In this article, Funnisha Garg pursuing M.A, in Business Law from NUJS, Kolkata discusses Clubbing of petitions.

Introduction

Article 32 of the Constitution gives Supreme Court of India the power to issue orders or issue writs. Five writs provided by the Indian Constitution are habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, Quo Warranto and certiorari, as appropriate for any application of rights.

The Constitution also gives the High Court the power to issue writs too. Article 226 of the Constitution states: “Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 32, each High court shall have the power, in the territories for which it exercises its jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, even in the appropriate cases, habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, warrant and certiorari, or one of them, for the application of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for other purposes.”

Types of Writs

Habeas Corpus

A judicial writ of Habeas Corpus is employed by the courts to search out if an individual has been illicitly detained. If the solution is affirmative, the court will order for his unharness. If an individual has been illicitly detained, he himself, an acquaintance or perhaps a relative can file a judicial writ of Habeas Corpus. Habeas Corpus is Latin for ‘Let North American country have the body’ (or, allow us to see the one that has been illicitly detained). Through Habeas Corpus, the court will so conjointly summon the person detained or captive to the court.

To file a Habeas Corpus petition. Although typically a petition is to be filed by the person being detained or in remission, as per Habeas Corpus, the other person will have a go at it on behalf of the detained individual. This written petition will be issued by a public authority or any specific individual.

Mandamus

A judicial writ of mandamus is issued by a better court to a court, assembly or a public authority to perform an act that such a court is sure to perform. If a public official isn’t performing his duty, the court will order it or him/her to try to do that. Writ of mandamus suggests that we have a tendency to command.[2]

To file a Mandamus petition

The writ will be issued against anyone, as well as the president or governor of the state, a personal person or a judge. Anyone or a personal body will file a judicial writ petition for writ of mandamus, subject to the person/persons having legal rights to try to, therefore, within the matter involved.

Prohibition

A judicial writ of prohibition, referred to as a ‘stay order’, is issued to lower court or a body to prevent acting on the far side its powers.

While the writ of mandamus is issued for any activity that’s not legal, the writ petition is issued against the lower courts, like magistrates and commissions, for inactivity within the matter of concern. The High Court and Supreme Court will issue the judicial writ of Prohibition.

Writ of Certiorari

The writ is issued by the Supreme Court to a lower court or the other body to transfer a selected issue to the upper courts than itself. The writ is issued by the high court to the lower courts or the Tribunal, once a slip-up of jurisdiction or law is believed to be committed then the writ could be a curative writ.

Quo Warranto

The writ of hearing (by what warrant) is issued to inquire regarding the lawfulness of a claim by a person or authority to in a Public Office, that he or she isn’t entitled to. The writ is merely for the public offices and doesn’t embrace private institutions/offices.

The writ will be filed providing your basic rights are being violated. Generally, you’ll be able to file a writ petition against state and government agencies. However, a writ Petition may be issued against private authorities after they are discharging public functions.

Writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

1) Appellate Jurisdiction
2) Original Jurisdiction 
3) Advisory Jurisdiction[3]

Appellate Jurisdiction

Appeals permitted under the Constitution, Article 132[4] – It provides for an appeal to the Supreme Court of any court, civil court, court or tribunal, order or decree, even if the Supreme Court certifies that the case raises a question of considerable law on the interpretation of the Constitution

Article 133 provides for an Appeal to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order during a civil proceeding of a High Court if it certifies that the case involves a considerable question of law of general importance and in its opinion, the same question must be determined by the Supreme Court.[5]

Article 134 provides for an Appeal to the Supreme Court from any judgment, final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding of the High Court if, [6]

• Appeal Reversed an order of acquittal of an accused person and Sentenced him to death or
• It Certifies that the case is a fit for appeal to the Supreme Court.

Appeal by Special Leave

Article 136 provides that the Supreme Court could in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any case or matter passed or created by any Court or assembly within the territory of India except the Court or tribunal accepted by constituted by or under any law relating to armed forces.[7]

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

Writs Article 32 – Guarantees the proper to manoeuvre the Supreme Court for social control of basic rights. Supreme Court has power to issue directions or orders or writs as well as the writs within the nature of Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, Prohibition, hearing and judicial writ, whichever could also be acceptable, for social control of those rights.[8]

Original Suits

Article 131 grants exclusive jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in any dispute between, [9]

• Government of India and one or a more of States or
• Between Government of India and any State or States on one side and one or a more of the different States on the opposite side
• Between 2 or a more of States, in so far as such disputes involve any question on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends

Transfer of cases

Article 139A(1)[10] provides that wherever cases involving constant or well constant queries of law ar unfinished before the Supreme Court and one or a more of High Courts or before 2 or more of High Courts, and also the Supreme Court is glad, on its own motion, or an  application created by the Attorney-General for India or by a party to any such case, that such question is substantial question of general importance, the SupremeCourt could withdraw the case or cases unfinished before the tribunal or the High Courts and get rid of all the cases itself.

Article 139A(2)[11] It states that the Supreme Court may, if it deems it appropriate, with respect to the ends of justice, transfer to any other High Court any case, proceeding or other pending proceedings before any High Court.

The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908[12] provides that the Supreme Court could transfer any suit, appeal or different proceedings from a High Court or different civil court in one State to a High Court or different civil court in the other State.

Section 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 provides that the Supreme Court could transfer any specific case or charm from one tribunal to a different tribunal or from a court subordinate to at least one tribunal to a different court of equal or superior jurisdiction, subordinate to a different tribunal.

Election disputes

Article 71[13] provides that each and every doubt and disputes about the election of a President or Vice- President are needed to be inquired into and determined by the Supreme Court.

ADVISORY JURISDICTION

Article 143(1)[14] provides that if at any time it seems to the President that an issue of law or truth has arisen, or is probably going to rise, that is of such a nature and of such public importance that it’s expedient to get the opinion of the Supreme Court upon it, he could refer the question to its Court for thought and also the Court could, once such hearing because it thinks work, report back to the President, its opinion on it.

Article 317[15] provides that the Chairman or the other member of a Public Service Commission can be removed from his workplace by order of the President, on the ground of wrongful conduct, once the Supreme Court on a reference being created by the President, has on inquiry reported that he ought, on such ground, To be far removed from his workplace.

Section 53K[16] provides for removal and suspension of chairman and Members of the legal proceeding assembly in consultation with the judge of India on any of the grounds laid out in clauses (a) to (f) of subsection (1) of Section 53K once a search by a judge of the Supreme Court.

REVIEW

Article 137[17] provides that, subject to the provisions of any law and rules created under Article 145, the Supreme Court has the facility to review any judgment pronounced or order created by it. Under the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 such a petition is to be filed among 30 days from the date of judgment or order and, as so much as practicable, it’s to be circulated, while not oral arguments, to the same Bench of Judges who delivered the judgment or order sought-after to be reviewed.

CURATIVE PETITION

As laid down by this Court within the case of Rupa Ashok Hurrah vs. Ashok Hurrah[18] even once dismissal of a review petition under the Constitution of India[19] Supreme Court, could entertain a curative petition and rethink its judgment/order, in the exercise of its inherent powers so as to stop abuse of its method, to cure gross miscarriage of justice and such a petition will be filed providing a Senior Advocate certifies that it meets the necessities of this case. Such a petition is to be initially circulated, in chambers, before a Bench comprising of 3 senior most judges and such serving judges who were members of the Bench that passed the judgment/order, subject material of the petition.

Clubbing of petitions on Gujarat incidents

The Supreme Court these days directed symptom of all public interest petitions for a joint hearing by a Bench headed by the judge, already hearing petitions about the simplest bakeshop case.[20]

A Bench, comprising Justice S. Rajendra man and Justice A.R. Lakshmanan, directed that the petitions filed by social activists Mallika Sarabhai and Digant Oza and journalist Indukumar Jani. Seeking appointment of an impartial inquiry into the communal violence within the State by a special investigation team be heard together. The court had, in April last, issued notice on the petitions to the Gujarat Chief Minister, Narendra Modi, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, the Bharatiya Janata Party, the State Director General of Police and different senior police officers.

During the resumed hearing those days, the Bench felt that each one the connected matters could be heard along and directed listing of these petitions before the judge Bench. In their petitions, Mallika Sarabhai and the others also had submitted that within the communal riots that followed the Godhra train carnage, there was total chaos, widespread violence and destruction of property belonging to the minorities, apart from the killings of quite 1,000 persons in Gujarat.

They said the resultant impact of the month-long incidents were that 20 lakh persons had lost their homes and properties and many of them had taken shelter within the relief camps, whose condition was miserable and unsanitary. The petitioners contended that visible of the actual fact that there was alleged connivance or deliberate inaction on the part of the Chief Minister, there would be no impartial inquiry in the slightest degree and no truth would kick off nor the guilty would be punished.

Clubbing of two suits – Case Study

Depends on the facts of the cases. If similar then yes. But as one is criminal and other is civil the possibility of clubbing both in my opinion is far remote.
If the Grievances of the petitions are co-associated with one another the Hon’ble Chief Justice of High court will allow the case to a single judge to take up 2 distinct matters under 2 different Laws along for better administration of justice.

MouthShut.com v. Union of India [21]Presented by the company Mouthshut.com to protect the freedom of speech and expression on the Internet. He argued against Section 66A and prayed for the modification or deletion of the IT Regulation of the Indian Technology Act. The Supreme Court, in a benchmark trial on March 24, 2015, has decided in ffavourof the candidate and the reversed section. 66A, declaring it unconstitutional and ordering the reading of the various sections of the law of IT Act. As a result, users are free to publish anything online, and publishers cannot be required to reduce content without a court order. This applies to all content generated by online users

Contents

• Significance
• Background

Significance

The cause and its proceedings were monitored by on-line Intermediaries, ISPs, medium service suppliers and social media corporations in India as well as overseas. According to the center for Communication, Governance, “this is one of the case under which India’s Supreme Court can outline contours of free speech online.” The case was clubbed along with a petition filed by Shreya Singhal a Law Student, challenging India’s IT Act’s section 66A. As a result of the hearing of all the petitions challenging the IT Act was clubbed along by a Supreme writ, the matter is usually conjointly referred as a Shreya Singhal case. Before the decision, CNN reportable that “…Mouthshut.com has taken its case to the country’s Supreme Court to guard what it says are the rights of Indian citizens and customers enshrined by the Indian constitution.”

Background

MouthShut.com approached the India’s highest court- the Supreme Court of India disputation regarding the Draconian impact of Sec. 66A. It conjointly prayed that India’s info Technology Rules 2011 be invalid or changed. These petitions were filed in April 2013. The writ petition was filed by MouthShut.com under Article 32 of the Constitution because the IT Rules were violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
Mouthshut.com He argued that people who post comments on the site are denied the fundamental right to freedom of expression because of the provisions of Section 66A. In addition, the same as the rules of creating an IT burden, forcing them to detect content and practice censorship online. While a private party can claim that related content is degenerating or violating copyright, such determinations are generally created by the judges and involve a factual and attentive investigation of the interests and competing factors that the signatories are unwilling to create. Signatories receive communications and phone calls from cybercars and police stations, asking them to remove content and provide information to the user, which hinders the operation of their business[22]

Writ petition On April 29, 2013, Mr. Harish Salve attorney had defended the applicant. Accepting the petition, Supreme Court Judge TS Thakur and Sudhansho Mukhopadhya ordered that the petition would require a simultaneous hearing with “Shreya Singhal against Union of India[23].

Later, several different civil liberty organizations, NGOs, people and also the internet and Mobile Association of India filed their own petitions that are labelled along with the main petitions.

Delhi High Court Junks Pleas Against clubbing End-Use Of Mines

Delhi HC laid-off the pleas of some private corporations challenging the decision of the Ministry of Coal to club all sectors, barring power, under one class for coal block auctions.[24]

“The writ petitions are laid-off,” a bench of justices BD Ahmed and Sanjeev Sachdeva said.

The decision comes after almost 18 months once it had been reserved on April 13, 2015 on the pleas of 4 corporations — Utkal Coal Ltd, Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd, Jayaswal Neco Industries Ltd and Bhushan Power and Steel Ltd.

The companies had previously argued that due to the “wrong” classification, the basic sectors such as iron and steel, which art is protected under the coal charter 2014, were losing out to aluminium companies at the auction.

They had argued that the government’s decision to club all end-uses, except power, under ‘non-regulated sector’ has led to a “skewed” bidding method during which unequal were competing with one another for mines.

• The question raised during this petition is whether or not the provisions of Section 220[26] would apply to an individual who has been defendant of committing 3 offenses of a same kind within one year, however, the place of incident, Police Station/ Station Division and witnesses being different’
• Petitioner is facing trial within the following 3 cases:-

a) FIR No.376/07 underSection 328/379/420/468/471/ 411/34 of the Indian Penal code registered on 23.10.2007 in police office city;

b) FIR No.396/07under Section 328/379/411/34 of the Indian Penal code registered on 19.11.2007 in police office Mandir Marg, New Delhi;

c) FIR No.12/08 under Section 328/379/411/34 of the Indian legal code registered on 08.01.2008 in Police Station city Cantt. 

• Within the said 3 cases, Petitioner has been charged sheeted for committing Associate in Nursing offense punishable under Section 411 of the Indian Penal code, i.e., for the offense of buying stolen articles.
• Joint trial of the above than same 3 cases was sought-after by the Petitioner by moving an application under Section 408 of Code of Criminal Procedure before the learned Session decide and also the same stood declined by holding as under:- ‘It so, emerges that each one the cases relate to totally different incidents and thus the judgment within the case of Sudhir and others (Supra) is of no facilitate to the applicant/accused as 3 criminal cases that ar sought-after to be transferred by the applicant/accused to at least one court, relate totally different incidents, distinct police stations and whereby witnesses also are totally different. Within the circumstances, there’s no justification to permit the prayer of the (Sunil Gaur, Jan 2009)applicant/accused. The application is hereby dismissed.
• Section 220 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was invoked by the applicant to request for clubbing of the 3 cases pending against him for the offense punishable under Article 411 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 220 Cr. P.C. It is expected that, if a series of acts, therefore, relate to one another to form the same transaction, more crimes than the one committed by the same person, it can be charged and prosecuted in court for each of these offenses
• During the course of the arguments, learned counsel for the Petitioner has placed reliance upon case of ‘Adnan Bilal Mulla vs. State of Maharashtra[27]’, wherever it had been found that the common thread was running through the different incidents of blast at different places in metropolis and also the trial of metropolis blast cases was clubbed along within the peculiar facts of the same case by holding that the affiliation between the series of acts is a vital ingredient for those acts to constitute the same transaction.
• Reliance has been placed by the Petitioner upon the case of ‘Smarty Machra and Another vs. State’[28],whereby defendant persons were found to possess conjointly committed totally different offences of theft of car stereos and it had been command that it’s necessary that the defendant persons need to have been defendant of conjointly committing different offences of same kind to attract section 223 of the Cr. P.C.
• The quantitative relation of the author cited judgments doesn’t apply to the case of Petitioner as he’s facing trial in these 3 totally different cases along with his co-defendant, not for the main offense of possessing stolen articles. Moreover, the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 220 of the Cr. P.C. is discretionary one. The learned Session Judge, Delhi justly refuses to exercise it within the present case to the club along with these 3 cases as FIR No. 396/07 pertains to the totally different session division. However, it’s found that the opposite 2 FIRs, i.e., FIR Nos.376/07 and 12/08 pertain to the police office in Delhi Cantt. And thus to at least one Session Division; and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, the trial of said 2 FIRs same to be pending before 2 totally different Additional Sessions Judges, at Dwarka Courts, New Delhi can be conveniently assigned to one court.
• It has been expressed within the present petition that the trial of FIR No. 376/07 is pending before the learned District and Additional Sessions Judge, Dwarka Courts at the stage of arguments on the purpose of charge and also the trial of FIR No. 12/08 is additionally pending before Sh. N.K. Kaushik, learned Additional Session Judge, Dwarka Courts, at the stage of arguments for the purpose of charging.
• In reading about the preceding position, this petition is part accepted to the extent that the learned Sessions judge Delhi is directed to assign the trial of FIR No. 376/07 registered at police office Delhi Cantt., and also the trial of FIR No. 12/08 registered at police office delhi Cantt., to at least one court, to enable the Petitioner to move application under Section 220 of Cr. P.C. For clubbing the trial of the said 2 FIRs, if therefore suggested. The prayer of the Petitioner for transferring FIR No. 396/07 registered at police office Mandir Marg, Delhi to a court of various session division, wherever the opposite 2 FIRs are pending, is herewith declined.
•  With said directions, this petition and pending applications stand disposed of.

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH BILASPUR[29]

Two or more claim cases arising out of the same accident, ought to be clubbed along for a trial.

• APPEAL under SECTION 173 Of The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. JUDGMENT 
  
•  Invoking the legal proceeding jurisdiction of this Court under Section 173 of the motor vehicle Act, 1988, appellant/claimant herein has challenged the award dated 16/01/2001, gone the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Sakti, District Bilaspur (in short ‘the claims Tribunal’) in Motor Accident Claim Case No 05/1992, by that the Claims Tribunal has rejected her claim petition filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988.

Brief facts necessary for disposal of this appeal are as under:

• The appellant/claimant filed an application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 pleading inter alia, that on 20/08/1991 at Chandrapur (Dabhra), Tahsil Sakti, on account of collusion of 2 vehicles i.e Truck and motorcar, she suffered injuries. It had been pleaded that the Truck was owned by the non applicant/respondent No. 2 & insured with non-applicant/respondent No. 3 and motorcar was owned by a non-applicant/respondent No. 4 & insured with non-applicant/respondent No. 5 and claimed compensation to the extent of 54,450.
• Learned claims Tribunal to shut scrutiny of oral and documentary proof on record held that the appellant/claimant isn’t established the actual fact of accident on 20/08/1991 and any did not prove negligence on the part of the respondent/driver and consequently, the appellant/claimant isn’t entitled to any compensation and rejected the appliance under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988.
• Mr. Sachin Singh Rajpoot, learned counsel showing as an acquaintance of the Court submits that the appellant/claimant has filed a copy of the award passed in Motor Accident Claim Case No. 01/1992 (Chetan & another v. Tej Singh & others) selected 16/01/2001 and Motor Accident Claim Case No. 02/1992 (Banarsi Sahu et al.v. Tej Singh & others) selected 16/01/2001, arising out of the same accident, in which, the appellant/claimant has conjointly suffered injury. He submits the actual fact of the accident has proved to be within the same claim cases Chetan & another v. Tej Singh & others and Banarsi Sahu and other v. Tej Singh & others and Banarsi Sahu and other. v. Tej Singh & Others (supra), and compensation has been awarded to appellant/claimant by the Claims assembly in those cases; whereas the appellant’s/claimant’s claim petition has been rejected, holding that accident has not been proven.
• He any submits that the finding recorded by the Claims assembly during this regard is perverse. He last submits that the Claims assembly need to have detected all the claim cases along and need to have determined all the claim cases by common award, so as to avoid conflicting award in connecting claim cases.
• Per contra Mr. H.B. Agrawal Sr. Counsel, showing with Mr. Pankaj Agrawal and Mr. Sourabh Sharma, counsel appearing for the for the respective Insurance Company supported the award stating inter alia that the impugned award is strictly in accordance with law and no interference is called for in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

The court held that,

The court held that the Claims in Motor Accident Claim Case No. 01/1992 (Chetan & another v. Tej Singh & others) selected 16/1/2001 and Motor Accident Claim Case No. 02/1992 (Banarsi Sahu and another v. Tej Singh & others) decided on 16/1/2001.

Claim Case No. 01/1992 (Chetan & another v Tej Singh & others) selected 16/01/2001.

Claim Case No. 02/1992 (Banarsi Sahu & others v. Tej Singh & others) selected 16/01/2001.

Claim Case No. 05/1992 (Kamla Tibeto-Burman v. Tej Singh & others) selected 16/01/2001.

• All 3 claim cases are arising out of 1 accident occurred on 20/08/1991, on account of collusion between 2 vehicles i.e. Truck No.
• BR-14/A/2473 and Jeep B.P.T.-266; resulting in passing of 2 conflicting awards by the Claims Tribunal.
• The M.P. Motor Vehicle Rules, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Rules of 1994’) has been enacted. Rule 237 of the Rules of 1994 prescribes the procedure in connecting cases.
• Procedure in connecting cases ;- (1) wherever 2 or a more of cases pending before a Claims Tribunal arise out of Same accident, and any issue concerned is common to 2 or a lot of cases, such cases, may, so far as the evidence bearing on such issue is concerned, be held simultaneously
• Whereas action is taken under sub-rule (1) the proof pertaining to the common issue or problems shall be recorded on the record of 1 case and also the Claims Tribunal shall certify under its hand on the records of any such different case, the extent to that proof, therefore, recorded applies to such different case and also the indisputable fact that the parties to such different case had the chance of being present, and, if they were present, of cross-examining the witnesses.
• Within the instant case, Rule 237 of the Motor Vehicle Rules, 1994 has not been followed in its letter and spirit and also the 3 claim cases arising out of same accident dated 20/08/1991, are tried on an individual basis while not following the procedure laid down in Rule 237 of the principles of 1994; resulted the passing of conflicting awards by the claims Tribunal. By the impugned award, i.e. Motor Accident Claim Case No. 05/1992 (Kamla Tibeto-Burman Tej Singh & others) has been rejected holding that the accident isn’t proven, whereas, in Motor Accident Claim Case No. 01/1992 (Chetan & another v. Tej Singh &others) and Motor Accident Claim Case No. 02/1992 (Banarsi Sahu and other. v. Tej Singh & others) arising out of same accident, the accident has commanded to be proven by the Claims tribunal in its award dated 16/01/2001 and also the award directional the compensation has been passed, that might be avoided following the mandate of Rule 237 of the Motor Vehicle Rules, 1994.
• The Division Bench of M.P. HC had once in a while to contemplate the impact of Rule 237 of the M.P. Rules 1994 in Capital Roadways and Finance (Pvt.) Ltd., Bhopal v. Mohan Bai wd/o Mehtab Singh and others[30], para-6 as beow:
• Within the instant case, the photocopy of the policy was on record in each of the case. The 2 Claim cases arising out of same accident are determined in 2 separate cases by two separate Judges. In one in every of the cases, the actual fact of policy is held to be proved, however the liability of the insurer is restricted to Rs. 50,000/-whereas within the differential case, the Claims Tribunal command that the insurance itself isn’t proven though in one of the 2 cases the actual fact of pendency of the connected case in another Court was delivered to the notice of the learned member. Such eventualities giving rise to conflicting findings will be avoided if claims arising out of same accidents between the same parties are clubbed along for a trial and call. See- Rule 237 of the M.P. Motor Vehicle Rules, 1994 that on principle will be created applicable by getting orders for clubbing the cases for trial that arise from the same accident:
• Thus, for the explanations aforesaid the award gone the learned claims Tribunal rejecting the claim petition filed by this appellant/claimant holding that the accident isn’t proven cannot be sustained and is herewith reserved. The matter is remitted to the learned Claims Tribunal to contemplate a new, once giving chance to steer proof to the parties and shall conjointly confine the mind the award passed within the Motor vehicle Claim Case No. 01/1992 (Chetan & another v. Tej Singh & others) and Motor Accident Claim Case No. 02/1992 (Banarsi Sahu and other. v. Tej Singh & others). The Claims assembly can pass the award ideally within a period of four months. Since the appellant/claimant has not appeared before this Court, the Claims Tribunal can decide the claim case once noticing the parties, strictly in accordance with law.
• This Court appreciates the valuable help rendered by Mr. Rajput, Learned counsel, Who appeared as a friend of Court

[1] Shah, V. (2016, December 13). What is a Writ and What is a Writ Petition? Retrieved August 16, 2017, from https://vakilsearch.com/advice/writ-petition-india-filing-drafting/

[2] http://www.legalservicesindia.com/article/article/analysis-of-writ-of-mandamus-592-1.html

[3] Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of India. Advocate in Delhi, Supreme Court, High Court, DRT, CAT, BIFR, CLB, India. N.p., 26 June 2012. Web. 16 Aug. 2017.

[4] Article 132 of the Constitution of India, 1950

[5] Article 133 of the Constitution of India, 1950

[6] Article 134 of the Constitution of India, 1950

[7] Article 136 of the Constitution of India, 1950

[8] Article 32 of Constitution of India, 1950

[9] Article 131 of Constitution of India, 1950

[10] Article 139(1) of Constitution of India, 1950

[11] Article 139A(2) of Constitution of India, 1950

[12] Section 25 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

[13] Article 71 of the Constitution of India, 1950

[14] Article 143(1) of the Constitution of India, 1950

[15] Article 317 of the Constitution Of India, 1950

[16] Section 53K of the Competition Act, 2002

[17] Article 137 of the Constitution of India, 1950

[18] 2002 (4) SCC 388

[19] Article 137 of Constitution of India, 1950

[20] The Hindu : Clubbing of Petitions on Gujarat Incidents Ordered. Group Publication, 26 Sept. 2003. Web. 16 Aug. 2017.

[21] “Mouthshut.com v. Union of India.” Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, 18 Apr. 2017. Web. 16 Aug. 2017.

[22] http://sflc.in/mouthshut-com-india-pvt-ltd-v-uoi-w-p-c-no-217-of-2013

[23] http://courtnic.nic.in/supremecourt/temp/217201332942013p.txt

[24] India, Press Trust of. “Delhi High Court Junks Pleas Against Clubbing End-Use Of Mines.”NDTV.com. N.p., 05 Oct. 2016. Web. 16 Aug. 2017

[25] http://delhicourts.nic.in/Jan09/Kimti%20Lal%20Jain%20Vs.%20State.pdf

[26] Sec 220 of code of Criminal Procedure

[27] 2006 Crl.LJ 564

[28] 2007 (2) JCC 1570

[29] http://highcourt.cg.gov.in/Afr/courtJudgementandAFR/2013/Sep/MA238of01.pdf

[30] (1999(2) M.P.L.J. 554