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Detailed comparison : horizontal mergers and vertical mergers

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This article is written by Saumya Sharma, pursuing Diploma in M&A, Institutional Finance and Investment Laws (PE and VC transactions) from LawSikho. The article has been edited by Tanmaya Sharma (Associate, LawSikho), Ruchika Mohapatra (Associate, LawSikho) and Arundhati Das (Intern at LawSikho).

This article has been published by Abanti Bose.

Introduction

Today, when geographical limits are shrinking and global markets are available at the click of a mouse, there exists a possibility of access to better products due to more efficient and competitive markets. A merger is one such means that help the merged entity to achieve economies of scale, economies of scope, diversification in their production, and enhanced efficiency. A merger can be defined as a combination of two or more entities into one; the desired effect being not just the accumulation of assets and liabilities of the distinct entities, but the organization of such entities  into one business[…] Generally, in a merger, the merging entities would cease to exist and would merge into a single surviving entity.” However, there are also certain situations in which a merger can come under the radar of competition law related restrictions if such a merger would lead to appreciable adverse effects.

Mergers can be further categorized under different categories like a horizontal merger, vertical merger, congeneric merger, conglomerate merger, cash merger, etc. Horizontal mergers cover the merger of entities dealing in the same or similar commodity or industry, while vertical merger deals with the merger of entities in the same supply chain. When the merger of entities of related industries occurs,  it is called a congeneric merger and when the merger of entities of unrelated industries occurs,  it is called a conglomerate merger. 

In the case of a horizontal merger, there is the merger of entities on a parallel plane whereas in the case of a vertical merger, there is the merger of entities dealing vertically with each other. A vertical merger can be in the form of a backward vertical merger when there is integration with an upstream company, or in the form of forwarding vertical merger when there is integration with the downstream company. The present article provides a detailed comparison between a horizontal merger and a vertical merger.  

What is known as horizontal mergers?

A horizontal merger can be defined as a merger of two companies that are producing similar products and/or services or are “operating in the same or similar industry.” Therefore, in the case of a horizontal merger, the companies that are generally competitors to each other would merge as they are operating at the same level; for instance,  in a supply chain. Further, such mergers would come under the lens of the competition laws when they tend to reduce competition and establish a monopoly in the market by merging an entity that could happen to be the major player in the same space. The “purpose of a horizontal merger is to more efficiently utilize economies of scale, increase market power, and exploit cost-based and revenue-based synergies.”

For instance, in the ‘Diagrammatic Representation of Horizontal Merger’ given as Figure 1, wherein ‘+’ (plus) symbol signifies merger, there are three levels in the chain of production including the base level having 2 suppliers, middle level including 2 manufacturers and top-level having 3 distributors. Further, herein Supplier 1 is supplying materials to both Manufacturer 1 and Manufacturer 2, and Supplier 2 is only providing material to Manufacturer 2. Furthermore, Manufacturer 1 and Manufacturer 2 are further distributing their finished products through Distributor 1, Distributor 2 and Distributor 3. In the present situation, when there is a merger of Manufacturer 1 and Manufacturer 2, it results in a horizontal merger as both the manufacturers were operating at the same level in the supply chain.

Figure 1: Diagrammatic Representation of Horizontal Merger

A horizontal merger has the following advantages: 

  • Expansion of business segments including an increase in production.
  • Efficient utilization of economies of scale thereby increasing profitability.
  • Enhanced expertise with the integration of research and development of both companies.
  • Combating existing competition.
  • Enhancing authority in the market is evident through increased market share.
  • Realizing cost advantage due to economies of scope.
  • Geographical expansion of merged entities. 
  • Increased adaptability and lowering the response time to ever-increasing market demands.
  • Creation of considerable shareholder value.
  • Diversification of goods segment especially beneficial in case of complementary goods.

However, there are also certain disadvantages that may become evident pertaining to the horizontal merger, which are as follows:

  • Conflicting work cultures of merging entities.
  • Difficulties in harmonizing management and working patterns.
  • Non-attainment of desired synergies could act as a hurdle in achieving expected value addition.
  • Increase in monopolizing tendencies that would have a negative cascading effect like lowered competition, increased prices, compromise on quality, merged entity’s own urge to grow against competition decreases, etc. 

Understanding vertical mergers

Vertical mergers involve the consolidation of two companies that are at different stages of verticals in the production of goods or services. The vertical mergers may include backward integration or forward integration, wherein the former relates to mergers with upstream companies with producers, manufacturers, etc., while the latter relates to mergers with downstream companies with distributors.

For instance, in the ‘Diagrammatic Representation of Vertical Merger’ in Figure 2, wherein ‘+’ (plus) symbol signifies vertical merger, there are three levels of production wherein at the base level there are 2 (two) suppliers, at the middle level there are 2 (two) manufacturers and top-level including 3 (three) distributors. Further, Supplier 1 is supplying materials to Manufacturer 1 and Manufacturer 2, and Supplier 2 is only providing material to Manufacturer 2. Furthermore, the distribution channels of both the manufacturers, Manufacturer 1 and Manufacturer 2 include Distributor 1, Distributor 2 and Distributor 3. In this scenario, when there is a merger of Supplier 2 with Manufacturer 2, it results in a vertical merger as Supplier 2 with Manufacturer 2 being part of the same supply chain operating at different levels in the supply chain.

Figure 2: Diagrammatic Representation of Vertical Merger

Further, the benefits of the vertical merger are as follows: 

  • Enhanced efficiency throughout the vertical.
  • Efficient quality control at all stages of production.
  • Strengthened production and distribution channels thereby making the merged entity self-reliant and independent.
  • Better flow and control of information along the supply chain.”
  • Operating cost reduction along with better coordination across the vertical. 
  • Better management and administrative functioning through the deployment of efficient personnel along the supply chain. 

However, there are also certain disadvantages that may become evident pertaining to the vertical mergers, which are as follows:

  • Inefficiencies caused due to non-assimilation of varied cultures of management of merging entities that may include losing the major management personnel who doesn’t want to be part of the merged entity.
  • Enhanced cost due to increase of personnel at all verticals.

A detailed comparison between horizontal and vertical mergers

Horizontal mergers and vertical mergers are two different types of mergers wherein the former deals with the merger of entities on a parallel level while the latter deals with the merger of entities on the vertical level in the same supply chain. Both these types of mergers help in achieving economies of scale and economies of scope. Additionally, both these forms of mergers help in creating immense shareholder value as the two entities after merging lead to a more efficient entity. 

Further, the horizontal merger helps to increase the ambit of production or output of the merged entity and it may also increase the market geographically as for instance when an entity is formed after merging one entity operating in a certain region of a country with another entity functioning in a different region, the merged entity acquires the markets that were served by both the merging entities separately. This diversification of the merged entity is not limited to geographic diversification but may also extend to diversification in the range of production of commodities along with the consolidation of research and development of the merging entities thereby making the merged entity more efficient.

In the case of a vertical merger, more efficiency, coordination, and quality is assured as the entire vertical held by the merged entity tends to work on standard operating procedures and parameters of the merged entity, as in the case of an upstream vertical merger, where the quality of raw material procured and to be processed is ensured. Also, it makes the merged entity self-sufficient.

Further, the cons relating to both the mergers, vertical and horizontal are comparable as they suffer from similar problems pertaining to non-synchronization that arise due to the merging of management coming from different working environments and cultures. Additionally, there is a possibility of the emergence of a monopolizing tendency, which may affect the whole ecosystem negatively, as in the absence of any major competing partner, the balance of demand and supply equation relating to that product gets negatively affected posing further concerns relating to higher prices, deteriorating quality, decrease in merged entity’s own desire to grow against competition, among others. 

Conclusion

A merger is a union of two or more entities wherein generally one of the merging entities ceases to exist but it has several advantages that range from diversification of bucket of commodities to capturing larger markets geographically, to enhancing efficiency and quality.  A merger is categorized under different heads like a horizontal merger, vertical merger, congeneric merger, conglomerate merger, etc. 

A horizontal merger relates to the merger of entities dealing in the same or similar commodity, and a vertical merger relates to the merger of entities in the supply chain. Both, horizontal mergers and vertical mergers help to create economies of scale and economies of scope. On one hand, the horizontal merger may help the merged entity to diversify its production, its regional ambit, and at the same time upgrade its research and development, while on the other hand, vertical merger helps to attain a more efficient and coordinated system in the supply chain thereby creating an independent merged entity.    

Moreover, there can be certain negatives relating to mergers both, vertical mergers and horizontal mergers that might include the problem of harmonizing the different cultures of the entities merging and thereby creating problems relating to adjustments in various hierarchies in the merged entity. So, just like two sides of the same coin, both horizontal mergers and vertical mergers have their own reasons leading to merged entities along with their own pros and cons.

References

  1. https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/051415/what-are-advantages-and-disadvantages-horizontal-integration.asp
  2. https://cleartax.in/g/terms/horizontal-merger
  3. https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/strategy/horizontal-merger/
  4. https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/horizontalmerger.asp
  5. https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/051315/what-difference-between-horizontal-integration-and-vertical-integration.asp
  6. https://www.nishithdesai.com/fileadmin/user_upload/pdfs/Research%20Papers/Mergers___Acquisitions_in_India.pdf
  7. https://www.investopedia.com/articles/stocks/09/merger-acquisitions-types.asp
  8. https://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/verticalmerger.asp
  9. https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/strategy/vertical-merger-integration/
  10. https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/012715/when-does-it-makes-sense-company-pursue-vertical-integration.as

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8th Schedule of the Indian Constitution

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This article is written by Astuti Dwivedi of Hidayatullah National Law University. It discusses about the 8th Schedule of the Indian Constitution and gives a proper analysis of its framing in the past and its importance in today’s time.

Introduction 

The Indian Constitution is known to be the longest written Constitution in the world. Commenced in the year 1950, it is divided into 12 Schedules, 25 Parts and 448 Articles. So far, there have been 104 Amendments to the Constitution. The variety and diversity of India are well known and accepted in a number of festivals, cultures and traditions. The most significant feature, however, is the various languages that are spoken in this nation as India is home to 121 languages and 270 mother tongues. Of these multiple languages, 22 languages are signified as official languages under the 8th Schedule of the Constitution. This article attempts to highlight the historical making, purpose and functioning related to this Schedule.

History of 8th Schedule of the Indian Constitution

The Indo-Aryan and Dravidian language families include the majority of the components that make up the Indian language. The former belongs to the Indo-European language family and is spoken by 70% of Indians, predominantly in North India, whereas Dravidian languages are spoken by just 22% of the population and are prevalent in the South. Other Indian languages belong to the Austro-Asian or Sino-Tibetan (within that, Tibeto-Burman) linguistic groups, and there are a few isolated languages, for example, the Nihali or Kalto- the language of Maharashtra state.

English and Hindi together make up an essential part of the administrative dealings of the country. However, this prospect does not impose any burden on anyone to speak the major languages. The Schedule offers an open ambit and today stands with 22 languages allowing the people their freedom to choose whichever language they wish to speak. States have the freedom to select and make any of their regional languages crucial for their governmental issues and education. However, the history of this Schedule is marked by many significant timeline issues. 

Racing back to the freedom movement, we see that the Britishers made English their language for communication and Indians chose Hindi majorly to communicate. With the finalisation of the Constitution in the year 1950 came the addition of the Eighth Schedule, which marked 14 languages under ‘official languages’ status. It declared Hindi as the official Indian Language.

At first, came the Official Languages Act of 1963 which was based on making both Hindi and English the language of the Parliament. In the later year, 1964, a proposal was made to end the use of English. But this resulted in protests all over the country in states like Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Pondicherry, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal. This led to the fallout of the proposal. Further, in the year 1965, an Anti-Hindi Agitation had started It stood against Hindi as an official language of India. This agitation, too, had to be quashed down. In the year 1967 came the Official Languages Resolution which made English open and free to be used. 

Thereafter more languages were added to the Schedule through the Amendment Acts of 2002 and 2004, namely, the 71st Amendment and the 92nd Amendment respectively. 

Official Languages Act, 1963

In 1963 came the Official Languages Act which was passed by the Federal Parliament. It legally-established Hindi and English as the languages used in the Parliament while allowing the states and union territories to choose their own official languages freely. 

Section 3 of this Act cancels the 15 year expiration period that was set for the use of English. It permits usage of both English and Hindi Resolutions, general instructions, rules, announcements, administrative or other reports, or press releases issued or issued by the central government or a ministry, department, office, or organisation owned or controlled by the central government contracts, agreements, licences, permits, notices, and tender forms issued by the federal government or any ministry, department, office, or state corporation are all subject to the same rules.

The provisions on the use of English will remain in effect until resolutions for the discontinuance of the use of the English language for the purposes mentioned in the Act have been passed by the legislatures of all States that have not adopted Hindi as their official language, according to Section 5 of the Act. Both Houses of the Federal Parliament must also enact a resolution to this effect. 

The Governor of a State (with the exception of Jammu and Kashmir) may authorise the use of Hindi or the official language of the State in addition to English for the purposes of any judgement, decree, or order passed or made by the High Court for that State and for any judgement, decree, or order passed or made by in that language under Section 7 of the Official Languages Act (other than English).

This Act was further amended in 1976 to establish the Official Languages Rules, which were again amended in 1987.

Official Language Resolution, 1968

Passed by both the houses of the Parliament on January 18, 1968, the Official Language Resolution was brought in order to increase the usage of the Hindi language for official purposes by the Union of India.

The Resolution states Hindi to be the official language of the Union under Article 343 of the Constitution. Under Article 351, the Union will, as its duty, promote the spread of the Hindi language and work for its development so as to help it serve as a medium of expression for all elements of the composite culture of India. Article 343 (2) provided that English shall be continued to be used in the official works of the Union for a period of 15 years from the date of commencement of the Constitution, i.e., 25th January 1965. With the passing of this resolution, Article 343(3) came to the provisions that made the continuation of English valid even after 25th January 1965. It gave the parliament the power to make laws in this regard. 

The resolution also made the knowledge of either English or Hindi compulsory for the selection of candidates for the various posts in the central government. 

The final resolution by the Houses reads as,

“This House resolves –

  1. that compulsory knowledge of either Hindi or English shall be required at the stage of selection of candidates for recruitment to the Union services or posts except in respect of any special services or posts for which a high standard of knowledge of English alone or Hindi alone, or both, as the case may be, is considered essential for the satisfactory performance of the duties of any such service or post; and
  2. that all the languages included in the Eighth Schedule to the Constitution and English shall be permitted as alternative media for the All India and higher Central Services examinations after ascertaining the views of the Union Public Service Commission on the future scheme of the examinations, the procedural aspects and the timing.”

Purpose of 8th Schedule of the Indian Constitution

The purpose of the Eighth schedule is simply to bind together the diversity of the Indian subcontinent. Listing one language as a national language might turn into an unjustified stand for the rest of the languages spoken in India. Thus terming them as official gives a safe headline to progress and embrace diversity. It can thus be listed that the schedule is marked with purpose as:

  • Providing safe ambit to the languages and diversity in the nation. 
  • Give equal representation to the multi-racial, multi ethical nation.
  • Empower indigenous groups by giving them access to government in their native language. 
  • Enables more possibility to do business, trade and commerce in a more efficient manner via common language grounds.

Constitutional provisions related to 8th Schedule of the Indian Constitution 

The official languages of India are included in Part XVII of the Indian Constitution. The Articles included are from Articles 343 to 351. The constitutional provisions related to the Eighth schedule are articulated in Articles 344, Article 344 (1) and Article 351 of the Constitution. 

Article 344 provides for the constitution of a commission by the President on the expiration of five years. Article 351 provides for the spread of the Hindi language to develop it. It was to serve as a medium of expression for all the elements of the composite culture of India. 

Article 29 of the Indian Constitution around this context says that a section of citizens having a distinct language, script or culture are vested with the right to conserve the distinct language. In this regard, both the citizens and the state have equal responsibility to conserve the distinct language. 

List of languages in 8th Schedule of the Indian Constitution

The Schedule comprises of twenty-two official languages. Of these 22, 14 languages were included initially in the Constitution. Sindhi was added in the year 1967 by the Twenty-first Amendment of the Constitution of India. Thereafter, three more languages, Konkani, Manipur and Nepali were included by the Seventy- First Amendment Act of the Constitution. The further entries of Bodo, Dogri, Maithili and Santhali were added by the Ninety-Second Amendment Act of the Constitution thus making the count 22 as a whole. The 22 languages which are included in the Schedule are as follows:

(1) Assamese, (2) Bengali, (3) Gujarati, (4) Hindi, (5) Kannada, (6) Kashmiri, (7) Konkani, (8) Malayalam, (9) Manipuri, (10) Marathi, (11) Nepali, (12) Oriya, (13) Punjabi, (14) Sanskrit, (15) Sindhi, (16) Tamil, (17) Telugu, (18) Urdu (19) Bodo, (20) Santhali, (21) Maithili and (22) Dogri.

The list doesn’t end here. Considering the extent of diversity prevailing in the society, and the number of languages in mother tongues existent, more and more languages are proposed to be added to this Schedule. There are approximately 38 languages that have been raised with a demand to be included in the Schedule. 

These are: (1) Angika, (2) Banjara, (3) Bazika, (4) Bhojpuri, (5) Bhoti, (6) Bhotia, (7) Bundelkhandi (8) Chhattisgarhi, (9) Dhatki, (10) English, (11) Garhwali (Pahari), (12) Gondi, (13) Gujjar/Gujjari (14) Ho, (15) Kachachhi, (16) Kamtapuri, (17) Karbi, (18) Khasi, (19) Kodava (Coorg), (20) Kok Barak, (21) Kumaoni (Pahari), (22) Kurak, (23) Kurmali, (24) Lepcha, (25) Limbu, (26) Mizo (Lushai), (27) Magahi, (28) Mundari, (29) Nagpuri, (30) Nicobarese, (31) Pahari (Himachali), (32) Pali, (33) Rajasthani, (34) Sambalpuri/Kosali, (35) Shaurseni (Prakrit), (36) Siraiki, (37) Tenyidi and (38) Tulu

Classical languages under 8th Schedule of the Indian Constitution

In the present day scenario, there are six languages that are held under the ‘classical’ status in India; namely, Tamil (2004), Sanskrit (2005), Kannada (2008), Telugu (2008), Malayalam (2013) and Odia (2014). All these six languages are listed under the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution. 

The Ministry of Culture lists the terms which qualify a language as a classical language. 

  1. High antiquity of its early texts or recorded history over a period of 1500-2000 years.
  2. It must have a body of ancient literature or text which is considered a valuable heritage by the speakers.
  3. The tradition of its literature is original and not borrowed from any other speech community. 
  4. The classical languages and the literature should be such that they are different from the modern. A discontinuity between the classical language and its later form may not be opposed. 

Once a language is notified as a classical language, the Human Resource and Development Ministry lays forward certain benefits to promote it which stand inclusive of two major annual international awards for scholars of eminence in classical Indian languages. A Centre of Excellence for Studies in Classical Languages is put forth to promote the language; the University Grants Commission is also posted with a request to create and start central universities with a certain number of Professional Chairs declared for the Classical Languages. 

How a language is inserted in 8th Schedule of the Indian Constitution

The issues around the diversity and the number of languages formally accepted and spoken in the land of secularity is quite extravagant. To include a new language would be a prideful act to do but at the same time, the inclusion of every language could add to the bulky burden of the Constitution. But how do we define the difference between which language to be included and which not? This contention brought the Legislature to set up a committee in 1996 and 2003. 

The 1996 committee was known to be the Pahwa Committee and was set up under the chairmanship of Shri Ashok Pahwa. In the further development of this step, in September 2003, another committee was set up under the chairmanship of Shri Sitakant Mohapatra to bring in the spotlight criteria that could set forward the parameters for inclusion of a language in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution. The committee gave its report submission in 2004. After that an Inter-Ministerial Committee was constituted in the year 2012 who was chaired by the then Joint Secretary (HR), Ministry of Home Affairs, to study the matter deeply. The analysis of the report submitted by the 2003 committee was done, and the variety of opinions and concerns could not be resolved. 

Hence today, we have no objective criteria finalised despite the various meetings that were held in this regard. Therefore we move forward to understand how the previous languages have been added to this Schedule. The basic understanding tells us that it is through Constitutional Amendment that a language can be included in the schedule. The Bill to bring about this change can be a government Bill or a private Bill which can be introduced in any of the houses in the parliament.

Current situation as to the inclusion of language in 8th Schedule of the Indian Constitution

The current situation around this is vacillating because of the absence of any concrete objective criteria. Recently in 2019, a private member’s Bill was introduced in the parliament to give all the 22 official languages the status of the national language. It proposed an official amendment in Article 343 and its sub-clause 3 of the Article. The Bill was opposed by many members of the opposition for one of the points in the Bill opposed the use of Hindi in the Parliament and the same was held to be unmaintainable. Home Minister Amit Shah too held that even though he belonged to a non Hindi speaking town, he believes that Hindi is a connecting language for India. 

There have been many proposals regarding the inclusion of Bhojpuri as an official language in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution. At first in 1971, the Communist Party of India MP Bhogendra Jha brought a Bill in the Lok Sabha to make Bhojpuri an official language. Around four decades later, in March 2020, the government made positive statements in this regard. A concrete output is yet to be seen in this direction too. 

Conclusion

The variety of dialects and languages persistent in the Indian subcontinent is above 2500 in number. This rich diversity is something to be proud of and also preserved. The presence of the Eighth Schedule marks the acknowledgement of this fact and hence the conclusion that we have so many official languages. The progress continues, and there is hope to have more languages added to the list.

The call for today’s paradigm, however, states that the need for objective criteria to determine which languages are official and which are not is important. In the same direction, a move should necessarily be set forth. The question as to why we need to add more languages is also significant, but the answer stays that the vitality in the language is a key aspect in the understanding of the cultural diversity in India that is an outcome of various invasions, rulings and revolutions. Thus we have today, the official languages of the Republic of India listed in the Eighth Schedule to the Indian Constitution. However, English is not one of them. 

References


Students of Lawsikho courses regularly produce writing assignments and work on practical exercises as a part of their coursework and develop themselves in real-life practical skills.

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All you need to know about the Shimla Agreement

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This article is written by M.Manaswini Reddy of KVRR law college, Osmania University. This article covers all necessary aspects of the Shimla Agreement of 1972.

This article has been published by Sneha Mahawar.

Introduction

The Shimla Agreement is a recognised peace treaty signed between India and Pakistan on 2nd July 1972, following the India-Pakistan war of 1971. It was a formal agreement to end the hostile state of war between both countries to foster friendly relations. Like any other agreement, it aimed at ceasing hostilities. It was signed 6 months after the war, by the then Prime minister of India Indira Gandhi and the then President of Pakistan Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The agreement was signed with the hope that both countries would live with each other peacefully. It was seen as an effective framework for regulating peace between both countries.

Background of the Shimla Agreement 

The Shimla agreement of 1972 was more than just a peace treaty, it was the result of the India-Pakistan war of 1971 and sought to countermand the effect of such war. It practically wrecked the relations between India and Pakistan to be irreparable. The India Pakistan war of 1971, cost Pakistan to lose East Pakistan from West Pakistan and become an independent country now popularly known as Bangladesh. The war started as a result of Pakistan’s genocide over the Bengali population in East Pakistan. India lent support to the refugees of the genocide, India wanted to prevent Pakistan from entering India while liberating Dhaka.

Significance of Shimla as the venue for the agreement

The agreement was signed at the Barnes Court in Shimla, now the Raj Bhavan. The agreement was signed in such haste on the night of July 2nd, right after Bhutto made a declaration in a press conference that talks had failed. Shimla has been politically a very important city in the history of India’s struggle towards a sovereign state. Long before the Shimla Agreement, two other events made it so popular. Shimla Accord and the Shimla Convention.

The Shimla Accord then known as Simla witnessed the signing of an accord between India which was then a British colony, China, and Tibet on 3rd July 1914. The accord was for the to divide Tibet into inner and outer Tibet while China was to abstain from annexing outer Tibet. Between India and China, it was the introduction of the McMahone Line since both countries had disputes on un-demarcated borders.

The following event was the Simla Conference of 1945. The Conference was the reason for the Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946, it was the first step towards the possibility of an Independent India. Held on 25th and 26th June 1945 with 21 delegates. The agenda of the conference was to establish a provincial national government with the Executive council solely composed of Indians, governed by the Government of India Act of 1935. However, it failed due to the objections and tensions Mohamed Ali Jinnah had with the Congress and its nominating Muslims to the Executive council.

After which was the Shimla Agreement, a result of the Indo-Pak war of 1971.

Principles and objectives of the Shimla Agreement 

There were certain significant principles that both the countries were to abide by in order to modulate relations between both the countries.

Principles 

  • They made commitments to have a direct bilateral approach to resolve issues peacefully.
  • A special focus on people-to-people contacts was made for which they had to build a foundation of cooperative relations.
  • Both countries were supposed to take measures not to violate the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir which helps maintain peace among India and Pakistan and acts as a significant CBM.

Apart from these, there were comprehensive to the agreement meant for India and Pakistan as discussed below:

Objectives

  • Put an end to conflict and confrontation,
  • Promotion of friendly and harmonious relations, 
  • Establishing peace and welfare of the state,
  • Respect for each other’s political Independence, sovereignty, integrity, and unity,
  • Not to disturb each other’s internal affairs,
  • Refrain from hostile propaganda. 

Six key clauses of the Shimla Agreement 

  1. Relations between both countries were to be governed by the principles and  purposes of the UN Charter.
  • Differences between both countries to be resolved through peaceful means and bilateral negotiations, neither side can unilaterally alter the situation in case of a pending final settlement which might render detrimental to maintaining peaceful and friendly relations.
  • The commitment of both countries to co-exist as per the Charter of the United Nations, they agreed to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of each other. Peacefully, respecting each other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and not interfering in each other’s internal affairs, is to act as a prerequisite to reconciliation, good neighbourliness and peace.
  • Issues and reasons for conflicts between both countries have strained their relations for the last 25 years. Such issues must be settled peacefully.
  • There must be mutual recognition and honour for each country’s national unity, territorial integrity, political independence, and sovereign equality.
  1. Both governments take steps in their power to prevent hostile propaganda against each other and to encourage spreading such information which would develop friendly relations among India and Pakistan.
  2. To actively bring back and regulate relations among the two countries there had to be steps taken. Such as:
  • Efforts to bring back communications by the way of post, telegraph, air links including flights and border posts.
  • Taking appropriate measures to encourage travel resources for the nationals of the other country.
  • They were to work on bringing back trade and cooperation in economic and other fields as well.
  • Initiatives to encourage exchange of the knowledge in science and culture.
  1. Delegates from both countries take action to meet occasionally and discuss necessary details. For the purpose of initiating peace both the governments agreed that:
  • The Indian and Pakistani forces pull back to stay at their side of the international border.
  • The Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir as a result of the December 17, 1971 ceasefire, the countries agreed to honour it without any prejudices and stay on their sides. Neither of the countries can unilaterally alter the Line of Control no matter any mutual differences and legal interpretations occur between them. Both the countries promise to stay away from using any force or threat that may violate the Line of Control.
  • Right after the entry into the Agreement, the withdrawals will commence and shall be completed in 30 days thereof.
  1. The agreement will come into force with effect from when the Instrument of Ratification will be exchanged, subject to its ratification by both countries as per their Constitutional procedures.
  2. While the representatives of either side will come together often to discuss upcoming modalities and arrangements to bring peace and stability as well as a final settlement on the Jammu and Kashmir issue, the release of POWs. They are also to renew diplomatic relations. Both governments’ heads would meet at a mutually agreed time convenient to both in the future.

Effect of the Agreement

While India returned the 93,000 prisoners of war in an organised manner as promised by Indira Gandhi, Pakistan was to work on converting the Line of Control to an international border. India returned the prisoners of war along with the territories that it captured. The prisoners of war were mostly militants as well as few civilians, reports suggest they were mostly women and children. There was supposedly a meeting between Bhutto and Indira Gandhi, where Bhutto promised to turn the Line of Control to an International Border although at the time of finalising the Agreement such meeting’s happening was denied and repudiated.

There was no mention of the existence of such a meeting. Both India and Pakistan were busy focusing on their internal affairs and the promise made by Pakistan was never executed.

Did both parties to the agreement follow it

This Agreement determined the relations between both the countries. India faithfully observed the Shimla Agreement and abided by what was mutually agreed upon to improve the relations. Pakistan did not keep its word and continued to unsettle India on the Kashmir issue. There was a severe war-like situation between both countries around Kargil in 1999. Pakistani soldiers invaded Kargil in Jammu and Kashmir as well the lines of the Line of Control. A very critical war condition that lasted more than 60 days, until the involvement of the Indian Air Force drove Pakistani troops back to the territory. The effect of this war situation was yet another peace treaty, the Lahore declaration to maintain peace and stability.

Critical analysis 

The Agreement was looked down upon strategically by many and it was seen as a mistake from India’s point of view by Indira Gandhi. She was criticised widely for signing the Agreement without resolving the Kashmir issue. Pakistan claimed Kashmir so strongly that complications between India and Pakistan would have been inevitable. This was seen as another reason to criticise the signing of the Agreement by Indira Gandhi. It was called purposeless and impractical. Indira Gandhi could not use the victory of India in the 1971 war which was military surrender by Pakistan, to bring peace and stability amongst India and Pakistan.  Many addressed it as the treaty that was a mistake by Indira Gandhi since it backfired with the Kargil war situation of 1999 even after the surrender of POWs and territories by India. What was understood was that India had believed Pakistan was going to abide by the Agreement and demonstrate friendly conduct to foster peace and stability although Pakistan proved otherwise. Pakistan ought not to be underestimated since it has always been in a state of conflict over Jammu and Kashmir. India’s win in the Indo-Pak war of 1971 brought a lot of advantages to it, all that was lost by this agreement, perceived as false promises made by Bhutto. Pakistani leaders had a history of not keeping their word. India seemed to have missed the factor before signing the Agreement. The Agreement was criticised to have laughable expectations from Pakistan considering Bhutto never kept his word. Even if India returned territories it seized in the war and all the prisoners of war, the loss of the eastern part of Pakistan led to non-reconcilable relations between the countries.

Shimla and Kashmir issue

India and Pakistan have always had a dispute with the determination of which country Kashmir belongs to. The Shimla Agreement, although signed in the name of the Bangladesh/East Pakistan dispute, ended directly at the Kashmir dispute. Many perceived the Agreement to have instigated Pakistan to make Kashmir its Bangladesh. The Indo-Pak war in 1971 resulted in the military surrender of Pakistan and the loss of East Pakistan as a territory that put India supposedly in a powerful position. This affected Pakistan, they began working on the strategy to pressurize India by targeting Kashmir. Pakistan did not want to lose Kashmir as well. Pakistan strongly claimed its right over Kashmir, but never directly confronted India, even after signing the Shimla agreement. Thus the Shimla agreement only pushed Pakistan towards claiming Kashmir as its own, making the dispute active all over again.

Relation between the Shimla and the Delhi Agreement

The Delhi Agreement was followed by the Shimla Agreement, signed in 1973. It was a trilateral agreement between Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. The Agreement mainly focused on the repatriation of prisoners of war and civilians held in the three countries after the Bangladesh liberation war. Ratified by India and Pakistan only, although signed by all three countries. It was specifically required to repatriate Bengali bureaucrats and military personnel held up in West Pakistan to be moved to Bangladesh. India was to relocate 6,500 prisoners of war and military personnel while Bangladesh agreed to relocate mainly the Urdu-speaking Community of Pakistan. Pakistan did not properly settle the community in Pakistan after the Agreement due to which some of the prisoners of war were deserted and helpless.

Conclusion

The Shimla Agreement teaches a lot on the importance of bilateral agreements which seems to be the solution for the longest time for the conflicts between belligerent countries. The Shimla agreement is a perfect example of a bilateral agreement in the international purview but it is a failed agreement because it could not achieve any of India’s objectives fully, be it maintaining peace or resolving the Kashmir issues. If anything, it may have triggered the Pakistan army to claim Kashmir since they lost Bangladesh.

References


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Neeraj Grover murder case

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This article is written by Sarthak Kulshrestha, a BA.LLB. student at Jagran Lakecity University, Bhopal. In this article, the murder of Neeraj Grover, one of the most terrifying murder cases of India, has been discussed in detail. 

This article has been published by Shoronya Banerjee.

Introduction

The city of Mumbai is said to be India’s nerve centre for finding career opportunities in television and films. People living across different parts of the country come here to showcase their talent and aspire to establish their name in the entertainment industry.

Neeraj Grover, a young man who hailed from Kishni, a small town in Uttar Pradesh was born in 1982. He came to Mumbai to set his foot in the television industry. At the age of 26, he was working as a creative executive director in the Indian version of a US television show “Are you smarter than a fifth-grader.” He was also holding the auditions of a soon-to-be-released television series ‘Mahabharat.’ Neeraj’s work was going well until he chanced upon a lady named Maria Monica Susairaj, a Kannada actress. Over a period of time, the intimacy and affection between them grew to a certain level which ultimately led to the homicide of Neeraj Grover. This article further explains what exactly happened that it became one of the most gruesome murder cases in India.

Background of the case

Maria M. Susairaj first met Neeraj in his office for the purpose of giving the audition for the television series mentioned above. Neeraj did not find her acting skills up to the mark and fit for the role exactly required. Also, because she was of Kannada origin, she lacked the accent of the Hindi language which was required by the show. Irrespective of the anomalies he found in Maria’s character as an actress, he was impressed by her as a person. Soon, he befriended her, and since Maria also showed interest in him, they became good friends. They shared each others’ contacts and communicated regularly via calls and online chatting platforms.

Gradually, the affection and intimacy between both of them grew and they started meeting more frequently. As time passed, Maria found a place to stay in Mumbai. She took an apartment on rent, that was flat no. 201 in Dheeraj Solitaire apartments, Malad, Mumbai.

Facts of the case

Maria Susairaj was engaged to a person named Emile Jerome Mathew who was a naval officer posted in Cochin. He claimed that Maria was involved in a deep friendship with Neeraj. Being Maria’s fiance, Jerome became hypersensitive and possessive of her regarding her casual involvement with Grover. On the night of May 6, 2008, Neeraj reportedly went to Maria’s place to help her settle in her new house. Somehow, on a phone call, Matthew got to know that Neeraj was present at Maira’s house that evening and thereby he asked her to send Neeraj away and not let him stay overnight. However, he sensed the fact that he would spend the night at her house which was not at all acceptable to Matthew.

In the morning of May 7, 2008, when Maria and Neeraj were asleep, around 7 A.M., the doorbell of Maria’s house rang multiple times. Maria went to the main door of the apartment to check who was ringing the bell and she was shocked to see her fiance, Matthew on the doorstep. He barged into the house and found Neeraj inside. Matthew was enraged to see Grover there and bitter arguments had started between both of them which ended up in a physical tussle. Matthew in a fit of anger brought a knife from the kitchen and stabbed Neeraj repeatedly until he took his last breath. He died on the spot.

Reportedly, at 10 A.M., Maria went to purchase two duffel bags, bedsheets, curtains, and a knife. Then, Matthew and Maria cut the dead body of Neeraj into small pieces, allegedly three hundred pieces, and put it together in those bags which she bought earlier. They both changed the bedroom upholstery in order to destroy the evidence of murder. She borrowed the car of her neighbour and after keeping the bags in the boot space, at around 4:30 P.M., the same day, Maria and Matthew drove out of the city. On their way to the outskirts of Mumbai, the couple bought a quantity of petrol as they planned to set the pieces of the dead body on fire. Finally, after accomplishing the task of burning the last remains of Neeraj Grover, they returned to Mumbai late at night on the same day.

In the backdrop, the family and friends of Neeraj kept on trying to contact him since he was found missing, i.e., from the evening of May 6 itself. They called on his phone more than a hundred times but could not connect with him. This compelled them to file the police report of him being missing. His friends and family suspected Maria Susairaj of his disappearance. The police initiated the inquiry against her the next day, and she stated that Neeraj did come to her place but he left her house at midnight to go to attend a party.

Clues leading to suspicion

The forensic examination team went to the house of Maria Susairaj for the investigation as the acquaintances of Neeraj pointed the needle of suspicion towards her. On examining every corner, and the bedroom of the house, the team found that the upholstery of the room including the curtains, bedsheets, and everything was newly bought. Moreover, a bloodstain could be seen on the latch of the door and a little bit of it at some other places too. The exercise of blood sampling was conducted and it turned out to be Neeraj’s blood. 

Secondly, when Maria lodged a police complaint in Malad police station on May 9, she told the police that Neeraj was missing from the night of May 6 when he last met her at her apartment. She also said that he forgot his mobile phone at her place. Subsequently, the phone records of Neeraj were studied. The cellphone records showed that an SMS was received by Neeraj’s phone on the evening of May 7, the day he was murdered in the morning. This is where Maria’s claims were found to be falsifying because she said that Neeraj left his phone at her place, but the SMS received on May 7, traced a different location i.e. at Dahisar Check Naka. 

As the level of suspicion rose, the police investigated the case more meticulously. The debit card records showed that she bought the upholstery stuff, a chopper, and a couple of duffel bags from a mall adjacent to her apartment on the morning of May 7. The investigation authorities also found that the car which she alleged to have borrowed didn’t actually belong to her neighbour. She admitted that she lied about the same for some unspecified reasons. The statements of the watchman of her society, and the petrol pump attendee from whom the couple bought petrol, cleared the way of suspicion and testified for the collected proofs. 

When she found herself blocked from all the directions, Susairaj finally confessed to the commission of murdering Neeraj Grover. On the basis of the confession made by Maria Susairj, the police arrested her fiance, Matthew. The trial went on for a few years until the decision was pronounced by the Mumbai Sessions Court. 

The verdict

In July 2011, Additional Sessions judge, M.W. Chandwani gave the decision in this appalling murder case. After analysing all the circumstances of the case and the witnesses and proofs collected from both sides, the judge held Emile Jerome Matthew guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), and was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 10 years. The Court held Maria Susairaj not guilty of murder, but she was penalised for the offence of destruction of evidence under Section 204 of the IPC and was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 3 years.

Matthew was held guilty of culpable homicide

Though Matthew killed Grover with the intention of causing his death, he was not held guilty of murder. He was held guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Let us see the difference between culpable homicide not amounting to murder and culpable homicide amounting to murder.

Culpable homicide has been defined under Section 299 of the IPC. The ingredients of Section 299 are :

  • The intention of causing death,
  • Bodily injury that is likely to cause death,
  • The knowledge that the act is likely to cause death.

Culpable homicide amounting to murder

Simply put, culpable homicide amounting to murder is the same as murder that has been defined under Section 300 of IPC. The ingredients of the same are as follows : 

  • The intention of causing death,
  • Bodily injury sufficient to cause death,
  • Bodily injury, which offender knows, to be likely to cause death,
  • The knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that, in all probability, death will be caused.

The ingredients of culpable homicide amounting to murder have been pointed out above and are given under Section 300 of IPC. 

Exceptions to culpable homicide not amounting to murder

It is pertinent to note here that there are certain exceptions given under Section 300, one of which has been applied to the present case. If the act by the offender falls under any of the exceptions given under this section, then he will be held guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The exceptions are listed below :

  • An act done in grave and sudden provocation,
  • Act done in private defence,
  • An act done by a public servant in the course of exercising his powers,
  • Act done without any premeditation in a sudden fight,
  • An act done where the victim himself consented to such an act.

In Neeraj Grover’s murder case, the Court observed that the act of murdering Neeraj was not a premeditated act. The Court has construed it to come within the ambit of the fourth exception to Section 300, listed above. If a person kills another with the intention of causing death but does the act in a fit of rage or in a sudden quarrel, then he will be held guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

In the case of Santokh Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009), and Arumugam v. State Rep by Inspector of Police TN, (2009), the respective Courts held that it is a question of fact and whether the quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. In Neeraj Grover’s murder case, the facts explicitly show that the arguments took place between both Neeraj and Matthew which further induced Matthew to take a knife and stab Neeraj. This act attracts the guilt of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, being an exception to Section 300. Hence, Matthew was punished under Section 304 which prescribes punishment for culpable homicide.

Conclusion

The murder of Neeraj Grover was unfortunate enough to call it a monstrous act of Maria and Matthew. Cutting down the dead remains of the deceased in order to make it easy to dump it is a spine-tingling hideous act. At that time when the news of this incident recently broke, the media houses, in no time, reported it through their outlets. The public was also enraged at the disgrace of humanity through this appalling act. 

Many people, especially the acquaintances of Grover, were not happy with the decision of the Court. They wanted that the murderer must be given the death penalty or at least the punishment of life imprisonment. They alleged that this murder was a result of the criminal conspiracy between Maria and Matthew.  But, as he was found guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, he was punished accordingly. This case has also been presented before the world through a movie of 2011, named “Not a love story”. It is still a subjective call for the people whether they think that justice was delivered to Neeraj Grover or not, but whatever it seems to them, it cannot be denied that this murder case has been added to the list of the most terrifying murder stories of India. 

References

  1. Baghel, M. (2011). Death in Mumbai: A true story. Noida: Random House India.
  2. https://www.hindustantimes.com/mumbai/verdict-based-on-susairaj-s-statements/story-47f3yPKcaz3CcBoYDaLXJK.html 
  3. https://www.indiatoday.in/india/west/story/neeraj-grover-murder-case-maria-susairaj-and-her-boyfriend-found-guilty-136580-2011-06-30 

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P v. A Ors : guidelines issued by Bombay High Court on POSH Act

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This article has been written by Dev Shroff.

Introduction

The case P v. A & Ors. (PoSH Confidentiality Guidelines-Suit no. 142 of 2021) highlights the confidentiality Provision under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 and briefs about the history of the POSH Act. The confidentiality guidelines are specified under Section 16 of the POSH Act. It also emphasizes the breach of the guidelines specified under the act. This article spotlights the important features of the seven-page guidelines issued by Justice G. S. Patel of the Bombay High Court. A critical analysis of the judgement has also been included in the article which includes lack of transparency by the Bombay High Court, compliance by the Internal Complaints Committee, freedom of the media, etc. 

This article also accentuates the government’s continuing efforts in creating a stimulating awareness of sexual harassment at the workplace. It ends with the hope that the courts should resolve cases pertaining to sexual harassment with utmost secrecy. By reading this, the readers will understand why the names of the petitioner and the respondent have not been revealed and they will gain an insightful knowledge of the recently issued confidentiality guidelines.

Guidelines issued by Bombay High Court on POSH Act – critical analysis

In the recent case of the P v.. A & Ors. (PoSH Confidentiality Guidelines-Suit no. 142 of 2021) the Bombay High Court has issued an order containing certain guidelines relating to ensuring confidentiality of hearings pertaining to matters to the Sexual Harassment of Women (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (POSH Act). The guidelines on confidentiality are meant to serve as a working protocol for the courts. 

Background of POSH Act

Protection against sexual harassment and the right to work with dignity are universally recognised human rights by various international conventions and instruments, including the United Nation’s Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, which Convention has been ratified by the Indian government in 1993.

The background for enacting the POSH Act was due to the fact that sexual harassment results in violation of the fundamental rights of a woman to (i) equality as per Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India (Constitution) and (ii) right to life and to live with dignity as per Article 21 of the Constitution. Additionally, our Constitution guarantees every citizen a right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business, which includes a right to a safe environment free from sexual harassment.

The POSH Act was enacted in 2013 to “provide protection against sexual harassment of women at workplace and for the prevention and redressal of complaints of sexual harassment and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

Confidentiality provision under POSH Act

Possibly the most important objective of the POSH Act is to provide for an effective grievance redressal mechanism for women in case they have been subjected to workplace sexual harassment. In this respect, the POSH Act requires the parties to ensure confidentiality. 

Section 16 of the POSH Act states as follows:

Prohibition of publication or making known contents of complaint and inquiry proceedings. – Notwithstanding anything contained in the Right to Information Act, 2005 (22 of 2005), the contents of the complaint made under section 9, the identity and addresses of the aggrieved woman, respondent and witnesses, any information relating to conciliation and inquiry proceedings, recommendations of the Internal Committee or the Local Committee, as the case may be, and the action was taken by the employer or the District Officer under the provisions of this Act shall not be published, communicated or made known to the public, press and media in any manner:”

In case of breach of such a provision of the POSH Act, a monetary penalty of Rs. 5,000 has been imposed. It is however permitted to disseminate information regarding the justice secured to the victim, subject to the condition that the name, address, identity or any other particulars leading to the identification of the aggrieved woman and witnesses is not disclosed. 

Bombay High Court guidelines – important features

There is reportedly still some anxiety and fear in reporting instances of sexual harassment at the workplace. The Bombay High Court was of the view that it often leads to a scenario where the confidentiality of the parties stood compromised in case of litigation relating to the POSH Act. Accordingly, in the Court’s view, it was necessary to lay down guidelines to ensure confidentiality as it helps protect the identities of the parties from even accidental disclosure. 

The Court was of the view that “It is imperative, therefore, to protect the identities of the parties from disclosure, even accidental disclosure, in these proceedings. This is in the interest of both sides. There appear to be no established guidelines so far in such matters. This order, setting out a working protocol for future orders, hearings and case file management, is the first endeavour in that direction. These are only initial guidelines, and will necessarily be subject to revision or modification as needed. I would suggest that these guidelines are the minimum required.”

The important features of the Bombay High Court’s guidelines are summarized below.

  1. The seven-page order issued by Justice G. S. Patel relates to ensuring the confidentiality of the parties in respect of the manner in which such cases should be heard and handled by the courts, including the Labour Courts and Industrial Courts. In fact, the guidelines clarify that “under no circumstances will that Court deviate from these Guidelines”. The guidelines also apply to how decisions should be recorded, pronounced and communicated, and the precautionary steps to be followed while reporting such matters including by the media. 
  1. In terms of the filing protocols, any affidavit, application or pleading containing personally identifiable information of any of the parties shall not be retained by the Registry. As a result, for verification of identity, the Registry may ask for the production of an identity document to establish the identity of the deponent, but a copy of any such document shall not be retained on file. 
  1. The Registry is also barred from entering the email ID, mobile number, Aadhaar card number or any other personally identifiable information of any of the parties or witnesses. Anyone wishing to access any affidavit, application or pleading will not be permitted, other than the Advocate-on-Record with a current and valid Vakalatnama to take inspection or copies of any filing or order. The entire record shall be kept sealed by the Registry and not be given to any person without an order of the Court.
  1. All hearings of cases relating to the POSH Act will only be in Chambers or in-camera, thereby requiring physical attendance of the litigants and their respectful advocates (clerks and peons are instructed to leave the court). As a result, there will not be any online or hybrid facility for hearings. In relation to recording on hearings, the Bombay High Court clarifies that “any form of recording of any part of the proceedings is strictly forbidden” and “any attempt to record or transcribe any part of the proceedings will be a contempt of court.”
  1. In relation to each party, the Bombay High Court states that “Both sides and all parties and advocates, as also witnesses, are forbidden from disclosing the contents of any order, judgment or filing to the media or publishing any such material in any mode or fashion by any means, including social media, without specific leave of the court”. 
  1. In the case of witnesses, in addition to the usual oath, they must sign a statement of non-disclosure and confidentiality. Also, in the court’s order, no witnesses’ names will be mentioned, nor will their addresses be noted.
  1. Henceforth, for the orders to be issued by the courts in cases of the POSH Act, the names of the parties will not be mentioned. The orders will read “A v. B”, “P v. D” etc. Also, in the body of the order, (i) the parties will not be referred to by their names but only as to Plaintiff, Defendant No.1, etc. and (ii), there will be no mention of any personally identifiable information such as email ids, mobile or telephone numbers, addresses etc. All orders and judgments in relation to the POSH Act will be delivered in private and orders and judgments on merits will not be uploaded on the court’s website.

Critical Analysis of the Judgement

I list down some of those areas relating to the Bombay High Court’s order where there is a lack of clarity or will otherwise create challenges.

  1. Lack of transparency: The Bombay High Court’s order is likely to lead to concerns especially relating to the need for transparency. Since the PoSH Act is a new law, the interpretation of the courts on various provisions of the PoSH Act is critical, as it helps under the law better, both for employers as well as the courts. In absence of judgements, it will become difficult for others to track the judiciary developments in relation to the law. 
  2. Applicability of the guidelines: From a plain reading of the order, it is not entirely clear as to whom the order applies to or for that matter, what kind of orders, hearings, etc. are being referred to, including for example, ongoing cases relating to the POSH Act. 

Unlike the Supreme Court’s guidelines issued in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan in relation to how employers must deal with complaints of sexual harassment which were applicable to employers in the entire country, these guidelines are issued by a High Court. In view of certain conflicting judgements in relation to Article 227 of the Constitution, it remains to be seen whether these guidelines apply to the High Courts in other Indian states or if it would extend only to the courts in the State of Maharashtra. 

  1. Compliance by IC: There is no clarity as to whether the Internal Complaints Committee (IC) constituted by the employers as per the POSH Act also needs to follow these guidelines in terms of investigation of sexual harassment complaints and issuing of the report containing the IC’s recommendations. 
  1. Sexual harassment complaint under the IPC and other laws: The guidelines appear limited to cases relating to POSH Act and do not quite extend to sexual harassment complaints under the Indian Penal Code (IPC) which do not involve the workplace. Section 354A of the IPC defines sexual harassment and is unrelated to the workplace. Similarly, the guidelines do not cover harassment of transgenders, which is protected by the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 or harassment of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes, which is protected by Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
  1. Freedom to the media: The guidelines extend to the media and journalists. Failure to comply with the guidelines could be treated as contempt of court. The media is however entitled to considerable freedom of speech and expression under Article 19 of the Constitution and hence the media may continue to enjoy such freedom irrespective of the guidelines. 
  1. Accessing POSH Act judgement: The guidelines mandate that the order on merits in case of POSH Act will not be delivered in open courts, nor would they be uploaded online. It entails that for any lawyer to access the judgment in a POSH Act related matter, a court order will need to be obtained. This prohibition may be criticized as it could extend the protection of confidentiality meant for survivors to the harasser as well. It is imperative to mention that, as per section 16 of the POSH Act, there is a bar on disclosing any information related to the identity and addresses of the aggrieved woman, respondent and witnesses, any information relating to conciliation and inquiry proceedings or the recommendations of the ICC. However, even the POSH Act permits disseminating information pertaining to the justice secured. The idea is not just to punish the harasser but also create a deterrence in the organisation. Thus, not allowing the uploading of orders on merits is likely to deter the possibility of shifting the blame and shame on to the perpetrator.
  1. Anonymity of identities: The guidelines mandate anonymity in prohibiting the disclosure of identities of both the survivor and the harasser. This may create an asymmetry in denying the survivor of the crime, the right to express even after the accused is found guilty. Furthermore, the firewall, as created in compliance with the guidelines, will bring the perpetrator at par with the survivor. Section 228A of the Indian Penal Code allows a survivor of sexual assault to disclose her identity to public. However, the Bombay High Court’s guidelines appear to deny that right to the survivor.
  1. In-person hearings: Finally, the guidelines make it compulsory for all hearings to be held either in chambers or in-camera and require the physical attendance of parties to the proceedings, with no online or hybrid facility for hearings. While the purpose appears to be to protect the privacy of the parties, the guidelines create an asymmetry by making the proceeding onerous. This may particularly impinge upon such affected individuals who might be required to travel long distances as they do not live within the jurisdiction of the concerned court. Furthermore, as case records, orders and judgments of the case are not to be uploaded the record of the proceedings or orders passed will be inaccessible to the parties, again requiring frequent travel on their part.

Conclusion

The POSH Act along with the #MeToo movement and the government’s continuing efforts have been hugely successful in creating greater awareness of the issue of sexual harassment at the workplace. The Bombay High Court’s guidelines are definitely a step in the right direction, and the first of its kind, not just in India but possibly in the entire world. When implemented by various courts, it is likely to help create a system wherein women at the workplace feel secure and confident to report their complaints of sexual harassment and take it to the next level if there are not satisfied with the ICC’s views. The ICC, on its part, will also be more aware of their role and the need to comply with the law, in order to issue the correct decision.While there are some criticisms, the new guidelines of the Bombay High Court are definitely needed and will go a long way in increasing confidence in the judicial system. In fact, the guidelines may be a reminder not just for the courts but also to employers to ensure that such matters are handled with utmost secrecy.


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All you should know about 44th amendment of the Indian Constitution

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This article has been written by Oishika Banerji of Amity Law School, Kolkata. This article provides a detailed analysis of the 44th amendment of the Indian Constitution. 

Introduction 

The 44th Amendment to the Indian Constitution is an Act that was introduced into the Constitution by the 45th Amendment Bill in 1978. With the introduction of the 42nd Amendment  Act, 1976, various provisions of the Indian Constitution were subjected to modifications and alteration against the will of the citizens of the nation. The same was enacted by the Indira Gandhi-led Indian National Congress during the Emergency, declared under Article 352. In order to reverse those changes and establish harmony between the State and its people, the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 was welcomed. This article provides a detailed analysis of the 44th amendment of the Indian Constitution. 

Scenario prior to the introduction of the 44th Amendment Act, 1978

Article 352 of the Indian Constitution was used to declare a national emergency in India. Prior to the 44th Amendment Act, 1978, Article 352 of the Constitution stated that the President of the country could declare an emergency if she or he was satisfied that a grave threat to the security of the whole of India or territory of India remained, whether caused by war, external aggression, or internal disturbances. According to Article 352, the President issued the proclamation after Prime Minister Indira Gandhi made a decision and transmitted it to the President without consulting her cabinet. Indira Gandhi’s Cabinet Ministers had undoubtedly endorsed this decision a day later. The declaration was approved by a simple majority in both chambers of the Parliament. The emergency might last as long as there was no new Parliamentary decision, according to the previous rule.

Following the 1975 emergency, the laws surrounding the proclamation of emergency were carefully adjusted and specified. The importance of free speech and dissent was re-established, and the rule of law was re-established. However, because we are still in the early stages of democracy, there are many unanswered questions.

The Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 

The Statement of Objects and Reasons that was appended to the Constitution (Forty-fifth Amendment) Bill, 1978 which was enacted as the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 provided the following: 

  1. The Constitution’s fundamental rights, including those of life and liberty, can be taken away by a temporary majority, as recent experience has demonstrated. As a result, proper protections must be put in place to prevent such a situation from occurring again in the future, as well as ensure that the people have a meaningful say in deciding the type of government they will live under. One of the key goals of this Bill was to address this issue.
  2. As a result, it is proposed to provide certain changes to the Constitution that would have the effect of undermining its secular or democratic character, abridging or taking away fundamental rights, prejudicing or impeding free and fair elections on the basis of adult suffrage. Jeopardising the independence of the judiciary can be made only if they are approved by the people of India by a majority of votes cast in a referendum in which at least 51% of the electorate participated. This is being ensured by amending Article 368 of the Indian Constitution.
  3. Because of the elevated status desired for fundamental rights, the right to property, which has been the subject of several constitutional amendments, would cease to be a fundamental right and become just a legal right. Article 19 will be amended as needed for this purpose, and Article 31 will be deleted. The elimination of property from the list of fundamental rights would, however, ensure that minorities’ freedom to create and govern educational institutions of their choosing would not be harmed.
  4. Similarly, those holding land for personal cultivation and within the ceiling limit would not be harmed in their entitlement to obtain market value compensation.
  5. While property would no longer be a fundamental right, it would be given explicit recognition as a legal right, with the condition that no one may be dispossessed of their property unless in compliance with the law.
  6. A proclamation of emergency under Article 352 effectively amends the Constitution by changing it into a unitary state for the length of the emergency and allowing citizens to petition the courts to have fundamental rights, such as the right to life and liberty, suspended. As a result, adequate safeguards are required to guarantee that this authority is appropriately employed and not abused. As a result, it is advocated that a proclamation of emergency be issued only when India’s or any portion of its territory’s security is endangered by war, external aggression, or armed rebellion. The internal disturbance that does not get to the level of armed rebellion would not be grounds for issuing a proclamation.
  7. Furthermore, in order to guarantee that a proclamation is only issued after careful study, it is proposed that an emergency be declared only on the basis of written advice from the Cabinet to the President. As a proclamation of emergency effectively amends the Constitution, it is stipulated that the proclamation must be approved by the two Houses of Parliament with the same majority required to amend the Constitution and that such approval must be obtained within one month. Any such proclamation would only remain in effect for six months and could only be renewed by resolutions voted by the same majority. If the Lok Sabha passes a resolution condemning the proclamation’s continuation, the proclamation will likewise come to an end. A special meeting can be called by 10% or more of the Lok Sabha members to examine a motion condemning the proclamation.
  8. It would be provided that the power to suspend the right to move the court for the enforcement of a fundamental right cannot be exercised in respect of the fundamental right to life and liberty, as a further check against the misuse of the emergency provisions and to put such right on a secure footing. The stipulation that law for preventative detention cannot permit detention for more than two months in any situation unless an Advisory Board has certified that there are adequate grounds for such detention strengthens the right to liberty even further. The requirement that the Chairman of an Advisory Board is a serving Judge of an appropriate High Court, and that the Board is constituted in line with the Chief Justice’s recommendations, would provide additional protection. 
  9. A special provision is being created to protect the right of the media to report on the events in the Parliament and state legislatures openly and without restriction. The clause relating to the breakdown of the constitutional machinery in the states is being revised to specify that a proclamation issued under Article 356 would only be in effect for six months in the first instance and that it could not last more than one year in most cases. However, if a proclamation of emergency is in effect and the Election Commission certifies that extending the President’s rule beyond one year is necessary due to difficulties in holding elections to the State’s Legislative Assembly, the proclamation’s period of operation can be extended beyond one year. This is subject to the current three-year restriction. These measures would ensure that a state’s democratic governance is restored after the bare minimum of time required to organise elections.
  10. To avoid delays, it is proposed to amend Articles 132, 133, and 134 and add a new Article 134A to provide that a High Court should consider granting a certificate for an appeal to the Supreme Court on the basis of an oral application by a party or, if the High Court deems it appropriate, on its own motion, immediately after the delivery of the judgement, decree, final order, or sentence in question. Article 136 will be the exclusive rule in cases of special permission to appeal granted by the Supreme Court.
  11. Other amendments suggested in the Bill are primarily aimed at eliminating or rectifying constitutional distortions that arose as a result of legislation adopted during the Internal Emergency.

A brief overview of the changes introduced by the 44th Amendment Act, 1978

The changes that were introduced by the 44th Amendment Act, 1978 have been laid down hereunder for the readers to get a glimpse of the same at one go.

  1. Amendment of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976: In the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, Sections 18, 19, 21, 22, 31, 32, 34, 35, 58 and 59 shall be omitted. 
  2. Amendment of Article 19 (Right to Freedom): The changes that were brought in Article 19 of the Indian Constitution by the 44th Amendment Act, 1978 have been provided hereunder: 
  1. In Clause (1) sub-clause (e), the word “and” shall be inserted at the end.
  2. Sub-clause (f) was omitted.
  3. In clause (5), for the words, brackets and letters “sub-clauses (d), (e) and (f)”, the words, brackets, and letters “sub-clauses (d) and (e)” were substituted.
  4. Amendment of Article 22 (Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases): 
  1. Clause 4 of Article 22 has been subjected to changes.
  2. In clause (7), sub-clause (a) has been omitted, sub-clause (b) has been re-lettered as sub-clause (a) and sub-clause (c) has been re-lettered as sub-clause (b) and in the sub-clause, as so re-lettered, for the words, brackets, letter, and figure “sub-clause (a) of clause (4)”, the word, brackets and figure “clause (4)” has been substituted.
  3. Amendment of Article 30 (Right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions): 
  1. Clause 1A was inserted, and
  2. The sub-heading “Right to Property” occurring after Article 30 of the Constitution was omitted.
  1. Omission of Article 31 (Posts and telegraphs; telephones, wireless, broadcasting and other like forms of communication): The right to property was removed from the list of fundamental rights and elevated to the status of a legal right. Article 31 of the Constitution, which deals with the forced acquisition of property, has been removed.
  2. Amendment of Article 31A (Saving of laws providing for acquisition of estates, etc): In clause (1) of Article 31A of the Constitution, the words and numbers Article 14, Article 19, or Article 31″ should be replaced with the words and figures “Article 14 or Article 19.”
  3. Amendment of Article 31C (Saving of laws giving effect to certain directive principles): Article 14 or Article 19” shall be substituted with the words and figures “Article 14, Article 19, or Article 31” in Article 31C of the Constitution.
  4. Amendment of Article 38 (State to secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people): In Article 38, a new directive principle has been added, stating that the State must maintain social order in order to promote the welfare of the people.
  5. Substitution of new article for Article 71: Article 71 was substituted with a new article altogether concerning matters relating to, or connected with, the election of a President or Vice-President, by the 44th Amendment Act, 1978. 
  6. Amendment of Article 74: Article 74(1) was amended to contain a provision that the President may request that the Council of Ministers rethinks any advice given to him, but that the President must act on the advice given after such reconsideration. Previously, the President was required to act in line with the Council of Ministers’ advice.
  7. Amendment of Article 77 (Matters relating to, or connected with, the election of a president or Vice President): Clause 4 of Article 77 was omitted by the Amendment Act of 1978.
  8. Amendment of Article 83 (Duration of Houses of Parliament) and 172 (Duration of State Legislatures): The periods of the House of the People and the State Assemblies were restored to five years by amending Articles 83 and 172. The Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha had their terms extended from 5 to 6 years by the 42nd Constitutional (Amendment) Act.
  9. Substitution of new article for Article 103 (Decision on questions as to disqualifications of members) and 192: Articles 103 and 192, relating to decisions on questions of disqualification of members of Parliament and State Legislatures, have been replaced to provide that in the case of a member of a State Legislature, the President’s decision on the question of disqualification will be in accordance with the Election Commission’s opinion.
  10. Amendment of Article 105 (Powers, privileges, etc of the Houses of Parliament and of the members and committees thereof): In clause (3) of Article 105 of the Constitution, for the words “shall be those of the House of Commons of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, and of its members and committees, at the commencement of this Constitution,” the words, figures, and brackets “shall be those of that House and of its members and committees immediately before the coming into force of Section 15 of the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978” are substituted.
  11. Amendment of Article 123 (Power of President to promulgate Ordinances during recess of Parliament): Clause 4 of Article 123 has been omitted. 
  12. Amendment of Article 132 (Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court in appeals from High Courts in certain cases):  In Article 132 of the Constitution, 
  1. The words, figures, and letter “if the High Court certifies under Article 134A” shall be substituted for the words “if the High Court certifies” in clause (1),
  2. Clause (2) shall be omitted, and
  3. In clause (3), the words “or such leave is granted,” and the words “and, with the leave of the Supreme Court, on any other ground” shall be omitted.
  1. Amendment of Article 133 (Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court in appeals from High Courts in regard to civil matters): In clause (1) of Article 133 of the Constitution, the words, numbers, and letter “if the High Court certifies under Article 134A” should be changed with “if the High Court certifies under Article 134 A.”
  2. Amendment of Article 134 (Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court in regard to criminal matters): The words, numbers, and letter “certifies under Article 134A” was substituted for the word “certifies” in sub-paragraph (c) of clause (1) of Article 134 of the Constitution.
  3. Insertion of new Article 134A (Certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court Every High Court, passing or making a judgement, decree, final order, or sentence, referred to in clause ( 1 ) of Article 132 or clause ( 1 ) of Article 133, or clause ( 1 ) of Article 134): Article 134 A was inserted, which deals with certificates for an appeal to the Supreme Court. 
  4. Amendment of Article 139A (Transfer of certain cases): Clause (1) of Article 139 A was subjected to changes.
  5. Amendment of Article 150 (Form of Accounts of The Union and of The States): The words “on the advice of” were changed with the words “after consultation with” in Article 150 of the Constitution.
  6. Amendment of Article 166 (Conduct of business of the Government of a State): Clause (4) of Article 166 of the Constitution was omitted.
  7. Amendment of Article 194 (Powers, privileges, etc, of the House of Legislatures and of the members and committees thereof): In clause (3) of Article 194 of the Constitution, for the words “shall be those of the House of Commons of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, and of its members and committees, at the commencement of this Constitution,” the words, figures, and brackets “shall be those of that House, and of its members and committees, immediately before the coming into force of Section 26 of the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978” were substituted.
  8. Amendment of Article 213 (Power of Governor to promulgate Ordinances during recess of Legislature): In Article 213 of the Constitution, clause (4) was omitted.
  9. Amendment of Article 217 (Appointment and conditions of the office of a Judge of a High Court): In Article 217 of the Constitution, in clause (2),
  1. The term “or” at the end of sub-clause (b) should be omitted;
  2. The sub-clause (c) was omitted,
  3. In the Explanation, clause (a) was re-lettered as clause (aa), and the following was inserted before a clause, “(a) in computing the period during which a person has held a judicial office in the territory of India, any period after he has held any judicial office, during which the person has been an advocate of a High Court or has held the office of a member of a tribunal or any post”
  4. Amendment of Article 225 (Jurisdiction of existing High Courts): The following proviso was placed at the end of Article 225 of the Constitution:

“Provided that any restriction that applied to the exercise of original jurisdiction by any of the High Courts with respect to any matter concerning the revenue or any act ordered or done in the collection thereof immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall no longer apply to such exercise.”

  1. Amendment of Articles 226 (Power of High Courts to issue certain writs) and 227 (Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court): The High Court’s ability to issue writs for purposes other than the enforcement of fundamental rights were restored by amending Article 226. The High Court’s authority of supervision over all courts and tribunals within its geographical jurisdiction was restored by amending Article 227. It deleted the sections that stripped the court of the ability to decide on the President, Vice President, Prime Minister, and Speaker of the Lok Sabha’s election disputes.
  2. Amendment of Article 239B (Power of administrator to promulgate Ordinances during recess of Legislature): In Article 239B of the Constitution, clause (4) was omitted.
  3. Omission of Article 257A: Article 257A, which dealt with the ability of the Central Government to dispatch its military forces or other Union forces to deal with a grave crisis, was removed.
  4. Insertion of new Chapter IV in Part XII: In Part XII of the  Indian Constitution, after Chapter III, Chapter IV dealing with the Right to Property under Article 300A was inserted.
  5. Amendment of Article 329 (Bar to interference by courts in electoral matters) and omission of Article 329 A: The words, numbers, and letter “but subject to the conditions of Article 329A” were eliminated from the beginning paragraph of Article 329 of the Constitution. Article 329 A of the Constitution was omitted. 
  6. Amendment of Articles 352, 356, and 358: Proclamation of emergency under the Act of 1978 was subjected to several changes which have been discussed later in this article.
  7. Amendment of Article 359 (Suspension of the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III during emergencies): Article 359 of the Constitution reads as follows:
  1. In clauses (1) and (1A), the words, figures, and brackets “the rights given by Part III (excluding Articles 20 and 21)” was changed with the words, figures, and brackets “the rights conferred by Part III (except Articles 20 and 21)”,
  2. the following sentence was placed after clause (1A):

“(1B) The provisions of paragraph (1A) do not apply-

(i) to any law that does not contain a recital stating that it is applicable to the Proclamation of Emergency in effect at the time it is issued; or

(ii) to any executive action not conducted in accordance with a statute providing such a recital “.

  1. Amendment of Article 360 (Provisions as to financial emergency): Article 360, clause (5), was removed, which stipulates that the President’s satisfaction as to the occurrence of a situation threatening the country’s financial stability or credit in any section is final and conclusive.
  2. Insertion of new Article 361A (Protection of publication of proceedings of Parliament and State Legislatures): Article 361A of the Indian Constitution deals with the protection of the publication of proceedings of Parliament and State Legislatures.
  3. Amendment of Article 371F (Special provisions with respect to the State of Sikkim Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution): In clause (c) of Article 371F of the Indian Constitution, the words “six years” shall be replaced with “five years,” and the words “five years” shall be replaced with “four years” in both instances where they appear.
  4. Amendment of the Ninth Schedule: In the Ninth Schedule to the Indian Constitution, Entries 87, 92, and 130 were omitted.

Right to property under 44th Amendment Act, 1978

The scope of the right to property was being reduced by the legislature from the originally drafted Constitution, year by year. The Constitution’s 44th Amendment, enacted in 1978, marked a significant shift. It changed the Constitution’s right to property by declassifying it as a fundamental right and reclassifying it as a constitutional right. Article 300A, which corresponds to Article 31(1) solely, has been put under Part XII under a separate Chapter IV ‘Right To Property,’ while Article 19 (1) (f) and Article 31 of the Constitution of India have been eliminated. The above-mentioned Article took effect in regards to;

  1. A shift in the legislature’s attitude on the necessity to provide compensation when acquiring or requisitioning property.
  2. The intimate connection between property and other basic rights.
  3. Finally, the relationship between basic rights and directive principles.

Proclamation of emergency under 44th Amendment Act, 1978

  1. In its current form, under Article 352 of the Indian Constitution, the President can only declare an emergency if the Prime Minister and their Cabinet affirm the crisis situation in writing and deliver it to the President. The President can remit the written dossier for an Emergency declaration to the Prime Minister and Cabinet under Article 74. If the Cabinet resends it, however, the President must comply and declare an emergency. Unlike in 1975, the Prime Minister may no longer make a unilateral decision on the declaration of an emergency without a written explanation or transparency. 
  2. Similarly, a simple majority in Parliament is no longer sufficient to declare an emergency. After the 44th Amendment, 1978, a special majority is required for this. The proclamation must be approved by a majority of the entire membership of each House of Parliament, as well as a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting. Previously, in the lack of majority agreement from both chambers, the proclamation would expire after two months. After the 44th Amendment, however, this term was decreased to only one month. 
  3. After the decision was ratified by the two Houses of Parliament in 1975, there was no provision for a periodic review of the proclamation of emergency. The 44th Amendment Act, 1978, mandated that the emergency declaration be revisited after six months and, in the absence of fresh legislative consent, the emergency be discontinued. The Amendment further stated that ten percent or more of the Lok Sabha members might convene a meeting to discuss a bill to revoke the proclamation. A demand of this nature must be issued within 14 days. The emergency will be lifted if the bill is passed by a simple majority at the specially called meeting. 
  4. In most cases, the term of emergency is restricted to one year. The 44th Amendment Act, 1978 stated that the right to public access to Parliamentary proceedings will not be revoked in the event of a national emergency. 
  5. Furthermore, the 44th Amendment Act, 1978 changed Article 359, making it permissible to petition the Supreme Court and High Courts for writs in the form of Habeas Corpus, which was not available during the 1975 Emergency. Article 352(5) of the 38th Constitutional Amendment rendered the declaration of emergency non-justiciable. However, since Clause 5 was removed, any person can now challenge any declaration of emergency in a court of law on the basis of the government’s mala fide intentions. Enforcement of rights under Articles 20 and 21 cannot be suspended during the operation of the National Emergency.

State emergency as perceived by the 44th Amendment Act, 1978

The following clauses are added to Article 356 pertaining to the President’s ability to make a proclamation in the event of a state’s constitutional apparatus failing:

  1. The clause relating to the breakdown of the constitutional machinery in the states was revised to specify that a Proclamation issued under Article 356 would only be in effect for six months in the first instance and that it could not last more than one year in most cases.
  2. However, if a proclamation of emergency is in effect and the Election Commission certifies that extending the President’s rule beyond one year is necessary due to difficulties in holding elections to the State’s Legislative Assembly, the Proclamation’s period of operation can be extended beyond one year. This is subject to a restriction of three years. 

Judicial review of Presidential Proclamation 

  1. A President can declare an emergency under Article 352(1) if he/she is certain that a threat to India’s security, or a part of it, exists. The subject revolves around the question of whether the President’s satisfaction is justified or not. The effect of a proclamation of emergency on preventive detention, the effect of the suspension of Article 19 following a proclamation of emergency, and the effect of the President’s Order under Article 359, are some of the issues that the courts have explored in a number of instances over time.
  2. Sub-article (5) of Article 352 was inserted by the 42nd Amendment, which made the President’s satisfaction in declaring an emergency final and conclusive, provided that such satisfaction shall not be questioned in any court on any ground, and further barred any court from considering the validity of the President’s proclamation and its continued operation. It was evident that judicial review of a declaration or its continuation was not intended. 
  3. The 44th Amendment then struck out clause (5), indicating that the court’s jurisdiction to look into the mala fide issue of a proclamation or its mala fide continuation was not to be ruled out.

Conclusion 

The 44th Amendment to the Indian Constitution was significant because it partially reversed the distortions introduced by the 42nd Amendment. It changed the Constitution’s emergency provisions to prevent them from being abused in the future. The Supreme Court and the High Courts were given back the jurisdiction and power that they had before the 42nd Amendment. It reinstated the Constitution’s secular and democratic values.

References 

  1. https://www.theleaflet.in/pre-and-post-44th-amendment-how-to-declare-a-national-emergency/.
  2. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0019556119790242.
  3. https://byjus.com/free-ias-prep/44th-amendment-act/#:~:text=The%2044th%20Amendment%20of%201978,save%20by%20authority%20of%20law%E2%80%9D.
  4. https://www.india.gov.in/my-government/constitution-india/amendments/constitution-india-forty-fourth-amendment-act-1978.

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Supreme Court judgments on society maintenance charges

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This article has been written by Oishika Banerji of Amity Law School, Kolkata. This article provides a detailed analysis of a list of Supreme Court judgments on society maintenance charges.

This article has been published by Sneha Mahawar.

Introduction 

Apart from stamp duty and registration fees, maintenance costs are the cost of living in an apartment, and they are estimated primarily depending on the size of the property and the quality of the upkeep. Repair fees are generally used to fund the upkeep and maintenance of common spaces and utilities, as well as security services such as CCTV. Elevators, a clubhouse, and generators are among the common amenities. Put simply, in exchange for the maintenance fee, you receive services such as security, housekeeping, gardening, a lift, power backup, painting, and civil repairs in the society’s common spaces, among other things from the society you live in. This is known as the society maintenance charge. These fees may be set by the general body, but they must be at least 0.75 percent of the cost of the flat/shop every year. For a 1000 sq ft apartment, the annual charge will be Rs. 9,000/-. Whether the unit is inhabited or unoccupied, the monthly maintenance expenses must be paid by the owner or the renter. The bylaws will empower the organisation to take appropriate legal action in accordance with the requirements of the bylaws. This article explains the concept of society maintenance charge by means of landmark decisions of the Supreme Court on the same. 

Supreme Court judgments on society maintenance charges

A list of Supreme Court judgments on society maintenance charges has been discussed hereunder which will provide a better understanding to the readers on this subject matter. 

Malpe Vishwanath Acharya & Ors v. State Of Maharashtra & Anr (1997)

In the case of Malpe Vishwanath Acharya & Ors vs State Of Maharashtra & Anr (1997), the Supreme Court of India was hearing a batch of appeals and the connected writ petitions, filed by the landlords, questioning the validity of certain provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 which provides that landlords cannot charge rent in excess of the standard rent.

Facts of the case 

The appellants are the owners or representatives of numerous properties in Bombay that have been rented out to various tenants. They had filed writ petitions in the Bombay High Court challenging the constitutional validity of Sections 5(10) (B), 11 (1), and 12(3) of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947, claiming, among other things, that the provisions relating to standard rent were in violation of Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Indian Constitution and thus void. The main argument against the provisions was that the restriction on landlords’ right to increase rents, which had been frozen since September 1, 1940, or at the time of the first letting, was no longer a reasonable restriction and that the provisions had become arbitrary, discriminatory, and unreasonable over time, and thus were in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. The writ petitions were dismissed by the High Court, which held that the Act’s purpose was not to provide the landlord with an adequate return on his investment and that it was not open to him to claim an increase in the rent by taking into account the increase in the land privies, etc.

Supreme Court’s decision 

  1. It is true that whenever a special provision, such as the Rent Control Act, is made for one section of the society at the expense of another, such a provision or enactment may be necessary for the larger interest of the society as a whole, but the benefit that is given initially results in increasing injustice to the other section of the society and unwarranted largess or windfall to another, without appropriate corresponding relief. Its continuance, therefore, becomes arbitrary. 
  2. While the tenant will have the security of tenure in controlled premises, they should agree to pay a rent that offers an appropriate return on investment, as well as adequate maintenance and taxes, so that they do not have an unfair advantage over the landlord. The fact that the puggrie system has grown common in Mumbai as a result of the rent restriction legislation has been noted by the legislature. The Apex Court took judicial notice of the fact that the landlords are resorting to various measures to seek restitution in light of the excessively low rents they are receiving. These practises are outside the bounds of the law, and they are gradually leading to a state of lawlessness in which it is believed that the courts would become irrelevant in resolving conflicts between landlords and renters.
  3. The Apex Court observed that they have no doubt that the present provisions of the Bombay Rent Act related to the determination and setting of the standard rent are no longer acceptable in light of all the facts and circumstances. The stated clauses would have been knocked down as being irrational and arbitrary, but the Court did not believe it was essential to do so, given that the Bombay Rent Act’s revised extended time ends on March 31, 1998. The appeals were disposed of thereby viewing that the decision of the High Court upholding the validity of the impugned provisions relating to standard rent, was not correct. 

The Apex Court had further opined that with effect from April 1, 1998, a new Rent Control Act was to be established, taking into account the remarks expressed in this ruling regarding the determination of standard rent. It was made clear, however, that any further expansion of existing rules without bringing them into compliance with the views indicated in this judgment would be unlawful as arbitrary and in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution, and therefore would have no effect.

Narendra K. Kochar v. Sind Maharashtra Coop. Housing (2002)

In the present case of Narendra K. Kochar vs Sind Maharashtra Coop. Housing (2002), the Supreme Court of India was considering an appeal by special leave against a judgment of the Bombay High Court which dismissed the appellant’s writ application and upheld an order of the Maharashtra State Co-operative Appellate Court that had directed the appellant to act under Section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, in relation to a premise in question. 

Facts of the case 

The Sind Maharashtra Co-operative Housing Society Limited (respondent) was a tenant co-partnership housing society, and B.D. Punjabi (respondent 2) was a tenant co-partner in regard to apartment No. 5 in the Society’s Ashiana Building. The respondent 2, who was given possession of the aforementioned apartment, placed the appellant in it in December 1970, without the Society’s permission, as a licensee at a monthly charge of Rs. 325/-, which was later increased to Rs. 450/-. The respondent 2 had been delinquent in paying the Society’s dues since March 1977, and the appellant, who was the occupant, was causing a nuisance to the Society’s members. The Society filed the current action under Arbitration Case No. ABN 634/754 of 1977, seeking to reclaim vacant possession of the aforementioned flat from both the respondent and the appellant. A second petition was filed for the respondent to be directed to pay the Society’s dues. The Registrar of Co-operative Societies submitted the Society’s dispute to an Officer on Special Duty under Section 91 of the Societies Act, 1960, which was then moved to the Co-operative Court under Section 91A of the Societies Act,  1960, following amendments.

Supreme Court’s observations 

  1. As the appellant’s licence was valid on 1.2.1973, the Apex Court held that, as a protected tenant under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, he could not be evicted by bringing a proceeding under Section 91 of the Societies Act, 1960 and passing orders therein. This, therefore, circumvented the provisions of the Rent Control Act, where no proceeding was taken, and thus the impugned orders were unjustified. 
  2. The Supreme Court concluded that during the hearing, it became clear from reading the evidence presented by the parties that the real reason for the society’s initiating proceedings against the appellant in order to get rid of him appears to be that he was not behaving himself and conducting himself in such a way as to annoy other members of the society who occupy the flats. The Court further noted that the learned counsel for the appellant told the Court that the appellant would be counselled not to cause any issue or annoyance to other residents in the society, to adhere to the society’s laws, and to ensure that he had no outstanding debts. The total sum that the appellant was supposed to pay was Rs. 2,47,962/- which included repayment of loan and interest thereon, building maintenance, municipal taxes, parking charges, water charges, service and maintenance charges, sinking fund, interest on arrears, and building repairs charges.
  3. The appeal was granted thereby invalidating the contested orders and dismissing the Society’s petition under Section 91 of the Societies Act, 1960. The Court observed that the parties are responsible for their own costs based on the facts and circumstances of the case.

Action v. Director of Education & Ors (2009)

The case of Action vs Director Of Education & Ors (2009) that appeared before a Single bench of Justice S.B. Sinha of the Supreme Court of India was concerned about the Delhi School Education Act, 1973, which was enacted by the Parliament to provide for better organisation and development of school education in the National Capital Territory of Delhi (NCT) and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

Facts of the case 

The Delhi Abibhavak Mahasangh filed a Writ Petition in which it asked the Union of India, the Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi, and a few other government departments to take necessary steps to regulate admissions in recognized unaided private schools in Delhi in order to avoid and check the demand of illegal money in the name of donations by the schools at the time of admissions, by framing effective policy. It was claimed that private schools were engaging in large-scale commercialization of education, which had reached an alarming level due to the government’s failure to carry out its statutory functions under the Act and Rules, as well as failing to insist on schools adhering to affiliation bye-laws and bye-laws framed by the Central Board of Secondary Education.

One of the charges levelled against Unaided Recognized Schools in the writ petition was that the schools were transferring funds to societies/trusts and/or other schools run by the same society/trust, which the Mahasangh claimed was in violation of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 and Rules framed thereunder. Simultaneously, the Action Committee of Unaided Private Schools filed a civil writ case in the same High Court, requesting, among other things, that the Director of Education’s Order dated 10.9.1997, which provided that fees and money acquired from parents must be used precisely in line with the Rule 177 of the Rules. No money shall be moved from a school’s Recognized Unaided School Fund to the Society or Trust, as the case may be, that runs that school, nor shall any expenditure be made that is not beneficial to the school’s pupils or personnel, be set aside. 

Apex Court’s observations 

  1. The Apex Court had observed that if the Director of Education discovers that the school is run for profit, the school will be in violation of a condition of recognition and will be asked to correct it, failing which it will face the consequences, which may include withdrawal of recognition if the condition of recognition is not met. The Director of Education would be right in requesting that the school explain facts that, in his opinion, suggest that the institution is conducted for profit. The school must explain facts to the Director of Education’s satisfaction. If it is unable to do so, the Director of Education may request the school to reduce the fee and other charges that, in the Director’s opinion, demonstrate that the institution is pursuing commercial motives. The Court held that the school cannot claim that the Director of Education has no authority to order the school to reduce the fee and other costs since no such authority exists in unaided schools because Section 17(1) and (2) of the 1973 Act only apply to aided schools. The goal of lowering the fees and charges is to avoid taking the drastic step of terminating recognition or taking over the institution immediately.
  2. The Court held that before or after setting the tuition cost, no consent from the Director of Education is required. If the fixing is determined to be unreasonable and arbitrary, the Act and Rules provide adequate authority to offer directives to the school to correct the problem before resorting to punitive sanctions. Individual schools’ commercialization of education and exploitation of parents can be determined authoritatively by a careful review of their finances and other documents. The Court, therefore, appointed a committee chaired by Ms. Justice Santosh Duggal, a retired judge of the Apex Court, with the authority to nominate two persons, one with accounting knowledge and the other from the field of education, in consultation with the Chief Secretary of the NCT of Delhi, to decide on the fee and other charges levied by individual schools in accordance with the Court’s decision. The Court asked the Committee to rule on the claims of individual schools as soon as practicable after providing them with an opportunity to be heard.
  3. The Action Committee argued that, under the 1973 Act, the school was not a separate legal entity from the society, and under Rule 50, one of the conditions of recognition is that the school should be run by a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The school’s Managing Committee is subject to the trust or society’s control and supervision. As a result, the Action Committee believes that transferring funds from the school to the society or vice versa is a school-internal procedure that has nothing to do with whether the funds were misappropriated. The Court concluded that there can be no objection from the Department of Education as long as there is an acceptable fee structure in place and money is transferred from one school to another under the same administration.

Rasila S Mehta v. Custodian, Nariman Bhavan (2011)

In the case of Rasila S Mehta vs Custodian, Nariman Bhavan (2011), the Supreme Court of India was considering a civil appeal filed by Smt. Rasila S. Mehta, late Harshad S. Mehta’s mother, and Smt. Rina S. Mehta, late Harshad S. Mehta’s sister-in-law, against the final judgement and order dated 26.02.2008 passed by the Special Court in Bombay in Misc that dealt with certain amounts payable to the society the appellants were living in, towards repairs and maintenance charges, interest and penalty for belated payment.  Late Harshad S. Mehta was an Indian stockbroker, who was involved in the 1992 Indian securities scam because of which he was subjected to stringent deterrent as well.  

Facts of the case 

Smt. Rasila S. Mehta and Smt. Rina S. Mehta were avid investors who had amassed an investment portfolio that had grown in value over time. They each own one of Madhuli Cooperative Housing Society Limited’s nine flats, which have been merged with other flats occupied by the combined family. The appellants’ bank accounts and stock assets are held jointly, with the appellants as first holders and their family members as joint/second holders. The Special Court’s challenged judgement and order, dated 13.03.2009, was the result of a petition filed by the Custodian in respect of outstanding dues towards Flat Nos. 32A, 32B, 33, 34A, and 34B on the Third Floor and 44A, 44B, and 45 on the Fourth Floor, as well as terrace area on the Third Floor and eight-car parking space in Madhuli Cooperative Housing Society Limited, Worli, belonging to late Harshad S. Mehta as well as other related notified entities of the Harshad Mehta Group.

Supreme Court’s observations

  1. The Supreme Court observed that according to the rules and bye-laws of Mumbai’s Cooperative Housing Societies, which are incorporated under the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, all owners of residential properties/flats, as members of the Housing Society, are liable to pay such amount as may be determined by the society towards the upkeep, maintenance, and repairs of the flats as well as common areas and amenities in the housing society. As a result, Cooperative Housing Societies have the right to collect any arrears and costs from members who have failed to pay the society on time.
  2. The appellants, in this case, are notified parties who are the owners of mentioned properties and have failed to pay their share towards the Madhuli Cooperative Housing Society Limited’s maintenance costs, interest, and charges incurred in the Society’s repair of the mentioned properties. Madhuli Cooperative Housing Society Limited has sought Rs.1,87,97,011/- in total dues for the eight attached properties in dispute in a letter dated 12.03.2009. The notified parties/entities occupying the attached property are responsible for the maintenance charges, including interest for late payments, whereas the Custodian is responsible for paying the charges incurred by the society for the repair of the mentioned properties from the account of the notified parties. There is no question that the Custodian is responsible for paying maintenance and repair fees to society. 
  3. The Apex Court believed that the appellants should not be charged with interest and punitive fines for non-payment of maintenance and repair expenses to the society since they are battling the matter with the Custodian, the Special Court, and the Supreme Court. As a result, while upholding the Custodian’s claim as allowed by the Special Court for the reasons stated above, the Court emphasised that the Custodian is not permitted to collect interest and penalty charges from maintenance and repair costs arrears.

Indrani Wahi v. Registrar of Coop. Societies (2016)

The present case of Indrani Wahi vs Registrar of Coop. Societies (2016) that appeared before the Supreme Court of India concerned the issue of succession of interest of the Flat No.4-RB 2/3, Purbachal Housing Estate, Phase-II, Sector-III, Salt Lake City, Kolkata. The appellant, Indrani Wahi has been paying maintenance and other charges to the Society, for the aforementioned flat which originally belonged to her father. Subsequently, the appellant’s brother, Dhruba Jyoti Sengupta had claimed that the appellant was not entitled to the flat. This was because the appellant being a married daughter did not fall within the definition of the term `family’ as contemplated under Section 79 of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1983. Aggrieved with the decision taken by the authorities of the society which favoured the appellant’s brother, the appellant had approached the Calcutta High Court through a writ petition. The same turned out to be in the appellant’s favour. Further, the appellant’s brother and mother had approached a Division Bench of the High Court concerning the matter in hand which surprisingly dissatisfied the appellant leading her to approach the Apex Court.

Observations made by the Supreme Court 

  1. The Apex Court observed that it is vital to explain that in accordance with Sections 79 and 80 of the 1983 Act, the Cooperative Society has no choice except to transfer membership in the name of the nominee. The Court went further to state that the same has no bearing on the issue of title between the inheritors or successors to the deceased’s property.
  2. The Court ordered ‘the Cooperative Society’ to transfer the society’s stake or interest to the appellant, Indrani Wahi, owing to the fact that she had been paying maintenance charges throughout. The Apex Court concluded that the appellant’s brother would be free to pursue a case of succession or inheritance if he is instructed to do so in accordance with the law.

ITO v. Venkatesh Premises Co-op Society Ltd (2018) 

The issue before the Supreme Court of India with respect to the present case of ITO vs. Venkatesh Premises Co-op Society Ltd (2018) was whether certain receipts by cooperative societies from their members, such as non­ occupancy charges, transfer charges, common amenity fund charges, and certain other charges, are exempted from income tax, based on the doctrine of mutuality or not?

Supreme Court’s observations 

  1. The Supreme Court of India had observed that a leaving member is responsible for the transfer fees. If a portion of it is paid by the transferee for convenience, it does not have the character of profit or commerciality because the money is allocated only after the transferee has been initiated as a member. If you are not admitted, you will receive a refund. The principles of mutuality apply as soon as the transferee is inducted as a member. Non-occupancy costs are also assessed by the society and must be paid by a member who does not use the property but rents it out to a third party. 

The fees are once again used only for the benefit of the members in terms of facilities and perks. Contributions to the common amenity fund obtained from members selling of property are similarly used to cover sudden and frequent expensive repairs to maintain ongoing and proper hazard-free upkeep of the society’s properties, eventually benefiting the members’ enjoyment and safety. These fees are charged in accordance with the society’s bye-laws and on the basis of decisions issued by the society. The receipts in the present cases have indisputably been used for mutual benefit towards the maintenance of the premises, repairs, infrastructure, and provision of common amenities.

  1. If a society has excess FSI (Floor Space Index), it has the right to use it by building new structures in compliance with the legislation. Naturally, more costs for maintenance, infrastructure, common facilities, and amenities would be incurred as a result of the increased building. If a society first inducts new members who are required to contribute to the common fund in order to use common facilities, and then only grants them occupancy rights by lot, with the ownership remaining with the society, the receipts cannot be divided into two segments, namely, receipts and costs, so that the former is classified as income of the society with commerciality. Noting the same, the Apex Court concluded that the fact that the earnings exceeded the State Government’s restrictions does not imply that the society performed services for profit thereby attracting a commercial element, and so were taxed.

The Managing Director (Shri Grish Batra) M/s.Padmini Infrastructure Developers (i) Ltd. v.  the General Secretary (Shri Amol Mahapatra) Royal Garden Residents Welfare  Association (2021)

In the present case of The Managing Director (Shri Grish Batra) M/s.Padmini Infrastructure Developers (i) Ltd. vs. the General Secretary (Shri Amol Mahapatra) Royal Garden Residents Welfare Association (2021) that appeared before a bench of Justices Hemant Gupta and V Ramasubramanian of the Supreme Court of India, the Court had ruled that the builder must compensate the Residents Welfare Association for failing to provide promised amenities.

Facts of the case 

On property allocated by the New Okhla Development Authority (‘NOIDA’), M/s Padmini Infrastructure Developers (India) Ltd. (‘the opposing party’) marketed a residential apartment complex. The opposing party appears to have built and sold around 282 flats. Despite the fact that the purchasers were given ownership between 1998 and 2001, the completion certificate was only issued in December 2001. The Royale Garden Residents Welfare Association was created by the apartment buyers and registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 on September 30, 2003. On November 15, 2003, the Residents Welfare Association and the opposing party reached an agreement to take over the apartment complex’s maintenance. Following that, the Residents Welfare Association (‘complainant’) filed a consumer complaint with the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission under Complaint No.9 of 2007, seeking relief from the opposing party. 

By interim decision dated 04.06.2008, the National Commission appointed a local Commissioner to investigate the systems/facilities related to the reliefs sought in petition clauses 2 to 6 of the complaint and produce a report. After conducting a local inspection in the presence of representatives from both parties, the stated Commissioner delivered a report on July 8, 2008. The National Commission partially approved the complaint through a decision dated 05.01.2010, thereby accepting the local Commissioner’s findings and overruling the opposing party’s position about restriction. Aggrieved by the order of the National Commission, the opposite party (builder) had approached the Supreme Court of India. 

Supreme Court’s observations 

  1. The Supreme Court observed that in light of the conclusions of an independent architect selected by the National Commission, it is not permissible for the opposing party to construct a facade as if all essential services and facilities were turned over fully operational. If all of the services were delivered in a fully operable form, the opposing party should have received a written acknowledgment from the complainant. Alternatively, the opposing party should have insisted on an adequate clause in the Agreement dated 15.11.2003.
  2. In lieu of the reliefs sought in the case, the complainant shall be entitled to all promised monetary compensation in the amount of Rs 60 lakh, which was on deposit with the Registry of the Apex Court, with interest accruing thereon. Within two weeks, the opposing party (builder) must remove all building materials from the club house in Tower Eden’s basement and transfer over custody of the club house to the complainant.

Conclusion 

The judgments which have been explained in this article can appear to be complicated for some readers because of the complexity in the wordings used by the Apex Court in these decisions. But this article will largely help the readers understand the concept of society maintenance charge in a better way. 

References 


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Critical analysis of Section 313 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973

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CrPc
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This article has been written by Indrasish Majumdar an intern at LawSikho. The article has been edited by Ruchika Mohapatra (Associate, LawSikho) and Arundhati Das (Intern at LawSikho).

This article has been published by Shoronya Banerjee.

Understanding Section 313 of CrPC : meaning and interpretation

Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 bestows upon the court, the power to examine the accused with respect to the evidence which has been produced against him. This is in line with principles of natural justice i.e. ‘Audi Alteram Partem.’ The section also embodies the basic principle of fair trial to the accused. The statement, however, cannot be solely used for the conviction of the accused or to give him any advantage whatsoever. The statement taken by the accused is recorded without administering any oath and hence, cannot be used as evidence. Further, the accused can also not be cross-examined. 

The term ‘evidence’ as used in the section is not defined anywhere in the Code. It is defined in the Indian Evidence Act. Usage of the word  ‘may’ in Section 313(a) reveals how the accused cannot raise any concern even if the former decides not to question him. However, the presence of the word ‘shall’ in Section 313(b) suggests that the questioning of the accused is mandatory after the witnesses have been examined and that the absence of the same would result in the violation of the rights of the accused. Therefore, the focus should be on inviting the attention of the accused onto each and every piece of evidence that has the potential of being used against him and giving him the due chance to provide an explanation for the same. Questions posed to the accused must be fair, reasonable, and should be easily understandable.

Further, the questions asked must relate to the whole case and not to a specific part as such.  The answers given by the accused cannot be the sole basis of his punishment, they can only be used to appreciate the prosecution evidence. Additionally, Section 313(5) also provides the accused a chance to file a written statement as sufficient compliance with the section.

Sometimes, it so happens that the Appellate Court discovers later that a significant question that was vital from the case’s viewpoint was missed out in the first place. The omission of the same would not by itself, nullify the order of the court. The court should rather try to come up with a remedy that would correct the order. Further, it is the responsibility of the Court to bring before the accused, all such facts and circumstances, which can be used against him. Notifying such facts and circumstances to the accused is not a mere formality but also an embodiment of a vital principle of natural justice.  

Scope and objectives of Section 313 of CrPC

The fundamental objective of the section is to provide the accused a fair opportunity of being heard. Often, the accused either turns out to be an illiterate person or someone who is not completely aware of his right to a fair trial. Therefore, as reflected by the verbatim, “for the purpose of enabling the accused personally to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him”. As such, the most important aim behind introducing the section is to establish a link between the accused and the court.

Further, in case the lower court fails in providing the accused with an apt opportunity to furnish an explanation, the higher court can, under such circumstances, deny the validity of the question. Further, the presence of the word ‘generally’ in Section 313(1) (b) does not narrow down the scope of the section to a particular number of questions or to a certain nature of questions. The questions should relate to the whole case or any specific part if required. Such questions should also carry an explanation if needed, so as to enable the accused to understand them better. In cases of multiple witnesses, the court is not required to pose a separate question from each witness. The court may club the statements of each of these witnesses and form one question. Most importantly, it must be notified to the accused that his statements can be used against him in the Trial Court. As such, he should be made aware of the same. 

There are cases wherein the accused, owing to his exigent conditions, fails to remain physically present before the Trial Court in order to answer the questions. In such cases, an application has to be filed before the Court with an affidavit confirming the following points:- 

I. Facts that explain his reason for not being able to be physically present before the court. 

ii. An assurance from the side of the accused that in the given circumstances, no harm would be caused to him. 

iii. An undertaking that obliges him to the final decision of the court and that he would not question the same. 

Therefore, given the series of events and happenings over the year, Section 313 has witnessed evolution. The primary interest of the section lies in updating the accused with every piece of evidence which can be used against him. Hence, it is made for the benefit of the accused to allow him to justify himself before the court.

The Code requires the Trial Court to assess and examine the case as a whole. Only such information and circumstances that have been made aware of the accused can be used against him for the purpose of trial and not any other piece of information. As such, evidently, the section is meant for the bestowing upon the accused, the proper opportunity of a fair trial. 

Procedure envisaged under the Section : point of relevance

From a general reading of Section 313(1) of the Code, it can be interpreted that the court had power or discretion at any stage of inquiry to question the accused without giving any warning previously. The discretion/power can be seen by the use of the term “may” in the sub-clause (a), while sub-clause (b) makes the question to the accused mandatory as it uses the word “shall” in it. 

Section 313(3) suggests that it will not make the accused liable, if the accused is not giving answers or if the accused gives false answers to the question asked by the court under said provisions. The answers given during examination of accused under subsection (1) may be put in evidence and taken into consideration, that the evidence can be any for the accused or against the accused, for the inquiry or for the trial, for the offence which tends to show by the answers of accused.

While questioning the accused, there should be no scope of ambiguity left i.e. the question should be formed clear, logical, and understandable. While examining the accused, the socio-economic and academic qualification and capacity of understanding the question of the accused must be considered by the court. The Trial Court must take a higher degree of care while examining illiterate and rustic defendants. 

“The incriminating material is to be put to the accused so that the accused gets a fair chance to defend himself. This is in recognition of the principles of Audi Alteram Partem.” The purpose of the section is to give a chance to the accused person for explaining any incriminating circumstance made against him and to prove his innocence. Hence, the procedure must be followed so that the purpose and object of the section get served. Section 313 of CrPC nowhere provides the manner in which the accused shall be examined. Nevertheless, the Apex Court has always been of the view that the trial courts have to look after each and every pertinent material state of affair which appear as evidence against the accused, so as to enable the accused to defend any situation disclosed in the evidence and let the accused describe what the accused wants to say with respect to the case of the prosecution. Each material circumstance that is meant to be used against him must be questioned individually to the accused. The questions must be formed in such a fair way that they can be easily appreciated and understood by even illiterate or ignorant people.

Thus, it can be concluded that Section 313 is a bridge for establishing a direct conversation between the accused and the court for the purpose of enabling the accused to explain all the circumstances put forward to him and it, for a point of time put aside all counsels, witnesses, prosecutors and all other persons related to the case.

Under Section 313 the following things need to be considered while examining the accused 

1.   The statements given under this section do not have evidentiary value. Accused is not entitled to punishment even if he has given a false answer to the questions. 

2.  Accused has the right to remain silent and cannot be compelled to speak. Accused is free to answer or refuse to answer the question asked.

3.  Language of Section 313 of CrPC is easily comprehensible so that it leaves no place for misapprehension for the purpose of the section. 

4.   The scope and purpose of the question to be asked is limited i.e. the object of the section is to enable the accused to explain the circumstances that are being used against him as evidence. There is a statutory obligation on courts to put forward questions to the accused while the accused do not have any obligation to answer them.

5.   While questioning the accused any point that is incriminating or significant which can result in injustice or prejudice shall not be left out. Any such point cannot be used against the accused if it is left out while questioning. 

6.   While examining the deaf and dumb accused proper care has to be taken. The court is duty-bound to take the help of an interpreter or someone who can comprehend the signs of the accused for knowing the criminal nature of the act done by the accused, whether the accused is deaf or mute.

In-depth analysis of Section 313

While it is true that in the past few years, the right of the accused to a speedy and fair trial has gained due popularity, the overall awareness regarding creating better conditions for the accused which allows him to be examined in a reasonable ambiance still remains under question. Unfortunately, the attention gathered for creating rights of the accused has only attracted ‘sporadic attention’ from the judiciary as well as the Parliament. Keeping in mind the miscarriage of justice that takes place, the Supreme Court has laid down that a balance ought to be drawn between the prerogative of the prosecution and the rights of the accused.

Right to silence : a gray area in criminal jurisprudence

“Right to silence” as enumerated in Section 313 of CrPC authorizes courts to question the implicated or witnesses on incriminating circumstances arising in the course of investigation whether it be in his favor or against. Section 313(2) affirms that the accused is not obligated to administer an oath when making statements under the particular section. Therefore, he/she cannot be held liable for any comments made under Section 313. The section while aiding the accused, by providing him/her with an opportunity to accept or reject with a suitable explanation any incriminating evidence before it is held against him in the court of law also states the answers given may be considered by the court as evidence, if the prosecution is himself able to make a convincing case, and the right of accused is not infringed under Article 20(3). Therefore, the accused should nonetheless be cautious of what he is stating and remain silent if he/she believes the evidence might incriminate him.

Enshrined under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, the Right often gets diluted by the ratio enunciated in the judgment (Prahlad v State of Rajasthan), which preserves the right of the accused against self-incrimination. Right to silence is an important constitutional right recognized by the judiciaries in most countries. The following segment of the article in addition to outlining judicial interpretations of Section 313 adjudges the applicability and legality of such a practice in light of the legislative intent of its framers.

Prahlad v. State of Rajasthan 

In a recent Supreme Court judgment, Prahlad v. State of Rajasthan, dated 14/12/2018, a murder conviction was upheld because of the defendants’ inability to provide an explanation for the incriminating pieces of evidence against him. In this case, an eight-year-old girl was raped and murdered. In this case, the accused was proclaimed a person who had purchased sweets for her from a sweet shop. After which the victim was not seen. The assaulted and mutilated body of the girl was discovered the day after she was last seen at the sweet shop. The Sessions Court framed charges under Section 302 of the IPC (Indian Penal Code) and Section 4 of the POCSO Act against the accused. While the conviction was upheld by the trial court and High court the Apex court relieved him of charges under the POCSO due to insufficient evidence but held him guilty of murder under Section 302. Conviction, in this case, was based primarily on inferences deduced from the inability of the accused to suitably explain the incriminating circumstances. However, convicting someone based on his silence abrogates the right of the accused under Article 20(3) of the Indian Constitution reading “No accused person can be compelled to be a witness against himself”. The judgment paves way for a precedent of convicting accused on adverse inferences from their silence under Section 313 of CrPC.

Deducing adverse inferences (the jurisprudential perspective)

Deducing adverse inferences against the accused’s silence, while interrogating under Section 313, has been deliberated in many cases by the Apex Court on several occasions The conflict with respect to the “right to silence” in addition to jeopardising the right of the accused in getting proper justice, obstructs the performance of law enforcers in applying the law and pronouncing judgment. The court has been vacillating in its stance with respect to allowing adverse inferences to be deduced or not from the silence of the accused. In Ramnaresh and ors. v. The State of Chattisgarh it was dictated the court was allowed to deduce inferences, adverse or otherwise from the silence of the accused as long as the evidence was admissible in law. The court was allowed to base inferences in favor of or against the accused on the basis of such statements. The “right to silence” enumerated under Article 20(3) is not vitiated in the process the court ruled. In Munish Mubar v. the State of Haryana, it was made obligatory for the accused to answer implicating circumstances associated with himself, irrespective of whether it could pave way for adverse inferences to be derived with respect to him/her. 

The Apex Court in Barendra Singh v. The State of M.P held that inferences adverse in nature from the accused’s silence may be used for corroborating him in further trial by the prosecution, even if it cannot be used against him per se in the same case, it can be used in any other trial. In Raj Kumar Singh and Raju v. State of Rajasthan, the court prescribed “an adverse inference can be taken against the accused only if the incriminating material stood fully established and the accused is not able to furnish any explanation for the same.” However, the Prahlad judgment overruled the dictum in Raj Kumar Singh by stating adverse statements may be relied upon to the extent of convicting the accused.

Article 20(3) of the Indian Constitution reads “no person can be compelled to be a witness against himself”, subsuming “the right against self-incrimination”. Three conditions apply with respect to this right: 

1) presumed innocence of the accused, 

2) the onus of establishing guilt is on prosecution, 

3) the accused is not being coerced into making testimonies against his/her will. 

However, the Prahlad judgment stated, while the accused is allowed to remain silent, if the same extends to any incriminating circumstances, adverse inferences may be deduced. The conflict between Section 313 and Article 20(3) of the Indian Constitution is apparent, wherein it is the prosecution who is supposed to establish the guilt of the accused by facts. Convicting on the basis of his/her statements is against due process, and hampers the administration of justice for law enforcers in addition to violating the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 20(3).

Legislative intent behind Section 313

The legislative intent behind drawing adverse inferences may be established by contrasting Section 313 of Crpc with Section 342 of the code of 1898. As Section 342(2) of the 1898 code states “The accused shall not render himself liable to punishment by refusing to answer questions or by giving false answers to them, but the court and the jury (if any) may draw such inference from such refusal or answers as it thinks fit.” “Section 313” enacted in 1972 omits the later part of Section 342 of 1898 Code, ”The accused shall not render himself liable to punishment by refusing to answer such questions, or by giving false answers to them”. As is implicit, framers of the 1972 code did not envisage the drawing of inferences against the silence of the accused with respect to any incriminating evidence. The intention was further clarified post ratification of “Part 3 of Article 20.”

D.D Basu, discussing the dissenting opinion in the case of Adamson v. California mentioned “if you cannot compel an accused to make a statement against himself, you cannot draw any inference against him because he remains silent, since that would obviously oblige him to speak, rather than remain silent.”He additionally stated deducing adverse inferences on an individual’s reluctance to testify, is equivalent to punishing that person for wanting to exercise his rights under Article 20(3).  It can therefore be stated that the legislative intent of the proviso was not directed towards the law enforcers or the accused to be affected since the same would be intransigent to the fundamental right of the accused enshrined under Article 20(3).

Validity of the right to silence

The Indian judiciary embodies due process and the theory of due process is grounded on beliefs of liberalism. Therefore, the judicial machinery, while adhering to due process, assents to follow principles of liberalism along with. The Prahlad case showcases instances where the court has deviated from its stance. It needs to be noted that  Section 313 and Article 20(3) were enacted with an objective to give the accused a chance to answer incriminating circumstances which can be used against him. 

The court is, therefore, allowed to deduce inferences only from answers provided with respect to the incriminating circumstances and not his silence. Deducing adverse inferences from the silence of the accused countermands rationale behind not administering an oath to the accused while making statements under Section 313. Ensuring the accused is not governed by fear of perjury when delivering his account of the case. The mechanism of drawing adverse inferences taints the reliability and the validity of the statements made under the proviso, rendering it ineffective to be considered as evidence under Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act. 

The constitutional guarantee as provided in Article 20(3) underpins the “right to silence” of the accused. Drawing adverse inferences irrespective would contravene Article 20(3) and constitute testimonial compulsion. The judiciary should acknowledge the “right to silence” for an unrestricted right as part and parcel of “the right to free trial (Article 21)” and in-process establish its rarity in the field of criminal law.

Landmark judgments

The Supreme Court in a recent judgment delivered on 26thAugust 2019, considered the rights of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In Samsul Alam v. State of Assam, the appellant’s conviction of murder was upheld by the Gauhati High Court. However, when questioning the accused under Section 313, only two questions were put to him, as noted by the Apex Court. The same was noted perfunctory by the Supreme Court. It is under the principle of “audi alteram partem”, the right to be heard. The accused was acquitted taking into consideration the hasty manner in which the statements under the section were recorded.

In Shivaji Sabarao Bobade v. The State of Maharashtra, a three-judge bench of the Apex Court deliberated on the consequences of omitting certain incriminating evidence against the accused before him. The Supreme Court cautioned by stating: “The cherished principles of the golden thread of proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs through the web of our law should not be stretched morbidly to encompass every hunch, hesitancy, and degree of doubt. The excessive solicitude reflected in the attitude that a thousand guilty men may go out, but one innocent martyr shall not suffer is a false dilemma. An only reasonable doubt may be attributed to the accused. Otherwise, any practical system of justice will break down and lose credibility with the community.” 

The Court commented in case it finds the prosecution had failed to examine the witnesses for reasons not tenable or proper, the court may be justified in deducing adverse inferences against the prosecution. The bench held it was fundamental and in furtherance to the right to a fair trial that the attention of the prisoner is drawn to, every incriminating or inculpating material against him, so as to provide him with an opportunity to explain it. 

In Ashraf Ali v. State of Assam, the Court deliberated on the objective of Section 313. It stated the objective of Section 313 was to initiate a dialogue between the court and the accused. It is proper and logical to question the accused about a point of evidence if it is an important piece of information against the accused, and his/her conviction is to be based on the same.  

The objective and purpose of Section 313 are to preserve the rights of the accused under Article 20(3) of the Constitution, dictated by the court while referring to the 1898 CrPC where a similar provision had been subsumed under Section 342. The court mooted the “Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution” which laid down the rights to accused as under Section 313, the right to be informed on the nature and cause of accusation. The court stressed the importance of the examination of the accused to take place in proper form and manner. An evasive answer the court stated to a question concerning a fact adduced in evidence might aid the court in appreciating the evidence better. 

It can be deduced from the ratio of the above-mentioned cases, Section 313 is a statutory provision deeply rooted in the criminal justice machinery. The section enables the accused to speak honestly with “impunity”, as proviso (2) of the section allows the statement to be recorded without administering the oath, therefore the accused is saved from making him liable by proffering false answers. Therefore, unless the prosecution demonstrates beyond reasonable doubt that the statements of the accused are fabricated, the version of the accused in his statement should be accepted by the court. The section bestows on the trial court a strenuous duty to place before the accused each and every inculpatory material available against him appearing in evidence, failing which the trial process would be vitiated. The section aids the court in going a long way to realize its objective of ascertaining the truth, which is fundamentally the guiding principle of India’s criminal justice mechanism. Some more judgments are presented in detail:- 

1. Samsul Haque v. The State of Assam

The Supreme Court considered the rights of the accused enshrined under Section 313 and stated that the implicative material is to be put to the accused so that the accused gets a fair chance to defend himself. This is in recognition of the principles of audi alteram partem.

Facts

Several people (A 1-9) were accused of murdering a person. The sessions judge concluded that A1, A5, and A6 were proven guilty beyond doubt and the rest were acquitted.  Further, during the trial, only two questions were put in the said statement. The convicts filed an appeal before the Gauhati High Court. The appeal of the convicted accused was dismissed by the High Court, thus, that matter attained finality.

Principle laid

The title of Section 313 of CrPC suggests that it was drafted in order to empower the court to examine the accused. However, the section in essence is not limited to power but is also a duty cast upon the court to indulge in an inquiry to enable the accused to elaborate and explain the circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. Each object and material that is presented as evidence against the accused shall be put to him specifically, distinctly, and separately and failure to do so amounts to a serious irregularity vitiating trial if it results in prejudice to the accused.

 Hon’ble Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul in his judgment said that “The object of Section 313 of the CrPC is to establish a direct dialogue between the Court and the accused. If a point in the evidence is important against the accused, and the conviction is intended to be based upon it, it is right and proper that the accused should be questioned about the matter and be given an opportunity of explaining it.”

The questions put by the court shall put forward conclusive conservation which ensures that all the facts and circumstances are taken on the note. Therefore, when a court fails to put any specific question on an inculpatory material in the prosecution evidence, it dismisses any chance of refuting the materiality of the evidence. In furtherance, this causes a miscarriage of justice. Furthermore, the recording of a statement of the accused under Section 313 is not a purposeless exercise.

2. Sharad Birdichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra

“If the circumstances are not put to the Accused in his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, they must be completely excluded from consideration because the Accused did not have any chance to explain them.”

Facts

A woman was found dead in her home. Two theories were raised regarding her death. The first one was that she gave up on the torture of her in-laws and committed suicide.  The second, that her husband had an extra-marital affair and to make way for the same, he murdered his wife.

Both the High Court and the Trial Court rejected the theory of suicide and found that Manju was murdered by her husband. The High Court took note of 17 circumstances that in consequence contributed to a conclusion that the evidence produced by the prosecution was complete and conclusive. However, the value and relevance of the evidence itself were in question when an appeal was made before the Apex Court.

Principle laid

The foundation of the said decision by both the courts was the circumstantial evidence. There is a threat to the value of the said evidence, as it was deemed to be inconsistent with Section 313 of the CrPC. It was held that many of the circumstances put forward were irrelevant and rather overlapped with each other. Further, even the ones that were exclusively relevant and vital to the conclusions drawn were not in consonance with Section 313 of CrPC. Thus, they cannot be taken into consideration. If the evidence was not brought in front of the accused, it dismissed the chance of the accused nullifying or countering it with a fresh set of circumstances or reasoning.

Various pieces of evidence were used to prove the ill-treatment of the deceased, however, none of them were brought to question, which eliminated the possibility of a dialogue that CrPC prescribed through Section 313. No questions were put to the appellant in this regard in the course of his examination under Section 353 of CrPC even if there is any evidence about any ill-treatment of the deceased by the appellant or his parents it was completely excluded from consideration.

3. Ashraf Ali v. State of Assam

Circumstances about which the accused was not asked to explain cannot be used against him.”

Facts

A man was accused of Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code and the accused placed the plea of alibi. The alibi was rejected and subsequently was put to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment. The learned judge of the High Court reduced the sentence to 5 years. However, the High Court in its examination found that the evidence and circumstances that formed the base of the prosecution case had not been specifically placed before the accused. It was also noted that the Trial Court faltered in its duty in the examination. 

However, the High Court felt that no material prejudice was caused to the accused as he was found to be absconding for a long time. Therefore, the matter came in front of the Supreme Court in finality.

Principle laid

As per the s. 313 of CrPC it is fundamental that an accused is made aware of each detail that puts him behind the bars. This does not extend to a formality that can be sufficed by a questionnaire, but the courts need to take care that the accused knows and understands everything that has been leveled against him. The absence of such information or knowledge regarding the information may gravely imperil the validity of the trial itself.

Principles laid down 

1. Reena Hazarika v. State of Assam

The solemn duty that is upon the courts is to dispense justice after adequately considering the defence of the accused and the attempt at refuting the evidence and circumstances put forth against him under Section 313 of the CrPC and to either accept or reject the same for the reasons specified in writing. 

2. Shamu Balu Chaugule v. State of Maharashtra

The fact that an accused said to be absconding, not having been put to him under Section 342, Criminal Procedure Code, cannot be used against him. 

3. S. Harnam Singh v. The State

Not indicating the inculpatory material in its relevant facets by the court to the accused shall add to the vulnerability of the prosecution case. This shall also be noted by the courts as the recording of a statement of the accused under Section 313 is not a purposeless exercise.

4. Sujit Biswas v. State of Assam

The very purpose of examining the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is to meet the requirement of the principles of natural justice, i.e., audi alteram partem.

Conclusion 

With the changing structures of institutional motives and a continuous variation of power dynamics, it becomes necessary to highlight the powers of the court and distinguish them from the rights of the accused. Section 313 of CrPC is one such section that does both and is integral to the criminal procedure. In the pretext, while examining the section, the linguistics suggests that it is limited to the inherent power of the court to question the suspect, however through a layered understanding which is also based upon certain judgments from the Apex Court, one can understand the underlying conscience of the principles of fair chance and right to be heard in a courtroom. 

The section is a balance between the power of the court to examine the evidence themselves and hold it up against the accused along with the opportunity given to the accused to explain himself and put a defence. The attempt to strike a perfect balance is difficult with the scope of the law and its subjects changing with time. Therefore, with the evolution of laws, certain grey areas were identified. The insouciant conflict with the accused’s right to remain silent also gradually caught attention. Additionally, in the process of expanding analysis, it was noticed that there have been instances where there was an adverse effect of the statements made and conclusions brought upon in the scope of Section 313.

The pillar of judicial thought that brings clarity, as well as perspective to the bare text of the law, was consistent with regards to Section 313 where it stated across various judgments that the value of evidence exhausts if it is not scrutinised by a magistrate and brought before the accused. The right to refuse the given evidence, and form a conversation that has the capability of bringing out meaningful conclusions irrespective of the conditions and literacy of the accused is undeniable. Therefore, it can be concluded that Section 313 of CrPC is a provision that aids the principles of a fair trial by giving the opportunity to the accused to ascertain the value, conditions, and circumstances lying beside any evidence. The section is of great importance and is one of the pillars that support the desire for equity in judicial scrutiny.

References

Articles

  1. Sabhori Kumari, ‘Examination of Accused under Section 313’ <https://districts.ecourts.gov.in/sites/default/files/workshopscjrajam.pdf> accessed 14 March 2020 
  2. Govt. of India, ‘Analyzing Section 313 of CrPC’ (2013) <http://mja.gov.in/Site/Upload/GR/Title%20NO.202(As%20Per%20Workshop%20List%20title%20no202%20pdf).pdf> accessed 15 March 2020
  3.  Singh, Aishwarya Pratap, Inquisitorial Powers of the Court in Adversarial System: A Bird’s Eye View (February 6, 2018). http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3118880 accessed on 12 March 2020.
  4. Indian Legal Services, ‘Defense of the accused Under Sec.313’ <http://www.legalservicesindia.com/law/article/1099/5/-Defence-of-The-Accused-U-s-313-CrPC;-Non-Consideration-Can-Vitiate-Conviction> accessed 20 March 2020
  5. Chetan Lokur, ‘Section 313 CrPC, Audi Alteram Partem, and the Rights of the Accused’ (Bar and Bench, 7 October, 2019) < https://www.barandbench.com/columns/section-313-crpc-audi-alteram-partem-and-the-rights-of-the-accused> accessed on 24 Mar 2020

Books

  1. DD Basu, ‘Commentary on the Constitution of India’ (9th Edition, 2002) vol 2 (derived from the 180thLaw Commission Report).
  2. R.V Kelkar’s, Criminal Procedure (first published 1977, EBC)

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Shri Bhim Singh, MLA v. State of Jammu & Kashmir Ors. AIR 1986 SC 494

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This article is written by Prina Sharma, from Amity University, Kolkata, West Bengal. The article deals with the analysis of the Shri Bhim Singh vs. The State of J&K case in the light of false imprisonment and infringement of constitutional rights. 

Introduction

The case deals with false imprisonment, which is a state where any individual or any authority deliberately invades another person’s freedom without any legal jurisdiction or the grant of the restrained person. False imprisonment is a civil and a criminal wrong and it applies to both private as well as governmental detention. This matter is dealt with in the form of wrongful confinement in the Indian Penal Code, under Section 340. When it comes to police, the proving of false imprisonment is sufficient to obtain a writ of Habeas Corpus. The courts must not stay silent and be proactive in awarding exemplary compensation and costs to the restrained person. 

The Constitutional safeguard for the protection of arrested persons is violated by police officials in general and sometimes even Magistrates tend to neglect their duties and responsibilities and do not act by the law. A similar situation arose in the case of Bhim Singh v State of Jammu & Kashmir, headed by the bench consisting of Judges 0. Chinnappa Reddy and V. Khalid, where the petitioner, who is an MLA of Jammu & Kashmir, was illegally detained by the police while he was going to Srinagar to attend a session of the Legislative Assembly. He was deprived of his constitutional rights as he was not produced before the Magistrate within the requisite period after his arrest and also because he was prevented from attending the Session in the Legislative Assembly. There was an infringement of Article 21 and Article 22(2) of the Constitution. The detailed case is discussed further.

Facts of the case

On September 9, 1985, an FIR was registered against the petitioner, Shri Bhim Singh, under Section 153-A of the Ranbir Penal Code at the Police Station Pacca Danga, Jammu on the ground that he had delivered an inflammatory speech at a public meeting situated near Parade Ground, Jammu at 7:00 P.M. on September 8, 1985. He was arrested and detained by the police and deliberately prevented from attending the session of the Legislative Assembly of Jammu & Kashmir, which was held on 11th September 1985. Shri Bhim Singh was suspended from the Assembly on August 17, 1985, the opening day of the Budget Session of the Legislative Assembly. He brought the suspension under the notice of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir, however, the orders of his suspension were stayed by the High Court till 9th September 1985.

The Supreme Court in response to Bhim Singh’s wife’s Habeas Corpus writ had directed the Inspector General of Police to inform Smt. Jayamala where Shri Bhim Singh was held in custody. Shri Bhim Singh was released on bail, on September 16, 1985, by the learned Additional Sessions Judge of Jammu before whom he was produced. After his bail, he had filed a supplementary affidavit on 20th September 1985 stating more facts in addition to what had already been stated by his wife, Smt. Jayamala, in the petition. Simultaneously, there was a voting session going on at the assembly but he was not allowed to vote as he was refrained from going. His vote was very crucial; although the person whom he wanted to give the vote won, his right to vote was infringed.

Issues involved

  • Whether the arrest and the detention was illegal and will be qualified as false imprisonment
  • Whether the detention was a violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioner
  • Whether the petitioner is liable for exemplary compensation

Contentions of the parties 

Submissions by the plaintiff

The Petitioner contended that he was not produced before the Magistrate and the Sub – Judge (as contented by the respondents). He also mentioned that he wasn’t examined by the  Doctor and that he was treated inhumanely by the Police. Further, there was a voting session going on at the assembly but he was not allowed to vote as he was refrained from going through wrongful refrainment. His vote was very crucial; although the person whom he wanted to give the vote won, his right to vote was infringed.

Submissions by the defendant 

Shri M.M. Khajuria, the Inspector General of Police, and Shri M.A. Mird, the Superintendent of Police, Anantnag, contended that an FIR was filed against Shri Bhim Singh, under Section 153-A of the Ranbir Penal Code on 9th September 1985 at Police Station of Pacca Danga, Jammu. On 10th September 1985, a requisition for the arrest of Shri Bhim Singh was sent from the Police Control Room, Srinagar to the Superintendent of Police, Anantnag. On 11th September 1985, the Executive Magistrate First Class signed a remand to keep the petitioner, Shri Bhim Singh, for two days under police custody. On the expiry of the remand, a further remand for one day was obtained by the Inspector General of Police, Shri Khajuria, from the Sub-Judge with the reason that Shri Bhim Singh was sick (Medical Certificate attached), on 13th September 1985. The petitioner was produced before the Sub-Judge, after the expiry of the remand on 14th September 1985 and judicial custody for two days was obtained. Furthermore, again on 16th September 1985, the petitioner was produced before the Additional Sessions Judge where his bail was granted. 

Observation of the Court

Whether the arrest and the detention was illegal and will be qualified as false imprisonment

The Supreme Court, after viewing through the circumstances and listening to the contentions of the parties, concluded that the petitioner was falsely imprisoned. The Court noted that they hold no doubt about the fact that failure to file the affidavits of the two police officers, who arrested the petitioner and the one who produced the petitioner before the Magistrate was deliberate. The orders of the remand that were obtained from the Executive Magistrate of First Class and the Sub-Judge were obtained without the production of the petitioner, Shri Bhim Singh, before them. 

The Apex Court observed that the Executive Magistrate of First Class and the Sub-Judge did not seem to have been concerned about the fact that the person whom they were remanded to custody had not been produced before them and further stated that the police officers acted deliberately and mala fide and they were aided by the Magistrate and the Sub-Judge, by either colluding with them or by their casual attitude.

Whether the detention was a violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioner

The fact that the petitioner was not produced before the Magistrate on 11th September 1985 and the Sub-Judge on 13th September 1985, was a gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioner, Shri Bhim Singh, under Articles 21 and 22(2).

The Honourable Supreme Court observed that nobody cared to explain why Shri Bhim Singh was expected to pass through Qazi Kund, Anantnag on the night of September 9th – 10th, 1985, and why the Senior Superintendent of Police, Udhampur directed his officers to escort Bhim Singh, and who informed him about the petitioner’s arrest, suggests that Shri Bhim Singh was deliberately prevented from attending the session of the Legislative Assembly which was to take place on 11th September 1985. 

Whether the petitioner is liable for exemplary compensation

The Honourable Supreme Court noted that when someone comes to the court with a complaint that the person has been arrested and imprisoned with mischievous or malicious intent and that his constitutional and legal rights are invaded, then the mischief or malice and the invasion may not just be washed away by simply setting the person free. In cases such as this, the court has the jurisdiction to compensate the victim by awarding suitable monetary compensation. 

Judgment

The Honourable Supreme Court held that Shri Bhim Singh, the petitioner, was not produced before the Magistrate, either on 11th of September, 1985 or before the Sub-Judge on 13th of September, 1985, and he was arrested in the early hours of the morning of 10th September,1985. The Honourable Supreme Court stated that there certainly was a gross violation of Shri Bhim Singh’s constitutional rights under Articles 21 and 22(2).

The Apex Court deduced that it was expected that Bhim Singh would travel from Jammu to Srinagar on the intervening night of 9th-10th September 1985, as there was a meeting of the Assembly on 11th September 1985 and the police were sent a notice to arrest him when sighted en route to Srinagar and detain him to prevent him from proceeding to Srinagar to attend the session of the Legislative Assembly.

The honorable Supreme Court observed that “if the personal liberty of a member of the Legislative Assembly is to be played within this fashion, one can only wonder what may happen to lesser mortals.” The Supreme Court noted that two police officers, who were directly responsible for arresting the petitioner and the one who obtained the orders of remand, are just minions, in the lower rungs of the ladder. The Court stated that they do not have the slightest doubt that the responsibility of the arrest and detention lies elsewhere and with the higher echelons of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. The Apex Court could not, however, with the materials present with them, precisely say as to where and with whom the responsibility lay.

The Honourable Supreme Court held that the constitutional rights of the petitioner, Shri Bhim Singh, were violated with impunity and he had the right to receive monetary compensation. The first respondent, the State of Jammu and Kashmir, was directed by the Apex Court to pay Shri Bhim Singh, a sum of Rs. 50,000/- within two months from the date of the judgment of the present day.  

Ratio Decidendi

The Ratio Decidendi of the case is Injuria sine damno which means violation of legal rights without causing any harm, loss, or damage to the plaintiff/petitioner. In this case, it would not be necessary to prove that as a consequence of an act, the plaintiff/petitioner has suffered any harm, it is therefore actionable. For an action to be identified as Injuria sine damno, the only thing that has to be proved is that the legal rights of the plaintiff/petitioner have been violated.

In the case of Shri Bhim Singh v The State of Jammu & Kashmir, the petitioner, Shri Bhim Singh was deprived of his legal rights. He was illegally arrested and detained, therefore preventing him from attending the assembly session and thus, depriving him of his constitutional rights. This has also resulted in the gross violation of the fundamental right to personal liberty, freedom, and life with dignity under Article 20 and Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. The petitioner has also stated that he was not produced before a Magistrate within a requisite period, thus violating Section 56 and Section 76 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. He also stated that he was detained for more than 24 hours, therefore infringing his legal rights.

As a result of the damages caused by the respondents to the petitioner, the Honourable Supreme Court directed the State of Jammu & Kashmir, the first respondent, to pay Rs. 50,000/- to the petitioner, Shri Bhim Singh as monetary compensation. 

Analysis

False imprisonment is a common-law misdemeanor and a tort and it is one of the most severe forms of human rights violations that occur when a person intentionally restricts another person’s movement within any area without legal authority, justification, or the restrained person’s permission. False imprisonment is composed of four ingredients which are:

–       Complete deprivation of personal liberty

–       Knowledge of restraint

–       Presence of bad intention

–       Unlawful act

The case of Shri Bhim Singh v State of Jammu & Kashmir covers all of the above ingredients and even brings to light various illegal detentions by the police officers. There were certain fundamental rights provided by the constitution which were grossly violated in this case.

The petitioner, Shri Bhim Singh, even though he had the right to be produced before a Magistrate without delay, was not produced before any Magistrate by the arresting police officer immediately after he was arrested, and was rather detained in police custody for more than the required time, thus violating Section 56 and Section 76 of the CrPC which mandates that the person arrested shall be produced before the Magistrate or the court having jurisdiction in the case without unnecessary delay. Shri Bhim Singh’s right of not being detained for more than 24 hours was infringed, since he was not produced before any Magistrate within 24 hours, excluding the time it took to travel from the place of arrest to the Magistrate’s Court. The police officers did not fulfill the requirement and hence, the arrest was unlawful according to Article 22(2) of the Indian Constitution.

Our Indian socio-legal system is based on the foundation of non-violence, mutual respect and human dignity of the individual. Even the prisoners in jail have human rights because prison torture is not the ultimate remedy to get justice, what is equally important is confessing the failure to do justice to a living being. Article 21 of the Indian Constitution recognizes the importance of human rights and Article 20 with its sub-clauses re-enforces the same and aims to protect preserve the right of the convicts from being held down due to ex post facto laws, double jeopardy, and self-incrimination in Article 20(a), (b) and (c ) respectively.

Articles 20 and 21 provide an individual with the right to personal liberty, freedom, and life with dignity and that cannot be abolished even during an emergency. Even if a convict is imprisoned and has to serve a sentence, that still doesn’t give the authorities of the jail any right to torture or harass him without any jurisdiction. People often tend to believe that prisoners are subject to intolerable hardships that are remediless. Imprisonment holds a decisive and vital factor that shall be taken into account in order to compute and award damages. Furthermore, for awarding damages for false imprisonment both physical and mental injuries are required to be kept in mind. The very fact that the person has been imprisoned raises the claim of nominal or compensatory damages, given the fact that no other injury has been caused to the plaintiff. If any person is unlawfully detained by any police officer or government officer, then he or any person on his behalf can file for the Writ of Habeas Corpus that ensures the liberty of the person who is detained. The person who is about to be falsely arrested or imprisoned can also use reasonable force such as the force of self-defense depending on the circumstance, to prevent false arrest. 

Relevant cases mentioned in the judgment by the Supreme Court 

Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar and Anr. 

Rudul Sah was arrested for murdering his wife, in the year 1953. On 3rd June 1968, he was declared innocent by the additional session judge of Muzaffarpur and was also directed to be released from prison. However, after being declared innocent, he had to serve another 14 years in prison and was finally released on 16th October 1982. His predicament was highlighted in the media in 1968 which led him to file the PIL for severe injustice.

Nevertheless, Rudul Sah was released after the PIL appeared in court. Regardless of this, they were instructed to send a notification to the State of Bihar to justify some of the prayers made by the petitioner in the appeal. The prayers are as follows:

1. The petitioner asks the government to provide clinical assistance;

2. The petitioner sought subordinate alleviation including installment for his rehabilitation;

3. Requests compensation for his illicit detainment for more than 14 years.

Although the Court stated that they wanted to respond immediately to the notice of the cause, they did not provide any justification for the prayers for 4 months. On 16th April 1983, the warden of Muzaffarpur Central Prison, Shri Alakh Deo Singh, submitted a much-delayed affidavit in compliance with the order passed on 16th October 1982. The Court stated that the accused is blameless, but should be confined in prison until further orders from the state government and the Inspector General of prison.

It is said that when Rudul Sah passed the acquittal order, he was of unsound mind, although when he sent the report to the civil surgeon, he was reported as mentally stable during the time of his acquittal. Furthermore, there lies another question as to whether it took Rudul Sah 14 years to improve upon his mental imbalance. However, the government did not provide any medical report that may support any diagnosis that may prove that he was insane, nor did they produce any evidence regarding the drugs prescribed to Rudul Sah and for how long he had been diagnosed. 

Sebestian M. Hongray v. Union of India 

In this case, the decision of the Supreme Court involved the failure of the Government to produce two persons in the court, C. Daniel and C. Paul, who were taken to the Phungrei Camp by the jawans of the 21st Sikh Regiment on March 10, 1982, and held in their custody. 

Army Authorities, the Central Bureau of Investigation, the respondents, and several other authorities failed to find the two missing persons. The Court presumed the possibility that the two persons who were held captive by the army had met an unnatural death. 

The Court, in this unfortunate circumstance, keeping in mind the torture, the agony, the mental oppression, and the irreparable loss undergone by the wives of the persons, directed the Government to pay Rs. 1 lakh to both the wives as a measure of exemplary costs. The award of compensation directed by the Court was an act done by public servants in the performance of sovereign functions. 

Conclusion

Given all the facts of the case, we can conclude that preventing someone from exercising his/her rights freely by illegally detaining the person is a cause of false imprisonment and is a gross violation of their fundamental rights. In order to protect these rights, the Constitution has provided us with writ remedies that are enforceable by the High Courts and the Supreme Court. These rights are often violated by government authorities, although in some cases private parties are also involved in the misuse of a higher power. If any person is about to be falsely arrested or imprisoned then he can use reasonable force in order to prevent false arrest. The restrained person can use the force for self-defense but it is necessary to make sure that the force used is reasonable according to the circumstances.

References


Students of Lawsikho courses regularly produce writing assignments, and work on practical exercises as a part of their coursework and develop themselves in real-life practical skills.

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Latest Supreme Court judgments on granting of maintenance to wife

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This article has been written by Oishika Banerji of Amity Law School, Kolkata. This article deals with the Supreme Court judgments on granting of maintenance to wife. 

Introduction 

The notion of maintenance may be traced back to a civilised society’s social justice system. In Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse and Anr. (2013), the Supreme Court of India explained the justification for granting maintenance by stating that “maintenance is provided with the goal of strengthening the poor and attaining social justice, or individual equality and dignity. It encapsulates societal ideals.” The right to demand maintenance is statutory in India, and it cannot be taken away by an agreement to the contrary. Maintenance might be granted throughout the course of the proceedings (maintenance pendente lite) or after the completion of the proceedings (maintenance final), that is permanent maintenance. The right to claim maintenance is available to wives, children, and parents. Even husbands (who are unable to support themselves) are entitled to maintenance under specific personal laws. This article provides a list of ten Supreme Court judgments concerning the maintenance of a wife. 

Latest Supreme Court judgments on granting of maintenance to wife

In India, married women have the right to seek maintenance (both interim and permanent) under general laws, in addition to their rights under their separate personal laws. 

Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) requires a husband to support his wife (who is otherwise unable to maintain herself). The Supreme Court in Bhuwan Mohan Singh v. Meena & Ors (2014) has held that Section 125 of CrPC was conceived to alleviate the agony, anguish, and financial suffering of a woman who has left her matrimonial home for the reasons set forth in the provision so that the Court can make appropriate arrangements for her and her children if they are with her. The term “sustenance” does not always imply that one is living an animal’s existence. She has the legal right to conduct her life in the same manner as she would have in her husband’s home. 

The Delhi High Court had ruled in Kusum Sharma v. Mahinder Kumar Sharma (2020) that maintenance is not only a constitutional right but also an element of universal human rights. The purpose of paying maintenance is twofold, 

  1. First, to prevent vagrancy as a result of strained husband-wife relationships, and
  2. To guarantee that the poor litigating spouse is not crippled as a result of a lack of funds to defend or prosecute the case.

In addition to an order of maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC or any other legislation in effect, an aggrieved wife is entitled to maintenance under Section 20 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (PWDA). The amount of maintenance must be adequate, fair, reasonable, and commensurate with the injured person’s quality of living. 

Neha Tyagi v. Lieutenant Colonel Deepak Tyagi (2021)

A father’s duty and responsibility to keep his child until they reach the age of majority cannot be excused. It is also undeniable that the child has a right to be cared for in accordance with his father’s position. This was observed by division bench judges comprising of Hon’ble Justices Mukeshkumar Rasikbhai Shah and A.S. Bopanna of the Supreme Court of India,  in the matter of Neha Tyagi vs. Lieutenant Colonel Deepak Tyagi (2021).

Facts of the case 

The facts of the case are that the appellant and respondent were married and had a son out of wedlock. A disagreement erupted between the husband and wife, and the appellant-wife filed a number of complaints against the respondent-husband along with his employer, the Army Authorities. The complaints included the respondent’s extramarital affairs as well. The respondent-husband filed a divorce petition against the appellant-wife in the learned Family Court of Jaipur, alleging cruelty and desertion by the appellant. On May 19, 2008, the learned Family Court issued a decision dissolving the marriage between the appellant and the respondent based on cruelty and desertion by the appellant-wife. The appellant, in this case, filed an appeal with the High Court, feeling offended and unhappy with the ruling. The High Court dismissed the said appeal and upheld the decision and decree of the learned Family Court in the contested judgement and order. As a result, at the request of the appellant-wife, the present appeal was filed in the Supreme Court.

Observation by the Apex Court 

  1. After reviewing the facts and arguments offered, the Supreme Court concluded that the respondent’s duty and responsibility to maintain his son until he reaches the age of majority cannot be relieved. A child should not be made to suffer because of a disagreement between husband and wife. The father’s duty and responsibility for the child’s maintenance remain until the child reaches the age of majority. It is likewise unarguable that the son has a right to be maintained in the same manner as his mother. 
  2. It has been stated that the mother is unemployed. As a result, regardless of the decree of dissolution of the marriage between the appellant-wife and the respondent, a reasonable/sufficient sum is necessary for her son’s maintenance, including his schooling, which must be provided by the respondent. 
  3. In light of the foregoing reasons indicated above, the current appeal was dismissed by affirming the divorce/dissolution of marriage decree entered between the appellant-wife and the respondent-husband. However, the respondent-husband is ordered to pay the appellant Rs.50,000/- per month beginning in December 2019 for the support of his kid, based on the respondent’s current condition.

Rajnesh v. Neha (2020)

In Rajnesh v Neha (2020), a Supreme Court division Bench comprising of Justices Indu Malhotra and Subhash Reddy put down extensive norms to control the payment of maintenance in matrimonial cases on November 4th, 2020.

Facts of the case 

In this case, the appellant, Rajnesh, was ordered by the Family Court to pay maintenance to the respondent, Neha, and their minor child. He unsuccessfully challenged this order in the Bombay High Court and finally filed an appeal before the Supreme Court. Rajnesh was ordered by the Supreme Court to pay all his debts and make interim maintenance payments. 

Guidelines by the Supreme Court of India 

While adjudicating this case, the Court found the need to frame guidelines that would cover overlapping jurisdiction under different enactments for maintenance payment, interim maintenance payment, determining the quantum of maintenance, the date from which maintenance is to be awarded, and the enforcement of maintenance orders.

  1. The Court while addressing the conflict arising out of overlapping jurisdiction noted that, while there is no restriction on invoking multiple laws to obtain maintenance, it would be inequitable to direct the husband to pay maintenance under each of the proceedings, independent of the relief granted in a previous proceeding. As a result, the spouse seeking support must inform the Court if they have been awarded maintenance in a prior or separate proceeding. Furthermore, while determining the amount of maintenance, the Court must take into consideration any previous maintenance order in order to reduce or offset the amount.
  2. The Court has simplified the interim maintenance process in light of the judicial delay in adjudicating interim maintenance actions and the usual practice of parties concealing their financial position. The Court created affidavit templates for parties to use when declaring their financial situation. It also established deadlines to avoid delays and observed that the respondent must make their disclosure within four weeks, and the concerned court must rule on interim maintenance within four to six months.
  3. The Court acknowledged that there was no straitjacket formula to calculate the quantum of maintenance. The Court noted that the same should balance the applicant spouse’s interests with the responding spouse’s financial competence. The Court outlined considerations to examine when determining the amount of maintenance to be paid. The following items were included on the list, namely, 
  1. The parties’ status, 
  2. The applicant’s needs, 
  3. The respondent’s income and property, 
  4. The claimant’s liabilities and financial responsibilities, 
  5. The parties’ age and employment status, 
  6. The parties’ residential arrangements, 
  7. The parties’ minor children’s maintenance, and 
  8. Illness or disability..
  1. The Supreme Court noted that in the past, courts have utilised a variety of criteria to determine when maintenance should be paid to the applicant, including the date the application was filed, the date of the court order, and the date the respondent received the notification. After considering each of these cut-off dates, the Apex Court in the present case determined that awarding maintenance from the date of the application’s submission would be in the applicant’s best interests.
  2. The Court devised three techniques to address the challenges of implementing maintenance orders. First, the maintenance orders might be implemented in the same way as a civil court decision would, with the court having civil detention, property attachment, and other powers. Second, the court may dismiss the respondent’s defence. Finally, the court has the authority to begin contempt proceedings. Any of these tools might be used by the court to enforce maintenance orders.

Lalita Toppo v. the State of Jharkhand and Anr (2018)

In the present case of Lalita Toppo v. the State of Jharkhand and Anr. (2018) that appeared before the Supreme Court of India, the appellant, not a legally wedded wife of the respondent, had approached the Court to seek maintenance under the provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 assuming that she would not be entitled to maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.   

Facts of the case 

The appellant, in this case, was in a live-in-relationship out of which she also had a child. When the pair broke up, the appellant sought maintenance from her partner, which the Family Court in Gumla granted, paying her Rs 2000 per month and Rs 1000 to her child. Her partner took the matter to the Jharkhand High Court, which ruled that the Family Court’s ruling was incorrect. The appellant subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court, questioning the validity of the High Court’s decision. The three questions being associated with the present case that the Apex Court was made familiar with were:

  1. Whether a man and woman living together as husband and wife for a significant period of time would raise the presumption of a valid marriage between them, and whether such a presumption would entitle the woman to seek maintenance under Section 125 CrPC?
  2. Is transparent evidence of marriage required for a claim of maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC in light of the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005?
  3. Is it true that a marriage performed according to traditional rites and rituals without properly complying with the requirements of Section 7(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, or any other personal law would entitle the woman to maintenance under Section 125 CrPC?

Decision of the Apex Court

A three-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India comprising of former Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi and Justices UU Lalit and K.M. Joseph declined the aforementioned questions saying that the questions do not require any answer and further directed the appellant to approach an appropriate forum under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005. 

Jaiminiben Hirenbhai Vyas & Another v. Hirenbhai Rameshchandra Vyas & another (2015)

In the case of Jaiminiben Hirenbhai Vyas & Another v. Hirenbhai Rameshchandra Vyas & another (2015), the Supreme Court was considering an appeal made before it by a wife and her minor daughter. Her son was living with his father, the appellate’s husband, who was maintaining him. Under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Family Court ordered the payment of interim maintenance to the wife and minor daughter of Rs. 6,000/- per month. Interim support of 3,000/- per month was also granted under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, payable to both parties. By Order dated 31.01.2009, the Family Court ultimately resolved the maintenance procedures. The Family Court ordered maintenance to the daughter in the amount of Rs. 5,000/- per month from the date of the verdict. The Family Court also held that the appellant-wife would be entitled to no more than the interim maintenance she was getting under the Act of 1955.

The son was living with his father, who was paying his maintenance, and hence was not entitled to it. The major reason for the Appellant’s denial of maintenance was that she was found to have worked before her marriage, and the Family Court believed she could earn a living even after the separation, therefore she was refused support. The High Court did not agree with this viewpoint, noting that the Appellant had ceased working following her marriage and had two children. She had quit working since she was solely focused on her family. The High Court, therefore, overturned the Family Court’s decision and awarded Rs. 5,000/- in maintenance. 

But, the High Court had directed that the maintenance should be paid only from the date of its order and had not given any reason why it had not directed maintenance from the date of the application for maintenance. On being aggrieved by the same, the appellate approached the Supreme Court of India. 

Supreme Court’s observations 

  1. Every final order issued under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 shall include points for determination, the decisions thereon, and the reasons for such decision. To put it another way, Sections 125 and 354 (6) of the Code of 1973 must be read together. Section 125 of the CrPC implies that the Court should consider making the maintenance order effective from any of the two dates (the date of the order or the date of the application). It is neither appropriate nor desirable that a Court simply states that maintenance should be paid from either the date of the order or the date of the application in matters of maintenance.
  2. The Apex Court had noted that the High Court had offered no reason why maintenance should not be granted from the date of the application. In light of the fact that the appellant worked before marriage but not throughout her marriage, the Apex Court concluded that the circumstances eminently warranted the grant of maintenance with effect from the date of the application as there was no record of her earnings throughout the time the couple was married. Hence, the Order of the High Court was reversed by the Supreme Court in the present case as it held that the amount of maintenance should be paid to the appellant from the date of the application for maintenance itself. 

Manoj Yadav v. Pushpa @ Kiran Yadav (2011)

The present case of Manoj Yadav v. Pushpa @ Kiran Yadav (2011) concerned an appeal that was filed against the impugned judgement of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dated 23.01.2009 passed in Criminal Revision No. 12/2008. That judgement was rendered in a criminal revision brought against the learned Additional Family Court, Gwalior’s order dated 04.10.2007 giving respondent maintenance of Rs. 1,500/- per month under Section 125 CrPC. The respondent had requested an increase in the maintenance by means of her criminal revision. The High Court, in the impugned decision, awarded the wife-respondent in this matter monthly maintenance of Rs. 4,000/- with effect from January 1, 2009. That Order had been questioned before the Apex Court in the present case.

Observation of the Supreme Court of India 

  1. Because of the change to Section 125 CrPC by Madhya Pradesh Act (10 of 1998), learned counsel for the appellant had contended that the maximum sum that may be given as maintenance under Section 125 CrPC in the state of Madhya Pradesh might be Rs. 3,000/-. It appears that Section 125 CrPC has been further amended in Madhya Pradesh by a subsequent amendment by Madhya Pradesh Act (15 of 2004), which does not contain any upper limit on the amount of maintenance that can be granted under the aforementioned provision and instead leaves it to the magistrate’s discretion. As a result, the appellant’s counsel’s contention stood without merit.
  2. After the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2001, which removed the phrase “not exceeding five hundred rupees in the whole,” any state amendments to Section 125 CrPC that established a ceiling on the amount of maintenance to be provided to the wife, became invalid. The appeal in the present case was therefore dismissed. 

Bhabani Prasad Jena Etc. v. Convenr.Sec.Orissa S.Comn (2010)

In the present case of Bhabani Prasad Jena Etc vs Convenr.Sec.Orissa S.Comn (2010), two questions that were to be considered by the Supreme Court of India were as follows:

  1. The authority of the State Commission for Women, which was established under Section 3 of the Orissa (State) Commission for Women Act, 1993.
  2. Whether the High Court of Orissa was justified in issuing suo motu direction for the Deoxyribonucleic Acid Test (DNA) of the child and the appellant who, according to the mother of the child, was its father?

Facts of the case 

Bhabani Prasad Jena, the appellant, and Suvashree Nayak, the respondent, married on May 15, 2007. On June 30, 2007, the Marriage Officer, Khurda, Bhubaneswar, issued a certificate of marriage under Section 13 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. On August 7, 2007, the appellant filed a petition in the Court of District Judge, Khurda, Bhubaneswar, under Section 25(iii) of the 1954 Act, seeking a declaration that the marriage between him and the respondent, registered on June 30, 2007, was null and void and that the marriage had not been consummated. The respondent had issued a written statement with respect to this matrimonial process, traversing the claims stated in the petition discussed above. She also demanded Rs. 10,00,000/- in alimony for the rest of her life. 

The respondent filed a complaint with the Orissa (State) Commission for Women on December 30, 2008, alleging that she was married to the appellant and that they had separated due to the torture meted out to her by the appellant and his family members, as well as other issues which included that she had no source of income and was pregnant. The State Commission issued notifications to both parties in response to the complaint. The parties appeared before the State Commission on April 20, 2009. The appellant filed a written response to the complaint, claiming that the couples’ marriage was null and void owing to fraud and coercion and that he had already applied to the District Court of Khurda to have the marriage declared null and void.

The appellant filed a writ petition in the Orissa High Court challenging the aforementioned ruling. The appellant claimed that he did not father the child in the respondent’s womb and that there has been no husband-wife contact since August 7, 2007. On August 7, 2009, the High Court heard both writ petitions and issued an order mandating that the child’s DNA be tested at the SCB Medical College and Hospital in Cuttack and that the appellant likewise furnishes a blood sample for DNA testing. Being unsatisfied with the Order, the appellant approached the Supreme Court of India.

Apex Court’s observations 

  1. The use of DNA in a case where the paternity of a child is being debated in Court is a delicate and sensitive topic. One point of view is that when contemporary science provides ways of determining a child’s paternity, there should be no hesitation in using such techniques whenever the need arises. The opposing point of view is that the Court should be cautious about using scientific developments and instruments that infringe on an individual’s right to privacy and may not only be adverse to the parties’ rights but also have terrible consequences for the child. Even though the child’s parents were living together at the time of conception, the results of such scientific tests might sometimes taint an innocent child. When there appears to be a contradiction between a person’s right to privacy and the Court’s responsibility to find the truth, it is to be believed that the Court should exercise its discretion only after weighing the parties’ interests and considering whether DNA is crucially needed for a reasonable conclusion.
  2. Given the nature of the proceedings before the High Court, it must be concluded that the High Court exceeded its authority in issuing the challenged order. Surprisingly, the High Court overlooked the crucial fact that the couples’ marriage dispute was already proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction and that the court will adjudicate and resolve all issues of the matrimonial dispute brought by the parties in that case. Therefore, it is not possible to sustain the order passed by the High Court.
  3. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, thereby setting aside the Order of the High Court dated August 7, 2009, and the Order of the Orissa State Commission for Women dated May 11, 2009. The Apex Court further observed that the appellant shall be at liberty to contest the claim of maintenance from the respondent on all available grounds and the concerned court shall consider and determine such claim in accordance with the law on its own merits.

Bhushan Kumar Meen v. Mansi Meen @ Harpreet Kaur (2009)

In the case of Bhushan Kumar Meen v. Mansi Meen @ Harpreet Kaur (2009), the Supreme Court of India was considering an appeal directed against the Punjab & Haryana High Court’s judgement and order dated 1 July 2008 in Crl.Misc.No.14793-M of 2008, in which the appellant’s application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for quashing the orders dated 25 July 2007 and 6 November 2007 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patiala, granting Rs.10,000/- per month as interim maintenance to the respondent-wife was dismissed.

Facts of the case 

The appellant in light to this case had contended that the sum ordered by the Magistrate to the respondent-wife was unjustifiable. The appellant-husband had also raised a concern about the maintainability of the application under Section 125 CrPC due to the respondent’s ability to support herself. On behalf of the respondent-wife, it has been argued that, in light of the appellant’s net salary, the amount assessed by way of interim maintenance by the Magistrate and upheld by the Sessions Judge as well as the High Court could not be said to be excessive, and the fact that the appellant had taken a home loan that was adjusted against his salary is no reason to change the amount, as had been granted.

Supreme Court’s decision 

  1. The Apex Court was of the opinion that the amount granted by way of interim maintenance is on the high side, given that the appellant is getting a sum of around Rs.9000/- in hand after deduction of different sums, including the instalments towards repayment of the house loan. At the same time, the Court could not ignore the fact that the respondent-wife is now unemployed, or that there is no evidence on record that she was employed in any capacity. However, given her qualifications, there was no reason why she shouldn’t be able to support herself in the future.
  2. The Apex Court modified the learned Magistrate’s order granting Rs.10,000/- per month in interim maintenance to the respondent-wife and directed that the appellant-husband pay the respondent-wife Rs.5000/- per month instead of Rs.10,000/-, with all other terms and conditions as stipulated by the learned Magistrate continuing to apply.

Anu Kaul v. Rajeev Kaul (2009)

The Supreme Court of India was hearing an appeal filed by the respondent-husband in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, aggrieved by the judgement and decree passed by Addl. District Judge (Ad-hoc), Fast Track Court No.3, Faridabad, as the appellant had filed an application under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, for the grant of interim maintenance of Rs. 10,000/- and litigation expenses of Rs. 22,000/-, in the present case of Anu Kaul v. Rajeev Kaul (2009). The appellant confesses in her application that she is working and receives a monthly income of Rs.9,000/-. However, she claims that due to the lis (an action) between the parties, she is obligated to pay Rs.3,000/- in rent to the tenanted premises where she is now residing. She also indicated that her daughter is now grown-up, studying in Senior High School and that her education is being delayed owing to a lack of funding.

Supreme Court’s observation

  1. The Apex Court did not intend to increase the interim maintenance ordered to the appellant by the High Court during the pendency of the husband’s appeal because she was working and earns Rs.9,000/- per month. 
  2. However, the Court deemed it proper to direct the respondent to pay a sum of Rs.5,000/- per month to the applicant for the maintenance of their daughter during the pendency of the appeals before the High Court, taking into account the child being the daughter of a high-ranking officer, the exorbitant fee structure in good schools, and the cost of living.
  3. The appeal was disposed of accordingly.

Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai (2007)

The respondent (Sita Bai) in the present case of Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai (2007) had filed an application for maintenance from the appellant (Chaturbhuj) under Section 125 of the CrPC. Undisputedly, the appellant and the respondent married nearly four decades ago and had been living apart for more than two decades. She stated in her application that she was jobless and unable to support herself. Appellant had retired as Assistant Director of Agriculture and was receiving a pension of around Rs.8,000/- and a comparable amount in housing rent. Apart from that, he was lending money to individuals at a profit. The appellant sought a maintenance of Rs.10,000/-.

The appellant claimed that the applicant was residing in a home built by the appellant, who had acquired seven bighas of property in Ratlam in the applicant’s name. She rented out the house and lived with one of their sons since 1979. On March 13, 2003, the applicant sold the agricultural land. The profits of the transaction were still in the applicant’s possession. The appellant was receiving a monthly pension of around Rs. 5,700/- and was not paying housing rent on a regular basis. He was being paid between 2,000 and 3,000 rupees every month. In the instant case the Trial Court, the Revisional Court, and the High Court have analysed the evidence and held that the respondent-wife was unable to maintain herself and is therefore eligible for the same.

Supreme Court’s observations

  1. The Apex Court observed that the purpose of maintenance procedures is to discourage vagrancy by requiring those who can offer assistance to do so for people who are unable to maintain themselves and have a moral right to support. In this scenario, the statement “unable to sustain herself” would refer to the means accessible to the deserted wife while she was still living with her husband, and would not include the woman’s efforts to subsist the following desertion.
  2. The Court further noted that in the hypothetical event of a woman who was surviving by begging, her capacity to support herself would be insufficient. It is also not true to say that the wife was not capable of earning money, but she did not make an attempt to do so. The data on record must be used to determine if the deserted wife was unable to support herself. If the wife’s personal income is insufficient, she can file a claim for maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC. The test is if the wife can sustain herself in the manner in which she was accustomed in the absence of her spouse.
  3. The appeal was dismissed and the Apex Court did not consider it appropriate to interfere in the same. 

Rohtash Singh v. Smt. Ramendri (2000)

The Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Rohtash Singh v. Smt. Ramendri (2000) centred on the question of whether a wife who has been granted a divorce because she deserted her husband can claim maintenance allowance under Section 125 CrPC, and how far can the plea of desertion be considered an effective plea in support of the husband’s refusal to pay her maintenance allowance.

Facts of the case 

On the 10th of May, 1990, the petitioner, who is a soldier of the Indian Army, married the respondent. The respondent is stated to have left the petitioner’s family home in 1991 and moved to her father’s home. On the 5th of August, 1991, a notice was given to the respondent for restoration of conjugal rights due to her unwillingness to return. The petitioner filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage based on desertion under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. In her defence, the respondent cited several claims, including maltreatment and cruelty, as well as the petitioner’s demand for Rs. 21,000 in damages and a scooter. On the 28th of May, 1993, during the pendency of the divorce proceedings, the respondent filed an application for maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which was granted by the Family Court, Meerut. The petitioner appealed the Family Court’s decision in Meerut in a revision petition filed in the High Court, but the same was rejected on March 23, 1999.

Supreme Court’s observations

  1. The respondent continues to be “wife” within the meaning of Section 125 CrPC due to Explanation (b) to Sub-section (1), even if the marital ties were ended by the divorce issued by the Family Court under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
  2. The Court further observed that the respondent is entitled to maintenance as a wife unless she has one of the limitations listed in Section 125 (4) of CrPC. As a divorced woman also, she has the right to seek maintenance from the person with whom she was previously married. A woman after divorce becomes destitute. If she is unable to support herself or remains unmarried, the man who was formerly her husband will still be obligated to give her support.

Conclusion 

In marital conflicts, the maintenance idea aims to return the woman to the same level of comfort and lifestyle that she had before the marriage. In India, there is no set amount of maintenance that a husband must give his wife, and the amount of maintenance that the husband must pay, whether monthly or in one lump payment, is determined at the discretion of a family court. Wife maintenance is a tricky topic under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and it has been regarded as a manner of taking advantage of the husband by asking for food for life. Thus, the judiciary is the only reliance in such matters and therefore the purpose behind this article is to highlight the view of the Supreme Court of India with respect to maintenance of the wife by their husbands. 

References 

  1. https://districts.ecourts.gov.in/sites/default/files/Sec%20125%20CrPC%20Maintenance%20by%20Sri%20S%20S%20Upadhyaya.pdf.
  2. https://www.mondaq.com/india/family-law/1034570/supreme-court-clarifies-the-law-on-maintenance.
  3. https://lexforti.com/legal-news/landmark-and-latest-judgments-on-maintenance/#Bhagwan_Dutt_Vs_Kamla_Devi_and_Ors_Supreme_Court.

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