This article was written by Rashi Sharma and further updated by Monesh Mehndiratta. The present article provides the brief facts of the case, the issues involved, the judgement of the Court and the rationale behind the judgement. It also explains the law involved in the case and further provides its critical analysis. 

Introduction

“Reservation”

What comes to mind when you either think about this term or hear it?

The ground reality is that the people belonging to the reserved category would become happy thinking that they will be given equal opportunities like others but those belonging to the unreserved category might be disheartened thinking about its consequences. 

Reservation is not a negative term. The policy was implemented with a positive attitude and aimed to uplift the status of minorities and those people who faced discrimination but the worst consequence of this policy would be its misuse. People often misuse the policy of reservation for their personal benefits because of which the deserving candidates suffer and face the consequences. One such case is the State of Madras v. Champakam (1951), which we will be discussing in this article in detail wherein the petitioners were denied admission to certain educational institutions maintained by the government because they did not belong to a particular class or category. 

This was challenged by them in the High Court of Madras wherein they filed the application alleging violation of their fundamental rights. The High Court allowed their application which was further challenged by the opposite party in the Supreme Court. The present article provides the brief facts of the case, the issues involved, the judgement passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the rationale behind the judgement and also provides its critical analysis. 

Details of State of Madras vs. Champakam

Name of the case

The State of Madras v. Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan 

Citation

1951 AIR 226, 1951 SCR 525. 

Name of the petitioner

The State of Madras

Name of the respondent

Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan & C.R. Srinivasan 

Date of Judgement

09.04.1951

Name of the Court

The Supreme Court of India

Bench 

The judgement in the present case was delivered by a 7-judge bench which comprised of Hiralal J. Kania, Saiyid Fazal Ali, Mehr Chand Mahajan, and Vivian Bose, B.K. Mukherjea, Sudhi Ranjan Das and M. Patanjali Shastri. 

Laws involved

Articles 13, 16(4), 29(2), 46 of the Constitution of India

Background of State of Madras vs. Champakam

The Indian Constitution provides in its preamble equality for all its citizens. This is also one of the most important fundamental rights mentioned therein. It further provides various fundamental rights to the citizens and that these cannot be violated by anyone, be it legislative, assembly or executive. However, positive discrimination is allowed because of reasonable classification. One of the results of this is the policy of reservation which is implemented to protect the interest of minorities, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other backward classes in the country. However, this policy has been misused over time, especially in cases of admission to educational institutions maintained by the state. The students who cracked the admission examination and deserved seats in the admissions on merit are denied admission just because they belong to a certain caste or community. Such instances are a sheer violation of their fundamental rights. The present case is one such case and the Hon’ble Supreme Court correctly highlighted the violation of fundamental rights of petitioners (respondents in this case) and held the government order which was relied upon by the educational institutions for admissions as void. 

The present case also highlights the provisions of Part III of the Constitution i.e., the fundamental rights. The case highlights that everyone needs to respect and abide by those provisions and the directive principle of state policy cannot override them. A petition was filed by the petitioners in the present case in the High Court of Madras alleging infringement of their fundamental rights by the college authorities. They were denied admission because they belonged to a particular caste or category even though they cleared the admission test. 

Brief facts of State of Madras vs. Champakam

The present case is an appeal by the State of Madras (appellants) from the two judgments of the High Court of Madras in the case of State of Madras v. Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan (1951) and State of Madras v. C. R. Srinivasan (1951). The two different applications were filed under Article 226 of the Constitution but the complaints were similar and related to breach of fundamental rights of respondents. There are four medical colleges in the state of Madras maintained by the government and a total of only 330 seats are available for students in those colleges. Out of 330 seats, 17 are reserved for students outside the state and 12 for discretionary allotment by the state and the balance of seats available are apportioned between four different groups of districts in the State. 

Similarly, there are four engineering colleges maintained by the State of Madras and the total seats available are only 395 out of which 21 are reserved for students outside the state and 12 for discretionary allotment. The balance of seats is apportioned in the same manner as for medical colleges. These apportioned seats were filled according to some set proportions called the communal G.O. Thus, for every 14 seats to be filled the number of candidates selected was as follows:

• Non-brahmins or Hindus – 6
• Backward Hindus – 2
• Brahmins – 2
• Harijans – 2
• Anglo-Indians and Indian Christians – 1
• Muslims – 1

The candidates were selected based on certain principles like academic qualifications and marks obtained in medical colleges. Not less than 20% of the total seats were filled by women separately for each region and the selection committee could also admit more women candidates on merits and in accordance with the general principles laid down for the admission. This proportion was fixed in the old communal G.O. was followed even after the Constitution came into force. An application was filed to the Madras High Court for the protection of fundamental rights under Articles 15(1) and 29(2) of the Constitution by Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan. He also prayed to issue the writ of mandamus or any other writ restraining the state of Madras and officers from enforcing, observing, maintaining or following the Communal G.O. through which admissions were sought in the medical colleges. This is because fundamental rights were alleged to be violated. The petitioner alleged that on an inquiry about the admission, she came to know that she would not be given admission as she was a Brahmin.

Another similar petition was filed by Sri Srinivasan who applied for admission into the Government Engineering College in the state. He passed the Examination in first class and secured 369 marks out of 450. He alleged that the manner in which admissions were regulated in the college is in violation of the fundamental rights of the petitioner under Articles 15(1) and 29(2). 

Judgement of Madras High Court 

The Madras High Court allowed the applications of the petitioners alleging the violation of their fundamental rights by the Communal Government Order used by the medical and engineering colleges maintained by the state of Madras for admission. The respondents contended that the classification of caste in the order is not based on caste alone but on other factors like numerical strength, literacy and economic conditions of different communities and castes in the State and hence, not violative of any fundamental rights. 

The petitioner argued that they deny the contentions made by the respondents. This is because Article 37 states that the directive principles of state policy given in Part IV of the Constitution cannot overrule the provisions given in Part III of the Constitution. Neither the executive nor the legislature can violate or infringe any of the fundamental rights except provided by law. They further argued that the Government Communal Order in question in the present case was based on caste discrimination and hence, violated their fundamental rights and led to injustice. They asserted that caste should not be a deciding factor with respect to admission to educational institutions. It was further contended by the petitioners that the right given under Article 29(2) is an individual right and is expressed unequivocally and thus, no one should be denied admission to any educational institution maintained by the state on the basis of caste, religion, race or language. 

The Madras High Court found a disparity in the admissions and allotment of seats in the present case. It was found that the four Brahmin students selected in the engineering college secured marks between 398-417 while the Harijans secured only 217-231 marks. Thus, it was observed by the court that if a harijan who secured 231 marks can be allotted a seat but a Brahmin candidate securing 390 marks cannot be allotted a seat just because he or she belongs to a particular caste, there is a clear disparity and discrimination. The two applications made by the petitioners were allowed stating that admission must not be denied on the basis of caste, religion or race. The Madras High Court ruled in favour of the petitioners and declared the said order unconstitutional. Thereafter, the Respondent State filed an appeal before the Supreme Court of India against the decision of the High Court of Madras. 

Issues involved in State of Madras vs. Champakam

• Whether there has been a violation of the petitioners’ fundamental rights?
• Whether the G.O. issued by the state of Madras valid?

Contentions of the parties

Arguments of Appellant

The Advocate General representing the state contended that Article 29 of the Constitution has to be read with other Articles of the Constitution. He further stated that the state is under a duty to promote the educational and economic interests of people belonging to weaker sections especially those belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and also to protect them from social injustice and every form of exploitation. He contended that even though this provision is a part of directive principles of state policy but is fundamental for the governance of the country. He argued that according to Article 46, the state has to maintain communal G.O. and fix proportionate seats for different communities and if because of that order the petitioners are not able to get admission to the college, it leads to no infringement of their fundamental rights.  

With respect to the case of Srinivasan, It was argued on behalf of the state in the High Court of Madras that the allocation of seats in the college is not only on the basis of population but other factors like numerical strength, literary achievement and economic conditions of various communities in the state. He further pleaded that the seats available in the educational institutions maintained by the state are fewer so a large number of applications have to be denied but this denial is not on the grounds of religion or caste but on other factors and so the order of Government is not illegal and invalid. The other factors on which admission is denied to the applicants are:

• Paucity of seats as the numbers of seats fixed for Brahmins were already alloted to more meritorious students,
• Regional and linguistic representations
• Promoting the interests of backward communities

However, the counsel appearing on behalf of the state also conceded that the two applications filled for admission in the present case would not have been denied if they had an intention to take admission and if admission was given solely on the basis of merit. However, he further added that several other factors were taken into consideration while denying the admission. 

Arguments of respondent

The respondents argued that there has been a violation of their fundamental rights because they were denied admission to the educational institution even though they deserved the admission on merit. They further stated the Communal government order was entirely based on caste and category, thus, in violation of the rights of those who did not belong to the mentioned caste or category. 

Judgement of the Supreme Court

Ratio decidendi

The High Court in this case allowed both the applications of the petitioners and directed that the applications of the petitioners should be considered without any discrimination against them on the basis of religion, race or caste. These cannot be the grounds of selection. 

The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the classification in the Communal Government Order is based on religion, race and caste and is opposed to the Constitution. This clearly violates the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens under Article 29(2). The communal government order was held to be inconsistent with Article 29(2) and Part III of the Constitution and thus, void under Article 13. 

Obiter dicta

The Hon’ble Supreme Court rejected the contentions of the respondent and opined that the Directive Principles of State Policy are unenforceable by a court according to Article 37 of the Constitution and cannot override the fundamental rights contained therein. It was further opined that the fundamental rights as contained in the Constitution are sacrosanct and cannot be violated or abridged by any Act or order of the Legislative or Executive. If there is no violation of fundamental rights there can be no objections to the actions of the state if they are acting according to the Directive Principles of State Policy. However, their powers are subject to limitations provided under different parts of the Constitution. 

With respect to the arguments of the respondent on Article 46, the Court opined that if these arguments were accepted Article 16(4) would become unnecessary and redundant. The Court stated that the intention of the Constitution is not to introduce communal considerations with respect to admissions in educational institutions that are maintained by the state. The power of reservation has been given to the state to protect the backward classes and for that people belonging to these classes must be appointed in state services. However, this is not necessary when it comes to admission to educational institutions. This is also a reason to omit a similar clause in Article 29 as in Article 16(4). 

With respect to the case of C.R. Srinivasan, it was opined that he secured much higher marks than many of the non-brahmin candidates but he would not be given admission rather those non-brahmin candidates who secured fewer marks would be given admission over him. The only reason to deny him admission that comes to mind is that he is a Brahmin and not a non-brahmin candidate. This kind of denial is said to be made only on the grounds of caste. Thus, the classification in the Communal government order is based on the grounds of religion, caste and race and hence, violates fundamental rights of the petitioners. 

Laws involved in State of Madras vs. Champakam

Article 29 of the Constitution

Article 29 of the Constitution protects the cultural and educational rights of minorities. However, it also prohibits discrimination in admission to educational institutions on the basis of caste, religion, race, or language. Article 29(2) provides that a citizen will not be denied admission to any educational institution which is maintained by the state only on the grounds of race, religion, caste or language. 

In the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2002), it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that minorities can establish and administer their own educational institutions in order to preserve and protect their identity. Further, in the case of St. Stephen’s College v. University of Delhi (1991), the Supreme Court dealt with the issue of reservation of seats for students belonging to other communities in educational institutions established and administered by minorities. It was held that such seats can be reserved but the admission process must be fair and transparent. 

Article 16 of the Constitution

Article 16 deals with equality of opportunity for citizens in public employment. It provides that a citizen will not be discriminated against or denied any employment in office under the state on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or residence. However, it also provides that the state can make provisions for the reservation of backward classes who are not represented adequately, in the appointments. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Indra Sawhney and Ors v. Union of India (1992), held that the reservation of appointment as given under Article 16(4) is limited to only initial appointments and cannot be applied in matters of appointment. 

Article 46 of the Constitution

Article 46 is a part of the directive principles of state policy given under Part IV of the Constitution. It provides the duty of the state to promote the interests of people belonging to weaker sections like Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes with respect to education and economic interests and also to protect them from social injustice and exploitation. 

Aftermath of State of Madras vs. Champakam

The First Amendment was introduced to the Constitution of India as a consequence of the Supreme Court judgement in the present case. The Constitutional (First Amendment), 1951, brought some important changes which included:

• Restrictions to the freedom of speech and expression.
• Emphasised the need for special provisions for socially and economically backward classes and castes.
• Introduced land reforms. 

The amendment introduced one important clause in Article 15 of the Constitution i.e., Article 15(4). It provides power to the state to make laws for the advancement of socially and economically backward classes like Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other such groups. Article 15 provides that no one will be discriminated against on the grounds of race, caste, religion, creed, colour, sex, or language and even the state cannot do so. However, Article 15(4) provides an exception to this rule. It provides that the state can make laws for the advancement and upliftment of lower and socially and economically backward classes. 

The court in the case of M.R. Balaji and others v. State of Mysore (1962), held that the term ‘backward’ used in Article 15(4) includes both social and educational backwardness which could be due to occupation, habitation and factors other than caste. Further, in the case of R. Chitralekha & Anr. v. State of Mysore (1964), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that economic conditions and occupations of people are the basis upon which people are classified as socially and educationally backward. In the case of Indra Sawhney, the Apex Court observed that if a whole caste is socially and educationally backwards, reservations can be made in its favour. However, it was held that the government must exclude the creamy layer from such a reservation. This creamy layer includes those citizens who have attained a certain level of advancement with respect to social and educational life. 

Another major change that happened after the present case was the interpretation of directive principles of state policy by the judiciary. Following the present case, the judiciary has changed its views towards the relationship between DPSPs and fundamental rights. It has interpreted these principles in various cases and delivered landmark judgements. In the case of Re Kerala Education Bill, (1957), the Doctrine of Harmonious Construction was introduced and implemented by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in order to interpret the directive principles of state policy (DPSPs) and avoid any confusion and conflict between the fundamental rights and the DPSPs. It was held that if there is a conflict between the two, they must be interpreted harmoniously. Further, in the case of Pathumma v. State of Kerala (1978), the Supreme Court observed that the aim of DPSPs is to achieve some particular goals and the Constitution aims to strike a balance between the directive principles and the fundamental rights. 

It was also held by the Apex court in the case of State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas (1976), that the DPSPs and fundamental rights must coexist and efforts must be made to resolve any kind of conflict between the two. Further, the two were held to be supplementary and complementary to each other. In the case of Suresh Kumars & Ors. Dalmia Cement v. Union of India (1996). the court also observed that both of them are like the two wheels of the same chariot and none is less important than the other. They are together considered the conscience of the Constitution and can bring social revolution. 

Critical analysis of State of Madras vs. Champakam

One of the major arguments presented by the appellant in the present appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was related to Article 46 of the Constitution which provides a duty of the state to promote the educational and economic interests of weaker sections of society and those belonging to minorities and other backward classes like Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. According to them, the Communal Government Order in question was in conformity with this Article and provided necessary reservation to these communities and hence, did not violate any fundamental rights of the respondents. To this, the respondents argued that the above-mentioned argument is not valid as Article 37 clearly states that the provisions contained in Part IV of the Constitution are not enforceable by courts and would be applied by the state as principles while making any laws. 

I feel that the Hon’ble Supreme Court was correct in observing that the provisions given in Part III of the Constitution i.e., the fundamental rights cannot be infringed or overlooked by any authority. The directive principles of state policy cannot override these provisions. If we look into Article 16, it also provides equality of opportunity for all citizens and there can be no discrimination on the grounds of caste, creed, sex, religion, colour or language. Every human must treat others with respect and dignity. The approach of the judges in the present judgement fairly highlighted the discrimination faced by the students in seeking admission to the educational institutions maintained by the state in Madras.  

The courts in India dealt with several cases with similar issues regarding reservation in the country. One among those is the case of  Inamdar and Ors vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors (2005) further provides that the percentage of reservation under the policy of reservation cannot be decided by any state on its own. It will only be prescribed by law and every state has to adhere to such a percentage for reservation of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other backward classes and minorities. The judgement of the court in this case further provided the importance of Article 19(1)(g) that no one will be deprived from carrying on any occupation, trade or business. This right also extends to minorities and backward classes. Further, the court also provided that the reservation policy does not favour a student scoring fewer marks over a student who is meritorious and meets the criteria of marks. This means that the reservation policy is not aimed at denying admission to those who deserve it on merit. 

Another similar case in this regard is  Oliver L. Brown vs. The Board of Education of (Topeka) (1954). This is a landmark case related to the US Constitution and also restricted the 14th Amendment of the US Constitution. This case provided that there will be no discrimination with the candidates with respect to admissions in colleges and universities and that the seat will be given to the one who is deserving and meets the criteria of admission on the basis of merit. Thus, the Supreme Court has been correct in delivering the present judgement in favour of the students who presented the petition. This case also sets a precedent for any upcoming similar case where a student is denied admission on the basis of discrimination in the name of reservation. 

Reservation in India in education and employment

Article 14 of the Constitution gives the right to equality to the citizens of India. Further, Article 15 provides that there would be no discrimination on the grounds of race, caste, religion, sex, language etc. However, positive discrimination is allowed as a result of the doctrine of reasonable classification. This doctrine provides that positive discrimination can be done by the state on the basis of intelligible differentia (classification in reasonable grounds) with the rational nexus or objective to be achieved. Keeping this in mind, the policy of reservation was introduced to uplift socially and economically backward classes and bring them on the same page with other classes and communities. 

Reservation is not new to our country. This phenomenon has been in existence since ancient times. The policy was implemented in order to protect the socially and economically backward classes and castes from discrimination and torture and to provide them equal opportunities at par with other castes and categories. The state also prohibited the practice of untouchability (Article 17 of the Constitution) which was a kind of discrimination faced by people belonging to lower castes. The policy of reservation was introduced by Dr B.R. Ambedkar in the country as a measure to eradicate discrimination against the backward castes and classes and for their upliftment. However, it was initially implemented for 10 years but later, it was extended. 

After independence, various provisions relating to the reservation were introduced in order to provide equal opportunities to the reserved categories in employment and education. After the Decision of the Supreme Court in the present case in 1951, Article 15 was amended and various clauses were added with respect to protection of. Further, The Constitution (93rd Amendment) Act 2005 brought various changes and amendments in the Constitution pertaining to the reservation and protection of socially and economically backward classes and castes. 

The Cases of T.M. Pai and P.A. Inamdar are major cases in this regard and the case of Indra Sawhney which is yet another landmark case provides the exact percentage of reservations which is 50%. This bar of percentage cannot be exceeded by anyone and finally, Articles 16 (4-A) and 16 (4-B) were added to the Constitution which deals with the power of the state to make laws for reservation in cases of promotion and filling up of vacancies respectively. 

Conclusion

India is a culturally rich and diverse country. It has multiple religions and traditions and people living here have diversity in thoughts, opinions and ways of living. In this situation, it becomes necessary for the Government to recognise and protect people belonging to different religions, castes, cultures and traditions. The state has a duty to protect its citizens from any kind of discrimination and torture and is also responsible for their welfare. In lieu of this, the policy of reservation was introduced. This was done to protect the socially and economically backward classes of the country. The state also abolished untouchability and discrimination on the basis of race, caste, creed, colour, sex, religion or language. The policy of reservation aims to provide equal opportunities to the socially and economically backward classes and minorities in the country like Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes like other classes and castes. 

The Constitution also provides minorities to establish their own educational institutions and administer them. Seats are also reserved for them in the educational institutions maintained by the state but the objective was never to discriminate against those students who secured seats through merit. However, this reservation policy is now misused and students are discriminated against on the basis of their religion and caste. It is necessary to understand that this policy was introduced with a positive aim and if that aim is achieved, it is better to take it back rather than misuse it for personal benefits. Thus, it becomes necessary for the government to overlook the reservation policy and its consequences and make regulations in this regard so that no student who is deserving is rejected for admission or other opportunities. 

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

Who represented the appellant in the present case?

V.K.T. Chari, Advocate General of the state of Madras along with R. Ganapathy Iyer represented the state of Madras in this case.

Who represented the respondent in the present case?

The respondents were represented by Advocate Aliadi Krishnaswami Aiyer along with Alladi Kuppuswami Aiyer. 

What was the decision of the High Court of Madras in the present case?

The High Court of Madras declared the Communal Government Order unconstitutional on the ground that it violated the fundamental rights of the petitioner (respondent in this case).

References

• Reservation Policies in India, 2023 SCC OnLine Blog LME 6: https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2023/04/19/legal-analysis-of-recent-judgments-on-reservation-policies-in-india-legal-research-legal-news-updates/ 
• https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2022/01/31/reservation-in-promotion-the-6-issues-settled-by-supreme-court-on-collection-of-quantifiable-data-showing-inadequacy-of-representation/ 
• http://student.manupatra.com/Academic/Studentmodules/Judgments/MANU-TN-0014-1951-ILRMadras.pdf
• https://www.aironline.in/legal-articles/state+of+Madras+v.+Champakam+Dorairajan
• https://gyansanchay.csjmu.ac.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Champakam-Dorairajan-case-analysis.pdf
• https://www.juscorpus.com/state-of-madras-v-srimathi-champakam-dorairajan/
• https://www.scribd.com/document/625683971/state-of-Madras-v-Champakam-Dorairajan
• https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/questions-of-promotion/article24116633.ece
• https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2023/04/19/legal-analysis-of-recent-judgments-on-reservation-policies-in-india-legal-research-legal-news-updates/
• https://www.indiatoday.in/news-analysis/story/existing-reservation-quota-limit-of-the-indian-states-1799705-2021-05-06
• https://articles.manupatra.com/article-details/Changing-Contours-of-Reservation-Policy-in-India