This article is written by Daksh Ghai, from Symbiosis Law School, Noida. The article provides a brief overview regarding the political, legal, and human rights crisis in Lebanon which includes multiple government collapses, state illegitimacy, and the state’s violation of human rights.
Table of Contents
Introduction
The National Pact of 1943 established a parliamentary republic in Lebanon, with a Maronite Christian President, a Shia Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies (Parliament), and a Sunni Prime Minister sharing power. The law acknowledges 18 different religious groups or confessions. The Syrian civil war has had a particularly negative impact on Lebanon. The flood of Syrian refugees, which has now surpassed one million in a country with a population of 4.4 million, has had a tremendous influence on the country’s socio-economic and religious structure. The Syrian standoff has further exacerbated Lebanon’s already severe domestic political and economic situation.
Political crisis
The confessional system
Lebanon’s population is made up of roughly equal-sized Christian, Sunni Muslim, and Shi’a Muslim communities. Lebanon’s confessional system divides political posts among the country’s religious communities, or “confessions,” in ratios designed to reflect each group’s share of the population—despite the fact that the country hasn’t had a formal census since 1932. A Maronite Christian is elected President, a Sunni Muslim is appointed Prime Minister, and a Shia Muslim is elected Speaker of Parliament. The 128 seats in Lebanon’s Parliament are split evenly between Christians and Muslims, and each seat within an electoral district has traditionally been assigned to a specific religious community under Lebanese electoral law. The 1943 National Pact shaped Lebanon’s confessional system, which was adjusted and formalized by the 1989 Taif Accords, with the goal of encouraging consensus among the country’s sectarian communities, particularly in the aftermath of the country’s civil war. However, many people believe that the need for cooperation between rival political blocs on major issues contributes to political deadlock.
What’s wrong with Lebanon’s politics
Citizens accuse the political elite of abusing state resources for personal gain through patronage and clientelism networks that straddle business and politics. Unlike many Arab countries, Lebanon is ruled by a number of strong leaders and parties who wield power over the country’s numerous sectarian groupings. Quotas are used to distribute positions among the 18 officially recognized religions. Half of the members of Parliament are Christians, and the other half are Muslims. Critics claim that the system has kept the ruling caste in power indefinitely, allowing politicians to prioritize their interests over the needs of the state. The demands of the demonstrators include not only the removal of the elite but also a complete revamping of the system.
Unsatisfactory service
The following comment, from a UN specialist in Beirut, summarises the state of Lebanon’s public services: “We’re dominated by a kleptocratic, corrupt class. Why don’t they just fix the power? They aren’t going to! They give it away for free to their constituents in order to increase their popularity and gain votes. The previous Lebanese governments failed to offer excellent public services to citizens, violating the social contract between the state and the people.”
Inadequate infrastructure
The World Bank report suggested that the country’s infrastructure is in poor condition and requires repair. Lebanese individuals spend an average of 720 hours out of 4,380 days on the road, according to the World Bank’s Urban Development Transport Project. The traffic in Lebanon is mostly caused by the enormous volume of cars surpassing the capacity of the road network. Following the 2006 battle, Qatar and other Gulf states committed financial assistance to the government to help rebuild some of the infrastructures that had been destroyed. The World Bank and other donors have assisted the country in a variety of projects at the national and municipal levels, but more work is needed to establish excellent roads, water networks, drainage, and other infrastructure.
Garbage problem
Lebanon has been ravaged by a waste crisis in recent years. Despite the fact that rubbish collection and disposal are the responsibility of local governments, Sukleen, a private company, was hired to do so. A massive landfill in the heart of Beirut (the Normandy) had overflowed and had to be closed after the civil war. As a result, garbage collection was relocated to the Naameh landfill on the city’s southern outskirts as an emergency and temporary remedy. According to reports, the government was paying Sukleen about $147 per tonne of garbage in 2015, whereas the global average was $75 per tonne and the regional average was $40 per tonne. During this time, the government had not released resources from the “independent municipal fund,” which would have allowed local municipalities to fulfill their commitments of garbage collection and disposal within their jurisdictions.
Decentralizing problems : reliance on municipal-level responses
The responsibility of crisis management was passed to municipalities due to political gridlock at the federal level, where the impact of the influx was immediately obvious. According to a recent Oxfam survey conducted in five districts in north Lebanon, local authorities believe that the Central government is absent, leaving municipalities and local communities to deal with the crisis’ complex issues, such as housing shortages, sewage treatment, healthcare service provision, and security. To deal with the long-running and huge refugee crisis, local governments have limited administrative and governance capabilities. This has resulted in a high level of dissatisfaction among the local community. Municipalities have restricted financial resources as well. The Independent Municipal Fund – a Central, an intergovernmental grant-funding mechanism that transfers resources like taxes and levies from central to local governments – provides them with what they need. The basic demands of the local people and the provision of critical infrastructure frequently deplete municipal resources. 70% of Lebanon’s 1000 municipalities have fewer than 4000 registered residents. An estimated 80% are inefficient in terms of administration and finances. Deddeh, for example, is a town in El-Koura with a population of 3,993 Lebanese and hosts 2,500 refugees. The local municipal council is composed of four full-time employees: the president of the municipality, an assistant, and two security personnel. Local governments’ ability to ameliorate or respond to the crisis’s significant socioeconomic and political repercussions, such as rising unemployment, intensifying social strife, and humanitarian needs, is hampered by a lack of administrative capacity.
Protest movement
A proposed government tax on internet-enabled phone conversations (via services such as WhatsApp) sparked widespread protests in October 2019, leading to Prime Minister Hariri’s resignation and the collapse of the Lebanese government. The protests, which were considered as some of the largest in Lebanon’s history, reflected wider unhappiness with widespread corruption, inefficiency, and economic mismanagement. Activists, who symbolized a broad economic, political, and sectarian cross-section of Lebanese society, said the protests were primarily motivated by the government’s failure to provide adequate access to basic goods and services, such as employment, health care, water, electricity, and garbage collection. The movement called for political leaders to be replaced by technocrats and attacked Lebanon’s political elites, notably Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah. Hassan Diab, who took over as Prime Minister from Hariri in December 2019, established a new government of non-career politicians, however, these ministers were mostly considered as being tied to traditional political parties and lacking in independence. The possibility of forming a ministerial administration that would drastically marginalize Lebanon’s conventional political elite, many of whom have been in power since the conclusion of the country’s civil war, is divisive and appears to be one of the numerous factors delaying the formation of a government. It remains to be seen whether the protest movement can overcome internal splits and grow into a cohesive political force capable of challenging the country’s long-established political elites. Lebanon’s parliamentary elections are set for 2022, but it’s unclear if the protest movement will be able to compete effectively within Lebanon’s patronage-based political system.
2016-2020 : Multiple Governments Collapse
Hariri Government (December 2016-May 2018)
President Aoun named Saad Hariri as Prime Minister after the election. Hariri was elected to his second term as Prime Minister (he previously served from 2009 to 2011 under President Michel Suleiman). During a visit to Saudi Arabia in November 2017, Hariri briefly resigned. Hariri returned to Lebanon a month later and rescinded his resignation. Following the May 2018 parliamentary elections, his government was considered resigned.
Hariri Government (January 2019-October 2019).
Saad Hariri was re-appointed as Prime Minister by President Aoun in May 2018. After more than eight months of political gridlock, Hariri created a new cabinet in late January 2019. The Hariri cabinet had a majority of 30 members on March 8, reflecting the outcome of the 2018 legislative elections, however, Hariri had to resign again in October 2019 after widespread protests.
Diab Government (January 2020-August 2020).
President Aoun appointed Hassan Diab as Prime Minister in January 2020. The Diab cabinet, which consisted of 20 members, was the first since 2005 to be made up of parties from a single political bloc. Following the explosion at Beirut’s port on August 4, Diab resigned.
Adib Government (resigned before formation).
President Aoun named Mustapha Adib, Lebanon’s ambassador to Germany, as Prime Minister-designate on August 28. Adib resigned less than a month later after failing to meet Amal and Hezbollah’s demand that the Finance Ministry, one of Lebanon’s four “sovereign ministries,” be embroiled in Shi’a control.
2021: Status of government formation
Saad Hariri was reappointed as Prime Minister-designate by Aoun in October 2020. Hariri was unable to assemble a new cabinet in April 2021, despite agreeing to a major demand from Hezbollah and Amal that the Finance Ministry be kept under Shia control for one more appointment. Following a feud between Hariri and President Aoun and his son-in-law, MP Gebran Bassil, Najib Mikati was named as Lebanon’s next Prime Minister, barely 11 days after Saad Hariri resigned as Prime Minister-designate, ending nine months of political gridlock. Mikati ran practically unopposed, garnering 72 votes, 42 MPs did not vote at all. For nearly a year, the country has been without a functioning government and is attempting to modernize its economy in order to gain access to international funding.
State’s Illegitimacy
Lebanon has a parliamentary electoral system wherein the state’s powers are divided among the legislature, executive, and judicial branches, according to the Lebanese Constitution. The legislative branch is the Parliament (or House of Deputies), the executive branch is the government, and the judicial branch is made up of courts and judges. Theoretically, citizens elect their legislative members every four years, and the President of the republic is elected every six years. The President appoints the Prime Minister to form a government after consulting with the cabinet. To carry out its executive functions, the cabinet must first get a vote of confidence from the Parliament. The cabinet changes when the Parliament or the presidency changes, or when a member of the cabinet resigns.
Three elements contribute to the weakening of state legitimacy:
- A faulty electoral system and a long term in Parliament.
- The judiciary’s and police’s inadequacies.
- Existence of illegitimate arms and groups within the state.
Electoral Law
Until June 2017, two major electoral laws were in effect: the “1960 law” and the “2000 law,” both of which were engineered by Syrians. The majority system that underpins these rules meant that those with greater power and influence in the country kept their seats in Parliament, reducing the possibility of minorities being represented. According to the ballot, the candidate who receives the most number of votes wins all of the seats in their electoral district. This meant that, in a sectarian atmosphere, larger sects elected minority’ delegates within those districts. The rule also encouraged “slating” of candidates, in which candidates are picked for election lists based on their chances of winning seats and predicted popularity, rather than their political and economic policies. The election legislation, in combination with corrupt electoral practices (such as vote-buying), has often resulted in elected houses without national legitimacy.
The country was left in anarchy after Syrian forces withdrew from Lebanon in 2005. Without international mediation – especially from Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar – the various state actors could not establish a consensus on any state topic, and the country faced extended periods of political vacuum every time a cabinet or President was to be elected. The current President, Michel Aoun, was elected after 30 months and 45 parliamentary sessions.
The Parliament, which was elected in 2009, was still in office after its four-year term ended. The MPs’ terms were extended at the end of their first term in 2013, and again in 2017 when they passed a new electoral law. In practice, this implies that the public has not voted in legislative elections in nine years and that the current house of deputies, at the very least, does not reflect people’s preferences.
The division of seats by geographic regions and religious groupings is another concern in the parliamentary makeup. To heal the scars inflicted by the war, political/wartime leaders decided in 1989 to divide the 128 parliamentary seats in half between Muslims and Christians (and proportionately within each side). Even back then, it was evident that the separation was made to assure equity, not necessarily to reflect the society’s sectarian distribution. Indeed, there is no precise assessment of the composition of society today because the government has not undertaken a population census since 1932. The idea of a census, according to top government officials and party leaders, is a highly sensitive matter that could lead to civil tensions.
Judiciary and police
According to a recent survey conducted by a Lebanese anti-corruption NGO, people from all political parties, age categories, and geographical locations engage in and perceive high levels of corruption. The fact that less than 15 percent of the sample fully trusts the judiciary is the most startling of their results. 65 percent of those who don’t trust it entirely feel it’s because of political involvement and clientelism, while approximately half believe that it’s because of corruption and bribery. The police and the judiciary are among the top receivers of bribes in Lebanon, according to Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer.
Despite the fact that Lebanon has a large number of well-trained lawyers and judges, the judiciary lacks independence from political authority and confessional quotas. There is evidence of a massive backlog of inefficiently processed cases, as well as an unequal treatment before the law, particularly when adversaries have considerable socio-political clout or connections.
Recruiting prosecutors is frequently influenced by political authority and meddling. Furthermore, military courts have unrestricted authority, which is sometimes used for political purposes. The lack of fair trial principles, defendant rights, and political influence hamper these courts. Furthermore, military courts have unrestricted authority, which is sometimes used for political purposes. The lack of fair trial principles, defendant rights, and political influence hamper these courts.
Importantly, the judiciary now lacks the integrity necessary to enforce the law and safeguard the Constitution. Evidence demonstrates that political interference in the operation of the courts not only impedes the judiciary’s ability to hold the government and state officials responsible for their acts but also undermines the rule of law’s the fair and equal application to all individuals. Security and order are maintained at the personal or private level, eroding the state’s legitimacy and coercive authority. In addition to failing to uphold civil and criminal law, the judiciary has also failed to hold the government accountable for illegal acts. This is a direct result of the absence of separation of powers among the several institutions of government, notably between the political and judicial branches. Despite the fact that civil society and the media have reported countless failures and corrupt practices by ministers, MPs, and other officials to the judicial authorities, they have failed to take necessary action. Example include:
- Embezzlement in the telecom industry by a high-level official and by customs officers.
- The fraudulent deals were made during the 2015 garbage crisis.
- Unlawful institutions owned by political leaders, among many others
Furthermore, the police force frequently breaks the law. Lebanon’s civil society has taken to the streets in recent years to oppose the illegitimate government and its corrupt policies. The protests have been met with brutality, unequal force, and heavy armament by the police. Despite evidence of widespread uneven use of force by the police, the authorities have not disciplined the officers in issue, despite the fact that the Constitution protects freedom of expression, movement, association, and peaceful assembly. Furthermore, the army and police in Lebanon are in disarray. They lack political agreement on the scope of their responsibilities, military unity, training, and financing. The Lebanese army receives most of its financing and training from outside sources. The state’s legal and coercive capacity is harmed by a lack of strength, unity, and mandate, as well as significant levels of corruption.
Illegitimate arms
Despite the fact that the Taif Accord called for all armed groups and militias to disarm, this did not happen. The presence of armaments and (heavy) weaponry in the hands of individuals and significant political parties is perhaps the most dangerous to state legitimacy. The remains of the civil war militarisation represent a significant threat to the implementation of law and order in the absence of a strong state. Hezbollah, for example, has created a state inside a state, with a military wing, a political wing, social services for its “constituents,” and near-complete control of the country’s south and some other regions. The party has made peace and war choices without notifying the government, and the group utilized its weapons against fellow Lebanese civilians. Most recently, the armed group has decided to take military action in Syria and become involved in the country’s civil war on its own. This action puts not only Hezbollah’s Lebanese soldiers in jeopardy but also the country’s overall stability.
Some sections of the country still have tribal traditions that function outside of the state’s jurisdiction (most notably in the Bekaa valley in the northeast). They ignore the courts, believing they are above the law, and resort to violence to settle disputes. Some armed and aggressive cells can also be found in Palestinian refugee camps because these camps are not under Lebanese jurisdiction, the Lebanese army does not access them, and their security is entrusted to the camp residents. As a result, a large number of criminals have sought safety within these camps. As a result, transnational armed groups (such as Hezbollah, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and extremist groups like al-Qaeda) are both a cause and a consequence of the state’s weakness and illegitimacy. Without widespread support, such organisations would not have been able to endure and thrive. Due to the country’s sectarian tensions, each party has given non-state actors their full backing.
Pre-crisis legal framework
Lebanon lacks a clear domestic legal framework to guide authorities’ treatment of refugees, and the country makes no legal distinction between refugees and other immigrants. The ‘Law Regulating the Entry, Stay, and Exit from Lebanon‘, which dates from 1962, applies to refugees and all other foreigners in Lebanon.
Syrian nationals’ residency and work status in Lebanon is governed by additional legislation. Lebanon and Syria signed a bilateral agreement for Economic and Social Cooperation and Coordination in 1993. This agreement removed limits on migration and enabled nationals of both countries the right to work, reside, and engage in economic activities. Prior to the crisis, it is unknown how many Syrian labourers lived in Lebanon, with estimates ranging from 300,000 to 600,000. Agriculture, construction, commerce, and handicrafts were the most common jobs among Syrians. While Syrian nationals were legally required to get a work permit, neither Lebanese employers nor the Ministry of Labour (MOL) or the General Security Office (GSO) put the law into operation until 2014. According to official numbers, 650 Syrians were formally registered in 2012–2013, with 200 workers renewing their work licenses.
In terms of labour regulations and social security, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are subject to different frameworks. In 2010, the National Social Security Fund (NSSF), an independent, public social insurance agency, granted Palestinian refugees in Lebanon the ability to benefit from end-of-service benefits. Despite paying the same payments as Lebanese, they still do not have the entitlement to illness, maternity, or family indemnities. This law does not apply to Syrian Palestinian refugees.
Due to the lack of a distinct law or policy on asylum and refugees in Lebanon, refugees in the country lack access to a national legal framework to protect their rights under international law. Nonetheless, the 1962 law makes a few passing references to forcible repatriation of political asylum seekers. A political refugee deported from Lebanon will not be returned to a country where “his or her life or freedom is threatened,” according to Article 31. Moreover, the GSO was given the power to issue a transit pass to those who do not have travel documentation and are refugees, stateless, or nationals of countries with no representation in Lebanon. Furthermore, the Lebanese government recognises that people who have registered with the UNHCR will not be sent back to the countries that they fled.
These rules, however, have minimal impact because the Official of Lebanon has deemed the Syrian refugee issue to be governed by government choices rather than by legislation. This is in direct opposition to the Lebanese Constitution, which upholds the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its commitment to the right to seek and receive asylum. It also contravenes Lebanese legislation as well as a number of international treaties and conventions to which Lebanon is a signatory.
Entry restrictions and legal status
A new administration was created in Lebanon in February 2014, after months of consultation. By April 2014, the country’s refugee population had surpassed one million. This was due in part to the open border arrangement between Syria and Lebanon, which allowed Syrians to freely cross the border and get legal status easily and effectively. Soon, the larger effects of this massive population inflow, combined with an inadequate response directed primarily at the refugees themselves, were apparent:
- Economic stagnation,
- Assistance delivery issues,
- Increasing constraints on public services were all blamed on these developments.
Major moves in response
- In October 2014 the new government made two major reforms. To begin, it chose to collaborate with the UN to construct a Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) as part of the UN’s Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan in order to lessen the impact of the crisis on Lebanon and its people.
- Second, it released a ‘Policy Paper on the Syrian Crisis,’ which attempted to address Lebanon’s displacement crisis. The paper outlines the GOL goals and assumptions regarding the crisis, however, it lacks a clear implementation method and was published late in the refugee response planning process. The GOL declared its intent through the October Policy to:
- Cut down on the number of displaced people in its territory by controlling border access;
- Identify rising security concerns, including bolstering municipal police units to manage the displaced population; and
- Mitigate the crisis’ economic effects by, among other things, strictly enforcing laws governing displaced persons and foreigners to protect Lebanese employment generally.
The General Security Office’s Role
- The General Security Office, which was in charge of all entrance to Lebanon and asylum applications, used its discretionary powers under the October Policy to limit Syrian nationals’ access to specified categories. It also enforced a slew of expensive and time-consuming procedures for controlling the legal status of the individuals in the country. As a result of these policies, the distinctions between people the government considers to be displaced, refugees, and migrants got blurred.
- Regular checkpoints and other security measures targeted specifically at refugees, such as raids on informal settlements, became part of the October Policy’s implementation as the Lebanese security apparatus worked to ensure a minimal spillover of the conflict into Lebanon and cracked down on armed groups. At the end of 2014 and early 2015, arbitrary arrests and detentions of suspected refugees caught in raids grew more common, as did evictions of entire villages justified on safety grounds.
- After February 2015, more difficult procedures for renewing residency documents made this technique increasingly troublesome for refugees. As the number of refugees who were unable to renew their documents grew, so did the number of those who were unable to renew their documents. As a result, they became officially ‘illegal,’ putting them in jeopardy of being arrested.
- The new border controls established seven separate types for Syrian citizens to enter the country. If Syrians seeking refuge in Lebanon fail to meet one of these conditions – which include proving financial stability and plans to return – they are left with only two choices for entering the country. They can enter as a worker with a Lebanese sponsor on the basis of a “previous commitment of responsibility” or under one of the Ministry of Social Affairs’ four humanitarian exceptions, which are based on MOSA’s requirements.
Consequences of the October policy on the refugees
After the October policy Palestine refugees from Syria were accepted under even harsher conditions:
- They could only enter if they had an embassy appointment, were transiting to a third country (with documentation of airline tickets and a visa for the third country), or if they submitted a responsibility pledge.
- They were not eligible for humanitarian exceptions because of the high charges, as well as the risk of arrest and/or deportation by the GSO; few such refugees have sought the GSO to renew their visas.
Alternatives with the Syrian refugees
Syrian refugees who arrived in the country before the policy was implemented in October had two alternatives.
- They could either sign a promise not to work in order to renew their residency based on UNHCR registration, sacrificing much-needed income for themselves and their family in the process; or
- They could renew their residency by getting sponsorship from a Lebanese national (which effectively treats them as migrants).
Both solutions provide only a sliver of legal protection. Registration with the UNHCR does not grant refugees asylum or legal status. Meanwhile, the Syrian sponsorship system “violates the Lebanese code of labour” and leads to refugee abuse under the guise of sponsorship. As of September 2015, an estimated 57% of Syrians and 90% of Palestine Refugees in Syria lacked legitimate residency documents as a result of these efforts. This jeopardizes their refugee protection, putting them at greater risk of exploitation, abuse, and violations, such as gender-based violence.
Human right crisis
The right to life, liberty, and security
Physical safety
Suicide attacks and explosions occurred on a sporadic basis in Lebanon, posing a threat to the right to life, liberty, and personal security. The majority of the attacks took place in eastern Lebanon and Beirut. Following the deterioration of the security situation in these places, checkpoints have increased, posing a threat to Syrian refugees’ freedom of movement, particularly those without legal status. As a result of the widespread fear of arrest and imprisonment at checkpoints, refugees have been unable to access services or seek jobs outside of their immediate region of residence.
According to recent research conducted in February 2015 by International Alert, 74% of the Lebanese population believes Lebanon is less safe today than it was four years ago. Lack of security, terrorist actions, basic living requirements, unemployment, and the threat of civil conflict have all been mentioned as threats to safety and security.
Gender-based violence
In 2014 and 2015, minor improvements have been achieved in terms of gender equality. Law 293, known as the law to protect women and family members from violence, was ratified with amendments that kept the National Coalition for Legislating the Protection of Women from family violence unsatisfied. The problem with the current form of the law is that it still has some gaps on the issue of custody and it failed to criminalize marital rape. The two amendments mentioned above were not enough to guarantee gender equality and evidence of that was presented in the Gender Gap Report 2015 that ranked Lebanon as the 8th worst country of 145 states in terms of gender equality.
Arbitrary detention and guarantees of a fair trial
With the recent security situation in the country, cases of arbitrary detention have reportedly been on the increase in 2015. In many cases, the deprivations of liberty were not based on a legal decision and were a violation of the rights and freedoms that are protected under the UDHR and ICCPR. Many of the deprivations of liberty were not based on a legal decision and were a breach of the UDHR and ICCPR, which safeguard human rights and freedoms.
Trial of Michel Samaha
Michel Samaha, the former Minister of Information, was arrested along with his secretary, chauffeur, and two bodyguards in August 2012 when authorities learned of his plans to carry out bomb strikes around the country. Following incriminating proof of his suspected involvement in the scheme, Samaha was referred to the Military Tribunal. Samaha and two other men were charged with “forming an armed gang aimed at committing crimes against the public and subverting the state’s authority” the following month. Samaha’s trial began in June 2013 and was repeatedly postponed after he was detained without a trial for nearly a year, infringing on the most fundamental aspects of the right to a fair trial as required by international standards and giving the incarceration an arbitrary character. Samaha was sentenced to four and a half years in prison in May 2015, a sentence that was met with strong criticism from political factions, and his opponents viewed it as lenient. The Military Court of Cassation granted the military prosecutor’s request to appeal the decision against Samaha in June 2015. The retrial, originally planned for December 17th, was postponed until January 21st, 2016, and finally, Samaha was sentenced to a term of four and a half years which was later increased to 10 years after a retrial.
The state of the courts and the prison
- According to a recent survey performed by International Alert, more than half of the study’s respondents believe Lebanon’s courts are inaccessible, unfair, ineffectual, and slow. Almost two-thirds of those polled doubted their independence. Members of political parties have a higher good attitude toward the courts, whereas victims of crime have a far more negative attitude toward them. There are also significant regional differences: in the south, the courts are far more popular than in the north. This demonstrates that citizens’ overall perceptions of fairness in court are quite unfavourable, meaning that the likelihood of a fair trial is rather remote. In other words, they are not aware of the concept of a fair trial, and they do not expect it in situations where they may be imprisoned or detained.
- The practices of the Lebanese criminal justice system have not always followed the spirit of international agreements. In international law, for example, prisoners’ rights are primarily safeguarded and specified by Article 10(1). “All persons deprived of their liberty will be treated with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of the human person,”.
- According to information released by the Ministry of Justice, Lebanon’s convicts are housed in 23 different prisons across the country. Problems with jail facilities and management have been reported on a regular basis, but the government has yet to formulate a coherent response strategy to address the issue. For example, jails are still extremely overcrowded, owing to the lengthy pre-trial procedures as well as the institutions’ limited capacity.
Torture
Lebanon currently lacks a method to monitor the implementation of international agreements, such as the UN Convention Against Torture (UNCAT). There is also no legislative or policy framework in place to prevent torture impunity, putting persons in detention centres at increased risk of torture and ill-treatment.
Lebanon undertook various measures to implement several procedures and enact laws for the prevention of torture. Institutional instruments for complaints, as well as detection and investigation of torture abuses, were fostered through such processes. Certain state entities have made commitments to these, such as the Internal Security Forces (ISF), which formed a human rights department, a torture committee, a code of conduct, and a memorandum outlining the responsibilities of ISF units in implementing the UNCAT. Unfortunately, despite their importance, these procedures are nonetheless ineffective in terms of preventing torture. The ISF torture committee fails to implement a victim-friendly complaint process, is unable to respond to widespread torture, and, most crucially, is unable and unwilling to report on the cases it has investigated.
Child rights
In recent decades, Lebanon has made significant progress in improving the protection of children within the country. It ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) without reservations in 1991, as well as the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography in 2004 and the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict in 2002, but did not ratify it.
The Ministry of Education and Higher Education of Lebanon began the Quality Education for Growth National Education Strategy in 2010, which is set to end in 2015. This was established as part of Lebanon’s efforts to reform public and higher education, as well as develop and strengthen vocational and technical education to meet the country’s development and construction needs, as well as revise and develop curricula to reinforce national identity and integration, as well as religious and cultural openness.
During the Global Child Labor Conference in The Hague in 2010, Lebanon established a National Action Plan, pledging to end child labour by 2016. Despite the government’s ongoing efforts to tackle the problem, child labour persists in the form of an increasing number of children living and working on the streets. In Lebanon, street children continue to be one of the most prevalent and visible forms of child labour.
Over 100,000 youngsters are exploited and forced to work in dangerous situations as a result of child labour and illegal trade. According to a study published in February 2015 by the International Labor Organization (ILO), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and Save the Children International (SCI), 1,510 children aged 7 to 14 live or work on Lebanon’s streets for up to 16 hours per day as a result of social exclusion, household vulnerability, and organised crime.
Conclusion
Lebanon has been affected politically, socially, and economically since the Syrian crisis began in March 2011. The consequences of the crisis have continuously deepened in the nearly five years since it began. Today, Lebanon has the world’s greatest per capita refugee population per capita, with one out of every five persons being a refugee, resulting in a 30 percent rise in population. Refugees are spread around the country in over 1,700 locations, with a significant number of those under the age of 18 showing indicators of vulnerability in both refugee and host communities. The Lebanese state’s weakness and capture by self-serving elites are evident; at the moment, the overall estimated cost of the crisis to the Lebanese economy is US$7.5 billion per year, including $1.1 billion in higher expenditure due to increased demand for services.
References
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