This Article is written by Parmeet Singh from Amity Law School, Delhi on the relevance of Ridge v. Baldwin in India which was the case of the United Kingdom’ and was heard by the House of Lords. The case has been described as the landmark case because the judges hearing the case extended the doctrine of natural justice into the realm of administrative decision making.
Table of Contents
Introduction
In this case, the principle of natural justice has been infringed, however, In the Constitution of India, the expression of Natural Justice is nowhere used. However, the golden thread of natural justice sagaciously passed through the body of the Indian constitution. The preamble of the constitution includes the words, ‘Justice, Social, Economic and Political’ liberty of thought, belief, worship, and equality of status and of opportunity, which not only ensures fairness in social and economical activities of the people but also acts as a shield to individuals liberty against arbitrary action which is the base for principles of Natural Justice”. In this case, Mr Ridge contended that his principle of natural justice has been infringed by the watch committee by dismissing him from the police service without even stating the grounds of his dismissal, and not giving the opportunity of being heard. He further contended that the act done by the watch committee is fully wrongful and voidable.
Background facts
The appellant was a chief constable of the country Borough of Brighton and he has served for 33 years in the Brighton Police Force. On 7th March 1958, the Police authority during the time of Watch Committee decided that the appellant, Mr Ridge should be dismissed, and the appellant then maintained that the resolution was void and of no effect, because he was not given any notice on the grounds on which the committee proposed to act and he was not given an opportunity to be heard in his own defence. On 25th October 1957, the Appellant had been arrested, on a charge of conspiring [make secret plans jointly to commit an unlawful or harmful act] with the senior members of the Police Force and others to obstruct the course of justice, and had been suspended from the Police Force on 26th October. The appellant was acquitted on 28th February, but the other 2 members of the force were convicted. The appellant was further accused of the charge of corruption and was again acquitted on 6th March because no evidence was found against the appellant during the time of trial. Then the Watch Committee met and decided to dismiss the appellant from the Police Force. The power of dismissal is contained in Section 191(4) of the Municipal Corporation Act, 1882.
“The watch committee, or any two justices having jurisdiction in the borough, may at any time suspend, and the watch committee may at any time dismiss, any borough constable whom they think negligent in the discharge of his duty, or otherwise unfit for the same.”
The appellant maintains that the Watch Committee ought to have proceeded in accordance with regulations made under Section 4(1) of the Police Act, 1919, the section authorises the secretary of the state to make regulations as to, inter alia, and the condition of services of members of the police forces in England and Wales. Regulations were duly made by the secretary of the state, but the respondent was denying continuously that this does not apply in this case.
The appellant’s case is that according to the Municipal Corporation Act, 1882 the watch committee was bound to inform the appellant of the grounds on which they proposed to act and give him an opportunity of being heard for his own defence which is said in the principle of natural justice as well. The law of master and servant is not in doubt and the master can terminate the contract at any time with the servant for any reason or for none but it is also contained that if the master does in such a manner and breaches the contract then he must pay the damages to his servant. In this case of master and servant here the question arises whether the facts emerging at the trial prove breach of contract. The present case does not fall under such rule of master and servant because the chief constable here is not a servant of the watch committee.
In the present case, an unbroken line was found of the authority which says that an officer cannot lawfully be dismissed without telling him what is alleged against him and without hearing his defence. It may be convenient at this point of time, even if it is a general rule but the watch committee must hear a constable in his defence before dismissing him because the principle of natural justice also says that the person must be given an opportunity of being heard. The case is so clear that there was nothing that the appellant could have said could have made any difference.
Main Issues
The appellant had served for 33 years in the Brighton Police force. Further, On 7th March 1958, the appellant had been wrongfully dismissed from the police force by the watch committee and he was not given the opportunity of being heard in order to explain himself and defend himself. The appellant further contended that it was an unlawful dismissal and his principle of natural justice has been breached by the watch committee. Such dismissal was ultra vires and unlawful.
Section 4(1) of the Police Act, 1919 authorises the secretary of the state to make regulations. The regulations were duly made by the state but the respondent was denying that it does not apply in this case.
The question which arises here, in this case, is whether the facts emerging at the trial prove breach of contract or not.
Arguments
The arguments were raised by the appellant that in a proceeding under the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882 the watch committee was bound to hear the appellant, as the principle of natural justice, that before reaching to any decision they were bound to let the appellant know about his ground on which they proposed to act and give him a fair opportunity of being heard for his own defence. The appellant contended that Section 4(1) of the Police Act 1919 authorises the secretary of the state to make regulations as to, inter alia, and conditions for all the members of the police forces in England and Wales.
The respondent affirms that there are many cases where a man holds an office at the pleasure but do not have the right of being heard, there was a case, Terrell v. Secretary of state for the colonial and other, 1953 it was held in this case that such an officer has no right of being heard before he is dismissed, and the reason is clear. In Rex v. Mayor of Stratford, 1670 1 Lev 291 (It was held in the case that the person who is having power of dismissal need not have anything against the officer, and the officer is not under any condition to specify the reason of the dismissal). The leading case on this matter is Darlington School Case (1844) 6 Q.B. 682, (The judgement of the case was given by Lord Hatherley, and he held that he completely agreed that where an officer is simply appointed at the pleasure the person having a power of dismissal cannot be bound to disclose the reason of his dismissal)
The appellant affirms that it is convenient at the point to deal with an argument that, even if it is a general rule, the watch committee must hear a constable in his own defence before dismissing the person, this case is clear and nothing has been said by the appellant. It is very doubtful whether that could be accepted as an excuse, but even if it could, the respondents would fail on the facts. But as the two other courses were also open to the watch committee so the case is not so clear. On the facts, the watch committee could reasonably have decided to forfeit the appellant’s pension rights, but the appellant could not hold that the watch committee had acted wrongfully or wholly unreasonably if they had in the exercise of their discretion decided to take a more lenient course.
Further, the appellant argued that he does not hold that compliance with all the rules is by implication a condition precedent to the power to dismiss under Section 191(4). But if one of the regulations itself imposes that it is another matter. The appellant argued that Article 5 of European Convention on Human Rights provides that the case shall be heard by a tribunal appointed by the Police Authority and Article 11(1) of European Convention on Human Rights provides that the decision of the police authority shall be either to dismiss the case or to impose various punishments which include dismissal as well. The power of dismissal under Section 191(4) is not distinctive from the power of dismissal which is given under Article 11(1), and Article 11(1) is to make the power of dismissal conditional upon the receipt of the report and as there is no report at all and no enquiry to make such report. According to the study, the statutory authority to dismiss was never created so that the act of dismissal was a nullity. The Lordship should allow the appeal and declare such dismissal to be void.
Judgement
In the judgement, Lord Reid held that in the view after he takes this case there is not much to say and he said that he can usefully say about the principle of natural justice and their application to the procedure under Section 191(4) of the Municipal Corporation Act, 1882. Whether they are to be applied to any statutory procedure depends upon an implication to be drawn from the statute itself or not, and the question whether such an implication should be drawn in this case cannot be answered without consideration of the Police Act 1919, and the regulations which have been made by the State under Section 191(4) cannot be divorced. Since the regulations themselves prescribe the rules of justice that are to be followed, and the judge contended that it seems that there is nothing to be gained by seeking to ascertain what the position would be if the Discipline Code did not apply.
Further, It was held that there are three points, on which Lord Reid desires to comment upon. Firstly, he expresses no dissent from the view that if Section 191(4) stood alone the decision to be made under it is not purely administrative.
Secondly, he does most emphatically dissent from the view that natural justice did not require the watch committee to hear the appellant because he had an opportunity of putting his case before the trial judge. The appellant has not been compelled to put any case at all before the trial judge; he was there to answer an indictment on trial by jury. It would be quite wrong if an accused was to be embarrassed in the conduct of his defence on a criminal charge by the reflection that if he did not also satisfy the trial judge about the propriety of his actions in other respects, it might thereafter be the worse for him.
Thirdly, if there was apart from the regulations a miscarriage of justice, in this case, he agreed with the opinion of his noble and learned friend, Lord Evershed, for the reasons which he has given that the miscarriage rendered the committee’s decision voidable and not null and void ab initio.
Relevance in India
The case of Ridge v. Baldwin has enormous relevance in India. India obeys the judgement which is given by the House of Lords, in the particular case. India has cited the judgement of this case in various cases. The Supreme Court of India had cited this judgement while dealing with the case of State Bank of Patiala & Ors vs S.K.Sharma, 1996, in which it was said that there was a considerable argument in Ridge v. Baldwin that whether the decision of watch committee’s was void or merely voidable and the Supreme Court also stated that a decision given without regard to the principles of natural justice is void and that has been decided in this cited case.
Lord Reid held that the duty to act judicially must arise from the very nature of the function intended to be performed, and it need not be shown to be superadded. Justice Krishna Iyer quoted Prof. Clark in his article “Natural Justice: Substance and Shadow”, and he is of the view that the observation of Lord Reid has restored light to an area “Benighted by the narrow conceptualism of the previous decade”.
This development of law is traceable in India also where the Supreme Court was of the view even before the Ridge v. Baldwin that if there is a power to decide and determine the prejudice of a person, the duty to act judicially is implicit in the exercise of such power.
The decision of Ridge v. Baldwin is cited in several cases, almost before every High Court of India. The Gujarat High Court had also cited this landmark judgement in the case, East India Co. vs Official Liquidator And Anr, 1969 and say that the decision given in breach of audi alteram partem would not be considered as a nullity, but it would be considered as voidable at the discretion of the court only.
Conclusion
The appellant, in this case, was the chief constable of Brighton, England and he had been dismissed from the Police Force by the watch committee in the exercise of its power which is conferred to them under Section 191(4) of the Municipal Corporation Act, 1882. The appellant was not given the opportunity of being heard, for his own defence, before dismissing him from the service, and he contended that according to the principle of natural justice, the opportunity of being heard is given to every individual and the act done by the watch committee is fully wrongful.
The appellant states that the watch committee ought to have proceeded in accordance with regulations made under Section 4(1) of the Police Act, 1919, which authorises the secretary of the state to make regulation and the regulations were duly made, but the respondent maintains that they do not apply in this case. Lord Reid and Lord Hodson considered the matter that the decision taken by the watch committee which terminated the services of the constable as void because the rule of fair hearing had been violated.
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