The article has been written by Samiksha Singh. This article deals with the law relating to permanent injunctions. The article highlights the meaning and the provisions relating to a permanent injunction. The article, thus, comprehensively delves into an understanding of permanent injunctions as provided under the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

Table of Contents

Introduction

The term “injunction” is derived from the Latin term “injungere” which translates “to enjoin” or to “issue an authoritative command.” It is a form of preventive or mandatory relief and is codified under the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as “SRA, 1963”). Injunctions are generally categorised into two types: temporary (interlocutory) and permanent (perpetual). As the very expression denotes, a “temporary” injunction is one that is in force for a limited duration of time, whereas a permanent injunction is one that remains in force forever. Temporary injunctions are governed in accordance with Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. As opposed to this, permanent injunctions are governed in accordance with the SRA, 1963.

Thus, the idea behind the grant of a permanent injunction is essentially based on the principle of equity. One person, in whose favour the right exists, must not be forced to bring legal action again and again for every breach of a right or obligation owed to him. Hence, the idea behind the grant of a permanent injunction is to permanently settle the right and relieve the party in whose favour the right exists. 

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What is permanent injunction

Section 36 of the SRA, 1963, specifies that an injunction may be either temporary or permanent. As the very term specifies, a “permanent” injunction is one where one party (or the defendant) is permanently restrained from doing or not doing an act that would go against the other party’s right (or the plaintiff). Meaning thereby, once a permanent injunction is granted against any defendant, that defendant is then permanently restrained from claiming any right or doing any act or omission that would go against the plaintiff’s right. Since it is a final or permanent remedy, the court can grant a permanent injunction only after it has heard both parties on the merits of the dispute and decides to pass a decree on the merits of the dispute. For this reason, as specified in Section 37(2) of the SRA, 1963, a “perpetual” or “permanent” injunction would only be granted by virtue of a decree that too “upon the merits” of the dispute. 

Provisions dealing with permanent injunction

The law related to permanent injunctions is provided under the SRA, 1963. The following provisions deal with permanent injunctions.

  • Section 36 of the SRA, 1963: This section specifies that the Court may grant an injunction, which could be either a temporary injunction or a permanent injunction.
  • Section 37 of the SRA, 1963: This section defines the two types of injunction: temporary and permanent. In doing so, it provides that “temporary” injunctions are those injunctions that last only until a specified point of time or until the final order is passed. As opposed to this, permanent injunctions are those that permanently restrain the defendant from either claiming a right or committing any act that would go against the rights of the plaintiff.
  • Section 38 of the SRA, 1963:Section 38, in turn, specifies the circumstances under which a permanent injunction would be granted. It specifies that in instances where the injunction has to be granted in order to prevent any breach of obligation mentioned in a contract, the Court is to be guided by the provisions provided under Chapter II of the SRA, 1963. Additionally, Section 38 of the SRA, 1963, also lays down four circumstances where a permanent injunction may be granted in order to safeguard a right relating to property. The four circumstances under which a permanent injunction in relation to property may be granted are as follows:
    • When the defendant acts in the capacity of a “trustee” to the plaintiff’s property;
    • When the damage caused or likely to be caused cannot be determined;
    • When compensation would not be an “adequate” remedy;
    • When an injunction is required to prevent “multiplicity of proceedings”
  • Section 40 of the SRA, 1963: Section 40 provides that a plaintiff seeking permanent injunction is also free to additionally claim damages. Thus, the plaintiff may seek damages “in addition to” a grant of permanent injunction. Alternatively, the plaintiff may also seek damages “in substitution for” a decree of a permanent injunction. The court may then award such damages if it considers it fit.
  • Section 41 of the SRA, 1963: Section 41 provides the circumstances in which a permanent injunction would be refused. Section 41 lays down ten circumstances in which a permanent injunction would not be granted, as discussed below.

Scope of Sections 38 and 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963

A determination of a probable right to injunction cannot be made based solely on Section 37 of the SRA, 1963. It must be determined in the context and with reference to Sections 38 and 41 of the SRA, 1963. Sections 38 and 41 of the SRA, 1963, are ‘supplementary’ in nature. For this reason, these sections must be read in the context of each other. While Section 38 of the SRA, 1963, lays down the situations for the grant of an injunction, Section 41 defines when an injunction would not be granted.

When a permanent injunction is granted

Principles regarding grant of a permanent injunction

The principles based on which the Court grants a permanent injunction have been provided under Section 38 of the SRA, 1963. Accordingly, the following is clear:

  • For contracts: Section 38(2) + Chapter II of the SRA, 1963.
  • For other actionable wrongs: Section 38(3) of the SRA, 1963.

Requirements for issuing a permanent injunction

In order for a plaintiff to be qualified to get a permanent injunction against the defendant, there are certain prerequisites. These are:

  • Firstly, the plaintiff has to show that there is some legal right or obligation that exists in his favour. Here, the expression “obligation” would have the same meaning as specified under Section 2(a) of the SRA, 1963. For example, if the plaintiff files a suit for recovery of possession of some property, he has to establish that he has an interest or legal right in the property. 
  • Secondly, the plaintiff has to establish either of the two things: that is, the plaintiff has to show that the defendant has either already committed or is threatening to commit a breach of such a legal right that exists in the favour of the plaintiff. If there is no commission or threat to commit a breach of such a legal right, there can be no suit for injunction. In the case of Arulmighu Parasunathaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others (2021), the Madras High Court observed that since the plaintiff was in lawful possession of the property and such lawful possession was threatened by the government through the issuance of pattas, the plaintiff ought to be granted relief by way of an injunction.
  • Thirdly, since the very purpose of an injunction is prevention, the plaintiff has to show that an injunction is necessary to prevent the breach of a right or obligation that exists in his favour. However, it is necessary for the plaintiff to show that an obligation is owed to him by the defendant. If there is no obligation per se, there can be no injunction. In the Bombay High Court judgement in the case of Mukesh v. Charan (2017), the applicant sought permanent injunction against the respondents on the basis of a lease deed. Herein, the fact that the lease deed existed was in itself in question. The Bombay High Court observed that in order for an injunction to be granted, it must be shown that there is an obligation owed to the applicant. Since the applicants asserted that their possession was legitimate on the basis of a lease deed, and that lease deed, whether it existed or not, is in itself questionable, there can be no permanent injunction. 

Ingredients of Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963

Section 38 of the SRA, 1963, lays down the circumstances under which a permanent injunction may be granted. Accordingly, the following essentials are specified under Section 38 of the SRA, 1963, regarding the grant of a permanent injunction.

  • Why granted: Section 38(1) of the SRA, 1963, essentially answers “why” or “for what reason” a permanent injunction is granted. It, therefore, provides that in order to prevent a breach of any obligation that is “existing” in the favour of the plaintiff, he may be granted a permanent injunction. 
  • Course of action when obligation arises from a contract: There may be situations where the obligation that exists in favour of the plaintiff stems from any contract. Thus, in cases where any such obligation arises out of a contract, Section 38(2) specifies that the Court, while deciding to grant a permanent injunction, shall have regard to the provisions specified under Chapter II of the SRA, 1963. For the purpose of clarity, Chapter II of the SRA, 1963, containing Sections 9-25, deals with the provisions relating to “specific performance of contracts.” Accordingly, when the Court is faced with a question regarding the grant of any permanent injunction where the plaintiff derives the right or obligation from a contract, the Court, while deciding whether to grant an injunction or not, would have to give regard to the provisions specified under Chapter II of the SRA, 1963.
  • Permanent injunction in relation to the right or enjoyment of property: Permanent injunctions may also be granted when the acts of the defendant interfere with the plaintiff’s right over property. These instances may include situations where a defendant has either already invaded or such defendant “threatens to invade” the right of the plaintiff in relation to either a “right to property” or the “enjoyment of property”. In such situations, Section 38(3) of the SRA, 1963, lays down four instances where a permanent injunction may be granted:
    • First, in cases where the defendant acts in the capacity of a “trustee” to the plaintiff’s property and causes or is likely to interfere with the plaintiff’s right over the property or enjoyment of such property, a permanent injunction may be granted.
    • Second, if there is some “actual damage” that has already been caused or is “likely to be caused” and such damage cannot be determined, then the Court is also empowered to grant a permanent injunction.
    • Third, there may be situations where a grant of compensation would not ensure proper or adequate relief for the plaintiff; in such cases as well, a permanent injunction may be granted.
    • Fourth, if the grant of an injunction is required in order to prevent “multiplicity of judicial proceedings,” a permanent injunction may be granted.

It must, however, be borne in mind that Section 38 of the SRA, 1963, does not provide an exhaustive list as to when an injunction may be granted. Thus, even for those circumstances that are not expressly mentioned under Section 38 of the SRA, 1963, a permanent injunction may be granted by the Court. Thus, it is safe to conclude that the intent of Section 38 is only to “recognise” the Court’s power to grant an injunction in respect of the circumstances mentioned under it and not to “restrict” the Court’s power. This observation was also made by the Bombay High Court in the case of Janglu v. Shahaji (2008).

Permanent injunction in cases of obligations under a contract

Section 38(2) of the SRA, 1963, deals with permanent injunctions in instances of obligations arising under a contract. As already discussed, in cases of a grant of injunction for breaches of obligations arising under a contract, the courts would be guided by the provisions contained in Chapter II of the SRA, 1963. This is simply because the general rule in cases of a contract between the parties is to enable the performance of the contract itself. Injunction, therefore, is only granted in cases where the contract creates a negative obligation, that is, the contract specifies things that may or may not be done. This would be better understood with the help of an illustration. 

For example, one S lets out a part of his land to one Y. Herein, Y, in turn, contracts that he will not dig out the sand or construct a well. In this case, an injunction may be granted to restrain Y from digging out sand or constructing a well, which would go against the terms of the contract. This is because in this case, if the court decides to award any compensation, any such compensation would not be construed to be an adequate remedy. Thus, in this case, in order to give effect to the contract, the court would be more inclined to issue an injunction against Y.

However, it must be borne in mind that there can be no injunction in cases where there is no obligation in the first place. An illustration can be found in the judgement of the Madras High Court in the case of State Bank of India, Main Branch v. J.S. Ramamoorthy (1981). In this case, the plaintiff had sought an injunction against the bank, seeking all possible help in keeping the plaintiff’s industry running. The claim included granting loans as many times as the plaintiff required and getting all possible help from the bank in running the industry. In this case, the Madras High Court, while rejecting the contention, observed that a permanent injunction can only be sought on the basis of an obligation. It was noted that the bank was under no obligation to either lend money as much or as many times as the plaintiff desired or to keep the industry in running condition.

Permanent injunction for the right to or enjoyment of property

Section 38(3) of the SRA, 1963, provides for the power of the Court to grant permanent injunction in cases relating to either the “right to property” or “right to enjoyment of property.” Herein, the expression “property” denotes both “movable” and “immovable” properties. In instances of movable property, the court would grant a permanent injunction only if the property is of such value that damages would not constitute a proper or “adequate” remedy. For example, illustration (y) to Section 54 of the repealed Specific Relief Act, 1877, highlighted a circumstance where an injunction may be sought to protect movable property. As per that illustration, if there is one A who writes letters to one B, and upon both of their deaths, let’s say, C decides to publish them. However, if one D has some property in those letters, then D may seek an injunction against C to prohibit C from publishing those letters. This is because, in this case, damages may not constitute an adequate remedy. Similarly, an injunction may additionally be granted where the plaintiff seeks to protect his right to enjoyment of his property. The following four circumstances are provided under Section 38(3) of the SRA, 1963:

Defendant acts in the capacity of trustee of the property

The expression “trustee” translates to a person who looks after the property of another person for that person’s benefit. Given that the defendant acts in the capacity of a trustee, if he does something or is about to do something to the detriment of the plaintiff’s property, the plaintiff may seek an injunction to safeguard his interests. This may be better understood with the help of an illustration. For example, if Y acts in the capacity of a trustee for one S. Here, if Y decides to sell a part of S’s property, S may seek an injunction to prevent Y from making the sale.

It is not possible to ascertain damage

The objective of an injunction is to safeguard the interests of the plaintiff. In a given scenario, if the court is faced with a situation where it cannot determine what amount of damage is caused or may be caused, it would be more inclined to issue an injunction in respect of the plaintiff’s property.

Compensation would not be an adequate remedy

If the wrong caused or likely to be caused to the plaintiff cannot be made good with compensation, in those cases also, an injunction may be granted. For example, if one person, S, lives alongside the house of one Y, and Y, day in and day out, hammers his wall for 7 hours a day, then merely paying compensation to S would not constitute an adequate remedy. In this case, an adequate remedy in favour of S would be an injunction restraining Y from hammering his wall day in and day out. 

Without an injunction there would be multiple legal actions

The Court may also grant an injunction in those cases where, unless an injunction is issued, the plaintiff would be forced to file multiple legal actions. It is important to understand that the very object of the issuance of a permanent injunction is based on the idea of equity. Meaning thereby, it is to relieve a plaintiff from being forced to resort to legal proceedings again and again in respect of a right that exists in his favour. Therefore, the intent of this provision is to prevent multiple proceedings. 

When permanent injunction can be refused

Section 41 of the SRA, 1963, contemplates ten scenarios in which a permanent injunction would not be granted. However, while there is a list provided under this section, it must be borne in mind that “injunction” per se is a discretionary relief. Thus, courts may refuse to grant a permanent injunction even in those instances that are not expressly provided under Section 41 of the SRA, 1963. The ten grounds mentioned under Section 41 of the SRA, 1963, for refusal of the grant of a permanent injunction are as follows:

  • Section 41(a): To restrain from continuing with a judicial proceeding: In case where a judicial proceeding has already been started and is pending, an injunction seeking to restrain that person from carrying out that judicial proceeding would not be granted. However, if restraint by way of injunction is sought to avoid a ‘multiplicity of proceedings’, in those cases, an injunction may be issued.
  • Section 41(b): To restrain from taking action in a superior court: Essentially, if an injunction is sought that would have the effect of restraining any person from instituting proceedings before a higher court, such an injunction would not be granted. However, a court of superior jurisdiction may issue an injunction restraining a person from prosecuting a proceeding before a subordinate court.

This point may be better understood through the judgement of the Calcutta High Court in Indian Bank v. Euro International (P) Ltd. (1998). In this case, the prayer for injunction was made in order to prevent the defendants from seeking enforcement of claims based on bills of exchange “in any manner whatsoever.” It was observed by the Calcutta High Court that the term “any manner whatsoever” was wide enough to include both the courts of superior jurisdiction and co-ordinate jurisdiction. To that extent, this prayer was held to fall under Section 41(b) of the SRA, 1963, thereby being bad in law.

  • Section 41(c): Prevention to apply to a legislative body: An injunction would not be granted if the effect of the injunction was to prevent a person from “applying to any legislative body.”
  • Section 41(d): Prevention for restraining a person from carrying on a criminal action: An injunction would also not be granted if the effect of that injunction was to prevent any person from taking or carrying on with a criminal action. For example, a person cannot seek an injunction to prevent another person from filing an FIR.
  • Section 41(e): Contracts that cannot be specifically enforced: This clause essentially provides that if there is a contract which cannot be specifically enforced, then for those contracts, an injunction would not be issued to prevent their breach. 
  • Section 41(f): Nuisance as a ground to reject permanent injunction: An injunction would be granted only if the act of the defendant actually amounts to a nuisance. If the defendant’s act cannot clearly be termed as “nuisance”, then an injunction would not be granted. This is because everybody is permitted to use his premises in a way that he wants.
  • Section 41(g): Plaintiff’s acquiescence: If the plaintiff remains a passive spectator when the defendant’s acts infringes on the plaintiff’s rights, in those cases too, an injunction would not be granted. Thus, if the plaintiff silently acquiesces to the defendant’s continuing breach of the plaintiff’s rights, then too, an injunction would not be granted.
  • Section 41(h): Availability of another equally efficacious remedy: In cases where there is another equally adequate remedy available, in those cases too, an injunction would not be granted. However, this is not applicable in cases of a breach of trust.
  • Section 41(i): Conduct of the plaintiff: While granting an injunction, the courts take into account the conduct of the plaintiff. If the plaintiff exhibits such conduct that would deprive him of the remedy, then he would not be granted the relief of an injunction.
  • Section 41(j): Absence of personal interest: A permanent injunction is a preventive relief granted in favour of a plaintiff to safeguard his rights. If there is a case where the plaintiff himself either has no locus standi or interest in the matter at hand, he would not be granted a permanent injunction. The plaintiff must be interested in the matter so as to be granted a permanent injunction, if the court deems fit. 

Permanent injunction is a discretionary relief

An injunction, regardless of whether it is temporary or permanent, is a discretionary relief. This means that it is at the discretion of the Court to either grant or not grant a permanent injunction. While Section 38 of the SRA, 1963, does not expressly use the term “discretion”, yet such understanding can be derived from Section 36 of the SRA, 1963. Accordingly, Section 36 states that the court is empowered to grant preventive relief by way of an injunction upon its “discretion.”

Plaintiff to approach the court with “clean hands”

If the plaintiff approaches the court to seek an injunction, he must come with “clean hands”. It is well established that one cannot use judicial proceedings as a medium to protect the wrongs committed by us. Thus, the person seeking preventive relief by virtue of an injunction must approach the court with clean hands. In the case of Khatri Hotels (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (2011), the Supreme Court, while dismissing the appellants’ appeal, took into consideration that the appellants approached the court with unclean hands. This was because not only did the appellants suppress information from the Supreme Court, but they also raised some illegal construction, regardless of the fact that the Delhi High Court had issued an interim injunction against such construction. In this light, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of the appellants while also observing that the trial court and the High Court were correct in declining a permanent injunction against the appellants, who had approached the court with unclean hands.

Plaintiff must not acquiesce in the defendant’s breach

The term “acquiesce” implies acceptance. This acceptance may be reluctant in nature. However, if the plaintiff essentially acquiesces to the wrongful act of the defendant, he will be refused an injunction. This would be better understood with the help of an illustration. For example, if there is one S (the plaintiff) and one Y (the defendant). In this example, let’s assume that the housing structure of both parties is such that rainwater flows from Y’s land to S’s land. Herein, it is so that the plaintiff, S, does not oppose this despite being troubled by the rainwater flowing from Y’s land to S’s land for 20 years. S would not later be granted an injunction restraining Y from letting rainwater flow from Y’s land to S’s. The reason for this is simple. S, by not seeking any relief and allowing for such an act to continue for a period of 20 years, acquiesced in the act of Y.

Public interest may be a ground to not grant a permanent injunction

Public interest may be a ground to refuse an injunction against the plaintiff. If a larger public interest is involved, the court may be more inclined to award compensation to the plaintiff in place of an injunction. In the case of Executive Engineer, Lower Vana Project, Irrigation Department, Wardha v. Maruti Bapurao Auchat and Others (2012), a similar stance was taken by the Supreme Court. In this case, the plaintiff had successfully established that the government (the defendant) had disproportionately favoured other landowners. The plaintiff established that the construction of the canal was altered and made in such a way that the canal ran through the plaintiff’s land. Herein, while the Supreme Court acknowledged that the government’s actions were illegal, it was observed that if the direction of the canal was now changed, then it would affect 635 farmers. For this reason, instead of a permanent injunction, the plaintiff was awarded compensation of Rs. 7.5 lakh.

Case laws

Jai Dayal v. Krishan Lal Garg (1996)

Facts

In this case, a permanent injunction was sought and issued against the Respondent to prevent the respondent from blocking the passage between his house and that of the appellant. Further, a mandatory injunction was sought and granted to remove the obstruction in the passage. This injunction was issued by the trial court and subsequently upheld by the appellate court. This obstruction was cleared by the Respondent. At the time when the execution was sought by the appellant, it was observed that the Respondent had already cleared the obstruction. Thus, the execution case was dismissed.

However, subsequently, a shop was constructed at that place, which again had the effect of blocking the passage ahead of the appellant’s house. Upon learning this, the appellant again filed an execution application. This time, the executing court granted an injunction against the respondent for failing to disobey the mandatory injunction that was issued against him previously. However, this issuance of a mandatory injunction was through the attachment of the Respondent’s property. Further, the injunction also highlighted that if the Respondent failed to remove such obstruction, he would be detained in prison. This order of the executing court was upheld by the Additional District Judge. Upon a second appeal, however, the Allahabad High Court, while reversing and remitting the decree, observed that such obstruction must be viewed in the light of Section 22 of the Easement Act, 1882. Thus, it was observed by the Allahabad High Court that the courts must find out whether the obstruction was actually causing an enjoyment of easement. This order of the Allahabad High Court was challenged before the Supreme Court.

Held

In this case, the Supreme Court observed that the question of whether Section 22 of the Easements Act, 1882, applies or not must be determined at the time when such a question arises at the first instance. Herein, not only has a permanent and mandatory injunction been issued against the Respondent, but these injunctions have also become “final.” It is not permissible for the Respondents to now make arguments that would have the effect of circumventing the injunction. Further, it was observed that if the Respondent failed to comply, the same would be construed as a “continuing disobedience” thereby making the Respondent liable for penal consequences. 

Padhiyar Prahladji Chenaji v. Maniben Jagmalbhai (2022)

Facts

In this case, an appeal was filed before the Supreme Court, thereby challenging the judgement rendered by the Gujarat High Court. The Gujarat High Court confirmed the judgement of the trial court and the first appellate court that issued an injunction against the defendant, thereby restraining him from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff. In this case, the suit was the first instance filed by the plaintiff for cancellation of the registered sale deed, a declaration that the sale deed did not bind the plaintiff, and a permanent injunction seeking a return of the land that was in the possession of the defendant. On a perusal of the evidence before it, the Trial Court did not cancel the registered sale deed and also denied to grant a declaration as prayed by the plaintiff. The effect of this was that the plaintiff was construed to have no title over the suit property. However, the Trial Court did issue a permanent injunction against the defendant, restraining him from interfering with the possession of 5 acres of land by the plaintiff. The question before the Supreme Court thus was: if a plaintiff loses insofar as the plaintiff’s title over the property is concerned and it is also declared that the defendant is the true owner of the property, can there be a permanent injunction in favour of the plaintiff? 

Held

The Supreme Court observed that the Trial Courts and the High Courts have erred in granting permanent injunctions in favour of the plaintiff. The Supreme Court noted that upon an adjudication of the rights of the parties and a declaration that the defendant was indeed the true owner, there can be no injunction against the defendant, who is the true owner of the property. 

Balkrishna Dattatraya Galande v. Balkrishna Rambharose Gupta (2019)

Facts

In this case, an appeal before the Supreme Court was filed to challenge the judgement of the Bombay High Court. Herein, the Bombay High Court affirmed the judgement of the first appellate court, whereby a permanent injunction was granted in favour of the first respondent. The first respondent (tenant), while asserting that he was a tenant, sought a permanent injunction against the landlord (the appellant), thereby restraining the landlord from disturbing the tenant’s peaceful possession of the property. Upon a perusal of the evidence (both oral and documentary), the trial court dismissed the suit, thereby observing that the first respondent could not show that he was a tenant. The first appellate court, however, observed that the Trial Court had erred in its finding that the first respondent was not a tenant. It was observed that the record did not show that the first respondent had vacated the property after the withdrawal of the suit. The Bombay High Court affirmed the judgement of the first appellate court. The question before the Supreme Court was this: since the first respondent claimed that he was a tenant, however, he could neither establish his actual possession nor prove that he paid rent for more than 15 years, then in these circumstances can he claim and be granted a permanent injunction?

Held

It was observed by the Supreme Court that in any suit filed under Section 38 of the SRA, 1963, a permanent injunction would only be issued to that person who is in “actual possession” of that property. If such a person is unable to show that he was in actual possession of such property on the date of the suit, then there can be no permanent injunction in that case. In this case, the Supreme Court observed that the trial court was correct in its finding that the first respondent could not prove his actual possession of such property as on the date of the suit. In this light, the Supreme Court set aside the judgement of the Bombay High Court.

Conclusion

The grant of a permanent injunction is a mode of securing and safeguarding a plaintiff’s rights. Yet, it is a discretionary remedy. For this reason, while granting or refusing to grant a permanent injunction, the court would take into account a balance of convenience. It will also take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff to see whether the plaintiff actually requires the permanent injunction to safeguard an existing right. In doing so, the courts may also consider whether the plaintiff is essentially seeking to further a wrong that he himself committed under the garb of an injunction. The doctrine of “clean hands” in this regard has been greatly emphasised by the courts. However, there may even be circumstances where the plaintiff successfully establishes an existing right and a breach of that right is caused by the act of the defendant. Yet, in the light of the larger public interest, the courts may be more inclined to remedy the plaintiff through the payment of adequate compensation by the defendant. Thus, while an injunction is a preventive, discretionary remedy, its grant is based on a balance of convenience. 

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

What is meant by the term “preventive relief”?

Section 36 of the SRA, 1963, provides that a court is empowered to grant preventive relief by way of an injunction. An injunction, for this purpose, may either be temporary or permanent. An injunction is construed as a form of “preventive relief” because the basic object of an injunction is to restrain a party from doing something. This restraint could be in order to prevent, let’s say, a party from interfering with the rights of the other party. 

What is meant by the term “mandatory relief”?

Mandatory injunctions are defined under Section 39 of the SRA, 1963. Unlike preventive injunctions, where an injunction is granted to restrain a defendant from doing something, mandatory injunctions may be granted in order to compel the defendant to do something. The aim of mandatory injunctions is to compel the defendant to perform certain acts in order to restore the status quo. For example, if there is a property that belongs to both R and S and the property has not yet been partitioned. In this case, both R and S are co-owners of that property. Herein, let’s assume R does some form of construction on the property, that too without the consent of S and despite various protests by S. The Court may grant a mandatory injunction against R to demolish the construction in order to restore the status quo.

Is there any period of limitation for the execution of a decree that grants permanent injunction?

No, there is no fixed period of limitation within which an application seeking the enforcement or execution of a decree that grants a permanent injunction must be made. The proviso to Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963, provides for the same. 

What is the difference between a permanent injunction and a temporary injunction?

The difference between a permanent and temporary injunction is encapsulated in Section 37 of the SRA, 1963. As the very expression denotes, “temporary” injunctions only last for a specified period of time. For this reason, it is only a temporary or provisional remedy. Further, given they are temporary in nature, such injunctions may be granted at any time, so to say, during any stage of the suit. However, “permanent” injunctions, once granted, permanently restrain the defendant from claiming any right or doing or not doing an act. For this reason, it is granted only in the form of a decree and is based on the merits of the suit. Thus, while temporary injunctions only last until the time that the court specifies, permanent injunctions continue forever.   

Can a permanent injunction be sought on contradictory grounds regarding the plaintiff’s title over a property?

If the plaintiff seeks permanent injunction on the basis of two contradictory grounds concerning his title to property: one, on the basis of a registered sale deed; and second, on the basis of adverse possession, the same would not be allowed. In the case of Kesar Bai v. Genda Lal and Another (2022), the Supreme Court made a similar observation. It was observed that a claim on title based simultaneously on two contradictory grounds, where one is on the basis of a registered sale deed and the other is based on adverse possession, is untenable. Hence, the Supreme Court quashed the judgement of the Madhya Pradesh High Court and the first appellate court, which had issued a permanent injunction on the basis of adverse possession after the claim of “registered sale deed” was dismissed.  

What is an anti-suit injunction?

Any injunction that is issued to prevent a party from carrying on with a case outside the jurisdiction of that particular court may be termed as an anti-suit injunction. Anti-suit injunctions may be issued to prevent a party from initiating cases in another court or a foreign court. In the case of Dinesh Singh Thakur v. Sonal Thakur (2018), the Supreme Court reiterated that Indian courts can issue anti-suit injunctions in such cases and to such a party over whom that court has “personal jurisdiction.”

What is the implication of the use of the term “plaintiff” under Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 as far as the mode of the initiation of the proceeding is concerned?

Since Section 38 of the SRA, 1963, directly uses the expression “plaintiff”, it only means that a permanent injunction can only be granted by virtue of a “plaint” filed in this regard. The reason this question becomes important is because the earlier Section 54 of the repealed Specific Relief Act, 1877, used the expression “applicant.” Thus, the earlier Act provided a scope for there to be a proceeding instituted on the basis of an “application” and not only a “plaint”. However, since the SRA, 1963, directly uses the term “plaintiff’, the proceedings for the grant of a permanent injunction have to be commenced on the basis of a suit filed for that purpose.

References 

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