The article is written by Nishimita Tah. It provides a critical analysis of the landmark judgement in the State of U.P. vs. Nawab Hussain (1977), exhaustively covering the facts, issues, contentions, and the court’s ruling. An initiative was taken to analyse the case in the writer’s own words in a precise manner. Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, which deals with Res Judicata, has also been discussed at length in this article.
Table of Contents
Introduction
The rule of res judicata is based on the maxim “Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa,” which means that no one ought to be troubled twice for the same cause of action and interest. Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), 1908 forbids the filing of suits of a similar nature, with the same cause of action and the same issues of interest between the same parties. This section clearly specifies that once a matter is decided and finalised by a competent court, the parties are not allowed to reopen the case by filing a fresh suit of the same nature and interest. Res judicata under Section 11 is amalgamated with public policy and public interest. The doctrine of res judicata restricts the misuse of the judicial process and obstructs suits involving the same issue, cause, and interest that have already been heard and where the judgement has already been made by a competent court.
The Constitution of India includes the concept of double jeopardy, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under Article 20(2). This Article protects against double jeopardy and embodies the maxim “Nemo debet bis vexari,” a common law rule meaning that no person should be tried for the same offence twice.
The present case discusses the concept of res judicata and its applicability to writ petitions under Articles 32 and 226 of the Indian Constitution. In the case of State Of Uttar Pradesh vs. Nawab Hussain (1977), the Hon’ble Supreme Court specified a general distinction between the rule of res judicata and constructive res judicata as expressed under Section 11 of the CPC. This case is marked as a landmark decision in the Indian judicial landscape, highlighting the relevance of the concept of res judicata under the CPC.
Details of the case
Name of the Case
State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Nawab Hussain
Citation
1977 AIR 1680
Name of the petitioner
State of Uttar Pradesh
Name of the respondent
Nawab Hussain
Case type
Civil Appeal
Court
Supreme Court of India
Bench
Justices P.N. Shingal, Y.V. Chandrachud, and P.K. Goswami
Date of judgment
04.04.1977
Laws involved
Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Article 311 of the Constitution of India
Facts of the case
Nawab Hussain, the respondent in the present case, was a Sub-Inspector of Police working under the cadre of the State of Uttar Pradesh. A complaint was lodged against him under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and the Indian Penal Code, 1860. This resulted in two cases being registered against him. Based on the findings from the investigation conducted in both of these cases, the respondent was terminated from service by an order of the Deputy Inspector General (D.I.G.).
The respondent filed an appeal against his dismissal, which was dismissed. He then filed a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court, seeking to quash the disciplinary proceedings against him. He argued that he was never given the opportunity to respond to the allegations raised against him in the disciplinary proceedings. He further argued that the actions taken against him were thus unjust. However, this writ petition was also rejected.
Subsequently, he filed a civil suit before the court of the civil judge, challenging the order of his termination. He contended that he had been appointed by the Inspector General of Police, and under the provisions of Article 311(1) of the Constitution, the D.I.G. was not authorised to terminate his service.
The State of Uttar Pradesh challenged this suit, contending that the suit was barred by the doctrine of res judicata, as all grounds related to the present case had been raised or should have been raised in the special appeal and writ petition.
This suit was dismissed by the trial court. The District Judge also rejected the appeal and upheld the trial court’s judgement. The respondent filed a second appeal, which was decreed by the High Court. This led to the appeal in question before the Supreme Court.
Issues raised
The following issues were raised in the present case:
- Whether the doctrine of constructive res judicata is applicable to writ applications under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, especially with respect to issues that could have been raised earlier but were not?
- Whether the decision of the High Court that was on merits in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution constitutes res judicata in a subsequent regular suit involving the same matter between the same parties?
Arguments of the parties
Petitioners
- The petitioners argued ons several grounds including that the plea filed by the respondent before the civil court was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. They contended that all the arguments in the present case had either been raised or should have been raised in the special appeal and the writ petition.
Respondent
- The respondent had primarily two contentions. Firstly, he argued that his termination from service was not justified since he was not given a reasonable opportunity to defend against the allegations.
- Secondly, he contended that since his appointment was made by the Inspector General of Police, only the Inspector General was authorised to terminate his employment. Thus, the order of dismissal issued by the D.I.G of Police was against the law as he was not the competent authority to terminate the respondent’s service.
Laws discussed in State of U.P. vs. Nawab Hussain (1977)
“Res judicata” is a legal phrase that in modern legal discourse is commonly referred to as “claim preclusion”. This phrase signifies the binding effect of a judgement in legal proceedings and guarantees that the already settled disputes cannot be raised again.
Section 11 under CPC
Section 11 of CPC expresses that a court should not try such a suit that has been put directly or substantially in issue in a former suit or has been decided between the same parties on the same subject matter by a competent court to try such issues that have been ascertained and finalised by such court.
The explanations under Section 11 are as follows:
- The term “former suit” refers to a suit that has already been decided by a court before the suit in question. Whether such a suit was instituted before the suit in question, i.e., the current suit, does not matter when defining the term “former suit”.
- The ability of the court to decide a case is determined without any consideration of provisions related to the right to appeal the court’s decision.
- The issue in question in the current suit must be something in reference to a former suit. This means the issue in the current suit must have been claimed by one party and denied or admitted by the other party in the former suit. Such claims, denial, or admission can either be expressed or implied.
- Any argument or defence that was raised in the previous proceedings is considered to have been the issue of such suit directly and substantially.
- If the relief sought by the plaintiff(s) in the plaint is not explicitly granted by the court, then for the purposes of this rule, it would be considered that such relief sought was denied by the court.
- Where an individual files a suit in a bona fide manner in regard to a public right or a private right they share with others, all other people who have an interest in such rights or share such rights are also considered to have made the claim through the person who has initiated such suit, for the purposes of this section.
- This section applies to proceedings where a court enforces its decree. References to any suit, issue, or former suit are to be understood as referring to such enforcement proceedings, the issues raised in them, and any previous enforcement proceedings.
- An issue that has been heard, decided, and finally settled by a court of limited jurisdiction, but which was competent to decide such an issue, operates as res judicata in any subsequent suit. This is true even if that court is not competent to try the new suit or such issue that has been raised subsequently.
Doctrine of res judicata
As already discussed, the doctrine of res judicata is governed by Section 11 of CPC. It is a doctrine that prevents the courts from examining a case that has already been heard, examined, and settled by the same court. It ensures the fair and honest administration of justice by preventing the abuse of the law. It comes into play when a party attempts to initiate a new suit identical to the subject matter that has already been decided by the court in a previous case involving the same group of parties. The doctrine of res judicata applies not only to claims that were raised in the earlier lawsuit but also to particular allegations that were made during the initial proceedings across different jurisdictions.
Prerequisites for res judicata
The following conditions must be met for res judicata to apply:
- Judicial ruling by a competent court or tribunal: The decision must have been made by a court or tribunal that is competent or authorised to make such a decision in the matter.
- Final and binding: The decision should be conclusive and binding on all the concerned parties. Moreover, it should not be subject to further appeal.
- Decisions based on the merits: The court must have considered the substantive legal issues and made its decision accordingly.
- Fair hearing: Both parties must have had a fair opportunity to present their case and be heard.
- Previous decisions are conclusive: Whether the earlier decision was right or wrong is not relevant.
Nature and scope of res judicata
Res judicata signifies a general rule of law that governs all the functioning of the legal system. It is rooted in two principles derived from common law maxims: firstly, the public policy and necessity that make it in the state’s interest to put an end to litigation; and secondly, the principle that individuals should not face hardship by being subjected to repeated legal proceedings for the same cause of action. Thus, it is public policy that serves as the foundation of the doctrine of res judicata.
The scope of res judicata has been delineated under Section 11 of the CPC, which though not exhaustive in nature, continues to evolve. This doctrine is fundamentally grounded in the considerations of high public policy. It aims to accomplish two primary objectives:
- Firstly, there must be a finality to litigation. The outcome must be the ultimate result, ensuring that legal disputes arrive at a definitive resolution.
- Secondly, individuals should not be bothered by the same type of litigation twice. They must be protected against double jeopardy.
When assessing whether subsequent proceedings are barred by res judicata, several factors must be taken into account:
- Competency of courts,
- Parties and their representatives,
- The matters in issue, and
- The final decision.
It is crucial to recognise that the judgements issued in subsequent suits involving the same parties must be consistent with the issues already decided in the matter. The theory of res judicata asserts that once a matter has reached finality, it cannot be allowed to reopen. Importantly, the principle of res judicata does not prevent parties from exercising their right to appeal a decision.
Doctrine of Constructive res judicata
The doctrine of constructive res judicata is elaborated under Explanation IV of Section 11 of the CPC. It states that in any case which could or should have been raised as part of a defence in a previous suit will be considered to have been directly and substantially in question in that suit. This doctrine emphasises that there is no difference between the claims actually made in court and those questions that could have been made but were not. The doctrine of constructive res judicata prevents parties from raising arguments or defence in subsequent proceedings that could have been raised before in relation to the same subject matter.
Distinction between res judicata and constructive res judicata
The following table discusses the major points of differences between res judicata and constructive res judicata:
| Aspect | Res Judicata | Constructive Res Judicata |
| Scope | It directly applies to the matters that were actually litigated and decided | It applies to the matters that could have been litigated and decided. |
| Basis | Actual previous adjudication on the matter. | Potential adjudication on the matter. |
| Requirement of previous decisions | It requires a final decision on the merits. | It implies that the matter should have been raised in the previous suit. |
| Type of issues covered | Matters directly in issue. | Matters that might and should have been in issue. |
| Court’s competence | It requires the previous court to be competent to decide the subsequent suit. | It is assumed that the previous court could have adjudicated the unraised issue. |
| Prevention | It prevents re-litigating on the same issues. | It prevents litigation of new issues that should have been raised in the previous suit. |
Relevant Case Laws
Marginson vs. Blackburn Borough Council (1939)
The doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatam as a rule of evidence was expressed in the case of Marginson vs. Borough Council (1939). It underscored that the broader rule of evidence prevents the claim of the same cause of action. The theory of res judicata explains that:
- It involves a final and conclusive judicial decision aimed at the dismissal of disputes as a case of public policy, in the sense of protecting the general interest of the community.
- It seeks to protect the interests of the people and safeguards them against facing repeated issues or suits that have already been litigated.
However, it was also emphasised that the purpose of res judicata is to serve not only the public but also private interests by obstructing the reopening of matters that had already been adjudicated. It prohibits seeking another judgement for the same civil claim based on the same cause of action and same interest. Revisiting the same issues in the subsequent suits can expand the conflict in judgements of equal jurisdiction. This may lead to repetitive suits and bring the administration of justice into dispute. Such a repetitive action undermines the clarity and authority of judicial decisions when they are pronounced. They lose their identity and vitality.
Greenhalgh vs. Mallard (1947)
In the case of Greenhalgh vs. Mallard (1947), it was stated that the purpose of res judicata was not confined to the issues that were said to be decided before the Hon’ble High Court of Allahabad. Instead, it covers all the facts and issues that are a part of the litigation. The issues, in relation to the subject matter, were raised, denoting the misuse of the process of the court by allowing the filing of new proceedings based on previous proceedings.
Devi lal Modi vs. Sales Tax Officer, Ratlam(1964)
In the case of Devi Lal Modi vs. Sales Tax Officer, Ratlam (1964), the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held that on considerations of public policy to prevent multiple legal proceedings between the same parties, the rule of constructive res judicata applies. This means that if a party has raised a plea in a previous proceeding between them and the opponents, they cannot raise the same plea against the same party in a later proceeding based on the same issues and the same cause of action. Thus, this rule of constructive res judicata is applied to the prior writ proceedings.
Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh vs. State of Bombay (1964)
In the case of Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh vs. State of Bombay (1964), the Allahabad High Court referred to the principle of res judicata and its advancement over the period as outlined in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. This section, along with its explanations, covers almost the whole purpose of the doctrine. The Gulabchand case was similar to former proceedings but has no direct application to the issue of a high prerogative writ. However, the general principles of res judicata and constructive res judicata have been considered in cases involving repeated writ applications.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the principle of res judicata applies even when the preliminary proceedings are a writ suit. The Court noted that they had not yet considered whether constructive res judicata could be applied by a party in a subsequent suit. The Court further observed that the Allahabad High Court was erroneous in its examination of the Gulabchand case, as it concluded that the doctrine of constructive res judicata was not relevant in previous proceedings. The respondent could have raised the additional plea in the consequent suit, which he had not done in the writ petition he had filed earlier.
Overview of Article 226 of the Constitution
Article 226 of the Constitution is enshrined under Part V of the Constitution of India. It authorises the High Courts to issue writs to any government in appropriate cases. These writs include habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and certiorari. Article 226 gives the power to the High Courts to enforce the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Indian Constitution.
Under Article 226(1) of the Constitution, High Courts can issue orders and writs to government officials or agencies within their territorial jurisdiction to enforce legal rights. Article 226(2) extends this power of the High Courts to situations where the cause of action is completely or partially within their territorial jurisdiction, allowing the High Courts to furnish orders and writs to government officials or agencies outside their territorial jurisdiction.
Clause (3) of Article 226 deals with interim orders. When an interim order is issued against a respondent under the said Article in the nature of an injunction or stay, the respondent can apply to vacate such an order. According to Article 226(3), if the respondent files an application to vacate the order and furnishes a copy of the application to the party in whose favour the order was made, the High Court must dispose of the application within the period of two weeks of receiving it. The clause also specifies that if the High Court does not act within this period, the interim order will be vacated automatically.
Clause (4) of Article 226 clarifies that the jurisdiction granted to the High Courts does not prohibit the Hon’ble Supreme Court from exercising its powers under Article 32(2) of the Constitution.
It has been established that, in a general sense, the rule of res judicata does not apply during legal procedures under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The general rule of res judicata, as a well-established legal doctrine, dictates that writ petitions are subject to dismissal under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution. However, this rule does not prohibit the filing of writ petitions under Article 32 or special leave petitions under Article 136 of the Indian Constitution.
Overview of Article 32 of the Constitution
Article 32 of the Constitution of India is also known as the fundamental right to constitutional remedies. This Article states that an individual has the right to approach the Supreme Court to seek enforcement of their fundamental rights as guaranteed by the Constitution of India in case there has been a violation of the same. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has the power and authority to issue orders or writs for the enforcement of these fundamental rights. The writs include habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, and quo-warranto. It is an alternative remedy that has no bar to relief under Article 32.
The right to move before the Supreme Court is a fundamental right of an Indian citizen. It should not be adjourned, as prescribed by the Constitution. However, the Constitution also provides that the President can suspend the right to move any court for the enforcement of fundamental rights during the proclamation of an emergency, such as war, external aggression, or a financial crisis, as prescribed under Article 359 of the Constitution.
During the enforcement of fundamental rights, an aggrieved party can directly move before the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. This process, known as the original jurisdiction, does not require the party to first go through a process of appeal.
In cases of concurrent jurisdiction, if an aggrieved party’s fundamental rights have been violated, they have the choice of moving directly to either the High Court or the Supreme Court as prescribed under Article 226.
Case Laws
Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. vs. Janapada Sabha, Chhindwara (1961)
In the case of Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. vs. Janapada Sabha, Chhindwara (1961), the same parties were involved as in a previous case where a petition in the form of a writ was filed to challenge the imposition of a coal tax on the same issues. Although the petitioner tried to present it as an additional ground, the court did not allow it, and the petition was rejected. Consequently, a separate suit was filed to challenge the imposition of tax on different grounds, but this too was denied by the court.
The Allahabad High Court held that the writ was barred by res judicata because the court’s previous decision on the matter was already recorded. The same issue repeatedly came up in the second suit as an appeal before the court. During the pronouncement of the verdict, a straight question arose regarding whether the principle of constructive res judicata could be applied to suits under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court noted that the challenge to the validity of the notices in the current proceedings was based on entirely different grounds than those previously raised. It was not a case of the same issue being brought before the court once again but in different proceedings. The issues were completely different. The Court then mentioned that the High Court’s decision could only be upheld if the principle of constructive res judicata applied to writ petitions under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution. In the Court’s view, constructive res judicata, as defined in Section 11 of the CPC, is “a special and artificial form of res judicata”. It is generally not applied to writ petitions filed under these Articles.
Daryao and Others vs. State of U.P. (1961)
The rule of res judicata was expanded by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the verdict of Daryao and Others vs. State of U.P. (1961). In this case, the petitioner initially invoked Article 226 of the Constitution to file a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court. However, their plea was denied by the Hon’ble High Court of Allahabad. Subsequently, the petitioner invoked Article 32 of the Constitution and filed a writ petition before the Supreme Court, seeking the same remedy for the same issues. The respondent argued that the previous judgement by the High Court served as res judicata for the writ petition under Article 32. This raised a preliminary objection questioning the maintainability of the petition. The Supreme Court upheld this argument and denied the petition.
Article 311 of the Constitution of India
Article 311 of the Constitution of India safeguards civil servants against arbitrary termination and removal from service. The background of Article 311 states that:
- Any person who holds a civil rank under the civil service of the Union or any State shall not be terminated or removed by an authority subordinate to the one by which they were appointed.
- No person shall be dismissed, terminated, or removed from their rank without an inquiry in which they have been informed of the charges against them. Article 311 also ensures that they are given a reasonable opportunity to be heard in their defence against these charges.
According to the facts of the present case, the respondent challenged the termination order on the grounds that he had not been given a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to defend himself against the charges, as required under Article 311. The case highlighted the procedural safeguards ensuring that government servants are not terminated without a fair hearing as stated under Article 311. It also emphasised that all issues challenging the termination of service must be raised in the initial case filed before the court.
The case of the State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Nawab Hussain highlighted the interplay between Article 311 of the Indian Constitution and the doctrine of res judicata, emphasising the importance for civil servants to raise their grievances at the outset of the legal proceedings. The case also reinforced that the safety and security embodied under Article 311 upholds judicial efficiency and finality.
Judgement of the case
Decision of Allahabad High Court
The Allahabad High Court confirmed that the issue emerging between the parties constituted res judicata, as it had been raised in the writ proceedings. It was also noted that the respondent did not challenge the authority of the Deputy Inspector General of Police to terminate him in the writ petition. The issue was not addressed by the High Court in the writ proceedings.
The Court questioned whether the doctrine of constructive res judicata could be applied to issues that might or ought to have been raised in the previous proceedings. The Court noted that this issue of the case was left open by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh vs. State of Bombay (1964), and consequently, the respondent’s appeal was allowed.
The Hon’ble Allahabad High Court referred to several decisions of the Supreme Court, such as L. Janakirama Iyer and Others vs. P.M. Nilakanta Iyer and Others (1961), Devilal Modi vs. Sales Tax Officer, Ratlam and Others (1964), and Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh vs. State of Bombay, and concluded that any issue raised in the earlier petition will be considered res judicata. In the present case, the validity of the termination order by the Deputy Inspector General of Police was not questioned in the initial writ petition filed under Article 226. Since the issue was not raised earlier, it was not addressed by the High Court. The plaintiff was still allowed to raise this issue in subsequent proceedings. Res judicata did not bar it in this suit.
The High Court further held that the doctrine of constructive res judicata applied to the case. It concluded that the termination of the respondent’s service by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, despite the respondent’s appointment by the Inspector General of Police, was not valid. However, the Court made a mistake of law in resolving the issues related to the rule of res judicata, which were not essential for the Court’s decision.
Supreme Court’s Decision
The Supreme Court granted the appeal and overruled the judgement of the Allahabad High Court. The Court emphasised that any matter that should have been raised in a previous proceeding, but was not, is considered constructively decided to prevent multiple litigations and ensure finality.
The doctrine of constructive res judicata was an important prayer in this case, which was taken within the knowledge of the respondent and could have been raised in the writ petition but was not. The respondent contended that he was not given an opportunity to be heard against the allegations raised in the department inquiry, and thus the action taken against him was unjust in the eyes of the law.
Therefore, the respondent could not challenge his termination from service in the present suit. On the other hand, the termination was executed by an authority subordinate to the one that appointed him. This raised further legal issues.
The Supreme Court was of the view that the Allahabad High Court had erred in its ruling on the res judicata issue without considering the doctrine of constructive res judicata. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that it was unnecessary to examine the other points raised in the case.
Justice Gajendragadkar noted that constructive res judicata is a technical rule established by the Code. It means that if a party could have raised a certain argument in the previous case against their opponent, they cannot bring up that argument in a later case based on the same issue and involving the same parties. This rule applied to writ petitions as well.
The Supreme Court pointed out that the respondent failed to include crucial facts in the writ petition that was filed before the Allahabad High Court under Article 311(1) of the Constitution. Specifically, the respondent did not argue that he could not be terminated by the D.I.G. of Police because he was appointed by the Inspector General of Police. In addition to this, he was fully aware of this important argument but did not raise it in the writ petition.
Instead, the respondent contended about other aspects, such as the opportunity to defend himself in the departmental inquiry. Therefore, the respondent could not challenge his termination in a subsequent suit on different grounds that had already been dismissed.
Rationale behind this judgement
The provisions of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not exhaustive. It is related to cases where a previous decision operates as res judicata between the same parties on the same matter in subsequent civil suits. In general, the principle of res judicata applies when a case has been decided after being fully contested and the parties have had a fair opportunity to prove their case before a competent court. This principle prevents the same issues and causes of action from being re-litigated in future suits. However, it is not mandatory that the court must formally decide the matter in future suits or ongoing proceedings for res judicata to apply.
Analysis of State of U.P. vs. Nawab Hussain (1977)
The Allahabad High Court held that the principle of constructive res judicata did not bar the previously decided suit. The order of termination from service issued to the respondent by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, who was acting under delegation from the Inspector General of Police, was the subject of contention. The High Court made a legal error by ruling out the applicability of res judicata and restricting the examination of other points in the matter.
In the case of Marginson vs. Blackburn Borough Council, the concept of estoppel per rem judicatam, a rule of evidence, was defined as prohibiting the reassertion of a cause of action. This doctrine is grounded in two theories:
- Achieving final and conclusive verdicts for the final disposal of disputes in cases of public policy that serve the community’s overall interest, and
- Protecting the interest of individuals to be safeguarded from repetitive litigation.
Therefore, it serves not only a public but also a private purpose by preventing the reopening of previously decided matters. It prohibits obtaining a second verdict in a civil suit involving the same issues and the same cause of action. The repeated proceedings associated with the same subject matter can give rise to conflicting verdicts and repetitive actions. This can, in turn, undermine the integrity of the Indian legal system.
The same set of facts can give rise to multiple causes of action. If an individual is pushed to sue upon one cause of action at a time while holding back other issues for later suits, it increases the burden of litigation.
The clear and effective rules of evidence, as established in Gulabchand, have significantly shaped the development of the legal doctrines under Section 11 of the CPC. The explanations in this section cover almost all aspects of the field and have efficiently served the purpose of the doctrine.
However, these rules primarily apply to earlier suits and subsequent suits and have no direct application to a petition for the issue of a writ. In general, rules of res judicata and constructive res judicata are applied in cases of renewed applications for writs.
Conclusion
In the present case, the respondent was terminated from his position. Initially, he filed a writ petition claiming that he was denied the opportunity to be heard and that the actions taken against him were unjust. Later, he filed another petition where he alleged that he had been appointed by the Inspector General of Police and therefore could not be dismissed by the Deputy Inspector General. He alleged that the D.I.G. was not empowered to terminate him. Therefore, his termination from service was initiated by the person who did not have the power to terminate him and was thus invalid. He further argued that he was not afforded the opportunity to defend himself against the allegations in the departmental inquiry.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the arguments raised in the subsequent petition should have been included in the initial writ petition. This is because it was relevant and within the knowledge of the respondent at the time of filing the previous writ petition. The Court allowed this appeal, overturning the Allahabad High Court’s decision. The Apex Court also clarified the distinction between the principles of res judicata and constructive res judicata.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
What is the difference between the doctrine of res judicata and res sub judice?
The main difference between the doctrine of res judicata and res sub judice lies in their timing and status in court proceedings. Res judicata applies when a case has reached its final decision, preventing the same parties from filing subsequent litigations over the same subject matter again. On the other hand, res sub judice applies when a case is still pending before the court, preventing the parties from initiating parallel proceedings on the same issue.
What do you mean by the doctrine of estoppel?
The doctrine of estoppel is a principle that prevents a person from asserting facts that are contrary to their previous claims or actions.
What are the essentials for the applicability of the doctrine of res judicata?
The essentials for the applicability of the doctrine of res judicata have been outlined in the case of the Duchess of Kingston (1776) by Sir William De Gray, C.J., and states that :
- The court must have a competent jurisdiction.
- The issue of matter in the subsequent suit must be between the same parties.
What is the difference between the doctrine of might and ought?
The doctrine of ‘might’ and ‘ought’ have a wide extent. ‘Might’ refers to the idea of the possibility of joining all grounds of defence. Whereas ‘ought’ carries the idea of propriety or correctness of joining those grounds.
References
- https://www.multidisciplinaryjournal.net/assets/archives/2020/vol5issue5/5-5-18-571.pdf
- https://deliverypdf.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=093116088071094120077089069089100089033069066016061000078025116065003102123097031000063039024035109012028124109022009006077018012000008073033122006105114092030073087026078022126030106106002066101117007019019122075019115110080098105075092011102074081006&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE
- 18th Edition, M.P.Jain , Indian Constitutional Law
- 13th Edition, V.N.Shukla, Constitution of India
- 9th Edition, C.K Takwani, Civil Procedure Code
Students of Lawsikho courses regularly produce writing assignments and work on practical exercises as a part of their coursework and develop themselves in real-life practical skills.
LawSikho has created a telegram group for exchanging legal knowledge, referrals, and various opportunities. You can click on this link and join:
Follow us on Instagram and subscribe to our YouTube channel for more amazing legal content.
