Cossijurah case

This article was written by Pruthvi Ramkanta Hegde. This article explains the facts, issues, and judgement of the case of G. Basi Reddy v. International Crops Research Institute based on the interpretation of the scope of ‘State’ under the Constitution. The article also covers the definition of ‘State’ under Article 12 and some important judicial pronouncements in this regard. 

Introduction 

Judicial pronouncements are always made in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution since the Constitution of India is considered the mother law of India. Article 12 of the Constitution is one of the important provisions that define what constitutes the “State” under the Constitution. This definition determines the scope of governmental authority under Article 12 of the Constitution. In this regard, the case of G. Basi Reddy vs. International Crops Research Institute & Another (2003) is one of the most important for understanding how Article 12 of the Indian Constitution works. This case also explains the rules for identifying which organisations are considered “States” under the Constitution. 

Details of the case 

Name of the case

G. Basi Reddy vs. International Crops Research Institute and Another

Date of judgement

February 14, 2003

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Court name

Honourable Supreme Court of India

Supreme Court Bench

Honourable Justice Ruma Pal 

Honourable Justice B.N. Shrikrishna

Parties to the case

Petitioner

G. Bassi Reddy

Respondent

International Crops Research Institute. & Another

Equivalent citations

AIR 2003 SUPREME COURT 1764, 2003 (4) SCC 225, 2003 AIR SCW 1197, 2003 LAB. I. C. 1157, 2003 (2) UPLBEC 1185, 2003 (2) ALL CJ 1476, 2003 (3) COM LJ 90 SC, 2003 (2) SCALE 136, 2003 (2) ACE 421, (2003) 4 ALLINDCAS 809 (SC), 2003 (4) ALLINDCAS 809, 2003 (2) SLT 435, (2003) 1 SCR 1174 (SC), (2003) 2 JT 180 (SC), 2003 (5) SRJ 153, (2003) 2 LABLJ 1123, (2003) 2 ALL WC 1199, (2003) 2 CURLR 290, (2003) 98 FACLR 488, (2003) 2 LAB LN 1083, (20 03) 3 SERVLR 220, (2003) 2 UPLBEC 1185, (2003) 2 SUPREME 42, (2003) 2 SCALE 136, (2003) 3 INDLD 879

Author of the judgement

Honourable Justice Ruma Pal

Facts of the case

The International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) was a centre for research and training institutions focused on helping countries dealing with dry areas fight poverty and hunger in a sustainable way. The idea came from the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), a cluster of almost fifty institutions and intergovernmental organisations, including but not limited to the UN and the World Bank. This was mainly for improving sorghum, millet, pigeon peas and chickpeas, which are very important in many less developed regions, especially within India, some parts of Africa, and Latin American areas. To fund ICRISAT, certain members of CGIAR entered into agreements with organisations such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the Ford Foundation.

In March 1972, the Government of India and the Ford Foundation reached an agreement facilitated by CGIAR, called the March Agreement, leading to the establishment of ICRISAT in Hyderabad, India. According to this agreement, ICRISAT would serve as the primary centre for global research and training on these crops. Under the March Agreement, ICRISAT was established in India as an autonomous institution engaged in agricultural research, education and training. The director of the institute is chosen by a board of governors who supervise its overall functioning, while the director is responsible for managing its daily operations. Programmes were run by this board, its policies were developed and implemented, and its budgeting capacity determined how well senior staff members received appointments.

The Governing Board of ICRISAT, which could have up to fifteen members, included representatives from India, where ICRISAT is based, as well as from CGIAR and other supporting countries or organisations. A smaller group from CGIAR set up this board when ICRISAT first started. ICRISAT’s main offices and labs were constructed on land allocated by the Indian Government. The initial funding to establish ICRISAT came from the UK, USA, UNDP, and IBRD, with additional support from CGIAR members. India provided comparatively smaller financial contributions compared to these other countries.

ICRISAT also works in several African countries and has additional centres there established through agreements with those nations. Its team consists of people from twenty-two countries, including India, and they work in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. ICRISAT has offered training to many researchers and students from different countries, including India. Its board includes individuals of diverse nationalities, with additional members appointed by the Indian government. In addition, there are also representatives from Norway, Zambia, the Philippines, Germany, France, Sweden, the USA, Canada, Australia, Japan, Brazil, and Nigeria.

According to clause 6 of that March agreement, the Indian government would grant ICRISAT immunity under the United Nations (Privileges and Immunities) Act, 1947. It also stated that it recognised ICRISAT as an international body with non-profit status.

In the March Agreement, it was agreed that this institution would be recognised as a charity by the Government of India, but not to make a profit. It was also agreed that it should have certain rights under the United Nations (Privileges and Immunities) Act of 1947. On October 28, 1972, the Indian Government officially announced that it would extend these protections to ICRISAT and its international staff. However, there were a few exceptions when it came to solving legal disputes. Despite having these legal provisions, ICRISAT established its own regulations in 1976 regarding the management and discipline of its staff. These regulations took into consideration both international standards and local practices.

A few terminated former employees of ICRISAT tried to challenge this decision in the High Court of Karnataka on two occasions. However, their petitions were dismissed. The Court ruled that ICRISAT enjoys immunity from lawsuits because it is recognised as an international organisation under the 1972 Act. The court further held that ICRISAT functions similarly to an international organisation. Therefore, under Article 226, the court concluded that it did not have the authority to instruct or interfere with ICRISAT’s decisions or actions. Consequently, this present appeal was filed before the Supreme Court.

Issues

  1. Whether ICRISAT fall under the purview of Article 12 of the Constitution of India?
  2. Whether the agreement between the Government of India and ICRISAT enforceable in domestic courts even if it is not part of any domestic law?
  3. What kind of organisation is ICRISAT?

Law surrounding G. Basi Reddy vs. International Crops Research Institute (2003)

Article 12 of the Indian Constitution

Article 12 of the Constitution explains what the word “State” includes. It includes the central government, state governments, and any local authorities in India or under the control of the central government.

The term “other authorities” in Article 12 of the Constitution is clarified by important court cases. For instance, in the Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Jaipur vs. Mohan Lal (1967) case, it was decided that “other authorities” include any entity created by a law that performs governmental functions and operates in India or under the Indian government’s control.

The court in the Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. The International Airport of India and Others  (1979) case laid out some guidelines for identifying an entity as an “other authority” under Article 12. In this case, the International Airport Authority of India (IAAI) issued a public notice by inviting tenders for setting up and running a second-class restaurant and two snack bars at the Bombay International Airport. The petitioner submitted a tender, but it did not meet the specified conditions. Despite this, the IAAI accepted the petitioner’s non-conforming tender.

The main issue was whether the IAAI could be considered an “authority” under the definition of “State” in Article 12 of the Indian Constitution.

These guidelines include several criteria, one is whether the government owns most of the entity’s shares, and the other is whether the government mostly funds the entity. It also analyses whether the company has received government monopoly status or if the entity is highly managed by the government. The enumerated factors also consider whether the function of that state activity is important to the public at large. It was held in this case by the Supreme Court of India that IAAI is an “instrumentality of the state.” The court further emphasised that if authorities are exercising sovereign powers similar to those of the state,  whether they are constitutional or statutory bodies, they are considered ‘other authorities’. The central government exerted deep and pervasive control over the administrative affairs of IAAI; it qualifies as an ‘authority’ under Article 12. Thus, any agreement based on a nonconforming tender accepted by IAAI would be subject to constitutional limitations, including Article 14, which deals with the right to equality.

Over time, Indian courts have expanded the scope of “State” in various situations to protect fundamental rights. For example, in the case of the University of Madras by Registrar vs. Shanta Bai and another (1953) case, the Madras High Court introduced the principle of ejusdem generis, which means “similar in nature.” This principle indicates that entities performing governmental functions are covered under “Other Authorities.” Similarly, in the Sukhdev Singh & Ors. vs. Bhagatram Sardar Singh & Ors. (1975) case, entities like LIC, ONGC, and IFC were considered “State” because they performed functions similar to those of the government. 

There has been debate about whether the judiciary should be considered part of the “State”. Some legal experts, like H.M. Seervai and V.N. Shukla, argue that the judiciary should be included. They point to Articles 145 and Article 146 of the Constitution, which give the Supreme Court the power to make rules and appointments. In the Prem Chand Garg vs. Excise Commissioner, U. P. Allahabad (1962) case, the Supreme Court held that when the judiciary makes rules, it is considered part of the “State”. The Supreme Court ruled that the judiciary’s rule-making under Articles 145 and 146 qualifies as part of the “State,” subject to constitutional scrutiny. Conversely, in the Ratilal Panachand Gandhi vs. The State Of Bombay and Others (1954) case, it was decided that the judiciary is not part of the “State” under Article 12. However, in the A.R. Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak (1988) and Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar And Ors vs. State of Maharashtra (1966) cases, courts held that while judicial rule-making and administrative actions may be considered part of the “State” for constitutional purposes, the actual judicial acts of adjudication and trial proceedings generally do not meet this criterion. 

In the case of Zee Telefilms Ltd. and Another vs. Union of India and Others, (2005), the Honourable Supreme Court of India addressed the issue of whether the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) should be considered a “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution. The main question was whether the BCCI meets Article 12’s definition of a governmental body in spite of its prominent role and monopoly in cricket administration. The BCCI argued that it operates independently without government control or financial aid. The court agreed that because the BCCI functions on its own, without direct government involvement or a legal foundation provided by the government, it does not qualify as a “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution. Therefore, the court ruled that BCCI is not a state within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution.

Over time, there have been different judicial interpretations and discussions about what constitutes ‘State’ under Article 12 in Indian courts. 

Parties contentions

Petitioner contention

Petitioners contended that ICRISAT should be directed to frame rules aligning with Indian customs and fulfil Clause 6(a)(2) of the March agreement, which assured the governing authority over ICRISAT. The petitioner argued that the immunity granted to ICRISAT under the International Organizations (Privileges and Immunities) Act, 1947, was not applicable because ICRISAT was not an organ of the United Nations or a specialised agency as per Article 57 of the U.N. Charter. It was further contended that even if immunity was granted, it should not extend to employment disputes and should not prevent judicial review by the courts. They contended that the agreement violated fundamental rights under Articles 14, 21, and 311 of the Constitution. 

The petitioner argued that the immunity granted to ICRISAT violated his constitutional and fundamental rights in several ways. The petitioner claimed that the immunity granted to ICRISAT resulted in unequal treatment of his employees compared to employees of other organisations. 

He further argued that the immunity granted to ICRISAT deprived him of the ability to seek legal action in court to challenge his dismissal. He claimed it was a fundamental aspect of equality under the law. He claimed this was unequal treatment compared to employees of other organisations who could access judicial remedies for similar grievances. Thereby, his fundamental right under Article 14 was violated.  

The petitioner also claimed that the arbitrary termination of his employment without proper procedural safeguards violated his right to life and personal liberty, as confirmed under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. It was further contended that employment is essential to his livelihood, which is a fundamental aspect of his right to life. 

It was further contended that the immunity granted to ICRISAT effectively prevented him from seeking protection under Article 311 of the Constitution, which safeguards government employees from arbitrary dismissal. 

The petitioner further contended that the absence of an independent and impartial tribunal to resolve employment problems at ICRISAT was an obvious breach of his right to a fair hearing. Further argued that unfair procedures at ICRISAT undermined the principles of justice and fairness. This situation also violated his basic rights, as outlined in Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. He also argued that his termination from the job was completely random and unfair and went against the principles of natural justice. 

Respondent contention

Respondents objected that ICRISAT was outside the jurisdiction of the municipal courts under Article 226. Besides, it was not a government agency and was not controlled financially or administratively by the government. The Union of India maintained that the immunity granted to ICRISAT was based on an agreement with the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) and could not be altered unilaterally. ICRISAT contended that it was not subject to the court’s jurisdiction under Article 226 because it was neither a government body nor under government control. Both ICRISAT and the Union of India contended that a writ petition was not maintainable against ICRISAT, as it was not a ‘State’ or authority under Article 12 of the Constitution. ICRISAT further contended that the disciplinary action against the petitioner was carried out according to its internal rules, which were fair and consistent with domestic laws like the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act of 1946.

The respondents considered that ICRISAT was not discharging governmental or statutory functions that would be amenable to the issuing of a writ under Article 226. Rather, they contended, ICRISAT engaged in voluntary agricultural research and training and benefitted not only the Indian populace but also people around the world. The respondents further submitted that the employee-employer relationship between the petitioner and ICRISAT was contractual and that, therefore, the dispute must be resolved through contractual remedies and not through a writ petition under Article 226.

Judgement in G. Basi Reddy vs. International Crops Research Institute (2003)

The court examined whether ICRISAT, a global agricultural research institution, can be considered a “State” under Article 12 of the Indian Constitution. This examination is important because if ICRISAT were a “State,” it would be bound to observe the obligations of the Constitution.

The court reasoned that ICRISAT was formed to combat hunger and poverty in less developed countries and not act on behalf of India. India contributed a very small portion of the financial contribution, between 0.3% and 2% of the total budget of ICRISAT. Because of this small financial contribution, India had narrow control over the decisions and operations of ICRISAT. The court further observed that the state’s influence was primarily through acts of parliament, not direct control of the government. The court therefore decided that ICRISAT could not be considered a part of the government under Article 12 of the Constitution.

Further, the petitioner sought relief against the Union of India. The court said this claim was substantially identical to the one against ICRISAT and was not sustainable. The court is querying further whether the agreement between the government and ICRISAT is enforceable in Indian courts. These agreements amount to instruments; they do not fall into the category of domestic law.

The court concluded that the petitioner’s legal rights were not violated because ICRISAT was not considered a “State” under the Constitution. Therefore, a writ petition under Article 226 against ICRISAT could not be maintained. The court also noted that the complaint against the Union of India was not valid because it mainly involved ICRISAT.

The court referred to Clause 6(2) of the March agreement and held that ICRISAT’s Personnel Policy Statement (PPS) on internal discipline could not be questioned. According to the court, a writ under Article 226 cannot be used to enforce contractual rights unless a statutory body acts against a mandatory legal duty when terminating the contract.

The court decided that ICRISAT could not be classified as a “State” under Article 12 of the Indian Constitution because  it had limited financial ties to India and was not directly controlled by the Indian government. Therefore, it was not subject to the constitutional obligations that apply to government entities in India. Consequently, the petitioner was unable to use Article 226 to seek redress against ICRISAT. Furthermore, the court emphasised that writ petitions cannot generally be used to settle disputes arising from contracts. However, such writ petitions may be invoked if the disputes involve statutory bodies that have failed to fulfil their legal obligations.

Cases referred to in the judgement

In Pradeep Kumar Biswas vs. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology & Ors. (2002) case provided tests to determine if an organisation is controlled by the government and thus considered a “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution. The court used these tests to conclude that ICRISAT is not controlled by the Indian government and thus not a “State.”

In Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal and Others (1962) case, it was provided that a writ under Article 226 can only be issued if a fundamental or legal right is infringed. The court used this principle to determine that the writ petition could not be maintained against ICRISAT since it was not a “State” and no fundamental right was violated.

In Praga Tools Corporation vs. Shri C.A. Imanual and Others (1969) case, it was ruled that a writ can be issued to enforce statutory duties, but not to resolve private disputes or contractual obligations. The court concluded that since ICRISAT’s activities were not statutory, a writ could not be issued against it for a contractual employment dispute.

In Anandi Mukta Sadguru Shree Mukta Jeevananda Swami Suvarna Jaya vs. V.R. Rudani and others (1989) case, it was provided that a writ can be issued to any person performing a public function or duty. The court noted that ICRISAT’s activities were voluntary and not public duties, so a writ could not be issued against it.

The Vst Industries Ltd. vs. Vst Industries Workers Union & Anr. (2001) case reinforced the principle that a writ can be issued if a public function or statutory duty is involved. The court reiterated that ICRISAT’s functions were not public or statutory duties.

In S.R. Tewari vs. District Board Agra And Another (1963), case it was held that a writ under Article 226 cannot be used to quash an order terminating a contract of service. The court used this to support its decision that the petition could not be maintained to challenge the employment termination. In the Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli vs. Lakshmi Narain (1976) is the same as the S.R. Tewari case regarding the non-maintainability of writ petitions to enforce contractual rights. The court reinforced that a writ petition cannot be used to resolve employment contract disputes.

In Vidya Ram Mishra vs. Managing Committee, Shri Jai Narain College (1972) case, exceptions exist where statutory bodies act in breach of mandatory legal obligations. The court noted that since ICRISAT is not a statutory body, this exception did not apply.

In Dadu @ Tulsidas vs. State Of Maharashtra (2000) case, it was provided that international agreements must conform to domestic constitutional principles. The court noted that international agreements like the one with ICRISAT could not override constitutional rights, but this did not apply here since ICRISAT was not considered a “State.”

In Nain Sukh Das And Another vs. The State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others (1953) case, the court ruled that the scope of Article 226 is broader than Article 32, which is limited to fundamental rights. The court reinforced that Article 226 could be used broadly, but still not for enforcing purely contractual rights.

Conclusion

Determining the scope of authorities considered “State” under Article 12 is not easy, as the term ‘State’ has been interpreted by courts as per changing times. Through various case laws and judgements, as well as different viewpoints of judges and legal scholars, the meaning of “other authorities” has expanded. One of the primary tests applied by the judiciary to determine whether an entity is a ‘State’ is whether the entity performs functions that are performed by the state in its sovereign capacity or not. If certain entities perform functions that are typically done by the government, they can be seen as similar to the government itself.

Certain entities can be considered as part of the “State” if they are controlled or owned by the Indian government. If an entity is not under such direct control or ownership, it is generally not considered as a “State”. As a result, individuals cannot file a lawsuit against such organisations under Article 226 of the Constitution to enforce fundamental rights. 

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

Does Article 12 of the Indian Constitution consider the judiciary as part of the ‘State’?

Under Article 12 of the Indian Constitution, the term “State” does not specify that it includes the judiciary. However, the judiciary can be seen as part of the “State” when it performs non-judicial functions. However, there is ongoing debate about whether judicial decisions can be challenged as violations of fundamental rights.

What is the difference between the terms ‘instrumentality or agency’ and ‘other authorities’ as used in Article 12 of the Indian Constitution?

“Instrumentality or agency” of the State is a narrower term and refers to bodies performing State functions. It would include government companies or statutory corporations that are closely associated with the State. “Other Authority” is a more general term and includes authorities that impact people or are affected by an authority that is not a state government entity, for example, the municipal committee or panchayat. An authority could be an “instrumentality or agency” of the State, but all instrumentalities or agencies would not be authorities.

Can International Agreements be enforced in the domestic courts of India?

An international agreement can only be enforced in the Indian courts if it has been incorporated into the domestic law of India by the legislature. If the international agreement has not been incorporated into the domestic law, it will not be directly applied or used in the domestic courts in India.

References

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