This article is written by Almana Singh. It deals with the legal analysis of a landmark judgement wherein the validity of provisions of the C.P. & Berar Motor Vehicle(Amendment) Act, 1947 was questioned and it led to the establishment of the “Doctrine of Eclipse”.

Introduction 

In the landmark case of Bhikaji Narain Dhakras and Ors. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. (1995), the Indian Judiciary grappled with a crucial constitutional question: Can pre-constitutional laws be entirely invalidated if they infringe upon the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the Indian Constitution? Unlike the United States, where constitutional principles often supersede all pre-existing laws, India must navigate a complex legal landscape that includes both pre-constitutional and post-constitutional legislation. This case addressed this fundamental issue and formalised the recognition of the “Doctrine of Eclipse” in Indian jurisprudence. The Doctrine of Eclipse applies exclusively to pre-constitutional laws (those enacted before the enforcement of the Constitution). It comes into play when such laws infringe upon fundamental rights outlined in Part III of the Constitution. Rather than rendering the law null and void, it renders it inoperable and unenforceable to the extent it breaches those rights. If an Amendment rectifies the inconsistency, the law regains its force without requiring re-enactment. 

Details of Bhikaji Narain Dhakras and Ors. vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. (1955)

Case name

Bhikaji Narain Dhakras and Ors. Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. 

Petition numbers

189 to 193 of 1955

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Equivalent citations

MANU/SC/0016/1955, AIR 1955 SC 781, 1955 INSC 49, (1955) IMLJ 37(SC), [1955] 2SCR 589

Court

Hon’ble Supreme Court of India

Quorum

Justice Sudhi Ranjan Das, Justice N.H. Bhagwati, Justice T.L. Venkatarama Aiyyar, Justice Syed Jaffer Imam, and Justice N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar.

Parties to the case

Petitioners

Bhikaji Narain Dhakras 

Respondents

State of Madhya Pradesh 

Judgement date

29.09.1955

Statutes involved

Background of Bhikaji Narain Dhakras and Ors. vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. (1955)

The Motor Vehicle Act of 1939 (MV Act) granted significant powers over transportation to both the Central and Provincial Governments. In 1947, the C.P. & Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act was introduced further augmenting governmental authority. This Amendment empowered the government to set fares or freights across the province or specific route areas, revoke permits after three months, shorten licence durations below the MV Act’s stipulated period, and direct designated transport authorities to issue permits to the government or government-affiliated entities. The primary objective behind these Amendments was to enhance the control and influence of British officials, granting them extensive powers to oversee the transportation of goods.

Facts of the case 

The C.P. Transport Service Ltd. and Provincial Transport Company Ltd. were the two major private companies that dominated the motor transport business in the state of Madhya Pradesh. The petitioners had been carrying on the business under a permit granted to them under Section 58 of the Motor Vehicle Act, of 1939. The State and Union governments held 85% of the share capital and the Union government had a monopoly rule over the Motor Transport Business. Five writ petitions (Petition Nos.189 to 193) were filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The petitions filed alleged that with the enactment of the C.P. & Berar Act of 1947, the government was given broad powers over the private transport business, excluding all other motor vehicle operators.

Issues raised in the case

  • Whether the enforcement of the Constitution of India lead to the complete invalidity and nullity of pre-constitutional laws?
  • What does the term “void” mean as interpreted in Article 13(1) of the Indian Constitution, and what is its operational nature?
  • Whether the C.P & Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1947 is violative of Article 19(1)(g) and Article 31?

Arguments of the parties

Petitioners 

  1. Petitioners averred that Amendments made by the C.P. Berar Act are violative of fundamental rights vested with the citizens of India. Hence, the Act should be declared void. 
  2. The petitioners averred that Amendments made are void under Article 13(1) and cannot be revived after subsequent Amendments. It would have to be re-enacted. 
  3. Petitioners also averred that the C.P. Berar Amendment is violative of Article 19(1)(g) and it remains contradictory against the provisions mentioned in Article 13(1).
  4. Petitioners contended that the First and Fourth Constitutional Amendments cannot be applied retrospectively.

Respondent 

  1. The respondents relied upon the addition of “reasonable restriction” under Article 19(6) which was added by the First Constitutional Amendment in 1951. They agreed that the law was inconsistent with the Constitution of India. However, the inconsistencies were eliminated by the addition of the above-mentioned provision.
  2. Respondents averred that following the enactments of the First and Fourth Constitutional Amendments, the inconsistencies and irregularities of the C.P. Berar Act were reviewed and subsequently amended. Hence, it regained functionality and its constitutionality cannot be questioned.

Laws involved in the case

This case deals with several articles of the Constitution of India. Major ones have been briefed below:

Article 19(1)(g) is a fundamental right enshrined in Part-III of the Constitution of India which is extended to all the citizens of India. It gives the right to all the citizens in India to freely trade and carry out any occupation or business.

Article 19(6) This article puts “reasonable restrictions” on fundamental rights. It was brought in by the First Constitutional Amendment in 1951 which stated that fundamental rights are not absolute. The right of an individual to carry on trade was made subordinate through this article. It asserts that existing laws, or new laws created by the State, may impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise of rights conferred by Article 19(1)(g) in the interest of the general public. The state is empowered to engage in trade, business, industry, or service, either independently or through a state-owned or controlled corporation, even to the extent of excluding citizens wholly or partially. 

Article 19(1)(g) confers upon citizens of India the right to practise any profession or carry on any occupation, or trade. This fundamental right is reasonably restricted by Article 19(6). Restriction should be reasonable and should be in the interest of the general public. This was considered in the case of Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Jan Mohammed Usmanbhai (1986), wherein the Supreme Court held that the expression “in the interest of the general public” has to be considered in a wider sense. The court held that the restriction can also be imposed on clause(1)(g) to achieve any fundamental duties enshrined in Part-IV of the Constitution of India. The court held that the expression can be included within its restrictions for the preservation of public order, public health, public security, morality, and the economic welfare of the community. 

Article 13 of the Constitution of India, deals with laws inconsistent with or in derogation of fundamental rights. It also relates to the “Doctrine of Eclipse”. 

  • Any law in India that contradicts the fundamental rights granted by the Constitution becomes void to the extent of that contradiction.
  • The government cannot make any law that takes away or limits the rights given by the Constitution. Any such law would also be void.
  • “Law” includes any type of legal rule or regulation, and “laws in force” include laws passed before the Constitution came into effect, as long as it hasn’t been repealed.
  • This article doesn’t apply to Amendments made to the Constitution itself under Article 368.

Judgement in Bhikaji Narain Dhakras and Ors. vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. (1955)

Issue-wise judgement is given below for a thorough perusal:

Whether the enforcement of the Constitution of India leads to the complete invalidity and nullity of the pre-constitutional laws

The court introduced the concept of the “Doctrine of Eclipse” in this case. The court cited the case of Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay (1951) which stated that the law does not become void in totality or for all purposes or for all times or all persons but only to the extent of such inconsistency with the provisions of Part-III i.e. the fundamental rights. The court observed that if a pre-constitutional law infringes or hampers a fundamental right, that law will be held unconstitutional to the extent of the inconsistency with the fundamental right and that the law will not be held null and void. Rather, the law will be invalid to the extent of the inconsistency only. It is like a shadow cast over by the Constitution on the inconsistent law, it is “eclipsed” by the Constitution. 

Interpretation of the term “void” under Article 13(1) and its nature

The court observed in Para 15 and held that the inconsistencies of Article 13(1) were amended by the First Constitutional Amendment on 18th June 1951 and the law was revivified without having to be re-enacted. The notification declaring the intention of the State to take over the bus routes to the exclusion of all other motor transport operators was published on the 4th of February 1955 when it was perfectly constitutional for the State to do so. In the Keshavan Madhava Menon case, it was held that Article 13(1) was prospective in operation and this observation was upheld in the case at hand. 

Inconsistency with Article 19(1)(g) and Article 31

Article 19(1) guarantees to all citizens the right to freedom under seven heads. None of these rights are absolute, each of them is restricted by clauses mentioned in 19(2) to 19(6). Thus, the right to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade, or business conferred by Article 19(1)(g) was controlled by clause (6). The fundamental rights conferred in Part III of the Constitution are protected by Article 13 which deems a law inconsistent with fundamental rights as “void”, the interpretation of which has been explained beforehand. 

The new provisions introduced by C.P. Berar excluding all private motor transport operators from the field of transport business would be an infraction of provisions under Article 19(1)(g) and prima facie void under Article 13 unless this invasion by the C.P. Berar Act can be justified under Article 19(6). On 18th June 1951, the First Constitutional Amendment was passed and clause (6) was amended, subsequently removing the inconsistency with the fundamental right. The petitioners argued that the challenged Act was inconsistent with Article 31(2). The court noted that if there were no other factors at play, this argument might have been irrefutable. However, unfortunately, for the petitioners, the Fourth Amendment Act of 1955 came into effect on April 27, 1955, amending clause (2) of Article 31. The court affirmed that the C.P. Berar Act had been inconsistent with Article 31 from the inception of the Indian Constitution until April 27, 1955, when the Fourth Constitutional Amendment rectified the inconsistency. The present petition was filed on 27th May 1955, precisely one month after the enactment of the Fourth Amendment, which resolved the inconsistency.

Rationale behind the Judgement

Criminal litigation

The court relied on the judgement given in  Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay (1951). In this case, a pamphlet was published by the publishing house. It violated Section 15(1) and was punishable under the Indian Press Emergency Powers Act, of 1931. The prosecution was initiated against the petitioner, and proceedings were pending in front of the court when the Constitution of India was enforced. The petitioner contended that the provisions of the Press Act violated fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(a) read along with Article 13. It was decided that Article 13(1) does not make the law void ab initio for all purposes. Instead, it only became void to the extent of their inconsistency. This case marks the inception of the Doctrine of Eclipse. 

The Court observed that American authorities cited by the petitioners only pertain to laws post-constitution, which does not apply to India due to its diverse historical context. Both pre and post-constitutional laws must be considered. Article 13 explicitly renders void any pre-constitutional laws inconsistent with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. However, such laws are not entirely abolished; they continue to apply to pre-constitutional rights and liabilities and also remain enforceable against non-citizens even after the constitution. 

Analysis of the judgement in Bhikaji Narain Dhakras and Ors. vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. (1955)

This judgement raised the question of whether laws infringing fundamental rights can remain valid after the Amendments. Primarily addressing pre-constitutional laws, the case established the formalisation of the doctrine of the eclipse, which is further briefed in later sections of this article. The court noted that, while fundamental rights are inherent to every Indian citizen, they are not absolute and can be reasonably restricted. If a pre-constitutional law infringes upon a fundamental right, that law may be deemed invalid and suspended to the extent of the inconsistency. However, if the inconsistency is later rectified, the law will become operative again without requiring re-enactment. 

Significance and aftermath of the judgement

Although the judgement in Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay (1951) marks the inauguration of the doctrine of Eclipse in India. However, a thorough articulation of this doctrine could be seen in the case at hand. It is pertinent to mention that the Doctrine of Eclipse is applicable only to pre-constitutional laws. It ensures that the pre-constitutional laws remain part of the new legal framework of India, maintaining continuity in governance despite changes brought about by the constitution. This doctrine allows for flexibility in interpreting laws balancing the need for public order with individual rights. This Judgement explained the interpretation of Article 13. 

Doctrine of eclipse 

This judgement formally established the concept of the “Doctrine of Eclipse”. The doctrine is related to Article 13 of the Constitution of India. Clause-wise explanation of Article 13 is provided as:

  • Article 13(1) states that any existing law in force before the start of the Constitution within the territory of India which goes against or is inconsistent with fundamental rights, present in Part III of the Indian Constitution, becomes void to the extent of such inconsistency. 
  • Article 13(2) states that any new law becomes void the moment it comes into violation of fundamental rights, to the extent of such violation.

If a pre-constitutional law infringes or hampers a fundamental right, that law will be held unconstitutional to the extent of inconsistency with the fundamental right meaning that the law will not be held null and void. Instead, the law will be invalid to the extent of the inconsistency. The term “void” in the above-stated Article does not mean outright null and void, rather, it means void to the extent of inconsistency. 

Features of Doctrine of Eclipse 

  • The Doctrine of Eclipse only applies to pre-constitutional laws meaning the laws that came before the enactment of the Constitution on 26th January 1950.
  • The law in question must infringe a fundamental right enshrined in Part III for the Doctrine of Eclipse to come into play.
  • The law when infringes a fundamental right on the application of the doctrine of eclipse does not become null and void, rather, it becomes inoperable and unenforceable to the extent it breaches the fundamental right. 
  • If there is a relevant amendment that is made to rectify the inconsistency in the law and said breach of a fundamental right is mended back to its original position. That law will regain its power and come to light without being re-enacted altogether.
  • In State of Gujarat v. Ambica Mills (1974), The legislature of Gujarat adopted the Bombay Labour Welfare Fund(Gujarat Extension and Amendment) Act, 1961, amending the Bombay Labour Welfare Fund Act, 1953. The 1953 Act aimed to establish a fund supporting initiatives for the welfare of workers in Bombay. The respondents, a corporation formed under the Companies Act, of 1956, contested various provisions of the Act and its accompanying rules. The High Court of Gujarat ruled that the Act contravened Article 19 of the Constitution of India. The issue at hand was whether a law infringing the fundamental rights of citizen-employees under Article 19(1)(f) could be challenged by the Respondent, a non-citizen employer, on the grounds that the law is void against non-citizens. The court held that Ambica Mills, as a non-citizen, could not invoke Article 13(2) to declare the law void against them. The court reasoned that if a law violates the fundamental rights of citizens under Article 19(1)(f), it is void against citizens who have been conferred such rights, but it is operative concerning non-citizens because the law is void only to the extent that the rights conferred on citizens are violated and non-citizens do not have any fundamental rights granted under Article 19. 

Application of Doctrine of Eclipse to post-constitutional laws

Article 13(1) deals with pre-constitutional laws and Article 13(2) deals with post-constitutional laws. A distinction between these two was made in Deep Chand v. State of U.P. (1959) wherein it was observed that no hindrances or inconsistency with the Fundamental Rights can be made as it will render the law void ab initio or invalid. The Supreme Court in another Judgement of  Mahendra Lai Jaini v State of Uttar Pradesh (1963) established that post-constitutional laws that infringe on a fundamental right cannot be made functional by any constitutional amendments, they will have to be re-enacted. 

Applicability of Doctrine of Eclipse in recent cases

The case at hand is a landmark case as it has led to the establishment of the Doctrine of Eclipse. This Doctrine is time and again cited by courts, a few of the cases have been briefed below:

  1. Dularey Lodh v. The IIIrd Ad. District Judge, Kanpur & Ors. (1984)

Dularey Lodh, the Appellant-tenant challenged a decree for ejectment obtained by the landlord(Respondent) in 1971. The decree was initially held inexcusable due to jurisdictional objections raised by the appellant and a judgement of the Allahabad High Court. However, the U.P. Urban Buildings(Regulations of Letting, Rent, and Eviction)(Amendment) Act, 1976, retrospectively made Section 9 of the 1972 Act applicable, effectively removing the bar on executing such decrees. The court held that after the 1976 Amendment, the decree became legally executable. The court observed even if the 1972 Act was applicable, the decree would have been inexcusable but not invalidated. The Doctrine of Eclipse comes into play here, allowing the revival and executability without being re-enacted all over again. 

  1. Km. Shilpi Saini vs State Of Uttaranchal And Ors. (2003)

The petitioner sought a writ petition directing the respondents to grant her provisional admission until the declaration of her compartment examination results and to allocate her a seat based on her merit in counselling. The petitioner had appeared for AIEEE, 2003 but had not qualified for her immediate examination which was a pre-requisite for admission. In the counselling, it was noted that the petitioner had not submitted her pass certificate for immediate examination, but later she submitted it after appearing for compartment examination, thereby fulfilling the eligibility criteria. The court applied the doctrine of eclipse, which essentially means that once a legal obstacle preventing a right is removed, the right becomes immediately enforceable. The court cited the Dularey Lodh case, which has been briefed above. The court was of the opinion since the barrier had been removed, the petitioner should not be hindered from participating.

Conclusion 

In the case at hand, petitioners claimed that the C.P. Berar Act hampered their fundamental rights as citizens of India and according to Article 13, it should be declared null and void. However, The Hon’ble court applied the Doctrine of Eclipse and dismissed the case claiming that the inconsistency in the pre-constitutional law was fixed by subsequent amendments and there is no need to declare the law null and void entirely, scrape it, and re-enact. The court ruled in favour of the respondents underscoring the approach of jurists in constitutional interpretation highlighting the interplay between pre-constitutional and post-constitutional legal frameworks. By affirming the Doctrine of Eclipse, the court recognized the continued relevance of pre-constitutional laws subject to constitutional principles. This case emphasised the rich Indian history and its effects on today’s law.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

What does “void” mean under Article 13(1) and how is it interpreted in this case?

In Article 13(1) of the Constitution of India, “Void” signifies the invalidity of pre-constitutional laws conflicting with fundamental rights. Such laws are suspended until the inconsistency is resolved, but the entire statute isn’t scrapped off. Amendments, like the First Constitutional Amendment in this case, can rectify inconsistencies, reviving the law without re-enactment. 

Which law does the Doctrine of Eclipse relate to?

It is related to Article 13 of The Constitution of India. If a pre-constitutional law infringes or hampers a fundamental right, that law will be held unconstitutional to the extent of inconsistency with the fundamental right meaning that the law will not be held null and void. Rather, the law will be invalid to the extent of the inconsistency.

Is the doctrine of eclipse applicable to both pre and post-constitutional laws?

The Doctrine of Eclipse is specifically only applicable to pre-constitutional law. The Supreme Court in the case of Deep Chand v. State of U.P. (1959), observed that a post-constitutional law that violates a fundamental right is void ab initio.

What is the operational nature of Article 13(1)?

The court observed that Article 13(1) is prospective in nature. 

What are pre and post-constitutional laws?

Pre-constitutional laws were laws enacted during the British era and predate the enforcement of the Constitution of India on 26th January 1950. Conversely, the laws which came after the enforcement of the Constitution are referred to as post-constitutional laws.

When was the Motor Vehicle Act enacted?

The initial Motor Vehicle legislation was established in 1914 and underwent modifications through the Indian Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, of 1920, and subsequently, the Indian Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, of 1924. This legislation was later superseded by the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939, which became effective in 1940. Finally, the most recent Motor Vehicles Act of 1988 became operational on July 1, 1989.

References

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