Home case analysis Uday vs. State of Karnataka (2003)

Uday vs. State of Karnataka (2003)

June 6, 2024

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This article is written by Akshay Gendle and it discusses in detail the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Uday vs State of Karnataka (2003). The article includes facts, issues, arguments, judgement and the rationale behind the judgement of the Supreme Court. Lastly, the article talks about the critical analysis of this judgement and the misuse of the rape law by women in a number of circumstances.

Introduction

Marriage in Indian society holds great significance. One of the prominent reasons for such significance is that after the ceremony of marriage, the married couple can legally perform sexual intercourse without the fear of society. It also shows that sex still holds a great stigma in our society. Now when such sexual intercourse happens on the future promise of marriage and marriage does not happen due to any reason, then what happens? Does such sexual intercourse amount to rape?

The same was the situation in this case. A young girl performs sexual intercourse with a man she is in love with. The man promises her that they will get married after some time. She believes him out of love and continues their relationship. Upon pregnancy, the man refuses to marry her because of social stigma. Consequently, a woman files a rape complaint against the man.

Now the Court has to decide whether there was consent from a woman in this case. Did she give her consent only because of the future promise of marriage, or did she exercise her free will? We will find out the answers to these questions, along with the rationale for the Supreme Court coming to this conclusion. We will even discuss the critics of this judgement of the Supreme Court in order to come up with our own conclusion.

Details of the case

Name of the case

Uday vs State of Karnataka

Name of the court

Supreme Court of India

Date of judgement

13th February, 2003

Equivalent citations

AIR 2003 SUPREME COURT 1639, (2003) 2 SCR 231 (SC)

Bench

Justice N. Santosh Hegde and Justice B. P. Singh

Authored by

Justice B. P. Singh

Name of the parties

Petitioner: Uday

Respondent: State of Karnataka

Facts of Uday vs. State of Karnataka (2003)

The facts of the case are quite simple and are discussed hereinafter in a story format for better understanding.

When it comes to the ages of both the prosecutrix and the accused, it is an undisputed fact that the prosecutrix was 19 years old on the date of occurrence, i.e., in the last week of August 1988 or the first week of September 1988. The prosecutrix also deposed that her date of birth was August 6, 1969. The accused was also a young man of about 20-21 years of age when the occurrence took place, as he claimed to be 25 years of age in the year 1992 when he was examined under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

The girl (prosecutrix) and the boy (accused) were living in Majali Gaongeri, Karnataka. The girl was studying in college, and she was living with her parents, including her brothers and sisters. As stated by the girl in her deposition, the accused used to live in her neighbourhood and used to visit her house on a daily basis. Further, she added that the accused was a friend of her brother, and while visiting her house, they also used to have some conversation in between them. This gradually developed a friendship between them, and one day the accused proposed to her for a marriage. She denied it, stating that they both belong to different castes and that such a marriage is not possible and will not be acceptable in society. Here, the prosecutrix belongs to the Goundar Community, whereas the accused was Daivanya Brahmin, as stated in the facts of the case. Furthermore, it is not a disputed fact that even though the prosecutrix denied the marriage proposal, they were still in love with each other.

One day, the accused approached her house at 12 o’clock in the night when she was studying and asked her to come out to have some conversation, or he was willing to talk to her. As she was also deeply in love with him, she responded to his invitation and came out of her house. Later, they went to the under construction house of the accused, where the accused promised to marry her, and they even had sexual intercourse later that night. Here, the prosecutrix denied such sexual intercourse in the first place, but under that circumstance, she consented to such sexual intercourse, believing the marital promise of the accused.

Thereafter, they continued their affair and frequently used to go outside. During this period, the accused promised her several times that he would marry her. The prosecutrix even agreed that they had 15-20 times sexual intercourse in between them during this period. They also used to have sexual intercourse once or twice a week, she added. Further, she admitted that they were noticed by many people in her surroundings, and one day a person named Vanamala, who also noticed, asked her about their affair, to which she responded that they were madly in love with each other and the accused had promised to marry her. She also requested Vanamala not to disclose this fact to anyone, she added in her deposition.

In the meantime, the prosecutrix used to raise the question of marriage from time to time, to which the accused continuously responded that he would marry her upon the completion of the construction of his house and they would go for a registered marriage. Consequently, the prosecutrix got pregnant and disclosed the same fact to the accused, but he reassured her, stating that she should not worry and that he would marry her after some time.

In the 6th month of her pregnancy, prosecutrix’s mother got suspicious and discovered the truth from her. The prosecutrix told the accused that her mother discovered their truth, to which he replied that he would take her to some other place and marry her. Later, the truth came before the whole family, and her brother inquired of the accused regarding their marriage, and the accused told him that he would marry her, but this fact must not be revealed to his parents.

In the 8th month of pregnancy, the accused told the prosecutrix to be ready and that they would leave in the early morning. But he didn’t show up, and later, his cousin told her that he had gone to Sangli. He returned after eight days, and the brother of the prosecutrix again asked him whether he would marry her. The accused stated that to keep her at some other place, he will bear her maintenance expenses, and after her delivery and after the completion of the construction of his house, he will marry her.

This continuous false assurance of marriage led to the quarrel between the two families. As the accused did not marry her as he promised, the prosecutrix filed a police complaint on 12-5-1989 against the accused. Later, she gave birth to the child on 29-5-1989.

Issues raised

Whether the consent given by the prosecutrix was consent under Section 375?
Does the consent given by the prosecutrix fall within the meaning of misconception of facts under Section 90 of the IPC?

Arguments

In this case, the accused was charged with the offence of rape under Section 375 of the IPC, and one of the most important factors in deciding such cases is whether there was consent for such sexual intercourse or not. Therefore, a number of case laws were presented before the Supreme Court of India in order to understand whether there was consent from the prosecutrix while having sexual intercourse with the accused or not. Even foreign judgements were also taken into consideration for a better understanding of the consent mechanism used by a woman while having sexual intercourse with a person. Some of them are discussed below.

Meaning of Consent

In Holman v. R. (1970). It was held that ‘consent does not always mean there is a complete willingness of a woman for sexual intercourse. Sometimes, the consent of a woman may be hesitant, reluctant or grudging, but if she consciously permits it, then it can be considered as’ consent’.

The Apex Court even referred to Words and Phrases Permanent Edition Vol. 8A and stated that ‘in order to form consent under the law, a woman must have the intelligence to understand the nature and consequences of such sexual acts. Furthermore, such consent must be based on knowledge of its significance and morality and a woman must have the choice either to resist or allow such sexual intercourse.’

In Rao Harnarain Singh Sheoji Singh v. State (1958), it was observed that ‘consent, when it comes to the offence of rape, requires the voluntary participation of a woman; she must have the intelligence to understand the significance and moral quality of the act. And lastly, she must have exercised her free choice either to assent or resist such sexual acts.’

The High Court of Kerala in Vijayan Pillai v. State of Kerala (2003) observed that ‘consent to an act means a woman agreeing actively in her mind to an act, giving permission to such act and understanding the nature of that act.

In Anthony, In re (1960), it was observed that ‘a consent on behalf of a woman is when she willingly and without coercion agrees to engage herself in such an act, having full control over her physical and moral capabilities. It requires a voluntary and conscious decision on her side either to allow or withhold her permission for such an act, expressing her complete autonomy to accept or refuse.

This same view has been reiterated by the Punjab High Court in Arjan Ram Naurata Ram v. State (1960), by the Rajasthan High Court in Gopi Shankar v. State of Rajasthan (1967) and by the High Court of Bombay in Bhimrao Harnooji Wanjari v. State of Maharashtra (1975).

Misconception of Fact

Now, while addressing the issue of misconceptions of fact, the Supreme Court looked into the various judgements of the High Court and their observations in various case laws. Some of them are discussed below.

The Calcutta High Court has the view that a promise to marry on a future date and when such date is not certain, such a promise of marriage cannot be considered a misconception of fact. When we are talking about a misconception of a fact, such a fact must have immediate relevance, which in this circumstance is not present.

This same view of the Calcutta High Court was reiterated in Jayanti Rani Panda v. State of W. B. (1975) The facts of the case were similar to this case. The accused was a teacher in a local village and used to visit the residence of the prosecutrix. One day, in the absence of her parents, the accused proposed to the prosecutrix, expressing his love and his desire to marry her. The prosecutrix was also in love with the accused. Believing in the promise of marriage, the accused and the prosecutrix indulged in sexual intercourse for several months, resulting in the pregnancy of the prosecutrix. Consequently, she insisted on marriage, but the accused suggested an abortion and agreed to marry her after some time. This proposal was not acceptable to the prosecutrix, and the case came before the court of law.

The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court addressed the provision of Section 90 of the Indian Penal Code and concluded that not fulfilling the future promise of marriage does not always amount to a misconception of fact. The immediate relevance of such a fact is important. If the consent was obtained by the accused, showcasing the belief that they were already married, then such consent could be said to result from a misconception of fact within the meaning of Section 90. In this case, the accused made a future promise to marry and even the date was uncertain. The court further said that if a fully grown woman gives her consent believing in the future promise of marriage, indulges in sexual intercourse and continues the same act until she gets pregnant, then it’s an act of promiscuity on her part and is not induced by a misconception of fact. Section 90 can be invoked if the accused, who is intending to marry the prosecutrix, never really intended to marry her from the beginning of such a relationship.

In Saleha Khatoon v. State of Bihar (1989), the prosecutrix was a married person and the accused obtained her consent with the false promise of marriage. The lower court, instead of charging the accused with Section 376, charged the accused with Section 498 of the IPC, as the prosecutrix was already married. This verdict was overturned by the Patna High Court, which stated that a false promise of rape amounts to a misconception of facts within Section 90 of the IPC. The consent obtained by the accused was deceitful and the prosecutrix was tricked into such sexual intercourse. If she had already known about the reality of the intentions of the accused, she would not have consented to such sexual intercourse. The High Court, in their view, did not consider two questions in this case. Firstly, whether a misconception of fact must be confined to the circumstances falling under Section 375 of the IPC. And secondly, whether consent given under a misconception of fact contemplated by Section 90 has a wider application so as to include circumstances not enumerated in Section 375. Lastly, the High Court held that consent obtained through deceit is not consent and falls within the definition of rape under Section 375 of the IPC.

Law discussed in Uday vs. State of Karnataka (2003)

Some of the important sections of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 discussed in this case are as follows.

Section 90. Consent known to be given under fear or misconception

Section 90 broadly states that:

Consent is not said to be consent under the IPC if

Consent is given by a person under fear of injury.
Consent is given by a person under misconception of fact.
The person who obtained the consent knew, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such misconception.
Consent of Insane Person Consent given by a person suffering from unsoundness of mind or intoxication and, as a result, unable to understand the nature and consequence of that consent.
Consent of Child – consent given by a child under 12 years of age.

Section 375 Rape

Primarily, this Section enlists seven circumstances under which an offence of rape may happen and even under the Explanation 2 of this Section, it defines consent of a woman.

The essential ingredients of the offence of rape are as follows.

There must be sexual intercourse between a man and a woman.

This sexual intercourse must fall under any of the circumstances given below.

Against her will.
Without her consent.
With her consent, when her consent is obtained under the fear of death or hurt.
With her consent, when her consent is obtained under the misconception that the man is her husband but the man knows he is not her husband.
With her consent, when such consent is given because of unsoundness of mind, intoxication or under the influence of any stupefying or unwholesome substance.
With or without her consent, when she is under eighteen years of age.
When she is unable to communicate consent.

Explanation 2 of this Section talks about the consent of a woman for the purposes of this Section. It states that the consent of a woman must be voluntary, clear and unambiguous while performing any specific sexual act. Such consent may be communicated through words, gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal communication and communicates the willingness of a woman to participate in that sexual activity. Furthermore, the explanation also provides that if a woman is not resisting such penetration, that does not necessarily mean she is consenting to such a sexual act.

Section 376 Punishment for rape

This Section enlists persons in different capacities who may commit an offence of rape and shall be punished for the same. The punishment for the offence of rape under this Section shall be rigorous imprisonment for a term not less than 10 years and may extend to imprisonment for life which includes the remainder of that person’s natural life and shall also be liable for a fine.

Judgement of Karnataka High Court

When the matter came before the Sessions Court, the judge accepted the arguments of the prosecution, stating that the consent obtained by the accused in this case does not fall within the definition of consent under Section 375 of the IPC.

When it comes to Section 90 of the IPC, the judge is of the view that the consent obtained by the accused while having sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix is solely based on the false promise of marriage. Therefore, the judge affirmed that this consent was obtained by fraud and misrepresentation by the accused. The judge therefore held that the accused had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix without her consent, which amounts to the offence of rape under Section 375 of the IPC and is punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code.

In an appeal before the honourable Karnataka High Court, it affirmed the decision of the lower court based on the same grounds but reduced the punishment of the accused to 2 years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs 5,000, and in default, the accused underwent further rigorous imprisonment of 6 months.

Appeal to the Supreme Court

Aggrieved by the order and the judgement of the Karnataka High Court dated 20-4-1995, the accused appealed before the Supreme Court under special leave.

Judgement in Uday vs. State of Karnataka (2003)

The Supreme Court, while giving the judgement in this case, after taking into consideration the views of various High Courts, came to the conclusion that they are not deciding on two questions here. Firstly, the question of whether there is a misconception of fact when it comes to the offence of rape, confined to the situations given under Section 375 of the IPC. And secondly, whether consent given under the misconception of fact under Section 90 of the IPC has broader implications, including circumstances that are not specifically mentioned in Section 375 of the IPC.

Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed this appeal and set aside the order convicting the accused in this case under Section 376 of the IPC and the accused was acquitted. Now, we will discuss the rationale and reasoning behind this acquittal of the accused by the Apex Court.

Rationale behind this judgement

The Supreme Court, while coming to the above judgement, considered the views of various High Courts and Judicial Opinions; even foreign judgements were also taken into consideration for a better understanding of the consent mechanism of women while having sexual intercourse.

Hence, the Supreme Court observed that the majority of High Courts and Judicial Opinions are of the view that consent given by a woman having sexual intercourse with a man on a future promise of marriage does not amount to a misconception of fact, provided that she is deeply in love with that man. They further observed that a false promise of marriage is not a fact within the meaning of the Code. Even though the Supreme Court agreed to this view, it still added that there is no straight-jacket formula to understand whether the consent given by the prosecutrix in this case was voluntary or whether it was given under a misconception of fact.

The Supreme Court held that the test laid down by various Courts and Judicial Opinions provides the best guidance to the Courts to find out whether there was consent or not in these cases. But the Court, while deciding every such matter, must take into consideration evidence before it and the circumstances surrounding it, as each case has its own peculiar facts that will certainly help the Court come to the conclusion whether the consent of the prosecutrix was voluntary or it was given under a misconception of fact. Lastly, the Court added that the burden is on the prosecution to prove all the ingredients of such offence and it is also on the prosecution to prove that there was absence of consent.

Now coming back to the original facts of the present case, the Supreme Court considered the evidence on record and stated that the prosecutrix was a fully grown woman and was studying in college. She even admitted that she was in deep love with the accused; they belong to different castes and marriage was not possible for them. She revealed this fact to the accused when he proposed to her in the first place. They were aware of the fact that their marriage would be opposed by their family members.

Despite being aware of all these facts, the prosecutrix indulged in sexual intercourse with the accused. She had sufficient intelligence to understand the significance and moral quality of the act. That’s why she kept it secret from others. Even she asked one of the witnesses not to disclose this fact to anyone else. She did not resist the accused while having sexual intercourse when she was aware of all these facts. Thus, it can be said that she has exercised her free will to assent to this act, understanding the consequences and being aware of the fact that marriage may not happen between them. Finally, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the prosecutrix had consented to this sexual intercourse freely, voluntarily and consciously, and her consent was not in consequence of any misconception of fact.

Furthermore, there was no evidence to show that the accused never intended to marry her. Even the prosecutrix admitted that she had full faith in him. Because of the fear of family, the accused never gathered the courage to disclose his intentions to his family. And lastly, everything got complicated because of the pregnancy of the prosecutrix.

Lastly, Section 90 has two conditions to fulfil for its application. Firstly, it must be shown that the consent was given under a misconception of fact. Secondly, the person who obtained the consent knew, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such a misconception.

The Apex Court doubted the contention of the prosecutrix that the promise of marriage had induced the prosecutrix to have sexual intercourse with the accused. It’s already clear from the facts that the prosecutrix had full knowledge of the situation. She knew they both belong to different castes, marriage is not possible and they will face serious opposition from their families. So she was well aware of the fact that marriage may not happen between them, despite the promise of marriage from the accused. The question remains the same whether the accused knew or had reason to believe that the prosecutrix had consented to such a sexual act based on the future promise of marriage. There is no evidence to prove this contention.

Conversely, the accused had reason to believe that the consent of the prosecutrix was based on their deep love for each other. We can believe that because prosecutrix gave the accused such liberties, which are generally given to the person with whom a person is in deep love. The prosecutrix went with the accused to the lonely space at 12 o’clock in the night, which generally happens in such cases where two young people are madly in love. And in such an emotional state, they promise so many things to each other and the promise of marriage is one of them. Resultantly, the accused promised on many occasions that they will get married in future and in such an emotional and weak state of mind, the promise loses its significance.

The Apex Court believed that this must have happened in this case also and stated that the prosecutrix had sexual intercourse with the accused not because he promised to marry her in future but because she also desired for the same. In such a situation, it is not possible for the accused to have the knowledge that the prosecutrix had consented in consequence of a misconception of fact arising from his promise because there were other reasons than one for her consent.

Significance of Uday vs. State of Karnataka (2003)

Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar (2004)

In this case, the victim and the accused were neighbours and they fell in love. One day, the accused forcefully raped her and later consoled her by saying that they would get married. They continued to have sex for several months and eventually the victim got pregnant. This fact was revealed to the family of the victim but they did not oppose the accused because of his marriage promise. But the father of the accused took him to another village to get him married. Hence, the complaint under Section 376 of the IPC was filed by the victim.

The trial court held that sexual intercourse had happened against the will of the victim and hence amounted to the offence of rape. The High Court upheld the conviction of the accused but reduced the sentence of rigorous imprisonment from 10 years to 7 years.

But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the High Court and held that the accused was not guilty of rape. The Apex Court cited that there was no evidence to show that the accused never intended to marry the victim right from the start. The facts and circumstances of this case state that the accused had genuine intentions towards the victim but was not able to fulfil them due to family pressure.

Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana (2013)

The alleged facts of the case were as follows.

The accused and prosecutrix had known each other for some time. One day, the accused induced the prosecutrix, who was 19 years of age, to go to Kurukshetra to get married and she agreed. On the way, the accused took her to Karnal lake and had sexual intercourse with her against her will. Then he took her to Kurukshetra, stayed with her for 3-4 days and committed rape on her.

Later, she was thrown out by the accused. She then went to Kurukshetra University Hostel and stayed there for a few days. The warden got suspicious and asked her and then she narrated the incident. The warden informed her father. In the meantime, she left the hostel and met with the accused in the temple, where he again promised her that they would go to Ambala and get married. Later, the accused and the prosecutrix were on the bus stand, where police apprehended the accused.

The undisputed facts of the case were

The prosecutrix was 19 years of age.
She was in love and had willingly gone with the accused.
The accused assured her many times that they would get married.
The sexual intercourse happened with the consent of the prosecutrix, as there was no complaint raised by her and she even stayed with him for several days and travelled along with him.
Even after leaving the hostel, she again met the accused to get married.

The Supreme Court relied on the judgement of Uday v. State of Karnataka and stated that

The prosecutrix (19 years) had adequate intelligence and maturity to understand the significance and morality of the sexual act.
She had the knowledge that their marriage may not be possible due to castes and other factors.
It is not possible to conclude that the prosecutrix consented as a result of a misconception of fact because of the promise of marriage by the accused.
Even so, there was no evidence to prove that the accused never intended to marry her.

Finally, the Supreme Court held that the case was based on the fact that there was a false promise of marriage from the accused. But even in facts, it is clear that the accused was taking her to Ambala to get married so consequently, there was no false promise of marriage by the accused when considering the facts of the case.

Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the conviction of the accused and acquitted him.

Critical analysis of the Judgement

The judgement in this case is comprehensive but still, there are some factors that are neglected by the Supreme Court that are essential and the author, in her dissenting judgement, addressed the same. We are discussing the same hereafter.

Impossibility of intercaste marriage

In this case, the Supreme Court held that both prosecutrix and the accused belonged to different castes and they were likely to be opposed by their families. Even though they belong to different castes, there is still special legislation for such marriages in India, i.e., the Special Marriage Act, 1954. It is very unclear for the author why this judgement took such a harsh stance over the possibility of their marriage.

Characterization of consenting adult

The judgement cites that the prosecutrix had 15-20 times sexual intercourse with the accused and further clarifies that this sexual intercourse happened not only because of the promise of marriage but also because the prosecutrix also desired it. This promise of marriage was controversial in this case. The judgement states that an intelligent consenting adult woman will not enter into sexual acts knowing the impossibility of their marriage. She understands the moral implications of such intercourse and she will not engage herself in such an act because of the promise of marriage from the accused. This amounts to characterization of consenting adults in the eyes of the author.

Desire vs. Consent

In the present case, the accused used to visit the house of the prosecutrix and they gradually developed friendships between them. Eventually, the accused proposed the prosecutrix, which she denied. So the author points out that there was no sexual relationship between them before the promise of marriage from the accused.

Furthermore, the original judgement states that sexual intercourse also happened because of the desire of the prosecutrix. Here, the dissenting judgement of the author addresses the same issue in an important paragraph, stating that “desire cannot be considered to be synonymous with consent and prosecutrix may have been desirous of having sexual intercourse with the accused, but that does not imply that she consented to such sexual intercourse.”

Importance of promise of marriage

The author states that a promise of marriage has great importance in the eyes of the prosecutrix. The original judgement states that the accused, because of social pressure, did not keep his promise, though there was no legal impossibility for such a marriage in the eyes of the law. Inter-Caste marriages do happen in society. The author further adds that the positiveness of the prosecutrix was completely overlooked by the Supreme Court in this case. She crossed social boundaries with the accused and the judgement, instead of acknowledging this fact, states that the prosecutrix knowing the impossibility of marriage, still proceeds with such sexual intercourse because of her desires and her sexual liberties.

Misuse of Section 375 IPC

There are a number of cases where the accused used the victim for his sexual desires and left her alone once his desires were fulfilled. This is the harsh reality of society. But there is another facet to this issue and it is becoming rampant in today’s society. It is the misuse of the rape law by a woman when things are not working according to her will in a relationship. There are a lot of examples where a woman has filed a false rape complaint against a man just to take revenge. Some of these case laws are cited hereafter.

One of the recent cases was Manoj Kumar Arya v. State of Uttarakhand (2024). In this case, the complainant was involved in an intimate relationship with the accused for over a decade. They promised they would get married. Later, the accused got married to someone else. Even knowing this fact, the complainant still continued their intimate relationship with the accused and later an FIR was filed against the accused under Section 376 of the IPC.

The High Court, looking at the facts, stated that the complainant voluntarily established a relationship with the accused even though she knew that he was married. The element of consent is present here. The High Court further stated that in this modern society, Section 376 is being misused by women as a weapon against their male counterparts once there arise certain differences in their relationship.

In Sameer Amrut Kondekar v. State of Maharashtra & Anr (2023), a case before the Bombay High Court, a woman and the accused were in a relationship for a period of 8 years. They were involved in sexual intercourse whenever the prosecutrix used to meet him. Their affair was also known to their families. When the accused refused to marry her, she filed a complaint under Section 376 of the IPC against the accused. She contended that she was involved in such a physical relationship because of his promise of marriage.

The High Court of Bombay held that “cases where a relationship turns sour cannot be inferred from the fact that the physical relationship established on every occasion was against the will of the woman.” Hence, the accused was released by the court.

Conclusion

Indian society strongly believes in the institution of marriage and sex is an integral part of an institution of marriage. A promise of marriage is also an important part of the relationship between the couple. Hence, the court assumes that such a promise is, in most cases, not false, but there are adverse situations that are likely to happen that make the promise hard to fulfil. Therefore, women used to file complaints against the accused for having sexual intercourse on the false promise of marriage. Hence, the Supreme Court also directed that courts, while deciding such cases, must look into the facts and circumstances of the case in order to see whether there was consent or not.

References

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