This article was written by Sahil Mehta and further updated by Pruthvi Ramkanta Hegde. This article explains the facts, issues, arguments, observations and judgements in the case of Daniel Latifi vs. Union of India (2001). This article includes judgement comments on the Constitutional validity of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, of 1986. It also covers the overview of the certain provisions of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, of 1986 and also covers precedent cases.

Introduction

Different legal systems have various provisions to safeguard the financial well-being of divorced spouses. In India, maintenance laws are enacted to uphold the dignity and rights of those women who are financially dependent on their partners. In this regard, maintenance plays a greater role in providing justice to the victims. It is the kind of financial support that one party is obligated to provide to another, in the context of divorce. After the introduction of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, of 1986 (hereinafter referred to as “Act”) the concept of maintenance gained attention to Muslim women in India. The same aspect was discussed in the case of Daniel Latifi & Anr vs. Union of India (2001).

In this article, the author critically analyses the judgement of Danial Latifi & Another vs. Union Of India (2001). The case involved judgement that was inconsistent with the ‘Secular’ reasoning provided in Mohd. Ahmed Khan vs. Shah Bano Begum And Ors (1985) (referred to as the Shah Bano case). In this case, the constitutional validity of the 1986 Act was challenged. The present case addressed that the Act 1986 failed to give proper maintenance to Muslim women beyond the iddat period thereby it violated the fundamental rights of Muslim women. 

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Details of the case 

Name of the case: Danial Latifi & Another vs. Union Of India 

Case number: Writ Petition (Civil) 868 of 1986

Date of judgement: September 28, 2001

Court name: Honourable Supreme Court of India

Equivalent citations: AIR 2001 SUPREME COURT 3958, 2001 AIR SCW 3932, 2007 (3) SCC(CRI) 266, (2002) 1 CGLJ 184, (2001) 8 JT 218 (SC), 2001 (8) JT 218, 2001 (6) SCALE 537, 2001 (7) SCC 740, 2002 CALCRILR 1, 2002 (1) ALL CJ 490, 2001 (4) LRI 36, (2002) ILR(KER) 1 SC 287, (2001) 4 ALLMR 829 (SC), 2001 (10) SRJ 122, 2002 (1) BLJR 745, 2002 ALL CJ 1 490, (2001) ILR (KANT) (2) 5289, (2001) 2 RECCRIR 58, (2001) 2 ALLCRILR 405, (2001) 21 OCR 707, (2002) 1 CURCRIR 187, (2002) 1 CHANDCRIC 101, (2001) 2 DMC 714, (2002) 1 GUJ LR 531, (2001) 3 GUJ LH 465, (2001) 2 HINDULR 528, (2001) 3 KER LT 651, (2002) 1 MAD LJ 40, (2002) 2 MAD LW 372, (2001) 3 MAHLR 601, (2002) 1 MARRILJ 18, (2002) MATLR 53, (2001) 4 RECCRIR 468, (2001) 4 SCJ 1, (2001) 4 CURCRIR 81, (2001) 6 ANDHLD 63, (2001) 7 SUPREME 297, (2001) 6 SCALE 537, (2002) 1 UC 3, (2001) 45 ALL LR 426, (2002) 2 BLJ 237, (2001) 3 CAL HN 87, 2001 (2) ANDHLT(CRI) 327 SC

Supreme Court bench: Honourable Justice D.P. Mohapatra, Honourable Justice Doraiswamy Raju, Honourable Justice Shivaraj V. Patil, Honourable Justice G.B. Pattanaik, Honourable Justice S. Rajendra Babu

Parties to the case-

Petitioner: Danial Latifi and Another

Respondent: Union of India

Related statutes and provisions: Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, of 1986, Section 125 of Criminal Procedure Code, Section 127 of Criminal Procedure Code

Background of the case

Before the judgement of Shah Bano, it was considered that the Muslim husband had to pay the maintenance only till the iddat period. The right of maintenance of Muslim women ends after the iddat period. Iddat is a time period in Muslim law that a woman has to pass after the divorce or death of the husband before she can lawfully marry again. It generally ranges from three to four months in case of divorce and husband’s death. Further, it was considered that Section 125 of CrPC does not apply to Muslims, who are governed by Muslim Personal Law, Shariat. 

In Shah Bano, the issue was whether Section 125 applies to Muslims or not. Whether or not a Muslim woman, who is unable to maintain herself, can demand maintenance from her husband after the iddat period. The Supreme Court held that Section 125 is secular in nature and not associated with any personal law. It was enacted for quick maintenance and to prevent destitution and vagrancy. Justice Chandrachud held that personal law (Shariat) could not override the Constitutionally framed law (Section 125). Therefore, a Muslim woman, who is unable to maintain herself, can demand maintenance from her husband even after the iddat period. The husband is legally bound under Section 125 of the CrPC to pay maintenance. An obiter dictum also chastised the government for its failure to promulgate a Uniform Civil Code in the country.

The judgement in the Shah Bano was not accepted with open arms by the Muslim leaders. Muslims saw the judgement as a threat to their identity. They considered the judgement against their personal laws. There were already two issues that had caused unrest among the Muslim community. One was the Ram Janmabhoomi-Babri Masjid controversy, and the other was the admission of the petition in the Calcutta HC seeking a ban on the Quran as it preaches violence. The judgement in Shah Bano added fuel to the fire.

Facts of the case

The case deals with the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, which was challenged in court. In 1985, Shah Bano, a divorced Muslim woman, was awarded maintenance by the Honourable Supreme Court under Section 125 of the CrPC. Her husband, who had paid her the “mahr” and maintenance for the iddat period and later he had no further obligation to pay her. 

Meanwhile, the court in the Shah Bano case ruled that if a divorced Muslim woman cannot support herself, she can claim maintenance beyond the iddat period. Following Shah Bano’s decision, the Indian Parliament passed the Act. This Act aimed to limit the husband’s maintenance obligation to the iddat period only. In this case, the petitioner (Daniel Latifi) and others filed a petition challenging the Constitutionality of the 1986 Act on the ground that this Act unfairly restricted Muslim women’s rights to maintenance compared to women of other religions.

Issues of Daniel Latifi vs. Union of India (2001)

  • Whether the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, limit the maintenance rights of divorced Muslim women to only the iddat period?
  • Whether this limitation constitutes a violation of Constitutional rights by discriminating against Muslim women compared to women of other religions who can claim maintenance under the CrPC without such limitations?
  • Whether the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, violate the Constitution of India?

Legal aspects of the case

Overview of Muslim Women (Protection Of Rights On Divorce) Act, 1986

The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, was enacted in India to protect the rights of Muslim women who have been divorced by, or have obtained a divorce from, their husbands.

Section 3 of the Act provides for the provision and maintenance to the Muslim woman given at a time of divorce. The said provision obligates the husband for “a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid within the iddat period.” The terms reasonable and fair provision and maintenance signify that the maintenance can vary on a case-to-case basis and is open to judicial interpretation. The Act restricted the right of maintenance to Muslim women ‘by her husband’ until the iddat period only. If the woman has not remarried after the iddat period and cannot maintain herself, she cannot seek maintenance from her former husband. 

Section 4 of the Act relates to the maintenance of a woman. It states that, if a woman needs financial support, the Magistrate can order her relatives who would inherit her property to pay her reasonable and fair maintenance. If the woman does not have any relatives or her relatives cannot afford to pay, the Magistrate can then order the State Wakf Board to provide the necessary maintenance to the woman.

Section 5 of the Act, gives a divorced Muslim woman and her former husband the option to choose to be governed by the maintenance rules in the CrPC instead of the rules in this Act. They can make this choice on the first day the court hears their case about maintenance. Both the woman and her ex-husband need to declare, either together or separately, in a written statement like an affidavit that they want to follow the CrPC rules for maintenance. If they make this choice and submit the declaration to the court, the court will then decide the maintenance issue according to the CrPC. Earlier it was Section 125 of the Crpc now the maintenance is replaced with Section 144 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Samhita, 2023. The “first hearing” means the first date the court asks the ex-husband to attend the hearing for the woman’s application for maintenance.

Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973

Section 125 of the CrPC prescribes certain rules for claiming the maintenance to the wife. 

As per Section 125(1), if a wife cannot support herself, and he has the means to do so but refuses to pay maintenance, she can ask the court to order him to pay her a monthly amount for her maintenance. Even if the wife is divorced, she can still ask for maintenance as long as she has not remarried.

The term “wife” includes a woman who has been divorced by her husband or who has obtained a divorce from him, as long as she hasn’t remarried.

As per Section 125(2) The maintenance or interim maintenance, along with the expenses for the legal process, must be paid from the date of the court order. Alternatively, the court can decide to start the payment from the date the application for maintenance was filed.

As per Section 125(3), if a person fails to pay the maintenance or interim maintenance as ordered by the court, without a valid reason, the Magistrate can:

  • Issue a warrant to recover the unpaid amount, similar to how fines are collected.
  • Sentence the person to imprisonment for up to one month or until the payment is made, whichever happens first. If the husband offers to maintain his wife on the condition that she lives with him, and she refuses, the Magistrate will consider her reasons for refusal.

The court can still order the husband to pay maintenance if the wife’s refusal to live with him is justified. If the husband has married another woman or is keeping a mistress, this is considered a valid reason for the wife’s refusal to live with him.

Section 125(4) A wife who is living in adultery is not entitled to receive maintenance from her husband.

  • A wife who refuses to live with her husband without a valid reason is not entitled to claim maintenance.
  • If the husband and wife are living separately because they both agreed to do so, the wife cannot claim maintenance.

Section 125(5) the court can cancel the order for maintenance if it is proven that the wife:

  • Is living in adultery.
  • Refuses to live with her husband without a valid reason.
  • Is living separately from her husband by mutual consent.

Arguments

Petitioner’s contentions

  • The petitioner argued that the main goal of the Act is to undo the Shah Bano’s case. They referred to the case of Aga Mahomed Jaffer Bindaneem vs. Koolsom Bee & Ors (1897) who claimed that interpreting religious texts in unfamiliar languages is not safe.
  • It was further contended by the petitioners that the Act was less beneficial than Sections 125 -128 of the CrPC. 
  • Further, contended it unreasonably discriminated against Muslim divorced women and violated their rights under Articles 14, Article15, and Article 21 of the Constitution. 
  • Further religious writings of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and Bashir Ahma referred by the plaintiff to support the claim that Muslim society is taking care of divorced women. They contended that the word ‘gift’ in Surah 241 of the Holy Quran should be understood according to Muslim personal law. 
  • They further argued that the court’s translation and interpretation of certain Quranic verses in the Shah Bano case were wrong and should not be used. They also said that paying “mata” is only necessary in specific situations, like when a marriage was not consummated before the divorce.
  • The petitioner claimed that Section 4 of the Act does not provide benefit to a woman of such kind. They argued that the Act treated divorced Muslim women unfairly as compared to other religions. On the other hand, it further claimed that provisions of the Act violated Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution of India. 
  • They further contended that the Act’s language should be understood to mean that divorced women should get long-term support, not just support during the iddat period. Further, it was contended that the Act requires husbands to make arrangements for their wives’ future needs, not just temporary needs during the iddat period.

Respondent’s contentions

  • Respondents contended that maintenance is a part of the personal law of a community of Muslims. Further contended that under Section 3 of the Act, “reasonable and fair provision and maintenance” is to be made within the iddat period, not for life.
  • Respondents argued that personal law can form a legitimate basis for differentiation and does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution.
  • The respondents argued that the Act does not violate the rights of Muslim women as per Section 125 of the CrPC. They contended that the Act does not limit maintenance to the iddat period but includes long-term support unless the woman remarries. 
  • They argued that the legislature misunderstood the court’s decision in the Shah Bano case. Further, it was contended that the Act codifies the right to maintenance beyond the iddat period.
  • Respondents contended that the Act was enacted to address the ruling in Shah Bano’s case, ensuring maintenance within the personal law framework of Muslims and that Section 3(1)(a) of the Act aligns with Muslim personal law.
  • Respondents maintained that the Act intends to protect Muslim women from becoming destitute without extending the benefits of Section 125 CrPC, providing a framework that considers Muslim personal law and ensures that women are not left unprotected.

Judgement in Daniel Latifi vs. Union of India (2001)

The Apex Court further found that the Act applies specifically to Muslim women who are divorced under Muslim law. However, the Act does not apply to those divorced under other laws. It does not cover deserted or separated Muslim wives. Maintenance is required only during the iddat period; after that, responsibility falls on the woman’s relatives or, if necessary, it falls on the State Wakf Board. The court held that a Muslim husband must provide reasonable and fair maintenance for his divorced wife, which includes support beyond the iddat period. This maintenance must be arranged during the iddat period, as required by Section 3(1)(a) of the Act.

Further held that the husband’s duty to provide maintenance under Section 3(1)(a) is not limited to the iddat period alone but extends beyond it. If a divorced Muslim woman who has not remarried is unable to support herself after the iddat period, she can claim maintenance from her relatives. Section 4 of the Act specifies that relatives should provide maintenance in proportion to the inheritance they receive from her according to Muslim law. If relatives are unable to provide the necessary financial help to the woman, the court may direct the State Wakf Board to cover the maintenance.

Thereby the Honourable Supreme Court upheld the Constitutional validity of the Act. The court further held that the Act does not violate Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Indian Constitution. It held that there is no discrimination when the state has made a specific provision for a particular community that is equally or more beneficial than the general law. The Act does not nullify or go against the ratio decidendi of the Shah Bano but merely codifies it.

Rationale behind the case

The Apex Court observed that while deciding cases with laws related to matrimonial relationships, it is very required to consider the social conditions of the society. In our society, whether people belong to the majority or minority groups, there is a significant economic disparity between men and women. 

The Hon’ble Court further observed that society is dominated by men both socially and economically. On the other hand, women often find themselves in a dependent role. Many women, even if they are highly educated, leave their careers to focus on their families after marriage. Their contribution to the marriage is immense and cannot be measured simply in monetary terms. When such a relationship ends, compensating for emotional loss or personal investment is very challenging. It is a basic human right and a matter of gender and social justice to provide financial support to a divorced woman, in terms of maintenance. It is also recognised universally across religions. The Act should not shift the responsibility of caring for a divorced woman to unrelated parties like heirs or wakf boards.

The Court further observed that the preamble of the Act represents that its purpose is to protect the rights of divorced Muslim women. Further court referred to Section 2(a) defines a divorced woman under the Act as one who has been divorced according to Muslim law. The Court opined that the Act specifically applies to Muslim women who have been divorced under the principles of Islamic law. Section 2(b) defines the iddat period, which is the waiting period a divorced woman must observe before she can remarry. 

The Court opined that the obligations of the husband to provide maintenance for his ex-wife during this period are in line with Islamic principles and are needed for the woman after the divorce. Section 3 and Section 4 play crucial parts of the Act. Section 3 mandates that a divorced woman is entitled to a fair provision and maintenance from her ex-husband within the iddat period. It also covers provisions related to the maintenance of children and the return of the dower or mahr and other properties given to her. If the husband fails to provide these, the divorced woman can apply to a Magistrate for orders. 

The Court further opined that the husband’s liability is not limited to just the iddat period but extends beyond it. The court further opined that the amount provided during the iddat period must cover the woman’s future needs. Section 4 states that if a divorced woman cannot maintain herself after the iddat period and has no means of support from relatives, the Magistrate can direct the State Wakf Board to provide maintenance. However, this section does not address provisions other than maintenance. 

The Court also reviewed Section 5, which allows a divorced woman to choose to be governed by the provisions of Sections 125 to 128 CrPC instead. The Court opined that it can be done by a mutual declaration made at the first hearing of the application. The Court viewed this as an alternative remedy for women who prefer the general law of maintenance under the CrPC. Accordingly, a divorced woman and her ex-husband can agree to follow these CrPC sections for maintenance matters.

Relevant cases discussed while deciding this case

Olga Tellis & others vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation and others (1985) 

Facts

In this Olga Tellis & others vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation and others (1985) case, a group of pavement dwellers who were facing eviction from their homes by the Bombay Municipal Corporation. These individuals, who lived in makeshift shelters on pavements. 

Issue

  • The central issue was whether the right to life under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution includes the right to livelihood and the right to live with dignity.
  • Whether the eviction of pavement dwellers without providing alternative accommodation would violate Article 21 of the Constitution?

Arguments

The petitioner argued that their eviction would deprive them of their basic means of livelihood and violate the fundamental right of Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.

Judgement

The Supreme Court of India held that the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution includes the right to live with dignity.  The court decided that the eviction of pavement dwellers without providing adequate alternative accommodation would violate their fundamental right to live with dignity. 

Relevancy

The court referred to this case to emphasise that the right to life under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution includes the right to live with dignity. The court used this principle and held that depriving a divorced Muslim woman of maintenance from her husband beyond the iddat period would violate her right to live with dignity.

Arab Ahemadhia Abdulla and Etc. vs. Arab Bail Mohmuna Saiyadbhai and others (1988)

Facts

In Arab Ahemadhia Abdulla and Etc. vs. Arab Bail Mohmuna Saiyadbhai and others (1988), the case involved a dispute between a divorced Muslim woman, Arab Bail Mohmuna Saiyadbhai, and her former husband, Arab Ahemadhia Abdulla. The dispute was regarding the extent of maintenance and provision that the husband was obligated to provide after the divorce. Petitioner challenged the claim for maintenance beyond the iddat period.

Issue

The central issue was whether a Muslim husband is obligated under Islamic law to provide maintenance to his divorced wife only during the iddat period, or if he is also required to make a fair and reasonable provision for her future that extends beyond the iddat period.

Judgement

The Gujarat High Court ruled that a Muslim husband is indeed liable to make a fair and reasonable provision for his divorced wife’s future, which is not limited to the iddat period.  The court held that the husband’s obligation extends beyond the iddat period. 

Relevancy

This case was referred to in this case to support the contention that the obligation of a Muslim husband to provide for his divorced wife should not be confined to the iddat period.

Kunhammed Haji vs. Amina (1995)

Facts

In the Kunhammed Haji vs. Amina (1995) case, the petitioner, Kunhammed Haji, was the former husband of the respondent, Amina. Amina had filed a maintenance petition under Section 3 of the Act. Further, she filed this suit to claim the following three things:

  • Mahr amount according to Muslim Law.
  • Maintenance for the period of Iddat.
  • A reasonable and fair provision for her future livelihood.

The Magistrate allowed her maintenance during the Iddat period and granted Rs. 30,000 as a reasonable and fair provision for her future livelihood but rejected her claim for Mahr.

The petitioner appealed this decision and argued that under the Act, his liability extended only to the Iddat period and not beyond it.

Issues

Whether a divorced Muslim woman’s right to maintenance under Section 3(1)(a) of the Act is limited to the Iddat period or extends to a reasonable and fair provision for her future livelihood beyond the Iddat period?

Judgement

The Kerala High Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts. It held that the petitioner’s liability included not only maintenance during the Iddat period but also a reasonable and fair provision for the future livelihood of the divorced wife.

The court further held that under Section 3(1)(a) of the Act, the husband’s liability to make provisions for the wife was not confined to the Iddat period alone but extended beyond it for her livelihood.

Relevancy

The court referred to this case and reinforced the principle that under the Act, a divorced Muslim woman is entitled to a fair and reasonable provision for her livelihood beyond the Iddat period. 

K. Zunaideen vs. Ameena Begum And Another (1997)

Facts

In the K. Zunaideen vs. Ameena Begum And Another (1997) case, K. Zunaideen was married to Ameena Begum, and their marriage was dissolved through divorce. Ameena Begum filed a petition seeking maintenance from her former husband, Zunaideen, under Act, 1986.

Issues

Whether a divorced Muslim woman is entitled to maintenance beyond the iddat period under the Act?

Arguments

  • The petitioner argued that his responsibility to provide maintenance was limited to the iddat period as per Islamic law, and no further obligations existed beyond that period under the Act.
  • The respondent contended that under Section 3(1)(a) of the Act, the former husband is required to make a reasonable and fair provision for her future, which includes maintenance beyond the iddat period.

Judgement

The court ruled in favour of Ameena Begum. The court held that a divorced Muslim woman is entitled to fair and reasonable maintenance for her future, which extends beyond the iddat period.

The court interpreted Sections 3(1)(a) and 4 of the Act and the Court interpreted the importance of the terms “made” and “paid” in Section 3(1)(a) of the Act. The former husband is required to make a reasonable and fair provision for the future of his divorced wife, which includes maintenance during the iddat period and for her future well-being. The court concluded that the liability of the former husband is not restricted solely to the iddat period but must cover the future needs of the divorced wife.

Relevancy

The case ruling supported the right of a divorced Muslim woman to receive maintenance beyond the iddat period. 

Usman Khan Bahamani vs. Fathimunnisa Begum And Ors. (1990)

Facts

In Usman Khan Bahamani vs. Fathimunnisa Begum And Ors. (1990), Fathimunnisa Begum (respondent) sought maintenance after their divorce from Usman Khan Bahamani (petitioner) beyond the iddat period. The couple had gone through a divorce, and during the iddat period, Usman Khan provided financial support as per Islamic law. However, Fathimunnisa Begum claimed that she was entitled to further maintenance beyond this period.

Issue

The primary issue in this case was whether a Muslim husband’s obligation to provide maintenance to his divorced wife extends beyond the iddat period under the Act.

Arguments

  • The petitioner argued that his obligation to maintain his divorced wife ended with the completion of the iddat period as per Islamic law.
  • The respondent argued that the husband should be responsible for her maintenance beyond the iddat period since she could not support herself.

Judgement

The court held that the husband’s responsibility to provide for his divorced wife is limited to the iddat period only. Once the iddat period is over, his liability ends. The court further stated that if the divorced wife has already received a fair and reasonable amount of financial support at the time of her divorce, she cannot claim any additional amount for her future from her former husband. The court clarified that after the iddat period if the woman is unable to maintain herself, she must first seek support from her relatives. If her relatives are unable to help, she can approach the Wakf Board, which is responsible for supporting destitute Muslim women.

Critical analysis of Daniel Latifi vs. Union of India (2001)

In the present case, the Supreme Court has upheld the Constitutional validity of the Act. The court judgement made it clear that provisions of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 do not violate Constitutional rights by restricting divorced Muslim women to maintenance only during the ‘iddat’ period. Further courts in this case recognised the need to balance religious practices with fundamental rights and interpreted the provisions of the Act in such a way only. 

On the other hand, the court pointed out that a divorced Muslim woman is also entitled to seek maintenance under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. However, if her husband fails to meet the conditions outlined in the Act. Specifically, if the husband does not provide sufficient maintenance during the iddat period to ensure her financial security for the rest of her life, she can claim maintenance under Section 125. The court interpretation is made on the basis of terms “to make reasonable and fair provisions” and “to pay maintenance”. 

Current scenario of divorced Muslim women

Divorced Muslim women have the right to seek maintenance not only under their personal law but also under the CrPC. Judiciary in many cases has upheld the Muslim women’s right to claim maintenance even after the iddat period too.  Some of the recent judgement include:

In the Md. Quamruzzaman vs Begam Ara (2019) case, Md. Quamruzzaman (the petitioner) was married to Begam Ara (the respondent). Over time, their relationship deteriorated, and Quamruzzaman claimed that Begam Ara misbehaved with him, which led him to marry another woman, Momina Khatoon. Quamruzzaman also alleged that Begam Ara had an illicit relationship with another man, Niharul Haque and that this was the reason he divorced her. Quamruzzaman claimed to have divorced Begam Ara, but there was no concrete evidence in the record showing the details of the divorce, such as when and where it occurred, whether there was any attempt at reconciliation, and whether he paid her the required maintenance for the “Iddat” period as per Islamic law.

The court found that Md. Quamruzzaman did not provide sufficient evidence to prove that he had divorced Begam Ara. The court emphasised that even after the enactment of the Act, 1986, a Muslim husband is responsible for making reasonable and fair provisions for the future of his divorced wife, which includes maintenance beyond the “Iddat” period.

The court referred to the Danial Latifi and Another vs. Union of India (1973), which upheld the validity of the 1986 Act and confirmed that a Muslim husband must make provisions for his divorced wife’s future, which extends beyond the “Iddat” period.

The court also noted that, according to the transitional provisions of the 1986 Act, any application for maintenance by a divorced woman under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, pending at the time of the Act’s commencement, must be disposed of according to the 1986 Act.

In the case Rana Nahid @ Reshma @ Sana vs. Sahidul Haq Chisti (2020), the appellant, Rana Nahid, was married to the respondent, Sahidul Haq Chisti. After their divorce, the appellant sought maintenance under the Act. She filed an application for maintenance after the completion of the iddat period and claimed that she was unable to maintain herself. The primary issue before the court was whether a divorced Muslim woman could claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) after the enactment of the 1986 Act. Another key issue was whether the Family Court had jurisdiction to hear applications for maintenance under Sections 3 and 4 of the 1986 Act.

The appellant argued that she was entitled to maintenance post-iddat as per the 1986 Act and should not be excluded from seeking maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. 

On the other hand, the respondent contended that the 1986 Act specifically governs the maintenance of divorced Muslim women. Thereby it excludes the application of Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. Additionally, the respondent argued that the Family Court did not have jurisdiction over applications filed under the 1986 Act.

In its judgement, the court ruled that a divorced Muslim woman could not claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. as per the enactment of the 1986 Act, as the Act provides specific provisions for such maintenance. However, the court clarified that under Sections 3 and 4 of the 1986 Act, a divorced Muslim woman is entitled to maintenance if she is unable to maintain herself after the iddat period and has not remarried. The court also held that the Family Court has jurisdiction under Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 to entertain applications for maintenance under the 1986 Act. The Magistrate dealing with such applications is to be deemed a Civil Court subordinate to the District Court. 

In the case of Mujeeb Rahiman vs. Thasleena (2022), the dispute revolves around the maintenance rights of a divorced Muslim woman. The Family Court initially awarded Thasleena, the wife, a monthly maintenance of ₹6,000 from the date she filed the petition. Mujeeb Rahiman, the husband, argued that since they were already divorced, the court should not have ordered maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.PC beyond the date of their divorce. He further claimed that he had already sent ₹1,00,000 as a fair and reasonable provision for her future maintenance, as required under the Act.

However, the court clarified that the Act, which codifies the rights and obligations of divorced Muslim women, does not nullify a divorced Muslim woman’s right to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. The court emphasised that a divorced Muslim woman can still claim maintenance under Section 125 until her former husband fulfils his obligations under Section 3 of the Act.

The honourable Supreme Court recently upheld the divorced Muslim women’s rights in the case of Mohd Abdul Samad vs The State Of Telangana (2024). In this case, the Appellant, Mohd Abdul Samad, was married to Respondent No. 02 on 15.11.2012. Their relationship deteriorated and led to Respondent No. 02 to leave the matrimonial home. She lodged an FIR against the Appellant under Sections 498A and Section 406 of the IPC 1860. In response to the legal proceedings, the Appellant pronounced a triple talaq on 25.09.2017 and obtained an ex parte divorce through the office of the Quath, with the divorce certificate issued on 28.09.2017. The Appellant attempted to provide INR 15,000 for maintenance during the iddat period, which Respondent No. 02 refused. Instead, she filed a petition for interim maintenance under Section 125(1) of CrPC 1973 before the Family Court, which granted interim maintenance of INR 20,000 per month on 09.06.2023. The Appellant challenged the Family Court’s order in the High Court of Telangana, which modified the interim maintenance amount to INR 10,000 per month on 13.12.2023. 

The Supreme Court affirmed that Section 125 of the CrPC applies to all married women that includes those who are Muslim, as well as to all non-Muslim divorced women. For Muslim women who are married and divorced under the Special Marriage Act, the provisions of Section 125 of the CrPC apply in addition to the remedies available under that Act. For Muslim women who are married and divorced under Muslim law, both Section 125 of the CrPC and the Act, 1986 are applicable. These women have the option to seek remedies under either or both of these laws, as the 1986 Act is intended to supplement rather than replace Section 125 of the CrPC. Furthermore, if a divorced Muslim woman seeks relief under Section 125 of the CrPC, any orders made under the 1986 Act will be considered in accordance with Section 127(3)(b) of the CrPC.

The Supreme Court further ruled that a Muslim woman’s right to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC cannot be taken away, even if she has already claimed maintenance under the Act. The Court further emphasised that maintenance is a matter of “parity and rights,” not just a charity. The Court again stated that while people are free to follow their religious practices, those practices should still align with the broader principles of justice and equality as outlined in the Indian Constitution. Similarly, religious laws should not violate constitutional rights, such as the right to equality confirmed under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.

Conclusion

The author has concluded that a secular step was taken while introducing Section 125 in the CrPC. It grants maintenance rights to all women, irrespective of their religion. The court in Shah Bano affirmed the same. However, the legislature brought the Act to nullify the judgement in Shah Bano and the same was confirmed by the court in Danial Latifi. 

However, the court has overlooked specific contentious issues in Danial Latifi. It has deviated from the ratio given in Shah Bano. While upholding the validity of the Act, the court failed to consider why Section 125, which is a step towards achieving UCC in the country, should not have primacy over any other personal law. Further, it has not justified why the relatives and Wakf board should be obliged to maintain women and not their husbands. The court has also overlooked the intention of the parliament behind the Act and the prevailing circumstances going on in the country at that time. If the court would have considered the above contentions, the judgement could have been different. 

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

What is “mahr” in Muslim law?

In Muslim law, “mahr” is a mandatory payment or gift given by the groom to the bride at the time of marriage. 

What is the “iddat period” under Muslim law?

In Muslim law, the “iddat” period means a period in which a woman must undergo after the dissolution of her marriage. It can occur either through divorce or the death of her husband. The main reason for this period is to determine if the woman is pregnant or not. For women who have regular menstrual cycles, the iddat period lasts for three menstrual cycles after a divorce. For women who do not menstruate, it is three lunar months. However, if the woman is pregnant at the time of the divorce or the death of her spouse, in such circumstances the iddat period continues until she gives birth to the child. In the case of a husband’s death, the iddat period is determined as four lunar months and ten days. During the iddat period, a woman is not allowed to remarry. She is generally expected to stay at home and avoid social activities. If her husband has died, the iddat also serves as a mourning period.

What is the meaning of “mata”?

In Muslim law, “mata” means a kind of payment or support a husband must give his ex-wife after the divorce especially when the husband initiates the divorce. This concept is embedded within the principles of fairness and justice, that the wife is not left in financial hardship after the dissolution of the marriage.

References

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