This article is written by Shreeji Saraf. This article talks about the case of Guramma Bhratar Chanbasappa Deshmukh vs. Mallappa (1964), which in turn deals with the rights to joint family property under Hindu law, particularly with respect to adopted children and natural born children. The article lays out the facts, issues raised, and arguments presented by both the parties and the judgement passed by the court while highlighting what were the legal aspects involved in the case.

Introduction

The case of Guramma Bhratar Chanbasappa Deshmukh vs. Mallappa (1964) highlights various concerns relating to the right of a person to adopt a son in a situation where a son has already been conceived. This case involves a question related to that of the right of the father to gift a property to the daughter for her maintenance and it even revolves around various adoption and partition rights. 

One of the fundamental values highlighted by the Supreme Court is that the presence of the son in the mother’s womb does not invalidate the adoption. In addition to this, the court has rightly followed all the laws and provisions dealing with the rights of the daughters in receiving the property from the father as a gift. The court has cited various judgements with reference to this case. 

This article covers the Trial Court’s decision and the High Court’s decision, deals in detail with the issues that were discussed in this case, arguments that have been presented by both parties, the rationale behind the judgement and also the relevant judgements referred to in this case. Let’s delve into it.  

Details of the case 

Case name: Guramma Bhratar Chanbasappa Deshmukh vs. Mallappa

Name of the appellant:

1. Guramma Bhratar Chanbasappa Deshmukh And Others (In Ca No. 334 Of 1960)

2. Nagamma Bhratar Chanbasappa Deshmukh And Another (In Ca No. 335 Of 1960) 

Name of the respondent:

1. Mallappa Chanbasappa And Another (In Ca No. 334 Of 1960) 

2. Guramma Bhratar Chanbasappa And Others (In Ca No. 335 Of 1960) 

Name of the court: Hon’ble Supreme Court

Hon’ble bench: Justice K. Subba Rao, Justice Raghubar Dayal and Justice J.R. Mudholkar.

Case type: Civil Appeal

Date of judgement: 19th August, 1963

Citation of the case: AIR 1964 SC 510

Facts of the case

Chanbasappa died on 8th January 1944, leaving behind his 3 wives, namely, Nagamma, Guramma and Venkamma. Apart from them, he also left behind two widowed daughters, Sivalingamma and Neelamma, children of his pre-deceased wife. While he was alive, he possessed a large immovable property. It was alleged that on 30th January 1944 Nagamma had adopted her sister’s son, Malappa. Further, it was also said that at the time of Chanbasappa’s death, Venkamma was pregnant and she subsequently gave birth to a son on 4th October 1944. A few days prior to his death, Chanbasappa executed deeds of gift and maintenance, in favour of his wives, widowed daughters, a son of an illegitimate son and a relative. Much before his death too, he had executed a maintenance deed and a gift deed of some property, in favour of Nagamma. 

The main subject of legal action was the partition and possession of the large immovable property of Chanbasappa. One of his wives, Nagamma, filed a civil suit for the partition and control of 1/6th share of the property. Furthermore, she wanted her share in the property, after the alienations committed by her husband on 4th and 5th January 1944 were set aside. The following were the various parties involved in the case: 

• The other two other widows of Chanbasappa, namely, Guramma and Venkamma,  were made defendants 1 and 2 
• The adopted son was considered to be defendant 3, while the son who was born after his death was made defendant 4 and the remaining alienees were defendants 5 to 8.  

Trial Court’s decision

The learned Judge of the Trial Court was of the opinion that the adoption of defendant 3, by the plaintiff, was not considered valid by law. However, the court did confirm that defendant 4 was the posthumous son of Chanbasappa, born to Venkamma. Furthermore, the Judge noted that the plaintiff was not able to establish any proof or evidence in support of the contention that the deeds that were executed by Chanbasappa in favour of defendants 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8 were corrupted by fraud. 

The court decided that the deeds executed by the deceased Chanbasappa, in favour of the defendants and of the plaintiff, were legitimate. The judge passed an order stating that: 

• Defendants 1 & 2 would be entitled to the same share as that of the plaintiff, that is, 1/6th share in the suit property;
• Defendant 4 would be entitled to a 3/6th share in the suit property. 

He further ordered an investigation in relation to that of the future mesne profits arising out of the said property.

Being aggrieved by the judgement and order passed by the Trial Court, the plaintiff and defendant 3 preferred an appeal regarding the same, to the High Court.

High Court’s decision

The High Court of Bombay took note of the Trial Court’s observation that defendant 3 had been adopted by the plaintiff and went on to declare it as valid. The court also agreed that defendant 4 was Chanbasappa’s posthumous son, born to Venkamma. The deeds executed by the deceased, in favour of defendants 6, 7 and 8, as well as the gift in favour of defendant 5, were ruled to be invalid. The court suggested that the property be re-distributed between the parties in the following manner:

• Defendants 1 & 2 and the plaintiff would be entitled to the same share in the property, that is, 4/27th share in the suit property;
• The adopted son would be entitled to 1/9th share in the suit property;
• The posthumous son would be entitled to a 4/9th share in the suit property. 

Additionally, the court directed that defendants 1 & 2 would not be entitled to a separate maintenance, as they were already receiving a share in the property. 

Aggrieved by the judgement and order of the High Court, both Malappa and Nagamma filed appeals against the same, in the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

Issues raised 

1. Whether Nagamma’s adoption of Malappa, should be invalidated, as he was adopted when defendant 4 had already been conceived?
2. Whether an adopted son of a Sudra is entitled to the same share of property, as that of a natural born son?
3. Whether Chanbasappa’s transactions in favour of defendants 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8, were binding on the family?

Arguments of the parties

Appellants 

Mr. Sastri, the counsel for the appellants, laid down an argument that the adoption of defendant 3 was void, invalid and unlawful, as defendant 4 was already conceived at the time of the adoption. As per Hindu Law, in the matter of partition and inheritance, a son in the womb of the mother or a son conceived, is the same as a son who is already born. This should apply in the case of adoption as well. Just as an unborn son possesses the right to challenge his father’s transfer of family property, a son adopted under such circumstances should also have similar rights.

It was further contended that since the High Court had overruled the alienations that Chanbasappa had made, the concerned alienated property should be added back into the pool for partition. 

Mr. K. R. Chaudhari added that the High Court had committed a mistake in distinguishing between the documents executed in favour of the plaintiffs and those executed in favour of defendants 1 and 2. The documents in favour of the plaintiffs were upheld, but the documents in favour of defendants 1 and 2 were nullified.

Respondent  

The counsel for the respondents contended that the gift deeds which were executed in favour of defendants 7 and 8, by Chanbasappa, should be considered as binding on all the members of the family. The High Court was of the opinion that since these gifts were made after defendant 4 was conceived, they were invalid. With respect to this, the respondents argued that these could be challenged only by defendant 4 and since he had accepted the same, defendant 3, who was born after these gift deeds were made, could not question their validity.

The respondents stated that the gift was made for pious purposes and therefore, must be held as legally valid.

The counsel for the respondents put forward that whether an adopted boy or a natural born son, both hold equal shares in the property of the family. They even highlighted that adoption of Malappa by Nagamma, cannot be invalidated merely because of the presence of defendant 4 in the womb. There is no Hindu Law that supports the contention or establishes a condition or requirement of non pregnancy of the wife in order to exercise their right of adoption. 

Judgement in Guramma Bhratar Chanbasappa Deshmukh vs. Mallappa (1964)

The Supreme Court decided the following:

• With the exception of the issue regarding defendant 8’s right to receive the concerned portion of the property, as maintenance, Civil Appeal No. 334 of 1960, filed by defendants 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, and 8, would be dismissed.
• Defendant 8 was allowed to receive the property executed in her favour through a gift deed, by Chanbasappa.
• Civil Appeal No. 335 of 1960, filed by the plaintiff and defendant 3, would be dismissed.

Rationale behind the judgement 

The court observed that Hindu texts relating to adoption, particularly, Dattaka Chandrika and Dattaka Mimamsa, do not lay down any clear direction with respect to the question of whether a son conceived and in the womb, should be treated in the same manner as a son who has already been born. These texts, while implying that adoption is recommended for those who do not have a son, do not specifically state anything regarding a son who has been conceived. Nowhere has it been mentioned that a son in the womb is considered the same as a son who has been born. In fact, such an assumption could lead to a lack of certainty in the process of adoption.

Under Hindu law, the primary aim of adoption is to enable the adopter with spiritual benefits, as well as an heir. However, imposing a condition regarding the possibility of having a child of their own in the future, would lead to uncertainty. For instance, if while being unaware of his wife’s pregnancy, a man adopts a son, such an adoption would be considered invalid if the wife eventually gives birth to a son or even has a stillbirth.

No Hindu laws or texts specifically lay down any condition regarding pregnancy, for adoption. Some cases, such as that of Byreddi Chinna Narayana Reddi vs. Byreddi Peda Rama Reddi (1891), held that, before adopting a child, the person must be sure that they would not have a natural born child. However, in the case of Nagabhushanam vs. Seshammagaru (1878-81), the Division Bench of the Madras High Court decided that adoption by a Hindu parent, with the awareness of his wife’s pregnancy, would not be considered to be invalid. The High Court of Bombay, in the case of Shamavahoo vs. Dwarakadas (1888) was of the same opinion. In the case of Daulat Ram vs. Ram Laal (1907), the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court was also in consensus with the same.

The main issue in this case is whether a son conceived and in the womb would be treated as equally as a son who has already been born, with respect to legal rights. The son who is in the womb has a right to the family property. When the son is in the womb, if the father makes any decision relating to that of the property, like selling or dividing the property among family members, the son, when he is born, can object to those decisions. The reason behind this is his right to the family property since birth. Adoption holds more of a spiritual purpose and hence, to prevent interference with the same, the court in this case, held that an adoption made by the father is not invalidated by the existence of an unborn son.

The court then went on to reject the appellant’s contention that the alienated property should be added back into the pool for partition. The property transactions, including those relating to defendants 1 and 2, were already invalidated by the High Court. Further, the property was ordered to be divided as per the decided shares and both the plaintiff and defendant 3 had accepted the same. Hence, there existed no need to further deliberate on this issue.

The court also rejected the appellants’ argument that the High Court had committed a mistake in distinguishing between the documents executed in favour of the plaintiffs and those executed in favour of defendants 1 and 2. The documents had been executed by the Chanbasappa in favour of the plaintiff at a time when he was the sole surviving coparcener, which implied that he had complete control over property transactions. However, when the documents were executed in favour of defendants 1 and 2, defendant 4 had already been conceived, which meant that Chanbasappa was no longer in complete control of the property. On the basis of this, the High Court had accurately declared the transactions made in favour of defendants 1 and 2, to be invalid. 

Another point of contention highlights the fact that defendant’s 4 consent could not have been acquired because he was not born when the transactions of the property took place and when the lawsuit was filed, he was still a minor. At the time of alienation of the property, Chanbasappa had no power or entitlement to do so, because he had not obtained the consent of all the family members. His power was only limited to the divisions or alienations that were required to be made out of necessity or for the benefit of the property. Both the adopted son and the natural born son acquire an interest in the family property from the time of adoption and birth, respectively. A managing member or the karta of the family property has the right to alienate property out of necessity or benefit, with the consent of all the coparceners. A sole surviving member can alienate the property freely because nobody else holds a joint interest and he has the absolute power to do so, but If any other member is adopted or conceived before the alienation, this power is then limited. If Chanbasappa had alienated the property without any substantial reasons, the child who was in the womb (defendant 4) and the child who is adopted later (defendant 3), can raise objections to these alienations once they become aware of the same. Once defendants 3 and 4 attain the age of majority, they can hold these alienations as void, if Chanbasappa did not make them for any binding purpose of necessity or benefit.

The next question was to determine whether the gift deeds executed by Chanbasappa, in favour of defendants 7 and 8, were binding on the family. The High Court had agreed with the Trial Court and invalidated the gifts, on the ground that Chanbasappa did not hold the power to gift a family property. This court separately examined each gift, to determine its validity.

Chanbasappa executed a gift deed for immovable property worth Rs. 1500/-, in favour of defendant 7, who was a relative. The gift was said to be made out of love and appreciation. It was argued that since the gift was made for a “pious purpose”, as per Hindu law, it would be valid. Particularly under Mitakshara law, donations in the name of a “pious purpose” are allowed. As observed by legal scholars, the term “pious purpose” refers to any charitable act. The main issue here was whether a manager of property could gift an outsider with joint family property, on the basis of a pious purpose. Hindu law allows minor gifts to outsiders, for pious purposes, but it does not grant power to do so merely on the basis of charity, particularly with respect to joint family property. Therefore, this gift in favour of defendant 7 was declared to be invalid. 

Chanbasappa also executed a gift deed, creating a life interest in the property, worth around Rs. 5000/-, in favour of defendant 8, his widowed daughter. It was stated that since her husband had passed away and the amount received from the previous property was not enough, she was given this property to maintain herself. The question here was whether a widowed daughter could be granted a life interest in joint family property, by the father. This court referred to the case of Jinnappa Mahadevappa Kundachi vs. Chimmava Krishnappa Kochari (1934) and observed that since the law must be upheld, the same must be examined to arrive at a decision regarding the legality of this gift. Most Hindu texts which govern the laws hold that there exists a moral obligation to support daughters, even though they do not hold a legal right to the family after their marriage. Several cases also stand in its favour. Anuvillah Sundararamaya vs. Cherla Seethamma (1911) held that gifts given to a daughter, later on even after marriage, for her maintenance, were legally valid. This was affirmed in other cases such as Ramalinga Annavi vs. Narayana Annavi (1922), Pugalia Vettorammal and Anr. vs. Vettor Goudan (1911) and Devabhaktuni Sithamahalakshmamma vs. Pamulapati Kotayya (1936). The crucial factor to be noted here is that the gifts must be reasonable, depending on the conditions and extent of property held by the family. Chanbasappa’s family possessed extensive property. Moreover, he allotted only a small portion of the property, as a life estate for his widowed daughter. Hence, Chanbasappa’s execution of a reasonable gift deed in favour of defendant 8, can be seen as the fulfilment of a moral obligation and thus, valid.

Moving on, with respect to the respondent’s stance that within the Lingayat community, which form a part of the Shudra caste, both a natural born son and an adopted son must have equal shares in family property, the court referred to the case of Tirkangauda Mallangauda Kashigaudar vs. Shivappa Patil (1943), which observed that Lingayats are governed by Hindu law, in the same manner as Shudras. The court also went on to state that there arose no need to determine whether Lingayats definitively fall under the ambit of Shudras. For the purpose of this case, the court decided to assume that either Lingayats are Shudras or the Hindu law which governs Shudras, governs Lingayats as well.

The court then looked into the details of Arumilli Perrazu vs. Arumilli Subbaraydu (1921) and Giriapa vs. Ningapa (1892). It observed that the state of Bombay never followed the Dattaka Chandrika, which laid down that natural born sons and adopted sons were entitled to equal rights in property. The court found no reason to change this and rejected the contention that natural born sons and adopted sons have equal rights in property.

Relevant judgements referred in the case

Arumilli Perrazu vs. Arumilli Subbarayadu (1921)

Facts

In this case, an appeal was filed against Subbarayadu, by Arumilli Ramanna and his three sons. Subbarayadu had adopted Arumilli Ramanna, back when he had no child of his own. He then went on to have two sons after the adoption. 

Issue

The primary question which arose here was whether Arumilli Ramanna and the two natural born sons, would all be entitled to equal shares in Subbarayadu’s property. These parties were all those belonging to the Shudra community, in Madras. 

Judgement

The court observed that in Madras, the Dattaka Chandrika was followed, according to which, a natural born son and an adopted son have equal rights in property.

Giriapa vs. Ningapa (1892)

Facts

In this case, the High Court of Bombay dealt with the matter of property shares between an adopted son and a natural son born later. The court was of the view that irrespective of whether governed by the Mitakshara law or the Vyavahara Mayukha, in the western part of India, if a legitimate son is born after the adoption of a son, the adopted son is entitled to only one-fifth of the father’s property. The Privy Council in the case of Arumilli Perrazu vs. Arumilli Subbarayadu (1921), held a similar opinion, and the same was also reiterated in Tukaram Mahadu Tandel vs. Ramachandra Mahadu Tandel (1925).  

Issue

The main issue that was highlighted in this case was that the existence of the son in the embryo invalidates an adoption or not?

Judgement

The High Court of Bombay went to observe that the Dattaka Chandrika, which favours adopted sons, was commonly followed by the Sudras in Madras and Bengal, but not in the western region of India. The Dattaka Chandrika was never considered as a strong driving force in western India, and hence, it was decided that the regional principles is what should be followed in this case.

Jinnappa Mahadevappa Kundachi vs. Chimmava (1934)

Facts

This case pertains to the facts that a Hindu father had executed a gift of a portion of the joint family immovable property in favour of his daughter for her maintenance. 

Issue

The main issue that concerned this case was whether the Hindu father had the right or power to grant a gift to the daughter out of the immovable joint family property and is the concept of gift considered to be valid as per the Hindu law. 

Judgement

The Trial Court had passed the judgement in favour of the respondents, deciding that the Hindu father could do so. This was further appealed before the Bombay High Court, which set aside the judgement passed by the Trial Court and stated that the gift that was made by the father to the daughter was invalid. It was stated that under Mitakshara law, a father was not permitted to gift any portion of the joint family property to his daughter. These basic principles cannot be overlooked. 

Analysis of Guramma Bhratar Chanbasappa Deshmukh vs. Mallappa (1964) 

In this case of Guramma Bhratar Chanbasappa Deshmukh vs. Mallappa (1964), holds great importance in Hindu law, especially with respect to property rights, validity of gift deeds and adoption. The court’s decision in this matter, dealt with various complex issues while shedding light on principles that govern Hindu law.

One of the primary questions in this case was whether an adoption is deemed invalid by the existence of a son in the womb. The Supreme Court held that an adoption in such circumstances would be legally valid. No condition of pregnancy is imposed on adoption. This reduced ambiguity and laid out precise instructions for future instances of adoption. The aim is to ensure that neither the spiritual nor the legal purpose of adoption is compromised. 

While deciding on whether in the Shudra community, a natural born son and an adopted son would have equal property rights, the court explained that western India, Bombay in this case, followed a different rule as compared to regions such as Madras and Bengal, where the Dattaka Chandrika is the governing rule. Pointing out and deciding the case at hand on the basis of this distinction, helped uphold and promote regional legal customs and rules.

Another important matter that this case dealt with was with respect to a Hindu father gifting any portion of the joint family property to his daughter. The court emphasised that maintaining one’s daughter was a moral obligation that must be fulfilled, which contributes towards achieving a legal system free from gender bias.

This judgement also played a role in safeguarding the interests of all the members of a family, even those still in the womb.

Hence, this legal case established a vital legal precedent, with regard to the rights of family members, especially various children, in joint property.

Conclusion 

Guramma Bhratar Chanbasappa Deshmukh vs. Mallappa (1964) serves as a landmark judgement in the field of Hindu law, especially with the changing times wherein adoption and a gender bias free society are encouraged. This case dealt with complex and sensitive issues and shed light on topics such as moral obligations, collective ownership and regional legal customs as well. This case remains a significant reference to practitioners and scholars even today.

This case has not only highlighted the important provisions of adoption related to Hindu law, it has cited various case laws that are extremely insightful. The case laws give us an overview of the dealings of the court of law by the judgements passed. This case is one of the landmark cases.   

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

What are the laws that are concerned with the adoption of a child in India?

Till date, there is only one law that is concerned with the adoption of a child in India and it is under Hindu law, the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 deals with adoption. No other personal laws in India have specific laws for adoption and hence, may approach this through the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 or the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015.

What is the maximum age of a child who can be legally adopted in India?

The maximum age of a child who can be legally adopted in India is 18 years.

Does a gift deed require registration?

As per Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 a gift deed needs to be registered with a sub registrar. 

What is the time period within which one can challenge a gift deed?

A gift deed can be challenged within 3 years from the date of execution or from the date when the donee becomes aware of it. However, the period may also vary depending on the reason behind the challenge.

References 

• https://docs.manupatra.in/newsline/articles/Upload/E8EFE493-114B-4E5B-A014-682EB1729301.pdf 
• https://blog.ipleaders.in/gift-deed-uses/ 
• https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/wealth/legal/will/inheritance-rights-how-self-acquired-ancestral-property-will-go-to-different-categories-of-children/articleshow/105489957.cms?from=mdr 

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