This article is written by Mehak. This article seeks to provide a case brief on Moti Singh vs. State of U.P. This article revolves around the admissibility of a dying declaration when there is insufficient evidence proving the cause of one’s death. Further, this article includes all the facts, details, issues, arguments advanced, and judgement passed by the Bench. 

Introduction

Moti Singh vs. State of UP (1963) is a judgement addressing a question pertaining to the admissibility of a dying declaration when the cause of death became uncertain. This case extensively talks about the evidentiary value of statements recorded under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, where the actual death of the person takes place some days after making the dying declaration. In this case, the Supreme Court addressed the appeal filed by Moti Singh and Jagdamba Prasad (accused/appellants) against the orders of the Allahabad High Court, which convicted the accused by relying on the dying declaration made by Gaya Charan. The Supreme Court in the appeal acquitted the appellants of the charges, stating that the statement of the person who died is only relevant when such a statement relates to the cause of his death or circumstances that resulted in his death, and in this case, the cause of his death is uncertain. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that appellants come under the ambit of the benefit of doubt, too. 

Details of the case

• Case name: Moti Singh vs. State of UP 
• Appeal No.: 146 and 147 of 1962
• Equivalent citation: 1964 AIR 900, 1964 SCR (1) 688
• Court: Supreme Court 
• Bench: Raghubar Dayal, Syed Jaffer Imam, Subbarao, and J.R. Mudholkar 
• Petitioner: Moti Singh
• Respondents: State of UP
• Type of case: criminal 
• Act involved: Indian Evidence Act, 1872
• Important provision: Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
• Date of the Judgement: January 23, 1963

Facts of Moti Singh vs. State of UP (1963) 

Moti Singh, Jagdamba Prasad, and five others were accused and convicted by the Sessions Judge of Unnao for the murder of Gaya Charan under Section 148, Section 302 read with Section 149, and Section 307 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. Each accused was sentenced to life imprisonment as per Section 302, read with Section 149 of the IPC. Thereafter, the appellants preferred an appeal to the Allahabad High Court, where the court acquitted the appellants, namely Sheo Darshan Singh and Avadh Behari. The Court acquitted them on the basis that their names were not mentioned in the dying declaration made by Gaya Charan under Ex. Kha 75. Also, in Ex. Kha 75, four assailants were mentioned, which made it factually doubtful that the number of assailants was more than four. Moreover, the High Court felt doubtful of the deposition made by the eyewitnesses that the accused fired gunshots from the seori (cattle shed) when the victim passed along the passage. However, the High Court strongly believed the prosecution version of shots being fired from the room and the platform because such a deposition was made by prosecution witnesses. Also, exhibits Kha 5, 8, and 75 mentioned the same, which was recorded by a Magistrate at the hospital. Therefore, the Court consequently acquitted Sheo Shankar, Jagjiwan, and Shankar Dayal of the charges. The High Court fully relied on the Ex. Kha 75 (dying declaration of Gaya Charn) and considered his statement as a complete account of the occurrence. So, the Court considered that the number of assailants could not be more than four in number since, as per the statements recorded in Ex. Kha 75, the number of assailants was only four. And so the Court viewed that Section 149 does not apply to the current scenario, and hence, no offence is committed under Section 148 of the IPC. 

The Court also, while relying on the dying declaration, convicted Jagdamba Prasad while also considering the fact that he remained absconded until his arrest on September 30, 1960, from the day of the occurrence of the incident that took place on February 9, 1960. The Court, relying on Ex. Kha 75, convicted Moti Singh and Jagdamba Prasad since their names were expressly mentioned. The Court distinguished these two appellants from others on the basis that these two appellants were expressly mentioned by Gaya Charan under his dying declaration. Thereafter, Moti Singh and Jagdamba Prasad obtained special leave from the court and preferred the appeal to the Supreme Court. It follows that if the alleged dying declaration is considered as inadmissible evidence, then the appeal has to be allowed and the conviction of the appellants will be set aside.

Issues raised 

On the basis of the facts and arguments advanced by the parties, the Court framed the following questions of law for its consideration: 

1. Whether the dying declaration made by Gaya Charan is admissible or not?
2. Whether Moti Singh and Jagdamba Prasad should get the benefit of doubt?

Arguments of the parties

Appellant

The Appellant, i.e., Moti Singh, appealed to the Honourable Supreme Court against the decision passed by the Allahabad High Court. The Appellant mainly argued on the admissibility of the statement made by Gaya Charan under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, as Ex. Kha 75. The counsel pointed out that the statements under Section 32(1) can only become relevant and admissible in the eyes of the law if they show the cause of his death or the circumstances of the transaction that resulted in his death. Whereas, in the present scenario, Gaya Charan died after 20 days of making the statements, and after his death, before any postmortem or examination could be done, his body was cremated. Due to non-examination, there is no evidence on record of the cause of his actual death, since his death took place several days after the incident. 

The counsel further contended that mere deposition made by the doctor that the injuries were in depth and to be dangerous to life cannot hold guilty of the offences charged. In connection with this fact, the counsel brought up the fact that Ram Shankar, who was also injured by the gunshots he received, considered them to be dangerous to life, but that did not lead to his death. Therefore, mere deposition by the doctor shows that such injuries were dangerous to life, and so the injuries must be the cause of Gaya Charan’s death, and so we can rely on his dying declaration as well. The Court, on the basis of such findings of fact, argued that to rely on a dying declaration, one must prove the cause of his death, which in this case is uncertain, and this uncertainty must not be overlooked. Therefore, we cannot hold Moti Singh and Jagdamba Prasad accountable for the cause of Gaya Charan’s death and should get the benefit of doubt.       

Respondent

The Respondent here was the State of UP. The respondent mainly focused on Ex. Kha 75 Gaya Charan’s statement proving that gunshots were fired on him, out of which he recognised some assailants, namely Jagdamba, Phunnar, Moti, and one man whom he knew by face. Moreover, the eyewitnesses who made the deposition in court allege that the accused fired them with guns and pistols inside and outside of the room from one side and also from the cattle shed, which was on another side of the passage. Moreover, the statements made under Ex. Kha 5 and Kha 8 stated the same. Also, the doctor opined that the gunshot injuries on the body of Gaya Charan were deep enough to be dangerous to life. 

The counsel for the respondent further stated that the admissibility of the dying declaration made by Gaya Charan should not be put into question, as the statements made by Gaya Charan show the circumstances of the transactions that resulted in his death. Therefore, the statements recorded under Ex. Kha 75 should be considered for the conviction of the accused under the offences charged. 

Laws discussed in Moti Singh vs. State of UP (1963)

Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 

Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, considers those statements as relevant, where a statement made by a person shows the cause of his death or circumstances of transactions that resulted in his death. The statements made by the person before his death are covered under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and are described as “dying declaration”. A dying declaration can be considered relevant in any form, whether written, verbal, or in gesture form. Therefore, this section applies whenever any statement made by a person before his death raises questions about the cause of his death. 

Khushal Rao vs. State of Bombay, (1957), is one of the landmark cases when it talks about the reliability and admissibility of the dying declaration. In this case, the Supreme Court laid down certain principles while considering dying declaration-

• There is no absolute law stating that a dying declaration cannot be the sole basis for conviction unless corroborated.
• Determination shall be made on the facts of the case as to in what circumstances the dying declaration has been made.
• The dying declaration holds the same amount of weightage as other pieces of evidence.
• A dying declaration cannot be measured with confession or evidence of approver.
• The corroboration is necessitated if the Court, with sufficient reasons, comes to the conclusion that the dying declaration is not free from infirmities.
• The court has to observe the opportunity the deceased person had in order to test the reliability of the dying declaration. 
• A dying declaration recorded by the magistrate in proper form holds more weightage than an oral dying declaration holding infirmities.
• If the court is convinced that the declaration made is true, then it can be the sole basis for the conviction. 

This case acts as a precedent for determining the reliability of dying declarations. As follows, in the Moti Singh vs. UP case, the Supreme Court did not rely on the dying declaration made by Gaya Charan and acquitted the appellants. Gaya Charan died several days after making a dying declaration, and before knowing the cause of the death, his body was cremated, and the reason behind it became uncertain. This uncertainty left the aforesaid conditions unfulfilled since the circumstances under which the declaration was made became debatable. Also, as per Section 32(1), only those statements are relevant that state the cause of the death, which in this case is doubtful. Therefore, the Supreme Court relieved the charges imposed upon appellants on the basis of doubt.  

Section 148 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860

Section 148 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, states that every person who is guilty of rioting, if armed with deadly weapons or anything that, if used as a weapon, can likely cause death of a person, shall be liable for imprisonment not exceeding three years, a fine, or both.

Rioting has been defined under Section 146 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which states that when any unlawful assembly or any member of such unlawful assembly uses force or violence in furtherance of the common object, then every member shall be liable for the offence of rioting. The punishment for rioting has been prescribed under Section 147 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, for a term not exceeding two years, a fine, or both. 

Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860

Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, states that if any member of the unlawful assembly has committed an offence in furtherance of a common object, then each member of such unlawful assembly shall be punishable under this provision of the act. The contribution of each member to the commission of the act shall not affect the quantum of punishment. Every member of an unlawful assembly shall be equally liable for the offence committed.

Unlawful assembly has been defined under Section 141 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which states that any assembly of five or more persons shall be designated as unlawful assembly if the common object of such assembly is:

• To show criminal force to the Central government of any State government or Parliament or Legislature of any State, or any public servant. 
• To restrain the execution of any law or any legal process.
• To commit any mischief, criminal trespass, or any other offence. 
• To obtain any possession of property or deprive someone of their incorporeal rights by means of criminal force.
• To compel any person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or to omit to do which he is legally bound to do, by means of criminal force. 

Sections 302 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860

Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, states that every culpable homicide shall be murder if any person commits any act:

• with the intention of causing the death of the person or 
• with the intention of causing bodily injury to the person, knowing that such harm is likely to the cause death of such person or is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death,
• have sufficient knowledge that such an act is so dangerous that it must cause death or cause bodily injuries that can likely cause the death of such a person.

Therefore, whoever commits any act with such intention or knowledge shall amount to murder as per Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. 

Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, specifies the punishment for murder. It states that whoever commits murder shall be punished with the death penalty or imprisonment for life and shall also be liable for a fine.

Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, explains that whoever does any act with an intention or knowledge and under those circumstances, if by such an act the death of such person is caused, he would be guilty of the murder charges, then such person shall be liable with imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10 years and shall also be liable to a fine. But if such an act causes hurt, then he can also be liable for imprisonment for life. Moreover, if such a person is already liable for life imprisonment and any hurt is caused, then he shall be liable for the death penalty.

Judgement in Moti Singh vs. State of UP (1963)

The Hon’ble Court found that the incident occurred on February 9, 1960, and he was admitted to the hospital the same day, where he was examined by Dr. Bhatnagar. Upon examination, it was found that he had two gunshot injuries of entry ¼ x ¼ up to the depth of the abdomen, which, as per the opinion of the doctor, was dangerous to life. Following that, he either discharged or left the hospital before the injuries healed up; there is no record showing the circumstances in which he left the hospital, and subsequently, he died on March 1, 1960, in Kanpur. It was further learned that the body was cremated before any postmortem examination could be done on his body to determine the actual cause of his death. Due to non-examination, there was no explicit evidence showing the cause of the death of Gaya Charan. 

The mere fact that the two gunshot injuries were dangerous to life cannot hold appellants guilty of the death of Gaya Charan, which took place about three weeks after such an incident. Since, in connection with the fact that Ram Shankar, who was injured too in the incident, received a gunshot wound of 1×1/4 up to the death of his abdomen above the right end of the upper border of Symphysis pubes, it was also contemplated as dangerous to life, but he did not die of such an injury. Therefore, relying only on such evidence cannot charge appellants for the death of Gyan Charan. Thereupon, the effect of this finding specifies that the dying declaration made by Gaya Charan, Ex. Kh 75, is inadmissible. Because, as per Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the statement of the person who died is only relevant when such a statement relates to the cause of his death or the circumstances that resulted in his death. And in the present scenario, there is no sufficient evidence establishing that the injuries made at the incident resulted in Gaya Charan’s death, so the statements made by Gaya Charan at the hospital become irrelevant and cannot be considered admissible evidence as the statement does not relate to the cause of his death. Hence, the statement made by Gaya Charan as Ex. Kha 75 is inadmissible in nature. The Court therefore allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court by acquitting Moti Singh and Jagdamba Prasad of the charges. The Court added that these two appellants too deserve the benefit of doubt and that they would have gotten the benefit of doubt earlier if the High Court had not totally relied on the Ex. Kha 75 made by Gaya Charan. 

Rationale behind this judgement

This case proved to be one of the most influential due to the fact that it tries to elucidate the admissibility of a dying declaration when the cause of the death is uncertain. The Hon’ble Court in the present case clearly outlined that if the person whose statement was recorded under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, died some days later and there is no evidence on record showing the actual cause or reason of his death as to why his death took place several days after the occurrence of the incident,. Such uncertainty about the death made the dying declaration irrelevant because it does not satisfy the ingredients of Section 32(1), which states that only such statements shall be considered relevant if they state the cause of his death or the circumstances that resulted in his death. Here, the cause of the death is uncertain, and there are no findings as to what resulted in his death; therefore, the statement recorded as a dying declaration seems irrelevant while convicting the accused of the offences. Hence, one must get the benefit of uncertainty if there is a lack of evidence showing the cause of the death.   

Analysis of Moti Singh vs. State of UP (1963) 

This case is among those that analyse the admissibility and applicability of statements recorded under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The Bench in this case focused on the admissibility of a dying declaration when the cause of the death of a person is doubtful. The Bench alludes to the ingredients of Section 32(1), which clearly states that a dying declaration recorded under this section shall only be considered relevant if it relates to the cause of his death or states the circumstances of transactions that resulted in his death. Further, it was stated that in this case, Gaya Charan, whose statement was recorded on the day he was admitted to the hospital under expectation of death, was considered relevant and admissible. But, as per the facts on record, Gaya Charan left the hospital and died 20 days after he left the hospital. 

The condition in which he left the hospital is not on record. To know the actual cause of his death, a postmortem was necessary, which, due to the cremation of the body, failed to happen, and the cause that resulted in his death remains uncertain. The Bench cannot convict the accused solely on the basis that the injuries Gaya Charan had were dangerous to life on the basis of a finding that Ram Shankar, who too had injuries in that incident that were dangerous to death as per the doctor but that did not result in his death. Therefore, the cause of the death of Gaya Charan becomes uncertain, and one cannot rely on the Ex. Kha 75 (dying declaration) to convict assailants of the charges made by the Session Judge of Unnao. 

The Court hence held that, just like other assailants get the benefit of doubt since their names were not expressly mentioned in Ex. Kha 75, Moti Singh and Jagdamba Prasad too shall get the benefit of such uncertainty. The reason being that the dying declaration made by Gaya Charan is irrelevant and inadmissible, and hence they cannot be convicted on such uncertainty. The Court therefore acquitted the accused and cleared them of the charges that were made against them.

Conclusion 

The decision by the Hon’ble Court in Moti Singh vs. State of UP mainly emphasised the admissibility of the dying declaration. The Court in this case elucidated the application of Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. To summarise, the Court herein held that where the deceased statement has been recorded as a dying declaration but the death took place some days later and there is no evidence showing the cause of his death due to non-examination or any reason, then such statements shall be considered inadmissible. Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside the order of the Allahabad High Court and acquitted the appellants of all the charges. The reason being the non-examination of Gaya Charan’s body, which raises uncertainty as to the cause of his death. The dying declaration can only be relevant when it specifies the cause of the death or the circumstances that resulted in it. Hence, the uncertainty of the death of Gaya Charan cannot make the dying declaration relevant and admissible. So, under such uncertainty, appellants cannot be convicted for the murder of Gaya Charan, and they must be acquitted by getting the benefit of doubt. 

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

What is the evidentiary value of the dying declaration?

The dying declaration is admissible under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and is based on the legal maxim ‘nemomoriturus prae-sumitur mentire’ which means that a man will not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth. The Apex Court in K.R. Reddy vs. Public Prosecutor (1976) and Kushal Rao vs. State of Bombay (1957) observed the evidentiary value of dying declarations, stating that dying declarations are admissible under Section 32 because there is a belief that great solemnity and sanctity are attached to the words of a dying man and are not likely to lie out of his mouth. A dying declaration can act as the sole basis for the conviction of an accused without any corroboration if the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary and if such a statement isn’t tutoring, prompting, or a product of his imagination. The Court also ascertains if the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make the statement and that he was making the statement without any influence or threat. Hence, this adds to the evidentiary value of a dying declaration.

Who may record the dying declaration?

Section 164(1) of the CrPC empowers the magistrate to record the dying declaration of the person, which adds up to strong and reliable evidence. But if there is no time to call the magistrate because of the deteriorated condition of the declarant, the statement can be recorded by the doctor or a police officer. But a statement must be recorded in the presence of one or two witnesses for it to be reliable. Moreover, the dying declaration can also be recorded by any person who is not a magistrate, doctor, or police officer and is admissible in court. But the person who records the statement must show that the person, at the time of making the statement, was in a fit state of mind.

When is the dying declaration considered inadmissible?

The statement made by the dying person is not considered as admissible evidence when the statement is of such a nature that it does not relate to the cause of his death, or it suffices that the dying declaration was made under undue influence, threat, etc. Dying declarations have no evidentiary value if a person making a statement is unsound. If the statements are contradictory or incomplete in nature, then they also cannot be considered as reliable evidence for the conviction of the accused. 

What are the forms of the dying declaration?

Dying declarations can be made in the form of a question-answer, which is considered the best form of dying declarations. However, precaution must be taken while asking the questions, and the answers to such questions must be written. The person can also make dying declarations in the form of gestures and signs when he is unable to speak and can make gestures in the form of yes or no that are admissible under law. Oral evidence is also one of the forms of dying declaration where a person makes his last statement to his wife, father, or any relative, friend, or acquaintance in a conscious state. 

References

• https://districts.ecourts.gov.in/.pdf
• http://student.manupatra.com/Academic/Abk/Law-of-Evidence/Chapter4.htm