In this article, P. Mohan Chandran pursuing M.A, in Business Law from NUJS, Kolkata discusses the Use of Machines in Arbitration – Are We Ready?

The use of technology in the legal field has been continuously evolving, and its use by lawyers has risen steadily. For instance, DRExM[1] has, lately, been used in Egypt to resolve construction disputes, because of its ability to recommend the most appropriate dispute resolution technique, depending on the nature of the dispute, the evidence, and the relation between the parties.

Of late, a group of lawyers – Watson, Ross, Lex Machina and Compas – has been the most sought-after by the most reputed law firms. They are supposed to forecast results with greater accuracy than Gary Born,[2] create more compelling stories than Stanimir Alexandrov[3] and even administer better awards than Gabrielle Kauffman-Kohler.[4]

In the future, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is expected to transform legal practice. In the coming future, the possibility of technology having its predominance over human subjects, even in the field of law, is high. An American law firm has already started using an AI researcher that can conduct legal research more swiftly and economically than a human. In this scenario, the million-dollar question in everyone’s mind is: ‘will technology replace arbitrators shortly? And, are we ready for it?’

Technology/Machines Replacing Humans

In the U.S, advanced document production programs have already begun to displace contract lawyers. A latest report [5] by Carl Frey, co-director of the Oxford Martin program on technology and employment at the Oxford University, reveals how rapid enhancements in machine learning imply risk for highly-skilled workers, who may have their jobs mechanized, with judges and magistrates at medium risk (40.1%), together with detectives, economists, computer programmers, commercial pilots, and personal financial advisers. Those professionals who are at highest risk are insurance underwriters, loan officers, and credit analysts.

Technology makes us rethink on the intuitive nature of the arbitrator’s order and how much of it can be renounced. It is said that writing one’s own awards protects one’s own intellectual integrity and that arbitrators who delegate this task to an assistant are no longer discharging their decision-making function.

We need to confront new changes head-on and question ourselves about what we eventually expect from the arbitral process, and what it can accomplish. Do we want impeccably logical, absolutely unemotional reactions? Irrefutable legal reasoning? A quest for truth? And what is the role of justice and empathy – which supposedly, even highly advanced machines can’t replicate – in the arbitral decision making of the future? We are on the cusp of time where technology in arbitration is in a transitional phase, from being just functional to truly life-changing.

Appointment of machines as Arbitrators

Arbitration is not immune to dynamic technological advancement. With technology reigning supreme over humans, the bigger question that arises is: ‘are parties willing to appoint machines as arbitrators?’

None of the arbitration laws explicitly restrain the appointment of a computer as an arbitrator. Instead, every provision pertaining to the validity of the arbitration agreement only defines it as the submission of a dispute to the arbitrators. In turn, the definitions of ‘arbitral tribunal’ only mention that parties may appoint a sole or a plurality of arbitrators. Thus, based on this argument, both an arbitration agreement referring the dispute to a machine arbitrator and the composition of a tribunal by such machine would be valid.

However, the Arbitration Acts of Brazil (Art. 10), Ecuador (Art. 19), Peru (Art. 20), and Colombia (Art. 7 – domestic arbitration) contain specific references to arbitrators as ‘humans’ or require them to act by themselves. For instance, the Peruvian Arbitration Act states that “any individual with full capacity to exercise his civil rights may act as an arbitrator”[6].

On the contrary, legislation of Chile, Colombia (international arbitration) and Mexico, as well as the Model Law, do not contain a specific reference to arbitrators as ‘human,’ nor require them to be in a capacity to exercise their civil rights. Disputably, this legal lacuna would allow users to appoint a computer as an arbitrator in these countries.

However, the legal status of MLS (Machine Learning Systems) might change in the future. For instance, members of the European Parliament have mooted to provide legal status to robots, classifying them as ‘electronic people’ and holding them liable for their acts or omissions. This kind of regulation could open new avenues, allowing parties to appoint computers, even in countries that require ‘human’ arbitrators. Moreover, even if parties were disallowed to appoint computers as arbitrators, it does not mean they cannot consent to use them. Even if arbitration laws do not apply, courts should still execute such agreements as a matter of contract law.

Apart from these regulating considerations, the appointment of machine arbitrator could be curbed based on an alleged breach of international public order. Such a concept constantly emerges to meet the needs of the political, social, cultural and economic contexts. However, change takes time to be executed.

Hence, an award effected by machine arbitrators should be set aside for violating the international public order, as it lacks critical human attributes such as emotion, empathy and the ability to explain a decision.

Use of ‘Virtual’ Technology in Arbitration

We can see where the fault lines of a modern vis-à-vis traditional legal landscape will lie with one piece of technology whose use extends to the frontier between the conventional and the life-changing video conferencing. The technology of Video Conferencing technically viable since 1964, became prevalent only after the turn of the millennium. As the technology has advanced and dispersed, it has increasingly been offered in arbitration as the mode for examination and cross-examination of witnesses who have difficulty in showing up personally at hearings.

The use of video technology has incited an interesting rift in the opinions of arbitrators and counsels alike. On the one hand, conventionalists believe that it is fundamentally illogical to question a witness from a remote location, on the other side, enthusiasts believe that video technology will help get rid of much of the time and expense that plagues arbitration hearings.

For a brief moment of time, the conventionalists had a point. The video technology in use was comparatively primeval, susceptible to disruption and delay, and hardly an optimal medium for the art of cross-examination. However, since 2010, newer and better video technology has empowered multiple users from diverse locations to meet and negotiate by video, in high definition and with no significant time lag. This newer generation of video technology mostly disqualifies the criticisms that many arbitrators and counsels had initially advanced against the use of video conferencing in arbitral hearings. Moreover, it makes pragmatic the possibility of not only examining far-flung witnesses but also executing arbitrations with several of the participants and stakeholders in different locations. However, there remains a substantial percentage of practitioners who are uncomfortable with the prospect of administering all or part of an arbitral hearing by video. These criticisms all condense to the loss of in-person contact that follows from a virtual proceeding.

It is at this point in the development of technology in arbitration that criticisms of this type expose a firm elemental belief. As mentioned above, the modern wave of high-definition video conferencing provides a crystal-clear picture of a participant on the screen akin to him sitting just next to you in the room. The participant’s facial expressions, body language, and voice tone are enhanced by the medium of the video conference. It is no longer maintainable with this kind of video to criticize that one cannot gauge a witness’s non-verbal and sub-conscious signs.

With rapid advancement in technology, we face the possibility of even more immersive and realistic technology to simulate personal interactions. Today, we are on the verge of a revolution in virtual reality technology. Some of the technological giants, such as Google, Facebook, and Microsoft, have announced virtual reality headsets that signify a sea-change in current technology, competing with independent outfits such as Magic Leap, to develop the most economical and most realistic devices. The first such headsets may be more suitable for video games and visual images than for virtual hearings, but it is unlikely to take long before they can efficiently replace video conferences as substitutes for personal meetings providing a much more realistic, real-time feel.

When the cost and quality of such technology make it practical to conduct ‘headset hearings,’ any criticism about the proximity of the medium and the difficulty of interacting with others in a virtual hearing will be eliminated. All that would be left, then, as a probable criticism to virtual hearings, is an inexpressible preference for the ‘feel’ of dealing with a witness personally, rather than distantly. The idea behind this is that there is an indefinable component to personal human contact, in which the participants are provided a better opportunity to assess the qualities of their speakers than they would be by phone, video, or hologram. If the arbitrators make this preference clear, the parties and their lawyers will keep supplying witnesses in person to meet it.

One of the fields where technology is mostly used in arbitration at the moment is advocacy. With smart use of computer-generated graphics or diagrams, complicated facts are simplified, and a case is made easier to understand. An interactive video of a damaged manufacturing plant will probably emphasize the message of the plant’s failings more effectively than would a dry, oral recitation of the construction’s failure. A video of the ravage created by a natural disaster will carry more emotional weight in a dispute about insurance coverage than a spreadsheet exposing the ruin in figures. In the near future, we can expect more advanced visual fireworks ever to assist parties’ cases.

If the evaluation of evidence and decision-making role of arbitrators is, as disputed, increasingly seized by AI, technological advocacy aids will become progressively redundant. A computer is not vulnerable to emotion and will be no more influenced by a video than by a transcript.

The present generation of lawyers in arbitration confront a turbulent ride with technology. Today, and for a few more years, they can leverage technology to move and persuade tribunals. But the rapid growth of technology will steadily weaken their power and could phase out their role altogether.

Performance of Machines vis-a-vis Humans in Arbitration

Although technology has evolved rapidly in the last few years, a Machine Learning System (MLS) is still unable to read, forecast or feel emotions precisely. The lack of emotional processing would be a significant drawback for a machine arbitrator.

Emotions are vital for humans. This would be a significant drawback for machine arbitrators. Machines, including computers, can’t instantly feel emotions because they can neither recognize nor understand signs such as facial expression, gestures, and voice intonation. In turn, machines can’t communicate information about their own emotional state by using relevant, responsive signs.

Inability to give due recognition to the parties’ emotional reactions impedes the arbitrators’ understanding of the case as it undermines the part played by the parties’ emotions in the circumstances leading up to the dispute. Emotions act as a source of information, matter of motivation and control information processing by masking our perception, memory encoding, and judgments. Without emotions, our decisions are not human. Moreover, specific emotions such as anger plays a significant role in legal decision making. According to Terry Maroney[7], anger generates a bias towards fighting against injustice. Thus, angry arbitrators are vulnerable to feeling an intense desire to repair an unjust situation, even if that means taking more risks to rectify the existing scenario.

Furthermore, MLS also lacks empathy, i.e., the ability to understand the intentions of others, anticipate their behavior, and experience the emotions they are feeling. This emotional intelligence characteristic requires the development of metacognition i.e. thinking about thinking, thinking about feeling and thinking about other’s thoughts and feelings. However, computers haven’t acquired this feature hitherto.

Empathy is critical in arbitration. Arbitrators have to put themselves in the shoes of the respective parties to fathom their hopes, struggles, expectations, and assumptions. It is only after this cerebral exercise that arbitrators are ready to perceive the dispute and reach an award completely. Moreover, MLS are not yet able to explain their judgments. This could be an issue, even where arbitrary awards are allowed if consented. For instance, computers would be unable to issue final judgments regarding a fundamental decision subject to an appeal for reconsideration. Arguably, this could breed defiance against machine arbitrators, based on due process. Prominently, the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation, that is effective from May 2018 prohibits automated decisions regarding profiling, if the algorithms cannot be subsequently explained to its users (“right to an explanation”).

This may create numerous issues, as corporations might try to mask information from public scrutiny, access to codes will possibly be complex for ordinary citizens and, specially, there will be an imbalance between the mathematics involved in machine learning and the demands of human-scale reasoning and style of interpretation. In short, machines are limited. An unemotional arbitrator, without empathy and the ability to explain itself, would be unable to fully comprehend the drama of the parties, their intent, and the provided meaning, apart from the written text of the contract and documents.

However, AI will not eliminate arbitration for now because resolving international disputes goes beyond establishing the factual matrix of a case and applying established legal principles.

It may be easy to analyze a wealth of well rationalized common law judgments and come to almost accurate conclusions. When humans can do it, AI could do it better. However, in many jurisdictions, court judgments are much shorter, and the reasoning is much vague, with very little explanation of the relevant facts and parties’ arguments. As a consequence, legal research needs experience in a specific jurisdiction and knowledge of the historical roots of several legal principles and traditions. It becomes subtler and, to a great extent, echoes a speculative game where you have to use your intuition and everyday life experience to understand the rationale behind a specific judgment. International arbitration resolves disputes from around the world between parties from different geographies and with different legal traditions. There is no reason to presume that AI would match the quality and ease of information available for research in every geography anytime soon.

The same goes for fact-finding, too. The analysis of the information, which is well documented and consistent, is not too arduous a task for a human. Therefore, it could be accomplished easily by AI. But the fact-finding function of the arbitrator goes beyond that because, in several intricate disputes, the factual matrix is split up. A few facts may not be established with adequate certainty. Even the standard of proof pertinent to non-criminal law cases necessitates something that goes beyond pure analytical skills. Arbitrators may need to summon up their personal business experiences from everyday life. They may require utilizing their knowledge of various cultures, business traditions, and human psychology to identify which interpretation is more probable, or which one is real to be believed. They then need to figure out the links between isolated proven facts.

Moreover, in several cases, the application of law to the established facts does not automatically yield the right result for one reason or another. Some vital facts cannot be established with appropriate certainty. Sometimes, the law, when applied stringently, may spark improper results. Sometimes the law may not even exist to govern a particular situation, and the parties may also ask their arbitrators to resolve the dispute according to the principles of right and good. All these situations necessitate that human senses of justice and equity are involved in the decision-making process.

Hence, AI may be suited for smaller and more simple cases. But the real value of international arbitration as a means of peaceful resolution of international disputes between various parties is not in creating standardized and steady results. Its real value is that the people involved in the process – arbitrators, counsel, experts – exercise their own cultural, business and legal backgrounds, life experiences, and senses of equity and justice to settle the dispute. This is usually not only right as a matter of strict law, but is most significant as just and fair under the circumstances of the case.

A popular study[8]of Israeli parole judges over a span of eight months explained that their conduct showed an expected pattern. After starting work in the morning, they would grant applications for parole at an average rate of 65%, with the number of successful applications declining before lunchtime. After lunch, an applicant’s probability of parole surged again to 65% before steadily declining again. The gravity of the applicants’ crime had no relation to the sequence in which it presented itself before the judges; they were simply more inclined to be lenient when they were not hungry.

Well, one may wonder what connection this has with technology! The answer is that technology is reaching a stage where devices can not only compensate for human lacuna in decision-making, but also substitute their own, more precise assessment of the facts.

There is a volley of questions that might arise from the use of technology in an arbitration. Would parties be compelled to use it? Could arbitrators confront a challenge from a party for using technology on the basis that they were abjuring their responsibility to adjudge the case to a machine? Or could they confront a challenge for not using it on the ground that they ought to use every tool at their disposal to determine the truth? Would counsel waiver to advance certain witnesses on the ground that they might not survive the eagle-eye of a machine – and would that be atrocious? Would arbitrators attract a negative inference from a witness willing to depose, but not to use the machine? Whatever it is, technology seems to be here to stay.

Advantage Machines

MLS could assist arbitrators. For instance, HYPO is a computer that guides arbitrators in the search for precedent, explains similarities and differences between cases, and even suggests possible arguments that could be used for dispute resolution. In such cases, the machine would not make the decision, but only act as a guide for arbitrators. In this scenario, it would still be up to the human arbitrators to attribute purpose and meaning to the evidence.

The arbitration legal framework was not structured to explicitly prohibit or admit the appointment of computers as arbitrators. With the evolution of technology, we have to amend our laws accordingly. Therefore, arbitration practitioners should discuss the changes that would take place if machine arbitrators are appointed. How would the standard of ‘conflicts of interests’ be applied? Would it be possible to appoint a machine in a panel with two human arbitrators? How would they deliberate?

Technology will undoubtedly and ultimately catch up and provide solutions. Primeval lawyers who try to clutch on to tradition and quell innovation will remain at the middle of the evolutionary chain. Hence, it is left to the arbitration community to express its needs for empathetic arbitrators, who are able to explain and feel their decisions.

Very soon, AI could take over certain portion of legal business, such as legal research and drafting, if it is able to deliver more consistent and reliable results at more economical costs. AI will be better able to perform legal research than humans. Similarly, it is quite likely that AI will be better at fact-finding. Most organizations would be glad to have a dispute resolution mechanism that delivers consistent and precise results at a fraction of the actual costs involved in today’s arbitrations. There is probably less scope for apprehension about machines adjudging humans in the commercial context. For this reason, AI-based dispute resolution will likely take over some portion of the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) market in the near future. Also, it will leave very little scope for standard disputes. By using the same AI technology, without formally involving in a dispute with an opponent, results might be easier to predict. So, to be precise, it will be a mechanism for alternative dispute prevention’.

Benefits & Risks With Machine Arbitration

Benefits

The legal market in general is getting more dynamic, with a robust focus on efficiency, novel ways of offering legal services, cost competitiveness, new market players and new online legal services, which will also affect the arbitral proceedings, and the lawyers and client expectations on the use of technology, instant access to knowledge, and communication taking place with extraordinary speed.

With the help of state-of-the-art technology, benefits such as enhanced accessibility, search and support facilities for electronic files, interactive documents, virtual hearings with improved use of exhibits, online dispute resolutions and efficiency growth can be accomplished. This is a dynamic process, evolving into more production-friendly arbitration over time. Today, the level of electronic evidence being accepted differs predominantly. Some arbitral tribunals only accept hard documents, while others are receptive to accepting electronic evidence.

Risks

The use of new technology brings both risks and opportunities. Some of the risks concern issues related to security and privacy, ownership of data, technical problems with dual-use devices, the risk of missing important information with too many possibilities to access numerous documents and the risk that the parties may not be equally well-equipped or experienced, resulting in an inequality that could be inimical to due process. These risks need to be carefully addressed and it is crucial that the adoption to latest technology is made with appropriate care and contemplation as not to impair the fundamental principles of the process. The advances made in information and communications technology have opened up opportunities and changes that have invariably had – and will continue to have – an impact on working practices and created new client expectations for the arbitral community to adapt. The enduring success of international arbitration in the 21st century will depend on our ability to develop innovative and visionary techniques to meet the future challenges and risks.

Innovative Technology in Arbitration

There are already numerous new innovative projects being planned and implemented, mostly in the consumer dispute field with online dispute procedure solutions. For instance, the European Commission, of late, recommended the setting-up of an EU-wide online platform resolving consumer disputes. But, there are also solutions targeted at the efficient management of intricate business disputes referred to international commercial arbitration by the use of the latest technology. For instance, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) has created a facility called Net Case, which allows parties and arbitrators to handle aspects of their proceedings in a secure online environment.

Another similar technological innovation is the WIPO ECAF, which allows parties, experts, arbitrators, and mediators in a case to submit communications electronically, record facts, receive case information summaries and synopsis of schedule, and the economic status of the case. Other instances on the use of new technology to simplify litigation management are:

Case Anywhere

A web-based software application tool, created for US litigation, which can be used by court and lawyer to efficiently manage their cases by allowing users to electronically serve litigation documents, arrange and search case records, access testimonial transcripts, and communicate over a secure internet connection.

LexisNexis CaseMap

A tool for lawyers to effectively seize, organize and assess the facts, cast of characters, relevant issues, research and participants in a case.

The Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC)

The Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), of late, has also launched a forward-thinking project using new technologies – The Swedish Arbitration Portal. The portal is an innovative service that provides the arbitration association free access to English translations of Swedish court judgments on issues pertaining to both international and domestic arbitrations.

With the use of cloud computing, latest state-of-the-art software products can be used without any huge upfront investment costs, which would shrink the costs of execution and provide well-developed, efficient and economical solutions for arbitral proceedings. With the rampant use of cloud-based technology, latest innovative solutions to meet the challenges of the future and identifying ways to draft the award faster will be increasingly easy to adopt.

Usually, the question of whether and to what extent latest technology will be used in a given arbitration will be a thing for the parties and arbitrators to decide in discussion with each other. Although the benefits provided by the latest technology are quite compelling, there is no proposition that they should be imposed against a participant’s will. So, lawyers have to take the call when it has to be determined how the new wave of information technologies will impact arbitration. It is advisable for lawyers to embrace the vast technological possibilities by adapting them to the dynamic world.

Hot-Tubbing

Hot-tubbing or simultaneous evidence is a system of providing evidence, where experts give evidence simultaneously and the court or tribunal leads a discussion between them.

The main objectives of expert hot-tubbing in technology-related arbitrations are:

• To save trial time
• To enhance the quality of expert evidence
• To support the court in determining disputed issues of expert evidence
• To save costs.

Hot-tubbing allows experts to ask questions to each other, answer such questions, and most importantly, to respond to each other’s opinions. It helps the tribunal in understanding technology matters. However, the success of hot-tubbing depends on the arbitrator’s adequate understanding of the subject-matter to conduct the discussion and the ability of the arbitrator to chair in the discussion between experts.

Conclusion

The advent of AI will transform legal practice. The likely impact for those engaged in the arbitration arena is that there is no express prohibition to machine arbitration or machine arbitrators in one Model Law jurisdiction. Public policy concerns are likely to arise, but these are expected to wane over time.

The rapid nature of technological advancement entails swift action to address the legal, ethical and practical challenges raised by machine arbitration. The development of specialized arbitral rules and frameworks to control and execute machine arbitration will be essential should this technology become a reality.

Probably these rules and frameworks should be drawn up soon in the near future. After all, the Permanent Court of Arbitration published their Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Outer Space Activities in 2011, well ahead of the comprehensive commercial spaceflight. Similar prudence in respect of machine arbitration may reduce the risks that tend to accompany far-reaching change.

With the advancement of AI programs such as Watson, it is possible that in the present direction, a computer would be able to serve as a fact-finder and arbitrator on its own, within the next 20 years: exploring the applicable law more intensively, evaluating the validity of witness evidence more flawlessly, and contemplating a great deal more swiftly than human arbitrators. Parties might then not object to the use of such a machine to decide their disputes.

However, it would remain the choice of the parties whether to employ a non-human arbitrator when one becomes viable. Given our mindset and weakness for human interaction, parties may well reject the opportunity to have their dispute decided by a computer program, even at the risk of having more ‘imperfect’ humans possibly decide it ‘unfairly’.

An interesting scenario might occur if one party were willing to use a computer as an arbitrator, but another objected to it. Will the arbitral institution be able to foist a non-human arbitrator on an objecting party, or would that characterize an abuse of the process? It might be that parties and institutions adopt an amalgamated approach, with parties appointing humans and a machine serving as the third member.

On the other hand, a human tribunal might review with a computer as a supplement to, or check on, their decisions. The computer might, therefore, perform a role akin to the one for which tribunals use tribunal secretaries. This kind of approach might provide a satisfactory solution to those who emphasize on human interaction in an arbitral proceeding and those ready to place their faith on the less imperfect, but less acceptable, prospect of ‘robotic justice’.

As arbitration is predominantly criticized for getting sluggish and exorbitant, the technology that could be used in the process is becoming more economical and advanced. The economics of dispute resolution, thus, proposes an inflection point somewhere in the next decade, where the benefits of technology rapidly enhance the current process.

References

1. Jose Maria de la Jara, Alejandra Infantes, and Daniela Palma, Machine Arbitrator: Are We Ready? KLUVER ARBITRATION BLOG (May 4, 2017), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2017/05/04/machine-arbitrator-are-we-ready/.
2. Jack Wright Nelson, Machine Arbitration and Machine Arbitrators, YOUNGICCA BLOG (July 28, 2016), http://www.youngicca-blog.com/machine-arbitration-and-machine-arbitrators/.
3. Andrey Panov, Machine Arbitration: Will We be Out of Our Jobs in 20 Years?THOMSON REUTERS (Aug. 4, 2016), http://arbitrationblog.practicallaw.com/machine-arbitration-will-we-be-out-of-our-jobs-in-20-years/.
4. Thomas D. Halket, Using Information Technology in Arbitration, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Jan. 2015), https://www.americanbar.org/publications/gp_solo/2015/january-february/using_information_technology_arbitration.html.
5. Innovation in Arbitration, VIRTUAL INTELLIGENCE,http://vqab.se/innovation-in-arbitration.aspx.
6. Paulius Docka, How Hot-Tubbing Might Affect Technology Related Arbitration, SILICON VALLEY ARBITRATION & MEDIATION CENTER, https://svamc.org/how-hot-tubbing-might-affect-technology-related-arbitration/.
7. Dr. Faith Serbest, The Use of Information Technology in International Commercial Arbitration, ACADEMIA.EDU (June 6, 2012), https://www.academia.edu/5795816/The_Use_of_Information_Technology_in_International_Commercial_Arbitration.
8. Paul Cohen and Sophie Nappert, The March of the Robots, GLOBAL ARBITRATION REVIEW (Feb. 15, 2017), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1080951/the-march-of-the-robots.
9. Sophie Nappert and Cohen, The Brave New World of IT and International Arbitration – The Practitioner’s Perspective,RESEARCH GATE (Sept. 2016), https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Sophie_Nappert/publication/303749723_The_Impact_of_Technology_on_Arbitral_Decision_Making_-_The_Practitioner%27s_Perspective/links/5750460508aefe968db72809/The-Impact-of-Technology-on-Arbitral-Decision-Making-The-Practitioners-Perspective.pdf.

[2] Gary Born is the Chair of the International Arbitration Practice Group. He is widely regarded as the world’s pre-eminent authority on international commercial arbitration and international litigation. For the last two decades, he has been ranked as one of the world’s leading international arbitration practitioners and the leading arbitration practitioner in London for the last two decades.

[3]Stanimir A. Alexandrov is co-leader of Sidley Austin LLP’s International Arbitration Group. He focuses his practice in the areas of international dispute resolution, including investor-state arbitration and international commercial arbitration, and resolution of trade disputes before the WTO.

[4]Prof. Kaufmann-Kohler is a Partner at Lévy Kaufmann-Kohler and Professor at the University of Geneva. She has acted as counsel or arbitrator in over 200 commercial, investment, and sports arbitrations. She is founder and director of the Geneva LLM in International Dispute Settlement (MIDS), and Co-founder of the Foundation for International Arbitration Advocacy (FIAA).

[5]Paul Cohen and Sophie Nappert, The March of the Robots, GLOBAL ARBITRATION REVIEW(Feb. 15, 2017), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1080951/the-march-of-the-robots.

[6] Jose Maria de la Jara, Alejandra Infantes, and Daniela Palma, Machine Arbitrator: Are We Ready? KLUVER ARBITRATION BLOG (May 4, 2017), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2017/05/04/machine-arbitrator-are-we-ready/.

[7]Terry Maroney’s research focuses fundamentally on the role of emotion in law. She was chosen as a Fellow of the Center for Advanced Study in Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University to pursue a theoretical and empirical investigation on the role of emotion in judicial behavior and decision-making. Her scholarship on judges’ emotions — including “Angry Judges,” “Emotional Regulation and Judicial Behavior” and “The Persistent Cultural Script of Judicial Dispassion” — has been extensively read by both judges and scholars of judicial behavior.

[8]Paul Cohen and Sophie Nappert, The March of the Robots, GLOBAL ARBITRATION REVIEW (Feb. 15, 2017), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1080951/the-march-of-the-robots.