This article is written by Shweta Singh. This article contains a detailed analysis of the findings and decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Chameli Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1995). In addition to this, it also discusses the relevance and significance this case holds in today’s scenario.

This article has been published by Shashwat Kaushik.

Introduction 

The citizens of India are guaranteed several fundamental rights that are important for the holistic growth and development of an individual. The right to shelter is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(e), read with Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. However, there are instances when the fundamental rights of an individual come into direct conflict with the rights of the public at large. The case of Chameli Singh v. State of U.P. (1995) (referred to as “this case”) reflects such a conflict and exemplifies how such conflict can be resolved by the court by adopting a balanced approach wherein the rights of both the individual and the community are safeguarded. Land acquisition by the government for the welfare of the marginalised section of society often leads to the acquisition of private property, which results in the deprivation of the owner’s right to shelter. To prevent such a conflict, the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1894) provides for procedural safeguards. Such safeguards mandate that the appropriate government to acquire land by following the procedures outlined under the Act of 1894.  

Details of Chameli Singh vs. State of UP (1995)

Name of the case

Chameli Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1995)

Name of the Court

Supreme Court

Date of the judgment

15 December, 1995

Parties to the case

Petitioner 

Chameli Singh

Respondent

State of Uttar Pradesh

Represented by

Petitioner

Shri R. K. Jain, Senior Advocate

Respondent 

Dr. N.M Ghatate, Senior Advocate 

Equivalent citations

AIR 1996 SC 1051, JT 1995 (9) SC 380, 1996 (1) SCALE 101, (1996) 2 SCC 549, [1995] SUPP 6 SCR 827, AIR 1996 SUPREME COURT 1051, 1996 (2) SCC 549, 1996 AIR SCW 542, 1996 ALL. L. J. 413.

Type of the case

Civil Appeal No. 12122 of 1995 with SLP (Civil) No. 4896 of 1993.

Bench

Justice K. Ramaswamy, Justice Faizan Uddin, and Justice B.N. Kirpal.

Author of the judgment

The Judgment was authored by Justice K. Ramaswamy.

Statute referred

1. The Land Acquisition Act, 1894- Section 5A, Section 17(4), Section 4(1).
2.  The Constitution of India, 1949- Article 21

Background of Chameli Singh vs. State of UP (1995) 

India faced severe challenges to achieve its developmental goals, which are economically profitable, socially inclusive, environmentally sound, politically viable, and in accordance with the Rule of Law. A major point in these challenges was the equitable and effective acquisition of land by the government for multiple economic development projects, including infrastructure and industry.

On the other hand, there was an urgent need to protect the constitutionally guaranteed land rights of the poor and most disadvantaged communities in India. This protection paralleled the sustainability of their social and economic independence. Land, therefore, had worth beyond its economic implications; it embodies community identity, history, and culture. It is important to note that the dispute that arose because of the acquisition of land by the government, which led to the deprivation of people’s land rights, caused extensive impacts across India’s economic, social, and political domains. These disputes encompassed various aspects, showcasing the intricate interplay between developmental objectives, personal rights, public welfare, and government authority.

It was the responsibility of the government to carry out public infrastructure-related projects, which often involve construction work. In order to carry out these projects successfully, the government might have felt the need to acquire the land, which in some cases might have been the private property of citizens. In such instances, the government’s authority to acquire land superseded the individual’s right to ownership of that property. This acquisition process enabled the government to confiscate private property for the realisation of public infrastructure projects, thereby allowing the development of essential public projects for the whole society.

The Act of 1894 was the main authority that the government followed for the purpose of acquiring land for the greater public interest. Part II of the Act of 1894 addressed the process of acquisition, with Section 6 focusing on the declaration of acquisition for public welfare purposes and Section 9 pertaining to the invitation for claims for compensation. This Act of 1894 was heavily criticised for being violative of the right to residence provided under the Indian Constitution. Even though the Act of 1894 had provisions for providing compensation to the owners of the land whose land had been acquired, the procedure for seeking compensation was not very smooth. Consequently, many were forced to challenge the decision of the government to acquire particular land before the court of law, where the major issue for the court was to decide whether such an acquisition curtailed the fundamental right to residence and a right to shelter provided under the Indian Constitution. The same issue was also presented in the present case.

Facts of Chameli Singh vs. State of UP (1995) 

The appeal was filed against the decision made by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court on February 5, 1993, regarding a writ petition filed by the appellants. The appellants were the owners or holders of specific land units that were located in the plot of land numbered Plot No. 16 in village Bairam Nagar belonging to the administrative unit of Pargana Nahtaur within the jurisdiction of Tehsil Dhampur, in District Bijnore, Uttar Pradesh. The land in dispute totalled 5 bighas, 6 biswas, and 14 biswas.

Through the application of Section 4(1) of the Act of 1894, these lands were included in the State Gazette on 23rd July 1983. As per Section 4(1), an appropriate government (central or state) was required to publish a notification in the Official Gazette outlining its intention to acquire a particular land that is necessary for public welfare. In addition to such notification, a declaration was also published according to the provisions contained under Section 6 of the Act of 1894, bypassing the enquiry under Section 5-A. Unwilling to give possession of their lands, the appellants challenged the validity of the notification published pursuant to Section 4(1) along with the exercise of power by the government provided under Section 17(1) and Section 17(4), which allowed for the omission of the Section 5-A enquiry. The appellants had challenged the impugned notification on three grounds. In the first place, they contended that Section 17(1) invoked by the government for the acquisition of their land did not apply to their situation as their land was not classified as wasteland or arable land. The second argument presented by the appellants in support of their claims was that there were no urgent circumstances for the government to take immediate possession of the land for providing accommodation facilities to the Scheduled Caste, and therefore, dispensing with the requirement of enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act of 1894 was not justified. Lastly, they argued that such acquisition of their land by the government was a violation of Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, which protects the right to life and livelihood. They asserted that the acquisition would deprive them of their lands, which were the only source of their livelihood. 

However, the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court dismissed these contentions raised by the appellants in support of their claim. Consequently, being dissatisfied with the decision of the Allahabad High Court, they filed an appeal to the Supreme Court by way of a Special Leave Petition.

Issues raised

1. Whether the government was justified in invoking the urgency provision under Section 17(4) of the Act of 1894. 
2. Whether the delay in publishing the notification of the accusation on the part of the government rendered the invocation of the urgency provision void. 
3. Whether the acquisition of the petitioner’s land by the government would lead to the deprivation of the right to livelihood provided under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. 

Arguments of the parties

Arguments presented by the petitioners 

The petitioners argued that despite the Tahsildar’s proposal for acquisition dated August 3, 1979, the notifications under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 were published only on April 30, 1983, and then on July 23, 1983, in the Uttar Pradesh Gazette. The notification under Section 6 of the Act was also published on July 23, 1983. They further mentioned that it is apparent from the notification published according to Section 4 of the Act of 1894 that the provisions of Section 17(1) and (1-A) as amended by the U.P. State Legislature, were invoked by the government, which provided for the dispensing with the requirement of complying with the enquiry procedures outlined in Section 5-A of the Act of 1894. The appellant contended that there was no indispensable emergency for the acquisition of their land, as evidenced by the fact that the State Government decided to acquire the land back in June 1979 and the report submitted by the Tahsildar on August 3, 1979. However, despite these actions taken early on, the government delayed the taking of action for approximately four years and then illegally bypassed the requirement of Section 5-A of the Act of 1894. 

Mr. R. K. Jain, esteemed senior counsel of the petitioners, emphasised his points with increased fervour and underscored the significance of the timeline discrepancy: the proposal put forth in 1979 and the issuing of the notification by publishing it in April 1983. This delay, in his opinion, eliminated any claim of urgency that would validate the circumvention of the 30-day enquiry procedure mentioned in Section 5-A. Access to such an enquiry, he highlighted, was not merely procedural but acted as a safeguard for the interests of the property owners. He argued strenuously that such an invoking of the urgency clause under Section 17(4) of the Act of 1894 should not rob the citizen of this right.

Mr. Jain further asserted that in acquisitions meant for housing purposes, such an enquiry done under Section 5-A should be followed as a standard practice. He contended that dispensing with the requirement of enquiry by the government should be exercised only as an exceptional measure warranted only in rare circumstances, as mentioned under Section 17(2) of the Act of 1894. To reinforce his point and back his claim, he referenced the precedent set by the Supreme Court in the case of Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra (1977).

Highlighting one of the profound implications of land acquisition, Mr. Jain highlighted the fact that this deprivation of property equalled a taking away of the basic fundamental right of the livelihood of people, which was guaranteed under Article 21 of the constitution. He objected strongly against depriving owners of their means of sustenance through compulsory acquisition, suggesting that there should be a more balanced and fair approach in land acquisition proceedings.

Arguments presented by the respondent

The respondent in turn gave many arguments to disprove what the appellants had stated in their arguments. Firstly, it was clarified by the respondents that the houses constructed by the appellants did not fall within the category of agricultural lands. They further asserted that they had complete authority to invoke Section 17(1-A) of the Act of 1894 as amended by the State Legislature of the U.P., which entrusted the state government with the power to take possession of lands other than wasteland or arable land, particularly for sanitary improvements or planned development. 

Moreover, the respondent mentioned that the state government had statutorily been authorised under Section 17(4) of the Act of 1894 to dispense with the requirement outlined in Section 5-A in the case of an urgent situation. Therefore, when an appropriate government considered that there was an earlier need to take possession of the land for the construction of houses for Dalits, it made an opinion of urgency to go ahead with the perception and acquire the land. As a result, the government should be released from its obligation to conduct the enquiry under Section 5-A and could directly proceed with publishing the declaration under Section 6 after the publication date of the Section 4(1) notification.

The respondent highlighted the authority vested in the land acquisition officer under sub-section (1) of Section 17. According to this section, once the notice under Section 9 was served and a 15-day period had expired, the land acquisition officer was given the authority to carry out possession of the land for the public good.

The respondent’s argument in essence maintained that the actions of the government complied with the statutory provisions of the Act of 1894 and that the urgency to build houses for Dalits justified the exemptions from the applicability of some procedural requirements to the present situation. 

Law discussed in Chameli Singh vs. State of UP (1995)

Right to shelter

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966) highlight the necessity of ensuring decent living conditions for all individuals and their families. Article 25(1) of the UN Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states that every person is entitled to a standard of living adequate for the improvement of their health and well-being and that of their family as well. This standard covers basic vital needs such as food, clothing, shelter, healthcare, and necessary social services. Another aspect related to the right to an adequate standard of living is outlined in Article 11(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) published in 1966, which not only emphasises the accessibility of basic needs but also the continuity in the advancement of living conditions. It establishes that those states that are parties to the covenant are to recognise and take appropriate steps to realise these rights.

The matter of property rights in India has been a source of contention for quite a while, since it is related to the right to shelter. Originally, the right to property was recognised as a fundamental right under Article 31 of the Indian Constitution. However, the 44th Constitutional Amendment Act of 1978, repealed this right and replaced by Article 300A. Consequently, the right to property has been revised and stipulated as a constitutional right in Article 300A. This alteration enabled the state to seize private property through legal proceedings, thus balancing individual property rights with those of the state. However, it is pertinent to mention that the Supreme Court, in the case of Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985), determined that the right to life guaranteed by Article 21 of the Indian Constitution encompasses the right to livelihood and shelter. This landmark case expanded the realm of the right to life from merely a physical existence to an inclusive one that includes conditions necessary for a life with human dignity, such as shelter and a decent means of living.

Under the Constitution of India, the right to shelter is a fundamental right ensured by Article 19(1)(e), read with Article 21. In the case of P. G. Gupta v. State of Gujarat (1995), the three-judge bench decided that the right to shelter is expressed not only in Article 19(1)(e) but also in Article 21 of the Constitution of India, ensuring the right to residence and settlement. The right to shelter is an elementary part of the protection of life assured under Article 21 and constitutes a meaningful realisation of the right to life. The preamble of the Indian Constitution pledges social and economic justice, equality of status and opportunity, and dignity for every citizen to foster unity among all segments of society in a united India. Article 39(b) directs the State to ensure the fair distribution of community resources to promote the welfare of the people, particularly the weaker sections, minimise income inequality, and strive to eliminate disparities in status. Article 46 instructs the state to give special attention to the social, economic, and educational needs of marginalised groups, specifically Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The right to social and economic justice is intrinsically linked with the right to shelter as an essential element of a meaningful right to life. Consequently, it was held that the right to residence and settlement is a fundamental entitlement under Article 19(1)(e) and an integral aspect of the inseparable and meaningful right to life under Article 21. 

In the case of Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khimalal Totame And Others (1990), a panel of three judges discussed the fundamental necessities of human beings, which conventionally are food, clothing, and shelter. The right to life is the keystone of any civilised society, embracing not only the basic necessity of living but also the right to live in a proper environment and in a proper house. It’s significant to recognise the difference between the shelter needs of humans to those of animals. Unlike animals, whose primary needs for security are just their bodies, humans need settings that serve all purposes—their physical health, mental welfare, and mental insights. The primary aim of the Constitution is the comprehensive development of each individual, which begins with the provision of decent housing, especially for children. While not every citizen may have homes that are well built and comfortable, the Constitution underlies the concept of a reasonable dwelling. In the case of India, even a simple dwelling made from mud or thatch could be acceptable, if it meets the basic needs and improves safety against hazards. The focus is not on facility buildings but on sufficient conditions for all citizens, which ensure the overall well-being and development of society.

The Court, in the case of State of Karnataka v.Narasimhamurthy (1995), reiterated that the right to shelter is a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1) of the Constitution. To ensure the complete realisation of this right for individuals who are economically disadvantaged, it is imperative for the government to facilitate opportunities for housing construction. The acquisition of the land by the government to provide housing accommodation to the poor and homeless serves a public interest, thereby complying with the state’s constitutional obligation to furnish housing facilities to those in need.

In a civilised society, the right to live as a human being goes beyond the minimum sustenance requirement of a man. It can be realised only if the individuals have access to all the needed facilities for their development and, at the same time, are free from anything that impedes or narrows their development. The very notion of the right to life in a civilised society includes, but is not limited to, food, water, a healthy environment, access to education, healthcare, and shelter. These are the basic human rights that are recognised by civilised societies across the world. The right to shelter is not only about securing one’s physical life from dangers, but it also signifies a home, where individuals can develop holistically—mentally, physically, intellectually, and spiritually. Thus, the right to shelter encapsulates a variety of elements, including adequate area, secure and suitable buildings, clean surroundings, access to basic amenities such as air, water, light, electricity, sanitation, and other civic facilities like roads for convenient daily activities.

The doctrine of eminent domain

The practice of land acquisition by a state is based on the doctrine of eminent domain, which grants the state authority to act in the public interest. This doctrine is based on two Latin concepts:

1. Salus populi supreme lex esto, which means that the welfare of the people is the paramount law.
2. Necessita public major est quan, which means that public necessity is greater than private necessity.

The process of land acquisition in India runs on the principle of eminent domain. Eminent domain gives the government the government the power to acquire possession of private property for public purposes without obtaining the consent of the owner. This power is granted to the government for the purpose of fulfilling its obligation to provide housing accommodation to the public at large and can be exercised only after paying compensation for the property taken.

The Constitution plays a vital role in the establishment of the scope and implementation of the eminent domain doctrine. This doctrine is implicitly acknowledged within the constitutional framework, notably in Article 300A. Under this Article, it is provided that property can be acquired by the authority only by way of legal process, thus establishing the foundation for the doctrine of eminent domain. 

The doctrine of eminent domain, like other government actions, is also subject to the scrutiny of judicial review. The courts are vested with the power to examine the validity and constitutionality of eminent domain cases. The courts determine if the acquisition is made for a legitimate public purpose, if the owner has been able to get proper compensation, and if all the necessary legal processes have been followed. The judiciary plays a critical role in maintaining the balance between the government’s authority to acquire private property for public welfare and the rights of the owner of these properties. The judiciary, by means of its interpretation of the doctrine and its exercise in specific cases, definitely defines the course of the eminent domain law. Judicial review is a vital component of ensuring accountability and fairness in exercising eminent domain powers by governmental bodies. It functions as a safeguard mechanism, preventing any possible abuse, and helps to protect the property rights of the owners within the confines of eminent domain.

In the case of the State of Gujarat v. Shantilal Mangaldas (1969), the Supreme Court reiterated that the doctrine of eminent domain is the foundational part of government authority. This implies that the government has absolute authority to acquire private lands for public good, provided that fair compensation is provided to the owner.

In the case of Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India (1951), the Apex Court underscored that under the concept of eminent domain, a sovereign state has the ultimate authority to take private lands for public use. However, such authority should be exercised carefully, with the supreme objective of promoting the public good and undertaking legitimate public functions. While there may be good reasons for exercising this power, it can sometimes be used aggressively in the name of social welfare.

Urgency provision under the Act of 1894 

Under the Act of 1894, the urgency provisions are contained in Section 17. According to Section 17(1), whenever the appropriate government (central or state government) considers in cases of urgency that the land is needed for public purposes, it may take possession of such land, and such land after possession shall vest absolutely in the government without any encumbrances. Section 17(4) outlines the procedure to be followed after subsection (1) is applicable to any piece of land decided to be acquired by the government. Section 17(4) authorises the government to determine that whenever the land is considered to be acquired for the purpose of public good and a reason for the urgency of fulfilling such a purpose exists, it can bypass certain procedural requirements provided under Section 5-A of the Act of 1894. The provisions of this section can be dispensed with by a declaration made under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 at any time after the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act of 1894 has been published.

Section 5-A of the Act of 1894 empowers the person who is interested in the land notified under Section 4(1) to raise objections. After the objections have been raised within the time frame of 30 days from the date of the publication of the notification, such person shall be given an opportunity to be heard and present his objections to such acquisition. Section 17(4) authorises the government to dispense with the procedure of recording objections and hearings whenever there is a case of urgency. 

It is important to note that this section places enormous authority on the government to acquire land, and therefore, the scope of judicial review has been expanded in matters of land acquisition, wherein the courts have decided upon the validity of invoking the urgency clause provided under the Act of 1894. When the court reviews the validity of the invocation of the urgency clause, it focuses its findings only on whether the government had valid and good reasons to bypass the procedures outlined in Section 5-A. In short, the court has to find out that, firstly, the land is acquired for the public good, and a sense of urgency exists to fulfil the objective of achieving the public good. For clarity, it is pertinent to mention that, while judicially reviewing the validity of the invocation of the urgency clause, the court shall not decide upon the legality of the acquisition itself.

Judgment in Chameli Singh vs. State of UP (1995)

The Court in its judgment put a strong emphasis on the fundamental attribute of the right to residence and settlement, set out under Article 19(1)(e) of the Indian Constitution, which was part of the larger and inseparable right to life as articulated in Article 21. The Court recognised that the imperative to ensure access to the shelter was not peculiar to India but was a pervasive and worldwide problem afflicting many other countries, both under-developed and developed. 

The Court recognised the harsh living conditions of the Dalits in the entire country, which were continuously on the rise. The Court also asserted that such a problem required immediate attention and judicial recognition. It highlighted that, despite the passage of time, these marginalised communities still faced harsh living conditions. The Court acknowledged that, looking into the present living conditions, there was an urgency in taking action to address the unsanitary and deplorable housing conditions dwelt by Dalits, tribes, and the poor. 

The Court pronounced that the provision of housing sites for Dalits and tribes as well as the economically underprivileged was a national necessity as well as a constitutional responsibility, and the demand for redressing these injustices remained unabated.

In light of these reasons, the Court was of the view that there was no legal infirmity at all in the impugned notification, thereby dismissing the appeal. Nevertheless, considering the facts, the Court decided not to impose costs on the appellant.

Issue-wise judgment of the case

Whether the Government was justified in invoking the urgency provision under Section 17(4) of the Act of 1894

The court recognised the appalling housing conditions in the country and highlighted the observation made by Justice Chinnappa Reddy in the case of Kasireddy Papaiah v. Govt. of A.P. (1975) (Kasireddy Papaiah case). In this case, Justice Chinnappa Reddy observed that the matter of providing houses to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes was of paramount urgency and extraordinary importance, as historical circumstances had made it imperative to address this issue swiftly. He underlined that the longer the time span it took to solve the housing problems of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, the more urgent the issue became. It implied that the seriousness of the issue could not be ignored due to the passiveness of bureaucracy. He, therefore, believed that resorting to the emergency provisions of the Act of 1894 to give the site for housing to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes was fair as long as the intention for the same was not malicious.

The Court made another reference to the case of the State of U.P. v. Pista Devi (1986) (Pista Devi Case), wherein the observation made by Justice Chinnappa Reddy in the Kasireddy Papaiah case concerning the Schedule Tribes was equally applied to providing housing accommodations to all citizens of the country. In this case, a two-judge bench, considering the rapid rate of population growth and the critical need for housing, determined that the government could use the urgency clause for planned development in urban areas. The court further stated that in the Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (1975) case, which was decided in 1975 by a Constitution Bench, the Court supported the exercise of the state’s power under Section 17(4), dispensing with the enquiry requirement as mandated by Section 5-A of the Act of 1894, for the purpose of the planned development of Delhi.

The Court clarified its position with regard to the issue of bureaucratic delays and the weight of the government’s finding of emergency in matters related to Section 17(4). The Court cited the case of Jage Ram v. State of Haryana (1971) and held that the officers’ slowness at the beginning of the acquisition process was not relevant in determining whether there was urgency at the time of notification. The Court also noted that the government’s determination of urgency, while not definitive, holds considerable significance. The Court, by further elucidating its finding on this particular issue, referenced the case of Rajasthan Housing Board v. Shri Kishan (1993) and observed that the government’s determination in accordance with Section 17(4) is subjective. As long as there was material upon which the government might plausibly form this subjective judgment, the Court should not interfere with such findings.

In the case of the State of U.P. v. Keshav Prasad Singh (1995), the Court adjudged that the government had the right to use the special powers given to them by Section 17(4) of the Act of 1894 by applying the urgency clause, thereby not conducting the mandatory enquiry under Section 5-A, provided that the urgency was evident based on the available facts on record.

The Supreme Court, following the judgments and observations given in the above-listed cases, opined that it was evident there was a severe dearth of houses for STs and SCs, which prompted the State to act fast in providing housing on par with its constitutional duties. Therefore, the government’s invocation of Section 17(4) as per the Act of 1894 was a justified procedure.

Whether the delay in publishing the notification of the accusation on the part of the government rendered the invocation of the urgency provision void

In order to decide upon this particular issue, the Apex Court assisted itself by referring to the Pista Devi case. Here, the Court addressed the question of whether the State Government had the legal authority to exercise its right under Section 17(4) to dispose of the enquiry provided by Section 5-A in the pursuit of housing accommodation for planned development in Meerut following the acquisition of land. The Court stated that giving people a place to live should be a priority for the whole nation since it is a national urgency, which the Court must acknowledge judicially. In addition, it was made clear that any delays existing before and after the issue of the notification by the concerned officer did not eliminate the urgency aspect of land acquisition for housing development.

The Court followed the ratio given by the court in the Deepak Pahwa v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (1984) case. In this case, a three-judge bench of the Court upheld the notification under Section 17(4) of the Act of 1894 despite the delay of 8 years, which was because of the inter-departmental discussions that took place before the issuance of the notification. The Court opined that this itself could constitute a valid ground for applying the urgency clause, citing the lapse of time. Even though there had been bureaucratic inefficiencies that led to delays, the Court asserted that the original urgency that justified expeditious action still holds and that the need for quick action could not be undermined.

After the perusal of the relevant cases on this issue, the Supreme Court, by assessing the facts of the present case, gave its decision on this particular issue. It is acknowledged by the Court that in both the pre-notification and post-notification stages, there were delays with the land acquisition process. Despite the delays, the government applied the “urgency clause” and waived the enquiry process under Section 5-A. The Court concluded that the delay itself accelerates the sense of urgency. This implied that as long as the delay persisted, the more urgent the issue became. The court reiterated that unless the government’s motives were proved to be mala-fide (bad faith), it would not interfere with the decision of the government that the issue of public concern had been deemed an urgent matter. The Court underlined the fact that the need to redress the problem of unhealthy and inadequate housing for those belonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and the poor continued to persist. Therefore, as long as the national problem of providing housing to these marginalised groups remained unsolved, the urgency to acquire land remained. The Court recognises the fact that the government has taken measures to meet the housing needs of vulnerable communities by offering decent living conditions with better sanitary conditions. It showed that, notwithstanding the delays, the government’s intentions seemed to be aimed at resolving a pressing social issue. Finally, the Court concluded that the delays that occurred because of the officers involved in the land acquisition process both before and after notification were not enough to make the urgency clause invalid. Thus, in spite of the fact that the acquisition procedure was delayed, the government speeding up the land acquisition process by invoking the urgency clause was justified.

Whether the acquisition of the petitioner’s land by the government would lead to the deprivation of the right to livelihood provided under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution

The Court acknowledged that land acquisition, being a compulsory process of law and intended for public purposes puts ownership at risk, which could deprive the owner of their means of livelihood. However, it should be noted that the state was given the power of eminent domain for the interest of the public at large, therefore, individual property rights had to give way to this public purpose. The Court pointed out that compensation, including solatium, was provided to landowners who were unwilling to give up their land voluntarily under Section 23(2) of the Act of 1894. This compensation had been calculated at an amount determined by the prices prevailing at the time of issuing the notice for acquisition under Section 23(1) of the Act of 1894. The Court found that when land acquisition was done following the stipulated legal process, it could be regarded as a legitimate exercise of state power. Consequently, it could not be considered as a denial of the right to livelihood. The Court also mentioned that, in addition to receiving compensation for the acquired land, interest had been payable to compensate for any dislocation or loss of enjoyment of property. Interest had been calculated from the time of notification under Section 23(1-A) until the time compensation was deposited. The Court finally held that a plea of deprivation of the right to livelihood under Article 21 of the Constitution was untenable in land acquisition cases executed in accordance with the legal procedure as stated in the Act of 1894.

Analysis of Chameli Singh vs. State of UP (1995) 

This case highlights the importance of the right to shelter as an intrinsic part of human development and, hence, has been guaranteed as a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(e) of the Constitution of India. To realise such a right for the weaker sections of society, such as Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, the Act of 1894 provided the authority to the appropriate government to acquire land for the purpose of developing housing facilities for these weaker sections of the society. In the process of acquiring land, there often arises a conflict between the right to shelter of an individual and the public at large, as an acquisition by the government leads to the possession of the property owned by an individual. This case highlights the importance of safeguarding the individual right to shelter together with the government’s responsibility to provide accommodation facilities to those who are deprived of the same in the interest of the public. In this case, the Supreme Court, through its decision, established that while the government is authorised to acquire land under the Act of 1894, it is important that such an acquisition process is in accordance with the procedures duly established under the Act of 1894 and that the individual whose lands have been acquired is given fair and just compensation in order to strike a balance between the contesting rights of the individual and the public at large.

Conclusion 

In this case, the Supreme Court emphasised that whenever the government exercises its power to acquire land for public purposes, the individual right of an owner would yield place to the larger public purposes, provided that such acquisition of land by the government is done by following the due procedure of law. In the cases of the land acquisition process, the due procedure of law mandates the publication of notifications in the Official Gazette and newspapers, soliciting objections from concerned parties, and payment of fair and just compensation to the owner. However, the urgency of providing accommodations to the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes requires the government to bypass such elaborate procedures to fast-track the acquisition process. This is where the Court comes to play its role by exercising its power of judicial review. Whether the urgency clause as provided under Section 17(4) of the Act of 1894 has been correctly and validly invoked by the executive or not comes under the scope of judicial review in land acquisition matters.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

Is the right to shelter a fundamental right?

Under the Constitution of India, the right to shelter is a fundamental right ensured by Article 19(1)(e), read with Article 21. In the case of P. G. Gupta v. State of Gujarat (1995), the three-judge bench decided that the right to shelter is expressed not only in Article 19(1)(e) but also in Article 21 of the Constitution of India, ensuring the right to residence and settlement. The right to shelter is an elementary part of the protection of life assured under Article 21 and constitutes a meaningful realisation of the right to life.

What was the main issue in this case?

The main issue before the court was whether the acquisition of the petitioner’s land by the government would lead to the deprivation of the right to livelihood provided under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.

What is the meaning of the doctrine of eminent domain in land acquisition cases?

Eminent Domain gives the government the power to acquire the possession of private property for public purposes without obtaining the consent of the owner. This power is granted to the government for the purpose of fulfilling its obligation to provide housing accommodations to the public at large and can be exercised only after paying fair compensation to the owner for the land taken.

References

1. https://www.lawinsider.in/judgment/landmark-judgement-chameli-singh-v-state-of-u-p-1996-2
2. https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609acc5e4b014971140fb22#17
3. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/18928039/