Last verified: April 2026

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When a poem becomes an FIR: and why quashing petitions exist

In the summer of 2024, a sitting member of the Rajya Sabha posted a poem on Instagram. Written in Hindi verse, the poem addressed themes of political protest and dissent. Within days, the Gujarat Police registered an FIR under multiple sections of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, alleging promotion of communal enmity and incitement. No preliminary inquiry was conducted. No senior officer applied his mind to whether the poem, taken as a whole, actually disclosed any cognizable offence. The FIR was registered mechanically, and an investigation began.

This is exactly the situation where a quashing petition under Section 528 BNSS was the only remaining remedy.

The parliamentarian moved the Gujarat High Court, invoking its inherent jurisdiction. The High Court declined to interfere. It found that, at the nascent stage of investigation, it would be premature to quash. The matter was then taken to the Supreme Court of India as a criminal appeal, raising a question that courts across the country routinely face: when does criminal law become an instrument of harassment, and what is the High Court’s power to stop it?

The Supreme Court of India answered that question on March 28, 2025, in Imran Pratapgarhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 INSC 410. A bench of Justice Abhay Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan examined the FIR and the investigation and reached a sharp conclusion. The Gujarat Police had committed a “mechanical exercise,” registering the FIR without the preliminary inquiry required by Section 173(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 before registering FIRs for certain sensitive offences. The bench called the proceedings “a clear abuse of the process of law” that “virtually borders on perversity.” The FIR was quashed entirely, not because the poem was beyond criticism, but because the criminal process had been weaponised without any genuine legal basis.

What makes the case significant beyond its immediate facts is what it illustrates about everyday criminal litigation in India. FIRs are registered for commercial disputes between business partners. They are registered in matrimonial conflicts, in property quarrels between neighbours, and in political grievances between rivals. In many of these cases, the criminal justice process itself (the FIR, the police investigation, the chargesheet, the summoning order, the trial) becomes the punishment, long before any court pronounces guilt or innocence. The reputational damage, the travel restrictions, the anxiety of court appearances: an accused who eventually wins at trial will have still suffered years of that process.

Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), the direct successor to Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is the High Court’s instrument to intervene in that process. It preserves the court’s inherent jurisdiction to terminate criminal proceedings that constitute an abuse of the court’s process, or that cannot continue without causing injustice. The provision is short. The jurisprudence built around it spans more than six decades and runs to thousands of pages of judicial reasoning.

This guide explains what a quashing petition under Section 528 BNSS is, the grounds on which one can be filed, how the step-by-step procedure works, and what the most significant Supreme Court judgments, including a 2025 framework that every practitioner now needs to know, require of courts deciding these petitions.

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A quashing petition under Section 528 BNSS is a petition filed in a High Court invoking its inherent powers to terminate a criminal case (an FIR, chargesheet, or ongoing proceedings) that constitutes an abuse of the court’s process or cannot be allowed to continue without causing injustice. Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, effective July 1, 2024, directly succeeds Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

The sections below address each stage of this remedy: its statutory source, the transition from CrPC to BNSS, the grounds for quashing, the procedure for filing, and what happens after the petition is decided.

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Table of Contents

1. What is a quashing petition under section 528 BNSS?
2. What is section 528 BNSS? The inherent powers of the High Court
3. Section 482 CrPC vs section 528 BNSS: what changed and what stayed the same
4. Grounds for quashing an FIR under section 528 BNSS
5. The 2025 four-step test: how High Courts now evaluate quashing petitions
6. Grounds for quashing a chargesheet or charge after cognizance is taken
7. Article 226 vs section 528 BNSS: which remedy applies, and when?
8. How to file a quashing petition under section 528 BNSS: step-by-step
9. Interim stay of investigation: how it differs from final quashing
10. Compoundable and non-compoundable offences: when does compromise justify quashing?
11. Special scenarios: matrimonial, domestic violence, POCSO, economic offences, and property FIRs
12. What happens after the quashing petition is filed?
13. What happens if the quashing petition is rejected by the High Court?
14. The successive petition trap: why you cannot file a second quashing petition on the same grounds
15. The Allahabad 9-judge bench referral: the question that could change quashing law
16. Landmark cases on quashing petitions under section 528 BNSS and section 482 CrPC
17. Frequently asked questions about quashing petitions under section 528 BNSS
18. References
19. Legal disclaimer

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What is a quashing petition under section 528 BNSS?

A quashing petition is an application filed before a High Court requesting it to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to terminate criminal proceedings, at any stage before conviction, on the ground that those proceedings constitute an abuse of the court’s process, or that allowing them to continue would cause injustice that cannot be remedied in any other way.

“Inherent” is the operative word. The power does not derive from any single statutory grant. It exists because every superior court of record carries, by its very nature, the authority to prevent its own process from being used as an instrument of oppression. Section 528 BNSS does not create this power; it saves and preserves it.

Quashing is distinct from three other forms of criminal court intervention. It is not an acquittal: acquittal is a trial outcome on merits; quashing stops the proceedings before trial ever reaches that stage. It is not an appeal: appeals challenge wrong verdicts after a decision is rendered; quashing is a pre-trial remedy that operates independently of any finding on guilt. And it is not a revision: revision corrects errors of jurisdiction or procedure by a lower court; quashing is a discretionary exercise of inherent jurisdiction, not an error-correction mechanism.

Can a Sessions Court quash? No. The power is exclusive to High Courts. Sessions Courts have no inherent jurisdiction to quash FIRs or criminal proceedings; they can revise, they can discharge, but they cannot quash. And while the Supreme Court can quash proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or under its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142, it does not exercise that power under Section 528 BNSS, which is specifically a High Court provision.

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What is section 528 BNSS? The inherent powers of the High Court

Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 reads: “Nothing in this Sanhita shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Sanhita, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”

Three purposes flow from that text. First, the High Court can use inherent power to give effect to any order under the BNSS: a gap-filling function. Second, it can prevent abuse of the process of any court: the quashing function. Third, it can act “to otherwise secure the ends of justice”: the broadest, most discretionary purpose.

The provision is verbatim identical to Section 482 CrPC. As the Supreme Court held in Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Anr., (2017) 9 SCC 641, Section 482, and by extension Section 528, “saves” inherent powers but confers no new ones. The power existed before the statute. It will exist even without it.

For a deeper treatment of how inherent powers operate across different levels of Indian courts, see this guide on the inherent powers of Indian courts.

These inherent powers were judicially recognised in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866, decided in 1960, where the Supreme Court first catalogued the categories of cases in which High Courts could exercise this jurisdiction. That 1960 ruling is the origin point of the entire doctrine. What followed, Bhajan Lal, Gian Singh, Parbatbhai Ahir, Neeharika, built on that foundation over six decades.

On effective date: Section 528 BNSS governs all quashing petitions filed on or after July 1, 2024, when the BNSS came into force. The Sikkim High Court confirmed this in Deepam Pradhan and Ors. v. Krishna Kumari Bhandari and Ors. (Sikkim HC, June 2, 2025); the applicable law is determined by the petition’s filing date, not the date of the underlying FIR.

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Section 482 CrPC vs section 528 BNSS: what changed and what stayed the same

This is the most common confusion practitioners encounter when dealing with petitions filed after July 1, 2024. The table below resolves it.

The practical takeaway: if a client’s FIR was registered in 2022, under the old CrPC regime, but you are filing the quashing petition today in 2026, you cite Section 528 BNSS. Not Section 482 CrPC. The Sikkim High Court in Deepam Pradhan and Ors. v. Krishna Kumari Bhandari and Ors. made this explicit, and several High Court registries have begun returning petitions that cite only Section 482 CrPC for post-July 2024 filings.

And here is the most reassuring part of the transition: nothing changed in the law itself. Every judgment under the predecessor provision under Section 482 CrPC, Bhajan Lal (1992), Gian Singh (2012), Parbatbhai Ahir (2017), Neeharika (2021), is fully applicable under Section 528 BNSS, because the text is identical. A quashing petition filed in 2026 can and should cite all of those cases.

What’s worth flagging is the pending constitutional question around Section 528’s scope, the Allahabad High Court’s 9-judge bench referral (covered in detail in Section 15 below), which could add new dimensions to the doctrine in the near future.

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Grounds for quashing an FIR under section 528 BNSS

The Bhajan Lal seven categories: the foundational framework

Every quashing petition filed in India today begins with State of Haryana and Ors. v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Ors., 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335. In that 1992 ruling, the Supreme Court categorised the situations in which the inherent power to quash can be exercised. Thirty-plus years later, these categories remain the primary framework, unchallenged in substance, only supplemented.

The seven categories:

1. No cognizable offence disclosed: The allegations in the FIR, taken at face value and in their entirety, do not make out any cognizable offence, or do not constitute the offence named in the FIR. The court reads the FIR as the prosecution’s best case and asks: even if all of this is true, is there a crime here?
2. Absurd or improbable allegations: The allegations are so inherently improbable, so at odds with established facts, that no reasonable person could conclude they justify further proceedings. This is not about credibility assessment; that is for the trial court. It is about allegations that are self-evidently nonsensical.
3. Specific statutory redress available: A specific provision in the BNSS or another statute offers effective redress for the complainant’s grievance, making the criminal proceeding unnecessary and disproportionate.
4. Mala fide intent / vengeance: The criminal proceeding is manifestly motivated by personal animosity, is instituted with mala fide intent, and is designed to wreak vengeance on the accused rather than to vindicate any genuine legal right.
5. No basis for police investigation: The allegations, even if taken as stated, do not justify a police investigation under Section 173 of the BNSS (formerly Section 156(1) CrPC). They may describe a wrong, but not a cognizable one.
6. Express legal bar: There is a legal bar, a statutory prohibition, a limitation, a requirement of prior sanction, that prevents the institution of the criminal proceedings.
7. Oblique motive: The criminal proceeding is instituted with an ulterior or oblique purpose, to coerce, to extract a settlement, to damage a competitor, rather than to vindicate any genuine criminal grievance.

In practice, most quashing petitions invoke a combination of these categories, not just one. A petition that pleads only one Bhajan Lal category when multiple apply is leaving grounds on the table.

Modern additions to the grounds (2021–2026)

The Bhajan Lal framework has not been static. Courts have recognised specific additional grounds over the past several years.

The counterblast FIR doctrine. A “counterblast FIR” is an FIR filed by one party in retaliation after suffering an adverse court order in civil or matrimonial proceedings. Courts increasingly treat this as a separately named ground of abuse of process; not merely an instance of the Bhajan Lal categories, but a doctrine in its own right. The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Imran Pratapgarhi v. State of Gujarat reinforces the principle that FIRs filed as a strategic response to civil litigation, rather than out of genuine criminal grievance, warrant quashing. When advising a client who has just been hit with an FIR days after a civil court ruled against the complainant, plead the counterblast doctrine specifically.

Vague, delayed, and uncorroborated allegations. This is where the 2025 four-step test (see Section 5) operates. If the accused can bring positive material, not just point to weaknesses in the FIR, showing the allegations are self-evidently unsubstantiated, that material can ground a quashing petition independently.

Domestic violence proceedings. In V. Krishnamma & Ors. v. Garima Bais, SLP(Crl.) No. 9534 of 2025 (decided October 28, 2025), the Supreme Court confirmed that proceedings under Section 12(1) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, are now quashable under Section 528 BNSS at any stage. Prior High Court decisions, including the Madhya Pradesh High Court’s contrary view, are overruled. This opens a significant new avenue for practitioners representing respondents in DV proceedings.

Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (cruelty to a married woman), now reflected in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, is a non-compoundable offence. But it can be quashed by the High Court on settlement. Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and Anr., (2012) 10 SCC 303 and Narinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr., (2014) 6 SCC 466 are the primary authorities. The offence is private in nature; when the parties have genuinely resolved the dispute, the public interest in prosecution is minimal.

When courts will NOT quash: the hard limits

Three categories of FIRs are generally beyond the reach of Section 528 BNSS:

Serious public-interest crimes. Murder, rape, organised crime, large-scale terrorism: courts decline to quash these even when both parties reach a settlement. The offence affects society at large, and the state’s interest in prosecution cannot be waived by private settlement.

Economic offences affecting the public. Where the offence involves fraud against the banking system, securities manipulation, Ponzi schemes, or large-scale public money, the Supreme Court’s principles in Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat apply: the economic consequences for society foreclose quashing on settlement alone, however genuine the private compromise.

Disputed facts. The High Court does not conduct a mini-trial in quashing proceedings. If the question is whether the FIR’s version of events is true, whether the accused actually did what the FIR alleges, that is the trial court’s domain. A quashing petition must identify a legal ground, not merely argue that the prosecution’s case is weak.

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The 2025 four-step test: how High Courts now evaluate quashing petitions

Prior to September 2025, the Bhajan Lal framework addressed situations where the FIR itself was deficient on its face. But there was a gap: what happens when the accused comes to the High Court not just pointing to weaknesses in the FIR, but bringing affirmative material, documents, CCTV footage, digital records, that demonstrably disproves the allegations?

The Supreme Court addressed this gap in Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 3831 of 2025, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1947 (decided September 2, 2025). Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice Sandeep Mehta held that in such cases, High Courts must apply a four-step test:

1. Is the accused’s material indubitable? The evidence brought by the accused must be clear and credible; not mere assertion, not a disputed version, not conjecture. It must be material that stands on its own.
2. Does the material disprove the charges or dislodge their factual foundation? It is not enough that the material raises doubt. It must substantially undercut the very basis on which the FIR was registered.
3. Can the prosecution possibly refute this material at trial? If a prosecution answer to the accused’s evidence is plainly available, through witnesses, counter-documents, further investigation, the matter should go to trial. Quashing is appropriate only where the prosecution cannot plausibly rebut the material.
4. Would continuing the trial constitute a gross abuse of the process of court? Even if all three preceding questions are answered in the accused’s favour, the court must be satisfied that the continued prosecution is not merely weak but is an abuse of the judicial process itself.

Only when all four steps are answered affirmatively should a High Court quash on the basis of accused-side material.

Sajal Bose v. The State of West Bengal and Others, 2026 INSC 322 (decided April 6, 2026) illustrates this test in operation. CCTV footage from three cameras at the location of the alleged incident demonstrably showed that the accused were not present at the time stated in the FIR. The prosecution had no counter-evidence and offered no explanation for the discrepancy. The Supreme Court held that the four-step test was satisfied and ordered quashing.

The practical takeaway: digital evidence, CCTV footage, GPS location data, call detail records, timestamped financial transactions, is now a viable and effective tool for meeting the four-step test. Practitioners handling quashing petitions should build an evidentiary file in parallel with the criminal proceedings rather than waiting for the FIR’s weaknesses to expose themselves during trial.

This test operates alongside the Bhajan Lal categories, not as a replacement. It fills a specific gap for cases involving accused-side affirmative evidence.

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Grounds for quashing a chargesheet or charge after cognizance is taken

A common misconception: the Section 528 BNSS power applies only before a chargesheet is filed. That is incorrect. The High Court’s inherent jurisdiction survives the filing of a chargesheet and the Magistrate’s cognizance.

But the threshold shifts. Before a chargesheet is filed, the court asks: does the FIR, on its face, disclose a cognizable offence? After a chargesheet is filed and cognizance is taken, the question becomes: do the materials before the Magistrate, including the chargesheet, the investigation findings, and the documents annexed, disclose sufficient grounds for framing charges against the accused?

Three specific grounds justify post-cognizance quashing:

First, the chargesheet itself may disclose no offence; if the investigating officer’s own materials, when read honestly, do not make out a prima facie case, there is no basis for proceeding to trial.

Second, a legal bar may exist that was absent at the FIR stage: for example, a requirement of prior sanction from the competent authority, which has not been obtained. Proceedings without a required sanction are void and liable to be quashed.

Third, the proceedings may have become an abuse of process after cognizance. A post-cognizance compromise between the parties, or the discovery that the investigation was conducted mala fide, can ground a petition even at this later stage.

The phrase “post-cognizance” marks the moment when the Magistrate applies their mind to the chargesheet and formally takes cognizance of the offence; not merely when the chargesheet is filed. Section 528 BNSS remains fully available after that moment.

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Article 226 vs section 528 BNSS: which remedy applies, and when?

Here is the single most consequential procedural trap in post-BNSS quashing practice. Junior advocates miss this regularly, and the cost is a dismissed petition and a client whose procedural position is now worse than before.

The rule is straightforward, though its implications are not always appreciated. Article 226 of the Constitution gives every High Court writ jurisdiction: a broad power to issue writs, including writs of certiorari, that can be used to quash an FIR or chargesheet. This power is available at any stage. But the Supreme Court, in Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1948 (SLP(Crl.) No. 13424 of 2025, decided September 3, 2025), clarified the boundary: Article 226 is the appropriate vehicle for quashing before the Magistrate takes cognizance. Once the Magistrate takes cognizance, Article 226 is no longer the appropriate remedy. The sole remedy is Section 528 BNSS.

The following table summarises the position:

Stage	Remedy available
Pre-FIR / at FIR stage	Article 226 or Section 528 BNSS
Investigation stage (pre-cognizance)	Article 226 or Section 528 BNSS
Post-cognizance (after Magistrate takes cognizance)	Section 528 BNSS only
After chargesheet and cognizance both complete	Section 528 BNSS only

A petition filed under Article 226 after cognizance is taken will be dismissed on maintainability grounds. The counsel’s first task, at the moment of receiving instructions, is to confirm the stage of proceedings. Call the client’s previous lawyer, or check the case file: has the Magistrate issued a summoning order? Has the accused appeared before the court? If yes, cognizance has been taken. File under Section 528 BNSS.

The distinction matters also at the drafting stage. An Article 226 petition and a Section 528 BNSS petition have different cause titles, different grounds frameworks, and different jurisdictional statements. They are not interchangeable documents with a find-and-replace on the provision number.

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How to file a quashing petition under section 528 BNSS: step-by-step

The procedure varies in some respects across High Courts; cause titles, court fee schedules, and number of filing copies differ by jurisdiction. What follows is the common framework, applicable across most High Courts.

Step 1: Determine the correct High Court.
The quashing petition is filed in the High Court that has jurisdiction over the area where the FIR was registered. This is the High Court to which the Sessions Court in that territory is subordinate. An FIR registered at a police station in Lucknow falls within the Allahabad High Court’s jurisdiction; an FIR in Bangalore falls within the Karnataka High Court’s jurisdiction.

Step 2: Identify the stage of proceedings.
Confirm whether the Magistrate has taken cognizance (see Section 7 above). This determines whether Article 226 or Section 528 BNSS is the applicable provision and informs your drafting approach. If you are uncertain about the stage, confirm through the case records before filing.

Step 3: Gather the mandatory documents.
The petition must be supported by:

• Certified copy of the FIR (from the police station or the court record)
• Copy of the chargesheet (if filed)
• Copy of the complaint or complainant’s statement (where available)
• All court orders passed in proceedings below (Magistrate orders, Sessions Court orders)
• Settlement deed or compromise affidavit (where applicable)
• Affidavit of the petitioner verifying the facts in the petition
• Any material evidence relied on for quashing (digital evidence, documents, CCTV records, if invoking the four-step test)
• Vakalatnama or authority letter to counsel

Step 4: Draft the petition.
The petition must contain: (a) a cause title identifying all parties and the court below; (b) a jurisdictional statement explaining why this High Court has jurisdiction; (c) facts in chronological order, supported by the record; (d) the FIR text reproduced or annexed; (e) specific legal grounds for quashing: cite the applicable Bhajan Lal categories and the 2025 four-step test where relevant; (f) a prayer clause requesting quashing of the FIR or chargesheet and interim stay during pendency; (g) a list of dates and events; and (h) an indexed list of documents annexed.

This is where most practitioners make a strategic error; pleading only one ground when the facts disclose several. The Bhajan Lal categories are not mutually exclusive. Plead all applicable grounds.

Step 5: Pay the court fee.
Court fees for quashing petitions vary by High Court; typically a nominal fixed fee ranging from Rs. 200 to Rs. 2,000, depending on the court. Do not assume a figure: confirm the current fee schedule with the HC registry or the relevant High Court’s original side rules before filing. A mismatch in court fee results in the filing being returned.

Step 6: File the petition with the High Court registry.
Most High Courts now accept e-filing through their case management portals. Physical filing remains available at the registry. Confirm the number of copies required: typically three to five sets including annexures. Some High Courts require separate sets for the court, the respondents, and the registry.

Step 7: Obtain a listing date and serve notice.
Once listed, the court will issue notice to two respondents: the State (represented by the Additional Government Pleader or the Public Prosecutor) and the complainant. The complainant must be impleaded as a respondent; failure to do so is a common and frequently fatal filing error. Courts have dismissed petitions for non-joinder of the complainant.

Step 8: Apply for interim stay of investigation (if required).
If the investigation is ongoing and arrest is imminent, a prayer for interim stay of investigation should accompany the first hearing. The threshold for interim stay is high; see Section 9. But if the need is acute, the petition itself should be filed on an urgent basis and the stay prayer argued at the first opportunity.

How long does a quashing petition take?

In straightforward cases, where the FIR on its face discloses no offence and the State files no meaningful reply, the petition can be disposed of in two to four months. In contested cases where the complainant files a detailed counter-affidavit and the State opposes, expect six to twelve months. In complex multi-party or economic offence cases, eighteen months or more is realistic. These are estimates based on typical docket conditions; the pace varies significantly between High Courts and within different benches of the same court.

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Interim stay of investigation: how it differs from final quashing

These two forms of relief are often conflated, and conflating them leads to poor strategic decisions.

Final quashing terminates the proceedings permanently. The FIR ceases to exist; the investigation stops; if the accused is in custody solely on that case, they are released. It is the permanent remedy.

An interim stay of investigation is a temporary order directing the police not to proceed with the investigation while the quashing petition is pending. The FIR is not quashed; it remains registered. The stay simply halts the investigative process until the court decides the petition on merits.

The Supreme Court in M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. The State of Maharashtra and Others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315 imposed a high threshold for interim stays. Courts do not grant them routinely. The petitioner must demonstrate: (a) a strong prima facie case for quashing; not just a weak FIR, but one where quashing appears plainly warranted on the face of the record; (b) that the balance of convenience favours the stay; and (c) that without the stay, irreversible harm will occur: typically, imminent arrest for which no other protective remedy exists.

In practice, if you file a quashing petition primarily to obtain an interim stay and prevent arrest, without meeting those conditions, most High Courts will decline the stay; and the investigation continues regardless.

Here is the important distinction: if the primary concern is imminent arrest, the more targeted remedy is an application for anticipatory bail under Section 482 BNSS (which governs bail, not inherent quashing powers, a different provision entirely). The quashing petition is the permanent remedy; anticipatory bail is the protective shield while the permanent remedy is being pursued.

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Compoundable and non-compoundable offences: when does compromise justify quashing?

The starting point is Section 359 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (formerly Section 320 CrPC), which lists “compoundable offences”: offences that parties can formally compromise and compound before the court. For these, the path from compromise to quashing is relatively smooth: the parties file a joint application, the court is satisfied the compromise is genuine, and the proceedings end.

The harder question is what happens with offences that cannot be compounded under Section 359 BNSS: murder, rape, robbery, serious cheating, and similar serious offences. These are “non-compoundable.” Can a High Court still quash them on settlement?

The Supreme Court’s answer in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and Anr., (2012) 10 SCC 303 was: yes, but only through Section 528 BNSS’s inherent power, and only when three conditions are met. The offence must be essentially private in nature. No public interest must be served by continued prosecution. And the court must be satisfied the compromise is genuine; not coerced, not a pretext.

Narinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr., (2014) 6 SCC 466 added a category-based refinement. Matrimonial disputes, property quarrels, and similar private disputes are ordinarily amenable to quashing on compromise. Serious offences with a public dimension, large-scale fraud, violence against strangers, sexual offences with public interest implications, are not.

The distinction between compoundable and non-compoundable matters for procedure, not for the ultimate availability of quashing. A non-compoundable offence cannot be “compounded” under Section 359 BNSS; but it can still be quashed under Section 528 BNSS if the Gian Singh conditions are met. The High Court’s inherent power is the difference.

A compromise deed must accompany the quashing petition or a separate application. It should be a notarised affidavit or deed executed by both parties, annexing the terms of settlement. Courts will scrutinise the compromise for voluntariness, particularly in matrimonial cases.

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Special scenarios: matrimonial, domestic violence, POCSO, economic offences, and property FIRs

Matrimonial disputes: the most commonly quashed FIRs

Matrimonial FIRs, Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (cruelty), dowry prohibition offences, domestic violence complaints, are the single largest category of quashing petitions filed in India. And they are the most commonly successful.

Even where the offences are non-compoundable, High Courts routinely quash when the parties have genuinely settled. The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Mamidi Anil Kumar Reddy v. The State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr., 2024 INSC 101 is particularly instructive: where a civil dispute, including a matrimonial property dispute, has been given a criminal colour through strategic FIR registration, and the parties have settled the underlying civil grievance, continued prosecution serves no purpose. The criminal process in that context is a tool, not a genuine invocation of the penal law.

Domestic violence proceedings under Section 528 BNSS

Following V. Krishnamma & Ors. v. Garima Bais (SLP(Crl.) No. 9534 of 2025, decided October 28, 2025), the Supreme Court confirmed that petitions under Section 12(1) of the Domestic Violence Act are now quashable under Section 528 BNSS at any stage. Previously, there was genuine ambiguity; DV proceedings are civil-criminal hybrid proceedings, and some courts held that Section 528’s inherent power did not extend to them. That position is now overruled.

The practical implication is significant: the entire class of DV Act proceedings is now within Section 528 BNSS’s scope. Respondents in DV cases who have grounds for quashing, a genuine compromise, a proceeding that is manifestly malicious, a case that discloses no offence under the DV Act, can now approach the High Court directly.

POCSO cases: a narrow exception only

POCSO (Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act) cases cannot generally be quashed on compromise. The public interest dimension is too weighty. Some courts have, in rare instances, considered narrow exceptions in cases involving adolescent relationships where persons are of nearly consenting age, the relationship was demonstrably mutual, and prosecution would cause more harm to both parties than it prevents. This remains an unsettled and extremely narrow area; not a general rule. Do not advise clients that POCSO cases can routinely be quashed on settlement. They cannot.

Economic offences: generally beyond quashing

Large-scale economic offences, banking fraud, securities manipulation, Ponzi schemes, are generally not quashable even when the accused and the complainant reach a private settlement. The principles from Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat apply: where the offence affects the public or the financial system, the court’s inherent discretion is exercised against quashing.

Cheque bouncing under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is treated differently. It is a civil-flavour criminal offence, designed to secure payment of a debt. When the complainant accepts the cheque amount plus compensation, the underlying grievance is fully redressed. High Courts routinely quash Section 138 proceedings on settlement.

Property disputes and civil FIRs

Property disputes that escalate into criminal FIRs, criminal trespass, criminal intimidation, mischief, are strong candidates for quashing. The key question is whether the civil remedy adequately addresses the grievance. Where civil proceedings adequately address the dispute, a civil suit for declaration, injunction, or possession, the criminal FIR loses its justification. Courts have held that registering a criminal FIR to coerce a settlement in a civil property dispute is exactly the kind of abuse of process Section 528 BNSS exists to address.

The Supreme Court confirmed in Imran Pratapgarhi v. State of Gujarat that a nascent investigation is not a bar to quashing when the FIR on its face discloses no cognizable offence. A client who has just received notice of an FIR, before any arrest, before a chargesheet, can still file a quashing petition immediately.

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What happens after the quashing petition is filed?

The typical lifecycle of a quashing petition:

1. Petition filed. Listed for admission before the court within one to four weeks (varies by High Court and docket pressure).
2. First hearing. The court decides whether to admit the petition and issue notice to respondents, or dismiss it summarily (in limine) if the grounds are plainly insufficient.
3. Notice served. Respondents, the State and the complainant, file their reply or counter-affidavit within four to eight weeks.
4. Arguments. Petitioner argues; the State and complainant respond.
5. Final order. The court either quashes the proceedings or dismisses the petition.

Can the petition be withdrawn? Yes. A petitioner can file a memo of withdrawal at any stage. But unconditional withdrawal typically forecloses re-filing on the same grounds, effectively invoking the successive petition rule. If withdrawal is necessary, include a specific reservation of rights in the withdrawal memo.

When a petition is allowed and the proceedings are quashed, the effect is immediate: the FIR terminates, the investigation stops, any pending chargesheet proceedings collapse. If the accused is in custody solely on that FIR, they are entitled to be released.

Can a quashed FIR be re-registered? Generally, no. The quashing order extinguishes the FIR and bars re-registration on the same facts. A fresh FIR on genuinely new facts, facts that emerged after the quashing order, is technically possible, but it will face serious judicial scrutiny and is rarely sanctioned.

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What happens if the quashing petition is rejected by the High Court?

Three options follow a rejection:

Special Leave Petition to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. An SLP challenging the High Court’s dismissal is maintainable. But the Supreme Court is selective; it entertains SLPs against quashing dismissals primarily where the High Court made a jurisdictional error or the case involves a significant question of law. A routine dismissal on the merits, where the High Court properly applied the Bhajan Lal test, will not ordinarily be reversed.

Continue with trial. A rejected quashing petition is not a finding on guilt. The trial court proceeds on the merits of the case entirely independently. A dismissed quashing petition does not prejudice the accused’s defence at trial and cannot be used as evidence of guilt or even of a weak defence.

Apply for bail. If bail has not already been secured, or if the rejection changes the remand position, a bail application should be filed promptly. Rejection of a quashing petition is not a ground for denial of bail, but it may affect the court’s perception of the strength of the prosecution’s case.

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The successive petition trap: why you cannot file a second quashing petition on the same grounds

This is the most costly practitioner error in the entire domain. Courts have consistently held, rooted in the principles from Bhajan Lal and affirmed through Parbatbhai Aahir, that a second quashing petition filed on the same grounds as the first is not maintainable. It constitutes an abuse of the court’s process in itself.

The rule makes the first quashing petition irreversible on its grounds. If a petition is dismissed on merits, the grounds raised in it are exhausted. A second petition that re-raises those grounds will be dismissed at the threshold.

What constitutes “new grounds” that could justify a second petition? A development that genuinely did not exist at the time of the first petition: a compromise reached after the first dismissal, a new Supreme Court judgment that creates a ground not previously available, or a new fact that emerged from the investigation after the first petition was disposed of. What does not count: existing weaknesses in the FIR that could have been raised in the first petition but were not.

The practical implication: before filing the first petition, counsel must anticipate every available ground and plead all of them. Filing a petition that pleads only settlement as a ground, when the FIR also on its face discloses no cognizable offence, is a strategic error that cannot be corrected in a subsequent petition. The Bhajan Lal categories are your checklist. The four-step test is your secondary checklist. Use both.

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The Allahabad 9-judge bench referral: the question that could change quashing law

In 2025, Justice Arun Kumar Singh Deshwal of the Allahabad High Court made a referral that every quashing practitioner should track. Two constitutional questions were referred to a 9-judge bench of the Allahabad High Court:

Question 1: Is the 1989 ruling in Ramlal Yadav, which held that Section 482 CrPC (now Section 528 BNSS) cannot be used to quash an FIR itself, only the “proceedings” arising from it, still good law?

Question 2: Does the High Court have power under Section 528 BNSS to quash the FIR and the investigation itself (not merely the proceedings following from it), when the conditions in Bhajan Lal and Neeharika are satisfied?

The distinction matters more than it might initially appear. If Ramlal Yadav is correct, then technically a High Court under Section 528 BNSS can only quash the proceedings flowing from an FIR, the chargesheet, the cognizance order, the summons, but not the FIR itself. In practice, the Supreme Court has routinely quashed FIRs directly, and the mainstream view treats the FIR as quashable. But the Ramlal Yadav doubt creates procedural arguments that some courts still entertain.

If the 9-judge bench overrules Ramlal Yadav, confirming the power to quash FIRs directly, it will settle the ambiguity permanently. High Courts will be able to stop investigations at the FIR stage, without waiting for proceedings to develop from the FIR first.

If the bench reaffirms Ramlal Yadav, practitioners will need to be more precise in their prayer clauses: “quash the proceedings” rather than “quash the FIR,” or plead both.

As of April 2026, the referral is pending before the Allahabad HC 9-judge bench. No ruling has been issued. Monitor LiveLaw, Verdictum, and Deccan Herald for updates. Whatever the outcome, the resolution will be significant.

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Landmark cases on quashing petitions under section 528 BNSS and section 482 CrPC

Case name	Year	Court	Key holding	Significance
R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab	1960	Supreme Court of India	Three foundational categories for quashing: legal bar, no cognizable offence, manifest mala fides	Origin of quashing jurisprudence; all subsequent cases build on this
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal	1992	Supreme Court of India	Seven categories for exercising inherent quashing power; FIR must be read as the prosecution’s best case	THE foundational framework; cited in every quashing petition for 30+ years
Gian Singh v. State of Punjab	2012	Supreme Court of India (3-judge bench)	High Courts can quash non-compoundable offences on settlement when the offence is private and no public interest is served	Settled the long-contested question of compromise-based quashing
Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab	2014	Supreme Court of India (3-judge bench)	Post-Gian Singh guidelines on how courts should weigh compromise across different offence categories	Practical refinement of Gian Singh; widely cited in matrimonial quashing petitions
Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat	2017	Supreme Court of India (3-judge bench)	10-principle synthesis of all prior quashing jurisprudence; Section 482 saves not confers power	The most comprehensive single authority; go-to citation for the full framework
Neeharika Infrastructure v. State of Maharashtra	2021	Supreme Court of India (3-judge bench)	High threshold for interim stay of investigation; quashing power itself unaffected	Draws the critical distinction between stay of investigation and final quashing
Mamidi Anil Kumar Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh	2024	Supreme Court of India	Criminalising civil and matrimonial property disputes through multiple FIRs, post-compromise, is abuse of process	Key authority for civil-dispute-dressed-as-criminal FIR ground
Imran Pratapgarhi v. State of Gujarat	2025	Supreme Court of India	Mechanical FIR registration without Section 173(3) BNSS preliminary inquiry, targeting protected speech, is abuse of process	First major BNSS-era quashing ruling on free speech; confirms nascent investigation is no bar
Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh	2025	Supreme Court of India	4-step test for evaluating accused-side material in quashing petitions	Establishes the current operative structural framework for all 2025+ quashing petitions
V. Krishnamma v. Garima Bais	2025	Supreme Court of India	Section 528 BNSS is maintainable to quash DV Act proceedings at any stage	Expands quashing power to domestic violence proceedings; overrules contrary HC views
Deepam Pradhan v. Krishna Kumari Bhandari	2025	Sikkim High Court	Petitions filed after July 1, 2024 must invoke Section 528 BNSS; petition filing date determines applicable law	Confirms the transitional rule; critical for practitioners filing post-BNSS petitions
Sajal Bose v. State of West Bengal	2026	Supreme Court of India	Where CCTV footage demonstrably displaces FIR allegations and prosecution has no answer, the 4-step test mandates quashing	Most recent application of Kesarwani 4-step test; confirms digital evidence as a viable quashing tool

The arc of this doctrine runs from R.P. Kapur (1960) laying the constitutional foundation to Bhajan Lal (1992) codifying it to Parbatbhai Ahir (2017) synthesising it into 10 principles, and then into the BNSS era, where Imran Pratapgarhi, Kesarwani, and Sajal Bose have begun adding new structural layers. The doctrine is not static.

Any quashing petition filed in 2026 should cite, at minimum: Bhajan Lal (grounds), Parbatbhai Ahir (complete framework synthesis), Neeharika (if seeking interim stay), and Kesarwani (if relying on accused-side material). For matrimonial or settlement-based petitions, add Gian Singh and Narinder Singh.

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Frequently asked questions about quashing petitions under section 528 BNSS

FAQ 1: What is the difference between Section 482 CrPC and Section 528 BNSS?

Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 is a verbatim carry-over of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The text is identical. The difference is purely temporal: Section 482 CrPC governed petitions filed before July 1, 2024; Section 528 BNSS governs petitions filed on or after that date. All case law under Section 482 CrPC is fully binding under Section 528 BNSS.

FAQ 2: What is the difference between quashing and acquittal?

Quashing is a pre-trial remedy; it terminates criminal proceedings before any finding on guilt or innocence. Acquittal is a trial outcome; it is a court’s verdict, after examining evidence, that the prosecution has not proved the charge. Quashing prevents the trial from happening; acquittal ends the trial in the accused’s favour.

FAQ 3: What is the difference between quashing and appeal?

An appeal challenges a decision already made: a conviction, a sentence, an order by a lower court. Quashing does not challenge a past decision; it invokes the High Court’s inherent power to stop proceedings that are an abuse of process or that cannot continue without causing injustice. They operate at fundamentally different stages and on different legal bases.

FAQ 4: Can a Sessions Court quash an FIR?

No. Inherent quashing power is exclusive to High Courts. Sessions Courts have jurisdiction to revise, discharge, or acquit; but not to quash an FIR or terminate proceedings using inherent jurisdiction. Any application styled as a “quashing petition” before a Sessions Court is not maintainable and will be dismissed.

FAQ 5: Can an FIR be quashed if there is a compromise between parties?

Yes, if the offence is essentially private in nature and no public interest requires continued prosecution. The Supreme Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab confirmed that High Courts can quash even non-compoundable offences on genuine compromise. The court evaluates whether the settlement is voluntary, whether the offence affects anyone beyond the parties, and whether any public interest mandates prosecution.

FAQ 6: Can a non-compoundable offence be quashed on compromise?

Yes, but only through Section 528 BNSS’s inherent power, not through Section 359 BNSS’s compounding mechanism. Section 359 BNSS permits parties to compound only specified compoundable offences. Non-compoundable offences fall outside Section 359. But High Courts can exercise inherent power under Section 528 to quash non-compoundable offences on settlement, provided the Gian Singh and Narinder Singh conditions are met.

FAQ 7: What documents are required to file a quashing petition?

A quashing petition must be supported by: certified copy of the FIR, copy of the chargesheet (if filed), all court orders from proceedings below, copies of the complainant’s statement and complaint (where available), settlement deed or compromise affidavit (if applicable), petitioner’s affidavit verifying the facts, any digital or documentary evidence relied on for quashing, and a vakalatnama for the advocate.

FAQ 8: How long does a quashing petition typically take?

In straightforward cases, where the FIR discloses no offence on its face and the State does not contest, two to four months is realistic. In contested cases where the complainant files detailed opposition, expect six to twelve months. Complex multi-party cases or economic offence matters can take eighteen months or more. Timelines vary significantly by High Court and bench.

FAQ 9: Does a compromise deed need to be filed with the quashing petition?

Yes. Where the petition relies on a compromise between parties, the compromise deed or settlement affidavit must be annexed: either to the petition itself or to a separate application filed at the first hearing. The deed should be notarised, should describe the terms of settlement in full, and should be executed voluntarily by both parties without duress.

FAQ 10: What happens if the quashing petition is rejected by the High Court?

Three options: (a) file a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution, challenging the High Court’s dismissal; (b) proceed with the trial in the court below; rejection of the quashing petition is not a finding on guilt and does not prejudice the defence; or (c) apply for bail, if not already obtained. The SLP route is available but the Supreme Court entertains it selectively.

FAQ 11: Can a second quashing petition be filed after the first is dismissed?

Generally, no. Courts have consistently held that successive quashing petitions on pre-existing grounds constitute an abuse of the court’s process. A second petition is maintainable only on genuinely new grounds: grounds that did not exist at the time of the first petition, such as a compromise reached after dismissal or a new judicial development. Existing weaknesses in the FIR, not raised in the first petition, cannot justify a second petition.

FAQ 12: Can a quashing petition be filed after a chargesheet is filed?

Yes. Section 528 BNSS power is not limited to the pre-chargesheet stage. After a chargesheet is filed, the threshold for quashing rises; the court assesses whether the chargesheet materials disclose sufficient grounds for framing charges; but the jurisdiction remains intact.

FAQ 13: Can an FIR be quashed after cognizance is taken?

Yes, but only under Section 528 BNSS, not under Article 226. Once the Magistrate takes cognizance, Article 226 is no longer the appropriate remedy (Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1948). Section 528 BNSS remains fully available. The grounds and threshold are the same as at earlier stages, adjusted for the materials now available to the court.

FAQ 14: Can Article 226 be used to quash an FIR after cognizance?

No. The Supreme Court in Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1948 (SLP(Crl.) No. 13424 of 2025, decided September 3, 2025), clarified that Article 226’s writ jurisdiction for quashing FIRs is available only before cognizance is taken. Once the Magistrate takes cognizance, the sole remedy is Section 528 BNSS. A petition filed under Article 226 at this stage will be dismissed on maintainability grounds.

FAQ 15: Which law applies, Section 482 CrPC or Section 528 BNSS, for petitions filed after July 2024?

Section 528 BNSS applies to all petitions filed on or after July 1, 2024, regardless of when the underlying FIR was registered. The Sikkim High Court confirmed this in Deepam Pradhan and Ors. v. Krishna Kumari Bhandari and Ors. (June 2, 2025). The petition filing date is the determinative factor, not the FIR date, the offence date, or the chargesheet date.

FAQ 16: Can an FIR registered under CrPC be quashed under Section 528 BNSS?

Yes. If the FIR was registered before July 1, 2024 (under the CrPC era) but the quashing petition is being filed after July 1, 2024, Section 528 BNSS is the applicable provision. All the prior case law, Bhajan Lal, Gian Singh, Parbatbhai Ahir, remains applicable because the statutory text is identical.

FAQ 17: How much does a quashing petition lawyer charge in India?

Fees vary widely across High Courts, the complexity of the matter, and the seniority of counsel. In major High Courts, Delhi, Bombay, Madras, Calcutta, senior criminal advocates typically charge between Rs. 1,00,000 and Rs. 5,00,000 or more for a contested quashing petition. In smaller High Courts or for straightforward matters, the range may be Rs. 25,000 to Rs. 1,00,000. There is no standard rate. Always discuss fees and scope of engagement at the outset.

FAQ 18: What is the success rate of quashing petitions in matrimonial cases?

No official data on success rates is published by any High Court. Anecdotally, petitions based on genuine compromises in matrimonial disputes, particularly Section 498A IPC cases, have a significantly higher grant rate than contested petitions in other categories. The combination of private nature of the offence, genuine settlement, and strong case law (Gian Singh, Narinder Singh) gives well-drafted matrimonial quashing petitions a relatively strong position. But “success rate” depends heavily on the specific facts, the opposing counsel’s approach, and the bench.

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References

Case Law

1. R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866
2. State of Haryana and Ors. v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Ors., 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
3. Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and Anr., (2012) 10 SCC 303
4. Narinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr., (2014) 6 SCC 466
5. Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Anr., (2017) 9 SCC 641
6. M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. The State of Maharashtra and Others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315
7. Mamidi Anil Kumar Reddy v. The State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr., 2024 INSC 101
8. Imran Pratapgarhi v. State of Gujarat & Ors., 2025 INSC 410
9. Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 3831 of 2025, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1947
10. V. Krishnamma & Ors. v. Garima Bais, SLP(Crl.) No. 9534 of 2025: decided October 28, 2025; bench: Justice Rajesh Bindal and Justice Manmohan
11. Deepam Pradhan and Ors. v. Krishna Kumari Bhandari and Ors. (Sikkim HC, June 2, 2025)
12. Sajal Bose v. The State of West Bengal and Others, 2026 INSC 322

Cases cited in body, not hyperlinked (Indian Kanoon URL pending indexing):
Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1948 (SLP(Crl.) No. 13424 of 2025, decided September 3, 2025)

Statutes

• Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023: sections cited: 173(3), 359, 528
• Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: sections cited: 320, 482
• Constitution of India: articles cited: 136, 142, 226
• Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005: section cited: 12(1)
• Indian Penal Code, 1860: section cited: 498A (now reflected in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023)
• Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881: section cited: 138

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Legal disclaimer

This article is published for informational and educational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and no lawyer-client relationship is created by reading this content. Laws and judicial interpretations are subject to change. For advice on your specific situation, consult a qualified advocate.

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