This article is written by Shubham Choube. This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the case of Jayantilal Amrit Lal Shodhan vs. F. N. Rana (1963). In this article, the author has delved into the details of the case, along with the arguments presented by both the parties, constitutional aspects involved and a critical analysis of the judgement. 

Introduction

The Supreme Court, in the case Jayantilal Amrit Lal Shodhan vs. F. N. Rana and Others 1963, dealt with a question which went against the very basic principles of Indian Constitution and the rights enshrined in it. The question was to determine the extent to which the state might use its authority, powers, and discretion to handle the situation without jeopardising citizens’ civil liberties.

It is a question that lies at the very heart of any democratic state, that has to determine how much it is willing to sacrifice for the principles of rule of law when the liberties are at stake. This involves more understanding of the Constitutional provisions governing India with a special focus on the provisions on property, due process and equality clauses. This case was a classic example of the balance, which has to be maintained between the executive branch’s sovereignty and personal freedom.

On one hand the state has a legal right to pass or enforce laws that will be useful and helpful in regulating the welfare of the people, development of trade, commerce and what can be called social justice. On the other hand, such actions should not deny or infringe on the rights and freedoms given by the Constitution to each and every person. It was, therefore, a great task for the Supreme Court to not only provide the plain meaning of the laws but at the same time the spirit of the laws. It defined the nature and the scope of legal norms governing such matters as property rights, legal procedures, and this issue of state intervention. 

The case reflects the core values of justice and democracy as well as the place of individual citizens in the political process and the role organised into the state at the same time it is necessary to remember that the decisions made in that case are still relevant because the ruling given by the Supreme Court in this case serves as a benchmark and an enshrinement of key principles of justice, liberty, and equality as instituted in the Constitution of India.

Details of the case

Name of the case: Jayantilal Amrit Lal Shodhan v. F.N. Rana and Ors.

Citation: AIR 1964 SC 648

Case type: Civil Appeal

Bench: Justice J.C. Shah, Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar, Justice K.N. Wanchoo, Justice  Raghubar Dayal

Author: Justice J.C. Shah

Name of the appellant: Jayantilal Amrit Lal Shodhan

Name of the respondents: F.N. Rana and Ors.

Date of the judgement: 5 November, 1963 

Facts of the case

On 1st May 1960, as a result of the reorganisation of the State of Bombay under the Bombay Reorganisation Act 1960, out of the territory of the State of Bombay, two states were formed – the State of Maharastra and the State of Gujarat. The President of India on 24 July, 1959 issued a notification regarding land acquisition under Article 258 of the Constitution of India. The Commissioner of Baroda Division, State of Gujarat, exercised the powers entrusted on him by the said notification and published a notice under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act I of 1894 (for brevity ‘Act’) and on 01 September 1950, notifying that a piece of land Part of Plot No. 686, Ellis Bridge Town, which was owned by the appellant was needed for a public purpose i.e, constructing of a Telephone Exchange Building in Ahmedabad. Also the Commissioner authorised an Additional Special Land Acquisition Officer to carry out the functions as Collector under the Act. The appellant filed objections to the proposed acquisition of the land under Section 5A of the Act. After considering the objections raised by the appellant, the Collector delivered his report to the commissioner and another notification on 11 January 1961 under Section 6(1) of the Act was issued, in which he declared the acquisition of the notified land. Thereafter the appellant approached the High Court of Gujarat to challenge the notification and to seek a writ of mandamus under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. However, the petition was dismissed by the High Court. Therefore, accompanied by a fitness certificate under Articles 132(1) and 133(c)(1) of the Indian Constitution, this appeal has been preferred. 

Issues raised in the case

• Whether the notification issued by the President comes within the purview of being a  law under Section 87 read with Section 2(d) of the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960?
• Whether this appointment constituted an improper sub-delegation of authority or was a legitimate exercise of the powers entrusted by the President?
• Whether the Presidential notification issued on July 24, 1959, under Article 258 of the Constitution, retained its force and effect after the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960 came into force?
• Whether the Commissioner of the newly formed State of Gujarat had power under the Land Acquisition act in terms of the Presidential notification?

Arguments of the parties

Petitioners 

The following were the contentions of the appellants:

• That the Commissioner had no authority in operation of the events that had happened that is to issue the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 in exercise of the authority purported to have been derived from the notification issued by the President on July 24, 1959 under Article 258(1) of the Constitution whereby the authorities of the Union Government in so far as the matters relating to the acquisition 
• Proceedings under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act is quasi-judicial in nature, the Commissioner is not authorised to assign authority for reporting under that Section, and the Commissioner is not even permitted to consider the report submitted by the Collector.
• That the power exercisable by the President under Article 258(1) of the Constitution relates to an executive power. It empowers the President to delegate functions to a State Government or any of its officers. The appellant claimed that this practice of entrusting the executive powers does not fall under the meaning of the word “law” under the Section 87 of Bombay Reorganisation Act. Hence, the Commissioners of the new State of Gujarat were not legally equipped to act on behalf of the Union Government of India under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as per the Presidential notification after May 1, 1960.
• The appellant supported this plea by highlighting the split of Part XI of the Constitution into two chapters: In Chapter I, numbered Articles 245 to 255 which covers the subject of division of legislative authority and Chapter II, Articles 256 to 261 which contains provisions concerning the administrative relations between the States. Article 258 falls in the second chapter, making it clear that it is not a legislative provision but rather an administrative or executive one. The argument was further supported by the background of Articles 256 and 257 which seems to deal with exercise of the use of the executive authority to compel obedience to the parliamentary laws and extinguish obstruction of the Union executive authority. Thus, the appellant argued that the functions entrusted by a Presidential notification under Article 258 cannot be regarded as law under Section 87 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act.

Respondent 

The following were the contentions of respondent:

• According to the respondents, only the Presidential notification under Article 258 issued on 24 July, 1959 had the force of law. In their view, this meant that the notification was subject to the Bombay Recognition Act of 1960 (Act No. XI of1960) but was not forwarded by that Act. Referring to Section 82 and 87 of this Act it was argued that the legal instruments including the Presidential notification were still existing and valid. Thus, the Commissioner had legal right to execute the functions, the Union Government of India vested him under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act.
• The respondents argued that the notification made under Article 258(1) of the Constitution, the Commissioner had the authority to appoint a Collector as defined under Section 3(c) of the Land Acquisition Act. They pointed out that this appointment did not amount to any type of improper sub-delegation of authority. 
• According to the respondents, the tasks that were carried out under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act were administrative in nature even though they may have been quasi-judicial in the eyes of law. They asserted that these functions can be exercised by the Collector or any other officer that may be appointed by the proper government for the purpose of performing the functions of the Collector mentioned in the Act. They explained that this was precisely what the Commissioner had done through the said Presidential notification. Therefore, the Commissioner could lawfully appoint the Collector to execute these functions even though they were partly quasi-judicial and partly administrative. 

Laws involved in Jayantilal Amrit Lal Shodhan vs. F. N. Rana and Others (1963)

Constitution of India 

Article 73(1) of the Constitution

India being a federal nation there is definitely a division of powers between the central and state government which has its own benefits and drawbacks. The executive power of the Union is to be exercised by the President, with reference to the Constitution of India. However, it cannot be exercised unless one knows what is meant by the term executive and what these executive powers entail. In accordance with the Constitution of India the Union Executive is stated in Part V under Article 72 to 78 and the State Executive in the Part VI under Article 153 to 167.

It is imperative to note that the actual meaning of the term “executive functions ” is not articulated in the Constitution since they are the residue of the function after legislative and judicial functions have been stripped out. In its literal sense, it refers to the enforcement of the law; however, in the broader sense, it includes “preservation of law and order, administration of Government property and state owned enterprises and services, formulation and direction of foreign policy conduct of warfare and the supply or control of such services such as education, health, transport and financial assistance and insurance by the state.” The vagueness of this definition raises the question of how much of the executive authority can be vested in the Union. However, Article 73 serves as a shell and aids in establishing the extent of executive power.

The Article 73(1) states that subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive power of the Union will encompass the subjects over which Parliament has authority to enact legislation; and to the exercise of such rights are exercisable by the Indian Government by virtue of any treaty on agreement subject to the provisions of this Article, the executive power of a State shall not, where the State Legislature has also authority to enact legislation, extend in any State to matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has power to make laws.

Article 256 of the Constitution

According to Article 256 of the Indian Constitution, every state’s executive power must be applied in a way that ensures compliance with Parliament’s laws as well as any existing laws that apply to the state. This provision authorises the Union government to issue directives to states as needed for this purpose. Essentially, Article 256 requires state governments to follow and implement legislation made by the central government, ensuring legal uniformity and coherence throughout the country. If a state fails to comply with these directives, it may be interpreted as a breakdown in constitutional machinery, potentially leading to President’s Rule under Article 356. The Article also grants the union government legislative authority to direct states to adopt parliament-enacted laws in order to avoid a conflict between the centre and the states. 

Article 258 of the Constitution

According to Article 258 of the Indian Constitution, the President of the country has the power to entrust the implementation of the Union function to any State Government or its officers if required. This provision is important to allow the central government to discharge its responsibilities by relying on the administrative apparatus of state governments.

Article 258(1) gives the President power to delegate either conditionally or unconditionally to the State Government or any of its officials any of the executive powers of the Union, if the State Government gives its consent to the delegation. This delegation can be done in respect of any matter to which the executive power of the Union extends. This provision promotes the integration of the Union with the state governments in the conduct of their affairs by enhancing the co-ordination and effective implementation of most of the Union policies within the states.

The Article 258(2) enables the Parliament to make laws that enable the central government to delegate powers and set duties on the state authorities. This means that, consequent to legislation enacted with its approval, Parliament can delegate powers to state officials to discharge functions incidental to the Union. Such laws give legal backing that enables state authorities to legally and efficiently undertake such delegated functions.

In this regard, Article 258(3) has elaborated that any act done by state authorities under powers entrusted by an order of the President under clause (1) of this Article shall not be regarded as an act of the State Government. This provision affirms that while the implementation of the functions of the Union is vested in state officers, it is the Union Government that is charged with responsibility and accountability.

Thus, Article 258 of the Indian Constitution advances administrative rationality and co-operative federalism since it allows the Union government to assign its executive powers to the State Government effectively resulting in harnessing local administrative resources for optimal governance.

Article 372 of the Constitution

Article 372 of the Indian Constitution is vital in legal evolution during the transition from British rule to post British India. It states that the law of the land at the time of adoption of the Constitution shall remain in force until it is changed, abolished, or amended in accordance with legal procedures. This Article fills this gap by avoiding the possibility of a void that would occur if all the laws that were in force during the British era become unconstitutional after the enactment of the new Constitution.

It is therefore apparent that for the purpose of preserving the legal order and authority, the provision in Article 372 is significant. Thus at the time of independence, India had the monumental task of evolving a new legal order without interrupting the normal working of the administration or the Justice delivery system. The framers of the Constitution also made clear that many of the previously existing laws would remain in force, which allows the government to function without interruption, and people would always know what is legal and what is prohibited.

Moreover, through Article 372, the country can work towards changing the laws with much more care and precision. It recognizes the fact that although the new Constitution greatly reforms the government system, it is politically unwise and may cause instability to change the entire legal framework at once. It empowers the legislature to review the colonial laws and replace them with the post-independent desired laws of the nation.

Consequently, Article 372 can be hailed as the wisdom of the framers of the Constitution. It also emphasises the significance of maintaining legal continuity, especially when transitioning from colonial rule to a sovereign democratic republic, so that the newly established government could begin its operation efficiently and also prepare for the progressive legal changes that are envisioned.

Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)

The first Indian Land Acquisition Act was passed in the year 1894 with the purpose of bringing legal structure in order to acquire private property for public utility including transportation, town planning, industrialization and other public purposes. The Act sought to provide a structural and equitable means of attaining land, while at the same time providing for the rights of the land owners relative to the process of public development. It provided for the manner of giving notices to the land owners, for affording consideration to their objections, for assessing the compensation and for entering upon the land acquired. It intended to allow for the development of public projects while at the same time ensuring that the process of land acquisition was fair, just and transparent.

Section 4(1) of Land Acquisition Act

Section 4(1) states that when it appears to the appropriate government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose, a notification to that effect shall be published in the Official Gazette and in two daily newspapers circulating in that locality, of which at least one shall be in the regional language, and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality (the last of the

Section 5A (2) of Land Acquisition Act

Sub-Section (2) of Section 5A gives the owners of the land an option for raising an objection to the intended acquisition. This means that once a notice under Section 4(1) is published, the appropriate government or any other authority to whom power is delegated has to consider these objections. The land owners have the chance to state their issues and explain why they are against the acquisition. This subsection makes the acquisition procedure as similar to a legal process as possible in order to assure legal justice and accountability.

Section 6 of Land Acquisition Act

Section 6 relates to the acquisition of the land by the appropriate government for public interest. After the government is done with the consideration of the objection if any then the government delivers the declaration in the official gazette. This declaration enables the acquisition to continue and it is an important legal step that transfers the ownership of the land to the government so that it can take physical possession of the land.

Clause 3(ee) of Land Acquisition Act

This clause also establishes the meaning of the term “ Collector ” in the context of the Act. The Collector is an official of the government who works in the area of land acquisition; who is also involved in the activities such as measurement of the land, assessing the compensation, and ensuring the whole process is lawful. It is thus evident that the Collector has an important position when it comes to implementing the land acquisition process.

Section 87 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act

In this context, the legal provisions have been traced out in Section 87 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act 1960 dealing with the aspect of laws and notifications in the States emerged after the Reorganisation of the erstwhile Bombay State. This Section also allows for the application of any law, rule, regulation, order, or notification in force in the former State of Bombay to the new State of Maharashtra and Gujarat unless repealed, amended or replaced by an appropriate authority. In other words, Section 87 is a provision that ensures that law prevails after restructuring without any legal or administrative loophole.

It provides for the interpretation of all the provisions of the existing laws referring to the State of Bombay or any of its authorities as referring to the corresponding authorities of the new States. This provision is essential to avoid any legal complexities and organisational disruptions that may arise after reorganisation. It enables the respective State Governments to enforce and implement these laws and notifications as if the reorganisation had never occurred, which helps in maintaining administrative continuity.

Section 87 also permits the alteration and amendment of the laws to accommodate the needs of the new States. This flexibility is necessary when it comes to response to local needs and to maintain relevancy and efficiency of the legal system in the new administrative conditions.

Judgement of Jayantilal Amrit Lal Shodhan vs. F. N. Rana and Others (1963)

The judgement was decided with the ratio of 5:1. The dissenting opinion was given by Justice K.N. Wanchoo. Justice Wanchoo dissented making his primary concern the principle of Separation of Powers whereby he opined that the Articles 258(1) executive actions could not create the continual authority in the Commissioners after the reorganisation without further authorization by the Article 258. However, issue-wise judgement is as follows:

Whether the notification issued by the President is law within the meaning of Section 87 read with Section 2(d) of the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 11 of 1960.

The Supreme Court observed that on 24th July 1959, while enjoying the authority vested under Article 258 of the Constitution, the President through a notification exercised and delegated by the agreement with the State Government of Bombay, to the Commissioners of Divisions in the State of Bombay all the functions of the Union Government in relation to the Land Acquisition Act I of 1894. As to acquisition of land within the boundaries of the aforementioned Commissioners’ territorial jurisdiction for the benefit of the Union, in the same manner as may be provided by the Government of Bombay as from time to time may exercise control over the acquisition of land for the purpose of the State. At the time when the aforesaid notification was given the area which now constitutes the State of Gujarat and in which the said land is situated was included in the State of Bombay but by May 1, 1960 known as the appointed day under the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960 out of the territory of that State. Two States have been created vide Section 3 of the Act being the State of Maharashtra and the State of Gujarat.

Certain stipulations have been made about the law’s territorial restrictions and the officers’ ability to remain in their positions that they held prior to the designated day of appointment.  Continuation and deemed appointment under Section 82 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act 1960 it was provided that every person who immediately before the appointed day was holding or discharging the duties of any post or office in connection with the affairs of the State of Bombay in any area which as from the said day falls within the State of Maharashtra or Gujarat shall, subject to an order of the competent authority, continue to hold the same post or office that in Section 87 specific provisions were made for extending the territorial operation of the laws even after the appointed day. It was further provided that provisions of Part II i.e. provisions relating to the reorganisation of Bombay State into two States shall take effect as if the said new State was already in existence and the provisions of Section 3 won’t be considered to have changed the areas that any legislation that was in effect just before the designated day applies to or extends to, and any geographical references in such laws to the State of Bombay shall, unless otherwise specified by the Act. According to Section 2 (d) of the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960 meaning of law shall include any enactment, ordinance, regulation, order, byelaw, rule, scheme, notification or other instrument which had the force of law in the whole or in any part of the State of Bombay immediately before the appointed day.

Using this rationale, the Supreme Court was able to come to the conclusion that the Presidential notification that granted Land acquisition powers to the Commissioner under the Land Acquisition Act was equally the force of law. Thus, the actions of the Commissioner were legal, as those orders in the Edward Mills Case. 

Whether this appointment constituted an improper sub-delegation of authority or was a legitimate exercise of the powers entrusted by the President.

The Supreme Court observed that under Section 55 of the Land Acquisition Act, the Commissioner has been delegated the power to frame rules under the Act exercisable by the appropriate Government. Whether such a function can be entrusted does not require consideration in this particular case. An argument which was raised, pointing to an erroneous assumption as to the sphere of the operation of Art 258(1) can, however be noted. That clause enables the President to entrust to the State the functions which are vested in the Union, and which are exercisable by the President on behalf of the Union : this does not mean that it empowers the President to delegate to any other individual or authority the powers and duties which the Constitution mandates the President to exercise and perform. The Article 123, Articles 268 to 279, Article 356, Article 360, Article 309 – to mention some – are not the powers of the Central Government; these are the powers conferred on the President under the Constitution and are beyond delegation or can be exercised by any other body or authority under Article 258(1). Such powers cannot be delegated under Article 258(1) because they are not the powers of the Union, and not because of the special character of the mentioned powers. There is a vast array of other powers exercisable by the President, for instance Articles 124 & 217, Article 344, Article 340, Article 338, etc.

According to Article 258(1) the power to make rules vests in the President as the head of the Union and this power is in relation to any matter in which the executive power of the Union is vested and it may be delegated to any State Government or officer of that Government. These are indeed the functions of the Union and not of the President. It might be beyond doubt that the delegation of power or authority to the President is enshrined in the Constitution and of necessity, would carry the force of law. Thus the character of the exercise of the function so entrusted must derive from the field in which that function is to be exercised and the effect which that exercise will have on the citizen’s rights. Thus, the Supreme Court is directly concerned with the nature of the power exercised by the President under Article 258(1) when it attributes certain functions to the State or its officers. It is, of course, true that the President is the recognised executive head of the Union and it would be inconceivable that power being wielded by him under Article 258(1) cannot have the character of law within the meaning of Section 87 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act. Thus, by the notification dated July 24, 1959 by the President, power was delegated to the Commissioner, Baroda Division, in the case of matters connected with the acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act 1894. 

According to item 42, List III, the subject of property acquisition is in the Concurrent List of the Constitution. The Parliament has the authority to legislate on the acquisition of property for the purpose of the Union, and Article 73(1)(a) extends the Union’s executive power to the acquisition of property for the Union. According to Article 298 of the Constitution, the Union has the exclusive right to conduct any trade or activity, as well as to acquire, hold, sell, and engage into contracts for any purpose. According to Article 73(1) of the Constitution, the Parliament may purchase property for the Union. As a result, the Supreme Court ruled that the Union’s executive jurisdiction over the forced acquisition of property remains intact, even in circumstances when the State has the authority to acquire land.

Whether the Presidential notification set out on July 24, 1959, under Article 258  of Indian Constitution, retained its force and effect after the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960 came into force. 

The Supreme Court ruled in this case that it was open to the Legislature to delegate functions of the Central Government under Article 258(2), thereby conferring powers and imposing duties on Commissioners of State Divisions under Sections 4, 5A, 7, 9, and 11 and related Sections. The exercise of such entrustment of power could not be questioned on the basis that it was unauthorised. In the event of being entrusted through enactment, it would have the force of law. By an appropriate legislation contained or otherwise in the Land Acquisition Act, it was open to the Parliament to provide the authority to set out notifications as per Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and the authority to designate the Collector is to be enjoyed by the officer selected by the proper Government. Thus, if the appropriate government issued a notification naming the officer to exercise the power, it would undoubtedly amount to exercise of the power in connection with the carrying on by the existing government of the said functions in the said manner and thus would come within the ambit of Section 2(d) read with Section 2(c). The President may assign duties to the State Government or its officers, as authorised by the Constitution, rather than listing all of the provisions and categorising the functions granted to the authorities of the State through the exercise of legislative power. The result of Article 258(1) is only to convert an open ended provision which the Legislature could exercise through legislative for the purpose of entrusting functions to the officers to be described by the President from time to time and under the conditions the said notification provides.  The notification merely empowers the State or an officer of the State under the statute in the given circumstances and up to the extent to perform the aforesaid functions. The said notification of the President has the following consequences: Where in the Act, the words ‘appropriate government’ occur in connection with provisions for acquisition of land for the purpose of the Union, the said expression will carry the meaning that wherever the words ‘appropriate government or the Commissioner of the Division having territorial jurisdiction over the area in which the land is situated. ’ In other words, the Presidential notification, if issued, must be deemed to partially amend the Land Acquisition Act. 

Whether the Commissioner of the newly formed State of Gujarat had power under the Land Acquisition act in terms of the Presidential notification.

The Supreme Court referred to the term ‘Collector’ used in the Act refers to the Collector of any district or some other officer who may be declared as such by the appropriate government, for exercise of all or some of the powers of a Collector under the Act. The statute itself empowers the appropriate government to designate the Collector in accordance with the Act and the Commissioner with vested authority under Article 258(1) of the Constitution appointed Additional Special Land Acquisition Officer, Ahmedabad as Collector under Section 5A of the Act. Thus, in appointing the Additional Special Land Acquisition Officer the Commissioner was invoking the authority through which he was endowed by the appropriate government under the provisions of the Act. It was noted that the appellant enclosed no documents which may support the argument which at one stage was vaguely made that the Collector’s proceeding was tainted with illegality or irregularity. The Collector according to provisions of Section 5A conducted an inquiry and submitted his report to the Commissioner who acts as the authority under the appropriate government and as per the recommendation of the report, the notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued. Section 5A(2) states that any objection to the acquisition of the land notified or of any land of the locality must be made by the objector in writing to the collector. Moreover, the collector has to provide the objector with an opportunity of hearing either in person or through a pleader and to compile all the objections that have been heard. If any further inquiry is required then the collector may present a report outlining recommendations regarding the objections. The report required by Section 5A does not need to be completed before the notification under Section 6 is issued.

The proper government in accordance with Section 17 may acquire the land without any encumbrances and order under Section 17(4) that with respect to any land to which the appropriate government determines the provisions mentioned in Section 5A(1),(2) shall not apply where the following provisions of this Act are applicable: Once again the Collector is not obligated to make any decision. He has to forward the case to the appropriate government for determination with the record of the proceedings conducted by him and a report that includes his recommendations on the objection Section. At first glance, such a report would be an administrative report and based on it the Government decides under Section 6 whether or not to notify the land for acquisition. The notion that any particular land is required for the public use is an administrative decision and it is with a view of making the decision that the Act compels those inquiries to be made. However, it is a fact that the Collector has to follow the procedure prescribed and to afford an opportunity to the person who objects to being heard either in person or through a pleader. This provision, however, is open as under Section 5A it is provided to the Collector to make an independent inquiry other than the inquiry regarding the objections submitted. It cannot in the circumstances be said that the inquiry is a judicial or a quasi-judicial inquiry for the purpose of the statute. In the present case there was no delegation of any of the judicial power which is by law vested in the Central Government. The power to hold an inquiry is statutorily vested in the Collector and the Collector has performed his statutory duty. The Commissioner functioning as such officer was only appointed on behalf of the Central Government the Additional Land Acquisition Officer as the Collector the impugned order also takes into consideration the report in exercise of the powers given to the Commissioner in terms of the powers entrusted on him under the notification issued by the President. In doing so he didn’t act in any way inconsistent with the authority vested in him or that the law could in certain circumstances vest in him. Therefore the appeal failed and costs were incurred with the majority.

Relevant judgments referred to in the case 

Judgements relied on for the majority view

Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur vs. The State of Punjab (1955)

The Supreme Court in this case held that there may be a problem in defining precisely what is meant by ‘executive function’ and what it encompasses. Normally the executive power implies that part of government responsibility which is left over after legislative or judicial responsibility has been exercised. The heads of state exercise executive authority, engaging in the enforcement of laws, management and implementation of policies, and the managing of state affairs on a daily basis. This includes decision making, policy making as well as the directions and coordination of public services for the running of governmental activities. This power lies in the hands of the executive part of the government headed by the President and/or the Prime Minister and the governmental departments and agencies. It is defined by its administrative, regulatory, and managerial roles that help enforce laws, and effect and implement legislation and judgements. 

The case established that executive function is difficult to define precisely, but generally includes the enforcement of laws, policy implementation, and daily management of state affairs, which are carried out by the executive branch, led by the President or Prime Minister, in collaboration with government departments. This view of executive power influenced the decision in Jayantilal Amrit Lal Shodhan vs. F. N. Rana and Others (1963), which clarified the scope of executive authority, particularly in relation to land acquisition. The court used this approach to interpret the Union’s power under Article 73(1) and ensure that the Union’s forced acquisition of property stays within its executive scope, even when states also have the competence to

Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. Shyamsundar (1961)

In this case the court said that it cannot however be assumed that the legislative functions are being done only by the Legislature, the executive functions by the executive and the judicial functions by the judiciary. The Constitution has not provided clear or strict separation of powers between the three branches of the State. It characteristically conveys exercise of functions legislative or judicial to the executive. For example, exercising the authority to make rules, regulations, and notifications, which are essentially of a legislative nature, is often delegated to the executive. In the same way judicial authority is also delegated by legislation to the executive authority.

The Edward Mills Company Ltd. Beawar vs. State of Ajmer (1954)

It was held in the Edward Mills case, that the main issue in dispute was whether an order made under Section 94(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, remained enforceable under Article 395 of the Constitution. In particular, with reference to Section 94(3) of the Government of India Act, a Notification was issued by the Central Government in 1949 according to which the functions under the Minimum Wages Act were exercised by the Chief Commissioner in the Chief Commissioner’s Province. Following the adoption of the Indian Constitution, the Chief Commissioner of Ajmer was the relevant government in connection to the Minimum Wage Act and issued employment notifications for textile factories.

It was claimed on this basis that the validity of these notifications was inadmissible after the Constitution because the Chief Commissioner did not have such power inasmuch as the Governor-General’s Order under Section 94(3) was not ‘law in force’ within Article 372 of the Constitution. The petitioners argued that new delegation of power under Article 239 by the President was necessary to enable the Chief Commissioner to legally operate under the Minimum Wages Act.

In the case of Edward Mills, the Supreme Court pointed out that ‘existing law’ as envisaged in Article 366(1) of the Constitution is synonymous with ‘law in force’ as envisaged in Article 372. Interpreting the phrase “law in force”, it stated that it includes regulations or orders having the force of law and when the Governor-General makes an order under Section 94(3) it is similar to a legislative provision regarding the rights and powers of the Chief Commissioner. Thus, such orders legally remained in force under Article 372. 

This interpretation was critical in Jayantilal’s case, as the court dealt with the continuity and legality of governmental activities after the Constitution. We affirmed that orders and actions performed under prior legal frameworks, whether they were inside the purview of ‘existing law’ or ‘law in effect’, remained lawful and enforceable under the new constitutional provisions, based on the precedent established in Edward Mills. This helped to clarify that the Union’s executive jurisdiction over forcible purchase of property remained intact, ensuring the continuity and legitimacy of such measures during the transition period from the Government of India Act, 1935 to the Indian Constitution.

Chanabasappa Shivappa vs. Gurupadappa Murigappa (1965)

Specifically in Chanabasappa Shivappa vs. Gurupadappa Murigappa (1976), the Mysore High Court decision under the provisions of Section 119 of the State Reorganisation Act, 1956, which in terms is not very different from Section 87 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960;  and given that the definition of ‘law’ in Section 2(h) of that Act is couched in terms identical to the definition given in Section 2(b) of the Bombay Reorganisation Act , the High Court  uphold the operation of a notification issued by the Government of Bombay Conferring powers to try election petitions under the Bombay District Municipal Act 1901 on the reorganisation of the State of Bombay under the States Reorganisation.

Rulings relied upon while giving the dissenting opinion 

The Public Prosecutor vs. Illur Thippayya, (1949)

In this case the orders were issued under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 24 of 1946, which were considered to have statutory effect. Those orders appear to have established a code of conduct for those dealing with the issues addressed in those orders, and so form secondary law. This case aided Jayantilal Amrit Lal Shodhan vs. F. N. Rana and Others (1963) by setting a precedent for the scope and interpretation of executive power. In Illur Thippayya, the court enlarged the scope of executive authority, emphasising the importance of state acts being consistent with legislative mandates and constitutional stipulations. This view bolstered the argument in Jayantilal that state activities, particularly those involving property acquisition, must be consistent with central laws and directions under Article 256, ensuring uniformity and respect to the constitutional framework in carrying out such functions.

State of Bombay vs. F.N. Balsara (1951)

This was a case of subordinate legislation because, the order that passed there, was under Section 139 of the Bombay Prohibition Act No. 25 of 1949 which empowered the Government to exempt any intoxicant or class of intoxicants from the application of any of the provisions of that Act by general or special order. That was the position in that case where such an order would clearly have been held to be having the force of law as it was subordinate legislation.

King Emperor vs. Abdul Hamid and Ramendrachandra Ray vs. Emperor (1922)

In this case, the Superintendent of Police issued an order restraining processions under Section 30 of the Police Act, and the issue was whether the order was legal. The Patna High Court has held that it is law. It was made by the Superintendent of Police as empowered by the Police Act to make an order which laid down the standard of conduct expected of inhabitants within his police district and any failure was punishable. It could also be imposed by courts and would be as legal in effect as any legal provision. The other case concerns a prohibition order made under Section 35 of the Calcutta Police Act and would have the force of law for the same reason. 

Analysis of Jayantilal Amrit Lal Shodhan vs. F. N. Rana and Others (1963)

The Supreme Court interpreted Article 258(1) of the Constitution that provides for the delegation of functions to state governments or officers. The fact is highlighted that it is possible for this kind of entrusting of authority despite the fact that they are of an executive complexion; provided the delegation is on matters of an executive authority which in this case are part of the legislative regime. The Supreme Court turned focus on Sections 82 and 87 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act which were the legal provisions that sought to preserve laws/orders that existed prior to the reorganisation. The Supreme Court held that the Presidential notification under Article 258(1) was issued prior to the reorganisation as a legal document properly enacted that remained in force after the reorganisation to thereby pass on functions to the state authorities. Following established milestones especially the Edward Mills case the Supreme Court ruled that for an executive order to be considered as the ‘law in force’ it has to have a characteristic of a regulation or legislation. At this, the Supreme Court noted that the notice that had been issued by the President was not an administrative act but had some legislative nature. The Supreme Court also in a way pointed to Article 372 by which the provisions of the Constitution shall not affect existing laws on the date of the commencement of the Constitution. It held that the notification under Article 258(1) came within the purview of the above classification and as such its legal character and efficacy were saved as was the case with departures through legislation. According to the Supreme Court, the given executive notification was properly characterised in relation to the purpose of the Act to address the legislative intent concerning the continuity of work and business functioning of state entities. The Supreme Court’s decision shows that any disruption of such processes requires clear statutory provisions and adherence to the principles of contract law. Thus, it emphasises the need for a strong framework that enables one to achieve the objective of ensuring that executive orders and notifications, regardless of the reorganisation, can be fairly easily incorporated into the legal system aimed at preserving the functionality and authorities of the state mechanisms excluding those that threaten the legislative integrity. This case also demonstrates the Supreme Court’s understanding that when the executive gives notice under the Constitutional and under the legislative measures, the notice is as legal as it would be given directly by parliament. It emphasises that constant administrative practice, maintaining the efficiency of the government functions, regulating relations, and recognising notifications as binding legal texts are essential during periods of major administrative reorganisation.

Conclusion 

The case of Jayantilal Amrit Lal Shodhan vs. F. N. Rana and Others (1963), offers valuable insights into the decisions of the legislative bodies which entrust certain executive functions and the judicial acknowledgement of their continuance even after reorganisation of states. This test for validating the legislative competence that transferred the subjects pertaining to the reorganised State of Gujarat to the new legislative list from the old legislative lists of the dissolved State of Bombay is found in the majority judgement of the Supreme Court reinforcing that the Presidential notification under Article 258(1) remained legal following the reorganisation of Bombay and therefore made it perfectly legal for the new Commissioners of the State of Gujarat to discharge the functions offered under it.

More generally, it serves as an example of how crucial it is for a Constitution to spell out the optimum way in which the task or functions of a government may be delegated and performed or continued. It also demonstrates how the judiciary facilitates the integration of the executive branch’s actions with legislative aims and objectives for smooth running of the governance systems. The decision made is not as limited to this concrete situation alone, offering an insight into hierarchical subordination and interaction of branches of power, the stability of legal tools within the framework of administrative shifts.

Ultimately, Jayantilal Amrit Lal Shodhan vs. F.N. Rana and Ors. highlights how the judiciary is charged with the duty of interpreting the Constitutional values and assuring that advancement is not a means of violating other people’s rights.  

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

Which provision of the Indian Constitution governs the separation of power between the executive and the legislature?

Article 258(1) of Indian Constitution relates to the executive powers, the delegation of functions under it can be included into the legislations framework, thus providing legal continuity and operational effectiveness in the process of reorganisation.

What was the minority view in the present judgement?

Justice K. N. Wanchoo dissented regarding this proposition stating that the executive functions under Article 258(1) cannot be taken to mean ‘law in force’ as per Section 87 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act. He was of the view that the Commissioners cannot proceed under the Land Acquisition Act since Parliament does not empower them to do so.

What did the Court mean by the term “law in force” in regard to this case?

In its turn, the Court explained the term “law in force” to encompass not only legislative acts but also executive orders and notifications that have precedential legal authority. This broad interpretation supported the assertion that the Presidential notification under Article 258(1) retained its legal viability following reorganisation.

What role did the Court play in relation to quasi-judicial functions in the case?

The Court responded to this issue by deciding whether the functions vested under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act consisting of objections to the land acquisition were quasi-judicial or administrative in nature. The decision also involved determining whether these functions could be lawfully delegated to state officers.

References

• https://blog.ipleaders.in/aspects-land-acquisition-india/
• https://blog.ipleaders.in/justification-torts-judicial-quasi-judicial-acts/

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