This article is written by Meenakshi Kalra. It attempts to analyse the landmark judgement of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust vs. Union of India (2014). The case deals with the constitutionality of Article 15(5) and Article 21A, which were inserted by the Eighty- Sixth Constitutional Amendment Act, 2002 and the Ninety- Third Constitutional Amendment Act, 2005, respectively, along with the constitutional validity of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009.

Table of Contents

Introduction 

India is home to many diverse cultures, religions, languages, castes and communities. It prides itself on being one of the most diverse countries in the world and promotes the concept of unity in diversity. There are various classes and castes existing in India, however, not all of these communities were given the same opportunities. The Constitution of India contains specific provisions for communities like Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Other Backward Classes that have historically faced inequality, especially in social and educational aspects for their upliftment.

To counter the curtailment of rights that these classes have faced, reservation policies in various sectors, such as education and government jobs, were introduced. This was done with the motive of uplifting people belonging to these classes. The case of Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust vs. Union of India (2014) 8 SCC 1 arises out of a conflict of rights that happened due to the petitioners claiming that Article 15(5) and Article 21A were against their rights stated in Article 19(1)(g).

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Background of the case

The case of Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust vs. Union of India (2014) arises out of a reference that was made to the Supreme Court by a three-judge bench through an order dated September 6, 2010 in the case of Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan vs. Union of India & Anr. (2012).

The said order challenged the validity of:

This case also plays a vital role in defining the ambit of the right to education under Article 21A and tries to plug the lacunas left behind in various other judgements, like the cases of T.M.A. Pai Foundation & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. (2002) and P.A. Inamdar & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2005). By doing this, an attempt is made to clarify the obligations and rights of private, unaided educational institutions in India.

Details of the case

Title of the case

Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust vs. Union of India

Date of judgement

6 May, 2014

Parties

Petitioner

Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust and Others.

Respondents

Union of India And Others.

Equivalent citation

AIR 2014 SUPREME COURT 2114

Type of case

Civil Original Jurisdiction

Court

Supreme Court of India

Bench

R.M. Lodha, C.J.I., A.K. Patnaik, S.J. Mukhopadhaya, Dipak Misra and F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, JJ. 

Author of the Judgement

A. K. Patnaik

Facts of Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust vs. Union of India (2014)

  1. In the case of Ashoka Kumar Thakur vs. Union of India (2008), the constitutional validity of Article 15(5) was challenged before the court, where the said clause was held to be valid and in conformity with the basic structure doctrine of the Constitution. The Court also stated that special provisions made by the State to secure admissions made under Article 15(5) in State-maintained institutions and aided educational institutions were valid and did not go against the basic structure.
  2. However, in the above case, the court did not answer the question regarding the validity of Article 15(5) in reference to “private unaided” educational institutions as they were not in attendance at the Court. The private, unaided educational institutions then filed numerous writ petitions before the Court regarding the validity of Article 15(5) and conformity with the basic structure doctrine with regards to whether they would fall into the scope of the same.
  3. Further, a three judge bench in the case of Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan vs. Union of India (2012) referred the case to a five judge bench through an order dated September 6, 2010 to debate the validity of Article 21A and Article 15(5), which were inserted in the Constitution by Eighty- Sixth Constitutional Amendment Act, 2002 and Ninety- Third Constitutional Amendment Act, 2005, respectively. 
  4. The Hon’ble Court, in its judgement, stated that the provision made for free and compulsory education for all children of the age of 6 to 14 years under Article 21A would not apply to unaided minority schools. 
  5. Further, two judges out of the three judge bench in the above case held the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, which is also known as the Right to Education Act (RTE Act) in 2009, to be constitutionally valid but did not comment on whether or not Article 15(5) or Article 21A are constitutionally valid and in conformity with the basic structure of the Constitution.
  6. Thus, this case arises from the reference to the order delivered by the three judge bench in the above case to decide upon the validity of Articles 15(5) and 21A.

Issues raised in Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust vs. Union of India (2014)

  1. Whether Article 15(5) of the Constitution of India is constitutionally valid and in conformity with the basic structure of the Constitution?
  2. Whether Article 21A of the Constitution of India is constitutionally valid and in conformity with the basic structure of the Constitution?

Arguments of the parties

Contentions made by the Petitioners regarding validity of Article 15(5) of the Constitution

Arguments made in Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust vs. Union of India (2014) 

The counsel for the petitioners in Writ Petition (C) No. 416 of 2012 was Mr. Mukul Rohtagi. He argued that, according to the eleven judge bench in the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. (2002), it has been held that Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution guarantees the right to carry on any occupation. This right also includes the right to run and manage a private, unaided educational institution.

Articles 14, 19, and  21 represent the golden triangle, which assures the people of this country of their rights and securities guaranteed by the Preamble of the Constitution by strengthening their fundamental rights in an egalitarian society by protecting the citizens’ right to liberty, equality and dignity. This was also held in the case of Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. (1980). Section 4 of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976,  cannot be amended by Parliament. Amending the same would be against the basic structure of the Constitution and would thus curtail the rights of individuals enshrined in Articles 14 and 19. If this is done, it will make any such amendment void. Further, in the case of I.R. Coelho (Dead) by LRs. vs. State of Tamil Nadu (2007), which also relied on the Minerva Mills case, it was held that Articles 14, 19 and 21 are the bedrock of the Constitution and they are not to be curtailed in any circumstances.

These Articles are collectively known as the golden triangle, as together they provide individual rights and liberties to citizens, which form the foundation of the Constitution. They promote the rule of law and equality and provide protection from any encroachment on citizens’ rights. Simply put, the golden triangle refers to the interdependence and mutual reinforcement of fundamental rights vested in these Articles.

Article 19(1)(g) is part of the basic structure of the Constitution and by inserting Article 15(5), the basic structure of the Constitution is being damaged. Article 15(5) states that the State shall have the ability to make special laws with regards to the development of the socially and educationally backward classes, Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes with respect to securing admissions in educational institutions. This shall also include private educational institutions, and nothing contained in Article 19(1)(g) shall interfere with the State’s ability to make any such provision.

The fundamental rights guaranteed by the golden triangle are vital and any legislation curtailing these rights will be subject to judicial review. Additionally, the Court also stated that even though the Parliament has the power to amend the Constitution, under any circumstances, even with a majority, it cannot amend and exclude Part III from the basic structure of the Constitution. Such an amendment, if made, has to be in conformity with the basic structure as provided within Articles 14, 19, and 21. It was clarified that after the basic structure doctrine was developed in the case of Kesavananda Bharati vs. State of Kerala (1973), laws made by Parliament are not protected from judicial review. This would remain the case even if the above-mentioned fundamental rights do not form part of the basic structure of the Constitution. 

Therefore, provisions made for reservation in unaided institutions in the case of Ashoka Kumar Thakur vs. Union of India (2008) under the Ninety-third Constitutional Amendment Act (2005) of the Constitution are contrary to the right contained in Article 19(1)(g), making them ultra vires of the Constitution.

Arguments made in Forum For Promotion Of Quality Education for All vs. Union of India (2014)

The arguments under this petition were presented by Mr. R.F. Nariman, who stated that Article 15(5) of the Constitution violates Article 14 as it breeds inequalities among different classes of citizens. 

According to the petitioners, there was a lack of clarity with regards to the differences between aided and unaided educational institutions. Both types of institutions were placed on equal footing in terms of providing admission benefits to socially and educationally backward classes of citizens. Aided institutes refer to the institutes that are funded by the government and are often subject to government regulations when it comes to their management. Unaided institutes, on the other hand, do not receive any funds from the government and are run on the private funds of the entities running the institute. These institutes have greater autonomy to determine their management process.

The T.M.A. Pai Foundation case clearly states the difference between private, unaided institutions and government-aided institutions. The two types of institutions cannot be dealt with in the same manner and it would be unfair to put them on the same level as there is a stark difference between the funding process, the admission process and the degree of autonomy that can be practised by the institutes. Further, the Court stated that if the State forces private, unaided educational institutions to admit students based on its criteria and interferes with their admission process under Article 15(5), it would infringe the rights of the institutes under Article 19(1)(g).

Additionally, the petitioners submitted that Article 15(5) puts an obligation on the private educational institutions to reserve some of their seats for individuals selected by the State which cannot be said to be a reasonable restriction or a regulatory provision under Article 19(1)(g) as stated in Article 19(6). As per the case of P.A. Inamdar & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2005), the petitioners stated that private educational institutions have full autonomy in choosing their admission process as they do not utilise State funds. Private educational institutions cannot be forced to follow reservation policy and they should be allowed to choose a process that is fair, transparent and based on merit. If the reservation policy is imposed on private educational institutions and unaided private educational institutions, then the quality of education imparted by these institutes will fall drastically. This is because the reserved seats would not be filled on the basis of merit but rather on the basis of class. This makes Article 15(5) violative of the rights contained in 19(1)(g).

Another case cited by the petitioners was Mohini Jain (Miss) vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. (1992) wherein it was held that the right to life is made up of many important rights, one of which is the right to education. These rights assure that an individual leads a dignified and honourable life and without protecting these rights, a dignified life cannot be guaranteed. It is the fundamental duty of citizens to try and achieve excellence in all areas to help the nation progress, as stated under Article 51A(j). To achieve excellence, the educational institutes have to maintain excellent standards and by implementing special provisions made by the State, the quality of the education imparted will be hampered. Therefore, special provisions made under Article 15(5) for socially and educationally backward classes, Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes by the State that interfere with the admission process of private educational institutions will not only be contrary to Article 21 but also to Article 51A(j). 

Mr. Nariman also stated that to achieve the Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP) stated under Part IV of the Constitution, in no way should the fundamental rights stated under Part III be violated. While the amendment under Article 15(5) aims to fulfil the DPSPs, it is in breach of the fundamental rights of individuals. The same has also been reiterated in the Minerva Mills case, which also states that both Part III and Part IV of the Constitution should work in consonance and anything that disturbs the balance between the two will automatically blemish and impair the basic structure of the Constitution. Thus, Article 15(5) is against the rights contained in the golden triangle and therefore cannot be said to be within the Parliament’s amending power.

Arguments made in Federation of Public Schools vs. Union of India (2013)

The arguments under this petition were presented by Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, who stated that according to the judgement of M. Nagaraj and Others vs. Union of India and Others (2006), there are ‘identity test’ and ‘width test’ that are used to determine whether or not a constitutional amendment is disruptive to the basic structure of the Constitution. The Court must determine and see whether the essence of a fundamental right as interpreted by the judiciary is intact and free of disruption by the width of its power when a constitutional amendment is introduced. If such an amendment is disrupting the identity of the right, then it can be said that it is also disrupting the basic structure of the Constitution.

The scope of the right under Article 19(1)(g) as per the T.M.A. Pai Foundation case for a private educational institution essentially includes: 

  1. charity, 
  2. autonomy, 
  3. voluntariness, 
  4. non-sharing of seats between the state governments and the private institutions, 
  5. co-optation and 
  6. reasonableness 

Under Article 15(5),  the State gets a wide power to make special provisions for securing admission in private educational institutions for persons belonging to socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes. By doing this, the identity of the fundamental right provided under Article 19(1)(g) would be compromised. Further, if the State is given such a wide ambit of powers, the basic structure of the Constitution is bound to be destroyed.

Arguments made in Vidyavardhaka Sangha (Regd.) vs. Union Of India (2014)

Mr. Anil B. Divan highlighted that courts are under the obligation to always be vigilant and attentive in making sure that the rights of citizens are always protected from any infringement whatsoever. This was first held in the case of Edward A. Boyd and George H. Boyd vs. United States (1886). Further, the case of Dwarkadas Shrinivas vs. The Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd. and Others (1953) reiterated the opinion of the Court in the Edward A. Boyd and George H. Boyd case. He also stated that while analysing the validity of Article 15(5), the Court must also pay attention to the observations made in the above cases.

Additionally, he argued that the political influence of large groups can lead to favouritism and division between classes and the need to protect the liberty and freedom of individuals is even more important when the government’s objectives are beneficent. It was further argued that Article 15(5) Amendment has been brought by political parties to increase their vote bank and to satisfy one section of society. This is because it gives preferential treatment to socially and educationally backward classes, scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. It  is the Court’s job to make sure that the fundamental rights of private educational institutions stated under Article 19(1)(g) are protected, as also reiterated by the T.M.A. Pai Foundation case.

In the case of The Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society and Another vs. State of Gujarat and Another (1974), it was stated that the purpose of giving rights to minorities under Article 30 was to reduce the disparity between the minority and the majority. But Article 15(5) only applies to non-minority private educational institutions and not to minority educational institutions, as stated under Article 30(1). Excluding minority educational institutions from the scope of Article 15(5) is irrational and gives them an undue advantage and benefit, therefore infringing on the right to equality under Article 14. By excluding minority educational institutions, special rights are being given to the minorities, which will give them an added advantage and an upper hand, which is not the purpose of this right. It is important to make sure that there is equality in how the majority and minority institutions are treated. It has to be made sure that all laws are applied to them uniformly and that minority institutions are permitted to do the same things as non-minority institutions. Secularism is an important part of the Constitution as it forms an essential element of the right to equality, which is the most important theme in the Constitution. This was held in the case of Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui and Others vs. Union of India and Others (1994). The minority institutes, as referred to in Article 30(1), being excluded from the ambit of Article 15(5), makes the Article not only against Article 14 but also against secularism. 

Contentions made by the petitioners regarding validity of Article 21A of the Constitution

The petitioners contended that the addition of Article 21A through the Eighty-Sixth Constitutional Amendment Act, 2002, alters the basic structure of the Constitution and therefore this amendment is not constitutionally valid.

Under Article 21A, the State shall make provisions to provide free and compulsory education to all children who are between the ages of 6 and 14. This Article contains the right to education and along with the introduction of this right, the Parliament also introduced the RTE Act, 2009, which makes provision for free and compulsory education for all children of the age of 6 to 14 years. 

The validity of the RTE Act was questioned in the case of Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan vs. Union of India & Anr. (2012) and held valid. But Sections 12(1)(c) and 18(3) of the RTE Act were held to be in contravention of the fundamental rights given under Article 30(1) to unaided minority schools. Therefore, it was held that the provisions of the RTE Act shall not include unaided minority schools under its scope. Though, in minority opinion, delivered by Hon’ble Justice Radhakrishnan, he stated that the obligations under the RTE Act were placed upon the State for free and compulsory education to children of the age of 6 to 14 years and not on the unaided non-minority and unaided minority schools. The RTE Act of 2009 was amended in 2012 following the decision in Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan vs. Union of India (2012). The said amendment added Section 1(4) to the RTE Act, 2009, wherein it was provided that, keeping in mind the provisions laid down for minority rights in Articles 29 and 30, the RTE Act shall apply to give children the right to free and compulsory education. 

Arguments made in Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust vs. Union of India (2012)

The petitioners argued that there is no obligation on the private, unaided educational institution under Article 21A, the only obligation lies on the State and its different agencies as stated under Article 12. The petitioners believe that the minority opinion given in the case of Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan vs. Union of India & Anr is actually the correct analysis of Article 21A. Further, if private, unaided educational institutions are included within the scope of Article 21A, then it would be against the basic structure of the Constitution as it would violate the right to establish and administer private educational institutions given under Article 19(1)(g).

Arguments made in Manjit Singh Sachdeva vs. Union Of India (2014)

In the case of P.D. Shamdasani vs. The Central Bank of India Ltd. (1951), the Court held that freedoms stated under Article 19 can only be protected against State action. The Court noted that the language and structure of the Article and its placement of Article 19 in Part III of the Constitution indicate that the freedoms and property rights it guarantees cannot be enforced against individuals.  In another case, Smt. Vidya Verma vs. Dr. Shiv Narain Verma (1955), the Court clarified that the right to personal liberty given under Article 21 can only be enforced against the State and not private individuals. According to these two cases, “State” under Article 21A would not include private, unaided educational institutions or private individuals.

Therefore, according to the above mentioned cases, Article 21A should be interpreted in the way the State has been defined under Article 12, which shall include the Indian Government, Parliament of India (which shall consist of both Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha), state governments, state legislatures (which shall include legislative assembly and legislative council of the state), along with all local authorities (such as Municipalities, Panchayats, District boards, etc.) and other authorities (such as the  National Human Rights Commission, Lokpal and Lokayuktas, National Commission for Women, etc.).

It is the State that is required to make efforts to provide “for” free and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age of 14 within 10 years from the date of commencement of the Constitution under Article 45. From the way Article 45 is framed, it can be understood that only the State alone is liable and obligated to provide free and compulsory education to all children up to the age of 14. After the Eighty- Sixth Constitutional Amendment Act, 2002, Article 21A was inserted to replace Article 45. Under Article 21A, the word “for” was removed but just because of the omission of the word “for,” the obligation for free and compulsory education for children cannot be put on private, unaided educational institutions. As per the decision of the T.M.A. Pai Foundation case, if the State is given the power to make provisions for fulfilling its obligations regarding providing free and compulsory education to those below the age of 14 years under Article 21A and allowing it to pass on its obligations to the private unaided schools, then it would make Article 21A violative of the rights of private unaided schools given under Article 19(1)(g).

Further, the objects and reasons of the RTE Bill state that the RTE Act is made to be in consonance with Article 21A. No mention of Article 15(5) has been made in the Bill hence, the validity of the RTE Act can only be tested in accordance with Article 21A and not Article 15(5). The petitioners maintain that Section 12(1(c) of the RTE Act, which states that a private unaided school shall make provisions to admit at least 25% of its Class I students with children belonging to the weaker and backward sections of society, is violative of their right under Article 19(1)(g). To support their argument, the judgements of the T.M.A. Pai Foundation and P.A. Inamdar have also been highlighted by them. Thus, according to the petitioners, the decision given by the three-judge bench in the case of Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan vs. Union of India & Anr. (2012)  is incorrect.

Arguments made in Muslim Minority School Management Association vs. Union Of India (2013) and Vidyavardhaka Sangha (Regd.) vs. Union Of India (2014)

The petitioners, Muslim Minority Schools Managers’ Association represented by Mr. Ajmal Khan in Writ Petition (C) No. 1081 of 2013 and La Martineire Schools represented by Mr. T.R. Andhyarujina in Writ Petition (C) No. 60 of 2014, highlighted several cases, ranging from Kerala Educational Bill case to the T.M.A. Pai case, supporting their argument regarding the violation of their rights if admission of children other than those belonging to the minority group that has established the minority institute, whether aided or unaided, is forced upon them by the State. The State is not permitted to violate the rights under Article 30(1) given to minorities on the basis of their religion or language. Their rights under Article 30(1) include the right to establish and administer educational institutions, thus, the State is not to infringe on the rights of minorities by making a law for the free and compulsory education of all children from the age of 6 to 14 years. 

Based on the above submissions, the petitioners claim that Section 1(4) of the RTE Act should be declared as ultra vires. 

Contentions made by the respondent regarding validity of Article 15(5) of the Constitution

The respondents were represented by Mr. Mohan Parasaran, the learned Solicitor General. He stated that the rights of private educational institutions under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution were not being infringed by reserving a few seats in private educational institutions, aided or unaided, for weaker, poorer and backward sections of society under Article 15(5). The same has been held under the judgement of the T.M.A. Pai Foundation case. He further stated that Article 15(5) is only an enabling provision as it gives the State power to make special laws for the development of socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. It is done by reserving seats for their admission in educational institutions, including private educational institutions, as held in the case of Ashoka Kumar Thakur vs. Union of India (2008).

He further stated that according to the judgement of Islamic Academy of Education & Anr. vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. (2003), which came after the T.M.A. Pai Foundation case, few seats in non-minority professional colleges were to be reserved for poorer and backward sections of society. But in the P.A. Inamdar case, the bench held that the judgement delivered in the T.M.A. Pai Foundation case in no way was to be interpreted in a manner to mean that the State was allowed to have a say in the process of admissions in unaided professional educational institutions, nor to force them to reserve seats for candidates selected by the State or enforce the reservation policy made by the State. As a result, the Ninety-Third Amendment Act, 2005, was introduced by the Parliament to incorporate Article 15(5) in the Constitution. This allowed the State to make special laws for the admission of socially and educationally backward classes, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in all educational institutions, including private institutes, irrespective of whether they are aided or unaided by the State. According to the respondents, the rights of  private educational institutions under Article 19(1)(g) have not been violated. They claim that Article 15(5) is in consonance with the right to establish and administer private educational institutions and the judgement delivered in the T.M.A. Pai Foundation case.

Article 15(5) excludes minority institutions as described under Article 30 from its scope and gives them a special status. As per the case of Ashoka Kumar Thakur vs. Union of India (2008), such exclusion is not violative of Article 14 because minority educational institutions come under different classes having different rights under the Constitution, hence, it cannot be said that Article 15(5) is in contravention of Article 14.

Contentions made by the respondent regarding validity of Article 21A of the Constitution

The respondent was represented by the learned Additional Solicitor General, Mr. K.V. Vishwanathan. According to the submissions made by him in the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill, which later became the Constitution (Eighty-Sixth Amendment) Act, 2002, the purpose of inserting 21A was to ensure that the State is able to provide free and compulsory education to all children of age 6 to 14 years. This was done to address the insufficiency of Article 45 to achieve the goal of providing free and compulsory education for children up to the age of 14 years, even after 50 years of adoption of the Constitution.

It was further submitted that the RTE Act, 2009, has been constituted to make sure that the purpose of Article 21A is achieved, i.e., that the State shall provide free and compulsory education for children up to the age of 14 years. Moreover, provisions have been made under Section 12(1)(c) of the RTE Act to help secure admission of children from weak and backward sections of society in Class I of the private unaided schools, wherein at least 25% of the seats shall be reserved for this purpose.

It is contended that the private, unaided schools are carrying out a function that is similar to that of State’s and thus they should not have any objections. By applying the functional test to the private, unaided schools, it can be said they are to be considered a State under Article 12. Therefore, the argument made by the petitioners that the State cannot pass on its responsibility of providing free and compulsory education to private educational institutes is moot.

According to the T.M.A. Pai Foundation case, while private, unaided educational institutes have a right to choose their students, they should not step back from admitting a few students from weaker sections of society either through freeships or scholarships. The Court also stated that a small share of seats should be reserved for the poor and weaker sections of society. For this purpose, the RTE Act of 2009 was enacted, under which Section 12(1)(c) provides that even an unaided private school shall reserve at least 25% of its seats in Class I for children from poor and weak backgrounds, therefore, the RTE Act is not beyond the powers of Article 19(1)(g).

In the case of Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan vs. Union of India (2012), it was held that the RTE Act will not cover unaided minority schools under its scope but will include aided minority schools. Mr. Vishwanathan submitted that minority institutions have equal status under Article 30(1), consequently, the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education (Amendment) Act, 2012 was brought in to rectify the loophole in the 2009 Act, wherein under Section 1(4) it was stated that the provisions of the Act shall apply in a manner so as to promote the rights of children to free and compulsory education but such provisions shall be subject to Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution, which provide rights of minorities. 

Provisions and Statutes Involved

Article 15(5) of the Constitution of India, 1950

Article 15 provides protection to citizens from discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. This Article is important because it addresses untouchability and tries to solve the problem of caste discrimination by providing  reservations to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Other Backward Classes.

Article 15(5) was added to the Constitution of India through the Ninety-third Constitutional Amendment Act in 2005. It states that nothing contained in Article 15 and Article 19(1)(g) shall have any effect on the State’s power to make special laws for the development of  educationally backward citizens, along with Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The State can make laws for both private and public, aided and unaided institutes. The minority institutes have been excluded from the ambit of Article 15(5) to protect their rights under Article 30(1).

Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, 1950

Article 19(1) of the Constitution of India provides 6 freedoms to all citizens of India. These freedoms are not absolute in nature and are regulated by reasonable restrictions that can be placed by the State.

Article 19(1)(g) guarantees the right to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business to all citizens of India. They can carry out any economic activity of their choice but this right is subject to certain limitations that have been laid down in Article 19(6).

Article 21A of the Constitution of India, 1950

Article 21A was added to the Constitution by the Eighty-Sixth Constitutional Amendment Act in 2002. The Article provides that every child between the ages of 6 to 14 shall have the right to free and compulsory education.

The insertion of this Article affirmed that education is a fundamental right protected under Part III of the Constitution. 

Under this Article, the State can also fulfil its goal of providing free and compulsory education for children, which has been stated under Article 45.

Consequently, after the introduction of this Article, the Parliament also enacted the Right to Education Act of 2009, which aims at the development and streamlining of the educational system in India.

Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, 1950

Article 30(1) provides protection for the rights of minorities who are residing in the country. The Article promotes the concepts of secularism and equality among diverse groups that are part of India.

Under this Article, minorities have a right to set up educational institutes and have full autonomy over them. These institutes can be set up by linguistic or religious minorities, this is done so that they can safeguard their traditions and cultures. These rights are only given to minorities and not other citizens under Article 30.

These rights are not absolute and some restrictions can be imposed on them but the imposition of such regulations should not be in such a way that it violates the rights of minorities.

Judgement of Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust vs. Union of India (2014)

Opinion of the Court on Article 15(5)

The Court is of the opinion that the purpose of Article 15(5) is to make sure that fair and equal treatment is given to socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in terms of opportunities provided by the State to study in all educational institutions other than minority educational institutions as defined under Article 30(1).

The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill of the Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act, 2005, which includes Article 15(5), states that the seats for socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are very restricted and there is an increasing need to make sure that such reservations of seats in institutes offering higher education, including professional education, are expanded.

Under the DPSP stated under Article 46, it is the duty of the State to make sure that weaker sections of society are given particular attention when it comes to protecting their educational and economic rights. To ensure this, there is a need to give them equal opportunities and encourage their educational development by reserving seats for admission in unaided educational institutions other than minority educational institutions, as described in Article 30(1). For this purpose, Article 15(5) has been introduced.

Under Article 15(1), the State is prohibited from discriminating against an individual on the basis of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. Further, Article 15(2) states that no citizen shall be restricted from entering shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment or be stopped from using wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or established for the use of the general public on the basis of their religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. 

Despite the existence of this Article, which ensures equal treatment and access for all by the state, some communities, like Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, have remained marginalised and backward and have not been given equal opportunities for their advancement. Article 15(5) has been added to address the loopholes that exist in Article 15 and to make sure that the disparity that exists between classes when it comes to securing admissions in educational institutions is dealt with. Thus, it can be said that Article 15(5) is an enabling provision and cannot be treated as a proviso or an exception under Article 15, as clauses 1 and 2 of the same also make provisions for securing equal opportunities as guaranteed by the Preamble and help in making it a reality.

The Court relies on the judgement of State of Kerala & Anr. vs. N.M. Thomas & Ors. (1976), which states that Article 15(5) and 16(4) share the same opening words and Article 16(4) is not treated as a proviso or an exception. Both of these provisions are aimed at providing equal opportunities to the backward classes. Further, in the case of Indra Sawhney & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. (1992), after the N.M. Thomas case, it was held that Article 16(4) is an enabling provision aimed at ensuring that equal opportunities are given to backward citizens to secure public employment and should not be treated as an exception to Article 16(1). These cases were also cited in the Ashoka Kumar Thakur case by Hon’ble Chief Justice K.G. Balakrishnan to uphold the fact that Article 15(5) is not an exception but rather an enabling provision.

On the contention that Article 15(5) is violative of Article 19(1)(g), the Court referred to the T.M.A. Pai Foundation case. It stated that overseeing and setting up an educational institution is considered an “occupation” under Article 19(1)(g). In this case, for the first time, Hon’ble Chief Justice Kripal, while talking about the four elements of rights stated under Articles 19 and 26(a) regarding unaided non-minority educational institutions, stated that education is considered an activity that is inherently charitable.

Further, the Court, while quoting the T.M.A. Pai Foundation case, also stated that it is of the opinion that while private educational institutions have a right to choose the students being admitted, admitting a small number of students who are a part of weaker and backward sections of society will in no way affect the institute’s independence in the admission process. If students from educationally and socially backward classes of citizens, as well as Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, are admitted to private educational institutions, it would simply amount to the element of charity, which is also a part of the right to establish and administer private educational institutions given under Article 19(1)(g), hence, it can be said that the “identity” of the right given under Article 19(1)(g) is not being curtailed.

In the P.A. Inamdar case, the Court stated that under the judgement in the T.M.A. Pai Foundation, the State does not have the power under 19(6) to force the unaided educational institutions into giving the State a share of their seats so that it could implement the reservation policy. This was held because the attempt made by the State to reserve seats in the unaided educational institutions was not a regulatory measure and hence it was not a reasonable restriction as defined under Article 19(6). 

The Court is of the view that since there is no other way that a restriction could be provided for the right stated under Article 19(1)(g) apart from Article 19(6), the Parliament had to come up with the Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act, 2005, to counter this situation. Article 15(5) of the Constitution added after the said amendment states that nothing contained in Article 19(1)(g) shall obstruct the State from creating any special new laws for admission in educational institutions, including private educational institutions, whether aided or unaided by the State aimed at the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes. This makes Article 15(5) distinct from the regulatory power given in Article 19(6) and empowers it with a new kind of power that authorises the State to implement the charitable aspect of the private educational institution. It is now upon the Court to decide whether this power given under Article 15(5) harms the right given under Article 19(1)(g).

Further, on the contention raised by Dr. Dhavan stating that the right of a private educational institution under Article 19(1)(g) contains a voluntary element as was held in the T.M.A. Pai Foundation case, the Court is of the opinion that, as per the judgements of the P.A. Inamdar case and the T.M.A. Pai Foundation case, while there is a voluntary element involved in the admission process of unaided private institutions, such institutes should strive to voluntarily consent to share seats with the State or employ the State’s common entrance test for selection instead of just relying on merit based system for admissions. 

The T.M.A. Pai Foundation case further states that these institutes should also make provisions to provide scholarships to students belonging to the poor and backward classes. These institutes have the freedom to conduct their own affairs in their own way, including the voluntary element to make decisions, but these freedoms provided under Article 19(1)(g) are also regulated by reasonable restrictions under Articles 19(2) and 19(6). This has been reiterated in the case of both the T.M.A. Pai Foundation and P.A. Inamdar. Therefore, nominating students for admission would count as an unreasonable restriction under Article 19(6), as was held by the above two judgements. To counter this, Article 15(5) was introduced by the Parliament by exercising its power of amendment under Article 368. It cannot be said that the said provision has affected the voluntary element present in the right given under Article 19(1)(g) in a drastic manner. Hence, the Court is of the opinion that the identity of the said right given to the unaided private institutes under Article 19(1)(g) has not been affected as severely as it has been portrayed by the petitioners by the addition of Article 15(5).

Further, the Court examined the contention of whether the Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act, 2005, is in consonance with the width test. The Court stated that the power given to the State under Article 15(5) can only be implemented for the purpose of making laws to help the backward classes, scheduled classes and tribes in terms of educational development, but if the law is made for any other class, then it will be beyond the scope of Article 15(5). The law must only be for admission in aided and unaided institutions and not for any other purpose, if it is made for any other purpose or affects the autonomy of education institutes, which is outside the scope of what has been stated in the T.M.A. Pai Foundation case, then such a law would be outside the scope of the power of State under Article 15(5). 

Thus, it can be said that the power provided to the State under the Article is quite limited and is only to be used for guidance in terms of making laws for the advancement of backward classes. If the power is used for any other purpose, then it is upon the Court to examine whether the provision made under Article 15(5) is limited to securing admissions in educational institutes. If the power has not been used for that specific purpose, then it will be declared beyond the scope of rights contained in Article 19(1)(g). In the present scenario, since Article 15(5) is for the specific purpose of securing admissions, it cannot be said to be in contravention of Article 19(1)(g) and hence satisfies the width test as well.

The Court also clarified the argument raised by the petitioners regarding the distinction between aided and unaided educational institutions. The difference between the two is that a private aided educational institution receives help from the State regarding its functioning and funds, whereas an unaided institute receives no help whatsoever from the State. Therefore, when a law is made under Article 15(5), it must be examined because the private, unaided educational institutions will need to be compensated for the provisions made by them to accommodate the backward classes, as they are not aided by the State in any way. Therefore, a law made under Article 15(5) that treats both types of educational institutions in an identical fashion is not unsusceptible to challenge under Article 14. Article 15(5) only mentions that nothing stated in Article 15 or 19(1)(g) will prohibit the State from making any special law for backward classes to help them secure admission in educational institutions, including private educational institutions, both aided or unaided by the State. Hence, it cannot be said that Article 15 is in contravention of Article 14 because it treats private educational institutions, both aided and unaided, in the same manner.

With regards to the argument that excluding aided and unaided minority institutes from the scope of Article 15(5) is violative of Article 14, the Court reiterated the judgement delivered in the T.M.A. Pai Foundation case. It stated that when it comes to admissions to an aided or unaided minority institution, Articles 29(2), 30(1) and 30(2) are to be taken into account. It has to be made sure that the minority character of the institutes is not destroyed by giving admission to students other than those belonging to the minority community that has set up the institution. 

Making provisions under Article 15(5) to reserve seats for those who are not a part of the minority community that has set up the institution conflicts with the rights of minority educational institutions. For this reason, minority institutes have been excluded from the ambit of Article 15(5). The minority institutes constitute a distinct class with distinct rights and are given protection under Article 30, as has been stated in the Ashok Kumar Thakur case, thus, such exclusion cannot be held to be against Article 14.

It was pointed out that the Court was not of the opinion that Article 15(5) is violative of secularism just because religious minority institutions stated under Article 30(1) are excluded from its ambit. In the  Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui case, the Court held that secularism is a principle that has been embraced by the people of the country. Secularism has been deciphered by the people through its existence in the Preamble of the Constitution, along with Articles 15 to 28. 

Secularism is regarded as an important part of the basic structure of the Constitution but in no way is the basic structure affected by excluding religious minority institutions under Article 15(5). The spirit of secularism lies in the acknowledgement and protection of this difference that exists in the country; this has also been held in the T.M.A. Pai Foundation case. Hence, the contention that Article 30(1) affects secularism in a negative manner is wrong, rather, it protects the secular element of India.

The Hon’ble Court was not convinced by this argument because prestigious educational institutions such as Kendriya Vidyalayas, Indian Institute of Technology, All India Institute of Medical Sciences and Government Medical Colleges all provide reservations of seats during admission for students belonging to backward classes, Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Classes, and still they are able to give outstanding results and quality students who go on to become leading individuals in every field they choose to go into. Thus, it cannot be said that excellence will be threatened by giving backward classes admission in private educational institutions. Moreover, to make sure that the goals of fraternity, unity and integrity stated in the Preamble are met, it is important that the backward classes of citizens are given opportunities for their advancement in society. The contention that Article 15(5) is violative of Article 21 is groundless and unfounded.

To conclude, the Court is of the opinion that Article 15(5) does not violate any of the rights stated under Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution. Hence, the Ninety-Third Amendment was therefore held to be valid and the decision of the Court in Ashoka Kumar Thakur vs. Union of India (2008) regarding the enforcement of reservation policy on unaided institutions being against the rights stated in Article 19(1)(g) is held to be incorrect.

Opinion of the Court on Article 21A and 2009 Act

The Court is of the opinion that, from the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Constitution (Eighty- Third  Amendment) Bill, 1997, Article 21A was inserted under Part III of the Constitution by the Eighty- Sixth Constitutional Amendment Act, 2002, to achieve the goals stated under Article 45. 

The contentions made by Mr. Rohatgi and Mr. Nariman regarding the obligation to provide free and compulsory education under Article 21A being in the State and not in the unaided educational institutions are correct. The term ‘State’ in Article 21A specifically refers to the “State” which can enact laws. Article 21A states that it is the State that should ascertain the procedure by which it will fulfil its duty to provide free and compulsory education. This gives the State a new power to ensure the fulfilment of Article 21A.  However, according to the case of Venkataramana Devaru vs. State of Mysore (1957), Article 21A must be interpreted in harmony with Article 19(1)(g) and Article 30(1) of the Constitution. The Court stated that there is nothing stated under Article 21A that may lead to a conflict with the rights given under Article 19(1)(g) or Article 30(1) but there is a chance that the law made under Article 21A might lead to a conflict, so the State has to make sure that the provisions made under the same to provide free and compulsory education to the children must also be in consonance with Articles 19(1)(g) and 30(1).

The Court reiterated that admitting a small share of students belonging to the poor and weaker sections of society will not be in conflict with what was held in the T.M.A. Pai Foundation and with the rights stated under Articles 19(1)(g) and is thus allowed. Later, it was clarified in the P.A. Inamdar case that the State cannot force the private, unaided educational institutions to admit students belonging to the poor and weaker sections of society as the power given to the State under Article 19(6) is only regulatory in nature and it cannot force such admissions. The element of voluntariness given under Article 19(1) is another thing that needs to be considered while making laws. 

The Eighty- Sixth Constitutional Amendment Act, 2002, gives the State a new power under Article 21A, under which it can decide the procedure that will be used to fulfil the purpose of providing free and compulsory education and achieve the goal laid down in Article 45 as a DPSP. This new power given to the State is distinct from the power given to the State under Article 19(6) and it impacts the element of voluntariness given under Article 19(1)(g).

The State under Article 21A, can now force the private, unaided schools to admit students from poorer and weaker sections of society by exercising the power vested in it under Article 21A. The power can only be exercised in cases where the law being made is for the admission of students aged 6 to 14 years and they belong to the poor, weak and backward sections of society. A small share of seats is to be reserved for them, as it will help in attaining the goals related to equality of opportunity and social justice, which have also been stated in the Preamble. Thus, a law made by the State under Article 21A for the purposes outlined above will not be contradictory to the rights of the private, unaided educational institutions given under Article 19(1)(g).

By enacting the RTE Act, 2009, the Parliament was determined to achieve the goals relating to equality, social justice, democracy and creating a society that is fair and charitable. These goals can only be achieved through education for all, including the poor and weaker sections of society. All institutes, whether aided or unaided, have the responsibility to impart education free of charge and equally to all sections of society.

Upon examining Section 12(1)(c) read with Section 2(n)(iv) of the RTE Act, an unaided school, even if it is not receiving any funds from the State, is required to admit at least 25% of the total students in Class I from weak and poor sections of society for the purpose of providing free and compulsory education. Section 12(2) of the RTE Act states that the school shall be reimbursed by the State for the expenses incurred by it by giving admission to such children or the actual amount charged to the child, whichever is less. Therefore, it is ultimately the State that is funding the education of these children belonging to the weak and poor sections of society, which makes the Act and its provisions harmonious with the rights provided to private, unaided institutes under Article 19(1)(g), as stated by the  T.M.A. Pai Foundation case. Hence, Article 21A does not violate the rights of non-minority private schools given under Article 19(1)(g) and helps in achieving the goals set by the Constitution relating to equality of opportunity and providing free and compulsory education to children of weaker sections and disadvantaged groups.

All religious and linguistic minorities have a right to set up and manage educational institutions of their choice under Article 30(1). No power given to the State can curtail this right and the State has no power to make any provisions that lead to the forceful admission of students that belong to the non-minority group in such institutions, as this would be against their minority character. In the Kesavananda Bharati case, the court held that the rights of  minorities have to always be protected and any amending power of the Parliament cannot be used to curtail their rights. Thus, the State cannot make any laws under Article 21A that will lead to violations of the rights of minorities relating to the setting up of institutes.

Section 12(1)(b), read with Section 2(n)(iii), states that a school receiving aid from the State is obligated to provide free and compulsory education to a proportion of students that matches the proportion of aid received to its annual expenses, minimum of 25% of the funds are to be reserved for this purpose. This also applies to aided minority schools, they are required to make provisions for the admission of children who may not belong to the minority group that established the school and provide them with free and compulsory elementary education.

Additionally, Section 12(1)(c), read with Section 2(n)(iv), instructs that unaided schools should also admit students belonging to weak and poor sections of society. A legal obligation has been placed upon them to reserve 25% seats in Class I, this also includes unaided minority schools, which also have an obligation to reserve 25% seats for such students regardless of whether they belong to the minority group that established the school.

In the present case, the Court is of the view that if minority institutions, whether aided or unaided, are forced to admit students, the minority character of such institutions will be destroyed and it will be in violation of minority rights stated under Article 30(1). Therefore, the provisions of the RTE Act of 2009 that are applicable to minority schools are invalid and unconstitutional. Consequently, the part of the majority judgement in Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan vs. Union of India & Anr. (2012) that states that the aided minority schools fall within the ambit of the 2009 Act that is applicable is also incorrect.

The Court declared that the Ninety-Third Constitutional Amendment Act, 2005, which inserted Article 15(5) and the Eighty- Sixth Constitutional Amendment Act, 2002, which inserted Article 21A, are in consonance with the basic structure of the Constitution and do not interfere with the same.

The RTE Act, 2009, does not violate Article 19(1)(g). However, the provisions that impact the rights of minorities in establishing and managing minority institutions, both aided and unaided, violate the minority rights stated under Article 30(1) of the Constitution. Therefore, the Court allowed Writ Petition (C) No. 1081 of 2013 filed on behalf of the Muslim Minority Schools Managers’ Association and Writ Petition (C) Nos. 416 of 2012, 152 of 2013, 60 of 2014, 95 of 2014, 106 of 2014, 128 of 2014, 144 of 2014, 145 of 2014, 160 of 2014 and 136 of 2014 which were filed by non-minority private unaided educational institutions, to be dismissed. All interim applications were also disposed of. Each party was instructed to bear their own costs.

Rationale behind the judgement

The rationale behind the decision in this case was to make sure that all individuals, irrespective of what class they belonged to, were given fair and equal treatment in terms of providing them opportunities for securing a proper education. This was done so that the goals stated under Directive Principles of State Policy under Article 45 regarding promotion of the educational and economic interests of weaker sections of society could be achieved.

According to the Court, Article 15(5) is an enabling provision and should not be read as an exception or a proviso to Article 15. It has been enacted to address and solve the problem of disparity that exists between classes by giving all citizens, including Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and socially and educationally backward classes, equal opportunities to secure admission in all educational institutes except minority institutes that are protected under Article 30(1).

The Court also cleared any contentions raised by the petitioners related to Article 15(5) being against secularism and in infringement of Article 19(1)(g). The reasoning behind this was that excluding minority institutes from the ambit of Article 15(5) protects the rights given to them under Article 30(1), which actually helps in promoting secularism and protecting diversity. Further, no rights of private educational institutions stated under Article 19(1)(g) are being infringed. The rights given to them also include a charitable element and reserving a small portion of seats for weaker sections of society will not have any effect on the voluntary element that has been stated in the right given to them to establish and manage institutes.

Also, the RTE Act contains provisions like Section 12(2), which states that private schools shall be reimbursed for the expenses they might incur when they admit students from weaker sections. This will not only help in the fruition of the goal of free and compulsory education but also protect the rights of unaided private schools under Article 19(1)(g).

The Court noted that it is the State’s responsibility to provide free and compulsory education, but to achieve this purpose, the private unaided schools must also lend a hand and share the responsibility with the State. To fulfil this goal of providing free and compulsory education to children aged 6 to 14 years, Article 21A was enacted in hopes of attaining the long pending objective stated in Article 45.

Precedents referred

Ashoka Kumar Thakur vs. Union of India & Ors. (2008)

This case revolved around Article 15(5) of the Constitution of India, 1950, wherein many petitions were filed challenging the reservation policy stated under the Ninety-Third Constitutional Amendment Act, 2005, along with the Central Educational Institutions Act, 2006. These petitions are merged together and brought before the Supreme Court of India. The petitioners claimed that the basic structure of the Constitution was being violated by Article 15(5) and the Ninety-Third Constitutional Amendment Act, 2005. The Court held both the reservation policy and the Ninety-Third Constitutional Amendment Act, 2005, constitutionally valid and stated that these provisions were important to promote equality among classes.

Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui and Others vs. Union of India and Others (1994)

This is an important case when it comes to the recognition of the concept of secularism in India. The Court herein stated that secularism is one of the most important elements that exist in the Indian Constitution. According to the Court, secularism is actually a part of the right to equality and it forms a central theme of the Constitution and hence, it should be protected and preserved. Articles 15 to 28, along with the Preamble, highlight the importance of secularism and how it has been adopted by the people of India as an integral part of their being.

Dwarkadas Shrinivas vs. The Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd. and Others (1953)

The case revolved around the validity of Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. (Emergency Provisions) Ordinance II of 1950 and Act XXVIII of 1950. The defendant claimed that the said Act and Ordinance were in violation of his fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. The case reached the Supreme Court, wherein it was held that the Act and Ordinance were indeed violative of the said fundamental rights. It was also stated that it is the Court’s duty to make sure that the rights and freedoms of the citizens are protected from cloaked invasions of their rights. This was also noted by Hon’ble Justice Bradley in the case of Edward A. Boyd and George H. Boyd vs. United States.

Edward A. Boyd and George H. Boyd vs. United States (1886)

This case was decided by the United States Supreme Court, in which important principles dealing with constitutional liberty and security were discussed. It is a landmark decision when it comes to the right to privacy. In this case, the issue revolved around the relationship shared by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The Boyds were presented with an order for compulsory production of records, they stated that a compulsory production of records would be violative of their rights under the Fourth Amendment and Fifth Amendment, which provides protection from unreasonable searches and seizures and freedom from compulsory self-incrimination, respectively. The Court ruled in favour of Boyds and Hon’ble Justice Bradley stated that it is upon the Court to protect individuals from curtailment of their rights and it should always be on the lookout for sneaky attacks on the freedoms and rights of individuals.

His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru vs. State of Kerala & Anr. (1973)

This case is popularly known as the Fundamental Rights Case. It is one of the most important cases delivered by the Indian judiciary. In this case, the Kerala land reforms were challenged and the case was decided by a 13 judge bench. The most significant development arising out of this case was the Basic Structure Doctrine, which states that no amendment being brought to the Constitution shall affect the basic structure of the Constitution, if an amendment does,  it will be labelled unconstitutional. It also overruled the case of Golak Nath vs. State of Punjab (1967).

I.R. Coelho (Dead) by LRs. vs. State of T.N. (2007)

This case is also known as the 9th Schedule Case and was decided by a 9 judge bench. This case upheld the superiority of the basic structure of the Constitution and stated that if an amendment is in contravention of the basic structure of the Constitution and fundamental rights, then it can be overruled, thus extending the scope of judicial review and strengthening the power of the judiciary.

Indra Sawhney & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. (1992)

This case is one of the landmarks that have shaped the reservation policy in India. The issue revolved around the implementation of suggestions made by the Mandal Commission, which suggested that 27% of seats should be reserved for OBCs in central government jobs. This case removed economic grounds as the sole criteria for reservation and stated that creamy layers are to be excluded.

Islamic Academy of Education & Anr. vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. (2003)

This case highlights the rights of minorities to set up educational institutions under Article 30. This Article gives them total control over the administration and creation of such institutes. Further, it protects the cultural and educational differences of different communities that exist in India. The Court ruled in favour of the Islamic Academy of Education protecting its rights under Article 30 as it was a minority institute.

M. Nagaraj and Others vs. Union of India and Others (2006)

In this case, the Court examined Article 16(4), which talks about equality in employment opportunities in the public sector. This Article was challenged on the basis that it is against the basic structure of the Constitution and that it curtails the right to equality by reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The Court held that the amendments brought to Article 16(4) were valid but reasonable steps must be taken in order to prevent the misuse of the reservation policy. 

Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. (1980)

This is a landmark case that has helped in the evolution of the basic structure doctrine. In this case, the Court held that the Parliament does not have unlimited power to amend the Constitution; rather, it has been limited by the Constitution. The Parliament only has the power to amend the Constitution by keeping the basic structure intact and making sure that, in the process of amendment, the basic structure does not get destroyed.

Mohini Jain (Miss) vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. (1992)

This case revolved around the issue of an extra fee called the capitation fee charged by private educational institutes for providing admission. The Court held that the right to education, which has not explicitly been stated under fundamental rights, still forms an important element of Article 21. Hence, the Court clarified that the right to education has to be treated as a fundamental right and the practice of charging a capitation fee was in violation of this right guaranteed by the Constitution. 

P.A. Inamdar & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2005)

This is one of the landmark cases when it comes to the rights of minorities to set up educational institutes. This case has helped make significant strides to safeguard the autonomy of minority institutions and make sure that all citizens are given equal educational opportunities. In this case, the Supreme Court stated that minority educational institutions have full autonomy to make decisions regarding admission of students to such institutes. The State’s reservation policy has no impact on the admission process selected by minority educational institutions.

P.D. Shamdasani vs. The Central Bank of India Ltd. (1951)

In this case, the Court stated that the placement of Article 19 in Part III of the Constitution and the language and construction suggest that the Article’s aim is to protect the freedoms stated under it from the actions of the State. Any violation of the rights of property by other individuals will not fall within the scope of Article 19.

Smt. Vidya Verma vs. Dr. Shiv Narain Verma (1955)

One of the most important observations made by the Court in this case was that the right to personal liberty, which forms a fundamental right under Article 21, can only be enforced against the State and not against private individuals if it is violated.

Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan vs. Union of India & Anr. (2012)

In this case, the validity of the RTE Act, 2009, was challenged by stating that the Act was against Article 14 and Article 19(1)(g) because it violated the rights of private educational institutions by implementing reservation policies for them. The Court held that the RTE Act was valid and it further stated that unaided private schools are not under the obligation to follow the reservation policy if the State does not make provisions to reimburse them for the admission of students from weak sections of society. 

State of Kerala & Anr. vs. N.M. Thomas & Ors. (1975)

In this case, the Court clarified the position of reservation policies in the employment sector. The Court held that the State has the power to make provisions for reservations to ensure equality among the different classes that exist in the country. Conflict arose when a rule was passed by the government of Kerala regarding the selection of people for subordinate services. These rules were challenged on the grounds of being unconstitutional and against Article 16. The Court held that the Rules were valid and that Article 16(4) was not to be treated as an exception to Article 16(1) but rather as complementary provisions that should be read simultaneously.

T.M.A. Pai Foundation & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. (2002)

This is a very significant case that was decided by an 11 judge bench in 2002. This decision paved the way for important guidelines related to the administration of private institutions. Minority rights under Article 30 were also in this case, which gives them the authority and power to set up educational institutions. The Court held that private educational institutions have full autonomy to set up and control their institutes in the way they want under Article 19(1)(g).

The Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society and Another vs. State of Gujarat and Another (1974)

This case’s decision aimed to protect the rights of the distinct linguistic and cultural minorities that exist in India under Article 30. The Court held that the minorities have full rights to establish and manage the educational institution of their choice under Article 30 but it should be read in the same way as Article 29, as this would be unconstitutional. The Court also held that Article 30 tries to make sure that there is equality between minorities and the majority but it does not mean that minorities have been given some extra rights or are privileged under the Constitution. 

Venkataramana Devaru vs. State of Mysore (1957)

In this case, the Court held that, if there is a conflict between two provisions of the law, they should be read in a harmonious manner using the rule of harmonious construction. This would ensure that the conflict is resolved in a way that does not hamper the rights of any individual. Harmonious construction aims at providing the interpretation in such a way that it is possible to enforce both provisions rather than having to discard one.

Critical analysis

The case at hand majorily discussed the addition of Articles 15(5) and 21A and whether or not this addition is constitutionally valid. The contentions made by the petitioners primarily state that these two Articles violate the golden triangle, i.e., Articles 14, 19, and 21. But the Court was not satisfied enough and it ruled in favour of the respondents stating that no Articles were being violated with the inclusion of Articles 15(5) and 21A.

Article 15(5) is in violation of Article 19(1)(g)

Many scholars believe that the Court was erroneous while delivering the judgement by stating that the inclusion of Article 15(5) is not contrary to the rights of the private unaided institutes under Article 19(1)(g). The petitioners backed their arguments with strong precedents to prove that their rights were being violated but the Court merely stated that reserving a few seats in their institutes would not harm their rights under Article 19(1)(g). It is a settled position that private, unaided institutions have full autonomy to set up and administer their institutes the way they want without any State interference. The judgement given by the Court goes against this settled principle by forcing reservations in private, unaided institutions.

Article 21A and the ambiguity in its scope

The petitioners contended that fundamental rights can only be enforced against the State and not private entities, hence, the obligation lies upon the State and not on the private, unaided institutions to fulfil the goal of achieving free and fair education.

This contention was acknowledged by the Court but it also stated that while the obligation under Article 21A lies with the State, it can also implement the provisions made under Article 21A on private, unaided institutions to fulfil its goals and duties. This situation creates a gap because if the State imposes its policies on private, unaided institutions, it could violate their constitutional rights and autonomy. This would lead to a complex and problematic scenario.

Minority institutes are excluded from the scope of RTE Act, 2009

The Court stated that the reservation policy of the State shall not apply to minority institutes as it would curtail the rights given to the minority institutes under Article 30(1). This conclusion reached by the Court lacks proper reasoning and analysis, as on one hand, it seems the Court is trying to promote the amalgamation of the minority community and other communities. On the other hand, it is stating that admitting students from other communities into a minority institute will pose a threat to the minority community.

Interpretation of the Supreme Court on Articles 30(1) and 19(1)(g)

The terms “establish” and “administer” stated under Article 30(1) are to be read together in a unified manner.  This would mean that the minority institute has been established by a certain community and is also being administered by the members of the same community.

The same two terms have also been given in Article 19(1)(g) for private educational institutes. This would mean that the State shall practise minimum interference in any decision making or administrative process apart from making provisions for reservation of seats.

In the T.M.A. Pai and Inamdar cases, it was inferred by the Court that rights of minorities under Article 30(1) and rights of private institutes under Article 19(1)(g) are synonymous in terms of government interference. Hence, the reservation policy should also apply on minority institutes if it is being implemented on private institutes. If the minority institutes are not obligated to reserve seats under the reservation policy then the private institutes cannot be placed under the obligation to do so either.

But in the case of Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust vs. Union of India (2014), the Court did not grant the same rights to the private institutes thereby increasing the chance of curtailing the rights of private institutes.

Conclusion 

The case of Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust vs. Union of India (2014) is one of the most significant cases in terms of its impact on the  Indian education system and constitutional law. In this case, the Court addressed important issues dealing with the right to education and how much power the State has to interfere with the functioning and administration of private educational institutions. 

The case further tested the validity of Articles 15(5) and 21A, along with the RTE Act, 2009, holding all three of them constitutionally valid. The decision of the case tried to strike a balance between the power vested in the State to ensure free and compulsory education and the autonomy granted to private educational institutions under Article 19(1)(g) while also protecting the rights of minorities related to the setting up of institutes protected under Article 30(1).

The case further determined the scope of the RTE Act and whether it will apply to the  minority institutes, regarding which the Court stated that the provisions of the RTE Act shall not apply to the minority institutes.

The case not only provides clarity regarding the ambit of the RTE Act but also highlights the importance of protecting the diverse landscape that exists in India. The decision gives equal respect to minority and majority rights while also maintaining equilibrium between both public and private interests.

References

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