Download Now
Home Blog Page 51

Section 141 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

0

This article is written by Sneha Arora. This article addresses Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and discusses the liability of companies and their officials in cases that involve dishonour of negotiable instruments such as cheques. This provision plays a crucial role in defining the responsibility of individuals and entities in managing and maintaining the integrity of financial transactions. Furthermore, in this article, we delve into the nuances of Section 141, its implications, legal precedents and practical applications. 

Introduction

“Corporate sector’s responsibility doesn’t just end in the Boardroom- it further extends to every signed check and promissory note”. Have you ever noticed any company tensed due to their liabilities in cases of cheque dishonour? Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 is a significant provision that addresses the liability of the companies and their officials in instances where negotiable instruments, such as cheques, are dishonoured. 

This article outlines the conditions under which individuals or groups of individuals associated with the company, including managers, directors, secretaries and other officers, can be held accountable for the company’s failure to honour its negotiable instruments. Understanding Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 is essential and significant for both legal practitioners and company directors, as it figures out the circumstances that may lead to personal liability for a corporate person. This provision ensures that the individual responsible for the operations, financial decisions and management of a company cannot evade his/her responsibility simply by virtue of the corporate structure. 

This article delves into the specifications of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, examining its legal framework, practical implications, and examination of its legal framework for companies and its officials. By shedding light on this important aspect of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, we aim to provide a clear understanding of how liability is determined and enforced in cases of dishonoured negotiable instruments. 

Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 

Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 addresses the issue of cheque dishonoured due to insufficient funds exceeding the agreed arrangement with the banks. When a cheque is returned unpaid, the payee must issue a written notice to the drawer within 30 days of receiving the bank’s dishonor notification. The drawer than has 15 days from the reciept of this notice to settle the payment. Failure to do so allows the payee to file a complaint in court within one month after the 15-day period. The guilty drawer faces potential penalties, including imprisonment for up to two years, a fine upto twice the cheque amount, or both. This provision aims to uphold the credibility of cheques as a reliable financial instrument.

Click to know more about the nature and punishment of Section 138. 

Explanation of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881

Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, specifically deals with the vicarious liability of companies in cases of cheque dishonour. It addresses the issue of liability, determining who would be liable in the event of an offence committed by a company. According to Section 141, if a person commits an offence under Section 138 (cheque dishonour) and the punishment for the same is a company, then every person and the company itself will be found guilty. This includes those who, at the time the offence was committed, were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company’s business. 

However, if any person can prove that the offence was committed without their knowledge or that they exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such an offence, then that person will not be liable for the same. This section aims to protect innocent individuals from liability in cases of cheque dishonour. 

The key provisions and implications of this section are as follows.

  1. Vicarious liability of an individual: If an offence under Section 138 is committed by a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company, shall be deemed guilty of the offence along with the company itself. This means that individuals associated with the company can be held liable for the company’s actions in dishonouring cheques. 
  2. Exemptions and defences: If the person proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence and if a person is nominated as a director of a company by virtue of his holding any office or employment in the central government or state government or a financial corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government or State Government, as the case may be, he shall not be liable for prosecution. 
  3. Additional liability of Officers: If it is proved that the offence was committed under the knowledge of any director, manager, secretary, or other officer of the company, such individuals shall also be deemed guilty of the offence.

Additionally, the provision emphasises the necessity for companies to follow rigorous internal controls and compliance measures. It ensures that the person who is assigned the role of managerial control actively performs and oversees the financial operations and must adhere to legal standards to avoid legal consequences. This proactive approach helps in mitigating the risks associated with cheque dishonour. Furthermore, it also promotes and establishes the culture of accountability and integrity within the organisation.

Scope of Section 141 of NI Act

Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, is a crucial provision that deals with the principles of vicarious liability for offences committed by companies. This section came to hold individuals associated with the company accountable for the companies’ actions,  particularly in cases of cheque dishonour and other offences under the said Act. It imposes vicarious liability on those responsible for or in charge of the company’s business at the time of the conduct of such an offence. Section 141(1) makes such persons responsible or liable for the conduct unless they prove a lack of knowledge or the presence of due diligence to prevent such happening, along with the exemption for nominated directors and government employees. Section 141(2) extends its liability to the directors, secretaries, managers, partners or officers whose consent, connivance or neglect led to the occurence of the offence. Companies and firms act through those business representatives whose action in business transactions affect the company’s goodwill. The principle of vicarious liability is further based on the maxim, “qui facit per alium facit per se” holds individuals accountable for offences committed in the course of their duties due to their relationship with the company. 

The scope of Section 141 has been well defined and has been extensively interpreted by the courts. This section will deal with detailed overview of the aspects of the provisions applicability and limitations. 

  1. Applicability to offences under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881: Section 141 applies to various offences under the said Act, such as the dishonour of cheques under Section 138. This provision is not limited to a specific offence but encompasses all those violations of the act committed by the company. 
  2. Offences covered: Section 141 specifically applies to the offences related to the dishonour of cheques, which is addressed under Section 138 of the Act. It also covers any other offences committed by the company that falls under the Negotiable Instruments Act of 1881. 
  3. Conditions for liability: They can be exempted from liability of an individual to prove that the offence was committed without their due knowledge and that the individual has applied all their efforts and diligence to prevent the commission of such an act. If the offence was committed with the consent or connivance or with the knowledge of the accused or any director, manager, secretary or other officer, they are held liable. 
  4. Judicial interpretation: Extensive interpretations have been provided by the courts for Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, clarifying the extent of liabilities for corporate entities and their officers. Furthermore, judicial decisions emphasise on the importance of preventive measures and internal controls within the companies to avoid the offences under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. 

Proof of liability

Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, is a crucial provision that holds individuals responsible for the actions of companies. This section imposes vicarious liability on individuals who are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company’s business at the time an offence was committed. This section aims to ensure that individuals who have a direct role in the company’s operation are accountable for any offences committed so far by the company. However, in order to establish this liability, the below provided elements are to be proved by the prosecution to establish their relevancy. To establish vicarious liability for the individual under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881, the prosecution must prove the following: 

  1. At the time the offence was committed, the individual was either responsible for or in charge for the conduct and management of the business of the company; 
  2. The individual had an active and direct involvement in the conduct and management of the company’s business and a role in the commission of the offence. Just being a nominal head or a mere designation is not sufficient. 
  3. The complaint so registered must contain specific averments to demonstrate the individuals role and liability at the relevant time when the offence was committed. Mere, or vague allegations would be of no sense. 
  4. The prosecution has to prove that the offence has been committed with consent or connivance or due to the neglect of the person. 
  5. The individual against whom the complaint has been registered or the individual who is accused can escape the liability if they can prove that the offence was committed without their knowledge or that they have provided relevant efforts to prevent the happening of the conduct. However, the burden of proof lies on the accused. 

Therefore, the prosecution has to establish a clear and direct nexus between the individual’s roles in the company’s affairs and the commission of the offence under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. A mere association or relationship with the company is not sufficient to attract vicarious liability under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. 

Defences

Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, imposes vicarious liability on individuals associated with the company for any offence or conduct so committed by the members or officials of the company. However, the law also provides certain defences on the basis of which the accused can limit or avoid his liability under this provision. 

These defences are of vital significance, as they allow individuals to escape prosecution even when an offence has been committed by the company they are associated with. The burden of proof for these defences lies on the accused, who must demonstrate that the specific conditions for their applicability have been met. 

Thereby, understanding the available defences and the evidentiary requirements in order to establish them is essential for individuals who may face prosecution under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Defences under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, are: 

  1. The accused in charge was not in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company’s business at the time the offence was committed. Just being a nominal head or mere designation is not sufficient alone to attract liability. The prosecution must prove the accused’s direct and active involvement in the company’s affairs. 
  2. The person against whom the complaint has been filed or the accused individual can prove that the offence was committed without or in the absence of his knowledge. The burden of proof lies on the accused to establish this defence. 
  3. The accused individual or the person against whom the complaint has been filed can prove that he provided relevant and subsequent efforts to prevent the commission of the offence. Again, the burden is on the accused to establish and demonstrate the steps taken to prove the offence. 

Therefore, the accused can escape liability under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, by establishing or demonstrating that they were not actively involved in the company’s operation and management at the relevant time or that the offences occurred without their knowledge, despite due diligence undertaken by the accused individual. The prosecution bears the initial burden of proof, after which the onus shifts to the accused to substantiate these defences. 

Case laws on Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, established a vicarious liability for offences committed by companies, particularly regarding cheque dishonour. Recent case law, notably Siby Mathews vs. Somany Ceramics Ltd. (2023), emphasises that only individuals in charge of the company’s affairs at the time of the conduct of an offence can be held liable. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that mere partnership or directorship does not suffice; specific averments regarding an individual’s responsibility are essential for liability under this section. The burden of proof lies with the accused to demonstrate a lack of involvement or due diligence. 

Similarly, in the recent case of Susela Padmavathy Amma vs. Bharti Airtel Ltd., (2024), the Supreme Court addressed the provisions of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The court emphasised that for vicarious liability to apply, the complaint must specifically allege that the accused was incharge of and responsible for the company’s conduct at the time of the happening of the offence. The absence of such specific averments led to the quashing of the criminal complaint against the appellant, reinforcing the principles established in Siby Mathews vs. Somany Ceramics Ltd.  regarding individual liability incorporate contexts.

In another landmark case, K.K. Ahuja vs. V.K. Vora and anr. (2009), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that if the accused is a managing director or joint managing director, no specific averments are needed as their title implies responsibility for the company’s conduct. For other directors or officers who signed the check, the signing alone indicates culpability under Section 141(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. However, directors, secretaries, or managers not involved in daily operations need specific allegations in complaints to establish liabilities showing their consent. For all other officers, complaints must include specific details about their role, knowledge and involvement in the offence to hold them liable under Section 141(1).

In case law S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. Neeta Bhalla and Anr. (2007), it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that while filing a complaint, it is mandatory to specify all the allegations against the director of the company, including that of mentioning the role played by the director during the happening of the offence. If such allegations are not stated, then the requirements of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 cannot be said to be satisfied. This case law highlights the requirements of specific allegations while filing a complaint under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. 

In the landmark case Anita Malhotra vs. Apparel Export Promotion Council & Anr. (2012), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the complaint so filed must specifically highlight and specify how and in what manner the director was in charge of or was responsible to the accused company for the conduct of its business. The court further stated that a mere bald statement that the individual was in charge of the conduct of the offence is not sufficient to prove the liability.

In another landmark case, Ashok Shewakramani vs. State Of Andhra Pradesh (2023), the Supreme Court held that Merely because somebody is managing the affairs of the company, he would not become incharge of the business of the company or the person whose responsible for the companies operations when the happening of the offence occurred.

Conclusion 

In conclusion, this article deals with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and establishes the conditions under which individuals or groups of individuals associated with the company, including managers and other officials, can be held accountable for the company’s failure to honour its negotiable instruments. It stipulates that any person who, at the time of the offence, was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company is liable. This provision ensures accountability and distinguishes between various levels of responsibility within the company. Furthermore, this article provides scope, defences and proof of liability under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. It further discusses the case laws that relate to Section 141 and its specific or long established judgements by the court.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

Are there any specific government required that all officers must meet? 

No, managing directors and non managing directors are presumed to be responsible by virtue of their positions. For other directors and officers, the specific government must detail their role and involvement in the offence to establish liability. 

What if the company director was not directly involved in the day-to-day operations of the business?

If an office employee, such as a director or manager, was not directly involved in day-to-day activities of the business, the complete report must include specific allegations showing their consent, knowledge or negligence to establish their liability.

What are the consequences of failing to include a specific government in the company? 

If specific governments are not included for non-senior officers, the complaint may be insufficient to hold them liable under Section 141, potentially leading to dissmisal of the case against those individuals. 

Can Section 141 be applied to those who are not directly associated with the company’s daily operations? 

Section 141 primarily targets those directly involved in the company’s business operations. However, for individuals not directly associated in daily operations, Pacific alleviations of their involvement in negligence are necessary to establish their part of liability. 

What is the role of “deemed liability” in Section 141 of Negotiable Instruments Act 1881?

Section 141 provides for deemed liability, which states that if a company commits an offence, individuals who are responsible for the conduct of the business are presumed to be liable unless they can prove that the offence was committed without their knowledge and that they have provided due diligence in preventing the happening of the conduct.

References

Download Now

Taxation on cryptocurrencies : all you need to know

0

This article has been written by Manika Singh pursuing a Diploma in Corporate Litigation course from LawSikho

This article has been edited and published by Shashwat Kaushik.

Abstract

This article examines the role of cryptocurrency, how cryptocurrency works, and there are different classifications of cryptocurrencies that help to determine the taxability of such cryptocurrency. There is a brief discussion about the taxability of cryptocurrency in the counties, where countries like India and China have not accepted cryptocurrency as a legal tender but any income earned from such transactions is taxable. On the other hand, countries like the UK and the US have accepted the cryptocurrency and made laws for its regulation. There is also a brief discussion about the issues regarding the taxability of cryptocurrency. The issue mainly is about international taxation, as there are few tax treaties, which lead to weak regulation systems and the creation of unwanted situations and problems, also leading to double taxation.

Introduction

Satoshi Nakamoti introduced bitcoin in 2009 as a cryptocurrency, and in actuality, cryptocurrency was developed before 2009. There was eCash developed by the DigiCash company in 1990. The working of eCash was based on the ‘Blinding Formula’. The purpose of this formula was simple: to encrypt the information between the individuals, which meant that there was no involvement of a third party. Then, in 1991, there was the evolution of blockchain by Stuart Haber and W. Scott Stornetta. Stuart Haber and W. Scott are both research scientists. At first, they were searching about making backups of digital documents, and later, they aimed for timestamps on the documents to make them more secure, and by doing so, they witnessed the evolution of cryptocurrency. Later, there is the evolution of cryptocurrency, which is digital cash and is very popular among people. The reason for such popularity is simple: because of its decentralisation, people feel secure; they feel that their transactions are not watched by third parties, as usually in any online transaction there is involvement from the bank. This security is attracting people to invest in cryptocurrencies, but it is also attracting money laundering cases. It will get difficult for the government to trace the transactions in cryptocurrencies, and people will take advantage of this technology. This is the reason why many countries have not legalised it, and India is one of them. 

What is cryptocurrency

It is simply a digital payment system where banks play no role as intermediaries, which means that the transaction is peer-to-peer. This runs on a technology known as blockchain, where the record of the transaction is with the currency holder; no other party or third party has information about such a transfer. The tax on cryptocurrency is known as a crypto tax; it simply means an amount paid to the government or authority for earning income through cryptocurrencies. Now, the question might arise about what kind of income is generated from cryptocurrency, which is taxable because usually cryptocurrencies are for transactions, so how is income generated from them? 

There are various ways by which a crypto holder can earn income or gains from such cryptocurrencies, which can be capital gains, mining, stakes, airdrops, and forks. 

Capital gain is simple; it means the profit earned by selling the crypto assets. The profit amount will be taxable, not whole. In crypto mining, the miner has to solve a complicated math problem and then guess a number. He can guess as many numbers as he wants, and then the number is verified, according to which he earns the income. This process is complicated and also requires a high-tech computer and high-power electricity. 

Staking rewards are earned when the holder locks up cryptographic assets for a period of time. In exchange for locking up the assets and participating in the network, the validator gets the reward. This is done when your cryptocurrency uses a proof-of-stake blockchain and you are eligible to stake your tokens. 

Airdrops and hard forks

Airdrops are earned when the holder of crypto assets receives a token directly in their wallets. Hard forks occur when there is a split in the blockchain. This split occurs when there is a change to the code that creates two paths. These above-mentioned are the incomes from cryptocurrencies; whether they are taxable or not will depend from country to country.

India 

On April 5, 2018, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), the central bank of India, issued a press release expressing concerns about the protection of consumers against virtual currency and announced a ban on cryptocurrency transactions. This decision sent shockwaves through the Indian cryptocurrency community and raised questions about the future of digital assets in the country.

The RBI’s ban on cryptocurrency was based on several factors, including concerns about money laundering, terrorist financing, and the volatility of cryptocurrency prices. The central bank also argued that cryptocurrency transactions were not backed by any underlying asset and, therefore, posed a significant risk to consumers.

The cryptocurrency ban was met with strong opposition from the Indian cryptocurrency community, which argued that the RBI’s decision was arbitrary and would stifle innovation in the fintech sector. Several petitions were filed in the Supreme Court of India challenging the RBI’s ban.

In March 2020, the Supreme Court of India lifted the RBI’s ban on cryptocurrency, ruling that the central bank had no authority to impose such a ban. The court’s decision was a significant victory for the Indian cryptocurrency community and paved the way for the growth of digital assets in the country.

It is important to note that the Supreme Court’s decision did not legalize cryptocurrency in India. Cryptocurrency remains unregulated in India, which means that there is no specific legislation governing the use, trading, or mining of digital assets. This lack of regulation creates some uncertainty for cryptocurrency businesses and investors.

Despite the lack of regulation, the Indian cryptocurrency market has grown rapidly in recent years. Several cryptocurrency exchanges have been established, and the number of cryptocurrency investors has increased significantly. The Indian government is currently considering the possibility of regulating cryptocurrency, and it is likely that specific legislation will be introduced in the future.

The issue arises: is any income earned from the cryptocurrency taxable or not? The answer is yes, they are taxable, because in India, it does not matter if income is earned from legal or illegal methods; it will be taxable.

To determine the taxability of income from cryptocurrency in India, it is essential to understand the residential status of the assessee. The Income Tax Act, 1961, specifically addresses this in Section 6, which defines the residential status of an individual.

Residential status:

  • An individual who is a resident of India, as per Section 6 of the Income Tax Act, is subject to tax on their worldwide income, including income earned from cryptocurrency. This means that if a resident Indian receives cryptocurrency income in India or outside India, it will be taxable in India.
  • A non-resident Indian, on the other hand, is only taxable on income earned in India. Therefore, if a non-resident Indian earns cryptocurrency income outside India, it will not be taxable in India.

Holding period:

In addition to residential status, the holding period of the cryptocurrency asset also plays a role in determining the taxability of gains.

  • Short-Term Capital Gains (STCG): If an individual holds the cryptocurrency asset for less than 36 months and then sells or trades it, the gains are considered short-term capital gains and are taxed as per the individual’s income tax slab. The tax rate for STCG from cryptocurrency trading is 30%, plus a 4% cess.
  • Long-Term Capital Gains (LTCG): If an individual holds the cryptocurrency asset for more than 36 months and then sells or trades it, the gains are considered long-term capital gains and are taxed at a flat rate of 20%, with no additional cess.

It’s important to note that these tax provisions are subject to change, and it’s advisable to consult with a tax professional or refer to the latest Income Tax Act and relevant notifications for the most up-to-date information on cryptocurrency taxation in India.

Cryptocurrency taxation

UK

The United Kingdom’s tax authority, His Majesty Revenue & Customs (HMRC), oversees the taxation of cryptocurrency transactions within the country. Cryptocurrency has been recognised as legal tender in the UK since its inception, and the UK parliament is currently working on implementing specific laws and regulations related to cryptocurrency.

In terms of taxation, the UK government has established a framework that determines the taxability of cryptocurrency gains. These gains are divided into two distinct categories:

Earnings Below 50,270 Pounds

If an individual’s cryptocurrency earnings fall below 50,270 pounds (approximately $67,800) during a tax year, they will be subject to a 10% tax rate. This tax rate applies to any profits or gains realized from buying, selling, or exchanging cryptocurrencies. It is important to note that the 10% tax rate is levied on the net gain rather than the total transaction amount.

Earnings Above 50,270 Pounds

For individuals whose cryptocurrency earnings exceed 50,270 pounds in a tax year, a higher tax rate of 20% will be applicable. This tax rate applies to the same range of cryptocurrency transactions as the 10% rate. It is crucial for taxpayers to accurately track their cryptocurrency transactions and maintain detailed records to determine their tax liability correctly.

It is worth noting that the UK government’s approach to cryptocurrency taxation aligns with its broader tax policy objectives. The government aims to strike a balance between encouraging innovation and ensuring that the tax system remains fair and equitable for all taxpayers. As the cryptocurrency landscape continues to evolve, HMRC may further refine and update its tax policies to reflect changes in technology and market practices.

US

Along with the UK, America has also legalised the transaction of cryptocurrency. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is the authority that administers and enforces the tax laws. 

Taxability of cryptocurrency by the IRS: the authority treats the cryptocurrency as a property, and by this, it is divided into parts:

  1. Taxability as capital gains: when a cryptocurrency is sold or used at a higher value than the purchase value, the assessee will pay tax on the gained amount. 
  2. If you receive crypto as payment for business purposes, it is taxed as business income. 
  3. If crypto mining, or crypto, is awarded for work done on a blockchain, then it will be taxable as ordinary income. 

China

The State Taxation Administration (STA) serves as the preeminent taxable authority in China, vested with the responsibility of overseeing and enforcing tax regulations. Despite China’s decision not to recognise cryptocurrency as legal tender, the government retains the authority to impose taxes on cryptocurrency transactions. This stance stems from concerns that Bitcoin transactions, characterised by their anonymous nature, could potentially facilitate money laundering and other illicit activities.

China’s refusal to embrace cryptocurrency as a legitimate form of currency aligns with its broader approach to regulating digital assets. The Chinese government has adopted a cautious stance towards cryptocurrency, viewing it as a potential source of financial instability and a threat to its centralised control over the financial system. This cautious approach is reflected in a series of measures implemented by the Chinese government, including restrictions on cryptocurrency exchanges and initial coin offerings (ICOs).

While China has refrained from granting cryptocurrency legal tender status, the government recognises the potential tax revenue that can be generated from cryptocurrency transactions. By levying taxes on cryptocurrency transactions, the Chinese government can capture a portion of the economic value created by the cryptocurrency industry. This approach enables the government to benefit from the growth of the cryptocurrency market without having to fully embrace it as a legitimate currency.

The taxation of cryptocurrency transactions in China is not without its challenges. One of the primary challenges lies in tracking and monitoring cryptocurrency transactions, given their decentralised nature and the potential for anonymity. To address this challenge, the Chinese government has implemented a number of measures, such as requiring cryptocurrency exchanges to register with the government and to implement anti-money laundering and know-your-customer (KYC) procedures. These measures aim to increase transparency and facilitate the tracking of cryptocurrency transactions, thereby enhancing the government’s ability to tax these transactions effectively.

Overall, China’s approach to cryptocurrency taxation reflects its broader stance on digital assets. While the government has refrained from recognising cryptocurrency as legal tender, it has acknowledged the potential tax revenue that can be generated from cryptocurrency transactions. By imposing taxes on cryptocurrency transactions, the Chinese government can benefit from the growth of the cryptocurrency market without having to fully embrace it as a legitimate currency.

Japan

The National Tax Agency (NTA) serves as the tax authority in Japan, overseeing the administration and enforcement of the country’s comprehensive tax system. Central to this system is the progressive tax structure, characterised by increasing tax rates as income levels rise. This progressive approach aims to ensure fairness and equity in the distribution of tax burdens across different income brackets.

One notable aspect of Japan’s tax system is the treatment of cryptocurrency. Cryptocurrency gains are subject to taxation similar to regular income, with tax rates ranging from 15% to 55%. The specific tax rate applicable depends on the individual’s overall income level.

To facilitate the reporting of cryptocurrency gains, the NTA has established two forms: Form A and Form B. Form A is intended for individuals reporting miscellaneous income, including cryptocurrency gains obtained through personal activities such as trading or mining. On the other hand, Form B is used by individuals engaged in business activities related to cryptocurrency, such as professional traders or cryptocurrency exchanges.

When completing Form A, taxpayers must declare their cryptocurrency gains under the “Miscellaneous Income” section. This form requires detailed information about the cryptocurrency transactions, including the type of cryptocurrency, the date of acquisition and disposal, and the amount of gains or losses incurred.

For individuals using Form B, cryptocurrency gains are reported as part of their business income. They must maintain accurate records of their cryptocurrency transactions, including invoices, receipts, and any other relevant documentation. The tax liability is then calculated based on the business’s overall income and expenses.

It’s important to note that the tax treatment of cryptocurrency in Japan is subject to ongoing developments and may evolve over time. Taxpayers are advised to stay informed about any changes or clarifications issued by the NTA to ensure compliance with the latest tax regulations.

Issues with the taxability of cryptocurrency 

The countries have provided for the taxability of cryptocurrency, but still, there are some issues with the taxation of cryptocurrency, which include the difficulty in classifying income. There are times when it gets difficult to determine the cryptocurrency as an asset or transaction because different countries have different understandings. 

The next issue is international transactions, as the concept is not adopted in many countries, due to which there is a lack of tax laws and treaties regarding taxation on cryptocurrencies, which leads to double taxation or evasion concerns. 

We know that the transaction of cryptocurrency is encrypted between the individuals, due to which arises the issue of determining the holding period of cryptocurrency because this holding period is essential for the classification of cryptocurrency. Due to this, many tax authorities are facing challenges on a daily basis. 

Conclusion

Cryptocurrency is a technology that is popular among people but not accepted by governments due to its complex nature of transactions, classifications, and such, leading to many other problems. But there is no doubt that in the future it will become more popular and will be used in daily life. 

The solution to the issues of taxability is simple: the government needs to understand cryptocurrency and make laws regarding its taxability to reduce the issues. 

References

Download Now

Legal implications of doping in professional sports

0

This article has been written by Rahil Vora pursuing a Diploma in Legal English Communication – oratory, writing, listening and accuracy from LawSikho.

What is doping

When we talk about doping in professional sports, it is understood as the act of athletes consuming one or more banned substances aiming to improve their athletic capacity and get ahead against rivals. These substances have been referred to as performance enhancing drugs (PEDs).

The purpose of the use of such drugs is also for faster recovery, but in contrast, it leads to severe health repercussions for the athlete. As well, the use of such drugs by the athlete undermines the spirit of fair competition in professional sports. 

Historical context

  • During the 1904 Olympics, marathon runner Thomas Hicks nearly died after consuming a mixture of brandy and strychnine.
  • The drug became very well-publicised during the 1960 Olympics when cyclist Knud Enemark Jensen died in competition due to using amphetamine.
  • In East Germany, athletes bulked up with drugs as part of a systematic program to dominate international competitions
  • High profile scandals, such as when Ben Johnson was disqualified at the 1988 Seoul Olympics for using steroids.
  • Lance Armstrong (a cyclist) was stripped of his seven Tour de France titles in 2012 after evidence of doping.

Which substances are banned from use

Some common PEDs include:

  • Anabolic steroids
  • Peptide hormones
  • Gonadotropins 
  • Beta-2 agonists
  • Hormones and metabolic modulators
  • Diuretics and masking agents
  • Stimulants 
  • Narcotics 
  • Cannabinoids 
  • Glucocorticoids 
  • Beta blockers
  • Blood doping 
  • Gene doping

Potential Side Effects of PEDs:

  • Cardiovascular issues
  • Liver damage
  • Hormonal imbalances
  • Psychiatric effects
  • Blood clots
  • Stroke 
  • Hypertension 
  • Neurological effects
  • Respiratory problems

Legal framework governing doping

Formation of the IOC Medical Commission (1967)

  • Doping in sports became a cardinal concern during the 1960s prompting the IOC to start the Medical Commission in 1967. This was important in paving the way for formal approaches in the endeavour of discouraging unfair play and/or protecting athletes.
  • This commission was to set out measures for rules and regulations to be put in place in anti-doping, which formed the basis for future anti-doping in international sports.

First Anti-Doping Tests (1968 Winter Olympics): First Anti-Doping Tests (1968 Winter Olympics)

  • Alpine Skiing as a sport was first included on the Olympic programme in the 1936 Winter Olympics in Garmisch Partenkirchen Germany, while anti-doping test of Olympic competition were first conducted in the 1968 Winter Olympics in Grenoble France. These tests were carried out in a bid to try and control the use of banned substances in the athletes.
  • The event demonstrated that the IOC placed great value in preserving fair practices in sporting activities by driving out dope users.

Establishment of WADA (1999)

  • Called into existence in 1999, situated in Lausanne, the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) was established because of the growing incidence and need for an international approach on doping in sports.
  • WADA serves as an independent international organisation that has the mandate of coordinating the working of anti-doping policies and standards across the sports and countries.

WADA 2021 Code

The WADA Code is a set of measures and regulations against doping; it is an anti-doping code that spells out the rights and wrongs of the world athletes and their aides.

This code stipulates guidelines in testing, sanctions, education, and any other anti-doping measures meant to eliminate unfair competition as much as to safeguard the pure athletes.

National Anti-Doping Agencies (NADOs)

At the national level, organisations are the independent national anti-doping agencies like the National Anti-Doping Agency (NADA) in India and so on that implement and enforce the anti-doping policies.

NADOs sample both in-competition and out-of-competition athletes in various sporting activities in a bid to eradicate cases of doping.

These points explain the emergence and growth of legal and regulatory standards in doping in sports through the interaction of the International Olympic Committee, WADA, and national organisations and administrations to ensure the principles of compliance with the principles of the fight against doping and protection of the rights of athletes.

DURATION OF SUSPENSION

As per the WADA 2021 Code if the athlete is found guilty of Anti Doping Rule Violation (ADRV) period of suspension of athlete depends upon certain circumstances:

Standard Duration: 2-year suspension is the standard for most Anti-Doping Rule Violation (ADRV).

It does provide for a lessening of suspension in certain circumstances. As an example, in out-of-competition cases where it can be proven that the athlete who has committed a violation (other than use of a “Substance of Abuse”) had no significant fault or negligence and provided evidence they used a product containing less than 4 mg per dose unit; however more was detected [threshold substance], then sanction may range from up to reprimand with warning depending upon when applicant last took this amount.

Enhanced sanction: The intervention of aggravating factors, for example, sample tampering or repeated violations can result in an increase in the severity of sanction up to a lifetime ban

Minimum sentence cut: Athletes who give an enormous amount of help in bringing other dopers to light could have their suspensions decreased by as much one-third through “minimum sentencing cuts.”

Legal implications

Criminal prosecution

Doping, therefore, has legal consequences that affected athletes, coaches, and officials have to endure as follows; Some of the penalties that athletes face in case they are caught in the act include fines and in the extreme cases of a prison term. These penalties raise the legal personnel’s concern towards doping and observe the commitment to maintain the fairness and organisational integrity of the game through penalty.

Contractual obligations

Doping violation therefore goes beyond legal consequences touching on contractual clauses. Sponsors and sports organisations usually sign contracts with athletes in which anti-doping clauses are harshly set out. Their violation causes liquidation of such contracts, and there is often a litigation process that ensues from the incident. Such contractual arrangements make the sponsors’ investments secured as well as guarantee that sports entities would have athletes that would compete with despicable integrity.

Civil lawsuits

Aside from contractual disputes, doping in sports has given rise to civil litigation actions. Athletes engaged in doping can find themselves facing legal consequences, including lawsuits for breaching contracts or negligence. These lawsuits are typically brought by affected parties, such as sponsors or competitors, who have suffered harm as a result of the doping.

Civil remedies are an essential avenue for individuals or entities who have been wronged through doping. Through civil actions, victims can seek compensation for their physical, financial, and reputational losses. These lawsuits serve several important purposes.

Firstly, they provide a platform for victims to hold athletes and other parties accountable for their actions. By allowing victims to seek legal recourse, civil litigation sends a strong message that doping will not be tolerated and that there will be consequences for engaging in such unethical conduct.

Secondly, civil lawsuits can help deter future doping. The threat of legal action can act as a deterrent to athletes who might consider using performance-enhancing drugs. Knowing that they could face significant financial and reputational consequences can discourage athletes from engaging in doping practices.

Thirdly, civil litigation can contribute to raising awareness about the harmful effects of doping. By bringing these cases to public attention, civil lawsuits can help educate the public about the dangers of doping and its negative impact on sports. This increased awareness can help foster a culture of integrity and fair play in sports.

Ethical considerations

Doping literally involves the complete defiance of basic precepts of the athlete’s code, thus threatening the very values that undergird the sporting spirit. Doping gives the athletes involved an unfair edge over others who have not carried out the vice, thus polluting the results of activities and competitions. Such unethical action affects the credibility of the athletes, fans, and the sports’ governing bodies, thus tarnishing the spirits of competition as a true reflection of talent and hard work.

Health and safety

The desire to achieve athletic excellence through performances enhanced by substances and methods on the prohibited list jeopardises the health status of the athletes. However, there are negative effects of doping on the physical and psychological statuses of the body other than increased performance levels in the short term. The desire to at least perform excellently can lead the athletes to have some unrecommended actions so that they can win the coveted trophy at the games. To shield athletes from this disservice, reinforced anti-doping enlightenment, assistance, and strict compliance with doping laws are important.

Trust and transparency

Termination of doping implications poses deep repercussions on the faith that people have in sports agencies and other authorities. Such events erode the morale of the people and shed light on more unaccountable measures that exist in the sport. Effective and uncompromising anti-doping standards coupled with efficient procedures of random drug testing are the ways to bring people back to the belief that competitions are fair and deserved. These measures give stakeholders confidence that in sports the contestants are equal and nobody is trying to deceive his counterpart or gain any unfair advantage.

Social impact

Sportsmen and women are expected to be exemplary, especially to the hopeful youths who admire them as their heroes. Negative messages that are associated with cheating and dishonesty are seen to be conveyed to impressionable audiences by such stars through doping cases. Maintaining and applying appropriate ethical measures in sports is crucial for ensuring that sports, in return, would not bring about detrimental impacts on society by athletes.

Economic influence

The impact of the doping scandal can enter the economic realm of the sporting culture, and this paper will look into the implications affecting different civilisation processes. The others that may be affected are those sponsors and advertisers, whose contributions are vital in the financial management of sporting activities’ teams and organisations since they may be compelled to pull out of their support due to doping scandals. This withdrawal may result in heavy revenue losses that are unprofitable for the business and economically unsustainable especially when it comes to dynastic entities in the Sports industry; it will also have impacts on athletes, fans, and the entire economy.

Global reputation

The principles are the inter-country sporting events that can decide the talented and sportsmanlike players of a country. Doping compromises the integrity of athletes, countries, and sports associations, therefore lowering their status in global society. In other words, observers must focus on achievements through clean and fair athletic competition not just for the honour and dignity of sports and athletes but also for the sake of international goodwill and the world’s favourable perception of other nations.

Unlocking the legal rights of athletes

Contracts in sports

Athletes often sign contracts with their teams, outlining their roles, responsibilities, and compensation. These contracts may include clauses related to performance expectations, injury compensation, and even behaviour off the field. It’s crucial for athletes to fully understand the terms of their contracts and seek legal advice if needed.

Key points

  • Negotiating contract terms to ensure fair compensation and benefits
  • Adhering to contractual obligations, such as promotional appearances or media interviews
  • Seeking legal help in case of contract disputes or breaches

Sponsorship and endorsement deals

Athletes frequently enter into sponsorship and endorsement agreements with brands looking to leverage their popularity and influence. These deals can be lucrative but also come with legal implications regarding image rights, exclusivity clauses, and brand association. Athletes must carefully review and negotiate these agreements to protect their personal brand.

Key points

  • Maintaining control over image and likeness in endorsement deals
  • Avoiding conflicts of interest with competing brands
  • Understanding the impact of endorsement deals on personal and professional reputation

Image rights and licensing

Athletes often monetise their image and likeness through licensing agreements for merchandise, video games, and other products. Protecting these image rights is essential to prevent unauthorised use or exploitation. Athletes can work with agents or attorneys to secure licensing deals that align with their brand values and financial goals.

Key points

  • Registering trademarks for name, logo, or catchphrases
  • Enforcing image rights through legal action against infringers
  • Maximising revenue opportunities through strategic licensing partnerships

Legal cases

Sustaining betting in Indian sports, several athletes have tested positive to the prohibited substances for several years now across disciplines. Here are some notable cases:Here are some notable cases:

Narsingh Yadav (2016): Sample A In wrestler Narsingh Yadav, his name connected with a doping test failure in the lead up to the 2016 Rio Olympics. He categorically rejected such claims, but such speculations brought a rather negative side to India’s participation at the Games.

Seema Antil (2000): Succeeding in jumping to the conclusion that discus thrower Seema Antil tested positive to a banned stimulant at the World Junior Championship in 2000 and was stripped of her gold medal.

Anil Kumar and Neelam Singh (2005): Both discus throwers in 2005 were given two-year bans for using prohibited substances, that is, performance-enhancing drugs.

Recent Surge (2022): This year, India was on the top of this list as per the data provided by the world anti-doping agency (WADA). This implies that the use of doping has not ceased in local sporting disciplines, hence the call for increasing the stringencies of anti-doping measures in India.

Technological and scientific advances

Doping in sports is a fight that can only be described as ongoing which is very similar to a game of cat and mouse. In some cases, players and their associates who supply them with substances where unnatural improvement is sought seek new ways of performing the task, science is likewise equally up to the challenge of finding ways of identifying those means and stopping their usage. Here’s a glimpse into how technology and science are advancing anti-doping efforts: Here is what the various technologies and sciences could look into when it comes to falsifying the processes of anti-doping:

Sharpshooter detection methods: There is a rather important subject that evolves with the current analytical procedures in use aimed at identifying prohibited substances in the least measure possible. The chemical procedures, including mass spectrometry and chromatography, are equally being enhanced to assist in the identification of newer forms of the banned substances and the shifting components used in the banned performance-enhancing drugs.

Biological passports: This method follows an athlete’s biological parameters on a daily basis and it has a baseline from which other measures can be taken. Any deviation from such values, like in Baseline Test 1, like a three-fold increase of the blood values, is regarded as doping.

Dried blood spot analysis: This innovative technique utilises a small amount of blood, which can be easily gotten by using a lancet provided on a finger to form a prick. In this method, athletes’ injury rates are low, the samples can be taken and transported easily and they can be stored as well.

Gene doping detection: It is on this note that researchers are looking for ways to identify cases of gene doping in which the body of an athlete is genetically modified to contain specific genes with a view to enhancing performance. While this is still a very new and not very developed technology, it has growth potential.

Artificial Intelligence (AI): It is currently under research in the pursuit of deciding methods to detect trends on anti-doping and even possible doping from the large amount of data. This assists the anti-doping agencies to tender market updates on the move and come up with suitable ways of testing the athletes.

These and many other developments accompanied by ever-going research studies are quite significant in the sense that they help to maintain the playing field in sports. This is perhaps achieved through the realisation of the following pertinent goals of most systems: To secure fairness in athletic events and eliminate cheating.

Conclusion

 Besides, the fight for clean sports goes on.

The issue of doping is a rather painful topic that largely overshadows such a domain as sports. That is why it destroys all the fundamentals of sports—justice, hard work, and the strive for the perfect anatomy of the human body. The fight against doping is ongoing since the participants of such practices create new schemes and methods, while participants of sports competitions try to invent something new; science in its turn tries to follow the pace and develop new techniques of detection.

It is still a long haul that has not been accomplished, but innovations such as the biological passports, the dried blood spot analysis, and the possibilities of gene doping detection are already on the horizon. In addition, there is a need for efficient laws and non-governmental cooperation through such bodies as WADA in the fight against doping.

In conclusion, there must be a combination of strategies to ensure that the sports are not compromised in any way. Ongoing research, stringent testing and measures on doping, and proper conduct by athletes, coaches, and support staff are very crucial. In this way, it will be possible to protect the mission of organisations that represent the spirit of sports, competition, and fair play.

REFERENCES:

Download Now

Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Gomedalli Lakshminarayan (1935)

0

This article has been written by Mudit Gupta. It comprehensively covers all the necessary details, including facts, arguments, and judgement, pertaining to the case of Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Gomedalli Lakshminarayan (1935). It deals with the essential concepts of Hindu Undivided Family and Coparcenary under Hindu law.

Introduction

The Hindu Undivided Family (HUF), and the succession of properties under it, is a concept rooted in the history of social development in India since the 19th century, currently discussed under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Despite its long existence, it gained recognition in taxation legislation in 1922. Since then, various questions regarding HUF have been addressed by the judiciary in India. One such question was addressed in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Gomedalli Lakshminarayan (1935)

This landmark judgement deals with the assessment of the income and assets transferred to the coparcener through succession after the father’s death for the purpose of taxation and for assessing the applicability of super-tax as per Section 55 of the Income-tax Act, 1922. The judgement distinguishes between incomes and assets gained through succession and those acquired through individual efforts. This article discusses all details related to the case, including facts, issues raised, arguments of the parties, relevant legal concepts, judgements referred to, and the final judgement. This landmark judgement is very important for those studying and researching the HUF under family law in India.

Details of the case

  • Case name: The Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Gomedalli Lakshminarayan
  • Citation: AIR 1935 Bom 412
  • Name of the appellant: Commissioner of Income-tax
  • Name of the respondent: Gomedalli Lakshminarayan
  • Date of the judgement: March 28, 1935
  • Court: Bombay High Court
  • Judge: Sir John Beaumont, C.J.
  • Important provisions: Section 55, Section 14(1), and Section 3 of the Income-tax Act, 1922

Facts of the case

In this particular case, there was a joint Hindu family originally comprising four members: a father, his wife, a son, and his wife. The father died in 1929, which was prior to the assessment year in question. Following the father’s death, the joint Hindu family consisted of the son (the assessee), his mother, and his wife. The family was in possession of some ancestral property, which was transferred to the son as he was the sole surviving member of the family. The primary issue here was whether the income received by the son/assessee, as the sole surviving male member of the Hindu Undivided Family, should be taxed as his own individual property or as income of the joint Hindu family for the purposes of super-tax under Section 55 of the Income-tax Act, 1922. The answer to this question was necessary for understanding the concept of super-tax and its applicability in such cases.

Issues raised

This case is pivotal as it provided answers to key questions regarding the assessment of income received through the right of survivorship in a joint Hindu family. The main issues presented before the court in this case were as follows:

  1. Whether the assessee’s income should be assessed as his own individual income or as income of the joint Hindu family?
  2. Whether the assessment levied was appropriate under the circumstances of the case?
  3. What distinguishes Hindu coparcenary from Hindu undivided families? 

This judgement addressed and provided answers to all these critical issues pertaining to the assessment of income received through the right of survivorship by a member of a joint Hindu family.

Arguments of the parties 

Contentions made by both parties are discussed in this section of the article and are as follows:

Arguments by the petitioner 

The petitioner in this case, the Commissioner of Income-tax, presented several contentions, with their main argument being that the income gained by the son through the right of survivorship should be taxed as individual income and not as the income of Hindu Undivided Family. They contended that the HUF ceased to exist as soon as the father died, leaving the son as the only male member in the family. Consequently, the income gained by the son should be treated as his individual income, and the provision for super-tax as provided under Section 55 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, should apply to this income. The petitioner also argued that the concept of the HUF is a legal fiction and should not be considered for taxation purposes. They also contended that recognising the HUF for taxation purposes would set a wrong precedent and could lead to tax evasion in future cases.

Arguments by the respondent

In response to the petitioner’s contentions, the respondent argued that the Hindu Undivided Family continued to exist even after the father’s death, as held in the case of Vedathanni vs. The Commissioner of Income-tax (1932). The respondent contended that the individual and the HUF are two separate legal entities, and therefore, the income should be treated as the income of the HUF, not the individual, for the purpose of assessment under the taxation laws. Hence, the son should not be levied any super-tax on the income coming from the property transferred to him due to his father’s death. It was also contended that the HUF is not merely a legal fiction but a reality in the social and economic landscapes of India. 

These were the contentions presented by both sides during the hearing of the case.

Concepts involved in Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Gomedalli Lakshminarayan (1935) 

For a clear understanding of this judgement, it is essential to discuss various concepts related to the undivided Hindu family and super-tax. 

Hindu Undivided Family and Hindu Coparcenary

To fully grasp this judgement, it is imperative to understand the concepts of the Hindu undivided family and Hindu coparcenary in detail. 

A Hindu Undivided Family is a traditional system or structure of family that is found amongst Hindu families in India where all members of a family, related by blood or marriage, live together and share common assets, like property and money. A family is considered to be a ‘joint’ or undivided family if the kitchen and place of worship remain shared and not separate, even when only one male member is left in the family. This family unit is recognised by law and has a unique status for legal and tax purposes.

In an HUF, all lineal descendants of the family, regardless of their gender, are considered members and have rights over the wealth of the family. The eldest male member is typically the head of the family and is known as the Karta. He manages the family’s finances and assets, wherein all members of the family have a stake in these shared assets. Unlike regular families, an HUF is treated as a single legal entity for the purpose of tax assessment, among others. This means such a family’s income can be taxed separately from the incomes of its individual members. This also means that such a family continues its existence even after the death of the Karta. The next eldest member simply takes over as the new head of the family, or the Karta.

A Hindu coparcenary, on the other hand, is a smaller group within an HUF that consists of only male members of three generations who are directly related to a common ancestor. This group includes a father, his sons, grandsons, and great-grandsons, all of whom are known as coparceners. They have a birthright to a share in the ancestral property of the family. It is important to note that the 2005 amendment to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, has changed the concept of Hindu coparcenary. Earlier, only male members of a joint Hindu family could be coparceners. However, the 2005 amendment gave daughters the same rights as sons, meaning they could be coparceners and become a Karta just like the sons, irrespective of their marital status.

These concepts are also defined by the two schools of Hindu law: the Mitakshara and the Dayabhaga. The primary difference between these two systems lies in the handling of coparcenary rights. The Mitakshara system includes coparceners, while the Dayabhaga system does not recognise coparcenary rights in the same way. In the Dayabhaga system, upon the death of a coparcener, the transfer of property takes place in the hands of his legal heirs rather than to other coparceners. Conversely, in the case of the Mitakshara system, the transfer of property is made into the hands of the coparceners and not to the legal heirs. 

Super-tax

The concept of super-tax, as outlined under Section 55 of the Income Tax Act, 1922, involves the levy of an additional tax on the total income of an individual, Hindu undivided family, company, local authority, or other association of persons. This tax is charged in addition to the regular income tax for any given assessment year. Basically, once the income tax is determined, an additional tax known as super-tax is also imposed on an assessee’s income. The rate depended on what was specified by the Act itself for that particular year.

Section 55 specifies that super-tax is charged on the total income generated by the assessee from the previous year. This provision ensured that all income, even if it was not taxed under the Income-tax Act, 1922, was subject to taxation and assessed under this provision, thereby preventing tax evasion of any kind. For example, in the present case, the income was generated in the year 1929, and the case was decided in 1935. Therefore, the income so generated was taxed under this provision, ensuring that all income generated through these years was taxed appropriately. 

This section also provided certain exceptions. It is important to note that the concept of super-tax as was outlined in the Income-tax Act of 1922 no longer exists in the current tax law of India. The Income-tax Act, 1961, which replaced the Income-tax Act, 1922, did not take forward the provision of super-tax. The structure of taxation in India was significantly changed with the introduction of the new Act. This change reflects the changes in economic conditions and the government’s objective of simplifying the framework for taxation.

Precedents referred to in Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Gomedalli Lakshminarayan (1935) 

Vedathanni vs. The Commissioner of Income-tax (1932)

During the hearing of the Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Gomedalli Lakshminarayan, the case of Vedathanni vs. The Commissioner of Income-tax (1932) was cited as precedent. In that case, the special bench of the Madras High Court held that a Hindu undivided family can consist of one male member and the widows of other coparceners. Hence, the arrears of the maintenance received by a widow of a deceased coparcener were exempted from the tax under Section 14(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922. The Bombay High Court in this case agreed with this interpretation of the Madras High Court. While pronouncing the judgement, the court accepted the reasoning provided and stated that it found no reason to deny the reasoning, which had been proposed by the Advocate General in the case. 

In Re Moolji Sicka and Others vs. Unknown (1934)

Apart from the above-mentioned case, the court also considered the case of Moolji Sicka and five other assessees before the division bench of the Calcutta High Court. However, it refrained from delving into its details, as only an uncertified copy of the judgement was made available to the court during the proceedings.

Judgement of the case 

After hearing the contentions of both parties, the court decided the following:

  1. The court determined that in the present case, the income must be treated as the income of the joint Hindu family, not as the income of the individual. This decision was based on the fact that the joint Hindu family continued to exist even after the death of the father, as the remaining members included the son, his wife, and the wife of the deceased father.
  2. The provision of super-tax will not apply in the present case. The income was not considered individual income of the assessee, and hence the liability levied on the son/assessee under the super-tax provision of the Income-tax Act, 1922, is not correct.

Rationale behind the judgement

The Hon’ble Bombay High Court based its decision on several key points, which are given as follows:

  1. While deciding on the issue presented regarding the validity of the joint Hindu family in this case, the court said that the case cited as a precedent in the present case, Vedathanni vs. The Commissioner of Income-tax, posed a similar question of law before the special bench of the Madras High Court, and there was no valid reason to have a differing opinion. Therefore, the court decided that a joint Hindu family can exist even if there is only one male member in the family, and hence, in this case as well, it does not get dissolved after the death of the father.
  2. While deciding on the issue of super tax, the hon’ble court said that as the joint Hindu family is considered to be valid, the income received as a right of survivorship is to be considered as the income of the joint Hindu family and not as the income of the assessee as an individual. Hence, the levy of super-tax cannot be held valid.

Conclusion 

The case of Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Gomedalli Lakshminarayan played a critical role in shaping the landscape of family law in India, especially when it comes to dealing with taxation. This case answered the important question regarding the assessment of income received through the right of succession and set a significant precedent. The judgement provided clarity on a common issue that impacts various other cases within Hindu society in India. The rationale of the court in this judgement thoroughly addressed all the issues posed before the court, providing a clear picture of how the assessment of income received by a coparcener as a right of survivorship should be done for the purpose of income tax. 

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) 

What is meant by ‘right of succession’ in Indian tax law?

The ‘right of succession’ refers to an individual’s legal entitlement to inherit property as per the succession laws. This right does not involve any individual effort on the part of the assessee in gaining such income.

How does Indian tax law treat income derived from the exercise of a right of succession?

After this case, the tax law in India treats income derived from the right of succession as income belonging to the joint Hindu family rather than to the coparcener individually.

Is the provision of super-tax still applicable in India?

No, the provision of super tax was abolished with the introduction of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The structure of taxation was changed after the introduction of the new Act.

References 

Download Now

Vellikannu vs. R. Singaperumal and Ors. (2005) 

0

This article is written by Almana Singh. It deals with a thorough analysis of the judgement pronounced in the case of Vellikannu vs. R. Singaperumal and Ors. (2005) where the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India dealt with the question of whether a person who has committed a murder is entitled to a share in the deceased victim’s coparcenary property. 

Introduction 

The word “coparcenary” is a narrow institute and it majorly included male lineal descendants of a common ancestor. Prior to 2005, the rights and liabilities entitled to coparceners were restricted to just male members of a common ancestor till the third generation. This scenario was changed to make the traditional laws more gender-neutral and women were given rights in coparcenary property. The 2005 Amendment brought in another change and the concept of survivorship was abolished. Devolution of the property was now to be taken up by either testamentary succession or in accordance with the rules of succession enshrined under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. This article deals with the facts, arguments advanced and judgement pronounced in the case of Vellikannu vs. R. Singaperumal and Ors. (2005) where the court went into deep discussions about the nature of coparcenary. It is emphasised that the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 which made major amendments to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was enacted on 09 September 2005 and the judgement in the case at hand was pronounced on 06 June 2005. The court has applied the rule of survivorship which is now abolished in India. 

Details of the case

  1. Case Name: Vellikannu vs. R. Singaperumal and Ors. (2005)
  2. Petitioner: Vellikannu
  3. Respondents: R. Singaperumal and Ors.
  4. Court: The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
  5. Type and case no.: Civil Appeal No. 4838 of 1999
  6. Date of judgement: 06 June 2005
  7. Bench: Justice Ashok Bhan and Justice A.K Mathur
  8. Equivalent citations: [MANU/SC/0367/2005] [2005 INSC 267] [2005 (2) AWC 1905 (SC)]
  9. Provisions and Statutes involved: Sections 6,8,25 and 27 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956

Facts of the case

The disputed properties are the self-acquired properties of Ramasami Konar and the first defendant in the case is his only son. The plaintiff is the son’s wife, meaning Ramasami Konar’s daughter-in-law. Ramasami Konar’s wife was divorced and already married someone else and was residing separately. On 10th October 1972, the first defendant that is the son murdered Ramasami Konar, his father and was convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 which under the new criminal laws is equivalent to Section 101 of Bhartiyay Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The son was convicted of the murder of Ramasami Konar and was given life imprisonment. Since the son had murdered the father, he was not entitled to any of the properties of the deceased father and the plaintiff who is the wife of the son claimed that she was entitled to the entire estate left by the deceased. The plaintiff citing Sections 25 and 27 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 contended that since the son was the murderer he was not entitled to the property and the property would be devolved in such a way that the son is presumed to be dead at the time of the partition and hence claimed to be the owner of all the properties. After the release of the son, the plaintiff and defendant lived together for some time before she was driven out of the house. 

Trial Court 

The plaintiff requested a declaration which would affirm her right in the deceased’s estate. The defendant argued that the plaintiff was not a legal heir of Ramasami Konar and that the suit was not maintainable. It was also alleged that all the properties acquired by Ramasami Konar were joint family property and the defendant will acquire them through the rule of survivorship.

The plaintiff sought a declaration to affirm her entitlement to the deceased’s estate. The defendant counter-argued that the plaintiff was not a legal heir of Ramasami Konar and that the suit was not maintainable. The defendant also claimed that all properties acquired by Ramasami Konar were joint family property which he would inherit through the rule of survivorship. 

By the order dated 31 March 1980, the Trial Court held that the disputed property is joint family property and the first defendant is entitled to it and the second defendant is a cultivating tenant. However, the court also noted that the first defendant had murdered his father and therefore is not entitled to claim any rights under Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1973 which is read with Sections 25 and 27 of the Act. All these Sections have been briefed in the later part of the article under the heading “Laws Discussed”. As per the proviso given in Section 6, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for half a share in the property and was granted the same. 

Lower Appellate Court

Aggrieved by the Trial Court’s decision, the first defendant made an appeal to the Lower Appellate Court. The court upheld the Trial Court’s findings but modified the decree and treated it as a preliminary decree. The court determined that the first defendant should be considered non-existent and that the plaintiff as a class-I heir under Schedule of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is entitled to a share in the property. The appeal was subsequently dismissed. 

High Court of Madras

Aggrieved by the decision of the Lower Appellate Court, the first defendant submitted a second appeal before the High Court of Madras. The High Court dealt with two major questions. 

  • Firstly, is the judgement labelled as “Ex. A.2” in the criminal case decisive in determining the issue of exclusion from inheritance in the ongoing proceedings? 
  • Secondly, whether the exclusion from inheritance would cover the enlargement of interest by the rule of survivorship in accordance with Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. 

For the first question, the High Court of Madras held that the judgement of the Criminal Court can be taken into consideration. 

Moving on to the second question, which decided if the plaintiff is entitled to inherit the deceased father-in-law’s estate and what effect would the provisions of Sections 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 have on her right?

It is to be noted that this fact was undisputed that the properties in the suit were Ramasami Konar’s joint family property the first defendant had a share in and both parties in question were to be governed by the Mitakshara school of Hindu law. 

After a thorough understanding of the arguments presented by both parties, the learned single judge of the High Court of Madras came to the conclusion that the view taken by both the previous courts could not be sustained. The High Court opined that the plaintiff cannot claim as the widow of the son and thus she could not claim one-half of the coparcenary property under the proviso of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. It was held that she would be only entitled to a share if the deceased and the son had partitioned the property before death. The first defendant had not inherited any share from the deceased Ramasamy Konar and the plaintiff is only entitled to claim as a widow if there is a succession to Ramasamy Konar’s estate. If there was no succession that had occurred, the proviso of Section 6 which states that the first defendant is assumed to have passed away before Ramasamy Konar does not apply. Therefore, she cannot claim to be the widow of a predeceased son. Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is not applicable here. 

The principles of justice, equity and public policy state that the plaintiff cannot be considered a new line of descent and the first defendant is to be treated as if he never existed. Since the plaintiff’s claim of the share in the property is based on the fact that she is the widow of the defendant and it is an undisputed fact that the first defendant is disqualified, this subsequently makes the plaintiff equally ineligible and disqualified because she cannot claim her share through her husband who was the murderer of the deceased. The High Court’s decision allowed the appeal made by the first defendant and the judgements along with the decrees of the Trial Court as well as the Lower Appellate Court were set aside. 

Issue raised

The Supreme Court had two major issues at hand:

  • whether the first defendant, who is the murderer in this case, is entitled to a share in the coparcenary property of the deceased victim.
  • whether the plaintiff, who is the wife of the son and who would ideally claim through the son entitled to a right in the deceased father-in-law’s estate.

Arguments advanced by the parties 

Appellants

The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the appellant is the sole female survivor of the Joint Hindu family property since her husband was disqualified. Citing the proviso under Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the counsel argued that she is entitled to the entire estate as the sole surviving member of the joint coparcenary property. 

Defendants 

The learned counsel for the defendant submitted that the disqualification attached to the son due to him being the murderer of Ramasamy Konar equally applies to the wife of the son as she was claiming the right in the estate because of her marriage with the son. 

Laws discussed

The court throughout the judgement referred to several Sections of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. All the major relevant Sections have been briefed below for a thorough understanding. 

Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act

Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is one of the most cited Sections in the case at hand. Section 6 was given a major overhaul and it was amended in 2005. To thoroughly understand the concept, the pre and post-amendment provisions of Section 6 have been briefed below. It is emphasised that the judgement pronounced in the case at hand was delivered prior to the 2005 amendment.

Pre-amendment (Before 2005)

Before the amendment of 2005, Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 governed how coparcenary property within the Hindu joint family under the Mitakshara school of law would be passed down. Under this provision, the interest of a Hindu male in the joint coparcenary property upon his death would be transferred in accordance with the rule of survivorship. However, there existed an exception where if a deceased had a surviving female relative who is listed under Class I of the Schedule given in the Hindu Succession Act or there is a male relative specified in the same class who can claim through the female, in both these cases the interest would devolve via testamentary succession or intestate succession instead of rule of survivorship. There were two explanations attached to the old provision of Section 6. 

Explanation 1: It created a legal scenario where the partition was considered to have taken place right before the death of the coparcener and entitled him to his share. 

Explanation 2: It stated that those who had separated from the coparcenary before the deceased’s death could not claim any interest in the deceased’s property. 

Post-amendment (After 2005)

The amendment introduced by Act 39 of 2005 which took effect on 09 September 2005 brought substantial changes to Section 6.

The revised Section 6(1) provided daughters the same rights as sons in coparcenary property within the joint family. It stated that from the date of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, the daughters in the family would by birth become coparceners with the same rights and liabilities as sons. This change was aimed at eliminating the gender discrimination which was present in the previous provision. 

This amendment made a historic change and the rule of survivorship was abolished meaning that the property would no longer pass exclusively to male descendants but would be equally divided to all the coparceners and the rules of succession enshrined in the Hindu Succession Act would be followed for devolution of the property. 

The proviso of this Section stated that any disposition or alienation of the property including any testamentary disposition occurring before 20 December 2004 would remain valid. 

Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act

Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 states the general rules of succession for a male Hindu who dies intestate meaning without leaving a will or a testamentary document. 

Rule 1: The property first goes to the heirs covered under Class I of the schedule given in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. 

Rule 2: If there are no Class I heirs, then it goes to the heirs listed in Class II of the Schedule. 

Rule 3: If there are no heirs in either Class I or Class II, the property then devolves to the agnates of the deceased. 

Rule 4: If there are no agnates of the deceased, the property goes to cognates. 

Here the term “agnates” means a person related wholly through males either by blood or by adoption and the term “cognates” means where the person is related to the deceased through one or more female relations. 

Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act

Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 states that a person who commits or aids in the commission of a murder is entirely disqualified from inheriting the property of the deceased victim or any other property related to the succession of the person they murdered or assisted in murdering. 

Section 27 of the Hindu Succession Act

Section 27 of the  Hindu Succession Act, 1956 states that when an heir is disqualified from inheriting any property under this Act, the property will be distributed as if that person had predeceased the intestate that is the person dying without any will or testamentary document. 

Judgement in Vellikannu vs. R. Singaperumal and Ors. (2005)

The judgement was penned by Justice A.K. Mathur. The Supreme Court at the very outset of the judgement cited several Sections of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, namely, Section 6, Section 8, Section 25 and Section 27, all of which have already been briefed under the heading “Laws discussed”. 

According to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, if a male passes away after the Act has come into effect, his share in the Mitakshara coparcenary property is to be inherited by the remaining members of the coparcenary through the rule of survivorship and not by the rules of succession laid out in the Act. The Supreme Court observed that in the case at hand it has been established that the deceased, Ramasamy Konar is a Hindu and is governed in accordance with the Mitakshara school of Hindu law and the disputed suit property is part of the coparcenary property. However, he died intestate meaning the deceased died without making any testament or a will for further devolution of his property after his death. 

Consequently, under the provisions of Section 6, the property should be inherited by the rule of survivorship by the remaining coparceners. However, there is an exception to this rule, if the deceased has left behind a female relative listed in Class I of the Schedule given in the Hindu Succession Act,1956 or a male relative listed in the same class of the schedule who claims through such a female, in these cases the deceased’s share in the Mitakshara property must be inherited through testamentary succession and not by survivorship. 

The Supreme Court noted that the property in question has been confirmed by lower courts as coparcenary property. If the first defendant had not murdered his father, the situation might have been different. The bench went on to examine how the succession of the deceased father’s property is affected when the son is responsible for the father’s death. Had the son not committed the murder, he and his wife would have inherited the property. Under the Mitakshara school of Hindu law, a son gains an inherent interest in all the coparcenary property by virtue of birth or adoption regardless of whether the property is ancestral or self-acquired. This principle is widely recognised by scholars in the realm of Hindu law. 

Rationale behind this judgement

The court referred to several books by renowned authors while delivering this judgement. The court made a reference to Mulla, in the 15th Edition (1982), pages 284 to 285 which states that under the Mitakshara school of Hindu law, one of the major features of a coparcenary is shared ownership. The property is owned collectively by all the coparceners. In an undivided family, there is no single member who can claim a specific portion of the joint family property. Each member’s interest and share in the property changes with births and deaths in the family. A member upon partition gains a defined share in the property. The correct term for a coparcener’s stake in the property is “undivided coparcenary interest”. Until the said partition occurs, all the coparceners have collective rights to possess and enjoy the property. Mulla cited the case of Katama Natchair vs. The Rajah of Shivangunga (1863) wherein the privy council observed that all the family members share a common interest and possession. When one member dies, the surviving members inherit by survivorship, maintaining the shared interest and possession they had during the deceased member’s lifetime. 

The court then cited S.V. Gupta’s Hindu Law, Volume 1, Third Edition (1981) on page 162 the author talks about the rights of coparceners and observes that until a partition takes place, a coparcener is entitled to 3 rights,

  1. Joint possession and enjoyment of joint family property 
  2. The right to claim a share in the joint family property as per the rule of survivorship 
  3. The right to demand partition of the joint family property

The Supreme Court referred to page 164 of the above-mentioned book where the author talks about the rule of survivorship. The author states that as long as a family remains united, the joint family property is inherited by the coparceners by the means of survivorship and not by the rule of succession. When a coparcener passes away, the remaining coparceners inherit his interest in the joint family property by the rule of survivorship. This is done to maintain the shared interest and possession all the coparceners enjoyed during the deceased’s lifetime. S.V. Gupta, the author of the book also notes that if a coparcener is disqualified from taking a share in the partition due to any disability, such as insanity they are still allowed to inherit the entire property as per the rules of survivorship. The court made a reference to page 165 of the book where the author states that once the deceased passes away and other coparceners inherit the property through survivorship, they do not become the legal representatives of the deceased. Survivorship simply increases the share of the coparceners in the property that they already collectively own.

The court made a reference to N.R. Raghavachariar’s “Hindu Law Principles and Precedents” (8th Edition, 1987) on page 230, the author outlines a few rights given to coparceners which are briefed below:

  1. Right by birth 
  2. Right by survivorship 
  3. Right to partition 
  4. Right to joint possession and enjoyment 
  5. Right to restrain unauthorised acts
  6. Right of alienation 
  7. Right to accounts 
  8. Right to make self-acquisition

Regarding the “Right by birth”, this can be drawn that every coparcener acquires an interest in the coparcenary property from birth and this right is retroactive to the date of conception but this does not negate the possibility that coparcenary property may come into existence after the coparcener is born. 

In regard to the “Right of survivorship”, the court noted that the system of joint family with its principles of succession through survivorship is unique to Hindu law. In such a family, no members have a specific share and the death or exit of a member does not change the family’s joint status. If a coparcener dies without any male heirs, his interest in the joint family property passes to the coparceners by survivorship and not by succession to his own heirs. The court noted that if a coparcener becomes insane after birth, he does not lose his coparcenary status even though his condition might disqualify him from claiming his share in the partition. The court emphasised that the beneficial interest of each coparcener fluctuates, it increases with the death of another coparcener and decreases with the birth of a new one in the family. The court settled that the member of the coparcenary acquires a right in the joint family property as a coparcener by birth and his share may fluctuate from time to time depending on births and deaths in the family but his right by way of survivorship in coparcenary property is settled, regardless of the fluctuations. 

The Supreme Court cited the case of State Bank of India vs. Ghamandi Ram (1969) where the principles of the Mitakshara school’s principles regarding the Hindu joint family property were discussed. According to the Mitakshara school of Hindu law, the property of a Hindu joint family is collectively owned by all coparceners in a quasi-corporate manner. The Mitakshara texts clearly state that the joint family property is held in trust for the benefit of all current and future family members. The Supreme Court in the Ghamandi Ram case listed a few characteristics of coparcenary under the Mitakshara school of Hindu law which are briefed below. 

  1. The male descendants of a common ancestor up to the third generation automatically acquire ownership rights in the ancestral property from birth. 
  2. These descendants have the liberty to assert their rights by requesting a partition at any time. 
  3. Until a partition occurs, each coparcener has joint ownership over the entire property along with the other coparceners. 
  4. This joint ownership means that possession and enjoyment of the coparcenary property is shared among all coparceners. 
  5. The property cannot be alienated without the agreement and consent of all coparceners, except in the cases of necessity. 
  6. When one coparcener dies, their interest in the coparcenary property is passed to the surviving coparceners in accordance with the rule of survivorship. 
  7. The coparcenary under the Mitakshara school of Hindu law is created by law and cannot be formed by individuals by way of agreements, except in the case of adoptions where the adopted son becomes a part of the coparcenary concerning the ancestral properties of his adoptive father from the date of adoption. 

The Supreme Court made a reference to the case of the State of Maharashtra vs. Narayan Rao Sham Rao Deshmukh and Ors. (1985) where the court elaborated on the concept of coparcenary given under the Mitakshara school of Hindu law. The court explained that coparcenary is related to joint family property where all coparceners share equally. However, a Hindu coparcenary is limited in scope as compared to a Hindu joint family. Only male members who gain an interest in joint or coparcenary property by birth can be coparceners. This group includes male members of a joint family, his sons, grandsons and great-grandsons. A coparcener has a right to the coparcenary property from birth itself, but this right and share in the property can only be precisely determined when a partition takes place. As long as the family remains joint, the share of a coparcener cannot be definitively fixed, as it is subject to change. 

The court after going into thorough discussions about the concept of the Mitakshara school and the right of coparceners in the joint family property along with referring to a few judgements opined that the first defendant and the plaintiff who was married to the first defendant were members of a joint Hindu family. If the first defendant had not been disqualified, they would have inherited property according to the Mitakshara school. The issue at hand is whether the sole male survivor who has incurred disqualification can still claim the property under the Mitakshara law. If he cannot inherit the property by survivorship, the next question is whether his wife who would succeed through him, can claim the share in the coparcenary property. The Supreme Court answered in negative and denied the share to the wife. 

The Court observed that even prior to the amendment made in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 when Section 25 and Section 27 did not exist. The stance of the law was the same and the person who had murdered his own father whose property they would have inherited was disqualified from inheriting the said property on the basis of principles of justice, equity, good conscience and public policy. The court now referred to a case of Kenchava Kom Sanyellappa Hosamani and Anr. vs. Girimallappa Channappa Somasagar (1924) where the Lorships determined that a murderer is disqualified from inheritance and rejected any distinction between beneficial and legal estates under Hindu law. They held that such distinctions which were present in previous rulings of subordinate judges and Madras High Court in the case of Vedanayaga Mudaliar vs. Vedammal (1904) will not be applicable. The privy council in the Kenchava Kom case (1924) also addressed whether inheritance could be claimed from the murderer and it was concluded that it could not. It was observed in the case that the murderer would be treated as non-existent for inheritance purposes, this was done to prevent the murderer from forming a new line of descent. The Privy Council ruled that a son who has murdered his father is entirely disinherited. They held that the murderer should be treated as if they were dead when the inheritance opened and excluded them from both legal and beneficial claims. The murderer can neither inherit the property nor can anyone claim it through them. This principle was later affirmed in several cases, namely, K. Stanumurthiayya and Ors. vs. K.Ramappa and Ors. (1942), Nakchhed Singh and Ors. vs. Bijai Bahadur Singh and Anr.(1953), Mata Badal Singh and Ors. vs. Bijay Bahadur Singh and Ors. (1956) and Minoti vs. Sushil Mohansingh Malik and Anr. (1982).

The court observed that the legal principle where a person who commits or abets murder is disqualified from inheriting property was codified by Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which states that even if a murderer was not previously disqualified under traditional Hindu law, they are now disqualified on the basis of justice, equity and good conscience. According to these principles, a murderer should not be considered a starting point of a new line of descent after inheritance but rather they should be regarded as non-existent when the succession opens. The court established that if a person murders their father or any individual from whom they seek to inherit, they get completely disqualified from such inheritance. Now, Section 27 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 states that if a person is disqualified from inheriting under this Act they will be treated as if they have predeceased the deceased. This means that a person who has murdered someone from whom they wish is disqualified due to their actions, in such a case, they will be regarded as having died before the deceased. 

The combined effect of Section 25 and Section 27 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is that a murderer is completely barred from inheriting the victim’s estate. The court made a reference to the objects and reasons wherein the framers of the Act cited the Privy Council’s decision and emphasised that a murderer should not be considered the starting point of a new line of descent but rather they should be regarded as non-existent. A person guilty of murder is treated as having no relationship to the deceased’s estate. 

The court in the concluding remarks of the judgement referred to the facts of the present case and held that due to the effect of Sections 25 and 27, the first defendant cannot inherit any property of his father as he was murdered by the defendant himself. On the basis of principles of justice, equity and good conscience, the line of descent of the first defendant ceases to exist. Once the son himself is disqualified then his whole branch of coparcenary that is his son and his wife also ceases to be entitled to share in the property. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the judgement pronounced by the learned single judge of the High Court of Madras and held that the plaintiff is not entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased, Ramasamy Konar. The Court said that they cannot decide the share of the wife without first deciding the share of the son because the share of the wife flows through him. Since the son is not entitled to any share in the property of the deceased, the wife cannot also lay any claim on the deceased father-in-law’s property. The appeal was dismissed without any order as to the costs. 

Precedents referred to in Vellikannu vs. R. Singaperumal and Ors. (2005)

The Supreme Court in its judgement majorly referred to two judgments, namely, State Bank of India vs. Ghamandi Ram (1969) and State of Maharashtra vs. Narayan Rao Sham Deshmukh and Ors. (1985).  Both of them have been briefed below for a thorough understanding. 

State Bank of India vs. Ghamandi Ram (1969)

Facts 

State Bank of India vs. Ghamandi Ram (dead) through Shri Gurbax Rai revolves around a dispute between the State Bank of India (formerly known as the Imperial Bank of India) and Ghamandi Ram, who after his death represented by Shri Gubax Rai. The respondent Ghamandi Ram held a cash credit account in the Imperial Bank of India in Bhawalpur. The key issue in the case was the liability of the joint Hindu family for the debts incurred by the Karta that is Ghamandi Ram upon his death. 

Issue 

The legal question was whether the entire coparcenary was liable for the debts contracted by the Karta for a family business.

Judgement 

The Supreme Court in the case of Ghamndi Ram went into discussions about the nature of coparcenary under the Hindu law. A coparcenary consists of male members of a family who acquire a right by birth in the joint family property. The Karta is the manager of the coparcenary property and has the authority to contract debts for the family business and such debts are binding on the entire branch of coparcenary provided they are incurred for family purposes. The court held that debts incurred by Ghamandi Ram as the Karta of the joint family firm were binding on the entire coparcenary property and the joint family was liable to make repayments accordingly. 

State of Maharashtra vs. Narayan Rao Sham Rao Deshmukh and Ors. (1985)

Facts

The case of State of Maharashtra vs. Narayan Rao Sham Deshmukh and Ors. (1985) involves Sham Rao Bhagwant Rao Deshmukh and his son Narayan Rao who were members of a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara school of law. Sham Rao’s wife Sulochanabai and his mother Gangabai were also members of this family. The family owned extensive properties which included agricultural lands. Upon Sham Rao’s death in 1957, his interest in the coparcenary property devolved equally to his son, wife and mother in accordance with Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. A notional partition assumed prior to his death determined the shares. Regardless of the partition, the family continued to live together and enjoy the properties as before. 

In 1962, the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, of 1961 came into force. Narayan Rao filed a declaration stating that the family held 305.49 acres of agricultural land and claimed a family arrangement divided the land into distinct shares. However, the Sub-Divisional Officer found the family was joint in estate and under the Ceiling Act, the family could not hold agricultural land exceeding one unit in the ceiling area and the family was entitled to retain only 96 acres where the remaining land was declared surplus and was to be surrendered in accordance with the Act. This decision was upheld by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. 

The High Court of Bombay concluded that upon Sham Rao’s death, the surviving members inherited their shares in the deceased property and thus ceased to hold the family property as joint family property. Each member was entitled to retain one unit ceiling area. The state government, aggrieved by this decision made an appeal and argued that the joint family continued and the family members collectively were entitled to only one unit of the ceiling area. 

Issue

Whether the family continued to be joint in estate despite the notional partition and collectively held one unit of agricultural land under the Act.

Judgement 

The Supreme Court took a narrow approach and opined that the notional partition, although ascertained the shares of the members, did not disrupt the unity of the family and held that the Act would be applicable and all the family members collectively would be eligible to hold one unit only. 

Analysis of the case

The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 introduced significant changes to ensure equality and gender neutrality in the laws governing joint family property and provided women rights and liabilities at par with men. In the present case, the issue at hand was whether a murderer is entitled to the coparcenary property of their victim. The court, rightly, answered in negative. 

Even if this decision was made after the amendment came into effect, the outcome would have remained the same. Granting ancestral property rights to a murderer is fundamentally opposed to the principles of justice, equity and public policy which is the foundation of our legal system. Such a deviation would be a disheartening sight as it would contradict the very ideals our justice system stands on. This judgement reinforces the idea that the law must align with the broader values of society.

Conclusion 

In conclusion, the judgement that was pronounced in the case of Vellikannu vs. R. Singaperumal and Ors. (2005), the Supreme Court of India addressed whether a murderer or someone claiming through the murderer is entitled to a share in the property of the deceased victim. The court decisively answered in negative and ruled that neither the murderer (the son) nor his wife (the person claiming through him) is entitled to any share in the property of the deceased. This judgement was a result of thorough discussions on the concept and nature of coparcenary as well as the incidents pertaining to a joint Hindu family. 

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

What is the rule of survivorship?

According to the rule of survivorship, upon the death of a coparcener, their share in the property is distributed among the surviving coparceners and under this concept the share of each coparcener in the joint family property fluctuates depending on the deaths and births in the family. This rule was abolished in India when the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 came into effect on 09 September 2005.

What are the major schools of Hindu law?

There are majorly two schools of Hindu law, namely, Dayabhagha school and Mitakshara school. Both these schools have a contrary understanding of the concept of coparcenary. Mitakshara school states that coparcenary rights exist by birth and on the other hand, Dayabhaga school opines that coparcenary comes into existence only after the death of the last holder of the property. 

References


Students of Lawsikho courses regularly produce writing assignments and work on practical exercises as a part of their coursework and develop themselves in real-life practical skills.

LawSikho has created a telegram group for exchanging legal knowledge, referrals, and various opportunities. You can click on this link and join:

https://t.me/lawyerscommunity

Follow us on Instagram and subscribe to our YouTube channel for more amazing legal content.

Download Now

Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act,1955

0

This article is written by Shreya Pandey and Ganesh. R, This article contains a detailed study of Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act,1955. Also, this article offers a comprehensive analysis of the legal precedents and applications of Section 9. Further, there is a comparison between Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act,1955 and Article 21 of the Indian Constitution to highlight the complexity between marital obligations and individual rights. 

Introduction

In India, marriage is considered a sacrament where the man and woman getting married are considered to get bonded within one relationship where they will be considered as one soul. When a man and woman get married, they follow certain customs according to their culture and religion, which brings them together for their entire lives. They are considered to be living together till their last breath, sharing all their happiness, and sadness, and being each other’s support. 

Imagine a situation where two people get married to each other, and after the marriage, the husband leaves the wife and settles somewhere else without explaining anything or giving any valid reason. In this situation, the woman who left her family and got married to the man with so many dreams is left unanswered, with broken dreams and hearts. In this case, the woman has all rights to take a legal step to compel her husband to live with her and live a life where she doesn’t feel abandoned by her husband. Such a legal right is not only available for a woman, but a man can also avail himself of this right if his wife withdraws from the society of the husband without giving any reasonable excuse.

The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 provides the married couple with certain duties and rights against each other in their marriage. In a marriage, it is presumed that the man and the woman should live together after marriage. Both parties in a marriage have the right to get comfort from their spouse, and if unreasonably one of the spouses fails to fulfil their obligations, then the other spouse has the right to remedy to compel him or her to do so.

Restitution of conjugal rights

Restitution of conjugal rights means resuming the marital relationship between both spouses. The main objective is to consummate the marriage and get along with each other’s society and comforts. The petition for restitution of conjugal rights is filed to make the court intervene between the parties to decide the case and grant the decree of restitution to preserve the marriage union.

Restitution of conjugal rights is a relief or remedy available to either of the parties to the marriage who got abandoned by the other spouse without explaining or giving any just and reasonable grounds for abandonment.

Understanding Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

Marriage in Smt. Saroj Rani vs. Sudarshan Kumar Chadha, (1984), is contemplated to be a bond where both husband and wife should share a common life where they will share happiness and will stand by each other even in miseries. 

Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 talks about the restitution of conjugal rights. It states that in a situation where a husband or wife withdraws from the society of the other spouse without giving them any reasonable cause, the other spouse has the remedy to file a petition before a district court for restitution of conjugal rights. If the court is satisfied that the statements presented in the petition are true and there is no legal bar to granting the remedy of restitution, then the court may pass the decree of restitution of conjugal rights.

This Section states that the court may grant a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights under the following conditions:

  1. When either party without giving any reasonable cause, withdraws from the society of the other spouse,
  2. The court is satisfied with the fact that the statements made in the petition are true.
  3. There is no legal ground on which the petition shall be declined.

Under this Section, the term ‘society’ means cohabitation and companionship that a person expects in a marriage. The term ‘withdrawal from society’ means ‘withdrawal from a conjugal relationship’.

In Mrs. Manjula Zaverilal vs. Zaverilal Vithal Das, (1973), the court stated that when the aggrieved party files a petition for the restitution of conjugal rights and proves that the defending party has withdrawn from the society of the aggrieved party, then the defending party shall thrive to prove that there was a reasonable cause to abandon or leave their spouse. 

Essential elements of Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

Following are the essential elements of Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955:

  1. The marriage between the applicant and defendant is legal, valid, and existing.
  2. The defendant should withdraw from the society of the applicant.
  3. Such withdrawal from society should be unjust and unreasonable.
  4. The court should be satisfied that the petition and the facts stated by the applicant are true.
  5. The court should be satisfied that there is no legal ground to refuse the decree.

Petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

  • Either of the spouses can file the petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
  • The party that has been abandoned by the other person in the marriage is supposed to file a case under this Section.
  • The petition is made by the person who wants to re-establish their marriage to compel the other person to perform their obligations and consummate their marriage.

Prerequisites for filing a case under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

To file a case under this Section, the following two prerequisites should be met:

  1. The husband and wife must be living separately without a reasonable excuse.
  2. The aggrieved spouse has filed the case under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act.

Place and time to file the petition under this Section

The petition for restitution of conjugal rights is filed before a family court having jurisdiction over the area where:

  1. The marriage ceremony was performed,
  2. The spouses used to live together.
  3. The wife is currently residing.

The appropriate Family Court, after hearing both sides and after getting satisfied that the spouse left without giving any reasonable cause, will order that spouse to live with the aggrieved party and, if necessary, give a decree attaching the defendant’s property. If the defendant does not fulfil the direction given in the decree by the family court within one year, then the petitioner can file a case of divorce.

An application for the execution of a decree

For the execution of a decree of restitution of conjugal rights, the petitioner can file a case of execution petition before a Trial Court. This is the second step that the spouse should take after he or she obtains a decree under the restitution of conjugal rights. For the execution of a decree passed under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, either spouse holding the decree can file a case under Order 21 Rule 32 of the Civil Procedure Code. It deals with the execution of the decree passed for the restitution of conjugal rights.

Order 21 Rule 32 states that if the party against whom the decree has been passed for specific performance does not obey or voluntarily fails to obey, the other party can file a case of execution that can be enforced in the following two ways:

  1. Detention in a civil prison; or
  2. Attachment of property.

Grounds for rejection of the petition

In Sushila Bai vs. Prem Narayan Rai, (1985), the court held that the following can be the defences to the suit of restitution:

  1. The respondent can claim matrimonial relief against the suit.
  2. Any evidence that proves that the petitioner is guilty of any misconduct.
  3. In a situation where it is impossible for both spouses to live together.

The grounds for rejection of the petition for the restitution of conjugal rights can be:

  1. Cruelty by the petitioner
  2. Matrimonial misconduct
  3. Remarriage of either of the spouses
  4. Delay in the initiation of the proceedings.

Burden of proof

The burden of proof is on both parties in the following ways:

  1. Petitioner – The petitioner filing the petition has the initial burden of proof to prove that the respondent has, without giving any reasonable cause, abandoned or withdrawn from the petitioner’s society.

In Mrs. Aruna Gordon vs. Mr. G.V. Gordon, (1999), a revision petition was filed to shift the burden of proving whether the respondent has withdrawn from society without giving reasonable cause to the respondent itself. The court held that the burden of proof will remain on the petitioner initially to prove that the respondent has withdrawn from the petitioner’s society without giving any reasonable cause, and then the burden of proof will shift to the respondent to discharge himself from the statements made against him and prove that the withdrawal was made after giving reasonable cause.

  1. Respondent – When the petitioner proves that the respondent has withdrawn from the petitioner’s society, then the burden of proof shifts to the respondent to prove that there was a reasonable excuse for withdrawing from the petitioner’s society.

In P. Rajesh Kumar Bagmar vs. Swathi Rajesh Kumar Bagmar, (2008) the court held that the burden of proof initially falls upon the petitioner claiming for the decree of restitution to prove that the respondent has withdrawn from the society of the petitioner without any reasonable cause, and when the court is satisfied with the statements made by the petitioner to be true, the burden shifts to the respondent to prove that there exists a reasonable excuse for such withdrawal.

The meaning of a reasonable excuse

The term ‘reasonable excuse’ used under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act might mean the following:

  1. A reasonable excuse can be anything that could grant the respondent matrimonial relief.
  2. If the petitioner is guilty of matrimonial misconduct, which is not a ground for divorce or separation under the Act, it is grave enough to form a reasonable excuse.
  3. If the petitioner is guilty of conjugal misconduct or any such act or omission that makes it hard or almost impossible for the respondent to live with the petitioner, then that would also be considered a reasonable excuse.

The following could be a reasonable excuse:

  • Cruelty.
  • Impotency.
  • Dowry demand
  • False accusations of adultery
  • Refusal to cohabit
  • Any such act makes it impossible for the other person to continue to live with the petitioner.

Provisions for restitution of conjugal rights in other statutes

In India, the remedy of restitution of conjugal rights is available not only under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, but also in the following provisions as well:

Section 32 of Indian Divorce Act, 1869

Section 32 of the Indian Divorce Act,1869, deals with the decree of restitution of conjugal rights. Under this Section, a spouse who was deserted by another spouse without any reasonable cause can file a petition with the court seeking restitution of conjugal rights. The court, after examining the provided evidence, and if the court is satisfied with the true statement made in the petition and divides there is no legal ground for refusal, may pass a decree to the respondent to cohabit with the petitioner. The main aim of this Section is to protect marriage from being broken for small reasons, and this Section ensures to restore marital harmony and fulfil marital obligations towards each other. However, such a decree can raise several legal questions about mandating cohabitation with the spouse, which may conflict with the other respondent’s personal freedom and privacy. In essence, Section 32 of the Indian Divorce Act,1869, reflects the traditional view of marriage as a sacred tradition and an indissoluble union, highlighting the importance of the marital bond through judicial intervention if it is needed. 

Section 33 of Indian Divorce Act, 1869

Section 33 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 provides defences available to the respondent in a petition for restitution of conjugal rights. According to this Section, the respondent has the privilege to resist the decree of the court by providing evidence to prove the petitioner is guilty of cruelty, desertion, adultery, or any other act that would entitle them to a decree for judicial separation or divorce. This Act ensures that the spouse cannot be compelled to cohabit if the petitioner has taken any actions that undermine the marital relationship or cause any harm to the respondent. Section 33 of the Indian Divorce Act provides equal opportunity and balanced rights for both spouses, protecting the respondent from forceful or against their will cohabitation with another spouse. Also, the law recognizes that the restitution of conjugal rights is not absolute and must be exercised in the manner of dignity for both parties involved in the case. The main aim of this provision is to protect the respondent from forceful cohabitation and to ensure the decrease passed by the court is fair and reasonable.

Section 36 of Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936

Section 36 of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, deals with the maintenance of a wife during the pendency of divorce or during the restitution proceeding, which reflects the importance of supporting the wife during the marital dispute in court. This Section is crucial as it gives financial protection to the spouse who is seeking the restoration of cohabitation. When a wife is the petitioner in the issue of restitution conjugal rights, she may face emotional and financial challenges in the process of proceeding, hence, Section 36 empowers the court to grant maintenance to decrease her burdens. Section 36 mainly aims to protect the rights of the wife during the restitution of conjugal rights and it also ensures a complete safeguard of her dignity and sustenance while navigating the marital dispute, which ultimately contributes towards preserving the sanctity of marriage. 

Section 22 of Special Marriage Act, 1954

Section 22 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 deals with the restitution of conjugal rights, allowing the spouse to file a petition against another spouse if the other spouse has withdrawn from the marriage without reasonable cause. During the proceeding, the court reviews the provided evidence, examines the circumstances of the case, and gives a verdict that suits the marital relationship. If there was no reasonable cause for the separation, then the ruling will be in favour of the petitioner. This mechanism aims to preserve marriage sanctity and encourage the continuity of marriage. However, this Section raises legal questions regarding a person’s privacy and autonomy as an individual. Section 22 of the Special Marriage Act, plays a crucial role in the legal framework in promoting marital unity and promoting structured processes in the issue of separation, which directly reflects the goal of safeguarding the institution of marriage in India. 

Need for restitution of conjugal rights

Marriage in India is considered to be a bond that is to be continued even after death. Withdrawal or abandonment is considered not to be good or normal, so it thrives hard for both parties to a marriage to sort out their problems, get along with each other, and stay together. When a man and woman marry each other, they are considered to be one soul who cannot live without each other, and therefore, it becomes very essential that in a case where one person abandons the other, certain steps are taken to bring the couple together so they understand the seriousness of the relationship they are in. Restitution of conjugal rights is the step that compels both parties to live with each other. 

Restitution of conjugal rights is a remedy that one person can avail of if he or she desires to give their relationship one chance to work out. Therefore, it is very important that there is a legal remedy in the law that could help a person in a marital relationship to live together where they can sort out their differences, give a chance to their bond, or come to a mutual understanding of whether they can live together in the future or not. Without giving that one chance, one person is left abandoned, unanswered, and without reasonable excuse.

Article 21 of the Indian Constitution

The right to privacy was a fundamental right that was guaranteed under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, 1950. Which they ensure to protect individual autonomy and dignity. This was highlighted in the case of K.S. Puttaswamy vs. Union of India (2018), in which they held that the right to privacy was a fundamental right and the main aim of this right is to protect the dignity and autonomy of the individual of the state. Also, this right ensures that the individual has the right to make personal decisions regarding their bodies, relationships, and beliefs without any intervention from the judiciary. The concept of restitution conjugal rights has been subject to many criticisms in accordance with the right to privacy because the decree of the court forces cohabitation, which may infringe upon the person’s dignity and freedom to make intimate choices. 

Jurisprudence of conjugal rights and the right to privacy

The concept of restitution of conjugal rights under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, is complexly linked with the individual right to privacy, which directly and indirectly raises several legal questions and ethical problems. Under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, the spouse can seek remedy from the court by order requiring the other spouse to recommence cohabitation if they have withdrawn from the marriage relationship without giving a reasonable cause. Section 9 of the said Act aims to provide protection for marital harmony and ensure the continuity of the marriage since it is considered a sacred form of tradition under Hindu laws. These actions and provisions of the said Act were criticised for potentially violating the fundamental rights that were guaranteed under the Constitution of India and individual autonomy. 

As we speak of fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, which deals with personal dignity, autonomy, and the right to make decisions in their intimate relationships without unwarranted interference, Critics argued that compelling the spouse to cohabit through a court decree directly violated the person’s right to privacy, which was guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. By taking this action, the state is involved in mandating personal space as well as in the person’s intimate aspects of their life. Which can affect a person’s privacy in intimate matters of their life. In the landmark ruling in the case of Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) vs. Union of India (2018), in which they said that the right to privacy was intrinsic to the right to life and personal liberty, which raised doubt on the constitutionality of Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act.

The complexity between Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act and Article 21 of the Constitution is evident in many judicial pronouncements. In the case of T. Sareetha vs. Vnekata Subbaiah (1983), the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that forcing a spouse to cohabit directly violates their personal freedom and privacy, declaring Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act as unconstitutional. However, this view of the High Court was overruled by the Supreme Court in the case of Saroj Rani vs. Sudarshan Kumar Chadha (1984), which upheld the constitutionality of Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, highlighting the importance of marital continuity and unity, and also mentioned the state’s duty in preserving the institution of marriage. 

The ongoing debate over the complexity of Section 9 and Article 21 reflects a detailed understanding of privacy and individual rights within the ambit of the marital law framework. Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, which deals with the restitution of conjugal rights and aims to protect marital bonds and ensure continuity of marriage, must be balanced against the fundamental rights to privacy that were guaranteed by the constitution, ensuring personal liberty and autonomy. It should not be compromised in the quest to uphold tradition and marital norms.

Important judicial precedents

Saroj Rani vs. Sudarshan Kumar Chadha (1984)

Facts 

In this case, Saroj Rani and Sudarshan Chadha got married in 1971. After some time, Sudarshan withdrew from the marriage without any reasonable cause. So, Saroj Rani filed a petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act seeking restitution of conjugal rights. Sudarshan contested the petition, citing various reasons for separation, which include allegations of cruelty and his inability to live with his spouse.

Issue

Whether the decree of restitution conjugal rights could be granted?

Judgement 

The Supreme Court upheld the validity of Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, highlighting that the provision serves an important purpose in protecting and preserving martial bonds. So, the court held that the respondent must cohabit with Saroj Rani since there is no reasonable reason for the separation. Also, the court stated that if the respondent did not comply with the decree passed by the court within one year, then the petitioner could file a petition for divorce under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. 

Seema vs. Rakesh Kumar (2000)

Facts

In this case, Seema and Rakesh Kumar got married under the Hindu Marriage Act. After the marriage, Seema filed a petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, seeking court intervention stating that Rakesh Kumar had withdrawn from the marriage without any reasonable reason and that he had not been cohabiting with her. 

Issue

  1. Whether the petition filed under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act is valid?
  2. Whether the court can pass a decree in cohabitation?

Judgement 

The Supreme Court upheld Seema’s petition, acknowledging that the petition filed under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act is valid. Also, the court highlighted the importance of continuity of marriage, held that the decree of restitution could grant conjugal rights and said that the petitioner is entitled to receive maintenance from the respondent if she is facing emotional or financial challenges. 

Jagadish Lal vs. Smt. Shyama Madan & Ors. (1964)

Facts

In this case, Jagadish Lal and Shyama were married, but soon after their marriage, their relationship deteriorated. Shyama filed a petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act seeking restitution of conjugal rights, claiming that Jagadish had withdrawn from the marriage without any reasonable cause. 

Issue 

Whether the court could grant a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights?

Judgement

The court ruled in favour of Shyama Madan, granting her petition for restitution of conjugal rights. It highlights the importance of maintaining the marital bond and also ensures the sanctity of the marriage. 

Harvinder Kaur vs. Harmander Singh Choudhry (1983)

Facts

In this case, the petitioner and respondent got married under the Hindu Marriage Act. Later, a conflict was formed between the couples, which led to the filing of a petition by Harvinder Kaur under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act seeking restitution of conjugal rights. Harvinder Singh stated that the restitution of conjugal rights was unconstitutional as it violated Article 21 of the Constitution which guarantees the fundamental right to privacy and personal liberty. 

Issue 

Whether Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act is constitutionally valid?

Judgement

The court highlighted that Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act is constitutionally valid, and the court held that the provision did not violate Article 21 of the Constitution which guarantees the right to privacy and personal liberty. The court encourages cohabitation between the spouses but at the same time, it also highlights the importance of personal liberty. Even though the court acknowledged Article 21, they stuck with the state’s interest in preserving the institution of marriage. The decree of restitution of conjugal rights acts as an inducement for the couples to live together.

Babita vs. Munna Lal (2022)

Facts 

In this case, Babita filed a petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act seeking restitution of conjugal rights, which was granted by the court. Despite this decree, Babita filed a petition to seek maintenance from her husband Munna Lal under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). Munna Lal opposed this petition, stating that the court had given a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights, so Babita should not be entitled to another maintenance. 

Issue 

Whether a decree from the court for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act limits the wife from seeking maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC)?

Judgement 

The court ruled in favour of Babita, stating that a decree from the court for restitution of conjugal rights will not bar the wife from seeking another maintenance under Section 125 of Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). Also, the court highlighted that the spouse seeking maintenance must be protected irrespective of the restitution of the conjugal rights decree. 

Constitutionality of Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

The question of the constitutionality of Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, was raised in the case of T. Sareetha vs. T. Venkata Subbaiah, (1983), where it was argued that this Section is constitutionally invalid as it violates the fundamental right to liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Indian constitution. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act is unconstitutional and void as it is violative of personal liberty, which is a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution . It was stated by the Court that “if the wife is compelled to live with her husband, this will also violate her right to privacy.” and the Court further stated that “the remedy of restitution offends the inviolability of the body and mind and invades the marital privacy and domestic intimacies of such a person.

Later, the Supreme Court in the case of Saroj Rani vs. Sudarshan Kumar Chandra, 1984, resolved the conflict between Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act and Article 21 of the Indian Constitution by upholding the decision made by the Delhi High Court in the case of Harvinder Kaur vs. Harvinder Singh, 1984, and holding that “the object of the degree was only to offer an inducement for the spouse to live together, and it does not force an unwilling wife to engage in sexual relationships with the husband.

Restitution of conjugal rights is a remedy that tries to protect the marital relationship of a couple, and it doesn’t violate any fundamental rights guaranteed by the Indian Constitution . The Court further clarified that the decree of restitution of the conjugal rights does not force the couple to get into a sexual relationship with each other; it only tries to bring in a consortium between them. 

In Ojaswa Pathak vs. Union of India, (2019), the constitutionality of restitution of conjugal rights was challenged on the following grounds:

  1. The decree given under this Section is against a woman’s autonomy as it forces a woman to return to her husband’s home without her will, where she might be subjected to brutality or misconduct.
  2. This Section indirectly goes against the private interest of sexual autonomy and makes them come into a sexual relationship with each other, which is violative of Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.
  3. This Section imposes an unequal and unjust burden on women, which is contrary to Article 14 and Article 15(1) of the Indian Constitution.

The Court has yet not decided the case and the case is still pending.

The mediaeval ecclesiastical law of England did not consider desertion a matrimonial relief. It provided for the remedy of restitution of conjugal rights. This remedy was not available in British common law, and the British Law Commission, presided over by Mr. Justice Scarman on July 9, 1969, suggested the abolition of the uncivilised remedy of restitution. The British parliament accepted the suggestion given by the commission and enacted Section 20 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act, 1970, through which it abolished the restitution of conjugal rights.

Conclusion

The provision of restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act has been subjected to many criticism and legal problems. But at the same time, many judgements were pronounced in support of Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 since the provision aims to protect the sanctity of marriage and helps in the continuity of marriage by mandating cohabitation. This Section will come into play when one spouse decides to withdraw from the marriage without any reasonable cause. During such an instance, the other spouse can file a petition with the court under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act seeking restitution of conjugal rights. This article gives a detailed explanation of how the restitution of conjugal rights commences and its procedure. Also, many judgements were referred to highlight the importance of Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, even though there was lots of debate between Section 9 and Article 21 of the Indian Constitution in accordance with the violation of the privacy of the individual. But these critics were overruled by stating that the restitution of conjugal rights aims to protect the marriage from breakage for small reasons, so in such instances, the state’s duty is to protect the institution of marriage. Analysing both the chances of this remedy is important to understand whether it is beneficial for the public or not. According to Indian culture, a couple should try hard to get along with each other and make their relationship work. This Section provides these cultures with legal backing but on the other side it forces two individuals to live together who do not want to live with each other, and a relationship that is made with force has no future. 

The Court has yet to decide the constitutionality of Section 9 under the Ojaswa case. It is expected that the Hon’ble Court would come to a decision that would be in the interest of the public and will also have an essence of Indian culture. 

References

Download Now

Types of Muslim marriages

0
Islamic-Law-Law-of-the-Muslim-World-eJournal.-June-14

This article has been written by Anwesha Pati. This article deals with the concept of marriage under Muslim law and how it has evolved from the pre-Islamic period to the present times. The article also discusses the formalities that are essential for a Muslim marriage to be declared valid and the legal status of the different kinds of marriages under Muslim law.  

Table of Contents

Introduction

Marriage is my precept and my practice. Those who do not follow my practice are not of me.”                            

                                                                                                      – Prophet Mohammad

An important aspect of personal laws governing any community is the concept of marriage. Under Muslim law, marriage is referred to as “Nikah”, which is an Arabic word meaning union of the sexes. Thus, the purpose of marriage has been the procreation of children and a mode of legitimising sexual behaviour. The Quran refers to Nikah as “Mishaaqan Ghaliza” which translates to a sacred and noble covenant. It is in the nature of a contract whereby two parties who have reached puberty (considered the age of majority in Islam for marriage) are tied in an eternal bond and vests them with duties and responsibilities that are to be fulfilled towards each other.

A perusal of the Quran and Hadees reveals that the purpose of marriage is threefold. Firstly, marriage provides an opportunity for a man and woman to experience each other’s company and the happiness of a shared home. Secondly, the object of marriage is to produce legitimate children and provide a conducive environment for their upbringing. Thirdly, marriage serves the social purpose of maintaining harmony and preventing men from indulging in promiscuous behaviour. Thus, marriage under Muslim law is considered crucial in regulating the social fabric and at the same time acts as a medium for men and women to fulfil their emotional needs through companionship.

Concept of marriage under Muslim Law

The concept of marriage has undergone significant changes since the inception of Islam. In pre-Islamic times, Arabic society was tribal in nature and is often referred to as Jahiliyyah (age of ignorance). The tribe was the main unit of society and in order to survive, every person had to belong to a particular tribe. Since the laws and regulations of each tribe differed, the position of women varied depending upon which tribe they belonged to. In most cases, it was not very favourable as it was a male-dominated society. The customs which were prevalent allowed men to take multiple wives and the marriages at the time did not bestow rights and obligations on the parties.

However, there is also ample evidence to show that women held high positions and were given rights, such as the right to choose their husbands, to divorce, and to return to their own tribe. The most common types of marriages that were in practice were marriage by agreement, marriage by capture, marriage by Mehr, marriage by inheritance, and Muta marriage. 

Marriage by agreement involves an agreement between a man and his future wife’s family.  The parties could belong to the same tribe or even different tribes. Some women were forbidden from marrying outside their tribe and had to marry within the tribe or a stranger who acquiesced to live with the tribe. In the case of intertribal marriage, the woman had to leave her family and reside with her husband. The children born from such marriages were considered a part of the father’s tribe unless a contrary agreement had been made during the marriage. In inter tribal marriages, women had more freedom and could refuse or divorce their husbands at any time.

In marriage by capture, referred to as Ba’al, women were taken as captives during the war by men from other tribes and were sold into slavery or marriage. The woman was completely under the control of the man in such a marriage. They had no freedom or the right to divorce and her only role was to bear his children. The husband was regarded as the lord or owner of the wife, and hence, it was referred to as a marriage of domination.

Marriage by purchase/Mehr is also another kind of marriage that was in vogue in pre-Islamic Arabia. The groom’s family paid Mehr to the bride in order to contract a marriage. Although such a marriage was slightly different from marriages by capture, the position of women remained unchanged as they were still under subjugation. The Arabs were wary about selling their daughters and wanted an equal match, charging a hefty Mehr while contracting such marriages.

Marriage by inheritance involves passing down a man’s wife after his death to his legal heir. When a man died, his heir inherited all his wives. He was allowed to either keep all of them as his wives or arrange a marriage in exchange for dower or he could simply dismiss them. This type of marriage was prevalent in most of Arabia, including Mecca and Medina.

Several other types of cohabitation practices like secret marriage (where the man visited the woman in secrecy occasionally), marriage by exchange (which allowed a man to exchange his wives with wife of another man), polygamy, polyandry, concubinage, service marriage (where a man unable to pay dowry agreed to serve the wife’s father or kin till he earned the bride price), wife lending (where a man allowed his wife to cohabit with “men of distinction” to bear children of noble lineage) can be seen in pre-Islamic Arabia.

However, in post-Islamic times, improvements in the concept of marriage can be observed. It is more of a contract between the parties who are on an equal footing and, at the same time, have secured the rights of women through the payment of dower. Islam has greatly strengthened the position of women who were subjected to male domination during the period of Jahiliyyah and recognised them as separate individuals who are equally entitled to rights of divorce, property, freedom, and dignity. The rights of women which were previously under the caprice of narrow societal norms were restored by Islam.

Nature of Muslim marriage

To put it in simple words, the nature of a Muslim marriage is essentially similar to a civil contract. The reasons behind connoting a contractual nature to a Muslim marriage are the following: 

  • A contract consists of an offer made by one party and accepted by another. Similarly in a Muslim marriage, a party has to make an offer of marriage (Ijab) in clear terms to another which should be accepted (Qubool).
  • Consent to a contract must be obtained freely without subjecting the party to any kind of coercion, fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence, or mistake. A Muslim marriage also stipulates that parties must consent to the marriage out of their free will.
  • A contract with a minor is void ab initio. In a Muslim marriage also, the parties are expected to have reached puberty, in order to contract a valid marriage. Marriage with a minor is considered to be void.
  • A contract that has been entered into when the parties were minor can be ratified or set aside by him/her upon reaching a majority. A Muslim marriage also provides the option of puberty wherein parties to the marriage, if given in marriage by their guardian during minority, can ratify or repudiate the marriage on attaining majority.

In the case of Abdul Kadir vs. Salima and Anr. (1886), Justice Mahmood dealt with the nature of Muslim marriage at length. Denoting it as a purely civil contract and not a sacrament, he goes on to elucidate that although the marriage is concluded with the recitation of Quranic verses, there are no stipulations provided in Islam such that its non-performance would render the marriage invalid. It is also not mandatory to be reduced to writing and the only considerations necessary are the declaration made by one party and the acceptance of it by another or by their guardians in the presence of proper witnesses. 

The moment a marriage is solemnised by making a declaration and its acceptance, both parties are vested with legal rights. Conjugal relations between them become legal. The wife has the right to dower, maintain, and raiment. The prohibitions of affinity are made applicable to both spouses and at the same time, they become entitled to mutual rights of inheritance. The husband is enjoined to treat all his wives equally, with respect and kindness, and also the power to chastise her in case of disobedience. Similarly, the wife is to provide access to her for establishing connubial relations.

However, in Shoharat Singh vs. Jafri Begum (1914), the Privy Council opined that a Muslim marriage is a religious ceremony. According to Justice Ameer Ali, marriage under Islam has its roots in tradition and religious duty ordained in the Quran. Its purpose is the propagation of the human race and to steer men away from foulness and unchaste behaviour. Muslim marriage is not entirely a contract and imbibes within it certain religious aspects also. It is mandatory that parties to the marriage must be Muslim by religion. The Quran describes marriage as “Ibadat” meaning a devotional act. Thus, men and women are discharging their religious duties by entering into the ties of marriage. 

Apart from these considerations, the concept of Mehr or dower has often been equated to consideration under Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. However, such a view is not entirely true because the object of the dower is not only a payment of a sum by the husband, rather it acts as a mark of respect for the wife and provides her with security for sustenance. The Indian Contract Act contains provisions of contingent contract, but a Muslim marriage cannot be contingent in nature. Under the contract law, acceptance can be given subsequently within a reasonable time, but in Muslim marriage, offer and acceptance must be given in the same meeting.

In the case of Anis Begum vs. Malik Muhammad Istefa (1933), it was held by Justice Suleiman that a Muslim marriage apart from being a contract, is also a religious sacrament.

Essentials of Muslim marriage

The essentials of a Muslim marriage can be listed as follows:

Competency of the parties

Both parties must be Muslim, of sound mind, and have attained the age of majority at the time of solemnisation of marriage. The age of majority, for the purposes of marriage under Muslim law, is when they hit puberty. However, a person who has not reached the age of majority can be given in marriage by his guardian. In order to understand how guardianship in marriage works, it is pertinent to know the following life stages. Under Muslim law, a man and woman have three life stages-

  • Saghir, when the boy or girl is under 7 years of age. A marriage solemnised at this age has no legal validity.
  • Sariri is the age between 7 to 15 years old. Even at this age, consent of the boy and girl is immaterial and they can be married at this age only with the guardian’s consent. Under Shia law, only the father or paternal grandfather, if the father is not present, is allowed to give a minor in marriage. Under Sunni law, the following persons can contract a marriage, on behalf of a minor, successively,
  1. Father,
  2. Paternal Grandfather, how high soever,
  3. Brother and other male relatives,
  4. Mother,
  5. Mother’s relatives,
  6. The State/Kazi/Court.
  • Bulugh, when the boy and girl attain the age of 15 years, they are allowed to contract marriage at their will and such marriages are considered to be legally valid under muslim law. 

It is also important to understand the concept of Khyar-ul-Bulugh in this context. Khyar-ul-Bulugh stands for the option of puberty where a minor who has been given in marriage by his or her guardian during minority is given the right to ratify or repudiate the marriage on attaining majority, provided the marriage has not been consummated. The option of puberty must be exercised immediately upon attaining puberty and any unreasonable delay may result in the expiration of the right. The wife can exercise the option of puberty on attaining 15 years of age, but before 18 years to ratify or repudiate the marriage.

However, the rigid application of this rule has been relaxed by the Courts wherein they have opined that if the minor wife is unaware of her right of repudiation, she is allowed to exercise it when it comes to her knowledge. She can ratify the marriage by making an express declaration or impliedly by entering into cohabitation with her husband or she can choose to repudiate the marriage by exercising this option. Repudiation of marriage by exercising this right is also a ground for divorce for a Muslim woman under Section 2 (vii) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939.

Similarly, the husband can ratify the marriage under the option of puberty by making an express declaration or payment of dower or by entering into cohabitation. However, the husband cannot exercise this right to repudiate the marriage if he has been given in marriage by his father or grandfather, but if it is proved that the father or grandfather has acted fraudulently or negligently at the time of contracting the marriage, then the minor is allowed to repudiate the marriage on attaining puberty. As to the question of whether a formal decree of the court is necessary after the marriage has been repudiated by the exercise of this right, there is a conflict of opinion among different courts. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in a case opined that the exercise of the option of puberty must be confirmed by a decree of court. But in Khatija Qubra vs. Iqbal Mohd(2009)., it was held that where the factum of repudiation has been proved, a separate decree is not mandatory. According to Radd-ul-Mukhtar, confirmation by Kazi is not required but the Hedeya stipulates confirmation by Kazi.

Parties must be sane at the time of marriage. A marriage contracted when the parties are not of sound mind will have no legal validity. However, if it is contracted during lucid intervals it will be considered as valid. A party who is not of sound mind can be given in marriage by his or her guardian.

Parties must be Muslim by religion in order to contract a valid marriage. Under Shia law, marriage with a non-Muslim is considered to be void or a Batil marriage. The position is different in the case of Sunni law. The validity of marriages based on differences in religion can be understood through the following table:

Marriage betweenSunni LawShia Law
Muslim male and Muslim femaleValidValid
Muslim male and Kitabia femaleValidVoid, but valid in case of Muta marriage
Muslim male and non-Muslim/non-Kitabia female (Hindu, Parsi)IrregularVoid
Muslim female and non-Muslim/ Kitabia/Hindu maleVoid Void

The word Kitabia is derived from the word “kitab” meaning book and it denotes a person whose religion has been revealed through a Holy book. The followers of Christianity and Judaism are referred to as Kitabia.  

A Muslim female is prohibited from marrying a non-Muslim or Kitabia and such a marriage shall be void under both Shia and Sunni law. She is also prohibited from practising polyandry(having multiple husbands). A marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim can take place only under the Special Marriage Act, 1954.

Consent

Both parties must have consented to the marriage of their own free will. Since Muslim marriage is in the nature of the contract, consent to a valid contract must not be obtained by coercion, fraud, undue influence, misrepresentation, or mistake. It is necessary that consent should be devoid of the abovementioned factors. A marriage in which consent has been obtained by compulsion is void under both Shia and Sunni sects. In case of consent induced by fraud, a marriage is voidable at the option of the party who has been defrauded. In case of a mistake of fact, the marriage is void.

Formalities

Apart from competency and consent of the parties, certain formalities have to be fulfilled to render it a valid marriage:

Offer and Acceptance 

Since Muslim marriage is in the nature of a contract, it can be solemnised when one party makes an offer (Ijab) of marriage and the other party accepts it (Qubool). The offer must be clear and unambiguous.

Same meeting 

The offer and acceptance must be made in the same meeting. If an offer and acceptance are made in separate meetings, it does not constitute a valid marriage. Nikah over the telephone is permitted only if the parties are residing in different countries or cities and will be valid if all the essential conditions are fulfilled.  

Witnesses 

Under Sunni law, the presence of two male persons or one male and two females is required at the time of making the offer and acceptance. Such a person must be an adult, sane, and Muslim by religion. However, the absence of witnesses does not render the marriage invalid but only irregular. Under Shia law, the presence of witnesses is not required at the time of marriage but in case of a marriage being contracted by a guardian on behalf of a minor, two adult witnesses must be present.

Reciprocity 

Acceptance of an offer of marriage must be unconditional, similar to Section 7 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

Prohibited degrees

Parties to the marriage must not be within prohibited degrees. Two types of prohibition are recognised under Muslim law:

Absolute prohibition

It refers to a kind of relationship that exists between the parties such that marriage between them cannot be permitted at all. It arises because of consanguinity, affinity or fosterage. A marriage contracted in violation of absolute prohibition is void. The following relationships come under absolute prohibition:

  • Qurabat or consanguinity means blood relationship. A man is forbidden to marry the following females: 
  1. His mother or grandmother, how high so ever,
  2. His daughter or granddaughter, how low so ever,
  3. His sister, whether half blood or full blood or uterine blood,
  4. His niece or great-niece, how low so ever,
  5. His aunt (father’s sister or mother’s sister) or great aunt (how high so ever).
  • Musharat or affinity refers to the nearness of a relationship. A man is forbidden from marrying the following female relatives:
  1. Ascendants of his wife. For example, his wife’s mother or grandmother.
  2. Descendants of his wife. For example, his wife’s daughter or granddaughter.
  3. Wife of any ascendant. For example, his father’s wife or paternal grandfather’s wife.
  4. Wife of any descendant. For example, the wife of one’s own son or son’s son, or daughter’s son.

Similarly, a woman  is forbidden from marrying the following male relatives:

  1. Ascendants of her husband. For example, her husband’s father or grandfather.
  2. Descendants of her husband. For example, her husband’s son or grandson. 
  • Fosterage or Riza is the third prohibition. A child under the age of 2 years who has been suckled by a woman other than his mother becomes the foster mother. Thus a man is prohibited from marrying such persons with whom he shares a foster relationship. He cannot marry his foster mother or grandmother (how high so ever) and his foster sister (daughter of foster mother).
Limited/relative prohibition

It refers to a prohibition that is relative in nature and once the impediment is removed the marriage becomes a valid one. A marriage in violation of a relative prohibition is irregular under Sunni law and void under Shia law. The following prohibitions are considered to be relative:

  • Unlawful conjunction–  A man is not allowed to marry two females who are related to each other because of consanguinity, affinity or fosterage. Thus a Muslim man marrying two sisters results in an unlawful conjunction and such a marriage will be irregular under Sunni law. He is allowed to marry his wife’s sister only after her death or divorce. 
  • Marriage with a fifth wife– Under Muslim law, a man is permitted to take 4 wives. Marriage with a fifth wife while the other four are still subsisting renders it irregular; however, the fifth marriage becomes valid after the death or divorce with any of the four wives.
  • Absence of proper witness– Muslim marriage requires the presence of proper witnesses at the time of its solemnization under Sunni law. The absence of witnesses only renders it irregular and not void. Under Shia law, the presence of a witness is not required.
  • Marriage during Iddat– Marriage with a female undergoing Iddat is irregular. Iddat is a period during which a woman remains in seclusion if her marriage has been dissolved by the death of the husband or by divorce. During such a period, she is not allowed to marry another person for the purpose of determining whether she is pregnant or not by the previous marriage and to avoid the confusion of paternity. The duration of iddat where marriage has been dissolved by divorce shall be:
  1. If not consummated, Iddat is not to be observed.
  2. If consummated and the woman is subjected to menstruation, 3     monthly courses.
  3. If the woman is not subjected to menstruation, then the Iddat period is 3 lunar months.
  4. If the woman is pregnant at the time of divorce, Iddat is to be observed till delivery or termination of pregnancy.

The duration of Iddat where marriage has been dissolved by the death of the  husband shall be: 

  1. 4 months and 10 days, irrespective of the fact of consummation.
  2. If the widow is pregnant at the time of death of the husband, then Iddat is to be observed till delivery or termination of pregnancy. If the delivery or termination takes place before the 4 months and 10 days, the remaining period has to be observed.

The Iddat period commences from the date of divorce or death of the husband or the date on which the woman gets the knowledge of the death of the husband or divorce. In the case where the husband has divorced his wife and dies before the completion of Iddat, the wife has to undergo iddat for a fresh period of 4 months and 10 days from the date of the husband’s death. 

  • Marriage with a non-Muslim– Under Sunni law, marriage with a non-Muslim is considered to be irregular. 
  • Marriage during pilgrimage– A Muslim undergoing pilgrimage or Hajj is forbidden from entering into a marriage.
  • Polyandry– Muslim women are not allowed to take multiple husbands and are to strictly practise monogamy. 
  • Rule of equality– The doctrine of equality stipulates that the parties to marriage must be equal, in terms of rank and social standing. According to the Hanafis, a Muslim male must be of good character, possess sufficient means, and hail from a good family. Among the Malikis and Shias, being a Muslim and having the means to sustain a family are the only requisites for marriage. The doctrine of equality holds little relevance in modern times as strict adherence is hardly possible. In cases where an adult marries into a family that is lower in rank, the court does not have the power to declare such marriage ad invalid. However in cases, where the woman has entered into a runaway marriage with a person of low rank, against the wishes of the family, both Ameer Ali and Fyzee concur that the court can annul such a marriage on application made by the wali (guardian) of the female.

Fixation of Mehr

Dower or Mehr is also an important part of a Muslim marriage. Mehr is a sum of money or other property to be paid or delivered by the husband to the wife by operation of law or as agreed upon by the parties to the marriage. Even in cases where the Mehr has not been fixed, the wife is entitled to her right to dower. Thus Mehr is regarded as a mark of respect for the wife by the husband and also acts as a deterrent for the husband from arbitrarily exercising his right of divorce. The purpose of Mehr is also to provide a means of sustenance to the wife after her divorce.

The amount of Mehr must be fixed at the time of marriage by the parties themselves if they have reached the age of puberty and are of sound mind. In the case of the marriage of a minor or lunatic being contracted by the guardian, the amount of mehr is fixed by the guardian and will be binding on the minor. The subject matter of dower can be anything of value and which is not regarded as Haram in Islam. It can be a handful of dates or if the husband is a slave, his services to his wife or instructions of the Quran, or any immovable property, land, house, etc. In most cases, a Mahr deed is executed which contains the details of the amount and means of payment in written form. 

Registration of Muslim marriage

Although registration of a Muslim marriage is not a mandatory requirement, the same can be done under the Muslim Marriages Registration Act,1981  governed by the Shariat Act, 1937. Registration of Muslim marriage involves the issuance of Nikahnama which constitutes valid proof of the marriage. It is issued by the Kazi who solemnises the marriage after obtaining the consent of both parties. Section 3 of the aforesaid Act stipulates that a Muslim marriage must be registered within 30 days of the conclusion of the nikah ceremony. 

The Act also enjoins upon the bride, bridegroom, and the Kazi who performed the nikah, a duty to have the marriage registered and that a copy of the Nikah-nama, where it is written and in other cases a memorandum filled in by the Kazi should be delivered by registered post to the Sub-Registrar of the Sub-District in which the marriage took place. The Nikah nama or the memorandum should also specify the amount of dower, whether prompt or deferred, and the manner in which payment is to be made. The Schedule appended to the Muslim Marriages Registration Act, 1981 states the details to be mentioned in the Nikah Nama or memorandum. They are: 

  1. The place of marriage
  2. (i) Full name of the bridegroom

(ii) His age

(iii) His place of residence

(iv) Address

(v) Full name of the bridegroom’s father

(vi) Whether the father is alive or dead

(vii) Civil condition of the bridegroom at the time of marriage, that is whether he is unmarried or widower or divorced or married. If he is married, how many of his wives are still alive also has to be mentioned.

(viii) Signature or thumb impression of the bridegroom or guardian 

  1. (i) Full name of the bride

(ii) Her age

(iii) Her place of residence

(iv) Address

(v) Full name of the bride’s father

(vi) Whether the father is alive or dead

(vii) Civil condition of the bride at the time of marriage

(viii) Signature or thumb impression of the bride or her guardian

  1. (i) Full name of the Nikah-Khan (the person who conducted the Nikah ceremony)

(ii) His age 

(iii) Place of residence

(iv) Signature of the Nikah-Khan specifying the date

(v) Father’s name

  1. (i) Amount of dower fixed

(ii) Manner of payment of dower

  1. Name of witness with parentage, residence, and address. 

Section 7 of the Act states that a Nikah Nama or memorandum will not be invalidated by reason of the failure of delivery of the Nikah Nama or memorandum to the Sub-Registrar or because of the reason that the copy of the Nikah Nama or memorandum delivered turned out to be defective. Section 8 imposes a penalty on any person who wilfully or negligently fails to deliver the copy of the Nikah Nama or memorandum to the Sub-Registrar and on conviction, a Judicial Magistrate may impose a fine which may extend to three hundred rupees.

Types of Muslim marriages

On the basis of validity, marriage has been categorised as valid (Sahih), void (Batil), and irregular (Fasid). The Sunni sect recognizes all three types of marriage however the Shia sect only recognises valid and void marriages. There is no such thing as irregular marriage under Shia law. 

Sahih Nikah (Valid Marriage)

A marriage that has been solemnised by observing all the essential conditions of Muslim marriage and does not suffer from any infirmities is called a Sahih nikah. It is a completely valid marriage in the eyes of the law.

Essentials of a Valid Marriage

  • Parties must be Muslim, of sound mind and reached the age of puberty. If the parties are minor, the marriage must be contracted by their guardians on their behalf.
  • Parties must have consented to the marriage out of their free will.
  • The offer(Ijab) and acceptance(Qubool) must have been made in the same sitting.
  • The parties must not be within prohibited degrees of relationship.
  • Two male witnesses or one male and two female witnesses must be present at the time of marriage, however, this is not necessary if the parties belong to the Shia sect.
  • The amount of dower must be fixed. 

Legal effect of a valid marriage

A valid marriage has the following legal consequences:

  • Consummation between husband and wife is legal.
  • The children born out of a valid marriage are legitimate and entitled to inherit the property.
  • Husband and wife can inherit each other’s property.
  • The wife acquires the right of maintenance, dower, and residence.

Batil Nikah (void marriage)

A marriage that has been contracted in violation of essential conditions under Muslim law is a void or Batil marriage. Such a marriage has no legal effect and does not create any rights or obligations between the parties.

Essentials of void marriage

  • Parties are not Muslim or of sound mind at the time of marriage.
  • Either of the parties has not given his/her consent to the marriage out of their free will.
  • The parties are within prohibited degrees of relationship which are absolute in nature like consanguinity or affinity or fosterage.
  • The dower has not been fixed.
  • The offer and acceptance of marriage has not been made in the same sitting or the acceptance has not been given unequivocably.

Legal effect of void marriage

A void marriage has the following legal consequences:

  • Consummation between husband and wife is unlawful.
  • Children of a void marriage are illegitimate and cannot inherit the property of their parents.
  • The wife is not entitled to receive maintenance under a void marriage.
  • The husband and wife are not entitled to inherit each other’s property, however she is entitled to dower if the marriage has been consummated.
  • Parties can separate from each other at any time without divorce and can contract another marriage.

Fasid Nikah (irregular marriage)

If the marriage has been contracted in violation of certain relative prohibitions, then it is called irregular or Fasid marriage. Such marriages can become valid if the relative prohibitions cease to exist or are removed. A Fasid marriage is in contrast to void marriages where the prohibitions are permanent and cannot be removed at all. It is only recognised by the Sunni sect.

Essentials of irregular marriage

  • Parties must be of sound mind and should have reached the age of puberty.
  • Parties must have consented to the marriage out of their free will.
  • The offer(Ijab) and acceptance(Qubool) must have been made in the same sitting.
  • The amount of dower must be fixed.
  • Parties must suffer from some relative impediments like-
  1. If the wife is an idolatress or fire worshipper.
  2. If the woman is undergoing Iddat.
  3. If the husband already has four wives and he marries another woman.
  4. If a Muslim man marries two women who are related to each other through consanguinity or affinity or fosterage.
  5. If proper witnesses are not present at the time of marriage(applicable only to Sunnis).
  6. If a Muslim woman has more than one husband.

Legal effects of irregular marriage

The effects of a Fasid marriage can be different depending upon whether the marriage has been consummated or not. If the marriage has not been consummated:

  •  It has the same consequences as that of a void marriage. The spouses can separate without divorce or the intervention of the court. 
  • The wife is not entitled to maintenance.
  • The wife is not bound to observe iddat.

If the marriage is consummated:

  • Children born out of such marriage are legitimate.
  • Mutual rights of inheritance between husband and wife are not available, even if marriage is consummated.
  • The wife is entitled to a specific or proper dower whichever is less.
  • The wife has to observe iddat in case of the death of her husband or divorce.
  • The wife is not entitled to maintenance during iddat.

Muta marriage

The word “Muta ” means enjoyment or use and a Muta marriage signifies a marriage that has been contracted temporarily for a specific duration by fixing the amount of dower. This type of marriage is recognised only under the Ithna Asharia school of the Shia sect and is void under Sunni law. The purpose of Muta marriage is to prevent the sin of Zina (adultery) and to give legitimacy to children born out of such marriages.

Essential conditions of Muta marriage

Competency

A male Shia is allowed to contract Muta marriage with a Muslim or Kitabia(Christian and Jew) or a fire worshipper. Muta marriage with a Hindu is void. A female Shia can enter into a Muta marriage with a Muslim only.

Fixed period

The term during which the Muta marriage is to last should be stipulated. The term could be for a week, a month, or a year. If the term is not fixed, then it will be treated as a permanent marriage.

Fixed dower 

The amount of dower to be paid is to be fixed at the time of marriage. If the dower is not fixed in a Muta marriage, the contract will be void.

Other formalities 

The essential conditions of marriage like consent of the parties, the option of puberty, age, and prohibited degrees must be kept in mind while contracting a Muta marriage. The presence of witnesses is not required.

Incidents of Muta marriage

  • Children born out of such marriage are legitimate and have the right to inherit from both their parents. 
  • The marriage is dissolved automatically on expiry of the stipulated period or by mutual consent or on the death of either party. Hence, a formal divorce is not required in a Muta marriage. If the wife leaves the husband before the term, he may deduct a portion of the dower.
  • The wife is not entitled to maintenance under Muta marriage but she is entitled to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (replaced by Section 144 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023)
  • If the Muta marriage is consummated the wife is entitled to full dower but if it is not consummated, she will be entitled to only half dower.
  • Muta marriage does not give rise to mutual rights of inheritance between the parties. However, if the agreement contains an express provision regarding mutual or unilateral right of inheritance, then such an agreement will be effective. 
  • The wife under a Muta marriage has to observe Iddat:
  1. Where there is no consummation, Iddat is not required to be observed.
  2. In case of death of the husband, for a period of 4 months and 10 days.
  3. In case of pregnancy, Iddat is to be observed till delivery.

Difference between Nikah and Muta marriage

  • Muta marriage is a temporary marriage entered into for a fixed period and which comes to an end on the expiry of the term or by death or by mutual consent whereas Nikah is a permanent marriage which can be dissolved by death of the husband or by divorce.
  • Muta marriage is recognized by the Shias only and not by the Sunnis whereas Nikah is recognised by both Shia and Sunni sects.
  • Muta marriage does not confer any mutual rights of inheritance between the husband and wife whereas, under nikah, both husband and wife are entitled to inherit each other’s property.
  • Divorce is not recognised under Muta marriage as it is temporary in nature and comes to an end after the expiry of the fixed term or if the husband decides to end the marriage, he can make a gift of the unexpired term known as a Hiba-i-Muddat, whereas, in Nikah, parties are allowed to put an end to marriage through the procedure of divorce.
  • The wife is not entitled to receive maintenance under a Muta marriage whereas, under Nikah, she is entitled to it.

Case laws and judicial interpretations

In Re; Petition of Luddun Sahiba vs. Mirza Kamar Kudar (1882)

Facts 

In this case, the petitioner filed an application under Section 536 of the Code of Criminal Procedure(replaced by Section 144 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) claiming maintenance from her husband Prince Mirza Kamar Kudar. It was admitted by her that both the parties were Shias and had contracted a Muta marriage for a term of fifty years. However, the defendant alleged that the term was for one and a half months only. The Deputy Magistrate was of the opinion that a Muta wife has no right to maintenance under Muslim law and the defendant had given up the remaining term of the Muta marriage, therefore she was no longer a wife as required under Section 536. Hence she is not entitled to claim the same under the Criminal Procedure Code. 

Issues 

Whether a wife by Muta marriage is entitled to the right of maintenance under Section 536, Criminal Procedure Code or not.

Judgement

The Calcutta High Court held that although under Shia law, a Muta wife is not entitled to any maintenance but the same cannot interfere with the wife’s statutory right to maintenance provided under Section 536 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The right to maintenance can form the subject matter of a civil suit and can be enforced, depending upon the personal law of the individual. But such a right has to be distinguished from the statutory right to maintenance provided under the Criminal Procedure Code which is applicable to every person who, despite having sufficient means, neglects or refuses to maintain his wife. 

Shahzada Qanum vs. Fakher Jung & ors. (1953)

Facts

In this case, a compromise deed with respect to the partition suit of the estate of Nawab Fakhrul Mulk was made and a decree was passed. In the decree, the claim of Shahzada Qanum, the alleged wife of Nawab Fakher Jung(the deceased) was kept open. It was claimed by the petitioner that she had contracted a muta marriage with Nawab Fakher Jung which was of such nature that it conferred the right of inheritance on her, as the muta marriage was for an unspecified period and hence valid for life. 

The Learned counsel for the petitioner adduced the evidence of witnesses who attended the muta marriage and had deposed that the marriage was for an unspecified period and the dower was fixed at Rs. 500. The deposition of another Prosecution Witness, Husan Afruz Buwa was also taken into record wherein she had deposed that Nawab Fakher Jung had stated that he had entered into a Muta marriage with Ameera Qanum for 5 years and his Muta marriage with the other three wives which included the petitioner was for life. This statement of Nawab Fakher Jung was admissible under Section 32(5) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 as it is a statement relating to marriage made before the dispute arose. The application for partition filed by the legal heirs of the deceased admits of the fact that there were four wives, out of which three widows were of Muta marriage and one widow of a Nikah marriage which makes it abundantly clear that the petitioner’s Muta marriage with the deceased was for life. 

The Learned counsel for the defendants argued that Safdarunnissa Begum, the sister of the deceased had filed a partition suit for the estate of her father, Nawab Fakhrul Mulk in which the petitioner was not made a party which indicates that a near relative of the deceased did not consider the petitioner as a rightful heir. Further, it was submitted that when the petitioner was made a party to the partition suit, she did not mention in her written statement about the Muta marriage being for life. It was contended on behalf of the defendants that it is a general rule under Muslim law that a Muta marriage is contracted for a specific period and failure to mention the period results in the marriage becoming void. A Muta marriage does not give rise to rights of inheritance and if it was intended by the parties, they must specify it in the contract itself at the time of marriage. Since no such terms were specified, the petitioner cannot claim such rights.

Issues 

Whether a Muta marriage which has been contracted for an unspecified period or for life is equivalent to a Nikah and bestows the rights of inheritance on the wife of the deceased husband.

Judgement

The Learned Court referred to Jawahar-Ul-Kalam, a well renowned book and important authority amongst the Shia sect to discern the validity of a Muta marriage for an unspecified period. It states that although it is necessary to specify the period while contracting a Muta marriage, however, omitting to do so either in words or in intention will result in a permanent contract. According to Ibn Bukair and Imam Jafer-us-Sdek, if the period is specified it becomes a Muta marriage and if not, it becomes a Nikah. After referring to the opinion of several Jurists and Imams, the Learned Court reached the conclusion that a Muta marriage which fails to specify the period intentionally or inadvertently gives effect to a permanent marriage and all the legal incidents like a right of inheritance between the husband and wife follow from it. In reference to the present case, the Court found that the evidence of witnesses adduced from the petitioner’s side did not match with the circumstances of the case and accordingly her claim that the Muta marriage was for an unspecified period or for life was dismissed.

Syed Amanullah Hussain & ors. vs. Rajamma & ors. (1976)

Facts

In this case, a person named Habeebulla Hussaini, who was the owner of a house and certain other moveable property died on 7th February 1967. The appellants filed a suit for recovery of possession for the same on the ground that he was the brother of the deceased and the sole legal heir. He contended that the defendant No.1  who was claiming herself to be the legally wedded wife of Habeebulla Hussaini was merely a maidservant who used to live in the same house and that there was no valid marriage between them nor was defendant No. 2 the son of the deceased born out of the wedlock. Defendant No. 2, the alleged son deposed that Habeebulla Hussaini was his father and Hussaini Bee his mother who used to live in the same house. He also deposed that although his mother was a Hindu Harijan, she had embraced Islam before marriage and took the name of Hussain Bee. In his support, he has produced several witnesses out of which defence witness. 1 has deposed that the name of the deceased’s wife was originally Rajamma and after marriage, it was changed to Hussain Bee. He also stated that Habeebulla Hussaini had told him in the presence of several persons that he had taken Rajamma as his wife by Muta marriage and that she had embraced Islam and two children, a boy and a girl were born out of the marriage. 

Issues

The validity of a Muta marriage between the deceased and the defendant, in the absence of any documentary evidence, was in question. 

Judgement 

The Andhra Pradesh High Court perused the legal position of Muta marriage and the legitimacy of children born out of such marriage. A Muta marriage can be contracted between a Shia male and a Kitabia female who is a Christian or Jew or a fire worshipper but not a woman professing any other religion. A Muta marriage is contracted for a specific period and should specify the amount of dower. Such a marriage does not create mutual rights of inheritance between husband and wife but the children born out of a Muta marriage are legitimate. The validity of a marriage can be established by direct or indirect proof. The indirect proof involves the presumption of certain factors like prolonged cohabitation or acknowledgment of the legitimacy of children by the father or acknowledgment by the husband of the fact that a woman is his wife. 

After considering the evidence at hand, the Court held that although there is no direct proof to show that there was a Muta marriage between the deceased and Rajamma, the evidence furnished through documents reveals that Habeebulla Hussaini was drawing a pension and applied for maintenance for the defendants from the Nizam Private Force as he was their retired employee and he had mentioned Defendant No 2 as his son. 

Since the marriage between the deceased and Rajamma had taken place a long time ago, it raises the possibility that the marriage certificate was not issued and several of the defence witnesses had stated that the deceased and Hussain Bee used to live as husband and wife. The wife of the deceased was called by the name of Hussain Bee in her locality, which validates the fact that she has indeed converted to Islam. Considering these factors the Court dismissed the appeal. The defendant was regarded as the legally wedded wife of the deceased and the brother of the deceased was not entitled to a share in the property. 

Ahmedabad Women Action Group vs. Union of India (1997)

Facts

One of the grounds taken up for consideration in a bunch of writ petitions was Muslim personal laws that allow polygamy to be declared as void as they violate Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. It was also contended that the mere fact of allowing a Muslim man to take more than one wife must be declared as amounting to cruelty under Section 2(viii) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939.

Issues

  • Whether Muslim personal laws that allow polygamy should be declared as void as they violate Articles 14 and 15 of the Indian Constitution or not.
  • Whether Muslim laws which permit a Muslim man to take more than one wife amounts to cruelty under Section 2(viii) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939 or not.

Judgement 

While dismissing the writ petitions, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that such matters were part of State policy, to be deliberated upon by the Legislature and the Court is not to interfere in it. As regards the question of whether Part III of the Indian Constitution ought to apply to personal laws, Justice Gajendragadkar has observed that since personal laws that deal with matters of marriage, divorce, adoption, succession, wills, joint family, partition, etc appear in item no 5 of the concurrent list, the central or state legislature is empowered to legislate on such topics. 

By keeping personal laws outside the purview of the term “laws in force” under Article 13, it can be inferred that the framers of the Constitution did not intend that they should be challenged through fundamental rights. In case of any reformations that should be brought about in the personal laws in force, the Parliament has been given the power to do so and the Courts should refrain from interfering as their function is to only apply existing laws and not lay them.

Abdul Kader vs. K. Pechiammal (2014)

Facts

In this case, the respondent who was a Child Marriage Probation Officer cum District Welfare Officer instituted a criminal case against the petitioner on the ground that he had arranged a child marriage where the bride has not attained the age of 18 years which was in violation of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006. The petitioners contended that Muslim personal law allowed a girl to be given in marriage when she attains puberty, which is generally 15 years. The Learned Judicial Magistrate while perusing the provisions of Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (hereinafter the PCM Act)  held that the Act is secular in nature and applies to Muslims. 

The word child defined in Section 2(a) of the Act means a person who has not completed the age of 21 years if male, and 18 years if female. Since the bride was a child under the said Act, the trial court passed orders restraining the petitioners from contracting the marriage until she attained 18 years of age. Thereafter the petitioners filed a criminal revision in Madras High Court against such an order. The petitioners contended that the Shariat Act, 1937 is a special law that makes applicable Muslim personal laws to Muslims. It has an overriding effect over the PCM Act which is a general law. They also argued that the Shariat Act, 1937 is a special law and it can be inferred from the fact that it has not been amended to apply the definition of child provided by the PCM Act. 

Issues

Whether a Muslim marriage contracted by parties who have not attained the age of majority is in violation of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006.

Judgement

The High Court upon hearing the submissions of both the parties reached the conclusion that the object of the PCM Act has been to prevent the evil practice of child marriages and provide stringent punishment to those who indulge in such practice. Where legislation has been enacted to give effect to a set object (in this case prevention of solemnization of child marriages), the court cannot be compelled to rule against legislative intent and state that the provisions of the PCM Act is not applicable to the Muslim community. 

Also while referring to several judgements that have deliberated upon the distinction between religious beliefs and practices, the High Court reached the conclusion that although the Shariat Act permits the marriage of underage children, it cannot be claimed as part of a religious right. Marriage of a girl child who has not crossed the threshold of 18 years is contrary to the provisions of the PCM Act whose object is to enhance the health and status of women and accordingly, the revision petition was dismissed.

Mohammed Salim Through Lrs. vs. Shamsudeen Through Lrs. (2019)

Facts 

In this case, an appeal was filed in the Hon’ble Supreme Court against the judgement of the Kerala High Court on the basis of a suit for partition and possession of 14/16th share in Plaint Schedule A and half the rights over Plaint Schedule B filed by the plaintiff (now respondent). The property in question belonged to Zainam Beevi who had gifted it to Mohammed Ilias by a gift deed. Mohammed Ilias and Mohammed Idris were two sons born to Zinam Beevi. Mohammed Ilias had a previous wife named Saidat with whom he had no children. Subsequently, he married  Valliamma, who was a Hindu at the time of marriage and gave birth to a son(the plaintiff). The plaintiff claimed that after the death of his father, he became entitled to the 14/16th share in Schedule A property, by virtue of being the legitimate heir and half a share in Schedule B property through inheritance after the death of Zainam Beevi as it would have devolved upon him as the son of the predeceased son and the other share would devolve upon Mohammed Idris, being the sole surviving son of Zainam Beevi. 

The defendants contended that the marriage between Ilias and Valliamma was not a valid one because she was a Hindu at the time of marriage and therefore the plaintiff, being the son of Valliamma, was not entitled to a share in the property. It was further contended that Mohammed Ilias had died two years prior to the year in which the plaintiff was born. The dispute regarding the date of birth of the plaintiff was resolved by tallying the date of birth recorded in the birth register with the Government Almanac, a public record maintained by the Trivandrum Public Library which showed that he was born two months prior to the demise of his father. The Trial Court ruled in favour of the plaintiff however it was reversed by the first Appellate Court. Thereafter, the judgement of the appellate court was dismissed by the High Court and it upheld the decision of the trial court.

 Issues 

  • Whether a marriage between a Muslim male and a Hindu female is void or irregular.
  • Whether issues of such marriages are legitimate or illegitimate.
  • Whether issues are entitled to inherit the assets of the father.

Judgement

The Supreme Court reaffirmed the decision of the High Court and held that the plaintiff was born out of a Fasid marriage and is the legitimate son of Mohammed Ilias. He is entitled to inherit the shares in his father’s property. The Court has extensively referred to several texts including Mulla’s Principles of Mohammedan Law and Syed Ameer Ali’s Principles of Mahommedan Law to reach the conclusion that marriage between a Muslim and Hindu is not void and children born out of such marriage are legitimate. A Fasid or irregular marriage is not an unlawful marriage in itself but it becomes unlawful due to the occurrence of certain temporary or relative factors. An irregular marriage can become valid on removal of the temporary impediment. Under Muslim law, a Muslim male is allowed to marry a Muslim female or a Kitabia but not an idolatress or fire worshipper. Marriage with an idolatress or fire worshipper is not void but invalid. The difference in the religion of the parties being a temporary impediment can be removed by the conversion of the wife into Islam. Coming to the effects of an irregular(Fasis) marriage, an irregular marriage does not create mutual rights of inheritance between the husband and wife, but the children born out of such marriage are legitimate and can inherit from the father’s property. In this case, since the wife was a Hindu, her marriage with the plaintiff’s father was Fasid or irregular and not void.

Sameena Begum vs. Union of India (2022)

Facts

In this case, the constitutional validity of regressive practices like polygamy and nikah halala has been questioned. The petitioner having been divorced twice through triple talaq contended that Section 2 of the Shariat Act, 1937 should be declared unconstitutional as it gives effect to polygamy and nikah halala. The acts of polygamy, Nikah Halala, Nikah Muta, and Nikah Misyar are against the constitutional principles of equality and the right to life under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution respectively. 

The petitioner also contended that such practices must be criminalised under Sections 498A, 375 and 494 of the Indian Penal Code and a Uniform Civil Code should be introduced so that all citizens are governed by the same rules regarding marriage and divorce. The petitioner also relied upon the judgement of Shayara Bano vs. Union of India (2017) whereby the practice of triple talaq was held to be discriminatory and unconstitutional. 

Issues

  • Whether the practices of Nikah Halala and polygamy should be criminalised under Sections 494, 375, and 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
  • Whether Section 2 of the Shariat Act, 1937 is discriminatory towards women and violates the right to equality provided under Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution.
  • Whether Section 2 of the Shariat Act, 1937 violates a Muslim woman’s right to dignity which is considered a part of Article 21 of the Constitution.

Judgement

The purpose of the petition is to reinstate the fact that triple talaq has been done away since it gives effect to gender bias, similarly, polygamy and nikah halala must be annulled. However, it is still pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and is yet to be decided. 

Conclusion

It is evident that the concept of marriage has undergone transformation since the propagation of Islam. In pre-Islamic times, the status of women was reduced to mere chattels of their husbands and did not entail any rights. However, the teachings of Prophet Mohammad have evolved the nature and meaning of marriage for the Muslim community. Marriage is considered to be an important part of the religious and societal duty of a person professing Islam.

According to the holy Prophet, a person who has entered into the holy union of marriage is deemed to have completed one-half of his duty towards his religion. At present, the rules regarding marriage are systematic and at the same time, it enjoins upon the parties certain rights and duties that are essential for a blissful and fulfilling conjugal relationship. The advent of Islam has also improved the position of women and introduced certain bars in the nature of absolute and relative prohibitions. 

Although the Quran favours monogamy, a Muslim male is allowed to take four wives as part of customary laws and stipulates that all of them are to be treated equally. Even though regressive practices of polygamy, nikah halala are still continuing, Muslim marriages which were previously pedantic have evolved to incorporate a semblance of religious as well as social aspects, bestowing both the husband and wife with important rights.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

What is the meaning of Khayr-ul-Bulugh?

The term Khyar-ul-Bulugh stands for the option of puberty. A minor who has been given in marriage by his or her guardian is given the right to ratify or repudiate the marriage on attaining puberty, provided the marriage has not been consummated. This right is available to both males and females.

Is Muslim marriage a contract or sacrament?

Muslim marriage is essentially a contract and not a sacrament. Islam defines marriage to be a civil contract whose purpose is the procreation of children and legitimising of sexual behaviour. 

What is the meaning of Iddat?

Iddat means waiting period or counting. When a marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or by divorce, a woman is supposed to remain in seclusion and abstain from marrying another person for the purpose of ascertaining whether she is pregnant or not. The object of observing Iddat is to remove the confusion relating to paternity.

What is the meaning of  Valid Retirement (Khilwat-us-Sahih)?

Valid Retirement or Khilwat-us-Sahih refers to the presumption of the consummation of marriage. If the husband and wife retire into their nuptial chambers under such circumstances that there are no legal or moral bars or any other physical impediment, it raises the presumption that the marriage has been consummated. 

What is Nikah Nama?

Nikah Nama or marriage deed is a document that contains the details of the marriage like the name of the parties, information regarding the families, the amount of Mehr (dower) that is to be paid and when it is to be paid, and other relevant information. It acts as an important piece of evidence in validating the existence of the marriage. 

Is registration of Muslim marriage necessary?

It is not mandatory to register a marriage under Muslim law. However, it is advised to get the marriage registered as it facilitates the validity of the marriage and has evidentiary value in matters of custody of children, the age of the parties to the marriage, etc.

What are the modes of divorce available to a Muslim man?

The Muslim man has the right to give divorce unilaterally in any of the following ways: 

1. Talaq-ul-Sunnat

2. Talaq-ul-Biddat

3. Ila(Vow of Continence)

4. Zihar(Injurious Assimilation)

What are the modes of divorce available to the wife under Muslim law?

The Muslim wife has the right to divorce her husband through Talaq-e-Tafweez. It is delegated divorce whereby the husband delegates his power to divorce to his wife or any other third party. Even though the husband may delegate his power to the wife, he does not lose his own right to effect a divorce against her.

The wife may obtain a divorce on the grounds specified under Section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939. Additionally, she is also entitled to divorce on the grounds of Lian(false charge of adultery) or Fask.

Fask means annulment or cancellation. Prior to the enactment of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939, Muslim women had the right to divorce their husbands under the doctrine of Fask on the following grounds: 

  1. That the marriage is irregular
  2. That the person having the right to avoid the marriage has exercised his option
  3. That the marriage was contracted in violation of prohibited degrees or fosterage

What is Khula?

Khula is a form of divorce by mutual consent where the wife gets the right to divorce her husband with his consent and on payment of certain considerations. As consideration of divorce, she may forfeit her dower. If the wife fails to pay the consideration, the divorce does not become invalid but the husband gets the right to claim the consideration. Once the offer of khula is made and the same is accepted by the husband, the divorce becomes irrevocable and the wife has to observe Iddat. 

What is Mubarat?

Mubarat is another form of mutual divorce whereby both the parties desire separation and are ready to release each other from the ties of marriage by mutual consent. An offer of Mubarat once accepted becomes irrevocable and the wife has to observe Iddat.

References

Download Now

Maintenance under Muslim Law 

0

This article is written by Prashant Prasad. This article tries to achieve a detailed analysis of maintenance granted under Muslim law and examines the landmark cases associated with it. Furthermore, for a deeper understanding, this article delves into a comparative analysis of maintenance under Muslim law and Hindu law. The article goes on to highlight the contemporary issues and challenges faced by divorced Muslim women with respect to maintenance, along with the possible remedies to address such issues. Additionally, the article discusses the Uniform Civil Code (UCC) and its impact on maintenance law. 

Table of Contents

Introduction

Under Muslim law, the term ‘maintenance’ is known as nafaqah, which translates to what a man spends on his family. Maintenance refers to the financial support provided by a person who is legally responsible for covering the essential needs of a family member, such as food, clothing, dwelling, and anything else that is necessary for their livelihood. There are different laws on the basis of which the right to maintenance is ascertained. The right to maintenance is available under various personal laws, such as Hindu, Muslim, Christian, and Parsi personal laws. The main aim behind providing maintenance is to protect the rights of the dependents and to give them a dignified life, which they are entitled to, even in case of dissolution of a relationship due to whatever reasons. Maintenance under Muslim law is governed by Muslim personal laws and the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. Further, it must be noted that, apart from these Muslim laws, Section 144 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (Earlier- Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973) also applies to Muslim women

Under Muslim law, the husband’s obligation to provide maintenance is not only limited to the wife but also extends to the children, parents, grandparents, and any other close relatives who are associated by blood. However, it is pertinent to note that the amount paid for maintenance depends on the financial capacity of the person who is paying it. The obligation to pay maintenance can be traced back to Islamic laws, which prescribe the guidelines and principles on the basis of which maintenance can be paid. The amount of maintenance can be enforced through a court’s intervention and failure to provide maintenance can result in legal consequences and punishments. However, the amount of maintenance can be changed on the basis of changes in circumstances, the financial status of the dependents, and the person paying the compensation. Let us explore these provisions in detail.

Historical background that led to evolution of maintenance under Muslim Law

Under Muslim law the people show their belief in the divine god named Allah, his teachings and scripture are mentioned in the holy book Quran, which is majorly followed by the peoples of the Islamic religion. The concept of maintenance has been raised from the various sources of Muslim law, which are as follows –

  • Holy Quran – The primary source of the Muslim law is the holy book known as Quran. This book contains the teachings (which are for the benefit of humans and mankind) of God given to the Prophet Mohammed, that were communicated to him by Gabriel (the archangel who acts as an intermediate between God and humans).
  • Ijma Ijma under Muslim law is considered a legal decision that was given at the time when there were no laws present. The person who used to make decisions at that particular time is known to be mujahids, who used to act as jurists to make decisions on any issue.
  • Sunnat – The tradition, procedure, and practices of the Prophet Muhammad are known to be Sunnat.          

All these sources of Muslim law form the basis through which the concept of maintenance has been aroused. These promote and preach the teachings of Allah and all these teachings and various sources led to the foundation on the basis of which the law of maintenance has developed.  

Principles involved in granting maintenance under Muslim Law

The principles involved while granting maintenance under Muslim law vary slightly depending on the jurisdiction. However, the principles that generally govern maintenance under Muslim law are as follows –

  • Ensuring a decent standard of living – Maintenance involves the basic elements, such as food, clothing, shelter, and other essentials that are required for the existence of human beings. The person who is responsible for providing these amenities must fulfil the needs of the dependents in order to provide them with a life of dignity and comfort.  
  • Duty to support – Muslim law imposes a duty on the male member of the family to provide financial and other required support to his wife and children, as well as other close relatives, depending on the situation. This duty to provide support has been derived from the prophetic tradition, which encompasses the importance of providing basic needs to the dependents of the family.
  • Just and equitable provisions regarding maintenance – The Muslim law stresses fairness and equality amongst the parties while deciding on the quantum of maintenance. The financial situation of the person who is under obligation to pay the maintenance and the needs of the dependents are taken into consideration and accordingly, the quantum of maintenance is decided.
  • Mutual duties – The amount of maintenance is a mutual arrangement amongst the family.  The male member of the family has been provided with the primary responsibility of financial support and this duty is balanced with the other rights and obligations of the people who are dependent on them.
  • Duration of maintenance The duration of maintenance under Muslim law lasts as long as the dependents are in need of such maintenance. It usually comes to an end when an event such as death, remarriage, etc. takes place. The duration of maintenance may vary based on the situation, such as the age of the children, the financial position of the party who is under obligation to pay, and anything else that may affect the payment of maintenance.
  • Flexibility – The order of maintenance under Muslim law is not permanent and may change according to changes in circumstances. For instance, if the financial situation of the party who is under obligation to pay maintenance changes significantly or the person who is dependent needs an increase in the amount of maintenance, then under such a situation, the court may order any alteration in the existing maintenance order.  

Conditions required to claim maintenance

There must exist certain prerequisite conditions on the basis of which maintenance can be claimed. The various conditions are as follows:

  • Inability to maintain oneself – The person claiming maintenance should show that they are incapable of maintaining themselves financially. The inability to maintain oneself can arise due to many reasons, such as old age, disease, responsibilities, or any other reason that justifies their inability.
  • Neglect on the part of a person under obligation – The person who is legally entitled to maintain has failed or neglected to maintain the person claiming maintenance. The neglect or failure to perform the obligation must have caused some difficulties for the party who is dependent.
  • Person must be related – The person who is claiming the maintenance and the person from whom maintenance is sought must be related to each other through some relationship. Such a relationship can either be a parent-child relationship, a husband-wife relationship, or any other close relative.
  • Obligation to maintain – The obligation of a person to provide maintenance must be recognized by the law. Therefore, if the law specifically imposes an obligation to provide maintenance, then that needs to be recognized as a legally valid obligation.

On the fulfilment of the above conditions, maintenance can be claimed by a person. The claim can be made during the subsistence of the marriage, during the pendency of any matrimonial suit, or after obtaining the decree of divorce by the court of law.

Quantum of maintenance

The quantum of maintenance is not prescribed under any personal law. It is the discretion of the court to fix the amount of maintenance based on the nature and circumstances of the case. The primary factor that is considered by the court while deciding the quantum of maintenance is the financial position of the husband and wife and other necessary factors, such as standard of living, age, health of the claimant, duration of the marriage, etc.

Beneficiaries of maintenance under Muslim Law

Under Muslim law, the following persons can claim maintenance –

Wife 

The men are liable to maintain their wives during the duration of marriage and even after the dissolution of the marriage. Therefore, it is the obligation of the husband to provide maintenance to his wife, irrespective of whether the financial condition of the husband is good or bad.

Children

The father is under obligation to maintain his children until they attain the age of majority, under Muslim law. However, once a male child attains the age of majority, the obligation to maintain him ends. In the case of a female child, the father is under an obligation to maintain her until the date of her marriage. However, it is pertinent to note that the father has no obligation to maintain an illegitimate child.

Under Hanafi law, if the father is poor and the mother is rich, then it is the obligation of the mother to maintain the child. However, the mother can recover the amount when the husband is able to pay.  

Under Shefai law, if the father is poor and the mother is rich, then there is no obligation on the mother to maintain the child. In such a situation, the grandfather is obliged to maintain the child.  

Parents and grandparents 

If there exist circumstances in which the parents or grandparents of a person are unable to maintain themselves, then it is the obligation of that person to maintain his/her parents and grandparents. The parents occupy the next position in the right to be maintained, after the child. Among parents, the mother is given preference over the father with respect to the payment of maintenance. It is immaterial whether the child is male or female, adult or minor. If they have sufficient property, they are responsible for supplying maintenance to their parents and grandparents. 

Other relatives

Under certain conditions, if the other relatives are unable to maintain themselves, they may be entitled to maintenance if they do not have sufficient means of income and are hence in need of it.  

Conditions when the wife and the others are not entitled to claim maintenance

The liability to pay maintenance to the dependents can cease to exist under certain situations. The various circumstances in which the dependents are not entitled to claim maintenance are as follows –

  • Wife – There are certain instances in which the wife is not entitled to receive maintenance- such as when the wife has not attained the age of puberty, when the wife abandons her husband without any reasonable cause or in the absence of any sufficient reason, or when the wife fails to comply with the reasonable requests of the husband. 
  • Children – Under Muslim law, the obligation to maintain children is until the period the child attains the age of majority in the case of a male child. Whereas, in the case of a female child the obligation to maintain her subsists till the date of her marriage. 

Once a male child attains the age of majority and a female child gets married then their right to claim maintenance terminates.

  • Parents and grandparents –  The obligation to maintain parents and grandparents arises when there is an instance in which they are unable to maintain themselves. However, if the situation changes and there is a reasonable source with which they can maintain themselves then they might not be entitled to claim maintenance. 
  • Other relatives – The obligation to pay maintenance is based on the familial bond and the payment of maintenance is voluntary rather than legal compulsion, in case they are unable to maintain themselves. Therefore, if the situation becomes favourable and they have some source of income then their right to claim maintenance terminates. 

Maintenance of wife under Muslim Law

Under Muslim law, the wife’s right to maintenance by her husband is an absolute right. Even if the wife has her own source of income, there is an obligation on the husband to maintain her. A claim of maintenance by the wife is preferred over that of the children because, under Muslim law, the wife is considered to be the root, and the child is considered a branch.

The maintenance by the wife can be divided into 4 parts, which are as follows –

  • Maintenance as an obligation of marriage
  • Maintenance on the basis of pre-nuptial agreement.
  • Maintenance can be claimed by the wife under Section 144 of BNSS (Earlier-Section 125 of CrPC).
  • Maintenance under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. 

Maintenance as an obligation of marriage

The husband is under an obligation to maintain his wife so long as she remains faithful to him and the orders made by the husband. However, a wife can seek maintenance even if she disobeys her husband in the following situation –

  • If there exists a situation wherein the husband keeps a concubine (a woman with whom a man cohabits without being married).
  • If the husband is guilty of committing cruelty towards the wife.
  • If the marriage was not consummated, owing to any kind of disease or illness, malformation, absence of husband without the prior permission of the wife, or if the husband has not attained the age of puberty.

Maintenance on the basis of pre-nuptial agreement

A prenuptial agreement is an agreement made before marriage between the couple regarding anything relating to assets, ownership, maintenance, etc. This agreement may establish the right over the property and can act as supporting evidence during the event of divorce or any other circumstance.

If the wife has laid down a condition, before entering into the contract of marriage under Muslim law, that under these circumstances she would be living separately and would be entitled to the maintenance, then maintenance will be paid according to such agreement. The condition can be anything, such as that the husband must not ill-treat her, must not get married to a second wife, must not keep a concubine, etc. If there has been a contravention of the conditions as made in the prenuptial agreement, then on the basis of this agreement, maintenance can be claimed by the wife. The wife is also entitled to a special allowance, known as kharcha-i-pandan, if stipulated in the prenuptial agreement.   

In the case of Muhammad Ali Akbar vs. Fatima Begum (1929), the parties were married on 27th July 1919. On that day, the husband, apart from executing a deed of dower, also promised to pay his wife Rs. 25 per month, as kharcha-i-pandan. The couple lived together till May, 1921 and on account of differences and quarrels with her mother-in-law, the wife left the home of the husband and went to her parent’s home. Subsequently, there was a reconciliation among the parties in December 1921. However, this reconciliation did not last long, and again, she left in July, 1922.

A case was filed by Fatima Begum against her husband for the recovery of a certain sum of money as maintenance, known as kharcha-i-pandan. However, the claim of maintenance was rejected by the lower court on the ground that there was no obligation on the husband under the Mohammedan law if the wife refused to live with him without any lawful cause. The Court further stated that the main reason why the wife left home was on account of the difference with the husband’s mother, which cannot be regarded as a lawful cause.

An appeal was filed by the wife. There was no question raised regarding not allowing maintenance, but an appeal was preferred to recover the amount of kharcha-i-pandan, which was not paid for 3 years. Finally, the Court in this case directed that the allowance, named kharcha-i-pandan, must be paid by the husband in addition to the amount of maintenance.  

Maintenance under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986

The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, was enacted with the main purpose of safeguarding the rights of Muslim women, particularly those who have been divorced or have been separated from their husbands. The Act provides a mechanism for the payment of maintenance to such Muslim women. Furthermore, the Act makes sure that the amount of maintenance paid is fair and reasonable. 

Origin of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986  

The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, was enacted because of the controversy related to the case of Mohammed Ahmed Khan vs. Shah Bano Begum (1985). The judgement delivered in this case was seen as an attack on Muslim personal law. A detailed analysis of the Shah Bano case would let us understand the need behind enacting this legislation.     

Mohammed Ahmed Khan vs. Shah Bano Begum (1985)
Facts of the case

In the present case, Mohammad Ahmed Khan married Shah Bano and the amount of mehar (amount payable by the husband to wife, which she would receive in case of divorce or his death) was fixed at Rs. 3000. Subsequently, 3 sons and 2 daughters were born out of wedlock. In the year 1978, the husband unilaterally divorced his wife by pronouncing “triple talaq,” known as talaq-ul-biddat. In accordance with Islamic law, the husband pays the decided amount of mehar to the wife, during the period of iddat (a period of three months after the divorce, in which Muslim women are not allowed to remarry).

Having been trashed out of her matrimonial home, the wife filed a petition under Section 125 of the CrPC (at present – Section 144 of the BNSS), seeking maintenance. The Judicial Magistrate ordered a maintenance of Rs. 25 per month. Dissatisfied with the amount of maintenance issued by the magistrate, the wife appealed to the Madhya Pradesh High Court in 1979. As a result, the amount of maintenance was increased to Rs. 179.20 per month.

Aggrieved by the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, the husband filed a petition before the Supreme Court of India. It was contended by him that according to the provisions of Muslim personal law, the amount of maintenance should extend till the period of iddat only and not beyond that. Therefore, Section 125 of the CrPC (at present – Section 144 of the BNSS) must not be applicable in the present case. The two-judge bench, in this case, was of the opinion that the present judgments on this particular issue have not been accurately pronounced. Therefore, to decide on the matter, a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court was constituted.      

Issues of the case

The various issues that were considered by the court were as follows –

  • Whether Section 125 of the CrPC (at present – Section 144 of BNSS) is a secular provision?
  • Whether there is any conflict between the payment of maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC (at present – Section 144 of BNSS) and the Muslim personal law?
  • Can maintenance be paid to a Muslim wife beyond the period of iddat?
Judgement of the case

It was observed by the Supreme Court of India that Section 125 of the CrPC (at present – Section 144 of BNSS) is a secular provision and is applicable to the spouse, whether they are Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Parsi, or of any other religion. It was ruled that this provision is applicable to every person belonging to all religions and has no connection with the personal law of any religion. It was further stated by the Court that the obligation of the husband, under Muslim personal law, to support his divorced wife remains only till the period of iddat. However, under Section 125 of the CrPC (at present – Section 144 of the BNSS), there is no scenario as such in which the responsibility of the husband ceases to exist after a particular period. It was added by the Court that if the divorced wife is capable of maintaining herself, the duty of the husband to provide maintenance is concluded after the period of iddat ends. However, it was clarified by the court that if the divorced Muslim wife lacks the means to sustain and maintain herself, she has the complete right to seek relief under Section 125 of the CrPC (at present – Section 144 of BNSS). Therefore, the major point that was delivered by the court in this case was that the husband is obligated to maintain his divorced Muslim wife even after the period of iddat.    

Consequences of the judgement delivered in the Shah Bano case

After the judgement that was delivered in the case of Mohammed Ahmed Khan vs. Shah Bano Begum (1985), there was an uproar amongst the people. There was scandalous media coverage, and apart from that, a huge protest and counter-protest from different religious groups were seen. The judgement not only created differences among the different religions, but along with that, the division also arose among the different sects of Muslims. There were a few groups that supported the decision, such as liberal Muslims, Hindus, and feminists. However, there were some groups, such as conservative Muslims, who vehemently opposed the decision. They saw the judgement as an attack on their religion since their personal laws directed the payment of maintenance till the period of iddat, but the judgement directed the payment of maintenance beyond the period of iddat.     

Due to huge political pressure and the ongoing protest regarding the judgement that was delivered, the Government passed the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. It actually seemed to reduce the protection granted to the women by the Shah Bano case. The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 stated that the liability of the husband to pay maintenance should subsist only till the period of iddat, and if after that period she is not able to maintain herself, then the relatives who have inherited any property from her would pay the maintenance. Finally, the different issues and difficulties pertaining to the legislation were resolved in the case of Danial Latifi vs. Union of India (2001), as discussed later on in this article.   

Provisions related to maintenance under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986

Different provisions, such as Section 3, Section 4, and Section 5 of this Act, deal with the maintenance of the Muslim wife and children. 

Section 3

This Section discusses the mehar and other property of Muslim women to be given to her at the time of divorce. Under this Section, a divorced Muslim woman shall be entitled to the following –

  • A reasonable and fair amount of maintenance must be paid to her by the former husband within the period of iddat.
  • If a woman herself maintains the children that are born either before or after the marriage, then a reasonable and fair amount of maintenance must be paid by the former husband for the child. The maintenance must be paid for a period of two years from the date on which the child was born.
  • The amount of mehar that was discussed previously must be paid to the wife at the time of marriage or any time after the marriage, in accordance with Muslim law.
  • The properties that were given to her, either before or after the marriage, by relatives, the husband, friends, or any relative of the husband or his friends.

If there exists any situation wherein a reasonable and fair amount of maintenance or the amount of mehar, has not been paid or any other property that she is entitled to under this Section has not been delivered to her, she or any other person duly authorised by her can file an application before the Magistrate for an order of maintenance, mehar, or delivery of any other property, as the case may be. When an application is made by the divorced woman and the Magistrate is satisfied that –

  • The husband has sufficient means of earning and has failed or neglected to make a reasonable and fair payment of maintenance towards the divorced wife and the children.
  • The amount that was required to be paid as mehar and the other property that the divorced woman was entitled to receive were not transferred to her.  

Then, under such conditions, the Magistrate may make an order, within one month of the date of filing of the application, directing the former husband to pay a reasonable and fair amount of maintenance to the divorced woman. If any person against whom the order has been made, fails to comply with the order without any reasonable cause, then the Magistrate may issue a warrant for levying the amount of maintenance in accordance with the provisions of the CrPC (at present – BNSS). The person can even be sentenced to imprisonment for a term that may extend to one year or until payment of the amount.

Section 4   

Section 4 discusses the order for the payment of maintenance. It has been stated under this Section, that once a Magistrate is satisfied that the divorced woman has not remarried and is unable to maintain herself after the period of iddat, an order can be made directing relatives to pay maintenance. A relative can be a person who would be entitled to receive her property on her death in accordance with Muslim law. The amount of maintenance to be paid by the relatives must be fair and reasonable, catering to the needs of a divorced woman and the standard of life enjoyed by her before the marriage. However, the financial means of the relatives must also be taken into consideration. The maintenance would be paid by the relative, in the proportion to which they are entitled to inherit the property.

In case the divorced Muslim woman is unable to maintain herself and has no such relatives, or the relatives do not have enough means to pay maintenance, the Magistrate may, through an order, direct the State Wakf Board that is established under the Wakf Act, 1954 or any other law for the time being in force, to pay maintenance as determined by him.

Section 5

Section 5 of the Act discusses the amount of maintenance. This Section states that the determination of the amount of maintenance is at the discretion of the court. However, while doing so, the court shall consider various factors, such as the following –

  • The status and position of the parties.
  • Reasonable amount of maintenance that the claimant wants.
  • If the claimant is living separately, then there must exist reasonable grounds for living separately.
  • The value of the claimant’s property and the amount of income derived from such property, along with the claimant’s own earnings, must be taken into consideration.
  • Any other factors that affect the amount of maintenance.

Landmark cases on maintenance of Muslim wives under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986

All India Muslim Advocate Forum vs. Osman Khan (1990)
Facts of the case 

In the present case, the Andhra Pradesh High Court examined the right of Muslim women to claim maintenance under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, and under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The case was brought before the full Judges Bench to consider some of the vital questions that were raised just after the case of Shah Bano, which led to widespread controversy. 

Issues 

The major issues that were considered by the Full Judge Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court were as follows-   

  • Whether the divorced Muslim woman is entitled to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, even after the passing of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986?  
  • Whether the maintenance as stated under Section 3(1)(a) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, is restricted to the period of iddat or extends to future needs after the iddat period?
  • To what extent are Sections 125 to 128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,  applicable after passing the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 and what would the mode of disposal of cases pending before the court under these Sections be?
Judgement of the case

It was held by the Andhra Pradesh High Court that the obligation of the Muslim husband to pay maintenance is limited till the period of iddat only. The amount paid during the period should be sufficient for her to maintain herself for the rest of the period. It was further stated by the Court that even after the maintenance is paid by the husband and the wife is unable to maintain herself, then she can claim maintenance from the relative who would inherit her property, and ultimately, from the Wakf Board, if nothing works.

The Court also ruled that Sections 125 to 128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, do not apply to divorced Muslim women unless the parties opt for their applicability under Section 5 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986.     

Sayed Fazal Pookoya Thangal vs. Union of India (1993)
Facts of the case

In this case, a divorced Muslim woman from Kerala, named Jameela, was awarded a maintenance amount of Rs. 15,400/- by the Judicial Magistrate. However, she was only able to recover an amount of Rs. 6,000/- and her husband was sent to jail for the unpaid amount of maintenance.

Jameela, unable to maintain herself and her three children, sought maintenance from the Kerala Wakf Board under Section 4(2) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. The Judicial Magistrate ordered the Wakf Board to pay the monthly maintenance of Rs. 250/-. The Wakf Board did not challenge the order made by the Judicial Magistrate, but the chairman of the Wakf Board, named Syed Fazal Pookoya Thangal, filed a petition questioning the constitutional validity of Section 4(2) of the Act. It was contended on behalf of the Wakf Board that the obligation of the Board to pay maintenance to divorced Muslim women by diverting their funds violates Article 25 (freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion) and Article 26 (freedom to manage religious affairs) of the Indian Constitution.

Issues

The Kerala High Court considered various issues, which were as follows –

  • Is Section 4(2) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, which directs the Wakf Board to pay maintenance, constitutionally valid?
  • Whether the payment of maintenance under Section 4(2) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, violates Article 25 and Article 26 of the Indian Constitution?
Judgement of the case

The Kerala High Court dismissed the petition. It was ruled that the Wakf Board is a statutory body and is not a religious denomination and therefore, the Wakf Board does not fall under Article 26 of the Indian Constitution. The Kerala High Court further stated that the maintenance to be paid under Section 4(2) comes from the funds of the Wakf Board and not directly from the properties of Wakf. Therefore, the Court dismissed the petition and held that Section 4(2) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, does not infringe Articles 25 and 26 of the Indian Constitution.  

Danial Latifi & Anr vs. Union of India (2001)
Facts of the case

The present case arose after the judgement passed in the case of Shah Bano and the consequences associated with it. After the Shah Bano judgement, the government came up with an Act, known as the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. The main objective behind the enactment of this Act was to protect the rights of Muslim divorced women. Danial Latifi, who had been the counsel of Shah Bano, challenged the constitutional validity of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, on the ground that the Act is inconsistent with the various provisions of the Indian Constitution, in particular, Article 14 (equality before law), Article 15 (prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth), and Article 21 (protection of life and personal liberty).

It was contended by the petitioner that Section 125 of the CrPC (at present – Section 144 of BNSS) has been enacted to provide relief to divorced women and hence, it falls within the ambit of Article 21, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. It was also added that denial of remedies under Section 125 of the CrPC (at present – Section 144 of BNSS) to Muslim women would amount to infringement of Articles 14, 15, and 21. It was further contended by the petitioner that the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, undermined the secular character of Section 125 of the CrPC (at present – Section 144 of BNSS) if it were not applicable to Muslim women.

Issues of the case 
  • Whether the provisions of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, are inconsistent with Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Indian Constitution?
  • Whether the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, is constitutionally valid?
Judgement of the case

The Supreme Court of India held that the husband is liable to pay reasonable and fair maintenance for the livelihood of the divorced wife. The Court said that the reasonable amount that is required for sustenance by the women, beyond the period of iddat, must also be paid by the husband within the iddat period, in accordance with Section 3(1) of the Act.

The Court further added that a Muslim divorced woman who has not remarried and is unable to maintain herself after the period of iddat, can proceed in accordance with Section 4 of the Act. The provision states that she should be supported by her relatives in proportion to their inheritance from her property after her death. If the relatives are not able to pay maintenance, the Magistrate may direct the State Wakf Board to pay the same.

Therefore, the court finally concluded by stating that the provisions of the Act do not violate Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Indian Constitution and that the Act is constitutionally valid.     

Iqbal Bano vs. State of UP (2007)
Facts of the case

In the present case, the husband and wife got married to each other in the year 1959, and a son was born out of wedlock, who died in the year 1991. The husband and wife were living separately after the death of their son. The husband stopped visiting the wife as well as paying money for her sustenance. In 1992, the wife approached the Court of Judicial Magistrate and filed a petition under Section 125 of CrPC (at present – Section 144 of BNSS) claiming the amount of maintenance of Rs. 500 per month. The husband contended that he already divorced his wife by uttering triple talaq a long time ago and along with that, the amount of mehar was also paid by him. It was further stated by the husband that in accordance with the Muslim personal law and also under the provisions of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, he is not obliged to pay maintenance beyond the period of iddat and therefore, the claim of maintenance by the wife must not be allowed. 

However, the submissions of the husband were rejected and the wife was allowed maintenance of Rs. 450 per month. Aggrieved by the decision of the Trial Court, the husband filed a revisional petition against such an order before the Additional Session Judge. The Additional Session Judge allowed the appeal and held that the petition for maintenance under Section 125 of CrPC (at present – Section 144 of BNSS) is not maintainable for Muslim women after the enactment of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 and the application must be filed under Section 3 of the said Act. It was further added by the Additional Session Court that, after the payment of mehar and the expiry of the iddat period, the marriage between husband and wife is considered dissolved. The wife, aggrieved by the order of the Additional Session Judge, filed a petition before the Allahabad High Court, which was dismissed, and therefore, the case finally reached the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India by way of appeal.

Issues of the case

The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India considered various issues, which are as follows –

  • Whether the divorced Muslim woman is entitled to file a petition under Section 125 of CrPC (at present – Section 144 of BNSS)?
  • Whether the liability of the Muslim husband to pay maintenance under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, is confined only till the iddat period?
Judgement of the case

The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India rejected the decision made by the Additional Session Judge that Muslim women are not entitled to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC (at present – Section 144 of the BNSS). It was clarified by the court that the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, is limited only to divorced Muslim women and not to married Muslim women. Therefore, the court on this particular issue held that married Muslim women are allowed to claim maintenance under the CrPC (at present, the BNSS). The Supreme Court of India referred to the case of Danial Latifi vs. Union of India (2001) and interpreted Section 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. It was ruled that the husband is bound to make the payment of maintenance before the expiry of the iddat period. However, it was further clarified by the court that the amount paid during the period of iddat must be such that it would be sufficient for a Muslim woman to sustain herself even after this period (until she remarries or does not, as the case may be).   

Therefore, after considering the facts and issues associated with the case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India set aside the order made by the High Court and remitted the matter for a fresh consideration.

Recent ruling of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India on this issue of maintenance   

Mohd. Abdul Samad vs. State of Telangana & Anr. (2024)

Facts of the case

In the present case, the husband and wife got married on 15th November 2012. Subsequently, after the marriage, on account of differences among the spouses, their relationship deteriorated and the wife left the matrimonial home on 9th April 2016. Eventually, the wife initiated a criminal proceeding against the husband for the offence which is punishable under Section 498A and Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (at present – Section 85 and Section 316(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, respectively). As a result, the husband pronounced triple talaq and moved before the office of Quzath to seek the decree of divorce. The decree of divorce was granted ex-parte and the certificate of divorce was issued on 28th September 2017. The husband claimed that he attempted to make the payment of approximately Rs. 15,000/- to the wife during the iddat period, which was refused by the wife. Apart from that, the wife filed a petition for interim maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC (at present – Section 144 of BNSS) before the family court, which was allowed via order dated 9th May 2023. Aggrieved by such an order, the husband filed an appeal before the High Court of Telangana to quash the present order regarding the interim maintenance, eventually leading to the passing of the instant impugned order dated 13th December 2023. Ultimately, an appeal was filed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, challenging the order passed by the High Court. 

Arguments on behalf of the appellant 

The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant contended that – 

  • Section 125 of CrPC (at present – Section 144 of BNSS) does not prevail over the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. As the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, is a special law; therefore, it prevails over the provisions of CrPC.
  • Even if a divorced Muslim women seeks to move to the court of law under the secular provision of Section 125 of CrPC (at present – Section 144 of BNSS), it is not maintainable and the correct procedure would be to file an application under Section 5 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986.
  • To substantiate the contentions, it was argued that, since the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 is a beneficial and efficacious remedy for Muslim women in contradiction to Section 125 of CrPC, and therefore the resort exclusively lies under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. 
  • It was further argued by the learned counsel that Section 3 and Section 4 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, commence with the non-obstante clause and hence, it shall have an overriding effect on the other statutes that are operating in the same field.  
  • Based on the above contentions, the learned counsel relied on legal precedents such as M/s. Jain Ink Manufacturing Company vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and Another (1980), wherein it was held by the court that the special law prevails over the general law. However, if a conflicting statute is passed by the same legislature then the rule of harmonious construction is to be applied while interpreting the statute. The case of Chennupati Kranthi Kumar vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others (2023), reiterated a similar position.        

Issue of the case

The major issue before the Court was whether, after the enactment of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, Muslim women were prevented from filing an application under Section 125 of CrPC (at present – Section 144 of BNSS)? 

Judgement of the case

The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, after considering the facts and issues associated with it, dismissed the appeal filed by the husband and allowed his ex-wife to seek maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC (at present – Section 144 of the BNSS). The Court ruled that Muslim women are allowed to seek maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC as it is a secular provision, despite the fact that their marriage was dissolved under religious personal law. It was further clarified by the court that if a Muslim woman is married and divorced under Muslim law, then under that situation, both Section 125 of the CrPC as well as the provisions of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, would be applicable. The option lies with the Muslim divorced women to seek remedy either under any of the two laws or both. The reason for this was that the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, is not in derogation to Section 125 of the CrPC; instead, it is in addition to the said provision. 

The court was of the opinion that Section 125 of CrPC (at present – Section 144 of BNSS) is embedded into the text as a social justice measure, and the remedy of maintenance is a crucial source of support for the impoverished, deserted, and deprived sections of women. It was noted by Justice BV Nagarathna that Muslim women who have been divorced through illegal means such as triple talaq (which is declared void) can also claim maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC. The court further clarified that the right to maintenance is in addition to the remedy which is being provided under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, which specifies that Muslim women who have been subjected to triple talaq will be entitled to claim subsistence allowance from her husband. Therefore, it can be concluded that in the case of Mohd. Abdul Samad vs. . State of Telangana & Anr. (2024), it was clarified by the court that the provisions of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 provide remedies in addition to and not in derogation of Section 125 of the CrPC (at present – Section 144 of the BNSS). 

Comparative analysis of maintenance under Muslim Law and Hindu Law

Governing law

With respect to the Muslim community, the traditional laws and Muslim personal laws govern maintenance. Apart from this, the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, is the primary governing law.

Maintenance under Hindu law is provided based on statutes such as the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. Maintenance under Hindu law can either be temporary or permanent, as observed under Section 24 (maintenance pendente lite and expenses of proceedings) and Section 25 (permanent alimony and maintenance) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

Beneficiaries of maintenance

Under Muslim law, maintenance is primarily directed towards the wife and children, and under certain situations, maintenance can also be paid to parents, grandparents, and other close relatives. The obligation of the husband to maintain his wife exists only till the period of iddat, but the amount of maintenance paid during the period of iddat must be reasonable enough to sustain her.  

Under Hindu law, the beneficiaries of maintenance are the wife, children, daughter-in-law, and other dependents of the family. Maintenance of wives under Hindu law is provided in accordance with Section 24 and Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and Section 18 (maintenance of wife) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956.

Gender inclusivity

Under Muslim law, the husband is considered to be the primary responsibility holder. The husband is only obligated to pay maintenance and is not entitled to receive maintenance.

Whereas under Hindu law, either the husband or wife can claim maintenance as enshrined under Sections 24 and 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. In the case of Smt. Kanchan W/O Kamelendra Sawarkar vs. Kamalendra Alias Kamalakar (1992), it was observed by the Court that since the husband is neither mentally ill nor disabled, he cannot be provided maintenance only on the ground that his business failed. Further, in the case of Rani Sethi vs. Sunil Sethi (2011), the Court, considering the circumstances and facts of the case—that the wife ran a flourishing business—directed her to pay maintenance to the husband. 

Duration of maintenance

Maintenance under Muslim law lasts only till the period of iddat, but the maintenance that would be required to sustain her beyond the period of iddat must also be paid during that period. However, if the wife is still unable to maintain herself after the period of iddat, she can claim maintenance from relatives, and if not from them, from the State Wakf Board. 

On the contrary, maintenance under Hindu law can apply for a lifetime as well. It can also be altered on the basis of changes in circumstances and the position of the parties,  as per Section 25(2) and Section 25(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

Contemporary issues and challenges regarding maintenance under Muslim law

In the contemporary age, there are various challenges regarding the maintenance of Muslim women that are surging at a rapid rate. Some of these issues and challenges are as follows-

  • Lack of uniformity – The first and foremost challenge that is faced by Muslim women in India is the lack of standardised law regarding maintenance. The Muslim personal laws are majorly uncodified, as opposed to the laws of other religions, such as Hindu, Christian, Parsi, etc. As a result of the lack of uniformity, many challenges arise while applying maintenance principles, and thereby difficulties are caused to Muslim women seeking maintenance.
  • Insufficient accessibility of legal awareness – The lack of legal knowledge and complexities in the legal process act as an impediment to women’s right to achieve maintenance. Many Muslim women in India face the challenge of receiving just a reasonable amount of maintenance, merely because of a lack of awareness.   
  • Gender inequality – The interpretation of Muslim personal law gives us a clear idea regarding the inequalities that exist among men and women. Some of the provisions tend to favour men, which leads to inadequate amounts of maintenance for women. This inequality can have a deterrent effect on the financial independence of divorced Muslim women.   
  • Social stigma and coercion – The current cultural norms of society are such that the family prioritises harmony amongst the members and other relatives over going ahead with an open dispute. As a result, this social stigma and pressure from the family and community deter Muslim women from asserting their legitimate claims of maintenance.
  • Economic barriers – Many Muslim women, especially those who do not possess the means to maintain themselves, might lack the proper financial resources to hire counsel or go ahead with a prolonged legal battle and because of this, they might not be able to assert their right to claim maintenance.
  • Ineffective enforcement and execution of court’s order – There exist situations wherein an order regarding maintenance has been made by the court but is not adequately enforced or complied with. As a result, many women are left with a prolonged legal battle full of emotional distress.
  • Influence of socio-economic factors – Many socio-economic factors, such as poverty, unemployment, discrimination, etc., further enhance the problems faced while obtaining maintenance.

These issues and challenges that act as an impediment to the right of Muslim women to claim maintenance, must be eradicated. A comprehensive approach is required to achieve the goal. To curb these challenges, there is a need for legal reform and therefore, making changes and updating subsisting laws can better protect the rights of Muslim women. They should be made aware of their rights pertaining to maintenance and this can be achieved through campaigns that can raise awareness regarding the available remedies. Development of programs and other initiatives to empower Muslim women must also be undertaken, to provide them an avenue to fight the battle for the rights that they deserve. Additionally, to provide practical support and justice to Muslim women, proper implementation of the order and decisions passed by the courts must be ensured. Adhering to these solutions can curb some of the challenges faced by Muslim women, with respect to receiving maintenance.   

UCC and its impact on maintenance law vis-à-vis Uttrakhand UCC

Uniform Civil Code, i.e. UCC, refers to the common sets of law for personal matters such as marriage, inheritance, divorce, adoption, maintenance, etc. that would apply to all people regardless of their religion. The main objective of UCC is to have a secular law that overrides religious law. The main aim of such law is to promote social harmony, gender equality, and secularism by eliminating the existing disparities in the legal system based on differences in religion and community. A code like this seeks to ensure uniformity in law not only among the different communities but also within the community.  

Recently, the state of Uttarakhand has become the first state in independent India to implement UCC. With the implementation of Uniform Civil Code in the state of Uttarakhand, there have been various changes introduced in the matter of marriage, divorce, maintenance, inheritance and live-in relationship. 

The provisions relating to maintenance have been inculcated under Chapter-V of the Uttarakhand Uniform Civil Code (2024). The various provisions relating to maintenance under the Uttarakhand Uniform Civil Code (2024), that brought changes in the previous existing laws are as follows – 

Section 33 of the Uttarakhand Uniform Civil Code (2024)

This Section addresses maintenance pendente lite and the expenses related to proceeding. It states that if, under any proceeding under this part, it appears to the court that either the wife or the husband (or, in some cases, a man with multiple wives prior to the commencement of this code), does not have sufficient income to cover their necessary expenses of the proceeding. The court may, on the application of either the wife or the husband, order the other party to pay the applicant such amount as the court may find  just and reasonable. 

It is pertinent to note that the application for payment of the expenses of the proceeding and such monthly sum during the proceeding must be disposed of within sixty days from the date of service of notice to the respondent. 

Section 34 of the Uttarakhand Uniform Civil Code (2024)

This Section discusses permanent alimony and maintenance. Any court exercising jurisdiction under this part, at the time of passing a decree or anytime after that, on an application made by any of the parties regarding the order of maintenance to be paid by the other party, may grant the order of maintenance at such a monthly rate or periodic sum. While granting the order for the decree of maintenance, the court should take into consideration the respondent’s income and estate, the applicant’s income and estate, and any kind of mutual settlement and agreement among the parties. If there is a change in the circumstances of the case after the order of maintenance is made, then, on account of the court’s satisfaction, the order of maintenance may, at the instance of either party, vary, modify, or rescind in any manner as the court may deem just and proper. 

This Section further describes that mahar, dower, streedhan and other property given to the wife shall be in addition to the claim made for maintenance. 

Conclusion

The entire purpose of providing maintenance is to protect the rights of a dependent person. Their life might change drastically because of the dissolution of marriage or any other instances such as death, incapability, etc. The main objective of granting such maintenance is to provide the same standard of living that the aggrieved party used to enjoy before the dissolution of marriage or any other instances such as death, incapability, etc. Therefore, it can be well inferred that the maintenance is not only provided to the wife but also to other members such as children, parents, grandparents, and other close relatives. 

Maintenance under Muslim law is slightly different from that under other personal laws, and the judiciary has significantly intervened in the aspects that were not in the best interest of the dependents. The cases of Shah Bano and Danial Latifi made an effort to bring reform into the process of granting maintenance. Despite these recent developments in the law pertaining to maintenance, there are still lacunae subsisting which need to be eradicated. However, it can be agreed that the provision of maintenance under Muslim law addresses the essential needs of the dependents and hence fosters a just and equitable support system.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

Is there any specific provision on the basis of which the amount of maintenance is decided under Muslim law?

There is no such specific provision under any personal laws, on the basis of which the amount of maintenance is decided. The discretion is on the court to decide what just and fair amount of maintenance would be. The court took into account various factors on the basis of which the amount of maintenance can be decided –

  • The financial status of the parties;
  • Needs of the claimant;
  • Standard of living;
  • Age and health of claimant, etc.

What are the legal remedies that are available to a Muslim divorced wife if her husband fails to pay maintenance?

If the husband fails to provide maintenance to his wife, the wife can file a petition under the provisions of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, which governs the concept of maintenance amongst the Muslim community. The wife can further claim maintenance from any relative who would be entitled to inherit her property after her death and ultimately, she can also claim maintenance from the State Wakf Board.

Can a wife who refuses to live with her husband still claim maintenance under Muslim law?

A wife who refuses to live with her husband can still claim maintenance. The reason for such a refusal to live with the husband must be valid (physical abuse, mistreatment, etc.). However, if the wife is living separately without any reasonable cause, then she might not be entitled to claim maintenance.

Can a Muslim wife claim maintenance if she is employed and earning?

A Muslim wife who is employed and is earning does have a full right to claim maintenance and this factor would not solely absolve the responsibility of the husband to pay maintenance. However, the court may consider this factor while determining the amount of maintenance.

Can the amount of maintenance be altered after being decided on?

If the financial status of the party who is under obligation to pay maintenance changes or deteriorates, an application can be made to the court for an alteration in the amount of maintenance. Conversely, the party to whom the amount of maintenance was granted can also apply to the court if their situation changes and they need any alteration in the amount. The court, after considering the circumstances, may decide to alter the amount accordingly. 

What are the other provisions under which a Muslim wife can claim maintenance?   

Muslim wives can claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. This Section provides that any person who has sufficient means to maintain themselves cannot deny maintenance to their wife, children, or parents if there arises a situation wherein they are unable to maintain themselves. This is a secular provision that is applicable to all persons, irrespective of their religion and is not concerned with the personal laws of the parties.  

If any person with sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain his wife, who is unable to maintain herself, then a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, on receiving proof of such neglect, can order the person to pay a monthly allowance as maintenance, at such rate as the Magistrate may deem fit. Under this Section, the term “wife” includes any woman who has been divorced from her husband and has not remarried. She must be a legally married wife and can be of any age, even a minor. However, the wife is not allowed to receive maintenance from her husband if she is living in adultery, refuses to live with the husband without any reasonable cause, or if she is living separately by mutual consent between the couple.  

In the case of Bai Tahira A vs. Ali Hussain Fissalli Chothia and Anr. (1978), the court noted that the payment of mehar is a customary practice, and divorced Muslim women retain the right to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC (at present – Section 144 of BNSS) until the reasonable sum is discharged.

References  

Download Now

Nawab Khwaja Muhammad Khan vs. Nawab Husaini Begum (1910)

0

This article is written by Avneet Kaur. It offers an extensive exploration of the case of Nawab Khwaja Muhammad Khan vs. Nawab Husaini Begum (1910), a significant judgement of the Privy Council dealing with recognition of third-party rights to sue for enforcement of a contract made for his benefit. The article discusses various legal provisions involved in the case, along with various aspects of the judgement. It also attempts to analyse the significance of the judgement in succeeding cases. 

Introduction 

The case of Nawab Khwaja Muhammad Khan vs. Nawab Husaini Begum (1910) revolves around the common law concept of privity of contract and its application in India. To better understand this, let us take an example: suppose ‘A’ and ‘B’ enter into a contract in which they create a trust for the benefit of ‘C’. In this case, the parties involved in the contract are ‘A’ and ‘B’ only; therefore, if we go by the principle of privity of contract, only ‘A’ and ‘B’ can have the right to bring an action for the enforcement of the contract. However, this will hamper the right of ‘C’ as he will not be entitled to sue for the contract if any party breaches the same. 

The present case also deals with a similar situation wherein an agreement executed between parents of minor children for their marriage stipulated a provision that entitled the wife to receive a monthly allowance from her father-in-law. The right of the wife to claim arrears was challenged on the grounds of privity of contract. The Privy Council gave a landmark decision and recognized that the rule of privity cannot be applicable in all cases. There may be situations where its application might result in injustice. Therefore, it will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. 

Details of the case 

  • Name of the case: Nawab Khwaja Muhammad Khan vs. Nawab Husaini Begum 
  • Date of judgement: 07.06.1910
  • Parties to the case:
  1. Appellant: Nawab Khwaja Muhammad Khan
  2. Respondent: Nawab Husaini Begum 
  • Equivalent citations: (1910) 12 BOMLR638, (1910) LR 37 I.A.152
  • Type of case: Civil Suit (appeal)
  • Bench: Justice Macnaghten, Justice Collins, Justice A. Wilson and Justice A. Ali.

Facts of the case 

Nawab Khwaja Muhammad Khan (appellant) entered into an agreement with the father of Husaini Begum on 25th October 1877. The agreement was regarding the marriage of his son, Rustam Ali Khan, with Husaini Begum (respondent). Nawab Khwaja Muhammad Khan voluntarily declared in the agreement to pay Rs 500 per month in perpetuity from the date of marriage to Husaini Begum as her Kharcha-i-pandan. 

The agreement stated that Nawab Khwaja Muhammad Khan would pay this amount using the income from certain properties that were specifically described in the contract. The agreement stipulated the date of marriage as 2nd November 1877. However, Husaini Begum as well as Rustam Ali Khan were minors at the time. Therefore, Husaini Begum moved into her in-laws’ house in 1883, upon gaining the age of majority. The husband and wife continued to live together until 1896. Due to differences, she left her husband’s home and has since lived more or less continuously in Moradabad. During this time, Nawab Khwaja Muhammad Khan discontinued the monthly payment of Rs 500 to Husaini Begum. 

Therefore, Husaini Begum brought a suit to claim arrears of the Kharcha-i-pandan against her father-in-law, Nawab Khwaja Muhammad Khan. The Subordinate Judge, Agra dismissed the suit by holding that Husaini Begum is not entitled to claim allowance. Aggrieved by the decision of the Subordinate Judge, Husaini Begum filed an appeal before the Allahabad High Court. The Allahabad High Court reversed the decision of the Subordinate Judge by holding that Husiani Begum has a right to claim the arrears. In response to this, Nawab Khwaja Muhammad Khan filed the present appeal before the Privy Council.

Decision of Subordinate Judge, Agra

The Subordinate Judge held that Husaini Begum had forfeited her right to claim allowance when she ceased to live with her husband. Allegations regarding Husaini Begum’s chastity post-marriage had been raised by Nawab Khwaja Muhammad Khan. The Subordinate Judge held that, though in the present case, unchastity had not been proved, if she had been proved unchaste or refused to live with her husband, then her father-in-law’s obligation would cease. Therefore, it was held that as Husaini Begum’s refusal to live with her husband is satisfactorily proved, she shall not be entitled to the allowance. 

Decision of Allahabad High Court 

The Allahabad High Court considered the provisions of the agreement. It was observed that Nawab Khwaja Muhammad Khan had committed to paying an allowance in perpetuity to Husaini Begum. Additionally, the agreement stipulated that neither Nawab Khwaja Muhammad Khan nor his heirs could raise any objection regarding the monthly allowance. Husaini Begum was granted the right to recover the allowances in any manner she pleased from the property listed in the agreement for this purpose. 

The High Court also held that there is no condition precedent or subsequent put on Husaini Begum for claiming the allowance. The agreement does not mention anything regarding the chastity or unchastity of Husaini Begum or whether Nawab Khwaja Muhammad Khan’s liability to pay allowance would cease when Husaini Begum refuses to live in a matrimonial home with her husband. 

The High Court held that the decision of the Subordinate Judge, wherein it was held that Husaini Begum’s refusal to live with her husband in conjugal domicile has relieved Nawab Khwaja Muhammad Khan of his liability, is wrong because no such provision is present in the agreement. The High Court also rejected the contention of Nawab Khwaja Muhammad Khan, stating that since Husaini Begum was not a party to the contract, she could not sue for recovery of arrears. The High Court held that the agreement was executed with the father of Husaini Begum when she was a minor. Further, she was expressly named in the agreement as the beneficiary. Therefore, Nawab Khwaja Muhammad Khan cannot use the agreement to the disadvantage of Husaini Begum. 

The High Court allowed the appeal in favour of Husaini Begum and set aside the decision of the Subordinate Judge, Agra. The High Court decreed Husaini Begum payable for the sum of Rs 15,000/- with a 6% interest rate per annum from 10.11.1903 till the date of payment with costs. And if the said amount is not paid on or before 01.06.1907, then the property or a part of the property listed for paying allowance shall be sold. 

Issues involved 

The issues raised before the Privy Council were as follows: 

  • Whether the respondent, i.e., Husaini Begum, can sue the appellant, i.e., Nawab Khawaja Muhammad Khan, as she is not a party to the contract.
  • Whether the right of the respondent to receive Kharcha-i-Pandan ceases once she stops living with her husband in the matrimonial home. 

Legal concepts involved in Nawab Khwaja Muhammad Khan vs. Nawab Husaini Begum (1910 

Privity of contract 

The principle of privity of contract as followed under English law stipulates that when a contract is entered into between two parties, upon its breach, only such parties can sue the other for enforcement of their rights and obligations. Only parties to a contract can sue for enforcement. Even the beneficiaries under such a contract do not have this right. 

However, in the case of Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd. vs. Selfridge and Co. (1915), the rigidity of the privity of contract saw a substantial shift. It was held that a person who is a stranger to the consideration in the contract can also sue. Therefore, exceptions to the rule of privity can be made when justice so demands. 

The Indian legal system also follows a slightly different approach regarding this principle. In the case of Babu Ram Budhu Mal and Ors. vs. Dhan Singh Bishan Singh (1956) , the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that the definition of the term “consideration” under the Inidan Contract Act is much wider than that in English law. In another case, Shuppu Ammal and Anr. vs. K. Subramaniam and Ors. (1909), the Madras High Court  observed the case of marriage settlements and family arrangements wherein a third party is made the beneficiary and a property charge is created to secure the interest of the beneficiary. It was held that in such cases, the beneficiaries can sue for enforcement of the contract. It was also held that no aspect of the Indian Contract Act discourages the right of a third party to enforce a contract made for his benefit. Therefore, the rulings of the courts in India led to the development of several exceptions to the principle of privity of contract, such as:

Beneficiary under the contract

If a contract has been entered into for the benefit of a person who is not a party to the contract, then in the event of a breach of such a contract, the beneficiary can also sue for enforcement of his/her rights. The fact that the beneficiary is not a party to the contract is immaterial. The case of Nawab Khwaja Muhammad Khan vs. Nawab Hussaini Begum (1910) deals with such a situation and the Privy Council upheld the exception of a beneficiary under a contract to the rule of privity of contract. 

Consent or acknowledgement

According to the rule of privity, a third party to a contract cannot sue. However, if one of the parties to the contract recognises, acknowledges or admits the right of such a third person, then such person will have the right to sue, and the party who acknowledged such right will be estopped from denying his/her liability for the same. 

Family arrangement

The purpose behind this exception is to protect the rights of those family members, such as daughters, who are not likely to get a specific share of the property of the family. For instance, if ‘X’ distributes his property among his two sons, ‘Y’ and ‘Z’, with the condition that they shall pay a certain sum of money to their sister ‘W’, who has not gotten any share, then if Y’ and/or ‘Z’ fail to fulfill this condition, ‘W’ can sue them. Therefore, the concept of privity of contract has undergone many changes in its application in India.

Arguments of the parties

Appellant

  • The appellant contended that since the respondent was not a party to the contract, her action for claiming arrears of allowance is not maintainable.
  • The appellants supported the above contention by relying on the authority of Tweddle vs. Atkinson (1861), wherein it was held that only a party to a contract can sue for its enforcement. The appellants referred to the principle of privity of contract and contended that, as the respondent is a stranger to the contract, she cannot sue for it.
  • It was also put forward that the respondent had forfeited her right to claim an allowance when she refused to live with her husband.
  • The appellant argued that his liability would cease on account of the respondent’s misconduct or suspicious and unchaste character.
  • The appellant also urged that the nature of the allowance involved in the present case is similar to that of pin money under English law. The husband exercises control over the application of such money and as the respondent has refused to live with her husband in their conjugal domicile, she has waived her right to the same.

Respondent 

  • The respondent put forward that the reason behind her decision to leave her matrimonial home was her husband’s misconduct and unchaste character. However, after leaving, she had been visited several times by her husband, who had taken no steps to enforce the restitution of conjugal rights. 
  • The respondent urged that she had a right to sue for enforcement of the appellant’s liability under the contract since she was a beneficiary under it, even though she was not a party to the agreement. 

Judgement by the Privy Council

Privity of the contract is not applicable. 

The Privy Council held that the decision of Tweddle vs. Atkinson (1861) does not apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The former, in essence, was an action to claim damages for loss suffered on account of a breach of a simple contract. The Tweddle vs. Atkinson case relied on the principle of privity of contract in its decision. According to the Privy Council, this principle cannot be referred to in the present case because the agreement stipulates that Nawab Khwaja Muhammad Khan has set aside specific charges from certain immovable property for the allowance that is to be paid to Husaini Begum. The Privy Council held that Husaini Begum is the only beneficiary entitled under the agreement, therefore, she is entitled to enforce her claim despite the fact that she is not a party to the agreement in question. 

The reasoning given by the Privy Council behind its decision to not rely on the doctrine of privity of contract was that there are many communities in India, such as the Mohamedans, who engage in marriages of minors contracted by their parents or guardians. In such a situation, if the doctrine of privity of contract is to be applied, then it will result in serious injustice against minors. The doctrine of privity of contract postulates that only those parties shall have a right to sue who have provided consideration in the agreement. And since minors did not provide any consideration, nor were they parties to contracts, the agreements entered into under which they are beneficiaries will become redundant. 

Comparison between pin money and Kharcha-i-pandan

The Privy Council also drew a comparison between the English concept of pin money and Kharcha-i-pandan. The Privy Council construed Khrach-i-pandan as a personal allowance provided to the wife in the Mohemadan community. The amount may be fixed either before or after the marriage and can vary as per the means and position of the parties. According to the Privy Council, the concepts of pin-money and Kharch-i-pandan stand on different legal footings due to differences in the social institutions that gave rise to these concepts. 

The Privy Council held that though pin money is also recognized as the personal expense of the wife, it is often described as a fund that she might be required to use during marriage with influence, guidance and upon her husband’s request. However, the concept of Kharcha-i-Pandan carries no such obligation. Though usually the allowance, or Kharcha-i-pandan, is received and spent in the marital residence, the husband has little to no control over the utilisation of such an allowance. 

Liability of the appellant does not cease

The Privy Council held that the agreement in the present case binds Nawab Khwaja Muhammad Khan to pay the fixed allowance of Rs 500 to Husaini Begum. There is neither any condition or obligation present in the agreement that shall mean that allowance will be paid only while she is living at her marital residence with her husband nor any clause that states that the defendant’s liability shall cease to exist when Husaini Begum leaves the conjugal domicile. The agreement only deals with conditions as to when and under which circumstances the appellant’s liability is determined. Under Mohammedan law, these conditions would come into operation when the wife entered her husband’s home, giving effect to the conjugal rights and obligations. 

The Privy Council held that there were no other conditions in the agreement because of Husaini Begum’s close relations with the ruler of Rampur. Therefore, Nawab Khawaja Muhammad Khan entered into the agreement to maintain Husaini Begum’s status. Based on the statements given by Husaini Begum, the Privy Council concluded that even though she had left her conjugal domicile, she was still often visited by her husband, who had taken no step to file for restitution of conjugal rights. Therefore, the Privy Council upheld and affirmed the judgement of the Allahabad High Court. The appeal was dismissed and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs. 

Rationale behind the judgement

The reasoning behind the Privy Council’s decision in the present case was based on the fact that the practice of child marriage is common in some areas. In such situations, the parents or guardians of the minor children enter into contracts with each other. The agreements often stipulate the date of marriage, rights and obligations subsequent to marriage, along with allowances to the wife. One such allowance under Mohammedan law is known as Kharcha-i-pandan, which is also the subject of discussion in the present case. 

Therefore, the minor children are not parties to the contracts but can be listed as beneficiaries under them. If the common law rule of privity of contract is applied here, then it can result in injustice against the beneficiaries as their right to bring a suit for enforcement of the contract will be barred. To prevent such injustice, the Privy Council attempted to establish that the principle of privity of contract does not have universal application. The rule can be done away with when justice so requires. Thus, even when a person is not party to the contract, he or she shall be entitled to sue for it if the contract involves his benefit. 

Significance in subsequent cases 

Mannath Veettil Itti Menon vs. Thazheth Meladem Dharman (1917)

The case of Mannath Veettil Itti Menon vs. Thazheth Meladem Dharman (1917) involved a situation wherein the execution of a melcharth (a legal document that allows for the transfer of rights in the context of land) led to a legal dispute over its interpretation and effects on the rights of the parties. The melcharth was executed between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant, which allowed the plaintiff (landowner) the right to redeem kanom (the land tenure system in Malabar, Kerala) in exchange for the transfer of rights on the land. However, the 1st defendant entered into an agreement with the 2nd defendant, who became the melkanomdar and had the responsibility of paying the rent to the plaintiff (landowner). 

The Madras High Court relied on the decision in the Husaini Begum case (1910) and held that the common law rule of privity of contract might be done away with in light of justice. However, it must also be noted that the Privy Council did not intend to lay down that the privity principle had no application in India. The Madras High Court held that though the plaintiff was not a party to the agreement between the defendants, he still had a right to sue for the contract. 

Adhar Chandra Mondal vs. Dolgobinda Das and Ors. (1936)

The case of Adhar Chandra Mondal vs. Dolgobinda Das and Ors. (1936) deals with property disputes among different parties engaged with each other through a network of transactions arising out of a co-owned estate in Murshidabad. The Calcutta High Court, while deciding the matter, relied on the judgement of the Privy Council in the case of Nawab Khwaja Muhammad Khan vs. Husaini Begum (1910). The High Court referred to a remark of Lord Macnaghten on the Husaini Begum case, which provided that if we were to assume that the plaintiff in the case was an English woman, she would not have been able to bring an action before the King’s Bench division. However, she could still bring a suit in equity. 

This is the result of the evolution of legal actions like assumpsit, in which the plaintiff had to prove that the defendant had intentionally committed a breach in order to deceive the plaintiff. Therefore, only the person who had been deceived could sue. This displays the limitations of the English courts. However, the Calcutta High Court held that the Indian legal system is not bound by such restrictions and, in matters of procedure, is guided by principles of justice, equity and good conscience. 

Analysis of Nawab Khwaja Muhammad Khan vs. Nawab Husaini Begum (1910

The general rule is that only those who have paid consideration in a contract can have the right to sue for enforcement of their rights or obligations. However, there are several situations wherein a third party can also have the right to sue, for instance, trust deeds, family arrangement agreements, prenuptials or agreements related to marriage under Mohammedan law. Therefore, in such situations, exceptions may be made on the basis of justice and equity. 

The Husaini Begum case also reflects a deviation from the traditional approach of following the privity principle. The Privy Council’s unique observation of the concept of marriage under Mohammedan law led to the recognition of the fact that the application of the privity principle in India cannot be the same as that in England. The Privy Council’s decision to not follow the authority of Tweddle vs. Atkinson (1861) brought a change in perspective for the Indian legal system. 

Additionally, the comparison drawn between pin-money and Kharcha-i-pandan also reflects the acceptance of differences in social, cultural and legal institutions in England. This provided a meaningful interpretation of the application of personal allowances within different cultural and sociological frameworks, underlying the unique traits of such situations that should be analysed while making a decision on the same. 

Conclusion 

The judgement in the present case has emphasised the differences in the application of the doctrine of privity in India and England. The Privy Council, while holding that the doctrine does not have universal application, also attempted to establish through subsequent cases that the same should not be construed to mean that the privity rule has no application in India. The facts and circumstances of each case should be considered to determine its application. The right of the respondent to claim arrears on her allowance was also recognized in light of the agreement involved in the case. This has also uplifted the rights of minor children, especially females, whose marriages are contracted by their parents. Any benefit or interest assigned to such minor children in the contracts should be upheld. 

The extreme emphasis put by the Allahabad High Court and the Privy Council on the interpretation of the terms of the agreement prevented the appellant from enforcing the contract to the disadvantage of the respondent when, in the first instance, it was made for her benefit only. This case marked one of the pivotal turns from the traditional rigid common law principles and recognized the unique cultural, social and legal nuances that exist amongst different communities in India. 

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) 

What is Kharcha-i-Pandan?

The literal meaning of Kharcha-i-pandan is ‘betel box expense’. It is a form of personal allowance provided to the wife in a marriage under Mohammedan law. The quantum of such an allowance can vary depending on the means and positions of the parties. The amount is usually given by either the father-in-law or husband. It may be fixed either before the marriage or subsequent to it.

What are some other personal allowances under Mohammedan law?

Apart from Kharcha-i-Pandan, there may be several other forms of personal allowance given to the wife under Mohammedan law. This may include Mehr or Dower, which is an amount given by the groom to his bride at the time of marriage, Nafaqah or maintenance, refers to the husband’s duty to fulfill the basic needs of his wife and children, Haddiya, which refers to gifts given by the husband to his wife out of affection, and a divorce settlement paid by the husband to his wife for her maintenance during the iddat period. 

Can a stranger to the contract bring a suit for its enforcement? 

The doctrine of privity of contract provides that only those parties who have given consideration to a contract shall have the right to bring an action for its enforcement. However, there may be circumstances where a third person can bring a suit for the contract. Some of these situations are trust deeds, contracts through an agent, family settlements, beneficiaries under contract, acknowledgement, estoppel, covenants running with land, etc. 

References 

Download Now

Types of Hindu marriage

0

This article was written by Vishesh Gupta and further updated by Monesh Mehndiratta. The present article explains different forms of Hindu marriage and the types of marriage currently existing in society. It also explores the nature of Hindu marriage and the changes brought about by the codification of law on Hindu marriage. 

Introduction 

Did you know that there are different types of marriages existing in society?

Yes, polygamy, bigamy, monogamy, etc., are terms that you might have come across, especially so during the last few years. These are all different types of marriages that exist in society. But what if you were told that there are different forms of marriage within the Hindu religion? What would be your reaction if you learned that there once existed various forms of Hindu marriage? 

This is true. In the pre-Vedic and Vedic periods, there were different forms of Hindu marriage. Some of these forms were widely accepted, while others were prohibited. However, after the codification of Hindu Law and the enactment of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, monogamy is the only form of marriage accepted and widely practised by people belonging to the Hindu religion in India. This Act provides conditions for a valid Hindu marriage, and monogamy is one of the most important essential conditions. The present article will explain the different forms of Hindu marriage and the change in the situation after the enactment of the Act. It also explores the nature of Hindu marriage and outlines the differences between bigamy, monogamy, and polygamy. 

Nature of Hindu marriage 

Marriage is one of the oldest institutions in society. It occupies an important place in the social life of a person. In a marriage, the daughter is entrusted by her father to a noble and sound groom, who becomes her husband. The institution of marriage is not new to society, but it found its existence in the Vedic period as well. Through this institution, males and females are united in wedlock, the purpose for which, in Hindu religion, is Dharma and to carry forward the family. This means that a Hindu marriage is considered important for the fulfilment of certain duties. 

Every man in the Hindu religion is under an obligation to discharge three debts according to Dharma, i.e., debt to father, debt to God, and debt to sages. For example, the eldest son is supposed to perform the last rites of his parents and ancestors for their salvation. Certain religious ceremonies in the Hindu religion are supposed to be performed by a man along with his companion, i.e., his wife. Thus, marriage in Hinduism is considered a religious sacrament. It can be said that marriage is intended to achieve the higher ends of life, namely, Dharma, artha, kama, and moksha.

Prior to the enactment of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, marriage was considered to create an inseparable bond between husband and wife that could not be broken. Manu, regarded as the ancestor of the human race in Hindu tradition and the author of the Manusmriti, opined that when a daughter is married, she remains the wife of her husband for her entire life, with neither remarriage nor divorce being possible. After the death of her husband, a woman was expected to lead a life of simplicity with minimal facilities. Thus, the bond between husband and wife was considered inseparable and unbreakable. Divorce and remarriage were not practised.

However, it is worth noting that within this inseparable bond, the situation for a man was different. He could have more than one wife and, unlike women, did not have any obligation to remain unmarried after his wife’s death. This led to disparity and issues that made it necessary to codify Hindu law. Apart from this, a man had the responsibility of maintaining the family due to the patriarchal nature of society and traditional gender roles. This was another issue that the legislation tried to address. 

Since the enactment of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, there has been a significant change in marital practices and customs. Unlike in the past, divorce and remarriage are now allowed, and the Act provides provisions for the same. In present times, a husband is required to maintain his wife and provide her with maintenance even if they are living separately. In fact, under Section 24 of the Act, a husband can apply for interim maintenance if he does not have any independent income of his own. Apart from this, the Act allows inter-caste marriages, as there are no restrictions or limitations regarding the caste of either the male or female, while the Special Marriage Act, 1954 provides for inter-religion marriages. However, it must be noted that the core principles and purpose of Hindu marriage remain unaffected even after the enactment of the statute. It is still considered a religious sacrament, with the obligation to perform religious rites and ceremonies. 

Different forms of Hindu marriage 

In the Hindu religion, marriage is considered a sacrosanct and holy union of two people. Different castes have different cultures and ceremonies to be performed in order to solemnise a marriage. These ceremonies have been recognised and codified in Hindu Law as customs. Prior to the enactment of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and during the Vedic period, there existed different forms of marriage. The various forms of Hindu marriages, such as Manusmriti and the Vedas, have been mentioned in religious texts and Smritis. However, these forms of Hindu marriages have not been specified in the central legislation that now governs Hindu marriages.  These forms of marriage were further categorised as:

  • Approved forms, and 
  • Unapproved forms

Approved forms of marriage

Society recognised and accepted certain forms of marriage among the various forms prevailing at that time. These forms were known as the approved forms of marriage. The following forms of marriage fall under the category of approved forms as these were the ones accepted and practised in society:

  • Brahma,
  • Daiva,
  • Arsha, and 
  • Prajapatya

Brahma 

Brahma’ is a widely accepted and approved form of marriage in India, which is still practised in society. This form of marriage is considered supreme among all other forms of Hindu marriage. Its importance is also mentioned in the Manusmriti, written by Manu. In this form of marriage, the daughter is adorned with ornaments and honoured with jewels before being given to a man selected by her father as her husband. The man is usually learned and well-versed in the Vedas. This form of marriage is also known as Brahma vivah.

According to Manu, the son of a wife married according to Brahma rites liberates ten ancestors and descendants. This means that the virtuous actions of such a son will help liberate or uplift ten generations of his ancestors and descendants to achieve a better spiritual state, possibly leading them to attain moksha, or liberation from the cycle of rebirth.                                          

The Supreme Court in Reema Aggarwal vs. Anupam And Ors. (2004) discussed the possibility of Brahma marriage being the origin of the dowry system in India but did not reach a conclusion. However, in practice, the bridegroom may use the custom of ‘exchanging gifts’ to harass and pressure the bride and her parents to give dowry. 

Daiva

This type of marriage means ‘marriage related to the rite of the gods’. Unlike in Brahma, a father in this kind of marriage gave his daughter to a priest as a form of a dakshina, which is a sacrificial fee. In this form of marriage, it was the father who searched for a groom for his daughter. However, one feature that makes this form of marriage different and less significant from Brahma is that a daughter was given as dakshina. According to Manu, the son of a woman who marries according to Daiva rites can liberate seven generations of their ancestors and descendants.

Arsha

The third form of approved marriage is Arsha. In this form of marriage, a daughter was married to a sage. The father of the bridegroom gives two cows or bulls to the father of the bride, unlike the other forms where the father of the bride had to give something to the bridegroom. This is the reason why this form of marriage was different from the other forms of approved marriage.

The concept behind such marriage was that it was beneficial for those who could not afford to give expensive items or gifts to the bridegroom. Thus, there was a presumption in this form of marriage that a girl is married to a sage or rishi in exchange for two cows or bulls. However, this form of marriage was not much appreciated because people believed that it was a kind of transaction or an exchange. 

Prajapatya

This form of marriage is quite similar to Brahma. The only difference is that there is no kanyadan in this form of marriage, and it is the father who searches for a groom for his daughter. However, in this form of marriage, the father of the bride puts a condition that the couple has to perform their religious obligations, i.e., Dharma, together diligently. The father’s only request and condition to the bridegroom was that he must treat his daughter as his partner, respect her, and also fulfil their religious obligations together. Manu opined that the son of a woman who is married, according to Prajapatya rites, can liberate his six ancestors and descendants.

Unapproved forms of marriage

The following forms of marriage were neither accepted nor recognised and hence categorised as unapproved forms of marriage. People were prohibited from practising such forms of marriage. These are:

  • Asura,
  • Gandharva,
  • Rakshasa, and
  • Paishacha

Asura 

This form of marriage is highly criticised, condemned, and unacceptable in society. In an Asura marriage, a girl is given in marriage after the bridegroom gives all possible wealth to the father of the bride. This is why this form of marriage is the most condemned. It resembles a business transaction where the bride is exchanged for wealth given by the bridegroom, indicating that the bride is purchased. 

The test for determining whether a marriage is ‘Asura’ or not was laid down in Kailasanatha Mudaliar vs. Parasakthi Vadivanni (1931). The test is that if the bridegroom gives any money or kind to the bride’s father as a consideration in exchange for his daughter and they are married, the marriage falls under this form.

Gandharva

In this form of marriage, a man and a woman mutually decide to marry each other, but the agreement arises due to lust, so the approval of parents is not necessary. The man and the woman make a bodily union without performing any religious rites and ceremonies or seeking the consent of their parents. This makes Gandharva a unique and unacceptable form of marriage. Although the concept of mutual consent for marriage was prevalent in the old Hindu system, the rate of solemnisation of such marriages was very low. This was because:

  1. It promoted child marriage.
  2. There were possible chances of inter-caste marriages, which were not approved much in society.
  3. It was against Hindu culture, norms, and values, as there was no parental consent in this form of marriage. 

The Supreme Court in the case of Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande & Anr. vs. State Of Maharashtra & Anr. (1965) provided essential ceremonies required for performing Gandharva marriage. One such custom is that the father of the woman should touch the foreheads of the bride and the bridegroom, which completes the marriage. Another custom is the presence of a Brahmin priest. It was also held that without these essential ceremonies, a Gandharva marriage cannot be said to be solemnised under Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act. 

Rakshasa

The Rakshasa form of marriage was considered one of the most brutal and unapproved marital practices in ancient society. In this form of marriage, a bride was abducted, and her family was subjected to torture. The bridegroom fought against the bride’s family to claim her as his own. This form of marriage was condemned for its cruelty, as it involved the violent kidnapping of a girl and the brutal treatment of her family, which could even lead to their death. The societal disapproval came from its blatant disregard for the bride and her family’s personal autonomy and human dignity.  

Paishacha

This form of marriage was deemed one of the most atrocious and reprehensible practices. In this form, sexual relations were forced on a girl while she was unconscious, either due to intoxication or drug administration, which was practically rape. After regaining consciousness, the girl was forced into marriage with the man who had violated her. This practice often involved the man making the girl drink alcohol or administering drugs to impair her senses, or he would simply choose a girl of immature understanding who lacked the ability to comprehend what was going on and resist. The girl and her parents, out of shame and trauma of such acts, had no other option but to agree to the marriage. The condemnation of this form of marriage reflects its extreme violation of personal consent and ethical standards.

Marriage under Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

The institution of marriage has been preserved even in the 21st century. Marriage under the Hindu religion is now governed by the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, in addition to religious ceremonies. It is an exhaustive piece of legislation and provides the conditions or essentials for a valid Hindu marriage. It is applicable to all Hindus, including Jains, Sikhs, and Buddhists, irrespective of their caste, colour, age, or sex. As mentioned above, even though the sanctity of Hindu marriage has not changed after the enactment of the statute, some new practices like divorce and remarriage have been introduced. 

The Act provides essential conditions for a valid marriage under Section 5 and provisions for the registration of marriage. It also offers alternative remedies for divorce, such as judicial separation, and states the grounds on which either spouse can seek divorce or judicial separation. Separate grounds have been provided for wives to seek divorce, along with provisions for maintenance. The Act prohibits bigamy and child marriage. Even though significant changes have been introduced under the Act, the importance and religious significance of marriage remain central. Courts try to preserve the sacramental nature of marriage by giving parties several chances to restore their marriage and relationships. 

As mentioned above, Section 5 specifies the conditions for a Hindu marriage. As per this provision, a marriage between two Hindus is said to have taken place if the following conditions are met:

  • The couple should not be married to someone else at the time of their marriage;
  • They must be mentally sound and capable of giving a valid consent; 
  • They should not be suffering from a mental disorder that may make them unfit for marriage or for having children. Additionally, they should not be subject to recurrent insanity attacks;
  • The groom must be at least 21 years old, and the bride must be at least 18 years old;
  • The couple must not be related to each other within the degrees of prohibited relationship unless their community customs allow such a marriage;
  • They should not be sapindas of each other unless their community customs permit the same.

Section 7 further stipulates the ceremonies that are essentially performed in order to solemnise a valid Hindu marriage. This section states a Hindu marriage can be conducted according to the traditional customs and rituals of either the bride’s or the groom’s family. Such a ceremony, however, must include saptapadi, where the bride and groom take seven steps together in front of the sacred fire for it to be considered complete and binding. The marriage is deemed complete as soon as the couple takes the seventh step.  

Changes brought by the Act 

The Act has successfully codified the law related to Hindu marriage, leading to uniformity. It has been given an overriding effect, which has resulted in the abrogation of harmful practices and customs. The following changes have been brought under the Act:

  • The Act clearly defines its applicability under Section 2. It provides that marriages among Hindus, Jains, Sikhs, and Buddhists are valid marriages.
  • It establishes monogamy as the only kind of marriage accepted under the law, which is one of the essential conditions of a valid Hindu marriage under Section 5(1) of the Act.
  • Bigamy has not only been prohibited under the Act but made a punishable offence, with punishments outlined in Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 81 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023
  • The Act recognises inter-caste marriages as valid. 
  • It provides a clear definition of the terms ‘sapinda’ and ‘prohibited degrees’ in order to determine when a marriage can be held invalid on these grounds. 
  • The Act defines the minimum age of marriage for brides and bridegrooms as one of the essential conditions for a valid marriage in order to prevent child marriages.
  • It recognises the importance of saptapadi, i.e., the seven steps rounds taken around the fire, in a valid Hindu marriage. 
  • Several matrimonial reliefs, such as restitution of conjugal rights, judicial separation, divorce, etc, have been introduced under the Act. 

Monogamy in Hindu Marriage

The term ‘monogamy’ means to have only one partner or marriage with only one person. Unlike polygamy, where a man can marry more than one female, monogamy allows marriage with only one female. It is pertinent to note that the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, recognises monogamy as the only kind of marriage to be practised and promoted under Hindu Law. Section 5 of the Act clearly provides that ‘neither party should have a spouse living at the time of his or her marriage, thus prohibiting bigamy or polygamy. If this condition is not fulfilled, the marriage will be declared null and void under Section 11 of the Act. This was also stated in the case of Smt. Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav vs. Ranantrao Shivaram Adhava (1988)

In the case of Bhogadi Kannababu & Ors vs. Vaggina Pydamma & Ors (2006), it was observed by the Supreme Court that if the condition mentioned in Section 5(i) of the Act, i.e., monogamy, is violated and a person marries another person during the lifetime of his or her spouse, such marriage would be void ab initio and the second spouse cannot inherit the property of the husband. The same was reiterated in the case of Gulabi vs. Sitabai (2006)

Another landmark case related to bigamy is that of Dr. A.N. Mukherji vs. State (1969). In this case, a man married another woman while his wife was still alive and the marriage was subsisting at the time of the second marriage. It was alleged that the second marriage was accomplished in different ways: the first ceremony was marriage on a full moon night, also called Chandra Anusthan, the second was the exchange of garlands in the temple of Goddess Kali, and a similar ceremony was performed before Guru Granth Sahib. However, none of the ceremonies were recognised in their culture and community, and so the offence of bigamy could not be established. 

One question that has been answered by the courts in this regard is whether a person can be restrained from remarrying by an order of injunction. This was addressed in the case of Shankarappa vs. Basamma (1963) by the Mysore High Court. It was held that an injunction can restrain a person from remarrying and can be granted in cases where a spouse apprehends the remarriage of his or her spouse. In the case of Sarla Mudgal vs. Union of India (1995), a landmark judgement on bigamy, a man converted to Islam in order to marry more than one female while his marriage, which was performed according to Hindu rituals, was still subsisting. He had a Hindu wife living at the time of his other marriage. The court convicted him for the offence of bigamy, against which an appeal was filed and decided along with the case of Lily Thomas vs. Union of India (2000)

The Supreme Court held that the institution of marriage is sacred for every religion and that religion is not a commodity to be used or exploited for personal means. It is rather a matter of faith. The court further held that if a man who is already married according to Hindu law and rituals, where monogamy is accepted and practised, converts to Islam to marry again without dissolving his first marriage, it results in the second marriage being declared void. Here, the person is said to have converted for personal gains, leading to religious bigotry. 

Difference between bigamy, monogamy and polygamy

Basis of comparisonMonogamy BigamyPolygamy
Meaning It implies marrying only one person. It means marrying another person during the lifetime of your spouse while your first marriage is still subsisting. It means marrying more than one person while your previous marriages are still subsisting. 
Recognition and practiseIt is recognised and widely practised in Hindu law in India.It is neither practised nor recognised in India.It is recognised in Islam. 
Cultural acceptance It is widely accepted and promoted in society. Not accepted.Accepted in Islam. 
Legal statusThis kind of marriage is legally valid. Monogamy is also recognised as an important condition of a valid marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. It is made a punishable offence in India under Section 494 and 495 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Considered valid in Islam. 
Whether punishable or not Since it is legally valid, it is not punishable. Punishment is prescribed under Section 494 and Section 495 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860Not made punishable but not promoted much in society. 

Conclusion 

Marriage is a sacred institution. The core principles and purpose of marriage have always been upheld and preserved, even by the courts of our country. In Hindu religion, it is regarded as a religious obligation. Due to numerous customs and practices, a need for a uniform system was felt. Hence, Hindu law was codified. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 helped in bringing uniformity regarding marriage and its essential conditions. Marriage is still seen as sacred and pious. There are different types of marriages, such as monogamy, bigamy, and polygamy, but under Hindu law, only monogamy is considered legally valid. The society also promotes monogamy as it provides a sense of security between husband and wife. 

In the present time, only the Brahma and Asura forms of marriage are prevalent in society. The other forms have become almost obsolete. However, both forms of marriage have evolved over time, but the essence of marriage remains the same. Unfortunately, there have been many instances of fraud, domestic violence, and cheating in marriage. Such instances create significant obstructions and instil fear in people’s minds regarding the sanctity of marriage. There is a need to regulate such cases of false marriages, fraud and scams, domestic violence, and cheating. Awareness must be created regarding the purpose and religious obligations of marriage. Legislatures must come up with solutions to curb these instances and matrimonial crimes. 

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

Is saptapadi recognised as a valid ceremony for Hindu marriages?

Yes, according to Section 7 of the Act, saptapadi (seven steps taken by the bride and bridegroom together around the sacred fire) is recognised as a valid ceremony for Hindu marriage and marriage is considered complete and binding when the seventh step is finished. 

Is it mandatory to register a Hindu marriage?

Section 8 of the Act gives the power to the state government to decide whether registration of marriage is compulsory or not. It also determines the procedure and particulars to be entered in the register for the same. 

What happens if any of the conditions of a valid marriage under the Act are not fulfilled?

If any of the conditions mentioned in Section 5 of the Act are not fulfilled or are violated, it results in the marriage being void according to Section 11 of the Act. 

References 

Download Now
logo
FREE & ONLINE 3-Day Bootcamp (LIVE only) on

How Can Experienced Professionals Become Independent Directors

calender
28th, 29th Mar, 2026, 2 - 5pm (IST) &
30th Mar, 2026, 7 - 10pm (IST).
Bootcamp starting in
Days
HRS
MIN
SEC
Abhyuday AgarwalCOO & CO-Founder, LawSikho

Register now

Abhyuday AgarwalCOO & CO-Founder, LawSikho