This article is written by Kishita Gupta, a graduate of the United World School of Law, Karnavati University, Gandhinagar. This article discusses in detail various elements related to the Minsk agreements, which were signed between Russia and Ukraine in the years 2014 and 2015.

This article has been published by Sneha Mahawar.

Introduction

“War never changes. The Romans waged war to gather slaves and wealth. Spain built an empire from its lust for gold and territory. Hitler shaped a battered Germany into an economic superpower. But war never changes.” – Fallout intro

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The tensions between Ukraine and Russia have not been hidden from the world for quite some time now. These tensions are not new and haven’t arisen suddenly between the two countries. The beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian War in March 2014, which was sparked by Russia’s takeover of Crimea and intervention in Donbas, occurred eight years ago. The incursion culminated in a violent battle in April 2014 between Ukrainian forces, local ‘separatists,’ and Russian ‘volunteers,’ who were sporadically assisted by regular Russian military forces. Then, by mutual consent, the two countries signed the Minsk Agreement I in 2014 and the Minsk Agreement II in 2015. The signing of the February 2015 Minsk II Agreement, which confirmed peace terms meant to end the conflict in far more detail than the September 2014 Minsk I Agreement did. However in February 2022 again the war broke out between the two countries where the Minsk Agreement came into the limelight. This is why it is important for us to know what these two agreements are and their significance. Therefore, this article will cover all the aspects relating to the two Minsk agreements.

Why are the Minsk agreements currently in the news

The President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, made two significant pronouncements in the days prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. First, Russia was the first UN member state to recognise the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces in eastern Ukraine as independent republics. And second, the Minsk agreements from 2014 and 2015, which sought to halt the separatist war in the area, have long since expired. 

The Minsk agreements, which were signed in 2014 and 2015 by Ukraine, Russia, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and representatives of the self-declared republics, were meant to put an end to the ongoing conflict in the Donbas region in southeast Ukraine. Even world leaders like Angela Merkel, François Hollande, and Vladimir Putin publicly endorsed the final product. 

As is well known, Minsk did not lead to peace. Despite the accords, there was a fluctuating level of severity to the military operations in eastern Ukraine. Russia and Ukraine each laid the responsibility for their failure to comply, on the other.

What are the Minsk agreements

The many agreements agreed upon by the Trilateral Contact Group members are collectively referred to as the Minsk agreements. Additionally, the heads of the military units in charge of specific Luhansk and Donetsk regions have signed each document. The Minsk Protocol (5 September 2014), the Minsk Memorandum (19 September 2014), and the “Package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk Agreements” (12 February 2015 – hereinafter referred to as the Minsk Agreement II) are the three key documents that make up the Minsk agreements.

Minsk Agreement I (2014)

Russia’s dual strategy led to the Minsk Agreement I. The regular armed forces offensive in Donbas was one thing, but diplomatic ties with major European powers (Germany and France), who together with Ukraine started the Normandy framework in June 2014, were quite another. This broad agreement, which consists of 12 brief points, was mostly forced on Ukraine by Russian influence. As there were grave worries that Moscow intended to build a land corridor connecting the Ukrainian territory it had captured with Crimea that had been annexed, the main priority of both the Western and Ukrainian parties was to contain the Russian onslaught. Particularly concerned about an unchecked escalation of the conflict, were Germany and France.

This led to a compromise document that defined the fundamental guidelines for conflict regulation, but it was immediately subjected to various interpretations by the parties. Security concerns, including the truce, the establishment of a safety zone, the removal of heavy equipment and foreign militants, and the installation of the OSCE observer mission, were of the utmost importance to Ukraine and should be completed first in order to freeze the conflict.

Before any security duties could be fulfilled, Russia had to fulfil its political obligations regarding dialogue, decentralisation of authority in Ukraine, an act introducing special status for “certain districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts,” and local elections held in these regions. Moscow planned to formalise the Donbas autonomy, in which Kyiv assumed nominal sovereignty but Russia retained actual power. The main commitments for the “separatists” were safety assurances, amnesty, and a hostage exchange.

Given that Russia was explicitly considered a guarantor of the accord rather than a party to the conflict, the treaty represented a significant political victory for Moscow. The recognition of DPR and LPR should be prevented from resulting in Ukraine’s achievement since its leaders, Alexander Zakharchenko and Igor Plotnitsky, signed the agreement without specifying their respective roles. In the discussions that followed, the fundamentals of the ceasefire, the removal of heavy equipment from the conflict zone, and the introduction of the observer mission were outlined (in the memorandum signed on September 19, 2014). A change that hurt Ukraine was that the observer mission’s coverage area now included the areas on both sides of the front line rather than the Russian-Ukrainian boundary.

Elements of the Minsk Agreement I

The 2014 Agreement consisted of the following points:

  1. The use of weapons must cease immediately bilaterally.
  2. OSCE’s inspection of the non-use of weapons regime
  3. Decentralise power, for example by passing the Ukrainian Law on the Temporary Status of Local Self-Government in Some Areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions (Law on Special Status).
  4. Ensuring OSCE verification and continuous monitoring of the Ukrainian-Russian State Border, as well as the creation of a secure zone along the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Border.
  5. Release of all hostages and others who have been unlawfully detained immediately.
  6. Adopt legislation that forbids the prosecution and punishment of individuals in relation to the activities that occurred in specific Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine locations.
  7. Continuation of inclusive national dialogue.
  8. Take measures to improve the humanitarian situation in Donbas.
  9. To ensure that early local elections are held in specific areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in compliance with the law of Ukraine on the temporary status of local self-government (Law on Special Status).
  10. Removal of militants and mercenaries from Ukraine’s borders, along with illegal military equipment and formations.
  11. Adoption of a plan for the restoration of Donbas’s economy and the restart of the region’s essential operations.
  12. Providing guarantees for personal security for the participants of the consultations.

But the Agreement failed to stop the war, as there were frequent violations by both countries.

Minsk Agreement II (2015)

After yet another limited Russian offensive in Donbas, the Minsk II Agreement was reached. This was more specific, but also more favourable to Russia and the ‘separatists’. The original agreement’s successor, known as Minsk II, was hammered out at a summit held at the city’s Independence Palace in February of the following year, mediated by French President Francois Hollande and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and attended by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko.

Elements of the Minsk Agreement II

It contained the following 13 points:

  1. The immediate and total cessation of hostilities in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine, as well as rigorous compliance with the cessation of hostilities
  2. Withdrawal of all heavy weapons by both sides at an equal distance.
  3. To ensure that the OSCE effectively monitors and verifies the ceasefire regime and the removal of heavy weaponry.
  4. To start constructive discussions about Donetsk and Luhansk’s interim self-government in accordance with Ukrainian law and to recognise their unique status by a parliamentary resolution.
  5. By enacting a law that forbids the prosecution and punishment of individuals in connection with the events that occurred in specific areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine to ensure pardon and amnesty.
  6. To ensure the release and exchange of all hostages and others who have been wrongfully detained
  7. To ensure that everyone in need has humanitarian assistance.
  8. Define the procedures for the full restoration of social and economic links, including social transfers like pensions and other payments.
  9. Full restoration of state border control by the Ukrainian government across the entire war zone
  10. Removal of all foreign military forces, military equipment, and mercenaries from Ukrainian soil under OSCE supervision.
  11. Carrying out constitutional reform, including decentralisation, in Ukraine in preparation for the implementation of a new Constitution.
  12. Elections to be held as per Ukrainian standards
  13. Strengthen the efforts of a Trilateral Contact Group that includes OSCE, Russia, and Ukraine representatives.

How was it more favourable to Russia than Ukraine

  1. It introduced a timeline for the political process including the special status of some Donbas regions.
  2. Despite not having control over them, it required Ukraine to reinstate social security payments for people living in the occupied territory.
  3. The agreement said that resuming Ukrainian rule over the seized border areas would be contingent on both the acceptance of the separatists and the fulfillment of political changes, including the decentralisation of government and conducting elections in the occupied Donbas.
  4. The Donbas ‘autonomy’ was granted a number of rights, including the ability to establish ‘people’s militias’, negotiate cross-border agreements with Russian territories, and control local power structures.
  5. The fact that the consensus agreement was supported by a special resolution of the UN Security Council was a testament to Russia’s diplomatic achievement.

The Minsk Conundrum

The main differences over Minsk II relate to how the points should be put into practice and how Russia’s position in the war should be understood.

  1. Russia is not subject to any duties under the Minsk agreement. Moscow describes itself as a mediator to aid in a settlement between Ukraine and the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics.
  2. While Russia denies having any military presence there, Ukraine claims that the Minsk agreement’s point 10 regarding the evacuation of “all foreign armed forces” relates to Russia.
  3. Another area where Russia and Ukraine disagree is the sequence in which political and military actions should be taken. Russia contends that the withdrawal of military hardware should occur before elections in the separatist republics, but Ukraine insists on the opposite.
  4. Ukraine views this as a breach of the Minsk agreement because more than 720,000 residents of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions have acquired Russian citizenship as a result of Russia’s 2019 adoption of a simplified passport system.
  5. Ukrainian officials contend that providing special status to the Donetsk and Luhansk regions is impractical since Ukrainian law considers these territories as being occupied by Russia.
  6. Additionally, Russians asked that neutrality clauses be incorporated into the Ukrainian constitution to prevent the country from applying for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) membership. However, Ukraine rejected the request, which is a major factor in the 2022 war.

Non-implementation of the Minsk agreements

Numerous obstacles stand in the way of the Minsk Agreements’ implementation as well as efforts to mediate the Ukraine conflict in general. A very small percentage of the agreed-upon steps have actually been put into action, despite some modest victories in agreements and decisions that have been signed using the Minsk framework. The Minsk Agreements’ signatories made promises, and additional decisions were reached, but no concrete actions have yet been taken to fulfil those promises.

Specific technical difficulties cause some implementation barriers, while document flaws themselves cause other obstacles. However, implementation and progress in negotiations are mostly hampered by broad geopolitical factors, which reduce the political space in which the parties can operate. These reverberate in the ongoing discussions in Minsk and take the form of conflicts over the dialogue’s structure, the parties involved in the conflict, and the nature of the conflict itself. Additionally, as the parties are politically constrained in their decision-making, it reduces the room for actual talks. The lack of political momentum hasn’t done much to convince the parties to carry out and abide by the agreements on the ground.

In conclusion, the conflicting sides breached the ceasefire agreement and blamed one another for starting the battle. The conflict area was constantly covered in heavy weapons. On occasion, both sides employed rocket launchers. The provisions of the agreements, which were meant to allow for the social and economic reintegration of separatist-controlled Donbas with the rest of the nation, were not put into effect by Ukraine because doing so would result in the political and economic consolidation of the self-declared republics. The isolation of Donbas accelerated its demise. On the other hand, the two areas were not entirely abandoned by the Ukrainian government. The state would have been compromised if its territorial integrity had been damaged.

Conclusion

Even though both countries signed various Minsk agreements as peace accords, peace couldn’t be brought. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is a result of the poor implementation of the Minsk Agreement. Regardless of how the current negotiations between both nations turn out, it is already evident how important the current situation will be to the process based on the lessons acquired from putting the Minsk agreements into action.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

Which countries signed the Minsk agreements?

The 2014 and 2015 Minsk agreements were signed by Russia and Ukraine as a peace accord for the war that was going on between the two countries at that time.

Why has the Minsk Agreement come to light now?

The 2015 Minsk peace agreement was essentially wrecked by Vladimir Putin’s decision to recognise Donetsk and Luhansk as independent rebel regions in eastern Ukraine on Monday night. This is the reason for the sudden limelight of the Minsk agreements.

References

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