This article is written by Janani Parvathy J. It provides a legal analysis of the landmark criminal law case, Pyare Lal Bhargava vs. State of Rajasthan (1963). This article covers the facts, issues, and brief judgement of the case. The article analyses some important themes of the case, including Section 378 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Involuntary confessions.

Introduction 

Pyare Lal Bhargava vs. State of Rajasthan (1963) is a landmark case in criminal law. The case explains the ingredients of a valid confession. Although confessions are not explicitly defined by legal statutes, admissions are covered under Sections 17 to 31 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. A confession is oral or documentary evidence, made formally or informally, which can lead to the conviction of the accused. Confessions are usually admissions of guilt made during criminal proceedings. Section 21 of the Evidence Act (now Section 19 of the Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023) emphasises ‘voluntariness’ as an important ingredient of a valid confession. A major question analysed in this case was whether the appellant’s confession was voluntary. 

Another important aspect of this case is Section 378 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860 (now Section 303 of the Bhartiya Nayay Sanhita, 2023), which pertains to theft and its ingredients. The Apex Court explained the elements of theft under the IPC and analysed whether they were fulfilled in the present case. Therefore, this case holds much importance for explaining theft and confessions under Indian criminal law. While the Appellate Court has touched upon these issues in previous judgements, none have comprehensively analysed Section 378 of the IPC and Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act (now Section 22(1) of the Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 as thoroughly as this one. The court laid down some important principles surrounding theft and confessions and their evidentiary value. Hence, this case is highly significant. 

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Details of the case

  • Name of the case: Pyare Lal Bhargava vs. State of Rajasthan
  • Citation: AIR 1963 SC 1094 
  • Name of the appellants: Pyare Lal Bhargava
  • Name of the respondents: State of Rajasthan
  • Case type: Criminal Appeal
  • Court: The Supreme Court of India
  • Bench: Justices K. Subba Rao, Syed Jaffer Imam, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, and J.R. Mudholkar
  • Date of the judgement: 22.10.1962
  • Acts involved: The Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 

Facts of the case 

The Sessions Judge of Alwar convicted the accused/appellant under Section 379 of the IPC and imposed a fine of Rs. 200. Subsequently, the appellant approached the High Court of Rajasthan, which upheld the decision of the Sessions Judge and convicted the accused. Aggrieved by this, the accused/appellant preferred the present appeal before the Supreme Court. 

The brief facts that were either admitted by the accused/appellant or submitted before the High Court are as follows: The first accused in this case is Ram Kumar. On November 24, 1945, he obtained permission from the government of the former State of Alwar to supply electricity to three districts, namely, Rajgarh, Khertal, and Kherli. For this purpose, Ram Kumar entered into a partnership with four other people, with the agreement that the license would be transferred to a company they were to establish based on this partnership. After the formation of the company, an application was made to the government for the issuance of a license in its favour. The accused, Ram Kumar, was directed to formally transfer his rights and license to the company so formed. Consequently, he filed a declaration on April 8, 1948, regarding the same.

It is at this stage that the second accused and the appellant, Pyare Lal Bhargava, came into the picture. He worked as a Superintendent at the Chief Engineer’s Office, Alwar and was friends with the first accused, Ram Kumar. It was on his instance that Pyare Lal Bhargava obtained the file containing the earlier mentioned application and affidavit (declaration) from the Secretariat. The appellant took this file to his house and gave it to Ram Kumar, who tampered with the documents. The latter substituted the application and affidavit with another application and letter so as to ensure that the license would not be issued to the company.

Thereafter, the accused, Ram Kumar, made a fresh application before the Chief Engineer that the license should not be issued in the company’s name. However, the tapering of documents was soon discovered and both Ram Kumar and Pyare Lal Bahrgava were prosecuted before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. Ram Kumar was convicted for committing an offense under Section 379 and Section 465, read with Section 109 of the IPC, whereas Pyare Lal Bhargava was convicted for committing an offense under Section 465 and Section 379, read with Section 109 of the IPC.

Aggrieved by this Order, both accused filed an appeal before the Sessions Judge, who mostly upheld the Sub-Divisional Magistrate’s decision. While he set aside the conviction under Section 465, the Sessions Judge upheld the conviction and sentence of Ram Kumar under Section 379, read with Section 109 of the IPC, and of Pyare Lal Bhargava under Section 379 of the IPC. Both accused, once again aggrieved by the decision of the Court, filed a revision before the High Court. This time, the High Court set aside the conviction and sentence of Ram Kumar but confirmed the same for Pyare Lal Bhargava. Consequently, the accused no. 2, Pyare Lal Bhargava, approached the Supreme Court.

Issues raised 

The following issues were raised in the present case:

  • Whether the confession was irrelevant under Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872?
  • Whether the High Court erred in relying upon said confession, especially since it was retracted by the appellant/accused and not corroborated?
  • Whether the ingredients of Section 379 of IPC have been fulfilled?

Arguments of the parties

Appellants

The counsel for the appellant raised three main contentions before the Supreme Court:

  • The appellant/accused had made a confession before one S.P. Singhal, the Officiating Chief Secretary to the then-existing Matsya Government. The counsel argued that this confession was not voluntary and therefore dismissible according to the provisions of Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act. Thus, this confession made by the accused/appellant before S.P. Singhal was invalid and should not have been relied upon to pass a judgement.
  • The second contention of the appellant was a continuation of the first. It was submitted that since the said confession made before S.P. Singhal was retracted by the accused/appellant, it could not be used as significant evidence to convict the accused. Reliance on such a confession was especially erroneous since it was not corroborated by any other evidence.
  • Further, the appellant argued that the essentials of Section 378 of the IPC, i.e., theft, were not proved in the present case. Therefore, the counsel for the appellant contended that the offence was not made and could not be proven sufficiently. 

Additionally, the appellant contended that the conversation between the appellant/accused, Pyare Lal Bhargava and the Chief Secretary was not a valid confession in the eyes of the law.

Respondent  

This judgement has not specified the arguments presented by the respondents.

Laws discussed in the case 

Several sections of the Indian Evidence Act and the Indian Penal Code have been discussed in detail in this case and are accordingly discussed below. 

Indian Penal Code, 1860

Section 378 of IPC (Section 303 of BNS,2023)

Section 378 of the IPC defines theft as ‘Whoever, intending to dishonestly take any movable property out of the possession of any person without that person’s consent, moves that property to such taking, is said to commit theft”. This definition is elaborated upon in Sections 378 to 382, which outline the offence of theft in detail.

Section 379 specifies that the punishment for theft can be imprisonment for up to three years and a fine. The key elements of theft include:

  • Dishonest intention to take property: The person must intend to unlawfully take the property, intending to deprive the owner of their rightful possession.
  • Movable property: The property involved must be movable, meaning it can be lifted, broken, uprooted, divided, or moved from one place to another.
  • Possession and consent: The property must be taken out of another person’s possession without their consent.

In the case discussed, Section 378 was thoroughly analysed. The Court confirmed that the essential elements of theft were present. It also clarified that theft does not require permanent dispossession of the property; even temporary movement of the property can constitute theft.

The Court’s ruling in this case, which not only explained the three essential elements of theft as explained above but also laid down that theft does not need a specific time frame and that temporary movement suffices, has made it an important precedent for interpreting Section 378 of the IPC.

Section 464 of IPC (Section 335 of BNS, 2023)

Section 464 of the IPC outlines three types of forged documents:

  • Creating false documents: This occurs when someone makes, signs, or seals a document with the intention of making it appear as if it was created or authorised by someone who did not actually do so.
  • Fraudulent alteration: This involves changing a document or electronic record in a way that makes it look different from how it was originally made, either by altering its content or its signature.
  • Induced signatures: This happens when a person is tricked or coerced into signing, sealing, or altering a document, or affixing their electronic signature, while they are under intoxication or unsoundness, such that they are unable to understand the nature of what they are doing. 

Section 465 of IPC (Section 336(2) of the BNS, 2023)

Section 465 of the IPC specifies the punishment for the offence of forgery. Forgery itself is defined under Section 463, which involves creating false documents or electronic records with fraudulent intent, such as to deceive the public or to sell property or enter into a contract. Section 464 further explains what constitutes a fraudulent document.

According to Section 465, anyone found guilty of forgery can be punished with imprisonment for up to two years, or a fine, or with both. In the current case, the accused was held liable for forging office files.

Section 109 of IPC (Section 49 of BNS, 2023)

Section 109 of the IPC addresses the punishment for abetment of an offence when there are no specific provisions for punishing that abetment elsewhere in the law. According to this section, if someone abets an offence and that offence is committed as a result, the abettor will be punished just like the person who actually committed the offence. It is important to note that Section 109 applies only when no other explicit legal provisions cover the punishment for the abetment. In the present case, the accused was convicted for abetting theft under Section 475, read with Section 109. 

Indian Evidence Act, 1872

Section 24 of IEA (Section 22(1) of BSA, 2023)

Sections 24 to 31 of the Indian Evidence Act address the validity and substantial value of admissions and confessions in judicial proceedings. While confessions by an accused can be highly significant, they may be rendered inadmissible under certain conditions. Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act outlines these conditions.

Section 24 stipulates that a confession is inadmissible if it is made under coercion, threat, or promise. Specifically, if a confession is obtained due to a plausible threat or promise concerning the present or future, it becomes inadmissible. Additionally, Section 24 requires that the threat or inducement must come from a person in authority who is capable of enforcing that threat. It is also crucial that the accused believes that by confessing, he will avoid greater evil or gain some advantage.

The central issue in this case was to analyse the validity of a  confession made by the accused to Shri S.P. Shingal and determine whether it was rendered inadmissible under Section 24. To simplify, a confession would be invalid if the following essential elements were present: 

  • The confession is made because of an inducement, threat, or promise that affects the accused’s current or future situation. This means that the inducement or threat must relate to something immediate or in the future, like a promise of leniency or a threat of punishment. If the promises or threats do not affect the accused’s situation, current or future, then such promises or threats don’t count.
  • Such inducement, threat, or promise must come from someone in a position of power or authority over the accused. This may include police officers, magistrates, or jailers who have authority and influence over the accused making the confession.
  • Such inducement, threat, or promise must be strong enough that the accused believes that making the confession would be helpful in avoiding a worse situation. In other words, the accused must have a reasonable belief that confessing will benefit them or protect them from a greater problem.

Confessions

It is pertinent to note that while Section 24 stipulates the conditions under which a confession would be rendered invalid, the Evidence Act itself does not define the term ‘confession’. However, it defines ‘admission’ in Section 17 (Section 15 of BSA, 2023) as an oral, written, or electronically recorded statement that hints or suggests something important about a fact in a case. This can include any statements made by the people involved in the case or under specified situations described within the Act.

An admission is substantive evidence and one of the best kinds, especially when corroborated through other evidence such as the accused’s conduct. It is clearly different from a confession. The Apex Court has time and again laid down the differences between the two. The primary difference between the two is that an admission is simply an acknowledgement of certain facts or claims. This acknowledgement is regardless of guilt or innocence. On the other hand, a confession means taking responsibility for a crime.

Confessions, though not explicitly defined under any law, are mentioned in Sections 24-30 of the Indian Evidence Act. They can be voluntary, involuntary, formal, informal, judicial, extra-judicial, or retracted confessions. The Pyare Lal Bhargava case specifically dealt with retracted confessions. As the name might suggest, a retracted confession is a confession that was previously made by the accused on his own volition but was later taken back, revoked, or retracted. 

Evidentiary value of confessions 

Confessions are seen as corroborative evidence but are not enough on their own to prosecute and convict someone. They help strengthen other evidence but do not serve as the sole basis for prosecution. In the case of Chikham Koteswara Rao vs. C Subbarao (1970), the Court confirmed that while admissions are prima facie evidence, they are not definitive or conclusive proof. This principle was also detailed in the present case. Similarly, State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Deoman Upadhyay (1960) was one of the first cases to establish that confessions made under duress are not admissible. 

Judgment in Pyare Lal Bhargava vs. State of Rajasthan (1963)

The Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the High Court, convicting accused no. 2 under Section 397 of the IPC and acquitting accused no. 1. The Supreme Court observed that all the essentials of theft under Section 379 were fulfilled in the present case. The court also analysed Section 24 in detail, explaining the meaning of a non-voluntary confession and the circumstances under which it applies in this case. 

Issue-wise judgement and the rationale behind it

Issue 1: Relevance of confession under Section 24 of the Evidence Act

The first issue before the Apex Court was whether the confession made by the accused, Pyare Lal Bhargava, was relevant under Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In order to decide on this issue, the court had to interpret Section 24. The Supreme Court observed that Section 24 has four essential conditions. It was noted that under this section, confessions would be inadmissible if made due to inducement or threat related to the charge the accused is facing. Additionally, Section 24 necessitates that the threat or inducement come from a person of authority and that the court must believe the accused confessed to avoid a greater evil or gain an advantage. 

The Court observed that the stringent rule of proof specified under Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, is relaxed under Section 24 of the Act. Section 3 lays down the circumstances under which a fact is considered ‘proved’. It specifies that a fact is proven when the court, after analysing all the evidence, concludes that the fact existed or that a prudent person would think it existed and act upon it. However, the Court observed that Section 24 uses the phrase ‘appears to the court,’ which relaxes the necessity for a prudent person to believe in the existence of the fact. Therefore, the Court noted that while prima facie evidence of a threat or inducement behind the confession might exist, it need not be strictly proven. The Court also observed that the legislature has intentionally adopted a lighter test of proof for confessions. 

The Court further observed that it was important to ascertain whether the threat or inducement was made by a person of authority. However, it emphasised the ‘reasonable belief’ of the accused that by confessing while being coerced, they would gain an advantage or avoid a greater problem or evil. The Court explained that while dealing with cases under Section 24, it was the duty of the court to step into the shoes of the accused and ascertain whether they ‘reasonably believed’ they would benefit from confessing. 

The Court decoded the facts as follows: The Chief Secretary told the accused-appellant that ‘if the whole truth did not come out, he would hand over the inquiry to the police.’ The appellant claims that this statement coerced him into confessing that he took and gave the file to Mr. Ram Kumar. 

The Court reasoned that the Chief Secretary is indeed an ‘authority’ under Section 24. However, the question to be determined was whether the appellant was genuinely threatened into believing that making a confession was a wise decision based on the statement of the Chief Secretary. The Supreme Court concluded that the statement made by the Chief Secretary did not amount to a threat under Section 24 and therefore refused to reverse the decision of the lower courts on this matter.

Issue 2: When can a confession be relied upon

The second issue raised before the Court was regarding the evidentiary value of a retracted confession in the conviction of the accused. The Court analysed whether a confession could be solely relied upon to convict the accused. The Supreme Court observed and laid down that, as a rule of prudence, a confession, when corroborated with additional evidence of the accused’s guilt, can lead to a conviction. However, the Court also highlighted that the evidentiary value of a confession differs from case to case. The Court further observed that an accused can also be convicted solely based on their confession if the court deems it fit under the given circumstances. 

While acknowledging that a confession could lead to a conviction, the Court also cautioned that it was unsafe to rely on confessions, especially retracted confessions, unless the court believed that the confession was voluntary and supported by additional evidence. 

The Supreme Court noted that the High Court had already analysed this issue satisfactorily. The High Court pointed out that evidence to corroborate the confession existed in the present case. The High Court had observed that the evidence provided by Bishan Swaroop (the clerk through whom the accused obtained the file), the entry in the Dak Book, and Exhibit PA. 4 corroborated the confession of Pyare Lal Bhargava.

Therefore, the Supreme Court dismissed the second argument of the accused-appellant by relying on the High Court’s decision in the present case. 

Issue 3: Section 378 of IPC

The third contention of the accused-appellant was that a case of theft under Section 378 of the IPC was not established in the present case. The Court dissected the ingredients of theft under Section 378 into four parts. 

The Apex Court observed that the first element of Section 378 is that ‘unlawful movement of property’ must occur, causing the legal owner some loss and the unlawful possessor some gain. Additionally, there must be a dishonest intention to gain at the expense of causing the lawful owner some loss. 

The second element is that this ‘dishonest intention’ must be directed towards the movement of movable property. The third requirement under Section 378 is that the said property must be taken out of the possession of its legal owner. Finally, the last element is that the said property must be moved to be taken out of possession. 

The counsel for the accused-appellant argued that, in the present case, the file was not ‘taken out’ because the Superintendent (the appellant) was in possession of the file himself. He further argued that there was no ‘dishonest intention,’ as the appellant only intended to show the files to Ram Kumar and returned them the next day. It was also contended that taking out the file did not result in any wrongful gain or loss to any of the parties, and thus, the ingredients of theft under Section 378 were not established. 

The Court rejected all these contentions and observed that the accused-appellant was not in possession of the files, as they were under the control of the Secretariat of the concerned Department concerned, specifically the Chief Secretary, and the appellant was merely a member working in the same organisation. Therefore, the Court dismissed the arguments that he possessed the files.

The Court further observed and clarified that the movement of property under Section 378 of IPC need not be permanent; even temporary movement of property from the owner’s possession would amount to theft under this section. The Court also rejected the argument that there was no ‘wrongful loss’ in this scenario. It was noted that wrongful loss occurs when a person legally entitled to a property is deprived of it. In this case, the accused-appellant unlawfully deprived the Chief Secretary and the Department of the file for the period it was temporarily out of their possession. Thus, the Court concluded that there was an unlawful loss to the Department. 

Although the court did not rely on precedents, it referred to Illustration (b) and Explanation 1 of Section 378 of the IPC. Section 378 illustrates that the temporary movement of movable property can amount to theft. Illustration (b), for instance, highlights that temporarily taking a dog from its owner’s possession would amount to theft. The Supreme Court relied on this illustration to affirm that temporary movement also constitutes theft. 

Therefore, the Court found that the key elements of theft were satisfied and upheld the lower court’s judgement by convicting the accused-appellant. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. 

Analysis of the case 

Pyare Lal Bhargava vs. State of Rajasthan is an important case that established several principles in criminal law. The accused was found guilty of tampering with office files by removing them without permission from the Chief Secretary and showing them to a friend, the second accused. The accused confessed to the Chief Secretary that he had stolen the file, but later retracted this confession.

The major issues before the court were whether the confession was voluntary, the evidentiary value of confessions, and the proper interpretation of theft. The Court explained the circumstances under which confessions would become involuntary. It opined on the necessity of a threat or inducement directed towards the confessor. The Court further explained that this threat must come from a person of authority and be directed at the confessor. It is also noted, and it is completely agreeable, that the threat or inducement must make the confessor believe that either it is the lesser evil or that he is gaining from it. While several courts had previously explained these elements of Section 24, this case was the first to highlight that the last element was the most important. 

Next, on the question of evidentiary value, the court observed that according to the general rule, a confession cannot be relied upon without any corroboration. The Pyare Lal case was one of the oldest and most significant cases to analyse confessions. The court established that, in some cases, the general or standard rule could be broken. It was observed that Section 24 was enacted with less severity than the standard rule. In some instances, if the courts deem it sufficient, a confession could solely be relied upon for conviction; however, the Court advised against the practice.

In subsequent judgments, the Supreme Court has denied the skeptical solace granted for convictions purely based on confessions. The last major takeaway from this case was that theft under Section 378 of the IPC also includes ‘temporary movement’. For example, if someone moves a book from their friend’s room without her permission and only for a couple of hours, even that act shall amount to theft under Section 378 of the IPC. This case was one of the first to explain the temporary movement of property and stands out by thoroughly explaining the evidentiary value of confessions and the law surrounding them.

Conclusion 

The Pyare Lal Bhargava case crisply analyses several important themes of criminal procedural law, including Section 379 of the IPC and Section 24 of the Evidence Act. This is one of the few judgements where the court relied solely on the interpretation of the statute and the factual circumstances of the case, without referring to other precedents. The case is highly significant for its interpretation of Section 24 of the Evidence Act and Section 378 of the IPC. It established that temporarily stolen property also amounts to theft. It further emphasised that confessions must be voluntary and not influenced by threats from a person of authority. In conclusion, the Pyare Lal Bhargava case is an important precedent in criminal law. 

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

What are the different types of confessions?

Confessions can be judicial, extrajudicial, retracted, or even those made to co-accused individuals. Judicial confessions are made before a Magistrate or in court, whereas extrajudicial confessions are made outside the court in a personal capacity, such as to the police, friends, or family, etc. Retracted confessions are those that the confessor later takes back, as seen in the present case. 

Can a confession be the sole reason for the conviction of the accused?

No, a confession alone cannot be the sole reason for the conviction of the accused. The court dealt with this issue in the present case and held that, in some instances, a confession could solely lead to a conviction. However, in subsequent judgments, this view has been reversed.

What is meant by corroborative evidence?

Corroborative evidence is an important element of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Corroborative evidence refers to the evidence that affirms or supports the already existing evidence. 

References

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