Home General State of Rajasthan vs. G. Chawla (1959)

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State of Rajasthan vs. G. Chawla (1959)

July 17, 2024

This article is written by Arkadyuti Sarkar. This article encompasses the concept of the doctrine of pith and substance, the facts of the case, issues raised, arguments by the parties, legal concepts and judgements that were involved, and the judgement with its rationale.

Introduction

India is a federation with a unitary bias. To clarify, the Indian Constitution recognises the legislative authority of the State Legislatures, however, with a significant tilt towards the law-making power of the Parliament. For this reason, many experts have regarded India as a unitary state with federal features. In the words of renowned constitutional expert Durgadas Basu, India is a “quasi-federal” State. Thus, with such a complex power division between the Union and the States, conflict is bound to arise.

This is where the doctrine of pith and substance is applied by the Supreme Court of India, as it holds the apex jurisdiction to deal with and resolve disputes between a state and the union. This case of State of Rajasthan vs. G. Chawla (1954) serves as a landmark decision where the Supreme Court applied the doctrine in a dispute concerning the legislative authority of a state-enacted statutory provision with that of a union-enacted statute.

Facts of the case

The Ajmer Legislative Assembly is empowered to legislate under the authority of Section 21 of the Government of Part C States Act, 1951, concerning any matters enumerated in the State or the Concurrent List enacted by the Ajmer (Sound Amplifiers Control) Act, 1952 and it received the Presidential assent on 9th March 1953 (later substituted by the Rajasthan Noise Control Act, 1963). In this case, the respondents were prosecuted under Section 3 of the Ajmer (Sound Amplifiers Control) Act, 1952 for breaching the conditions of the permit granting the use of sound amplifiers within the state on 15th and 16th May, 1954. The conditions were:

The speakers were tuned to have audibility beyond 30 yards;
The speakers’ placement is to be at a minimum height of 6 feet.

The case was successfully challenged by the Respondents as, upon referring to Section 432 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Judicial Commissioner held that the Ajmer (Sound Amplifiers Control) Act, 1952, was within Entry No. 31 of the Union List rather than the ambit of Entry No. 6 of the State List, which was claimed by the State of Ajmer and is, therefore, ultra vires of the State Legislature. The State of Ajmer, however, appealed against the order, and the Judicial Commissioner certified it to be fit for appeal as per the provisions of Article 132 of the Indian Constitution.

Issues raised in the case

The issue that was to be considered in this case was whether the Ajmer (Sound Amplifiers Control) Act, 1952, was ultra vires of the State Legislature as the Judicial Commissioner had held since it fell within the ambit of Entry No. 31 of the Union List rather than the ambit of the State List’s Entry No. 6.

Arguments of the parties

Appellants

The Appellants herein, i.e., the State of Ajmer (substituted by the State of Rajasthan after the reorganisation of the B States), appealed against the decision of the Judicial Commissioner, arguing that the Ajmer (Sound Amplifiers Control) Act, 1952, is not ultra vires as has been held by the Judicial Commissioner and is rather intra vires.

Respondent

The Respondents argued that the Judicial Commissioner of the State of Ajmer had rightfully held the Ajmer (Sound Amplifiers Control) Act, 1952, to be ultra vires.

Laws/concepts involved in State of Rajasthan vs. G. Chawla (1959)

The following laws and concepts came before the Supreme Court for consideration while hearing this case.

Article 132 of the Indian Constitution

The provisions of Article 132 of the Indian Constitution provides as follows:

Any decree, final order, or judgment of a High Court arising from any criminal or other proceeding can lie before the Supreme Court, provided the High Court certifies the same under Article 134A as containing substantial questions of law concerning constitutional interpretation.
If the certificate is provided, then any of the parties to the case concerned may appeal to the Supreme Court if a wrongful decision has been made by the High Court.

Concerning this Article, “final order” includes an order deciding an issue, which, if decided in the Appellant’s favour, would be sufficient for the final disposal of the case.

Section 3 of the Sound Amplifiers Control Act, 1952 (Ajmer 3 of 1953)

The Act has been substituted for the Rajasthan Noise Control Act, 1963, following the reorganisation of States.

Section 3 of the Act contains provisions as to the declaration and prohibition of nocturnal noise. According to this Section, in the area to which this Section may be applicable under Section 4(1), the District Magistrate or any other State Government empowered officer in this behalf may, by serving notice in a prescribed or other manner, declare any noises produced during such night hours as may be mentioned in the notice, whether vocally or by a sound amplifier or otherwise, which in his opinion is likely to cause annoyance or serious inconvenience to the public, to be nocturnal noise. The nocturnal noise shall be prohibited by notice served by the District Magistrate or any other officer designated by the State Government.

Section 3 of Government of Part C States Act, 1951 (49 of 1951)

This Section contains provisions concerning the constitution and composition of legislative assemblies.

A Legislative Assembly to exist in every state.
The seat allocation in legislative assemblies like Bhopal, Ajmer, Delhi, Coorg, Vindhya Pradesh, and Himachal Pradesh shall be in accordance with the 3rd Schedule.
In such legislative assemblies, there shall be the number of specified seats in the second column, opposite to that State to be filled by direct election, and of those seats –

The number mentioned in the 3rd column shall be the number reserved for the Scheduled Castes, and
The number mentioned in the 4th column shall be reserved for the Scheduled Tribes.

The composition of the State Legislative Assembly of any State, if unspecified in the 1st column of the 3rd Schedule, shall be specified through Presidential order.
The Coorg Legislative Council shall cease its operation and be considered to be dissolved from the date of formation of the Legislative Assembly of Coorg under the provisions of this part.

Article 246 of the Constitution of India, Sch. VII, List 1, Entry 31, List II, Entries 1, 6

Article 246, Schedule VII, List 1 of the Indian Constitution contains the Union List, i.e., the areas where the Union Parliament has the sole authority to legislate. List II contains the areas and subject matters where the state legislative assemblies hold the sole legislative authority.

List I, Entry 31

Posts and telegraphs; telephones, wireless, broadcasting and other similar forms of communication.

List II, Entry 1 and 6

Entry 1: Public order (excluding the use of any air force, navy, military, or other armed force of the Union or any other force subject to controlling the Union or any contingent or unit in aiding the civil power).

Entry 6: Public health and sanitation; hospital and dispensaries.

Doctrine of Pith and Substance

Before discussing the case in detail, it is necessary for us to conceptualise the doctrine of pith and substance properly. This doctrine is one of the oldest that is used for dealing with constitutional issues in India. The origin of this doctrine is traceable in the case of Cushing vs. Dupuy (1880) in Canada. The Canadian Constitution provides for the distribution of legislative powers between the Dominion and the Provinces with two separate lists for the two. Section 91 and Section 92 of the Canadian Constitution provide for the National and Provincial list concerning the area of distribution of legislative powers between the Dominion and the Provinces in Canada. The framers of the Indian Constitution, inspired by this system of legislative power distribution, adopted the same. Thus, this feature was incorporated into Article 246 of the Indian Constitution by its framers.

If a literal interpretation of the doctrine is performed, pith refers to the true essence of something, while its inherent substance serves as an essential component. Thus, the literal interpretation of the entire doctrine means that the most important part of something has its true essence.

According to this doctrine, where a law in reality and substance lies within the ambit of an item wherein the enacting legislature has legislative competency, then such law shall not be invalid simply for incidental touching of a matter that is outside the legislative ambit of its enacting legislature. Simply put, if there is a minimal transgression by a legislature while legislating an enactment or provision, then according to this doctrine, such transgression shall not render such a provision or enactment invalid. Now, determining the extent of such transgressions shall be a question of law and the Supreme Court of India has the sole authority to decide the same.

This being said, let us now delve deeper into the case before us.

Relevant judgments referred to in State of Rajasthan vs. G. Chawla (1959)

The Supreme Court referred to the following judgments, and the relevant excerpts are provided below.

Queen vs. Burah (1877)

Referring to the dictum by Lord Selborne in Queen vs. Burah (1877), the Supreme Court opined that the legislatures in India possess absolute legislative powers. This is the case even after the legislative powers are divided, subject to the legislative supremacy confined to the topics mentioned as Entries in the Lists that vest the power upon them. The entries, as has been decided on multiple occasions, although supposed to be mutually exclusive, are not always due to their occasional overlapping and are to be considered enume-ratio simplex of wide categories.

Subramaniyam Chettiar vs. Muthuswamy Goundan (1940)

Referring to this case, the Supreme Court observed that where such enumerated legislative powers exist in an organic instrument, and a conflict arises between rival lists, it necessitates to examine the impugned legislation in its pith and substance, and only such pith and substance lying within an Entry or Entries conferring legislative power is valid while a minimal transgression into the rival list is acceptable. The Supreme Court further quoted Gweyer. C as follows: “It must inevitably happen from time to time that legislation, though purporting to deal with a subject in one list, also touches on a subject in another list, and the different provisions of the enactment may be so closely intertwined that blind adherence to a strictly verbal interpretation would result in a large number of statutes being declared invalid because the legislature enacting them may appear to have legislated in a forbidden sphere. Hence the rule which has been evolved by the Judicial Committee whereby the impugned statute is examined to ascertain its ‘pith and substance’, or its ‘true nature and character’, for the purpose of determining whether it is legislation with respect to matters in this list or in that.” The Court further observed that the Judicial Committee of the Supreme Court had approved and applied the abovementioned dictum in cases on multiple occasions.

Judgement in State of Rajasthan vs. G. Chawla (1959)

The Supreme Court opined that the Judicial Commissioner’s order cannot be upheld and needs to be set aside. Thus, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, reversed the Commissioner’s original decision, and further declared that the Ajmer (Sound Amplifiers Control) Act, 1952, was intra vires, i.e., within the authority of the State Legislature. Moreover, the Supreme Court decided not to order a retrial of the case as it was four years old, further recording the State’s decision of not to prosecute the Respondents.

Rationale behind this judgement

The Court, after considering the involved legal provisions and various judgments, observed that the pith and substance of the Ajmer (Sound Amplifiers Control) Act, 1952, was controlling the use of amplifiers for interests concerning public health and peace by the State and hence it lied within the legislative powers conferred upon the State by Entry No. 6 and conceivable Entry No. 1 of the State List, and not within Entry No. 31 of the Union List although the amplifier is a piece of equipment for broadcasting or communication, the use of which is controlled and regulated, is indeed intra vires. The Court, while arriving at its decision, also noted the lapse by the Judicial Commissioner in consulting Entry No. 1 while arriving at the earlier decision to consider the Ajmer (Sound Amplifiers Control) Act, 1952 as ultra vires.

Analysis of the case

Since Indian Constitution makers, inspired by the doctrine of pith and substance of the Canadian Constitution, decided to adopt and incorporate it into the Indian Constitution, they paved the way for conflicts between the Union and the States. This is where the Supreme Court has always played a crucial role. This case and numerous other cases in the future have always clarified one thing, and that is the necessity of clearly understanding the intention of the legislature while reading a statute. A mere interpretation shall never reveal the pith and substance of an enactment, and thus, the necessity to delve deeper is a necessity. Had the Apex Court remained complacent with the fact that sound amplifiers were a part of the Union List, they would have never ventured into the legislative intent of the State of Ajmer behind enacting the Ajmer (Sound Amplifiers Control) Act, 1952 and would have upheld the decision of the Learned Judicial Commissioner instead of setting it aside.

Conclusion

The above case serves as a landmark decision concerning the doctrine of pith and substance. The Indian Constitution provides for power division among the Union Parliament and the legislative assemblies of the State. Due to such segregation, although unwanted, occasional overlapping and resultant conflict does arise, and thus, the Supreme Court has to perform statutory interpretation. This case clearly shows that the essence of the legislative enactments has to be considered by applying the doctrine and going beyond mere simple interpretation of the subjects in the Entries in the Lists of the Union, State, and Concurrent Lists of the Indian Constitution.