. Subsequently, the National Security Act, 1980 was enacted. 

Object of National Security Act

The objective of preventive detention measures is often misconstrued by the general public as well as the government. The aim of preventive detention measures is to prevent a person from committing an offence. It aims at anticipating that a person might commit an offence in the future and detaining him in order to prevent him from committing the offence. The preventive detention measures are not intended to be applied in cases of ordinary and general breaches of law and order. However, yet we see that in many cases, the National Security Act is invoked against people who are doubted to have committed any grave offence.  Such people must be tried under substantive laws dealing with the suspected offence. Preventive detention is a preventive measure and must be used in such a manner.

Overview of the Act

Detention order

Under Section 3 of the Act, the Central Government or the concerned State Government can order the detention of a person in order to prevent him from adversely affecting the security of India, defence of India, India’s relations with foreign nations, the maintenance of public order, or the supply of essential supplies. The Central or State Government can also order the detention of any foreigner if it is necessary for his expulsion from the country or to regulate his stay in the country. 

The State Government can also authorise the Commissioner of Police or the District Magistrate of any area to exercise such powers, provided the State Government is satisfied that such empowerment is essential in view of the circumstances prevailing in the concerned area. The Commissioner of Police or the District Magistrate, as the case may be, has to forthwith inform the State Government of the detention order along with the reasons for such an order. The order passed by the concerned officer will remain in force for a period of 12 days, and the approval of the State Government has to be obtained within this period in order to continue the detention beyond 12 days. 

Where the detention order has been passed by the State Government, the order will remain in force for a period of 3 months. However, the State Government may subsequently extend the period from time to time for a maximum of 3 months at a time. 

Where the State Government has itself ordered the detention or has approved the detention order passed by the concerned officer, it has to inform the Central Government about the order within 7 days. 

Section 4 provides that the detention order can be executed at any place throughout the territory of India.

It is pertinent to note that Section 5A provides that where the detention order has been made on several grounds, it would be deemed that a distinct order has been passed on each of the grounds.   Therefore, even if one or some of the grounds are vague, irrelevant or unclear, it would not render the detention order invalid and the order would survive on the remaining valid grounds. 

Section 13 provides that the maximum period for which a person can be detained under this Act is 12 months.

By virtue of Section 16, if any action is taken by the Central Government or the concerned state government under this Act in good faith, then no legal proceeding or suit can be brought against the government for the same. 

Communication of grounds for detention

By virtue of Section 8, the grounds of detention have to be communicated to the detained person as soon as possible. Such communication must preferably be made within a maximum period of 5 days and, in exceptional cases, within a maximum period of 15 days. 

The detenu should be provided with the earliest opportunity to make a representation against the detention order. 

In the recent case of Devesh Chourasia v. District Magistrate, Jabalpur (2022), the petitioner had been detained by an order passed under Section 3 of the Act. The court noted that the petitioner’s representation against the detention order was not considered expeditiously, and the rejection of such representation was not communicated to the petitioner in a timely manner by the Central and State governments. Resultantly, the two-judge bench of the Supreme Court set aside the detention order and the extension that was granted to the detention. 

Advisory boards

By virtue of Section 9, the Central Government or the State Government has to constitute the advisory boards whose primary task would be to advise the government whether there is sufficient cause for the continuation of the detention or not. 

The advice report would consist of 3 persons, and such persons must either be or should have been High Court judges or should be qualified to be High Court judges. 

Section 10 provides that the Central or State Government has to refer the detention order to the advisory board within 3 months of the order along with the grounds on which the order has been passed, the representation made by the detenu and, where the detention order has been passed by an officer authorised by the state government, the report of the officer. 

Section 11 stipulates the procedure to be followed by the Advisory Board. The advisory board will submit its report to the government after considering the materials placed before it and may also direct the government or any other person to produce any material that the board considers relevant to the matter. The board may also provide an opportunity to be heard to the detained person if it considers it necessary. The Board has to submit its report to the government within 7 weeks of the detention. Moreover, Section 11 expressly provides that the detained person cannot claim a right to be represented by a legal practitioner of his choice before the Advisory Board. 

The report submitted by the advisory board is confidential, except for the part that contains the opinions of the board. 

Section 12 provides that where the Advisory Board is of the opinion that there is sufficient cause to continue or extend the detention, the concerned government may order the extension of the detention. On the other hand, if the Advisory Board is of the opinion that there is no sufficient cause to continue with the detention, then the appropriate government is obligated to revoke the detention order. 

Exception 

Section 14A envisages the circumstances in which a person can be detained for a period extending 3 months without obtaining the opinion of the advisory board. A person can be detained for a period extending three months without referring the matter to the advisory board in the following circumstances;

  • Where the person is detained to prevent him from interfering with the government’s efforts in preventing terrorist activities.
  • The person is detained in order to prevent him from acting in a manner that would adversely affect the security of India, defence of India, supply of essential services, maintenance of public order or security of the state.

The question has time and again arisen before the Courts as to what are the standards upon which an act would qualify to be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The expression “public order” was defined by the Apex Court in the case of Kanu Biswas vs State of West Bengal (1972) The Court noted that public order concerns the general tempo of the country or a specific locality. The public order is disturbed by those acts that affect the tempo of the community and incite its members to commit a breach of the law.

In the case of Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal (1969), the Apex Court further clarified that it is the degree of disturbance caused by an act in society that determines whether it is prejudicial to the public interest or not.  

However, in such a scenario, the person shall not be detained for a period extending 6 months without obtaining the opinion of the advisory board with respect to the sufficiency of cause for detention. 

Constitutional provisions dealing with detention 

The Indian Constitution expressly provides that the government shall have the power to detain a person under preventative detention laws. 

Constitutional safeguards

The Constitution also provides certain rights to detained persons. Article 22 of the Constitution provides the following rights to the detained person: 

  • Article 22(4) provides where the person has been detained under a preventive detention law, he cannot be detained for more than 3 months unless the Advisory Board has recommended that there is sufficient cause for continuing the detention. It is pertinent to note that by virtue of the Constitution (Forty-Fourth) Amendment Act, 1978, the maximum period for which a person can be detained without obtaining the advisory Board’s opinion, was reduced from 3 months to 2 months. However, this mandate has not been given effect by a suitable amendment to the National Security Act. 
  • Article 22(5) provides that the detained person has the right to be informed of the grounds of detention as soon as possible and should be provided with an opportunity to make a representation against such detention.

In the case of Shibban Lal Saksena v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1953), the petitioner was detained under the Preventive Detention Act on the basis of two grounds; firstly, that his activities hindered the supply of essential commodities, and secondly, that his activities hindered the maintenance of public order. The matter was referred to the Advisory Board, and the Board, in its opinion, stated that the first ground was non-existent. The issue that arose was whether the detention should be continued solely on the basis of the second ground when the first ground was declared invalid by the Board. The Court noted that holding that the order was valid solely on the basis of the second ground would be to apply a subjective test of the executive decision instead of an executive judicial test. If the Board is of the opinion that the grounds are non-existent or unsubstantial, then the detention order would be vitiated as a whole. 

  • Article 22(7) provides that the Parliament may prescribe the circumstances under which a person can be detained for more than 3 months without obtaining the opinion of the Advisory Board. Moreover, the Parliament can also prescribe the maximum period for which a person can be detained under the preventive detention law. 

Constitutionality of the National Security Act

The constitutionality of the National Security Act was challenged in the case of AK Roy v. Union of India (1981). 

In this case, the constitutionality of the Act was challenged on the ground that it is a draconian law that places arbitrary and excessive powers in the hands of the executive. The petitioner thus contended that the Act was violative of Articles 14, 19, and 21. The Court made the following observations in this regard: 

  • The court pointed out that the Act also contains certain inherent safeguards to prevent the arbitrary exercise of power. For example, where the detention is made by an order of the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police, the officer making the detention order is required to communicate that decision forthwith, along with the reasons, to the State Government. 
  • The court pointed out that preventive detention without trial is evil, but such evil has to be suffered to the minimum extent as required for the protection of the collective interests of the society. The Court observed that when a person is detained, his family members or friends should be informed of such detention in writing. Mere detention does not deprive the detained person of all his fundamental rights. 

Moreover, the petitioner had also challenged the constitutionality of Section 3 of the Act on the ground that the terms such as “security of the state,” “relations of India with foreign powers,” etc., used in Section 3 are vaguely defined and are very wide in their scope, and therefore, the Section must be struck down. 

Thus, the application of the Section was based on the personal opinion of the authority empowered to detain a person. However, the rule of law requires that a person know with certainty the distinction between what qualifies as lawful and unlawful conduct. In the case of Section 3, in the absence of any precise definition, this requirement was not satisfied. The Court made the following observations in this regard:

  • The court pointed out that the expressions used in Section 3 are of such a character that they are not capable of being defined in a precise manner. Thus, a minimal degree of latitude has to be given to the Government in order to enable it to effectively implement the preventive detention laws. 
  • The Court pointed out that, at any rate, a court of law when faced with the question of whether the concerned action falls within the expressions used in Section 3 or not, would be able to determine an acceptable answer by the application of the judicial mind.  
  • The Court, while refusing to strike down Section 3, observed that such laws must be interpreted narrowly by the Court and their application must be confined to as few situations as possible.  
  • With respect to Section 3(2), the Court pointed out that it permits the detaining authority to detain a person for hindering the maintenance of essential services and supplies to the community. However, what constitutes essential supplies and services is up to the discretion of the detaining authority and this discretion is capable of being misused. However, at the same time, the provision is essential to ensure that essential services and supplies are steadily provided to the community, and thus, Section 3(2) cannot be struck down. 
  • The Court attempted to strike a balance between the protection of the personal liberty of individuals and the large interests of the community by holding that the services and supplies which are regarded as essential to the community must be made known appropriately to the public in advance through any order, law or notification and only after such communication, the detention order can be made. 
  • The petitioners had also challenged the denial of the right to consult a legal practitioner to the detenu as being unreasonable and arbitrary. However, the Court pointed out that Article 22(1) provides that every arrested person shall have the right to be represented by a legal practitioner of his choice but at the same time, Article 22(3) excludes the application of Article 22(1) in cases where a person is detained under the preventive detention law. Thus, the denial of this right to the detenu could not be termed as unreasonable. 

Judicial Pronouncements 

Ranveer @ Raman vs State Of Madhya Pradesh (2022)

Facts 

In the case of Ranveer @ Raman v. the State Of Madhya Pradesh (2022), the District Magistrate of Indore had passed an order for the petitioner’s detention by exercising the powers conferred on him by virtue of Section 3(2) of the Act. The grounds of detention were communicated to the petitioner, and he was provided with the right to make a representation against the order. The detention order was made on the basis of the four criminal cases that were registered against the petitioner. The petitioner approached the Madhya Pradesh High Court and filed a writ petition against the detention order. 

Arguments

The petitioner contended that he had not been convicted in any of the cases that were registered against him and that the detention order was passed with an ulterior motive. 

The respondents pleaded that all the procedural requirements had been observed. The petitioner was informed of the grounds for his detention; his relatives were informed of the date of his arrest; and the petitioner was informed that he had a right to appear before the advisory board. The detention order was made in view of the fact that the petitioner was involved in criminal activities that were prejudicial to public safety. 

Judgment 

The Court noted that the offences with which the petitioner was charged were bailable and the petitioner had been detained merely on speculation. The Court noted that a person can be detained if the executive is of the opinion that the person might engage in acts prejudicial to public order. Public order is different from law and order and if the act of the person merely disturbs one person and does not affect the ‘tranquillity’ of the society, then it would not be prejudicial to public order. 

The court noted that one of the cases had been registered in 2016, and it was 6 years later that the detention order had been passed. The Court observed that a person cannot be detained merely on the ground that he is likely to get bail. The concerned authority is empowered to pass a detention order while the accused is in jail, but the authority must give due regard to the fact that the person was already in custody at the time when the order was passed, and there must be cogent reasons on which the authority may pass the detention order.

The High Court concluded that the detention order passed by the District Magistrate was unsustainable and thus must be set aside. 

Ram Sewak v. State of UP (2022)

Facts

In this case, the petitioner was accused of committing the rape and murder of a 10-year-old girl and had been charged under the relevant sections of the Indian Penal Code and the Prevention of Children from Sexual Offence Act, 2012. The petitioner was arrested and subsequently preferred a bail application. While his application for bail was pending, the detention order was passed by the District Magistrate based on the report of the Sponsoring Authority.

The petitioner approached the High Court and pleaded for the issue of a writ of certiorari for quashing the detention order that had been passed against him by the District Magistrate. 

Arguments

The petitioner contended that the alleged incident had taken place in a secluded place and could not be said to have disrupted public order. The matter could have been dealt with under ordinary laws, and detention under the National Security Act was not required. 

The respondents, on the other hand, submitted that, in view of the gruesome nature of the offence, it disrupted the public order and tempo of the persons living in the concerned area. 

Judgment

The Court primarily noted that merely because an offence had been committed in a secluded area did not mean that it could not disturb public order. The factors to be considered are the degree of disturbance and the extent to which it affects the lives of the individuals living in the concerned locality. 

The Court pointed out that if a man molests women in secluded places, he makes all women apprehensive for their safety, and this affects public order and disturbs the community. 

The alleged offence led to an environment of fear and made the people of the locality angry, who had collected in large numbers. There was a state of fear among the people with regards to the safety of women, and there was tension in the area for several days. 

Police personnel were called from the nearby police stations to meet the requirements of the situation and the police had to be deployed to restore public confidence. The Court noted that the District Magistrate was of the opinion that the petitioner might repeat such acts if released on bail and thus had passed the detention order. 

The Court thus held that the Magistrate had correctly formed his opinion and refused to interfere with the detention order made by the Magistrate. 

Abhayraj Gupta vs Superintendent, Central Jail (2021)

Facts

In this case, the petitioner was apprehended in relation to a case of murder. The firing incident, resulting in the death of the deceased person, had taken place at the PWD Office. When the police tried to arrest the petitioner, he fired at the police personnel. Subsequently, the petitioner was taken into custody. 

The District Magistrate passed the detention order under Section 3 of the Act based on the aforementioned incidents. The detention order provided that due to the firing incident, the students of a college adjacent to the PWD Office panicked, and the guardians of the students had expressed their concern to the college administration.

The petitioner had approached the High Court under Article 226 and prayed for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus and a writ of mandamus to direct the concerned authorities to release him from detention. 

Arguments 

The following objections were raised by the petitioner against the detention order

  • The alleged incident qualified to be a law and order situation but did not affect the public order.
  • The firing incident had taken place in December, 2019 but the detention order was made in January 2021. Hence, there was no proximity between the two.  
  • The entire material on which the magistrate had relied on for passing the detention order had not been provided to the petitioner.
  • A copy of the report of the advisory board was not provided to the petitioner.
  • The petitioner was already in custody at the time when the detention order was made and he had not even applied for bail in relation to the third FIR lodged against him.

Judgment

The Court noted that if an act creates apprehension, fear, and a feeling of danger in the minds of the members of the community, then it can be deemed to disturb the public order. The contravention of any law affects order, but it affects public order only if it affects the community or the public at large. 

The High Court referred to the case of Sheshdhar Misra v. Superintendent, Central Jail, Naini (1985) and pointed out that every murderous assault incident in a public place, which can be equated to an ordinary murder, cannot be regarded as disturbing public order. Its impact cannot be said to be so fearsome and widespread that it would affect the tempo of the community.

The Court pointed out that the detention order did not provide any reasonable basis to suppose that the petitioner, if released on bail, would engage in acts prejudicial to public order. It did not provide any input as to the last activity of the detenu that would suggest that he might engage in acts similar to the alleged incident. 

The alleged incident had taken place 14 months prior to the detention order, and hence, the detention order has no proximity to the incident. Moreover, the petitioner was entitled to receive the entire material upon which the detaining authority had relied, and the same had not been provided to the detenu. 

The Court thus concluded that the detention order was unsustainable and allowed the writ petition. 

International Perspective on Preventive Detention 

Germany

Section 66 of the German Criminal Code permits preventive detention of offenders. In Germany, the Courts are empowered to order preventive detention for convicted offenders in addition to the prescribed sentence. The purpose of such a provision is to protect the general public from habitual offenders. It is pertinent to note here that in Germany, prison sentences are generally shorter as compared to other countries. The preventive detention laws in Germany have also been the subject of much controversy due to the challenges that these laws faced before the European Court of Human Rights.

M v. Germany (2009)

In the landmark case of M v. Germany (2009), the appellant was a habitual offender who had been convicted several times for offences such as murder, theft, etc. In 1986, he was sentenced to 5 years’ imprisonment for committing the offences of robbery and murder and the trial court had also ordered preventive detention in addition to the term of imprisonment. The appellant continued to stay in preventive detention after the expiry of the term of imprisonment, and he was in detention till 2001. In 2001, a court refused his appeal to be released from detention. 

In Germany, the maximum period for which a person could be detained was 10 years. However, the same limit had been removed by an amendment in 1998. The appellant challenged the refusal of his appeal before the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany on the ground that he had been placed in preventive detention prior to the coming into force of the amendment and therefore his detention could not be extended by virtue of the amendment. However, his appeal was rejected. 

Thereafter, the appellant approached the European Court of Human Rights. The appellant contended that the extension of his detention was violative of Articles 5 and 7 of the European Convention of Human Rights. Article 5 illustrates the circumstances in which a person can be detained. It provides that a person can be deprived of his liability for lawful detention subsequent to conviction, for non-compliance with a court order, to prevent him from committing any offence, to prevent him from spreading infectious diseases, or to prevent him from entering any country in an unauthorised manner. Article 7 provides that no person can be punished for committing any act or omission which was not an offence under any national or international law at the time when it was committed. 

The European Court of Human Rights pointed out that the German Courts erred in ordering the detention of the appellant beyond the ten-year period. The courts were imposing a penalty that was heavier than what was prescribed at the time when the offence was committed by the appellant. There was no causal relationship between the appellant’s conviction and his extended detention. Thus, the Court rules that the additional penalty could not be imposed retrospectively. Subsequently, the Federal Constitutional Court also held that the retrospective application of the amendment constituted a serious encroachment on the liberty of individuals. 

United States

In the United States, the Bail Reform Act, 1984 empowered judicial officers to order the preventive detention of convicted persons. The detention provisions under the Act were challenged in the case of United States vs Selena (1987). It was contended that the Act violated the due process clause provided under the Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution. The court pointed out that the persons detained under the Act must be kept separate from the convicted persons; the Act constituted permissible regulation and not punishment. The court observed that the detention stipulated under the Act was for the purpose of securing public safety. 

Thereafter, provisions relating to preventive detention have been incorporated in several state legislations. However, it is pertinent to note here that several constitutional safeguards are also available against detention laws. The Sixth Amendment of the US Constitution provides that in criminal prosecutions, the accused has a right to a speedy and public trial. The Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution provides that no person can be deprived of his liberty except according to due process of law/. Thus, the laws providing for preventive detention are also required to comply with the requirements of the ‘due process’ clause.                    

Criticism of the Act

The Act has often been criticised on the grounds that it places arbitrary power in the hands of the government and is often misused by the authorities. The Apex Court, in the case of AK Roy, had itself noted that the Act leaves scope for arbitrariness on the part of the executive but such discretion has to be allowed to the government to enable it to protect the general interest of the society. 

Certain provisions of the Act, such as those which provide that the detenu shall have no right to be represented by a legal representative before the Advisory Board, need to be amended. The detained person may not have the requisite knowledge that is essential to make an adequate representation. In some cases, the psychological and mental impact of the detention might also adversely affect a person’s ability to make an effective representation. In such a scenario, not providing an express right to the person to be represented by a legal practitioner is a violation of his rights. 

The Advisory Board has to render its opinion within 3 months of the detention period. This essentially implies that a person can be detained for up to 3 months without any review of the decision of the executive authority. This leaves tremendous scope for the violation of the constitutional rights of the detained person. During the period of 3 months, the detenu may be subject to unlawful torture or abuse. A person can be detained without being informed of the grounds of arrest for up to 10 days, and the government may, even when it discloses the grounds of arrest, choose to withhold information regarded by it as essential for securing the public interest.

The human rights abuses resulting from the preventive detention laws are often regarded as state-sanctioned abuses of individual liberties. The threshold for an act to qualify as a ground of detention is the subjective ‘satisfaction’ of the detaining authority, and this Act confers wide discretion on the executive. Preventive detention is regarded as an exception to the personal liberty granted by Article 21 of the Constitution. It is therefore essential to exercise this power only in certain extreme cases. Preventive detention curbs the free movement of an individual and is, therefore, an exception to Article 19(1)(d), which guarantees the right to free movement throughout the country to every citizen. Thus, it is clear that preventive detention orders confine and crib a person’s fundamental rights. 

The Act is often alleged to be against the spirit of several International Conventions to which India is a signatory. 

Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that all persons have a right to liberty, and no person can be arbitrarily arrested or detained. The Article further provides that a person should be deprived of his liberty only on such grounds and according to such procedures as the law prescribes. India ratified the convention on 10th April, 1979. However, in several cases, the person detained under the Act is not informed immediately of the grounds of the arrest or is arrested on grounds that are later held by the Court to be frivolous and vague. Such detentions are a violation of Article 9 of the Covenant.

Article 14 of the Covenant provides that any person who is charged with a criminal offence has a right to be heard by an impartial, competent, and independent Tribunal. In the case of preventive detention, the opinion of the advisory board cannot be regarded as a judicial review, and therefore, we see that it constitutes a violation of Article 14 of the Covenant. 

Similarly, Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that no person shall be arbitrarily detained, arrested, or exiled.  

Conclusion and Suggestions

The National Security Act is certainly a necessity to protect the nation from the abuse of democratic rights by certain anti-social elements. At the same time, questions about a conflict between human rights and national security will always arise. The need is to provide a balance between the two. 

However, at the same time, it is essential that the Act must conform to the Constitutional spirit. The mandate of the 44th Constitutional Amendment, reducing the maximum permissible period of detention without obtaining the view of the Advisory Board to 2 months, should be followed by a suitable amendment to the Act. At any rate, the Amendment should be given effect proprio vigore.  

It is pertinent to note that Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that where there has been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has been adversely affected should be provided compensation. It is essential that an obligation should be imposed on the Government to provide compensation to those who are detained under the Act and later it is decided by the Courts such detention was based on frivolous grounds or vague and unclear suspicion.  

There is an urgent need for the courts to evolve well-defined and precise standards to which the preventive detention laws must conform. Imprecise expressions such as ‘satisfaction’ of the executive authority need to be done away with. 

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

What is a sunset clause and does the National Security Act have a sunset clause?

A sunset clause is a legislative acknowledgement that the statute in question is a temporary measure and will cease to have an effect beyond a certain period. Extraordinary laws which are framed for a specific objective contain a sunset clause which ensures that these laws expire after their objective is fulfilled. 

The Preventive Detention Act had a sunset clause. However, the National Security Act does not have a sunset clause, and therefore, no time period has been prescribed for which it shall remain in force. 

Why was the National Security Act invoked during the COVID outbreak?

Several Indian states invoked the National Security Act during the COVID outbreak to prevent the hoarding of medicines and oxygen cylinders. The Act was also invoked against those who engaged in violence against doctors, medical practitioners, and police personnel. 

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