This article is written by Almana Singh. It deals with a thorough analysis of the judgement given in the case of Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar with reference to its facts, issues raised, arguments made, as well as the concerned legal provisions of the Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952, and the Constitution of India. 

Introduction

The article deals with the issues raised, arguments advanced and judgement pronounced in the case of Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar & others (1958). In this case, concerns were raised regarding the constitutionality of the Commission of Inquiry Act, of 1952 (herein referred to as “Act”). It was argued that this Act grants the government extensive powers to investigate the affairs of private individuals and companies under the guise of addressing matters of “public importance”, potentially infringing upon Article 14 of the Constitution. Despite these contentions, the court upheld the validity of both the Act and the notification dated 11th December 1956 in question. 

Details of the case

1. Case name- Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar & Ors.
2. Petitioner- Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia 
3. Respondent- Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar 
4. Court- Supreme Court of India
5. Type of case- Civil Appeal Nos. 455 to 457 and 656 to 658 of 1957
6. Date of Judgement- 28.03.1958
7. Bench- The then Chief Justice of India Sudhi Ranjan Das, Justice A.K. Sarkar, Justice B.P. Sinha, Justice S.K. Das, and Justice T.L. Venkatarama Aiyyar 
8. Equivalent citations- [AIR 1958 SC 538], [1959(61)BOMLR 192], [1958 INSC 29], [(1959)IMLJ67], [(1959)1SC R279]

Facts of Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia vs. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar & Others, 1958 

Six appeals were made against a common judgement pronounced by the Bombay High Court. Three miscellaneous applications were filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, namely:

• No. 48 of 1957, filed by Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia;
• No. 49 of 1957, filed by Shri Shriyans Prasad Jain and Shri Sital Prasad Jain; and
• No. 50 of 1957, filed by Shri Jai Dayal Dalmia and Shri Shanti Prasad Jain.

Under these miscellaneous applications, the plaintiffs prayed for quashing of notification number S.R.O. 2993 dated December 11, 1956, issued by the central government in exercising powers conferred on it by Section 3 of the Commissions of Enquiry Act of 1952. The High Court held the notification legal and constitutionally valid except the last part of clause (10) of the said notification. 

Notification in question

The powers conferred to the Central Government under Section 3 of the Act, an inquiry commission was formed, the notification of which was published in the Gazette of India on 11th December 1956. A brief explanation of the notification is given below for thorough perusal:

1. Several companies and firms were established or influenced by individuals such as Ramkrishna Dalmia, Jaidayal Dalmia, Shanti Prasad Jain, Sriyans Prasad, and Shital Prasad Jain, along with their relatives or employees closely associated with them. These companies attracted substantial investments from the public. However, investigations revealed significant irregularities in their management, including financial manipulation. It became evident that a considerable portion of the funds raised by the public were diverted for personal gain rather than the benefit of the companies. Consequently, the investing public suffered substantial financial losses as a result of these actions. 
2. The central government was of the opinion that there should be a full inquiry into these matters which are of public importance. Therefore, a Commission of Inquiry (herein referred to as “Commission”) was constituted consisting of the following persons, namely:

1. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar, Judge of the High Court at Bombay, Chairman;
2. Shri N.R. Modi of Messers A.F. Ferguson & Co., Chartered Accountants, Member; and
3. Shri S.C. Chaudhuri, Commissioner of Income-tax, Member.
4. 11 points were given under this notification on which the Commission was supposed to inquire and report. Out of these 11, clause (10) was the most controversial one which attracted the Bombay High Court’s attention. Clause 10 before the High Court’s judgement was pronounced as: 

“(10) Any irregularities, frauds, or breaches of trust or action in disregard of honest commercial practices or contravention of any law (except contraventions in respect of which criminal proceedings are pending in a Court of Law) in respect of the companies and firms whose affairs are investigated by the Commission which may come to the knowledge of the Commission and the action which in the opinion of the Commission should be taken as and by way of securing redress or punishment or to act as a preventive in future cases.”

Bombay High Court held the notification valid except for the last part of clause (10) from “and the action” to the words “in future cases” and directed the Commission not to proceed with the inquiry to the extent that it related to the aforesaid last part of clause (10).

4. A schedule was attached along with the notification which had the names of 9 companies and firms that were under scrutiny. A few of the companies were Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd., Dalmia Jain Aviation Ltd., Sir Shapurji Broacha Mills Ltd., Allen Berry and Co. Ltd., and so on. 
5. The initial notification did not specify any time for the completion of the inquiry by the Commission. However, on 9 January 1957, the Central Government issued another notification providing that all provisions of Section 5 of the Commission of Inquiry Act, of 1952 conferring a plethora of powers to the Commission shall be applicable. Subsequently, on 11 February 1957, a third notification was issued specifying two years from the date as the timeframe within which the Commission was to submit its report.

Laws involved in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia vs. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar & Others, 1958

The Commission of Inquiry Act, of 1952 received the assent of the President on August 14, 1952, and was after that brought into force by a notification issued by the central government. The Act provides for the appointment of a commission of inquiry and for vesting such commission with certain powers. Relevant provisions of the aforementioned Act have been briefed below:

Section 3

3(1) An appropriate government having the authority and if it deems it necessary can appoint a commission for inquiry and it must do so after a resolution is passed in either Lok Sabha or Rajya Sabha. The Commission is tasked with investigating specific matters of public importance within a defined time frame. However, there are certain conditions if multiple commissions are appointed for the same matter, If the central government appoints a commission, no state government can appoint a commission on the same matter and if the state government appoints a commission, no central government can appoint a commission on the same matter unless it believes that the investigation should extend to multiple states. 

3(2) The Commission may consist of one or more members appointed by the appropriate Government, and where the Commission consists of more than one member, one of them may be appointed as the Chairman. 

3(3) The appropriate government at any given time may fill the vacancy which may have arisen in the Commission. 

3(4) The relevant government is required to present the report of the Commission detailing the actions taken in response to the inquiry, to either of the houses, within 6 months of submission of the inquiry by the Commission to the appropriate government. 

Section 4 

Section 4 vests in the Commission the powers of a civil court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of the several matters specified therein, namely, summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath, requiring discovery and production of any document, receiving evidence on affidavits, requisitioning any public record or copy thereof from any court or officer, issuing commissions for examination of witnesses or documents and any other matter which may be prescribed.

Section 5 

Section 5 provides additional power to the Commission:

1. If the appropriate Government believes that certain provisions should apply to a Commission due to the nature of the inquiry or other circumstances, it can issue a notification to that effect. The specified provisions will then apply to the Commission as prescribed under the notification issued. 
2. The Commission can require any person to provide information relevant to the inquiry. The person is legally bound to provide the information. 
3. The Commission or an authorised officer can enter buildings to find and seize documents and take extracts related to the inquiry, subject to the provisions of section 102 and section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.
4. The Commission is considered a civil court, If someone commits specific offences in the presence of the Commission, it may after recording the facts constituting the offence and the statement of the accused as provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, forward the case to a magistrate having jurisdiction to try the same and the magistrate to whom any such case is forwarded shall proceed to hear the complaint.
5. Any proceeding before the Commission shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code.

Section 6 

Section 6 provides that no statement made by a person in the course of giving evidence before the commission shall subject him to, or be used against him in, any civil or criminal proceeding except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such statement provided that the statement is made in reply to a question which he is required by the Commission to answer or is relevant to the subject matter of the inquiry.

Section 7 

The appropriate government may under this section issue a notification declaring that the Commission shall cease to exist from such date as may be specified in the notification. 

Section 8 

No legal action can be taken against the government, the commission, its members, or anyone acting under their directions for any action taken in good faith under this Act or any related rules or orders. 

Article 14 of the Constitution of India 

Article 14 pertains, to equality before the law;

The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.

Article 246 of the Constitution of India 

Article 246 of the Constitution of India states, 

1. Parliament has the exclusive authority to legislate on matters listed in the Union list regardless of any conflicting provisions in clauses (2) and (3) of this Article.
2. While Parliament retains the exclusive authority over the union list, it also shares legislative powers with the State Legislature for matters listed in the concurrent list. However, Parliament’s authority takes precedence over that of the state in case of conflict.
3. The State Legislature possesses exclusive authority to legislate on matters listed in the State list, provided there is no conflict with the legislative authority of parliament or any concurrent legislative powers 
4. Parliament has the power to make laws concerning any matter for any part of the territory of India not included in a State notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in the State List.

Issues raised 

The court discussed a few major and minor contentions. Major contention dealt with the constitutionality of the Act. 

1. Whether the notification exceeds the scope of the Act or not?
2. Whether the Act itself is ultra vires to the Constitution?
3. Whether the notification issued by the Government for the appointment of a commission exceeds the bounds of delegated authority or not?
4. Whether the Act and/or the notification is violative of Article 14 or not?
5. Whether the petitioner’s company is arbitrarily singled out by the Government or not?

Arguments of the parties

Petitioners

1. The petitioners contended that the notification passed by the central government had gone beyond the scope of the Commission of Inquiry Act, of 1952.
2. The petitioners contended that the Act itself is ultra vires in two ways. Firstly, that it was beyond the competence of the Parliament to enact a law conferring such wide sweeping powers, and secondly, that the inquiry is a clear usurpation of the functions of the judiciary.
3. The government did not properly implement the policies and guidelines it was granted by the Act and has overstepped. 
4. The government has discriminated against and isolated the petitioners and notification was made with mala fide intention specifically to single out the petitioner.
5. The notification and the Act are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 

Respondents

The notification does not go beyond the powers outlined under Section 3 of the Act. The Act is not violative of Article 14 as it is enacted within the scope of Article 246. There have been no inquiries taken by either parliament or government, hence there is no usurpation of judicial functions.

Judgement in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia vs. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar & Others, 1958 

Issue-wise judgement is given below for a thorough perusal:

Whether the notification has gone beyond the Act 

Petitioners avered that Section 3 empowers the appropriate government in certain eventualities to appoint a commission to inquire into matters of public importance and for no other purpose. The contention is that the conduct of an individual person or a company cannot possibly be a matter of public importance. This contention was rejected and the court observed that the failure of big banks resulting in the loss of life saving of the general public is certainly a matter of public importance and the conduct of the persons in charge and the management of such a bank which brought about its collapse is equally a matter of public importance. Quite conceivably the conduct of an individual person or company or a group of individual persons or companies may assume such a dangerous proportion and may so prejudicially affect or threaten to affect the public well-being as to make such conduct a definite matter of public importance urgently calling for a full inquiry. The court held that notification was well within the powers conferred on the appropriate government by Section 3. 

Whether the Act is ultra vires the Constitution

It was contended that the Act had provided the government the powers beyond the scope outlined in the Constitution of India. The validity of the Act was questioned in two ways.

Firstly, It was beyond the legislative competence of Parliament to enact a law conferring such a wide sweep of powers. The petitioner’s counsel contends that if the notification aligns with the provisions of the Act, then the Act itself breaches constitutional boundaries. Parliament enacted the Act under its legislative authority as per Article 246, read with entries 94 in List I and entry 45 in List III of the seventh schedule. These entries pertain to “inquires”, allowing parliament to legislate on matters within its jurisdiction. However, the counsel argues that Parliament’s power should be limited to conducting inquiries and not extend to conferring additional functions. While acknowledging the broad interpretation of the Constitution, petitioners stress that laws concerning inquiries should serve the purpose of aiding future legislation within the relevant lists. The counsel asserts that inquiries should facilitate the gathering of information to formulate new laws for public benefit or to prevent harm. Administrative inquiries or those aimed at punishing individuals should not fall within the scope of these entities, as that would amount to overstepping the domain. The court rejected this argument and observed, that the words “for the purpose of” indicate that the scope of the inquiry is not necessarily limited to the particular or specific matters in any of the entries in the list concerned but may extend to inquiries into collateral matters that may be necessary for the purpose, legislative or otherwise, of those particular matters. 

Secondly, the petitioners contended that the inquiry was neither for any legislative nor for any administrative purpose but was a clear usurpation of the functions of the judiciary. It was contended that Parliament cannot undertake to inquire or investigate into alleged individual wrongs or private disputes because such inquiry or investigation is clearly not in aid of legislation. It was argued that if a criminal prosecution is to be launched, the preliminary investigation must be held in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure(CrPC) and it should not be open to any legislature to start an investigation on its own and thereby deprive the citizen of the normal protection afforded to him by the provisions of the CrPC. This argument found favour in the High Court and the portion of clause (10) of the notification which was ultra vires was removed. The Apex Court agreed with the conclusion of the High Court however, the line of reasoning on which the conclusion was based was rejected. The court observed that neither the Parliament nor the government has undertaken any inquiry at all. Parliament has made a law concerning inquiry and has left it to the appropriate government to set up a Commission of Inquiry under certain circumstances referred to in section 3 of the Act. The Central Government, in its turn, has, in exercise of the powers conferred on it by the Act, set up this Commission. It is, therefore, not correct to say that Parliament or the Government itself has undertaken to hold any inquiry. Subsequently, the contention that the powers given to the commission hinder the powers enshrined in the judiciary was categorically rejected. The concerned commission is merely constituted to investigate and record its findings and recommendations without having any power to enforce them, the inquiry or report cannot be looked upon as a judicial inquiry in the sense of its being an exercise of the judicial function and consequently, the question of usurpation by Parliament or the Government of the powers of the judicial organs of the Union of India cannot arise on the facts of this case.

Whether the Act and/or the notification is violative of Article 14

Article 14 says the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. The court referred to the judgement in the case Budhan Choudhry v. The State of Bihar (1954) to explain the true meaning of Article 14. The court observed that while Article 14 does not allow unfair treatment based on certain factors like race or religion, it does permit reasonable distinctions for the purpose of legislation. To be considered reasonable, these distinctions must meet two conditions:

1. that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia that distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together, from others left out of the group, and
2. that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question.

The court in the Budhan Choudhry case observed that what is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the act under consideration. 

The court at hand stated 5 categories under which a law whose validity is questioned under Article 14 would fall. The 5 categories have been briefed below for a thorough perusal:

1. A law can specify who it applies to and why certain people or things are included while others are not. This classification can either be stated directly in the law or inferred from the context surrounding it. When deciding if such a law is valid, the court looks at whether this classification is reasonable and relevant to the law’s purpose. It does not matter if the law targets specific individuals or a group; what matters is if the classifications meet these criteria. If it does, the court shall consider the law valid. The court then cited the case of Chiranjit Chowdhri v. The Union of India  (1950), in which it upheld the Sholapur and Weaving Company (emergency provisions) Act, ruling that it did not violate the constitutional rights and merely managed the shareholders powers. 
2. Sometimes, a law may target one person or thing or several individuals or things without any clear or reasonable basis for the classification evident in the law itself or from surrounding circumstances. In such cases, if the court cannot find a reasonable justification for the classification, it will declare the law discriminatory. Court referred to the case of Ameerunnissa Begum and Ors. vs. Mahboob Begum and Ors (1952), which concerns the constitutional validity of Waliuddowla Succession Act, 1950 which the Supreme Court found unconstitutional due to its discriminatory nature and misuse of authority. 
3. Sometimes, a law might not specify who it applies to, leaving it up to the government to decide. In such cases, the court won’t automatically strike down the law just because it includes a classification or gives the government discretion. Instead, the court will examine whether the law establishes any principles or guidelines for the government to follow when making decisions. If the court finds that the law doesn’t provide any such principles and gives the government arbitrary power to discriminate, it declares the law invalid. The court referred to the case of State of West Bengal v.Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952), in which the Supreme Court invalidated the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950, on the grounds of unconstitutionality and the court held that the provisions under this act granted the State Government unchecked authority to categorise cases without clear guidelines. 
4. Sometimes, a statute may not make a classification of the persons or things for the purpose of applying its provisions and may leave it to the government to classify the persons or things. However, it may at the same time lay down a policy or principle for the government for classification, and the court will uphold the law as constitutional.
5. Sometimes, a law may not specify who it applies to, leaving it to the government’s discretion to decide based on principles or policies outlined in the law itself. If the government doesn’t follow these policies when making its decisions, the court will hold the government’s actions invalid and not the law itself as it did in the case of  Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra (1952).

Now, the question arises under what category does the impugned Act or the notification fall?

The Act’s purpose, as evident from its title, is to establish Commissions of Inquiry and grant them specific powers. Section 3 of the Act empowers the appropriate Government to appoint a commission of Inquiry under certain circumstances to investigate a specific matter of public importance. It’s emphasised that this inquiry should be ancillary to the main purpose and cannot be independent. The scope of this power is limited to inquiries into matters of public importance, indicating a clear classification. It was argued that the Act falls within the ambit of above-mentioned 4th category, if not 1st, and does not delegate arbitrary power to the government making it constitutionally valid based on existing legal precedents. 

Whether the notification issued by the Government for the appointment of a commission exceeds the bounds of delegated authority

The petitioners contended that even if the Act might be considered valid, the government has not properly exercised its discretion based on a reasonable classification meaning the Act has set out clear guidelines, and the government has not followed them appropriately when exercising its authority. This contention stems from the sequence of events following the appointment of Shri Tricumdas Dwarkadas and Shri Thiruvenkatachari to assess the Indian Companies Act. Despite subsequent inquiries and reposts, including those by the Bhaba Committee, which contributed to the overhaul of the Companies Act, petitioners question the necessity for further inquiry. They argue that since no significant developments have occurred since the Committee’s report, there is no apparent need for additional investigation. The court disagreed with the contention on two bases, First, the Bhaba Committee on page 29 of its report recommended that further inquiries may, in the future, have to be made regarding some matters relating to companies, and therefore the possibility of fresh inquiry cannot be ruled out. Second, the appropriate government is empowered to appoint a commission of inquiry if, in its opinion, it deems it necessary. 

Whether the petitioner’s companies have been arbitrarily singled out for inquiry

The petitioners argue that they and their companies have been unfairly targeted for discriminatory treatment and subjected to a burdensome inquiry. According to the petitioners, discrimination began at the outset when the government decided to issue the notification. They point to a memorandum filed by the Bombay Shareholder’s Association before the Bhaba Committee, which raised similar allegations against other businessmen and companies. Despite these similarities in allegations, the Government selectively applied the Act to the petitioners and their companies issuing the notification against them while excluding others. While the notification primarily affects the petitioner and their companies, the petitioner argues that parliament entrusted selective application of the Act to the discretion of the appropriate government. Therefore, the Government’s decisions must be based on available evidence and formed opinions, but the petitioners contend that their treatment was arbitrary and unfair. However, the court observed the appropriate government is not expected to conduct a judicial inquiry into the truth of the materials presented before it. Instead, it must rely on the available information and exercise its discretion in good faith. While wide discretionary powers may raise concerns of misuse, they can be addressed in court if the law is administered unfairly or for unworthy purposes. In this case, the central government appointed investigators and had access to various reports and memoranda before concluding that inquiry into the petitioner’s conduct was necessary due to its perceived public importance. The court indicated that there’s no requirement for legal proof of allegation, the key question is whether the allegations, if believed in good faith, constitute a matter of public importance and the court concluded that in this case, indeed they do.  Moreover, the court observed that it is for the petitioners to allege and prove beyond doubt that other persons or companies have been left out and the petitioners and their companies have been singled out for discriminatory and hostile treatment. The petitioners, however, in the court’s opinion failed to discharge the onus. 

Eventually, the court held both the notification and the Act valid. However,  the court stated that the words “by way of redress or punishment” occurring in the latter portion of clause (10) would be deleted and will read as: “and the action which in the opinion of the Commission should be taken….. to act as a preventive in future cases”. 

Rationale behind the judgement

In this case, the court’s rationale behind the judgement can be understood through several key aspects, including the doctrine of severability and the analysis of the alleged violation of Article 14.

Firstly, the court addressed the doctrine of severability in Paragraph 12 of the judgement, particularly concerning the deletion of certain words from clause (10) of the notification. The court agreed with the high court’s reasoning that the efficacy of notification remained intact despite the removal of words. It concluded that the deleted words did not impact the functionality of the notification. Furthermore, the court extensively deliberated on the alleged violation of Article 14 through a thorough examination of relevant cases, laws, and legal principles, the court concluded that the Act including the provision of appointment of Commision of Inquiry did not infringe upon the fundamental rights enshrined in Article 13. The court emphasised that the government’s decision to establish a commission was justified and conducted in accordance with established guidelines and legal principles. This reflected a balanced approach towards legal interpretations, ensuring the preservation of legislative intent and upholding constitutional principles of equality and due process.

Precedents referred

Budhan Choudhry v. The State of Bihar (1954) was an appeal from a judgement of the High Court at Patna which raised a question of law regarding the Constitution. The appeal arose out of a criminal trial held in Bihar. The case against the appellants was investigated by the local police and they were then tried under Section 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which permitted the appellants to be tried by a Section 30 Magistrate and not by a Court of Session, and convicted on charges under the Indian Penal Code. The appellants appealed to the High Court at Patna on the basis of violation of the Constitution. The appeal was dismissed on the grounds that Section 30 did not violate Article 14 of the Constitution (non-discrimination). The High Court upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence. The Court granted leave to appeal to the Indian Supreme Court. In the case at hand, the court referred to the judgement to understand the true meaning of Article 14 in Para 13.

The court then examined the alleged violation of Article 14 and delineated 5 categories to assess whether a law could potentially violate this constitutional provision. The court cited several case laws for each of the categories which have been briefed below:

1. Under the first category, a statute may explicitly specify the individuals or things to which its provisions apply and the rationale behind it and it will be held valid. For this, the court referred to the judgement of Chiranjit Chowdhri v. The Union of India  (1950). In the case of Chiranjit lal Chaudhari, a shareholder of the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company Limited, filed a petition. The company, governed by the Indian Companies Act, faced closure in August 1949 due to reasons cited as mismanagement and the necessity to produce essential commodities. Subsequently, the government enacted the Sholapur and Weaving Company (emergency provisions) Act, granting it extensive powers to regulate the company’s affairs. This included appointing new directions, curtailing shareholders voting rights, and modifying provisions of the Indian Companies Act applicable to the company. Chaudhari contested the constitutionality of both the ordinances and the act alleging Articles 14, 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Indian Constitution. The Supreme Court ruled in favour of upholding the act and concluded that it did not infringe upon the petitioner’s fundamental rights. The line of reasoning given was the act did not entail the acquisition of the company’s property nor did it deprive the petitioner of the enjoyment of his basic rights. While the act curtailed the voting rights it did not impede their ability to hold shares and derive income and the appeal was dismissed. 
2. Under the Second category, a statute may target specific individuals or thighs without a discernible rationale for the classification. If the law lacks a reasonable basis for differentiation and seems to unjustly discriminate, the court may find it unconstitutional. The court cited the case of Ameerunnissa Begum and Ors. vs. Mahboob Begum and Ors (1952), which concerns the constitutional validity of the Waliuddowla Succession Act, 1950. This legislation was enacted to regulate the succession of the personal estate of Nawab Waliuddowala. The act aimed to dismiss the succession claims put forward by two wives of the late Nawab, Mahboob Begum and Kadrian, and their children. The dispute arose regarding the legitimacy of the marriages and the entitlement to Nawab’s property. The act was challenged for being discriminatory and for cursing the Rajpramuk authority. The Supreme Court analysed the constitutional provisions and found the act unconstitutional due to its discriminatory nature and misuse of authority. 
3. Under the third category, a statute may grant discretion to the government to select individuals for its applications. The court will examine if the statute provides a principle or policy guiding this discretion; if not, it may be struck down for enabling arbitrary discrimination by the government. The court referred to the case of State of West Bengal v.Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952), in this case, the Supreme Court invalidated the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950, on the grounds of unconstitutionality. The court held that the provisions under this act granted the State Government unchecked authority to categorise cases without clear guidelines. Despite acknowledging the necessity for prompt trials, the courts concluded that the act’s language permitted arbitrary classification, lacking a discernible connection between the classification and the act’s purpose. The act’s deficiency in categorising offences and its failure to incorporate the classification principle of CrPC made it constitutionally invalid. 
4. For the fourth and fifth categories, the court referred to the case of Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra (1952). The appellant, in this case, challenged the constitutionality of the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures Ordinance, which allowed for the establishment of special courts for expedited trials of specific serious offences. Despite the appellant’s arguments that law satire violated Article 14 by creating arbitrary classification, the Supreme Court upheld the ordinance;’s validity. The Court reasoned that the classification of offences and individuals for trial by special courts was based on reasonable differential and served the legitimate objective of maintaining public order and safety. Drawing a parallel with the Anwar Ali Sarkar case, where a similar law was struck down because of lack of nexus, the court found that challenged law in Kathi’s case had clear basis and justification for its classification. 

Critical analysis of Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia vs. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar & Others, 1958

The judgement, in this case, highlights several key points regarding the role and function of a commission of Inquiry under the Commission of Inquiry Act of 1952. The counsel for petitioners argued that while the Commission may gather facts and conduct inquiries, it cannot suggest legislative or executive measures to the government. However, the court disagreed, emphasising the importance of the commission’s recommendation in aiding the government’s decision-making process regarding legislative or administrative actions to address identified issues. Despite the Commission’s lack of judicial powers and the purely recommendatory nature of its reports, the court acknowledged the significance of its recommendations in guiding government actions. Along with this, the judgement reaffirmed the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution. It underscored that the legislature, executive, and judiciary are distinct organs of government, each entrusted with specific functions. The court applied this doctrine restrictively, emphasising the distinct roles of each organ and rejecting any encroachment upon the domain of another.

Judgement for which this case was relied on

Amar Joti Builders And Ors. vs Union Of India And Ors. (1972)

In this writ petition, 28 brickkiln owners contested various aspects of the Delhi Bricks Control Order, 1963, and associated directives, alleging their violation of constitutional provisions. Although initially challenging multiple provisions, the focus shifted during proceedings. The court clarified that while there was a restriction on selling bricks to non-consumers, it didn’t impose an absolute prohibition. Moreover, it found the price fixation reasonable, considering periodic reviews and factors like cost escalation. Regarding clause 6, the court reasoned that it operated within the framework of the law and didn’t grant unfetter power. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition, instructing each party to cover their respective costs. The court emphasised that while Clause 6(1) initially appeared to grant unchecked authority, its interpretation within the broader context of the Order and the Act revealed that the directions it authorised must align with the legal framework governing the brick distribution, sale, and movement. This interpretation was supported by the Ram Krishna Dalmia case. The court found that clause 6 operated within the bounds of law.

Conclusion 

In conclusion, the Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar & Ors. presented complex legal questions regarding the constitutionality of the Act and the validity of the notification issued by the government in this regard. Through a meticulous examination of various legal principles, including the doctrine of severability and the alleged violation of Article 14, the court upheld the validity of both the notifications and the Act. The court’s decision outlined the importance of maintaining a balance between legislative intent and constitutional principles. The court referred to several cases to invalidate the alleged violation of Article 14 which was categorically denied at the end. 

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

What does the phrase “usurpation of judicial powers” mean?

The constitution of India follows the principles of separation of powers, ensuring distinct roles and responsibilities for each branch of the government. This doctrine, rooted in democratic principles, aims to prevent the misuse of authority by delineating specific powers to each government. It mandates that no branch can exceed its designated authority. In the present case, the petitioner argued that granting the inquiry Commission the authority to investigate private disputes and individuals and to recommend punishment based on their findings constitutes a violation of the principle of separation of powers and overstepping the bounds of judicial powers.

What is the doctrine of severability?

The doctrine of severability means that when some particular provision of a statute offends or is against a constitutional limitation, but that provision is severable from the rest of the statute, only that offending provision will be declared void by the Court and not the entire statute. If good and bad provisions are joined together by using the words ‘and’ or ‘or’ and the enforcement of a good provision is not made dependent on the enforcement of the bad one that is the good provision can be enforced even if the bad one cannot or had not existed, the two provisions are severable and the good one will be upheld as valid and given effect to. 

References

• https://blog.ipleaders.in/separation-of-powers/ 
• https://blog.ipleaders.in/doctrine-of-severability/ 
• https://blog.ipleaders.in/commission-of-inquiry-act-1952-status-and-relevance/ 

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