This article, written by Sakshi Kuthari. It delves into the landmark case of E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr (1973), a pivotal legal precedent in Indian constitutional law. It examines the factual background, issues raised, judgement, and the intricate legal aspects involved in this case.

Introduction

With the passage of time and through various judicial pronouncements, it has been firmly established that every action taken by the State must strive to avoid the perils of arbitrariness. This principle is enshrined in Article 14 of the Indian Constitution and is essential to the rule of law, which governs our justice system. Arbitrariness is the anti-thesis rule of law. For the purpose of determining the legitimacy of State actions, it is necessary that this criterion of Rule of Law is followed. The concept and essence of arbitrariness are easier to grasp visually than to precisely articulate or define. Ultimately, determining whether an action is arbitrary hinges on the peculiarities of each case. An easy assessment involves examining whether there is a clear principle guiding the action and, if so, whether it meets the criterion of reasonableness. If a procedure is outlined  for carrying out an action and there are no hindrances to adhering to the procedure, deviating from it and performing the act in a manner that lacks any discernible reasonable principle may itself be considered arbitrary. 

In the case of E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1973), it is emphasised that every action undertaken by the State, including any policy changes, must be well-informed, equitable and free from any form of arbitrariness. 

Details of the case

Name of the case	E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr
Case no.	Writ Petition No. 284 of 1972
Equivalent citations	1974 AIR 555; 1974 SCR (2) 348
Statutes involved	Constitution of India, Indian Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954, Indian Administrative Services (Pay) Rules, 1954
Important provisions	Article 14 of the Indian Constitution;  Second proviso to Rule 4(2) of the Indian Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954 and Rule 9(1) of the Indian Administrative Services (Pay) Rules, 1954
Court	Supreme Court of India
Bench	A.N. Ray (Chief Justice). Justice D.G. Palekar, Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, Justice P.N. Bhagwati, and Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer
Petitioner	E. P. Royappa
Respondents	State of Tamil Nadu
Judgement Date	23 November, 1973

Facts of E.P. Royappa vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Another (1973)

The petitioner, a member of the Indian Administrative Service within the State of Tamil Nadu, filed a writ of mandamus under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution. On 13 November, 1969,  he was selected for the vacant post of Chief Secretary to the Government. The initial draft of his appointment order stated that he would replace C.A. Ramakrishnan, who was set to retire on 14th November, 1969, but he had been denied leave. An official Order, authenticated in the name of the Governor, was issued on the same day.

Subsequently, on 14th January 1970, following the recommendation of the State Government, the positions of the Chief Secretary and the First Member of the Board of Revenue were considered equivalent and exchangeable. A notification from the Central Government stated that the salary of the First Member of the Board of Revenue would be equivalent with that of the Chief Secretary. Then, on 31 August, 1970, another notification was issued by the Central Government, which enhanced the pay, rank, and status of the Chief Secretary to that of the Secretary to the Government of India, elevating the position of the Chief Secretary above all other state cadre posts, including that of the First Member of the Board of Revenue.

Thereafter, on 7th April, 1971, the petitioner was appointed as the Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Commission for a period of one year in the rank of Chief Secretary to the Government. However, the petitioner refused to join this post. Rather, he went on a leave from 13 April, 1971 to 5 June, 1972. After returning from leave, the petitioner found out that the post of Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Commission had been created again for another year at the Chief Secretary’s grade. He did not accept this position, asserting that the post of Deputy Chairman ceased to exist after 13 April, 1972. 

By an Order dated 27 June, 1972, the Government of Tamil Nadu sanctioned the creation of a temporary post of Officer on Special Duty in the grade of Chief Secretary to Government for a period of one year from the date of appointment or until the need for it ceased, whichever was earlier. The petitioner was transferred by the same order and was appointed as an officer on special duty in the post sanctioned aforesaid. But again, he did not join this post and filed a petition in the month of July, 1972. 

Issues raised

The following issues were raised in this petition:

1. Whether the petitioner’s appointment or transfer to a post not duly legally established, such as the post of officer on special duty, violates the second proviso to Rule 4(2) of the Indian Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954, which specifies that such posts cannot be considered equivalent to cadre posts with similar duties and responsibilities?
2. Whether the appointment of the petitioner to a position other than those listed in Schedule III, as per Rule 9(1) of the Indian Administrative Service (Pay) Rules, 1954, is permissible only if the relevant State Government or the Central Government declares that the said position is comparable in status and responsibility to one specified in the aforementioned Schedule?
3. Whether the petitioner’s appointment to a post subordinate in both rank and office to that of the Chief Secretary constitutes comprehensive discrimination, violating both Articles 14 and 16 of the Indian Constitution?
4. Whether the creation of the post, along with the petitioner’s appointment and transfer to it, is done with mala fide intention?

Arguments of the parties

Petitioner

The petitioner contended the following:

1. The transfer of the petitioner is contrary to the Second proviso to Rule 4(2) of the Indian Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954 & Rule 9(1) of the Indian Administrative Services (Pay) Rules, 1954;
2. The transfer was violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Indian Constitution, as the posts of Deputy Chairman, State Planning Commission and officer on special duty were inferior in rank and status to those of Chief Secretary; and
3. The respondent acted in mala fide exercise of power, not on account of exigencies of administration or public service, but because  the second respondent (Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu) was annoyed with the petitioner on account of various incidents referred to in the petition and wanted him out of the way.

Respondent

Following were the respondent’s contentions:

1. The petitioner was appointed in an officiating capacity to the post of Chief Secretary and reliance was placed on Fundamental Rule 9(19). Under that Rule, a Government servant officiates in a post when he perform the duties of a post on which another person holds a lien or the Government may, if it thinks fit, appoint a Government servant to officiate in a vacant post on which no other Government servant holds a lien; and
2. The respondents contended that no action has been taken by respondent number 2 under haste and with malafide intention; hence, the argument of petitioner is baseless.

Involved legal aspects

The doctrine of non-arbitrariness was discussed in this case. The scope of Article 14 was drastically increased in the present case by the Hon’ble Supreme Court by including executive discretion under its ambit. The Court had said that Article 14 provides a guarantee against the arbitrary action of the State. The right to equality is an antonym to arbitrariness. So it is necessary to protect the laws from the arbitrary actions of the executive organ of the government. The test of reasonable classification with the doctrine of anti arbitrariness was the most ideal approach to determining whether the State activity was against Article 14 or not.

The genesis of the “test of reasonable classification” is found under Article 14 of the Indian Constitution. The State has the power to legislate laws differently for different classes of people so that the Rule of Law and the principle of equality prevails. This Article permits “reasonable classification” but not “class legislation”. 

Issue-wise judgement in the case

Whether the petitioner’s appointment or transfer to a post not duly legally established, such as the post of officer on special duty, violates the second proviso to Rule 4(2) of the Indian Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954, which specifies that such posts cannot be considered equivalent to cadre posts with similar duties and responsibilities ?

The application of the second proviso to Rule 4(2) of the Indian Administrative Service Cadre (Rules), 1954, is deemed irrelevant in this context. This rule primarily confers upon the State Government, the limited authority to temporarily augment the cadre for a duration not exceeding that stipulated within the proviso itself. The determination of the cadre’s strength and composition falls solely within the purview of the Central Government under Rule (1), with the Central Government retaining the power to review it at three-year intervals or at any time in between, as per Rule 4(2). The State Government is not authorised to introduce a distinct category of post within the cadre nor can it make permanent additions to the cadre through the relaxation provided in the second proviso to Rule 4(2). Such actions would either modify the composition or the strength of the cadre, both of which exceed the jurisdiction of the State Government.

Under the second proviso, the State Government is permitted to make temporary additions, provided the added posts entail duties or responsibilities akin to those of an existing cadre post. The Government of India, as per the All India Services Manual, clarified that the exercise of this power by the State Government concerning  a post necessitates an impartial assessment of the associated duties or responsibilities compared to those of a cadre post. Temporary posts cannot be incorporated into the cadre unless they are already part of it. Thus, the State of Tamil Nadu cannot include the positions of Deputy Chairman, State Planning Commission, and Officer on Special Duty under the second proviso of Rule 4(2) since these were newly created categories of posts created by the State Government, rendering the second proviso inapplicable. Any challenge based on this proviso is unlikely to succeed.

Whether the appointment of the petitioner to a position other than those listed in Schedule III, as per Rule 9(1) of the Indian Administrative Service (Pay) Rules, 1954, is permissible only if the relevant State Government or the Central Government declared that the said position is comparable in status and responsibility to one specified in the aforementioned Schedule?

Rule 9(1) of the Indian Administrative Services (Pay) Rules, 1954 mandates an official declaration of equivalence between a non-cadre post and a cadre post, which is a prerequisite for appointing a member of the Indian Administrative Service to a non-cadre post. The Government is required to meticulously evaluate the nature and responsibilities associated with the non-cadre post to establish its similarity . If it appears to the court that this declaration of equivalence is made without due consideration of the actual responsibilities and nature of the non-cadre post, or if external factors influenced the decision, or if the roles are so dissimilar that no reasonable person could deem them equivalent, the court has the authority to nullify  the declaration and safeguard the civil servant.

The order dated 7th April, 1971,  which sanctioned the creation of the temporary post of Deputy Chairman and appointed the petitioner this role, lacked evidence of the State Government conducting an objective assessment of the post’s responsibilities to determine its equivalence to that of the Chief Secretary. Additionally, the Deputy Chairman’s role could not be considered equivalent to that of the Chief Secretary in one instance and to that of the First Member Board of Revenue at another, as the responsibilities and nature of the roles remain consistent. This suggests that the government did not conduct an objective assessment but merely adjusted the grade based on the appointee. However, the petitioner is now precluded from contesting the validity of this appointment since he had previously accepted it, believing it to be equivalent in rank and remuneration to that of the Chief Secretary.

Similarly, the order dated 27th June, 1972, concerning the appointment of an Officer on Special Duty, did not involve an objective assessment of equivalence by the State Government but was influenced by the status of the appointee. This non-compliance with Rule 9(1) implies that although the procedural requirement was not fulfilled, the petitioner cannot seek relief under Article 32 since the mere violation of Rule 9(1) does not constitute an infringement of any fundamental right.

Whether the petitioner’s appointment to a post subordinate in both rank and office to that of the Chief Secretary constitutes comprehensive discrimination, violating both Articles 14 and 16 of the Indian Constitution?

Article 16 is pivotal in ensuring equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters of employment or appointments to any state office. It stands as a distinct fundamental right because of its critical role in fostering equal opportunities in public employment, which is integral to the vision of building an egalitarian society as envisaged in the Indian Constitution. Essentially, Article 16 represents a specific application of the broader principle of equality encapsulated in Article 14. While Article 14 serves as the overarching principle, Article 16 functions as a particular manifestation of this principle, specifically focusing on public employment. Both articles are firmly rooted in the principles of equality and non-discrimination.

The petitioner’s transfer from the post of Chief Secretary to Deputy Chairman, and subsequently to Officer on Special Duty, along with the promotion and permanent appointment of a junior to the Chief Secretary’s post, was deemed arbitrary and a violation of both Articles 14 and 16. The argument hinges on the assumption that the roles of the Deputy Chairman and Officer on Special Duty do not carry the same status and responsibilities as those of the Chief Secretary. However, the evidence does not conclusively establish this presumption. Regarding the Deputy Chairman’s role, the petitioner himself acknowledged its equivalence in status and responsibility to that of the Chief Secretary. Although it may appear that the Officer on Special Duty role does not parallel the Chief Secretary in terms of both status and opportunity, the available evidence does not definitively prove any disparity in status and responsibility. Therefore, the challenge under Articles 14 and 16 must be dismissed based on the current available record.

Whether the creation of the post, along with the petitioner’s appointment and transfer to it, is done with mala fide intention?

The onus of proving malicious intent is considerable for the individual making the allegation. The petitioner did not meet the burden of proving malicious intent against the Chief Minister. The court would be cautious while drawing questionable conclusions from incomplete information presented by one party, especially when serious allegations are made against a person who holds an office with important responsibilities in the administration.

Ratio of the judgement

With a unanimous decision of the five-judges, the Bench without any dissenting opinion, dismissed the petition. Each judge offered different clarifications and observations, which are as follows:

1. Justices Bhagwati, Chandrachud, and Krishna Iyer laid stress on the verified order, which stated that the  petitioner’s promotion to Chief Secretary was only temporary. Chief Justice Ray and Justice Palekar emphasised the previous Chief Secretary’s retention of lien until retirement, which prevented the substantive filling of the position They also emphasised that the State of Tamil Nadu did not have the power to establish new positions such as Deputy Chairman, State Planning Commission, and Officer on Special Duty into the Cadre. Chief Justice Ray was of the opinion that this alteration infringed the Rules of the Cadre.
2. Justice Bhagwati paid attention to the inconsistencies in the ranking for Deputy Chairman and Officer on Special Duty. He drew attention to the fact that the petitioner’s  favourable acceptance of those positions made it impossible to challenge their validity. Moreover, he also stated that the Rule 9(1) violation did not in any way amount to fundamental rights violation.
3. There was a dismissal of the argument by Justice Bhagwati on the arbitrary transfers and promotions because  of lack of evidence. He also deemed the allegations of the petitioner of malicious intent against the Chief Minister as groundless.
4. The allegations against the Chief Minister were dismissed by the Court due to insufficient evidence.

Rationale behind the judgement

The basic principle behind both Articles 14 and 16 is equality and inhibition of discrimination. Equality should never be subjected to a narrow approach. With the traditional limits, the concept of equality should not be cribbed, cabined or confined. Equality has a dynamic approach and is antithetic to arbitrariness. Whenever the State takes any arbitrary action, it is implied that it is unequal both politically and constitutionally and is violative of Article 14. If the arbitrary State action relates to any matter relating to public employment, it is violative of both Articles 14 and 16.

Relevant judgments with respect to this case

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978)

In this case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court determined that the concept of equality is dynamic, encompassing numerous aspects and dimensions, and cannot be confined within traditional or doctrinal boundaries. Article 14 invalidates arbitrariness in State actions, thereby ensuring fairness and equal treatment. Legally and philosophically, the principle of reasonableness is a fundamental element of both equality and non-arbitrariness.

R.D. Shetty v. the International Airport Authority of India (1979)

In this case, Justice Bhagwati reiterated the principle established in the previously mentioned case emphasising that Article 14 strikes arbitrariness as any arbitrary action inherently undermines the principle of equality. The court adhered to the doctrine of classification, which is neither a restatement of Article 14 nor its sole objective. Instead, it serves as a judicial framework for determining whether the legislative or executive action under consideration is arbitrary and violates the principle of equality. If an unreasonable classification fails to meet the two aforementioned conditions, the challenged  law or executive action would unequivocally be deemed arbitrary, resulting in a complete breach of the guarantee of equality under Article 14. 

Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980)

In this case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court ruled that the rule of law, which forms the essence of the Indian Constitution, precludes arbitrariness. Any instance of arbitrariness or unreasonableness constitutes a violation of the rule of law. Article 14 principally establishes a safeguard against arbitrariness and restrains state actions, whether legislative or executive, that exhibit signs of arbitrariness. Every action taken by the State must adhere to the principles of non-arbitrariness and reasonableness. Failure to do so empowers the court to invalidate such actions.

D.S. Nakara v. Union of India (1983)

In this case, it was held that the fundamental right enshrined under Article 14 prohibits class legislation but allows reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. This classification must satisfy two criteria: first, it must be based on an intelligible differentia, distinguishing individuals or entities grouped together from those excluded from the group; and second, the differentia must have a rational connection to the objective intended to be achieved by the statute in question.

A.L. Kalra v. P & E Corporation of India, Limited (1984)

The Hon’ble Supreme Court noted in this case that Article 14 of the Indian Constitution strikes arbitrariness in executive or administrative actions because any action deemed arbitrary inherently undermines the principle of equality. An action deemed arbitrary by its very nature negates equality under the law.

A.P. Aggarwal v. Government of NCT of Delhi (2000)

In this case, it was held that there is a complete prohibition of arbitrary administrative action under Article 14 of the Indian Constitution. Whenever there is a presence of arbitrariness in any state action, Article 14 comes into picture. It prompts and compels the courts to invalidate such actions of the State that constitute a violation of Article 14.

Analysis of the judgement

The scope of ‘equality’ under Article 14 of the Indian Constitution was expanded with the help of the present case. The Court imposed limitations on the discretionary powers of the executive as well as on the administrative authorities. It ruled that administrative authorities, while exercising their discretion, must act reasonably, non-arbitrarily, and in a non-discriminatory manner. This judgement had an important implication for limiting the misuse of administrative discretion and introducing the rule of reason and non-arbitrariness in State actions.

Conclusion

A thorough examination of Article 14 is done with the help of the present case. Article 14 inhibits two substantial points. They are the requirements for an intelligible differentia and a reasonable nexus. These two tests incorporate both a moral principle and the principle of rationality. For the purpose of upholding the principle of equality, the evaluation of non-arbitrariness is determined by the constraints on the factors that influence the classification. However, when it comes to the implementation of the regulations within a specific category, a brief review is allowed, as the individuals themselves have the complete right to legal protection based on the concept of rationality.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

What is the fundamental principle embodied in Article 14 of the Indian Constitution ?

The fundamental aim of Article 14 is to ensure that all individuals subject to similar circumstances are treated with equality, both in the privileges granted and the liabilities imposed. Classification should not be arbitrary but rather rational, meaning it should be based not only on certain qualities or characteristics shared by all individuals grouped together, excluding others, but also on those qualities and characteristics having a reasonable connection to the legislative objective.

What is the essence of Article 14 of the Indian Constitution?

The essence of the right to equality encompasses both equality before the law and equal protection of the law. It emphasises that individuals who are equal should not be treated unequally, and valid classification is necessary to avoid arbitrary denial of rights to equals. Essentially, it signifies that similar individuals should be treated similarly and dissimilar individuals should be treated differently.

What essentials are taken into account when determining the appropriateness of valid classification?

For the purpose of determining whether a classification is appropriate and reasonable, the following two criteria must be satisfied:

• Firstly, the essence of arbitrariness, evasiveness or falsity should not be present. Rather, it should be founded on an intelligible differentia that is both bonafide and meaningful in application. The distinction should be such that it sets apart individuals or entities grouped together from those excluded from the group;
• The  differentia must have a rational or reasonable connection with the classification and the objective sought to be achieved by the statute under consideration.

What elements incorporate a legitimate basis for classification?

The term “differentia” is the legitimate basis for classification. It must be done in such a way that it turns out to be robust and holds a reasonable correlation with the object of the legislation sought to be achieved. But if the purpose for which the classification is done is discriminatory in nature, an argument could be made that the classification done is unreasonable and does not have a rational connection to the intended objective.

Is it necessary that every state action must be done in public interest?

Every action of the State must be informed by reasons and guided only by the public interest. Actions uninformed by reasons may be questioned as arbitrary. Whenever there is arbitrariness in state action, Article 14 springs to life and judicial review strikes down such action. Arbitrariness is the antithesis of Article 14. Equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies. Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in state action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment.

Why is ‘equality before law’ described as a negative concept?

It is considered a negative concept because it ensures no individual receives special privileges; instead, everyone is equally subject to the ordinary law of the land, without exception based on his rank or status. This principle describes the second principle of Dicey’s concept of the Rule of Law, which emanates from Britain. However, it is not a universal rule, as there are several exceptions to it. For example, diplomats in foreign nation states are granted immunity from the judicial process of the host country or immunity is provided to the President of India and the Governors of the States under Article 361 of the Indian Constitution or even various protections are also provided to public officials and judges and enjoyed by them, and certain special groups and interests, such as trade unions, are granted special privileges under the law.

Why is ‘equal protection of laws’ a positive concept?

‘Equal protection of laws’ is positive in content. It does not mean that identically, the same law should apply to all persons or that every law must have a universal application within a country irrespective of differences of circumstances. Equal protection of the laws does not postulate equal treatment of all persons without distinction. What it postulates is the application of the same laws, alike and without discrimination, to all persons similarly situated. It denotes equality of treatment in equal circumstances. It implies that among equals, the law should be equal and equality administered, and that the like should be treated alike without distinction of race, religion, wealth, social status or political influence.

References

• https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1327287/
• https://indiankanoon.org/doc/367586/
• https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2021/10/11/article-14-and-arbitrariness-vis-a-vis-legislative-action/
• https://lawbhoomi.com/e-p-royappa-v-state-of-tamil-nadu-and-anr-air-1974-sc-555/
• https://legalfly.in/e-p-royappa-v-state-of-tamil-nadu-case-summary/