This article has been written by Suryanshi Bothra. The article covers Ahmedabad Women’s Action Group & Ors. vs. Union of India (1997), which is a landmark case focusing on the constitutional validity of personal laws and their exemption from scrutiny under Part III (fundamental rights) of the Indian Constitution. Along with delving into the judgement passed by the Court, it outlines the arguments put forth by both the petitioners and respondents, and goes on to discuss the relevant statutes and legal precedents. The judgement underscores the separation of powers and the non-enforceability of the uniform civil code as a directive principle of state policy.

Introduction 

In the realm of women’s rights and gender equality in India, numerous legal battles have shaped the landscape of justice and social reform. In recent years, the #MeToo movement and increased awareness of gender-based violence have further brought these issues to the forefront, compelling lawmakers and society to reevaluate their stance on women’s rights. Against this backdrop, the AWAG case offers valuable insights into the struggles and triumphs of women’s rights activists in their quest for equality and justice. Ahmedabad Women’s Action Group (AWAG) & Ors. vs. Union of India (1997) stands as a landmark challenge to the complex set of personal laws that govern the intimate spheres of Indian citizens’ lives. The case dealt with a fundamental question that has long haunted India’s legal landscape- how can a modern, secular democracy ensure its constitutional commitment to gender equality while also safeguarding personal laws, particularly when the personal laws often reflect patriarchal norms? The aim of these challenges is to fight for gender equality, particularly in the areas of marriage, divorce, inheritance, and guardianship. The petition in this case highlights the tension between diverse religious practices and upholding constitutional mandates of equality and non-discrimination. This case can be seen as part of a broader movement to reform religious personal laws in order to uphold equality and justice. It was an early attempt at achieving a uniform civil code. 

Details of the case

Case name

Ahmedabad Women Action Group (Ahmedabad Women Action Group) & Ors. vs. Union Of India

Parties to the case

Petitioners

Ahmedabad Women Action Group (Ahmedabad Women Action Group) & Ors

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Respondents

Union of India

Type of case

Writ Petition

Case No.

(Civil) No. 494 of 1996

Court

Supreme Court of India

Case No.

(Civil) No. 494 of 1996

Statutes involved

Bench

Chief Justice of India Aziz Mushabber Ahmadi Sujata, Justice V. Manohar and Justice K. Venkataswami

Author of the judgement

Justice K. Venkataswami

Date of judgement

24th February,1997

Equivalent citations

(1997) 3 SCC 573, 1997 (2) SCALE 381, AIR 1997 SC 3614, JT 1997 (3) SC 171, [1997] 2 SCR 389

Background of the case

Ahmedabad Women Action Group was founded by Dr. Ila Pathak in 1981. Their main aim was to protect women from violence, protest against it and fight for the rights of all women. Since its inception, they have been lobbying for pro-women policies. They have been arguing for equal rights for women, both within their families and in society. This has benefited by applying policy-related pressure on the government. Prior to the Ahmedabad Women Action Group case, there were many attempts made to address gender discrimination in India. Most of those attempts were cited in this case by the Court as precedents, which will be discussed later in the case. 

This case highlights the conflict between maintaining cultural and religious diversity through personal laws and the constitutional goal of a uniform civil code (UCC), which aims to ensure uniformity and equality in terms of the governing rules for all Indian communities. It seeks to replace personal laws. Currently, only Goa has a common family law.

Facts of the case

Three writ petitions (by Ahmedabad Women Action Group, Lok Sevak Sangh and Young Women Christian Association) were filed together as a public interest litigation. The petitioners in this case challenged various provisions of Muslim law, Hindu law and Christian law. They claimed that some provisions of these laws (polygamy, unilateral divorce, discriminatory inheritance laws, and testamentary disposition) were violative of the fundamental rights under Article 14, which codifies equality before the law, Article 15, which prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion, caste, sex or place of birth, and Article 21, which talks about the right to life and personal liberty. The case also raised some very important questions about the need for the uniform civil code, envisioned in Article 44 of the Indian Constitution. 

Issues raised

The petitioners in the Ahmedabad Women Action Group case raised issues regarding the constitutional validity of certain provisions of personal law: 

  • Whether Section 2(2), Section 6,  clauses (i) and (iii) of Section 5, and the explanation to Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, violate Articles 14 and 15 when read with Article 13?
  • Whether Section 2 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, is void due to it violating Articles 14 and 15?
  • Whether Sections 3(2), 6 and 9 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, read with Section 6 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 are void?
  • Whether the unrestricted authority given to a Hindu partner to decide on inheritance distribution without ensuring a specified portion for their spouse and dependents, is valid?
  • Whether Sections 10 and 34 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, should be declared void?
  • Whether Sections 43 to 46 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, should be declared void?
  • Whether Muslim personal law allowing polygamy is declared void on the grounds that it violates Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution?
  • Whether the practice that enables a Muslim male to give unilateral talaq (divorce) to his wife without her consent and without resorting to judicial process violates Articles 13, 14, and 15?
  • Whether taking more than one wife by a Muslim husband should be declared an act of cruelty under Section 2(viii)(f) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939?
  • Whether the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, should be declared void for infringing Articles 14 and 15?
  • Whether the Sunni and Shia laws of inheritance, which give females a smaller share compared to males of the same status, should be declared void for discriminating solely on the basis of sex?

Laws involved in Ahmedabad Women Action Group (AWAG) vs. Union of India (1997)

Hindu Succession Act, 1956

Section 2(2) of Hindu Succession Act, 1956

This Section exempts certain Scheduled Tribes, as specified under Article 366(25), from the Act’s application. This Act applies to Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs, and anyone who would fall under the ambit of “Hindu”. It covers converts and re-converts of these religions as well.

Section 5(ii) of Hindu Succession Act, 1956

It exempts from its application any estate that descends to a single heir by way of agreements made by Indian State Rulers with the Government of India or by pre-existing enactments before the Act’s commencement. This provision ensures that certain estates, governed by specific historical agreements or laws, retain their intended succession frameworks, despite the general provisions of the Hindu Succession Act

Section 5(iii) of Hindu Succession Act, 1956

The Section exempts the Valiamma Thampuran Kovilagam Estate and the Palace Fund, administered by the Palace Administration Board, through the authority conferred on it by a proclamation by the Maharaja of Cochin.

Section 6 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956

If a Hindu male dies without a will, his property would be distributed in the following manner:

  • It would first go to the heirs specified in Class I of the Schedule. This includes the immediate family members, such as the widow, children and mother.
  • In case of absence of Class I heirs, it would go to the Class II heirs. This includes distant relatives, such as siblings, grandparents and other relatives.
  • In case both Class I and Class II heirs are absent, the property would go to the agnates (relatives through their lineage).
  • If there are no agnates, the property would go to the cognates (relatives through female lineage)

(Amended by the Hindu Succession Amendment Act, 2005 to include female Hindus as coparceners, who would be as entitled as the male heirs)

Section 30 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956

Under Section 30, a Hindu has the right to distribute his/her property by way of a will, or any other legal document, after his/her death. This would be in accordance with the rules established by the Indian Succession Act, 1925 or any other applicable law.

The explanation to this Section, states that a male Hindu’s interest in a joint family property, or a member’s interest in the property of a tarwad, tavazhi, illom, kutumba, or kavaru, can be considered his own property and also be disposed of by him.

Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 

Section 3(2) of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956

This Section exempts certain Scheduled Tribes, as specified under Article 366(25), from the Act’s application, unless the Central Government specifies otherwise by notification in the Official Gazette.

Section 6 of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956

The Section lays down the natural guardians for Hindu minors. They are the guardians of the minor’s personal well-being, as well as the property, except the undivided share in joint family property.

  • For a boy or an unmarried girl, the natural guardian is the father, and after him, it would be the mother. However, if the child is under 5 years of age, it is usually the mother who has custody.
  • For an illegitimate boy or an illegitimate unmarried girl, the natural guardian is the mother, and after her, it would be the father.
  • For a married girl, the natural guardian is her husband.

It must be noted that a person cannot be such a guardian if he/she has ceased to be a Hindu, or has renounced the world. Furthermore, stepfathers and stepmothers are also not eligible to be such guardians.  

Section 9 of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956

The Section deals with how a Hindu parent, through a will, can appoint a guardian for their minor legitimate children.

  • A Hindu father can appoint a guardian for his minor legitimate children, through a will. If he dies before the mother, this appointment of his will not come into effect. However, if the mother dies without appointing a guardian, then the father’s appointment will come into effect.
  • A Hindu mother or widow can also appoint a guardian for his minor legitimate children, though a will. 
  • Such appointed guardians shall take over after the death of the parent who appointed them. They have all the rights of a natural guardian under this Act.
  • In case the minor child is a girl, the appointed guardian’s rights terminate when she gets married. 

Indian Succession Act, 1925

Section 43 of Indian Succession Act, 1925

Section 43 states that if an intestate’s (person who dies without a legal will) father is dead, but the mother and siblings are alive, and there are no living children of any deceased siblings, the mother and each living sibling will inherit the intestate’s property in equal shares.

Section 44 of Indian Succession Act, 1925

Under Section 44, if an intestate’s father is dead but the mother is alive, and so are any siblings and the children of any deceased siblings, then the mother, each living sibling, and the children of each deceased sibling will inherit the property in equal shares. The children of a deceased sibling will equally share the portion that their parent would have received.

Section 45 of Indian Succession Act, 1925

As per Section 45, if an intestate’s father and siblings are all dead, but the mother and the children of the deceased siblings are living, then the mother and the children of each deceased sibling will inherit the property in equal shares. The children of a deceased sibling will equally share the portion that their parent would have received.

Section 46 of Indian Succession Act, 1925

Section 46 states that if an intestate’s father is dead, but the mother is living, and there are no siblings or children of siblings, the property will belong entirely to the mother.

Indian Divorce Act, 1869

Section 10 of Indian Divorce Act, 1869

Either spouse may file a petition in the District Court, for dissolution of marriage on the following grounds:

  • The respondent has committed adultery
  • The respondent has converted to another religion and has ceased to be a Christian
  • The respondent has been of unsound mind for a minimum of 2 consecutive years, before the filing of the petition.
  • The respondent has had a communicable venereal disease for a minimum of 2 consecutive years before the filing of the petition.
  • There has been no sign of the respondent being alive, for a minimum of 7 years.
  • The respondent, of his own will, refused to consummate the marriage
  • The respondent failed to comply with a decree of conjugal rights, for a minimum of 2 years after passing of the decree
  • The respondent deserted the petitioner, for a minimum of 2 consecutive years, before the filing of the petition
  • The respondent treated with cruelty to an extent that has made living together, harmful
  • The husband has committed rape, sodomy or bestiality since the marriage

Section 34 of Indian Divorce Act, 1869

This Section states that a husband can claim damages from an adulterer.

(Omitted by the Indian Divorce Amendment Act, 2001)

Section 2(viii)(f) of Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939

A Muslim woman can seek a divorce from her husband, if her marriage has not been consummated and if her husband has also treated her with cruelty. Under sub-clause (f), cruelty refers to the husband having more than one wife, and not treating her equally and fairly, as prescribed by the Quran. 

Section 2 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

Section 2 states that this Act applies to any Hindu, including those belonging to the Virashaiva, Lingayat, Brahmo, Prarthana and Arya Samaj communities, Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs, and anyone who is not a Muslim, Christian, Jew or Parsi (unless proven that they would not be governed by Hindu Law, if not for the passing of this Act). Furthermore, members of Scheduled Tribes also do not fall under the ambit of this Act, unless the Central Government decides otherwise. 

Section 6 of Guardians and Wards Act, 1890

Section 6 states that this Act shall not intervene in any legal power already in place to appoint guardians for minors.

Arguments of the parties 

Petitioners’ arguments 

The main contention of the petitioners’ was that certain provisions of Hindu, Muslim and Christian personal laws violate the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14, Article 15 and Article 21 of the Constitution.

Hindu personal laws

The petitioners claimed that Sections 2(2), 6,  5(ii) & 5(iii), and the explanation to Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956; Section 2 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; and Sections 3(2), 6 and 9 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 must all be repealed or reformed. The Ahmedabad Women Action Group argued against personal laws, which discriminate based on gender. They contended that the above-mentioned provisions should be declared void for violating Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution, which guarantee equality and non-discrimination. 

Muslim personal laws

The petitioners contended that polygamy violates women’s rights to equality and human dignity. They also stated that unilateral talaq denies women due process and equal rights in marriage. This relates to the controversial practice of triple talaq, which has since been banned in India through legislation. With regard to the stated provisions of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, they claimed that it was regressive and discriminatory and, hence, should be declared void. Islamic inheritance laws were also challenged for favouring male heirs, which the petitioners argued was unfair and discriminatory towards women. 

Christian personal laws

With respect to laws applying to the Christian community, the petitioners claimed that Sections 10 and 34 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 were discriminatory. Similarly, the validity of Sections 43 to 48 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, was questioned on the ground that they treat women unfairly. 

The petitioners implicitly supported the Uniform Civil Code (UCC), by challenging discriminatory provisions in personal laws. Through their questions on certain personal laws, they tried to suggest that the common law would better protect women’s rights. A UCC would replace the current system of separate personal laws for different religious communities, with a common set of laws governing matters like marriage, divorce, inheritance, and adoption for all citizens, regardless of their religion. 

Respondent’s arguments

The respondent in the present case contended that issues relating to personal laws, including those with respect to marriage and succession, are sensitive. They stated that these carry social and cultural undertones, and are not subject to trial by any court. The personal laws of different communities, whether Hindu, Muslim or Christian, are sacramental and deeply rooted. According to the Muslim Law Board, if these are altered judicially, it could lead to serious differences. The respondents argued that the judiciary should show restraint. They should let the legislature deal with personal laws. They went to point out that the courts earlier had underlined how efforts to resolve personal law matters through judicial activism were misguided, because the solution to these problems lay in reforming the laws and in the acceptance of such changes by society at large.

Judgement in Ahmedabad Women Action Group (AWAG) vs. Union of India (1997)

Cases referred

Madhu Kishwar & Others vs. State of Bihar & Others (1996)

In the case of Madhu Kishwar & Others vs. State of Bihar & Others, (1996), the petitioners challenged the custody laws of the Santhal Tribe. This case aimed to highlight the gender discrimination prevalent in tribal customs regarding inheritance rights. The petitioners claimed that these customs violated Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution. The case specifically focused on the denial of women’s ancestral property rights. It raised critical questions about the validity of customary laws that conflicted with the principles of justice and equality, which are enshrined in the Constitution.   

The challenge for the court was to balance the preservation of customary law, while protecting the fundamental rights of women and promoting gender equality. This case was cited in the Ahmedabad women Action Group case, as both cases questioned customary laws. In Madhu Kishwar’s matter, the Supreme Court intervened. It shed light on the court’s role in addressing gender-based injustices within customary laws. The Court reconciled customary practices with constitutional principles. However, the Court in the Ahmedabad Women Action Group case, deferred to the legislature for reforms. The variation in judgement highlights the difference between judicial activism and legislative authority while seeking gender equality. 

Pannalal Bansilal and Others vs. State of A.P and Another (1996)

This was a similar case, wherein certain provisions of the A.P. Charitable Hindu Religious and Endowments Act, 1987 were challenged. The petitioners argued that lack of uniformity in personal laws, leads to inconsistency and discrimination. The case examined various differential treatments of marriage, succession and divorce laws across different personal laws. The petitioners sought a directive from the Supreme Court, for the Government to formulate a uniform civil code. They argued for a code that would provide equal rights and obligations to all citizens, irrespective of religion. 

The Supreme Court in this case, mentioned that India is a pluralistic society and has a secular Constitution. Therefore, it aims to integrate diverse religious, linguistic and cultural communities. However, the Court preferred to make gradual progressive change. The aim of uniformity is noble, but the Court emphasised the need for its careful implementation and efforts to ensure that the code devised, is effective and inclusive. An important aspect of this case was the Court’s decision to exercise restraint and allow the legislature to reform personal laws. The Court in the Ahmedabad Women Action Group case, cited this judgement to reiterate its stance on separation of powers and its importance. 

Sarla Mudgal vs. Union of India (1995)

The Sarla Mudgal case was mentioned to discuss the interplay between personal laws, religious practices and constitutional mandate for gender equality. The case also evaluates the scope of Articles 25 (freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion) and 44 of the Indian Constitution. The Court observed that Article 33 (power of Parliament to modify the rights conferred by this Part in their application to forces, etc.) is based on the concept that there is no necessary connection between religion and personal laws. Article 44 aims to deprive religion of social relations and personal laws. It clarified that Articles 25, 26 (freedom to manage religious affairs) and 27 (freedom with respect to payment of taxes for the promotion of any particular religion), which guarantee freedom of religion, do not extend to personal laws such as marriage and succession. The Supreme Court observed that the personal laws of Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, and Jain communities, like those of Muslim and Christian communities, have sacramental origins. However, the former groups have demonstrated a willingness to adapt for the purposes of national unity and integration. In contrast, certain other communities have shown less inclination to change, despite the Constitution’s directive for a common civil code for all of India.

The Court also noted that previous rulings on the applicability of the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution, to personal laws, were not addressed in this case. The Court concluded that these matters would be more appropriately addressed by the legislature rather than the judiciary. 

Anil Kumar Mahsi vs. Union of Indian of India and Another (1994)

The Anil Kumar Mahsi case challenged the constitutionality of Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, of 1869. The petitioner was an aggrieved husband, pleading that Section 10 was discriminatory against him. He claimed that the grounds available for women to receive a divorce were not available to the husband. He stated that the wife could seek a divorce on the grounds of adultery and other offences, while he, on the other hand, could not. 

The Court upheld the validity of Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 claiming that women due to their non-aggressive and traditionally defensive roles in society, needed special provisions. The Court affirmed that the provisions were non-violative of Article 14. 

Maharishi Avadhesh vs. Union of India (1994)

In Maharishi Avadhesh vs. Union of India (1994), a writ petition was filed under Article 32 (remedies for enforcement of rights conferred under this Part) of the Indian Constitution. The petition asked the Court to intervene in issues pertaining to personal laws. It advocated for a single civil code. The petition had three main prayers. The first was to declare the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 unconstitutional because it was arbitrary, discriminatory, and violative of Articles 14 and 15, as well as the directive principles of state policy under Articles 44, 38 (State to secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people), 39 (certain principles of policy to be followed by the State), and 39A (equal justice and free legal aid). The Court in this case, highlighted that directive principles are guiding principles for governance. They are not subjected to trial by any court and do not override the legislative process. The petitioners also requested the respondents to consider enacting a common civil code for all Indian citizens. The third prayer was for the respondents to refrain from enacting Sharia Law, as it adversely affects the rights of Muslim women. The Court in this judgement, said that this was a matter for the legislature and does not fall under the purview of the judiciary. It laid emphasis on the separation of powers.

The Court in the present case too, said that these claims fall within the domain of the Parliament. The judgement also clarifies the scope of judicial activism. It indicates that the judiciary can advocate for constitutional principles, but it cannot substitute legislative action with judicial procedure. This demarcation of the roles of the legislative and judiciary is crucial in understanding the Court’s approach in the Ahmedabad Women Action Group case.

Reynold Raiamani and Another vs. Union of India (1982) 

In Reynold Raiamani’s case, the Supreme Court considered the application of Sections 7 (Court to act on principle of English Divorce Court. Omitted by the Indian Divorce Amendment Act, 2001) and 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, of 1869. These sections deal with the grounds and processes for divorce among Christians in India. The issue revolved around whether the courts could accommodate a liberal interpretation of the restrictive grounds for divorce under the Act. The issue was to understand to what extent the judiciary can interpret and expand the grounds for divorce. The petitioner felt that there was a need to accommodate changing societal attitudes towards marriage and divorce. The prayers were to get a judicial intervention that would allow a broader set of circumstances as grounds for divorce, keeping in mind the modern understandings of marital relationships and individual happiness. 

In this case too, the Court emphasised on the fact that the primary responsibility of modifying existing laws and making new ones, lies on the legislature, not the judiciary. This case reinforced the boundary between judicial interpretation and legislative authority. The case limits the scope of judicial activism. These principles were central in enacting and reforming personal laws. In this case, the Court also emphasised the importance of societal and familial stability in matters of matrimonial laws. In the Ahmedabad Women Action Group case, this consideration was relevant, as the judgement highlighted that although it is essential to have reforms, it is also essential to look at its broader implications on society. 

Krishna Singh vs. Mathura Ahir and Others (1980)

This case was slightly different from the other cases mentioned in the judgement. In this case, the main issue before the Supreme Court was whether a Sudra could be ordained into the religious order. The question was whether they could become a Yati (ascetic) or Sanyasi (monk), and thereby a Mahant (chief priest) of the Garwaghat Math, according to the tenets of the Sant mat Sampradaya. The High Court in this case, was of the opinion that the ancient Hindu rule which stated that Sudras could not become Sanyasis, would not be valid in the present day due to the fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution. However, the Supreme Court rejected this idea and held that fundamental rights do not extend to personal laws. It emphasised that the courts shouldn’t intervene in personal laws derived from recognised sources, such as smritis and commentaries, unless there have been alterations in the usages and customs. The Court reaffirmed that personal laws, being a part of the religious and cultural practices, are not subject to judicial reforms under the provisions of fundamental rights. This judgement underscores the judiciary’s limitations in reforming personal laws. 

This is particularly relevant to the Ahmedabad Women Action Group Case, wherein the petitioners argued that the sections of a few personal laws were discriminatory to women. Legislative primacy was also affirmed in the case. The legacy of judicial deference in matters like this was maintained. It stresses on consistency in terms of approach towards personal laws. 

State of Bombay vs. Narasu Appa Mali (1952)

The case of State of Bombay vs. Narasu Appa Mali (1952) is important in understanding the legislative power of enacting social reforms, and the relationship between personal laws and the Constitution of India, with a special emphasis on Article 14 and Part III of the Constitution of India. The judgement deals with the unequal treatment meted out towards Hindus and Muslims, under the Bombay Prevention of Hindu Bigamous Marriages Act, 1946. The learned Chief Justice Chagla observed whether it was appropriate for the legislature to determine what is regarded as social reform, since in a democracy, the responsibility of deciding state policies and legislations, lies on the elected representatives. Both Chief Justice Chagla, and Justice Gajendragadkar, conceded that Muslims were kept out of the purview of the Act, on the ground that the community recognises polygamy, while bigamy is prohibited under Hindu law. Different communities have unique religious and cultural traditions, which is why they have separate laws. For example, Hindu marriage is seen as a sacrament, while Muslim marriage is viewed as a contract. The Constitution’s Article 44 hopes for a future common civil code, but for now, it allows different personal laws. The Court said that lawmakers can gradually introduce social changes and do not have to apply the same laws to everyone right away. If a law is designed for a specific community’s unique situation, it would not be fair under Article 14 of the Constitution. Therefore, having different laws for different communities is fair and not arbitrary. Justice Gajendragadkar observed that the Constitution explicitly recognises the existence of personal laws and did not intend for them to be governed by Article 13. He noted that the framers of the Constitution were aware of the necessity for a gradual reform in personal laws. They envisioned the eventual establishment of a common code, but did not seek to immediately challenge personal laws by applying fundamental rights to them.

This view was reflected in the Ahmedabad Women Action Group case, which stated that the legislature, and not the judiciary, is the proper forum for legal reforms of personal laws. Both cases acknowledged that social reform is required, but slowly and according to the prevailing conditions. This case explained that many communities were not socially ready for reform, and this justified the differential approach within the legislature. The Court found that it is a “principle which requires the legislature’s sensitivity to the social life of the people, and the social dynamics of the nation”.

Judgement of the court

The Supreme Court, in its judgement, re-iterated the position that personal laws cannot be scrutinised by Part III (fundamental rights) of the Constitution. The Court held that separation of powers plays a significant role. It insisted that amending or reforming personal laws was the prerogative of the legislature. The judiciary cannot encroach on legislative functions. The desire for a unified law governing the personal affairs of citizens is undeniable. However, the Court clarified that it is a matter for the legislature to decide. It also said in its order that social reforms in issues as controversial and sensitive as personal laws, need to be dealt with in a manner that is in line with the procedures established by law. It further stated that while judicial pronouncements are able to highlight problems and stir the legislature’s conscience, the Court itself cannot legislate. Social evils require thorough observation and restructuring, over numerous sittings. Such personal laws can neither be changed by a court decision nor can a precedent be established for the same, shielding personal laws from judicial review. This is to honour cultural diversity and the complexity of personal law reform. 

The petitions were dismissed on the grounds that personal laws can only be changed by legislative processes and not by judicial interventions.

Aftermath of the Ahmedabad Women’s Action Group Case

The aftermath of the Ahmedabad Women Action Group (AWAG) case has been significant. It has been referenced in several notable cases. One such instance is P.E. Mathew vs. Union Of India (UOI) on May 3, (1999), where the court underscored the separation of powers between the judiciary and the legislature. Similarly, in Clarence Pais & Ors vs. Union Of India on February 22, (2001), the court cited the Ahmedabad Women’s Action Group case to address the  issues of testamentary succession laws. The court concluded that differences in laws were based on historical reasons rather than religious discrimination. The case also highlighted the complexity of achieving uniformity in a federal setting. The Ahmedabad Women’s Action Group case as well as these rulings emphasise the role of the judiciary and legislature in law-making. It reflects the ongoing debates around the Uniform Civil Code (UCC). The UCC aims to standardise personal laws across religions, a topic that remains contentious in contemporary India. The case, through its citations, continues to influence discussions on gender equality, legal uniformity, and the balance of power within the Indian legal system. By addressing the systemic inequalities in personal laws, the Ahmedabad Women’s Action Group case contributes to the broader debate on how to achieve legal uniformity without undermining the pluralistic fabric of Indian society.

Conclusion 

Ahmedabad Women’s Action Group & Ors. vs. Union of India (1997) highlighted the intricate relationship between personal laws and fundamental rights in India. The Court explained that personal laws cannot be scrutinised under Part III (fundamental rights) of the Constitution. It emphasised that it was a matter that required legislative action and not judicial intervention. This was said with respect to issues relating to personal law, taking into consideration cultural and religious sensitivities. The ruling in the case upheld the idea of division of powers, while pointing out that significant social changes, specifically those related to deeply rooted personal laws, should be achieved through the legislative process. The Court also reiterated that uniform civil code under Article 44, is a part of the directive principles of state policy and therefore, not enforceable. The judiciary may recommend the enactment of a UCC, but not enforce it. This would guarantee widespread societal reforms, while also maintaining stability. The Court’s decision to not intervene shows the careful balance between honouring religious practices and the ongoing discussion about the necessity of a common civil code.

Proponents of the Uniform Civil Code argue that it might also assist in cultural integration and societal inclusion by establishing a universal set of legal codes for all groups. The fear that the UCC would erode cultural diversity is unfounded as there are other factors besides personal laws that define cultural identity. Cultural diversity has not been damaged by previous reforms of personal laws. However, some of the arguments against UCC are that it may lead to the imposition of Hindu laws on other minorities.  

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

What did the Supreme Court decide in the Ahmedabad Women Action Group case regarding personal laws?

The Supreme Court ruled that personal laws cannot be tested against Part III (fundamental rights) of the Constitution. It said that reforms in personal laws, is the prerogative of the legislature and not the judiciary.

How does the Constitution of India view the implementation of a uniform civil code?

Article 44 states that the State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India. However, it forms a part of the directive principles of state policy and therefore, is not enforceable by courts. The judiciary may recommend the enactment of a UCC, but not enforce it. 

References

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