This article is written by Gauri Gupta. The article aims to provide a detailed analysis of the landmark judgement of Kameshwar Prasad Singh and Others v. The State of Bihar and Another (1962). The article highlights and elaborates on the judgement of the Supreme Court and discusses the necessary provisions in detail. The judgement plays a significant role as it sets an example of the power of the Supreme Court to strike down laws and regulations violative of the citizens’ fundamental rights.
Table of Contents
Introduction
The right to strike is considered to be a “labourer’s ultimate weapon.” Strikes can be described as a simultaneous cessation of work on the part of the employees or the workers. Strikes play a crucial role in every industry since the inequality of bargaining power between management and workers requires the latter to have a potent weapon to negotiate their needs and working conditions. The right to strike is a statutory and legal right under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and under various international conventions and organisations, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Labour Organisation.
The case of Kameshwar Prasad and Others v. The State of Bihar and Another (1962) is a landmark judgement of the Supreme Court. In this case, the Court refused to declare the right to strike as a fundamental right under Part III of the Constitution of India. However, it struck down rules put forth by the government that prohibited demonstrations by government officials.
Details of the case
Title of the Case
Kameshwar Prasad Singh v State of Bihar
Date of Judgement
22nd February, 1962
Parties to the case
Petitioner
Kameshwar Prasad Singh
Respondents
The State of Bihar
Equivalent citation
1962 AIR 1166 1962 SCR Supl. (3) 369
Type of case
Civil Appeal
Court
The Supreme Court of India
Provisions and Statutes Involved
- Constitution of India: Articles 13,19,33, 132,226 and 309
- Section 4-A of the Bihar Government Servants’ Conduct Rules, 1956
Corum
Justices N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, P.B. Gajendragadhkar, A.K. Sarkar, K.N. Wanchoo, and K.C. Das Gupta
Author of the Judgement
Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar
Facts of Kameshwar Prasad and Others vs. the State of Bihar and Another (1962)
The factual matrix of this case can be summarised in the following points:
- The Government of Bihar introduced a provision (Section 4-A) in the Bihar Government Servants’ Conduct Rules, 1956, by way of a notification in 1957. The provision prohibited government servants from participating in any demonstration or conducting a strike in relation to matters of service.
- Following this, six appellants filed a petition before the High Court of Patna under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and challenged the validity of the rule on various grounds, including the violation of Article 19 of the Constitution of India.
- Furthermore, the appellants also contended that the rule goes beyond the rule making power of the government under Article 309 of the Constitution of India.
- The High Court of Patna observed that the freedoms guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(c) do not include the right to resort to a strike or the right of government servants to participate in demonstrations. As a result, the learned judges of the High Court observed the rules introduced by the Government of Bihar as reasonable restrictions on the fundamental freedom granted under Part III of the Constitution of India.
- The appellants were aggrieved by the judgement of the High Court. Therefore, they filed an appeal before the Supreme Court of India after obtaining a certificate of fitness from the Patna High Court under Article 132 of the Constitution of India.
Issues
- Whether Section 4-A introduced into the Bihar Government Servants’ Conduct Rules, 1956, is constitutionally valid ?
Arguments of the parties
Petitioners
The petitioners contended that Rule 4-A of the 1956 Rules was illegal and unconstitutional. They based their argument on the ground that it was violative of Article 19(1)(a) and Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution. Further, the petitioners contended that the rule imposed an absolute restriction on government servants from holding demonstrations and strikes. The learned counsel for the petitioners also submitted that peaceful demonstrations were a part of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression.
Respondent
The respondent argued that it is not possible to interpret Rule 4-A by separating the legal and unconstitutional parts. As a result, they contended that striking down the entire provision was violative of the Constitution of India. They further highlighted that government employees are not exempted from the purview of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution of India. However, this in no way implies that the responsibilities of government officials cannot limit the rights of citizens.
Law discussed in Kameshwar Prasad and Others vs. the State of Bihar and Another (1962)
Article 13 of the Constitution of India, 1950
Article 13 of the Constitution of India clearly provides that the fundamental rights of Indian citizens enjoy supremacy over any other law. Article 13 is divided into four clauses. These clauses elaborate on the different provisions that are crucial to protecting the fundamental rights of the citizens of India.
Article 13 is significant for the case as it explains how the Supreme Court has the power to strike down any law enacted by the State abrogating the fundamental rights enshrined under Part III of the Constitution of India.
Article 13(1) provides that any law that is inconsistent with or derogatory to the fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution of India shall be void. In other words, if a law is found to be violative of a fundamental right guaranteed to an Indian citizen under Part III of the Constitution of India, it shall be deemed invalid and will be struck down by the courts.
The provision is of extreme significance since it limits the power of the Parliament to enact and implement laws that violate the basic and fundamental rights of the citizens of India.
Article 13(2) provides that any law that was enacted before the Constitution of India came into force and is inconsistent with or derogatory to the fundamental rights of Indian citizens shall be deemed to be void. It is important to note that it will be void only to the extent of such inconsistency. However, the government has the power to amend such laws and ensure that they are in accordance with the Constitution of India. In simpler words, the provision plays a crucial role in repealing and modifying the pre-independence laws if they are in violation of Part III of the Constitution of India.
Article 13(3) of the Constitution of India provides for abrogating state laws that are inconsistent with or derogatory to fundamental rights. The provision plays an important role because it strikes down any laws enacted by the State Legislature in case they are found to be in violation of the fundamental rights of the citizens.
Article 13(4) differs from the other clauses. It provides that the directive principles of state policy (DPSPs) under Part IV of the Constitution of India shall not be deemed to be void if found to be violative of the fundamental rights of the citizens. The provision is extremely important as it empowers the government to enact laws, thereby implementing the DPSPs.
The Supreme Court of India, in the case of I.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab (1967), observed that the term “law” under Article 13(2) of the Constitution of India includes amendments to the Constitution. As a result, if an amendment abrogates the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution of India, the entire Amending Act shall be deemed void.
Furthermore, in the case of Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), the Supreme Court of India upheld the constitutional validity of the 24th Amendment Act, 1971, which inserted Article 13(4).
Article 19 of the Constitution of India, 1950
Six fundamental freedoms are granted to the citizens of India under Article 19 of the Constitution of India. The provision is considered a pillar of democracy as its significance lies in its ability to adapt to the ever evolving changes of society. The rights granted to citizens are not absolute in nature and are subject to certain reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India. These restrictions are crucial for ensuring public order and maintaining the integrity of the country and include the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the state, friendly relations with foreign nations, public order, morality and decency.
The provision is relevant for this case because it grants certain fundamental freedoms to every citizen of India. However, these freedoms are not available to government employees, as evidenced by the judgement of the Supreme Court in this case.
Article 19(1)(a) – Freedom of Speech and Expression
In accordance with Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, every Indian citizen has the freedom to express their thoughts and ideas. This right includes the right to voice their opinion, publish their ideas either online or in print, and broadcast these opinions on radio, television and digital media platforms. It is important to note that the right is subject to certain reasonable restrictions, including sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the state, friendly relations with foreign states, public order, decency, morality, etc.
In the case of Express Newspapers v. Union of India (1958), the constitutional validity of the Working Journalists Act, 1955, was challenged. The act prescribed certain conditions of service for all those who were employed in the newspaper industry. It stipulated rules for the hours of work, leave, wages, etc., and thus was challenged on the ground of being violative of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. The Court upheld the validity of the act and observed that the act was passed to improve the conditions of service for those employed in the newspaper industry. Therefore, the act was not violative of Article 19(1)(a) and fell within the ambit of reasonable restrictions.
Article 19(1)(b) – Right to Assemble Peacefully and Without Arms
The right provided under this clause allows Indian citizens to assemble peacefully without any weapons. This right is considered to be the foundation of the democratic structure of India, as it allows public processions and demonstrations. However, the citizens should not be violent during these proceedings and ensure that they respect the reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2).
The right under Article 19(1)(b) provides for the right to assemble peacefully without arms and includes the right to hold public meetings and processions.
The Supreme Court of India observed in the landmark case of T.K. Rangarajan v. Government of Tamil Nadu (2003) that government employees do not have the fundamental right to strike. The rationale behind this was to maintain public order and ensure the smooth functioning of society without disrupting peace and harmony.
Article 19(1)(c) – Freedom to form Associations or Unions in India
The right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution of India provides that the citizens of India have the right to form associations, unions, or cooperative societies. This right includes the right to form political parties, companies, partnerships, societies, etc., subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2).
In the case of Damyanti v. Union of India (1971), the Supreme Court observed that the fundamental right to association means that the person forming that association has the right to continue to be associated with only those whom they voluntarily admit to being in association.
Article 19(1)(e) – Right to Reside and Settle in India
The provision provides for the freedom of an Indian citizen to reside, settle, or rent property in any part of Indian territory. However, the same is subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India.
In the case of U.P. Avas Evan\m Vikas Parishad v. Friends Co-op Housing Society Ltd. (1995), the Supreme Court held that the right to shelter is a fundamental right enshrined under Article 19(1)(e) and stems from the right of residence as provided under Part III of the Constitution of India. In other words, the Apex Court observed that the right to reside and settle in India under Article 19(1)(e) involves the right to shelter and construct houses for the purpose of residence.
Article 33 of the Constitution of India, 1950
Article 33 of the Constitution of India empowers the Parliament to enact laws that restrict or modify the application of the fundamental rights enshrined under Part III of the Constitution of India to the members of the armed forces, police forces, intelligence agencies, or similar forces that are responsible for maintaining the law and order of the state.
It is crucial to note that the provision empowers only the Parliament and not the Legislative Assemblies of the State.
The following restrictions are imposed on Article 33:
- Rights enshrined under Article 14, Article 15, and Article 19 have been restricted by the Armed Forces.
- The provisions of the Army Act of 1950, Air Force Act of 1950, and the Navy Act of 1957 cannot be challenged on the basis of being violative of the fundamental rights enshrined under Part III of the Constitution.
- The freedom of speech and expression, the freedom of assembly and formation of organisations and unions granted under Article 19 are restricted by the Central Government.
These restrictions do not take away the constitutional rights of the armed forces of Indian territory.
This provision highlights how the government cannot enact laws or provisions that abrogate the fundamental rights of the citizens of India. The same is evident in this case.
Article 132 of the Constitution of India, 1950
Article 132 of the Constitution of India provides for the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over appeals from the High Courts regarding matters pertaining to the Constitution. The provision empowers the Supreme Court to hear appeals from the judgement, decree, or order of the High Court on civil and criminal matters. The Apex Court is also empowered to hear appeals from any matters certified by the High Court involving substantial questions of law.
In the case of SP Sampath Kumar v. Union of India (1987), the constitutional validity of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, was challenged under Article 32 of the Constitution of India before the Apex Court on the ground of excluding the power of the Supreme Court and High Court to conduct judicial review. The Supreme Court of India observed that an appeal can be filed under Article 132 only where the High Court has issued a certificate providing for a substantial question of law.
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950
Article 226 of the Constitution empowers the High Courts to issue writs. These writs include the writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, certiorari and quo warranto. The provision plays a crucial role in enforcing the fundamental rights of Indian citizens.
Clause 1 of Article 226 provides that every High Court in India is empowered to issue orders, instructions, and writs to any individual or authority. This includes the government of India and various states. These writs are issued to enforce the fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution of India.
Clause 2 provides that the High Courts are empowered with the authority to issue orders, instructions and writs to any governmental authority or to an individual who is outside the local jurisdiction. This is applicable in circumstances wherein the cause of action is within the jurisdiction of the Court, but the Court does not have jurisdiction over the domicile of the individual or the place wherein the government office of that individual is located.
Clause 3 provides for issuing an interim order against the respondent. This can be issued in the form of an injunction or a stay. Furthermore, the interim order can be issued without providing the respondent with a copy of the petition, evidence or the opportunity to be heard.
Furthermore, it is crucial to note Clause 4 of Article 226, which provides that the power of the High Court to issue writs does not restrict or preclude the power of the Supreme Court to issue writs for enforcing fundamental rights under Article 32 of the Constitution.
In the case of Common Cause v. Union of India (2018), the Supreme Court observed that the High Court is empowered under Article 226 to issue writs. These writs are issued to enforce the fundamental rights of Indian citizens. However, what is crucial to note is that these writs can be issued for “any other reason,” extending beyond the enforcement of fundamental rights and including the enforcement of public responsibilities.
Article 309 of the Constitution of India, 1950
Article 309 of the Constitution of India plays a crucial role in addressing the appointment, conditions of service and tenure of persons who are serving in the public service of the Union of the States within the Indian territory.
The provision empowers the Parliament or the State Legislature, as the case may be, to enact laws that regulate recruitment and conditions of service. The provision further recognises the validity of the existing laws and regulations that relate to public services. Furthermore, the President or the Governor is empowered to make rules that are consistent with the provisions of the Constitution and relate to recruitment and conditions of service for appointing government servants.
In the case of Municipal Corporation, Jabalpur v. Om Prakash Dubey (2006), the policy decisions relating to regularising the services of the employees were laid down by the Municipal Corporation of Madhya Pradesh. Several petitions were filed questioning these policies on the ground of being violative of the fundamental rights enshrined under Part III of the Constitution of India . The Supreme Court observed that the regulation orders enacted by the government cannot override the rules framed under Article 309.
Section 4-A of the Bihar Government Servants’ Conduct Rules, 1956
Section 4-A provides that “No Government servant shall participate in any demonstration or resort to any form of strike in connection with any matter pertaining to his conditions of service.”
In simpler words, the provision provides for an express prohibition on demonstrations and strikes by government servants in cases pertaining to the conditions of their service. The provision was challenged in the case of Kameshwar Prasad and Others v. The State of Bihar and Another (1962) on the ground of being violative of the fundamental rights enshrined under Article 19(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution of India.
Precedents discussed in Kameshwar Prasad and Others vs. the State of Bihar and Another (1962)
Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh vs. Ram Manohar Lohia (1960)
The Supreme Court in this case observed that public order under Article 19 is synonymous with public tranquillity. Furthermore, public order under Article 19(2) and Article 19(3) provides for the absence of violence during protests. It is crucial for a law to be enacted for public order. Moreover, it is crucial for there to be a clear and reasonable connection between the restrictions on such freedoms and the potential disruption of public morality and order. The laws enacted should not cause public disorder.
This judgement is significant for this case, as Section 4-A provided for a restriction on fundamental rights, including the freedom of speech and expression and the right to assembly peacefully.
Judgement by Patna High Court
The High Court of Patna, in its judgement dated July 7, 1958, observed that the restrictions imposed under Rule 4-A are reasonable restrictions under Clause 6 of Article 19. The Court observed that the rule does not violate the fundamental rights enshrined under Article 19(1)(a) and Article 19(1)(b), as they impose necessary prohibitions in the interest of public order and morality.
The Patna High Court relied on the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Romesh Thappar v State of Madras (1950), wherein the Court dealt with the expression ‘public order.’ The Apex Court provided that the term ‘public order’ has a wide connotation and stated that tranquillity prevailed among society due to the regulations enacted and enforced by the Government. Furthermore, it manifested that the rule under the 1956 Bihar Rules was enacted keeping in mind public order under Article 19(2) and 19(4) of the Constitution.
Judgement in Kameshwar Prasad and Others vs. the State of Bihar and Another (1962)
An appeal was filed before the Supreme Court against the judgement of the Patna High Court pertaining to the constitutional validity of Section 4-A of the Bihar Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956. The Supreme Court observed that although special provisions exist for government officers under Part III of the Constitution of India, there is no specific reference that provides that the provisions are not applicable to them. The Court rejected the contention, which provided that the Constitution excludes government officers from the protections guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution.
The Court further discussed whether the right to “demonstration” is covered under Article 19(1)(a) and Article 19(1)(b) of the Constitution of India. The Court explained the term “demonstration” as a form of communicating one’s idea to others to whom it is intended to be conveyed. It can take various forms that fall within the scope of the freedoms guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) and Article 19(1)(b).
Thus, the Supreme Court accepted the contention, which provided that the fundamental rights under Part III apply to government servants and therefore allowed the appeal declaring that Section 4-A which prohibits any form of demonstration, is violative of Article 19(1)(a) and Article 19(1)(b), and thus declared it unconstitutional. Furthermore, the court observed that the right to strike is not a fundamental right.
Rationale behind the judgement
The Supreme Court, in the landmark judgement of Kameshwar Prasad and Others v. State of Bihar and Another (1962), struck down Section 4-A of the Bihar Government Servants’ Conduct Rules, 1956. The rule prohibited government servants from participating in demonstrations and carrying out strikes. The Supreme Court declared the rule to be ultra vires the Constitution of India as it violated the fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(a) and Article 19(1)(b), which provide for the freedom of speech and expression and the right to assemble peacefully without arms, respectively.
Analysis of Kameshwar Prasad and Others vs. the State of Bihar and Another (1962)
The landmark judgement of Kameshwar Prasad and Others v. State of Bihar and Another (1962) highlights the application of the fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution of India to government officials. It clarifies that although there are reasonable restrictions under Article 19(6) for protecting the sovereignty of India and for the public tranquilly, government servants enjoy these fundamental rights in the same way as the citizens of India. The judgement is crucial in protecting the rights of public servants. Furthermore, what is also important to note is that although the Supreme Court struck down Section 4-A of the Bihar Government Servants’ Conduct Rules, 1956, it observed that the right to strike is not a fundamental right within the purview of Part III of the Constitution of India.
Conclusion
The landmark judgement of Kameshwar Prasad and Another v. State of Bihar and Others (1962) decided upon a crucial question of public importance and extreme constitutional significance. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether Section 4-A of the Bihar Government Servants’ Conduct Rules, 1956, was violative of Article 19(1)(a) and Article 19(1)(b) of the Constitution of India. The Apex Court struck down the rule and observed that Section 4-A prohibits demonstrations and strikes and, thus, is abrogative of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression as well as the right to assemble peacefully without arms as provided under Article 19(1)(a) and Article 19(1)(b) of the Constitution of India, respectively.
The Supreme Court overturned the judgement of the Patna High Court, which provided that Section 4-A falls within the reasonable restrictions under Article 19(6) of the Constitution. Furthermore, what is required to be highlighted is the Apex Court extending the ambit of freedom of speech and expression and the right to assemble peacefully without arms under Article 19(1)(a) and (b), respectively, to include demonstrations.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
Is Right to Strike a fundamental right?
The 1962 judgement of Kameshwar Prasad and Others v. State of Bihar and Another clarified the scope of the right to demonstration. The Supreme Court held that although the right to demonstrations and strikes falls within the scope of Article 19(1)(a) and Article 19(1)(b), which provide for the freedoms of speech and expression and the right to assemble peacefully without arms, the right to strike is not itself a fundamental right under Part III of the Constitution of India.
Are the fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution of India applicable to government servants?
Yes, the fundamental rights and freedoms granted under Part III of the Constitution of India apply to government officers and servants as well. However, they are subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India.
Do workers have the right to strike?
Yes, the workers have a legal right to strike under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. However, the same is subject to statutory constraints and should not encroach upon the fundamental rights enshrined under Part III of the Constitution of India. The legal right to strike gives the worker the right to peacefully conduct demonstrations and processions to express their legitimate demands. However, government employees do not have the constitutional or statutory right to strike.
Is the right to strike guaranteed under International Conventions?
Yes, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides that the signatories have to ensure that the right to strike is guaranteed in conformity with the domestic laws of the country. India, being a signatory to the convention, is bound by it. Furthermore, the International Labour Organisation has recognised the right to strike and thereby, India, being a signatory to the same, is obligated to ensure that the right is granted as a legal right.
References
- https://primelegal.in/2023/01/12/right-to-strike-is-not-a-fundamental-right/#:~:text=The%20case%20of%20Kameshwar%20Prasad,of%20demonstration%20by%20government%20servants%20%3A
- https://updates.manupatra.com/roundup/contentsummary.aspx?iid=3174
- https://www.jstor.org/stable/43950718
- https://www.lawfinderlive.com/Articles-1/Article2.htm?AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1
- https://www.mcrhrdi.gov.in/91fc/coursematerial/pcci/Part3.pdf
- https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1664452
- https://nliulawreview.nliu.ac.in/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Volume-II-Issue-I-170-196.pdf
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