This article is written by Tisha Agrawal. The article deals with the case of Nanak Chand vs. State of Punjab (1955), with reference to its facts, issues raised, arguments made, judgement, concerned legal provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the Code of Criminal Procedure and the critical analysis. 

Introduction

The case of Nanak Chand vs. State of Punjab (1955) is a pivotal legal landmark judgement decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in 1955. The case revolves around the intricacies of the Criminal Justice system. It particularly concerns the liability of individuals for group offences. In a tragic incident, Sadhu Ram loses his life, prompting a rigorous legal inquiry into the culpability of the accused parties. The two key provisions of this case are Section 34 and Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. This case provided a platform for the judiciary to clarify the ambiguities revolving around these provisions. This case provides valuable insights into the application of statutory provisions and the evolution of legal doctrines. It was held by the Court that Objective is different from Intention and a person cannot be held liable for an offence for which he has not been charged. Also, it was clarified that no specific offence is created under Section 149 of the IPC. Let us understand the case in detail. 

Details of the case

  • Case name: Nanak Chand vs. State of Punjab 
  • Equivalent Citation: (1955) SCC Online SC 52
  • Act involved: Indian Penal Code, 1860, 
  • Important provisions: Sections 34, 149, 323 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 Sections 233 and 236 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.  
  • Bench: N.H. Bhagwati, Sudhi Ranjan Das, Syed Jaffer Imam, JJ. 
  • Petitioner/Appellant: Nanak Chand 
  • Respondents: State of Punjab
  • Judgement date: January 25, 1955

Facts of Nanak Chand vs. State of Punjab (1955)

The facts of the given case are such that one person named Sadhu Ram was killed on November 5, 1953, at around 6:45 p.m., allegedly by the Appellant and his companions. He was present at the shop of one Vas Dev when the attack took place. The Appellant was also there, carrying a Takwa. When Sadhu Ram’s body was examined after his death, it was found out that he sustained several injuries with a heavy, sharp edged weapon, which could have been a Takwa. According to the medical evidence presented before the Court, the Appellant along with others, was only charged with Sections 148 and 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).

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However, the Additional Sessions Judge, while dealing with the case, observed that there was no evidence to prove the allegations of rioting under Section 149 but the Appellant and others are guilty under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the  IPC for murder. He also acquitted three of the accused.  

Subsequently, there was an appeal against the order of the Additional Session Judge before the High Court. The High Court found the Appellant guilty of Section 302 of the IPC but altered the conviction of others to Section 323 of the IPC for voluntarily causing hurt and not murder. The Appellant alone was convicted of Murder and imposed a death sentence. Afterwards, the Appellant brought this matter before the Apex Court on questions of fact and law.

Issues before the Court

The main questions for consideration before the Hon’ble Court were:

  • Whether the Appellant could legally be convicted of murder and sentenced under Section 302 of IPC when he was not charged with that offence? 
  • Whether Section 149 of IPC creates a specific offence? 

Arguments of the parties

Arguments on behalf of the appellant 

It was contended on behalf of the appellant that since he was acquitted of the charges of rioting and offence under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the IPC, he cannot be convicted of the offence of Murder separately. A charge under Section 302 has not been framed against him. The appellant placed reliance on the provision of the Criminal Procedure Code in regard to framing of charges and the cases of Barendra Kumar Ghosh vs. Emperor (1925), Emperor vs. Madan and ors. (1914) and Panchu Das vs. Emperor (1907). These precedents support the contention that it will be illegal to convict an accused of an offence under a section for which a charge has not been framed. 

It was further argued that, in order to try the accused on distinct charges, there must be those distinct charges filed against him. Every such charge is tried separately except in cases mentioned under Sections 234, 235, 236, 237 and 239 of the CrPC. It is submitted that the charge under Section 149 is different from the offence of murder under Section 302 of the IPC. The exceptional provisions of CrPC did not apply to the facts of this case. 

Argument on behalf of the Prosecution 

The Prosecution side contended that Section 149 does not create any specific charge for any offence, It merely provides for constructive guilt. The constructive guilt is similar to Section 34 of IPC. Hence, there is no obligation for a separate charge under Section 233 of the CrPC. The Appellant could be convicted and sentenced under Section 302 of the IPC, even though no separate charge for murder has been framed against him. The prosecution relied on the case of Theethumalai Gounder v. King Emperor (1924). 

Both arguments were primarily based on the offence created by Section 149 of the IPC and whether the accused can be tried for murder if no separate charge for murder has been filed against him. 

Legal provisions involved 

Provisions of the Indian Penal Code 

Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code

Section 34 states that when a criminal act is committed by several individuals in furtherance of a common intention, each of them will be held accountable for the act in the same manner as if it were committed by him alone. This provision establishes shared accountability, which is present in both civil and criminal law. The essential ingredient of this provision is Common Intention. A common intention is a pre-planned scheme. It existed prior to the commission of the act. Sometimes, common intentions are also created on the spot. The main aspect is the pre-planned strategy to carry out the plan for the intended result. 

In order to establish common intention, it must be proven that each of them was aware of the objective of the others. This section does not mention any specific offence. It just states that if two or more people commit a crime for the same purpose in furtherance of a plan, they will be found jointly accountable. It is somewhat similar to Section 149 but it talks about a common intention rather than a common object. The case of Nanak Chand vs. State of Punjab (1955) differentiated between the two elements.

Barendra Kumar Ghosh vs. King Emperor (1925) is one of the earliest instances in which another individual was punished for the act of another. Section 34 does not constitute a particular offence but sets the principle of joint criminal liability. The case discussed the above-mentioned notion of Section 34.  

Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code

Section 149 says that every member of an unlawful assembly is guilty of an offence if such an offence is committed  in furtherance of the common object of the assembly. When a person is attacked by a group of people, it becomes difficult to identify who has committed which offence; therefore, in such circumstances, every member is made guilty of such offence. The foundation of this provision is that every member of an unlawful assembly sharing a common objective will be liable for the commission of such crime. This provision was incorporated into the IPC to maintain the tranquillity of society and punish those who actively participate in such unlawful assemblies and hurt innocent people. But, in order to convict a person for such offence, the Court must be satisfied that: – 

  • there was an unlawful assembly, 
  • a  member of such assembly must have committed an offence and 
  • the offence must be in furtherance of the common objective of the assembly. 

To convict a person under Section 149, the prosecution has to establish with the help of evidence that:-

  • First, the appellants shared a common object and were part of an unlawful assembly.
  • Secondly, they had to prove that they were aware of the offences likely to be committed in order to achieve the said common object. 

Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code 

Section 302 provides for the punishment for Murder. Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death or imprisonment for life and shall also be liable for a fine. There must be an intention to cause the death of another person. The intention need not be premeditated and can arise in the heat of the moment. Murder is an evil act and nobody has the right to take away the life of a person. Therefore, the punishment provided under this provision is also severe in nature. essential ingredients of Murder includes: – 

  • Intention
  • Cause of Death
  • Bodily Injury 

A death sentence or capital punishment is granted to the person who is found guilty of Murder under this provision. In India, a death sentence is given in the rarest of rare cases. It has been ruled by the Supreme Court in Raju Jagdish vs. State of Maharashtra (2019) that life imprisonment is a rule but the death penalty is an exception. 

Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code

Section 323 of IPC deals with voluntarily causing hurt. The term hurt includes any bodily pain, disease or infirmity caused by direct physical contact such as striking, hitting or pushing. A person found guilty of such an offence shall be punished with imprisonment, a fine or both. In order to convict a person under Section 323, it is mandatory to test the following: – 

  • The Act shall be voluntary in nature.
  • Such harm shall not be a consequence of grave and sudden provocation. The section explicitly provides that voluntarily causing hurt due to provocation is an exception to it. 

Provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure

Section 233 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

Section 233 of the CrPC is placed under the chapter of trial before a court of session. This provision deals with entering upon defence. It states that where an accused is not acquitted under Section 232 of the code, he shall be then called upon to enter on his defence and adduce any evidence he may have in support thereof. If the accused puts in any written statement, the judge shall file it with the record. This is an essential part of the session trial. It is applicable when the prosecution’s evidence is incomplete. The accused is given an opportunity to produce evidence in its defence. 

This right has been given to the defence to produce its witnesses as part of a fair trial and as part of the legal principle of hearing both sides. The right belongs to the accused and not to the Court concerned. 

Section 236 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 

Section 236 provides for a special procedure for determining liability for enhanced punishment as a consequence of a previous conviction.

Judgement of Nanak Chand vs. State of Punjab (1955)

In order to decide the case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court first delved into Section 149 of the IPC. It was observed by the bench that under this section, a person who is a part of an unlawful assembly is held guilty of the offence committed even by another member of the same assembly. In simple terms, it means that even if the person had no intention to commit a particular offence and had done no such act except to be present in the said assembly, he can be made liable for the acts done by others in the same assembly. However, in the absence of such provisions, a member of an unlawful assembly cannot be held liable for an offence not committed by him. 

Therefore, in situations where the accused is acquitted of participating in the riot, there cannot be any conviction of any one of them for an offence that he has not committed himself. Hence, the charge of rioting is necessary to be proved first in order to further make them liable for other offences under this section. 

The Hon’ble Court emphasised that there is a principle element under Section 34 of the IPC, which is the common intention to commit a crime. Consequently, to further the common intention, several acts may be done by several persons, resulting in the commission of that crime. In such an instance, each one of them would be held liable for that crime in the same manner as if all the crimes were committed by him alone. 

However, there is no consideration of common intention in Section 149 of the IPC. For the offence committed by one person of an unlawful assembly, all of the persons of such assembly can be held liable. Even though there was no common intention between them or actual participation in committing the crime. There is a difference between object and intention. The object may be common but the intentions of different members of such an unlawful assembly may differ.  After analysing the judgements referred by the appellant, it was pointed out that a person charged with an offence along with Section 149 cannot be convicted of the substantive offence without a specific charge being framed. As it is required by Section 233 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

When a charge under Section 302 read with Section 149 was framed against the appellant, the Supreme Court was indicating that the appellant was not being charged with the offence of Murder. Therefore, convicting him of Murder under Section 302 would be to convict him of an offence with which he has not been charged. As per the medical evidence present and the statements given by eyewitnesses, it is not proven that the appellant used the Takwa on the deceased. Therefore, no particular charge was framed against the appellant and thus convicting him on a separate charge would be prejudicial to his interests and the law. The appeal was therefore allowed by the Court, and the conviction of the appellant set aside.

The following cases were referred to by the Supreme Court while delivering the verdict:

  • In Barendra Kumar Ghose vs. Emperor (1925), Lord Sumner observed that a criminal act means the unity of criminal behaviour which results in something for which an individual would be punishable, as if it were all done by himself alone, that is in a criminal offence. There is a clear distinction between Sections 34 and 149 of IPC. 

It was also held that, for every distinct offence of which a person is accused, there shall be a separate charge and every such charge shall be tried separately. 

  • In Queen vs. Sabid Ali (1873), it was held that there was a difference  between object and intention. The object may be common, the intentions of the members of such an unlawful assembly may differ and they may be similar in one aspect that they are all unlawful. 
  • In Panchu Das vs. Emperor (1907), the decision supported the contention that it will be illegal to convict an accused of the substantive offence under a section without a charge being framed. 

The above-mentioned cases are the earliest instances of the ambiguities revolving around Sections 149 and 34 of the IPC.

Key findings of the Supreme Court

The judgement delivered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court was complex and difficult to understand. following key points can be taken away : – 

  1. There is a clear distinction between the provisions of Section 34 and Section 149 of IPC. These two sections should not be confused with each other. The principle element in Section 34 is Common Intention to commit a crime, whereas Section 149 does not involve common intention. 
  2. There is a difference between Common Intention and Objective. The Objective may be common but intentions of the several members of the unlawful assembly may differ.
  3. Both Sections 34 and 149 of IPC represent the rule of constructive liability, which connotes that an individual is responsible for the repercussions of another person’s wrongdoing.  
  4. A charge for a substantive offence under Section 302 or Section 325 of IPC is for a distinct and separate offence from that under Section 302 read with Section 149 or Section 325 read with Section 149. A person charged with an offence read with Section 149 cannot be convicted of the substantive offence without a specific charge being framed as required by Section 233 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
  5. Section 236 of the CrPC can apply only in cases where there is no doubt about the facts that can be proved but a doubt arises as to which of several offences have been committed based on the proved facts. In such a case, any number of charges can be framed and tried or alternative charges can be framed. 

Critical analysis of Nanak Chand vs. State of Punjab (1955)

The case of Nanak Chand vs. State of Punjab provides an in-depth analysis of the legal implications surrounding the application of Sections 34 and 149 of the IPC within the framework of Criminal Liability. The court elucidates the jurisprudence and intent of Section 34 of the IPC. it serves as an explanatory role and does not establish any specific offence. It provides that when multiple individuals act with a common intention and perpetuate a criminal act, then each of the persons shall be held liable for the actions of others as if they were committed by them individually. The provisions focus on the common intent of the individuals. 

The case underscores the difference between Sections 34 and 149 of the IPC. While the former focuses on the notion of shared intention, the latter pertains to liability incurred by members of an unlawful assembly for offences committed, irrespective of the absence of common intention between them. The major distinction is of intent and object. While the object may be similar of the persons involved in an unlawful assembly, the intent may differ. Section 149 focuses on the importance of membership in the unlawful assembly at the time of the offence rather than the existence of a common intention. 

The judgement also delves into the procedural aspects of charging and conviction, asserting that a person charged under Section 149 cannot be convicted of the substantive offence without a specific charge of such offence framed against him. In its discourse on these provisions, the court underscores and highlights the importance of ensuring a fair trial for the accused. It is also clarified that a charge under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC indicated that the court was not levying murder charges against the appellant. Hence, there is a need for clarity and adherence to procedural fairness in criminal proceedings to safeguard the rights of the accused and not take any decision in haste. 

Recent cases referring to Nanak Chand vs. State of Punjab

In the case of State of Gujarat vs. Bilal Ismail Abdul Majid Sujela (2017), Nanak Chand vs. State of Punjab was referred to and discussed by the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court. The jurisprudence on Sections 34 and 149 of the IPC explained in the case of Nanak Chand vs. State of Punjab is the true position. The distinction between common intention and object needs to be considered primarily before deciding the liability of the accused. 

In the case of Anna Reddy Sambashiva Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (2009), the Apex Court again discussed the distinction between Section 34 and 149 and upheld the dicta of Nanak Chand vs. State of Punjab

In Chainsukhlal Punamchand Meher vs. The State of Maharashtra (1968), the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay relied on Nanak Chand vs. State of Punjab and held that, in a case falling under the provisions of Section 236 and 237 of the CrPC, it is allowed for a Criminal Court to alter the conviction from an offence having lesser gravity to an offence of greater gravity. Given that prejudice is not caused by the accused. 

Conclusion

The case of Nanak Chand vs. State of Punjab (1955) stands as a significant precedent, throwing light on the distinctions between the legal provisions of Sections 34 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code. After the judgement of Barendra Kumar Ghose vs. King Emperor (1925), this became the next leading case dealing with Sections 34 and 149 of the IPC. The case  also clarified the application of the said provisions in criminal proceedings. The judgement underscores the fundamental principles of criminal liability while emphasising the need to establish common intention in cases governed by Section 34. The case also elucidated the broader scope of liability imposed on members of an unlawful assembly under Section 149. 

Common intention is different from common objective and for the application of both provisions, different elements are required. The judgement clarifies the intricacies surrounding these provisions while also reaffirming the importance of procedural fairness and adherence to the principles of natural justice in criminal trials. There is a necessity of framing specific charges for substantive offences and obligations to ensure clarity. The Court has safeguarded the rights  of the accused and upheld the integrity of the judicial system. 

Frequently Asked Questions 

What is a Common Intention?

A common intention is a shared purpose and design amongst all the accused individuals of a group. A common intention does not require a time gap and it can be formed even one minute before an incident. It also does not require prior agreement. In simpler terms, there must be a meeting of mind and unity and there must be an obvious act that must be performed in the progression of the common intention of all. 

What is an Unlawful Assembly?

An unlawful assembly is a gathering of three or more people with the intention of disturbing public peace. The participants must share a common illegal purpose, such as committing a criminal act, terrorising the public, etc. Section 141 of IPC defines an unlawful assembly and Section 149 provides for punishment of offences committed by such unlawful assembly. 

What is the difference between intention and object?

The key difference between a common intention and a common object is that a common intention requires a prior agreement or understanding between the individuals, while a common object can occur during the course of the crime. In Criminal Law, intention has a significant place. Section 34 of the IPC provides for the liability of several persons for offences committed in furtherance of a common intention. However, Section 34 does not specify any offence, as determined by the Court in Nanak Chand vs. State of Punjab (1955).  

References


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