Last verified: May 2026
On the morning of 25 December 2023, while most of India was on Christmas break, the Gazette of India quietly carried Notification No. 47 of 2023. With it, a statute that would replace one of the country’s oldest laws received Presidential assent. Nobody waved a flag. Nobody held a press conference. Six months and a few days later, on 1 July 2024, every police station, every magistrate’s chamber, and every trial court in India woke up to a different rulebook for the first time since 1872.
The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam 2023 (most lawyers shorten it to “BSA”) is now the statute that decides whether a WhatsApp screenshot is admissible against an accused, whether a CCTV clip can be played in open court, whether a confession recorded by a magistrate can be used at trial, and a thousand other questions that walk into court every working day.
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, drafted by Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, had survived the Crown, Independence, the codification debates of the 1970s, the IT revolution, and the courtroom arrival of the smartphone. It had been amended. It had been judicially reinterpreted in landmark cases. It had never been replaced. Until now. The BSA retains roughly 90% of the old Act’s substance. But the 10% that has changed is the 10% that mattered most in everyday litigation.
Here’s the thing. First, electronic and digital records (emails, WhatsApp chats, CCTV footage, server logs, cloud documents) are now treated as primary evidence under Section 57 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 read with Section 63 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023. Second, the Section 63 certificate regime now requires two signatures (the device-controller and a digital-forensics expert) instead of the single signatory under the old Section 65B(4). Third, Section 24 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 quietly expands the joint trial doctrine to cover absconding co-accused, a change every defence lawyer needs to read at least twice.
The doctrine of res gestae has survived. Dying declarations are still admissible. Police confessions are still inadmissible against the maker. The hearsay rule, with its eight historical exceptions, stands. The architecture is the same. But the wiring, particularly around digital evidence, is new.
This guide is the comprehensive walkthrough. Every section that changed, every section that didn’t, the complete IEA-to-BSA section-number map, the new Section 63 certificate format with its dual-signature requirement, the early 2024 to 2026 case law applying the BSA, the transitional rules for cases pending on 1 July 2024, and an 18-question FAQ at the end. By the time you finish, you’ll know exactly what the BSA does, what it changed, what it preserved, and how to argue your next evidence question under it.
The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) is the new Indian law of evidence that replaced the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 from 1 July 2024. Enacted as Act No. 47 of 2023, it has 170 sections across 12 chapters and 4 parts and applies to all judicial proceedings in or before any court except those before arbitrators.
This guide unpacks each major change, the full IEA-BSA section mapping, the new Section 63 certificate workflow, and the early case law applying the new statute.
What is the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023?
Why does the name matter? Because the title of the statute itself signals the change in approach: a Hindi-rooted name for a foundational procedural code, replacing one drafted in English by a colonial jurist in 1872.
The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam 2023 is, simply put, the law of evidence that now governs every judicial proceeding in India. It tells courts what counts as a fact, what can be relied upon to prove that fact, who can be a witness, and how documents (paper or electronic) are to be produced and proved. The Act is structured into 4 parts, 12 chapters, and 170 sections. Its short title is “Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023” and it is identified as Act No. 47 of 2023.
So who does it apply to? Section 1 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 tells us. The Act applies to all judicial proceedings in or before any court, including courts-martial. It does not apply to affidavits presented to any court or officer, and it does not apply to proceedings before an arbitrator. Critically, the BSA extends to the whole of India, including the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir.
The literal meaning: “Sakshya” and “Adhiniyam”
“Sakshya” (साक्ष्य) is a Sanskrit-derived Hindi word meaning evidence or testimony. “Adhiniyam” (अधिनियम) means Act or statute. Put together, “Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam” translates simply to “Indian Evidence Act,” but in Hindi-rooted vocabulary that signals continuity with India’s pre-colonial jurisprudential tradition. That naming choice, which most lawyers initially treated as cosmetic, has become a useful linguistic shorthand in court (judges now cite “BSA Section 63” without further explanation).
The BSA is one of three new criminal codes that came into force together. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) replaced the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) replaced the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The BSA replaced the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. All three operate as a single integrated framework. You cite all three in a serious criminal trial.
The statutory identity card: Act No. 47 of 2023
Quick context before we dive in. The legislative process matters because it explains why some provisions read the way they do. The Bill was introduced in Lok Sabha on 11 August 2023, referred to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, and reintroduced as a revised Bill on 12 December 2023. The Lok Sabha passed it on 20 December 2023. The Rajya Sabha cleared it on 21 December 2023. The President assented on 25 December 2023. The commencement notification, fixing 1 July 2024 as the effective date, was issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs and published in the Gazette of India.
The drafting agency is the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. The Standing Committee that scrutinised the Bill was chaired by Brij Lal, MP (Rajya Sabha). The minority dissent within the Standing Committee flagged language inconsistency in some Hindi nomenclature, but the substantive provisions were retained.
To whom does the BSA apply?
A common practitioner question: does the BSA apply to civil cases or only criminal? The answer is both. Section 1(2) makes the Act applicable to “all judicial proceedings” without distinguishing between civil and criminal courts. So a civil suit on contractual damages, a writ petition under Article 226, a divorce petition, a probate proceeding, and a criminal trial under the BNS all draw their evidence rules from the BSA.
Worth flagging: arbitration is excluded. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has its own regime (Section 19 of that Act gives the tribunal flexibility on evidence). The BSA also doesn’t govern affidavits filed before any court, which are governed by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the Limitation Act, 1963. And tribunal practice (NCLT, ITAT, NCDRC) varies (most adopt the BSA by reference, but some have their own evidence regulations).
Why was the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 replaced?
A natural first question. If the IEA had survived 152 years of independence, codification debates, and the digital revolution, why retire it now?
The short answer is that the IEA had become two statutes in one: the original 1872 text, and the 152-year accumulation of judicial gloss layered on top of it. The Section 65B saga (more on which below) is the canonical example. Between 2005 and 2022, the Supreme Court issued at least five rulings on what should have been a simple certificate provision, and the practitioner community still argued about the result. Replacement was a way of resetting that drift.
For the broader iPleaders treatment of the existing IEA framework, see our exhaustive overview of the predecessor statute. The discussion below focuses on what the BSA changed and why.
The case for replacement [HISTORICAL]
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 had been amended dozens of times. The Information Technology Act, 2000 inserted Sections 65A and 65B to deal with electronic evidence (the IT Act amended several Acts simultaneously, the IEA among them). The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 inserted Sections 53A and 114A on rape and consent. Each amendment added a layer. None pruned the old text. By 2023, the IEA was a 167-section statute carrying patches from at least seven major amendment cycles.
The decolonisation argument was articulated by the Union Home Minister during the Lok Sabha debates on 20 December 2023. The Standing Committee’s report, presented in November 2023, recommended language modernisation, electronic-evidence consolidation, and victim-centric reform. Each of those recommendations finds expression somewhere in the BSA’s 170 sections.
The substantive triggers: what the IEA could no longer handle
Frankly, this gets overlooked. The IEA wasn’t replaced because the law was wrong. It was replaced because the world the law was trying to describe had changed. The IEA was drafted for a courtroom in which the most complex evidence form was a contemporaneous letter. The BSA had to be drafted for a courtroom in which evidence routinely arrives as a 4K video, a cloud-server log, an end-to-end encrypted chat backup, and an AI-generated transcription.
Section 65B IEA tried to address this with a 1996 insertion. It took 18 years for the Supreme Court to settle the rule (in Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473), only to have a 2-judge bench try to relax it in 2018, and a 3-judge bench reaffirm it in 2020. The result was a procedural rule that practitioners couldn’t predict from one bench to another. Replacement, with the rule codified inside the statute itself, was the cleaner answer.
There were three other practical triggers. Joint trial provisions in Section 30 IEA didn’t expressly cover absconding co-accused, leaving courts to rely on judicial improvisation. Accomplice corroboration under Section 133 plus illustration (b) of Section 114 IEA was an awkward two-step rule. And the language and section sequencing had become non-intuitive (Section 65B sat far away from Sections 61-66 on documentary evidence).
The political and legislative rationale
In practice, though, the political dimension matters too. The trio of new criminal codes (BNS replacing IPC, BNSS replacing CrPC, BSA replacing IEA) was framed by the Union Government as a comprehensive break from colonial criminal law. The names were chosen in Hindi to signal that break. The Parliamentary debate emphasised that the new framework was “Indian” in conception, not just renamed. Whether the substantive provisions live up to that framing is a separate question (and one we’ll return to in Section 14 below).
What matters for the practitioner is this: the BSA is now law. The IEA is repealed. The familiar section numbers are gone. And every brief filed after 1 July 2024 needs to be retuned for the new vocabulary.
Structure of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam
How is the BSA actually organised? Let’s start with the top-line numbers. The BSA contains 170 sections organised across 12 chapters and 4 parts. The IEA had 167 sections in 11 chapters and 3 parts. So the BSA is slightly longer, with one additional part for clearer structural separation.
Here’s a comparative snapshot of the structural parameters:
| Statute | Year | Sections | Chapters | Parts |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Indian Evidence Act | 1872 | 167 | 11 | 3 |
| Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam | 2023 | 170 | 12 | 4 |
Parts I to IV: what each part covers
Part I deals with relevancy of facts (Chapters I to II, Sections 1 to 50). It tells you what facts a court will hear and what facts it will refuse to hear. Part II covers proof (Chapters III to VI, Sections 51 to 93). It tells you how the facts you’re allowed to bring in are to be proved (orally, by document, by presumption). Part III covers the production and effect of evidence (Chapters VII to IX, Sections 94 to 117). And Part IV covers witnesses and their testimony (Chapters X to XII, Sections 118 to 170).
Compare that with the IEA’s three-part structure: Relevancy / Proof / Production and effect. The BSA’s split of “witnesses” into a dedicated Part IV makes the architecture cleaner. A practitioner looking up examination-in-chief now goes to Part IV, not somewhere buried in the older Part III. Small change. Real navigational benefit.
The 12 chapters: section-range index
For a quick lookup, the chapter map looks like this:
- Chapter I: Preliminary (Sections 1 to 2)
- Chapter II: Relevancy of facts (Sections 3 to 50)
- Chapter III: Facts which need not be proved (Sections 51 to 53)
- Chapter IV: Oral evidence (Sections 54 to 55)
- Chapter V: Documentary evidence (Sections 56 to 93)
- Chapter VI: Of the exclusion of oral evidence by documentary evidence (Sections 94 to 97)
- Chapter VII: Burden of proof (Sections 98 to 117)
- Chapter VIII: Estoppel (Sections 118 to 122)
- Chapter IX: Of witnesses (Sections 123 to 138)
- Chapter X: Examination of witnesses (Sections 139 to 152)
- Chapter XI: Of the impeachment of credit (Sections 153 to 166)
- Chapter XII: Improper admission and rejection of evidence (Sections 167 to 170)
A common question practitioners raise is whether the chapter headings have changed in meaning. Mostly they haven’t. The chapter on documentary evidence is still about documents (paper and electronic), the chapter on oral evidence is still about oral testimony, and the chapter on examination of witnesses is still where you find the rules on examination-in-chief, cross-examination, and re-examination. What has changed is how those topics are detailed inside each chapter.
How the BSA structure differs from the IEA structure
So what’s actually new structurally? Three things stand out. First, the renumbering: every section number has shifted, even where the substantive rule is the same. Second, the formal Schedule (formerly the schedule attached to Section 65B IEA) is now built into Section 63 BSA itself. Third, certain chapter contents have been merged or rearranged for clarity (Chapter VIII on estoppel, for instance, is now a stand-alone chapter rather than buried within “Production and effect of evidence”).
The mistake we see most often: lawyers citing IEA section numbers in BSA-era briefs out of habit. Courts have been gentle about it through 2024. By 2026, that latitude has worn thin. Cite the BSA section. The renumbering is in the next H2.
Major changes from IEA 1872 to BSA 2023: the master mapping
This is the section most practitioners want first. What’s the new section number for what I’m used to citing? The honest answer: nearly everything has shifted. Here’s the map.
Before the table, a quick primer on how the numbers work. The BSA preserves roughly 90% of the IEA’s substance. Most provisions have been renumbered (often by a few sections, sometimes by ten or more). Some have been merged (two IEA sections into one BSA section). A few are entirely new (those built around electronic evidence and joint trial). And a small number have no direct BSA equivalent (those have been omitted as redundant or superseded).
The big picture: what changed and what stayed
What practising criminal lawyers tell us is that they need three things from any BSA explainer: the section number map, the substantive changes, and the citation re-shifts. The map is below. The substantive changes appear in Sections 5 through 9 of this guide. The citation shifts appear in Section 13.
But here’s the catch. Some IEA section numbers have moved by exactly one (Section 6 on res gestae becomes Section 4 BSA), some have moved significantly (Section 65B becomes Section 63), and some have shifted across chapters entirely. There’s no single arithmetic rule. Treat each cite individually.
Master mapping table: IEA to BSA
The following table covers 28 of the most-searched provisions across the IEA. For each, you get the IEA section number, the topic, the BSA section number, the change status, and a one-line practitioner note. Use it as your day-to-day desk reference.
| IEA Section | Topic | BSA Section | Status | Practical Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | Interpretation clause | 2 | Renumbered + expanded | Definition of “document” now expressly includes electronic and digital records |
| 6 | Res gestae | 4 | Renumbered | Substantive rule unchanged |
| 8 | Motive, preparation, conduct | 6 | Renumbered | Substantive rule unchanged |
| 9 | Facts to identify | 7 | Renumbered | Substantive rule unchanged |
| 10 | Things said or done in conspiracy | 8 | Renumbered | Substantive rule unchanged |
| 11 | When facts otherwise irrelevant become relevant | 9 | Renumbered | Substantive rule unchanged |
| 25 | Confession to police officer | 22 | Renumbered | Bar on admissibility retained verbatim |
| 27 | Discovery statement | 23(2) proviso | Restructured | Pulukuri Kottaya doctrine preserved |
| 30 | Confession of co-accused | 24 | Substantively changed | Now expressly covers absconding co-accused (joint trial expansion) |
| 32 | Statements by persons who cannot be called | 26 | Renumbered | Eight clauses (including dying declaration) preserved |
| 45 | Expert opinion | 39 | Renumbered | Substantive rule unchanged |
| 60 | Direct oral evidence | 54 | Renumbered | Hearsay bar substantively preserved |
| 65A | Special provisions for electronic records | 61 | Renumbered + reframed | Now read as the enabling provision for digital primary evidence |
| 65B | Admissibility of electronic records (certificate regime) | 63 | Substantively changed | Two-signature certificate (device-controller plus expert); Schedule format inside the statute |
| 73A | Proof as to electronic signature | 73 | Renumbered | Substantive rule unchanged |
| 84 | Presumption: Acts of Parliament | 80 | Renumbered | Substantive rule unchanged |
| 88A | Presumption: electronic messages | 88 | Renumbered | Substantive rule unchanged |
| 90A | Presumption: 5-year-old electronic records | 92 | Renumbered | Substantive rule unchanged |
| 92 | Exclusion of oral by documentary | 95 | Renumbered | Parol evidence rule preserved |
| 101 | Burden of proof: general rule | 104 | Renumbered | Substantive rule unchanged |
| 113A | Presumption: abetment of suicide of married woman | 116 | Renumbered | Substantive rule unchanged |
| 113B | Presumption: dowry death | 117 | Renumbered | Substantive rule unchanged |
| 114A | Presumption of absence of consent in rape | 120 | Renumbered | Substantive rule unchanged |
| 121 | Privilege: judges and magistrates | 124 | Renumbered | Substantive rule unchanged |
| 123 | Privilege: affairs of State | 129 | Renumbered | Substantive rule unchanged |
| 133 | Accomplice as competent witness | 138 | Substantively changed | Now arguably tilts toward mandatory corroboration in material particulars |
| 138 | Order of examinations | 143 | Renumbered | Substantive rule unchanged |
| 161 | Right of adverse party to inspect documents | 167 | Renumbered | Substantive rule unchanged |
(For presumption as to electronic agreements under the predecessor IEA framework, our earlier piece walks through the doctrine; the BSA preserves the architecture under Sections 88, 92, and 96.)
Sections that did NOT survive: what was omitted
Not every IEA provision made it into the BSA. A handful have been quietly dropped, generally because they had become redundant or because the subject matter is now covered in the merged provisions. The Standing Committee’s report flagged that “apparent omissions” are often merges, and practitioners should look closely before assuming a doctrine has been discarded.
The practical reality is that genuine omissions are rare and largely uncontroversial. What seems like an omission usually turns out to be a renumber-plus-merge. Before claiming an IEA doctrine has been discarded, check the merged provision in the BSA (the master table above flags status as “Renumbered + merged” wherever applicable).
Sections that are entirely new in the BSA
Three substantive changes deserve a flag. The Schedule format for the Section 63 certificate (formerly outside Section 65B IEA, now formally appended to the BSA itself). The express coverage of absconding co-accused in Section 24 (no IEA equivalent). And the reframing of Section 138 BSA on accomplice corroboration (which arguably tightens what was a discretionary rule under the IEA).
Each of these gets its own H2 below.
| IEA | Topic | BSA | Status | Practical Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | Interpretation clause | 2 | Expanded | “Document” definition expanded to include electronic and digital records. |
| 6 | Res gestae | 4 | Renumbered | Substantive rule unchanged. |
| 8 | Motive, preparation, conduct | 6 | Renumbered | Substantive rule unchanged. |
| 9 | Facts to identify | 7 | Renumbered | Substantive rule unchanged. |
| 10 | Things said or done in conspiracy | 8 | Renumbered | Substantive rule unchanged. |
| 11 | When otherwise irrelevant facts become relevant | 9 | Renumbered | Substantive rule unchanged. |
| 25 | Confession to police officer | 22 | Renumbered | Bar on admissibility retained verbatim. |
| 27 | Discovery statement | 23(2) proviso | Restructured | Pulukuri Kottaya doctrine preserved. |
| 30 | Confession of co-accused | 24 | Changed | Now expressly covers absconding co-accused (joint trial expansion). |
| 32 | Statements by persons who cannot be called | 26 | Renumbered | Eight clauses including dying declaration preserved. |
| 45 | Expert opinion | 39 | Renumbered | Substantive rule unchanged. |
| 60 | Direct oral evidence | 54 | Renumbered | Hearsay bar preserved. |
| 65A | Special provisions: electronic records | 61 | Reframed | Now the enabling provision for digital primary evidence. |
| 65B | Admissibility of electronic records | 63 | Changed | Two-signature certificate (device-controller plus expert). |
| 73A | Proof as to electronic signature | 73 | Renumbered | Substantive rule unchanged. |
| 92 | Exclusion of oral by documentary | 95 | Renumbered | Parol evidence rule preserved. |
| 101 | Burden of proof: general rule | 104 | Renumbered | “He who asserts must prove” preserved. |
| 113A | Presumption: abetment of suicide of married woman | 116 | Renumbered | Substantive rule unchanged. |
| 113B | Presumption: dowry death | 117 | Renumbered | Substantive rule unchanged. |
| 114A | Presumption of absence of consent in rape | 120 | Renumbered | Substantive rule unchanged. |
| 121 | Privilege: judges and magistrates | 124 | Renumbered | Substantive rule unchanged. |
| 123 | Privilege: affairs of State | 129 | Renumbered | Substantive rule unchanged. |
| 133 | Accomplice as competent witness | 138 | Changed | Tilts toward mandatory corroboration in material particulars. |
| 138 | Order of examinations | 143 | Renumbered | Substantive rule unchanged. |
| 161 | Right of adverse party to inspect documents | 167 | Renumbered | Substantive rule unchanged. |
Section 63 BSA: electronic and digital records as primary evidence
If you read only one section of this guide, read this one. Section 63 BSA is the provision that has changed the most about everyday courtroom practice, and it’s the provision most likely to trip up a lawyer who hasn’t updated their templates since June 2024.
So what’s actually new? In one sentence: electronic records can now be primary evidence in their own right, but to make them admissible, you need a Section 63 certificate signed by both the person in charge of the device and a digital-forensics expert. That’s the one-paragraph version. The detail follows.
The statutory framework: Section 61 read with Section 63
Three sections work together. Section 57 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (the new definition of “document,” which includes electronic and digital records). Section 61 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (the enabling provision: nothing in the BSA shall apply to deny the admissibility of an electronic record solely on the ground that it is electronic). And Section 63 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (the certificate regime that operationalises the rule).
Section 61 is doing the heavy lifting of doctrinal reframing. Under the IEA, electronic records were treated as a special category requiring secondary-evidence treatment under Sections 65A and 65B. Under the BSA, electronic records are documents, full stop, and they can be primary evidence. The certificate under Section 63 is the proof-of-authenticity wrapper, not a sign that the record itself is somehow less reliable. The legal philosophy has shifted (and it’s a meaningful shift, even if the practical workflow looks similar).
The two-signature certificate: what changed from Section 65B(4)
Now, here’s where it gets interesting. Section 65B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 required one signature: from a person responsible for the management of the relevant device or activities. That single-signatory model led to years of practitioner argument about who could sign (the device owner? the IT manager? a forensic examiner the party didn’t employ?). Section 63 BSA settles this question, but it does so by adding a requirement.
The new certificate needs two signatures:
- The person in charge of the computer or electronic device
- An expert (a person possessing knowledge of digital forensics or equivalent expertise)
The Schedule appended to Section 63 prescribes the certificate format. Both signatories certify that the electronic record was produced by a computer used regularly to store or process information, that the computer was operating properly during the relevant period, and that the information contained in the record is derived from data fed into the computer in the ordinary course of activities.
For a deep dive on the Section 65B certificate jurisprudence under the predecessor regime, our existing piece walks through the Anvar-Khotkar arc. The practical point: that jurisprudence has been codified and supplemented under Section 63 BSA. It has not been discarded.
The mistake we see most often is lawyers thinking the dual signature is optional. It isn’t. A certificate signed only by the device owner (the old Section 65B(4) format) is now defective on its face. A bench will let you cure the defect at first hearing. By the second adjournment, the patience starts wearing thin.
WhatsApp, CCTV, email, server logs: is each primary evidence under BSA?
Probably the most-asked practitioner question. Let’s run through the main forms:
WhatsApp messages: yes, primary evidence with a Section 63 certificate. Without the certificate, a printout is inadmissible (the Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473 and Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1 logic carries forward verbatim). The screenshot itself plus the certificate plus an affidavit explaining the chain of custody is the standard package.
CCTV recordings: primary evidence with a Section 63 certificate. As an alternative under the Arjun Khotkar exception logic, the original device (the DVR or hard drive) can be produced in court without the certificate, and a forensic-imaging report substitutes. Most prosecutors prefer the certificate route because it doesn’t require dismantling the camera installation.
Emails: same framework. The certificate is signed by the email service provider’s nodal officer (or the equivalent in-house custodian) plus a digital-forensics expert. Yahoo, Gmail, and most enterprise email providers now publish standardised compliance forms for Section 63 requests.
Server logs and cloud documents: same framework, but the cross-border server problem (Section 12 of this guide) introduces complications when the server is located outside India.
The Anvar to Khotkar to Section 63 arc: what survived [HISTORICAL]
This is worth tracing. The Section 65B story spans 18 years and at least five Supreme Court rulings. Each one shaped what eventually became Section 63 BSA.
In 2005, State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, (2005) 11 SCC 600 (a 2-judge SC bench) took a lenient view: secondary evidence of CDR printouts could be admitted via Sections 63 and 65 IEA without a Section 65B(4) certificate. That ruling stood for nearly a decade. In 2014, a 3-judge bench in the Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer ruling overruled it. Section 65B(4) certificate was now mandatory.
The Anvar position held until 2018, when a 2-judge bench in Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2018) 5 SCC 311 tried to relax the rule when the party didn’t possess the device. That stood for two years. In 2020, a 3-judge bench in the Arjun Khotkar ruling overruled Shafhi Mohammad and reaffirmed Anvar, with one carve-out: where the original device is produced in court, the Section 65B(4) certificate isn’t strictly necessary because the court can examine the device itself.
In 2022, Ravinder Singh @ Kaku v. State of Punjab, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 461 confirmed that oral evidence cannot substitute the Section 65B(4) certificate. By the time the BSA was enacted in late 2023, the Anvar-Khotkar position was the settled law. The BSA Section 63 codifies that position and adds the dual-signature safeguard. The 18-year practitioner argument is now, in effect, closed by statute.
Practitioner edge cases: what to do when
What if the device owner refuses to sign the Section 63 certificate? The practical workflow: file an interlocutory application with the trial court seeking a production direction. The court orders the device owner (or the relevant service provider) to either sign the certificate or face contempt. By 2026, this workflow is sufficiently established that most senior advocates can file the application as a routine step, not an exotic move.
What if the original device has been destroyed or is unavailable? The forensic-expert co-signatory becomes critical. The expert can certify based on metadata, hash values, and a forensic-imaging report. The court will need to be satisfied that the loss of the original isn’t suspicious, but that’s a Section 27/63 question (verify the section reference at filing).
What if the server is abroad? The cross-border problem. Cover this in detail in Section 12 below.
Pending cases filed with old Section 65B certificates: re-certify? [SECOND-ORDER]
A common Reddit-thread question. If you filed a Section 65B(4) certificate before 1 July 2024 in a proceeding that’s still at trial stage, do you need to re-certify under Section 63? The answer (and our recommendation, in our view) is: probably not for evidence already on record, definitely yes for fresh tendering of any new electronic exhibit.
The reasoning rests on an analogous BNSS authority. In Anil Kumar Yadav v. Directorate of Enforcement, (J&K HC, 16 April 2025), the J&K and Ladakh High Court held in April 2025 that BNSS framework applies to fresh proceedings filed post-1 July 2024 even where the underlying offence pre-dates the cutoff. Strictly a BNSS ruling, not a BSA ruling. But the doctrinal logic (procedural law of the day governs fresh procedural acts) carries across. Apply it cautiously, plead it carefully, but do apply it.
For a fuller treatment of secondary evidence under Indian law, our earlier piece on the IEA framework remains the better source for the predecessor doctrine. The BSA reframes that doctrine but doesn’t discard it.
Section 24 BSA: joint trial and the absconding co-accused
So why does Section 24 BSA matter? Because it answers a question Section 30 IEA didn’t: what happens to the evidentiary value of a co-accused’s confession when one of the accused is absconding and hasn’t been tried alongside the others?
Under the IEA, the answer was judicially improvised. Under Section 24 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, it’s express. Where one of two or more persons jointly tried for the same offence has absconded or has been declared a proclaimed offender, the trial of the other accused continues, and the absconder is deemed to be jointly tried for the purposes of confession admissibility. Confessions of one accused, otherwise admissible against another, remain admissible even when one accused is absent.
What Section 30 IEA said and what Section 24 BSA changes
Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 read: “When more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, and a confession made by one of such persons affecting himself and some other of such persons is proved, the Court may take into consideration such confession as against such other person as well as against the person who makes such confession.” Three conditions: persons jointly tried, same offence, confession affecting both.
The IEA didn’t expressly address what happens when one accused absconds. Lower courts inferred that joint trial was a status reserved for accused actually present, which created a problem in NIA, PMLA, and organised crime cases where absconders are common. Section 24 BSA fills that gap with an explanation: where an accused has absconded or is a proclaimed offender, that accused is deemed jointly tried with those present, for the purpose of Section 24 admissibility.
The “deemed joint trial” doctrine for absconders
The practical effect is significant. Take an organised-crime case with three accused. Accused A and B are arrested. Accused C absconds. A confesses to the crime, naming B and C. Under the IEA, Section 30 applied straightforwardly to B (jointly tried). Whether A’s confession was admissible against C (not present, not tried) was uncertain. Under Section 24 BSA, the answer is yes, provided C has been formally declared a proclaimed offender under Section 84 BNSS (the BNSS equivalent of CrPC Section 82).
The probative-value rule survives. Confessions of co-accused are weak evidence. They require corroboration. The Pulukuri Kottaya v. King-Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67 line of authorities on confession admissibility hasn’t been displaced. What’s changed is just the threshold question of whether the confession can be considered at all where one accused is absconding.
Practitioner takeaway: defending or prosecuting under Section 24 BSA
For defence counsel: object to the admission of a co-accused’s confession against an absconding accused unless the proclamation order under Section 84 BNSS is properly produced and proved. The Section 24 BSA explanation is conditional on formal proclamation. Without the proclamation, the deemed-joint-trial fiction doesn’t apply.
For prosecution: lay the foundation properly. File the Section 84 BNSS proclamation order. Get the magistrate’s certified copy. Bring it on record before tendering the co-accused’s confession. The mistake we see most often is prosecutors assuming the proclamation will be implicit. It isn’t. Plead it explicitly.
A common question in defence practice is whether the BSA changes the corroboration rule for confessions of co-accused. It doesn’t. The Sarwan Singh-line of authorities, treating confessions of co-accused as the weakest form of evidence requiring substantial corroboration, continues to apply.
Accomplice corroboration under Section 138 BSA
This is the section that gets the least attention in competitor explainers and (in our view) might end up being the most consequential change in the BSA’s substantive reframing of evidence.
The IEA dealt with accomplice evidence in two places. Section 133 IEA said an accomplice is a competent witness, and a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Illustration (b) to Section 114 IEA said the court may presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless his evidence is corroborated in material particulars. Read together, the position was: corroboration is a rule of prudence, not a rule of law. Whether to require it was a discretionary call.
Section 133 IEA + Section 114(b) IEA: the original two-step rule
Bottom line, the old rule worked like this. A trial court could convict on uncorroborated accomplice testimony. But it almost never did. Appellate courts treated lack of corroboration as a serious evidentiary infirmity. The practical bar was high. The doctrinal bar was lower. That gap (between practice and doctrine) gave courts wiggle room in approver-evidence cases (white-collar crime, narcotics, organised crime).
The two-step structure also created an interpretive inelegance. Section 133 said one thing (corroboration optional). Illustration (b) of Section 114 said the opposite (presume unworthy unless corroborated). Generations of law students have asked which provision actually controls. The Supreme Court generally said both, but harmonised. Practitioners rolled their eyes.
Section 138 BSA: the new framing
Section 138 of the BSA collapses the two provisions into a single rule. Statutory text now arguably tilts toward mandatory corroboration in material particulars (the academic commentary, including a 2024 piece from the National Law University Jodhpur Criminal Law Studies Blog, reads it that way).
Whether the BSA actually mandates corroboration as a rule of law (versus continuing the rule-of-prudence position) is unsettled. Our reading: the language of Section 138 is more directive than the IEA combination. But until the Supreme Court rules on it, treat the provision as creating a strong corroboration expectation, not a strict rule.
Practical takeaway
For trial advocates, the working assumption should now be that uncorroborated accomplice testimony will likely lead to acquittal. For investigators, the implication is to build corroborative material from independent sources (independent witnesses, physical evidence, electronic trails). Approver-evidence cases (white-collar crime, narcotics, organised crime) are most affected.
In practice, though, most experienced prosecutors were already treating corroboration as effectively mandatory under the IEA. So the BSA’s Section 138 reframing might end up codifying what was already best practice, rather than introducing a new burden.
Hearsay, dying declarations, and police confessions under the BSA
Three closely related doctrines. Each sees a section-number shift in the BSA. None sees a doctrinal upheaval. The architecture survives almost verbatim.
So what’s actually new in this trio? Mostly nothing, but the citations have all moved. If you’re filing a brief in May 2026, you need the new section numbers. The substantive arguments you’d make under the IEA still work under the BSA, but the section labels have changed.
For the law of admissibility under the IEA, our earlier piece walks through the doctrine in depth. Below, we focus on what has and hasn’t moved in the BSA.
Confessions to police officers: Section 22 BSA (formerly Section 25 IEA)
Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 said: “No confession made to a police officer, shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence.” That bar is now Section 22 BSA. The text is preserved verbatim.
A common question: what about confessions to a magistrate? Those remain admissible under the relevant BNSS provision (Section 183 BNSS, formerly CrPC Section 164). The BNSS-side rules on recording the confession (formal warning, voluntariness check, recording in the magistrate’s own handwriting) are unchanged. The BSA bar on police confessions, and the BNSS framework for magisterial confessions, work in tandem.
A practitioner edge case: confessions to police officers are inadmissible against the maker. They’re also inadmissible against a co-accused. But statements that aren’t strictly confessions (information leading to the discovery of a fact, for instance) come in through Section 23 of the BSA (the discovery exception). Discussed below.
The discovery exception: Section 23 BSA proviso (formerly Section 27 IEA)
Section 27 IEA said that when the fact discovered is in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence in police custody, only “so much of such information … as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered” may be proved. The Privy Council explained the boundary in Pulukuri Kottaya v. King-Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67 in 1946. Only the discovery-leading portion is admissible. A long, narrative confession smuggled in under the guise of discovery would be inadmissible.
Section 23 BSA preserves the discovery exception in a proviso to Section 23(2). The Pulukuri Kottaya doctrine survives intact. Police recovery memos (panchnamas) drafted in 2026 still rely on the same language as those drafted in 1946.
Dying declarations: Section 26 BSA (formerly Section 32 IEA)
Section 32 IEA’s eight clauses (the famous list of statements by persons who cannot be called as witnesses) survive as Section 26 BSA. The clauses cover:
- Statements made as to the cause of death
- Statements in the course of business
- Statements against the maker’s pecuniary or proprietary interest
- Statements giving an opinion on a public right or custom
- Statements relating to the existence of a relationship
- Statements relating to the existence of a relationship in family pedigree
- Statements in a document concerning a family transaction
- Statements made by several persons expressing feelings or impressions
Dying declarations come in under the first clause (statements as to the cause of death). A single dying declaration, if found voluntary and reliable, can sustain conviction. This was settled under the IEA. It remains settled under the BSA.
Hearsay: what BSA tightens and what it leaves alone
The general bar on hearsay (oral evidence must be direct) is in Section 54 of the BSA (formerly Section 60 IEA). The eight historical exceptions in Section 32 IEA survive as Section 26 BSA. Hearsay practice in modern Indian courts has changed less because of the BSA and more because of the way courts now treat WhatsApp and email messages from deceased complainants.
A modern application: a complainant sends a WhatsApp message to a relative describing harassment by the accused. The complainant subsequently dies (suicide or homicide). The WhatsApp message is now offered as a dying declaration under Section 26 BSA, supported by a Section 63 BSA certificate authenticating the message. The combination works (and it didn’t always work cleanly under the IEA, where the documentary-evidence rules and the hearsay exceptions sat in different chapters).
So is hearsay now easier to prove? In practice, yes. Not because the doctrinal bar has fallen, but because the BSA’s integrated treatment of electronic evidence and statements-of-deceased makes the procedural pleading cleaner.
Relevance, presumptions, and burden of proof under the BSA
How does the BSA handle the foundational logical structure of evidence (what’s relevant, what’s presumed, who bears the burden)? Mostly the way the IEA did. With renumbering. And one or two language tweaks.
Relevancy framework (Sections 3 to 50 BSA): what carries forward from IEA
The relevancy chapter is the BSA’s longest substantive chapter, and it’s also its most stable. Chapter II (Sections 3 to 50) covers what facts a court will hear. Most of the doctrines you remember from law school (res gestae, motive and conduct, similar facts, statements in conspiracy) are preserved.
Quick map of the most-cited relevancy provisions:
- Section 4 BSA (Section 6 IEA): res gestae
- Section 6 BSA (Section 8 IEA): motive, preparation, conduct
- Section 7 BSA (Section 9 IEA): facts to identify
- Section 8 BSA (Section 10 IEA): things said or done in conspiracy
- Section 9 BSA (Section 11 IEA): when otherwise irrelevant facts become relevant
- Section 26 BSA (Section 32 IEA): statements by persons who cannot be called
In practice, most relevancy arguments will still cite both the BSA section number and (especially in the early years post-1 July 2024) the IEA equivalent, to help the bench navigate the cite-shift.
Burden of proof (Sections 103 to 117 BSA)
The general rule (he who asserts must prove) is in Section 104 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (formerly Section 101 IEA). The two evidentiary standards (beyond reasonable doubt for criminal cases, preponderance of probabilities for civil cases) are preserved unchanged.
The specific-burden provisions have been renumbered:
- Section 116 BSA (formerly Section 113A IEA): presumption of abetment of suicide of married woman within seven years of marriage
- Section 117 BSA (formerly Section 113B IEA): presumption of dowry death
- Section 120 BSA (formerly Section 114A IEA): presumption of absence of consent in rape cases
What does this mean for you in practice? If you’re on the defence side, the burden-shifting provisions still apply automatically (you don’t need the prosecution to plead them). If you’re on the prosecution side, you still don’t need to lead positive evidence on consent in a rape case (Section 120 BSA does the work). The provisions have shifted by section number. The shifting of burden has not changed.
Presumptions about electronic records and signatures
Three presumption provisions deal with electronic records:
- Section 88 BSA (formerly Section 81A and 88A IEA): Gazette in electronic form, electronic messages
- Section 92 BSA (formerly Section 90A IEA): electronic records 5 years old
- Section 96 BSA: presumption as to electronic agreements
A practical point. The presumption in Section 92 BSA (5-year-old electronic records) is increasingly important in property disputes where electronic title chains and email records of negotiation become central. Combined with the Section 63 BSA certificate, a 5-year-old WhatsApp chat is now both presumed authentic (Section 92) and capable of being admitted as primary evidence (Section 63 with certificate).
Transitional rules: does the BSA apply to cases pending on 1 July 2024?
The single most-asked practitioner question post-1 July 2024. And one almost no competitor explainer answers cleanly.
So what’s the rule? The general principle of statutory interpretation is that procedural amendments apply to fresh procedural acts unless the statute expresses a contrary intention. Evidence law is procedural law (per Salmond, Black’s Law Dictionary, and a long line of judicial gloss). The BSA’s Section 170 repeal-and-savings clause preserves things done under the IEA, but doesn’t preserve the IEA framework itself. So fresh procedural acts (like tendering electronic evidence post-1 July 2024) draw their rules from the BSA.
The general principle: procedural law applies prospectively
Let’s break this down. Suppose an FIR was registered in 2022. The trial commenced in March 2024. The prosecution led witness testimony before 1 July 2024 under the IEA. After 1 July 2024, the prosecution wants to tender electronic evidence (a CCTV clip, say). Which evidence law applies?
The practical reality is that the BSA applies to the fresh procedural act (the tendering of the CCTV). The IEA applied to the procedural acts already completed (the witness testimony already on record). The case isn’t governed by one law uniformly, it’s governed by whatever law was in force at the time of each procedural act.
The decision matrix: which evidence law applies
This is the working table for 2026 practitioners:
| FIR Date | Trial Stage on 1 July 2024 | Evidence Tendered (Date) | Applicable Law |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-1 July 2024 | Trial commenced + evidence already led | Pre-1 July 2024 | IEA |
| Pre-1 July 2024 | Trial commenced | Post-1 July 2024 | BSA (majority view) |
| Pre-1 July 2024 | Trial not yet commenced | After commencement | BSA throughout |
| Post-1 July 2024 | (Trial post-FIR) | Any date | BSA throughout |
The middle two rows are where most practitioner uncertainty lives. The prevailing view (consistent with the Anil Kumar Yadav v. Directorate of Enforcement, (J&K HC, 16 April 2025) doctrine for BNSS) is that the BSA governs fresh tendering, even where the FIR pre-dates 1 July 2024.
The Anil Kumar Yadav v. ED principle (analogous authority)
In the Anil Kumar Yadav v. Directorate of Enforcement ruling, the Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court held on 16 April 2025 that the BNSS framework applies to fresh proceedings filed post-1 July 2024 even where the underlying offence pre-dates the cutoff. The case concerned a complaint filed by the Directorate of Enforcement on 22 August 2024 in relation to alleged offences predating 1 July 2024. The Special Judge had treated the proceedings under the old CrPC framework. The High Court remanded, holding that the post-1 July 2024 BNSS framework applied to the fresh procedural act of complaint filing.
Caveat: this is a BNSS ruling, not a BSA ruling. We’re applying it as analogous authority for the BSA-side question, on the principle that procedural law of the day governs fresh procedural acts. Practitioners should plead it as analogous, not as binding BSA authority.
Practitioner workflow: the four checks before filing electronic evidence in 2026
The practical workflow for any electronic-evidence filing in 2026 looks like this. Run four checks before drafting:
- Check 1: When was the FIR registered?
- Check 2: When was the chargesheet filed (if at all)?
- Check 3: When is the evidence being tendered (today, in two weeks, when)?
- Check 4: Has the same evidence already been certified under Section 65B IEA in this proceeding?
If the evidence was already certified under Section 65B before 1 July 2024 and is part of the existing record, you generally don’t need to re-certify. If the evidence is being tendered fresh post-1 July 2024, use Section 63 BSA format with dual signatures. The Anil Kumar Yadav principle guides the in-between cases.
The mistake we see most often is lawyers applying one rule across the entire proceeding. Don’t. Each procedural act gets its own evidence-law cut. The rule is granular, not blanket.
Landmark cases interpreting BSA-equivalent provisions
How much BSA-applied case law actually exists yet? Honestly, not much. The Act has been in force for under 2 years as of May 2026. The Supreme Court has not yet issued a major BSA-specific ruling. Most of what counts as “BSA case law” is really IEA-era jurisprudence applied to BSA equivalents, on the doctrine that the substantive rules are largely preserved.
Below is the case-law bedrock. Each ruling shaped a doctrine that the BSA has now codified, retained, or modified. Understanding this body of law is how you read the BSA correctly.
The Section 65B / Section 63 BSA arc: Anvar to Khotkar
This 18-year arc is now a single statute. Worth reading in sequence.
In 2005, State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, (2005) 11 SCC 600 (the Parliament Attack case) was the foundational ruling. A 2-judge SC bench held that printouts of CDRs were admissible as secondary evidence under Sections 63 and 65 IEA without a Section 65B(4) certificate. The lenient view stood for nearly a decade. In 2014, Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473 overruled it. A 3-judge SC bench, led by the then-Chief Justice, held that the Section 65B(4) certificate was mandatory. Section 65B was treated as a complete code for electronic-evidence admissibility.
In 2015, Tomaso Bruno v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 7 SCC 178 caused doctrinal drift. A 3-judge bench appeared to revert to Navjot Sandhu reasoning on CCTV evidence. That was later overruled. In 2018, Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2018) 5 SCC 311 (a 2-judge bench) tried to relax the Section 65B(4) certificate when the party tendering the evidence didn’t possess the device. The Shafhi-Mohammad relaxation lasted two years. In 2020, a 3-judge bench in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1 overruled Shafhi-Mohammad and reaffirmed Anvar, with one carve-out: where the original device is produced in court, the Section 65B(4) certificate isn’t strictly necessary because the court can examine the device itself.
In 2022, Ravinder Singh @ Kaku v. State of Punjab, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 461 confirmed that oral evidence cannot substitute the Section 65B(4) certificate. This is the doctrine Section 63 BSA now codifies.
The discovery doctrine: Pulukuri Kottaya survives
In 1946, the Privy Council in Pulukuri Kottaya v. King-Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67 interpreted Section 27 IEA. Only the discovery-leading portion of the accused’s information is admissible. A long narrative confession packaged as a “discovery statement” cannot be smuggled in. The doctrine has survived every subsequent challenge. The BSA Section 23 proviso preserves the rule with the same language. Police panchnamas in 2026 are drafted on the same Pulukuri Kottaya principle they were drafted on 80 years ago.
The transitional precedent: Anil Kumar Yadav v. ED
The most useful 2025 ruling for understanding BSA transition (and one of the earliest authorities applying the new criminal codes to fresh proceedings) is Anil Kumar Yadav v. Directorate of Enforcement, (J&K HC, 16 April 2025). Discussed in Section 10 above. In short: BNSS framework applies to fresh proceedings filed post-1 July 2024 even where the underlying offence is pre-cutoff. Apply the analogous logic for evidence law.
BSA-applied judgments (2024 to 2026): early signals
A genuine practitioner caveat: as of May 2026, the BSA case-law corpus is thin. High Court rulings citing Section 63 BSA in routine criminal trials are emerging. No Supreme Court constitution-bench exposition has yet appeared. The Vinod Boinapally constitutional challenge (filed in 2024, reported by LiveLaw) is pending in the Supreme Court. It challenges aspects of the BSA’s electronic-evidence and confession provisions as overbroad. The challenge may produce the first major BSA-specific Supreme Court ruling. For now, the constitutional position remains unsettled.
The implication for practitioners: cite the IEA jurisprudence as foundational, then cite the BSA section number it’s now codified into. The bench will follow the doctrinal continuity even where the section number is new. For a deeper treatment of examination and cross-examination of witnesses under the predecessor IEA framework, our existing piece walks through procedure that the BSA has substantially preserved.
AI-generated evidence, deepfakes, and BSA’s open questions
Now, the part that competitor explainers don’t really cover. What happens when the electronic record itself is fabricated? Section 63 BSA’s certificate regime can verify the device of origin, the time of recording, and the person in charge. It cannot detect that the underlying audio or video is an AI-generated fabrication.
This is the BSA’s blind spot. And it’s likely to become the most consequential evidentiary question of the next 5 years.
Section 63 BSA’s procedural-vs-substantive limitation [FUTURE]
Let’s break down what Section 63 actually verifies:
- The electronic record was produced by a computer used regularly to store or process information for the relevant activity
- The computer was operating properly during the period the record was generated
- The information in the record is derived from data fed into the computer in the ordinary course of activities
- The certificate is signed by the person in charge plus a digital-forensics expert
What Section 63 doesn’t verify is whether the underlying content (the video, the audio, the image) is a true representation of what actually happened in the world. A perfectly compliant Section 63 certificate could authenticate a deepfake video. The chain of custody is intact. The device is valid. The expert co-signatory checks the metadata and finds it consistent. The content itself is artificial.
The practical implication: Section 63 is a procedural rule, not a substantive truth-detection rule. It always has been (Section 65B IEA had the same limitation). The difference is that AI-generated fabrications, in 2026, are now within reach of any motivated litigant with consumer-grade software. The procedural shield is the same. The threats it’s defending against have multiplied.
Forensic-expert role under Section 63: why the dual signature matters
The dual-signature requirement in Section 63 BSA is a partial answer to the deepfake problem. The expert co-signatory has a professional duty to flag suspicious metadata, hash inconsistencies, or unusual encoding signatures that might suggest fabrication. A 2026 piece by Mondaq on deepfakes and the Section 65B / Section 63 framework, drawing on practitioner commentary in LiveLaw and Lawjurist, recommends a four-element best practice: chain-of-custody documentation, hash verification, metadata preservation, and an independent expert affidavit. Most digital-forensics labs are incorporating these into their standard reports.
The catch is that no consumer-grade or prosecutor-grade forensic toolset can guarantee deepfake detection. The technology is improving on both sides (generation and detection) at roughly the same pace. The expert co-signatory provides reasonable assurance, not certainty. Courts will need to develop their own evidentiary tolerance for this gap. Early signals suggest that benches will treat suspicious provenance (uncertain source, no chain-of-custody) as a stronger ground for rejection than they did under the IEA.
AI-hallucinated case citations and Section 39 BSA expert evidence [SECOND-ORDER]
A separate but related problem. In 2026, the Supreme Court took notice of cases where lawyers had cited “judgments” that turned out to be AI-fabricated. Reliance on LLM-hallucinated case citations may amount to professional misconduct under the Bar Council’s framework. The doctrinal connection is to Section 39 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (expert evidence). Courts must exercise caution before accepting expert opinion based on AI-derived analysis, because the AI-derived analysis itself may be unreliable.
The practical takeaway for advocates is to verify any case cited via an AI tool against Indian Kanoon or SCC OnLine before filing. The verification step that the post-2026 bench expects is Indian Kanoon. The verification step that the pre-2026 bench (often) accepted was a printed citation page from a textbook. Standards have hardened.
The cross-border server problem [FUTURE]
Where servers are abroad (AWS Singapore, Google US, Microsoft Ireland), who is the “person in charge of the computer” under Section 63 BSA? The statute doesn’t say. The IEA Section 65B(4) certificate had the same gap. The gap was always going to surface in serious cases.
As of May 2026, the cross-border server question is unresolved. The first major High Court ruling addressing it is expected within 12 to 18 months (and almost certainly in a commercial-disputes or cyber-fraud context). The provisional best practice that some senior advocates are using is to file a Section 63 certificate from the local custodian (the in-house IT manager who configured the cloud account) plus a supplemental affidavit from the cloud-service provider’s authorised representative. Whether courts accept that workaround as Section 63-compliant remains to be seen.
The practical reality is that cross-border evidence cases are growing fast. Cyber-fraud, cross-border M&A disputes, IPR, employment cases involving expat employees: each is an evidence question that ends up testing Section 63’s reach. The BSA’s drafters arguably didn’t anticipate this. The judicial gloss to fill the gap is going to be substantial. Watch this space.
Practical implementation: what changes in court on Day 1
So you’re walking into court on a Monday morning in May 2026. What’s the practical Day-1 checklist?
The short answer is that almost everything you cite has a new section number, the electronic-evidence certificate has a new format, and three substantive rules (Sections 24, 63, 138) have meaningful changes you need to handle. The longer answer follows.
Day-1 checklist for criminal litigators
For the criminal trial advocate, the cite-shift checklist is:
- Cite Section 22 BSA (not Section 25 IEA) when objecting to admissibility of a confession to police
- Cite Section 23 BSA proviso (not Section 27 IEA) when arguing about discovery statements
- Cite Section 26 BSA (not Section 32 IEA) when offering a dying declaration or other statement of a deceased
- Cite Section 39 BSA (not Section 45 IEA) when offering or challenging expert evidence
- Cite Section 63 BSA (not Section 65B IEA) on every electronic-evidence filing
- File the dual-signed Section 63 certificate per the Schedule format with every electronic exhibit
- Maintain a Section 84 BNSS proclamation order on file before invoking Section 24 BSA against an absconding co-accused
- Argue Section 138 BSA (not Sections 133+114(b) IEA) on accomplice corroboration
The Section 63 certificate is the single biggest day-to-day change. If your office still has a template Section 65B(4) certificate, replace it. Today.
Day-1 checklist for civil litigators
For the civil litigator, the BSA matters every bit as much as it does for criminal practice. The key cite-shifts:
- Section 63 BSA applies in civil suits (emails, contracts in PDF, ledger printouts: each needs the dual-signed certificate)
- Section 95 BSA (not Section 92 IEA) for the parol evidence rule
- Section 167 BSA (not Section 161 IEA) for adverse party’s right to inspect documents
- Documents-only suits (suits on bills of exchange, suits on negotiable instruments, suits on memoranda of agreement): prepare the Section 63 certificate at the affidavit-of-evidence stage, not at the filing stage
A common civil-litigation question is whether Section 63 BSA applies to scanned PDFs of paper documents. The answer is yes, technically. The PDF is an electronic record. The certificate verifies the scan was made from the original paper document. Most senior civil counsel are filing the dual-signed certificate even for routine PDF scans, because the alternative is an objection at trial that derails the timeline.
For the BNSS criminal procedure framework, our existing piece on anticipatory bail under the new procedural code walks through how the BNSS interacts with the BSA in a typical bail proceeding.
E-discovery in commercial suits [SECOND-ORDER]
A big knock-on effect. The Commercial Courts Act, 2015 read with Section 63 BSA is producing a new e-discovery practice in High Court commercial divisions. Producing party emails, server logs, and encrypted chat archives now requires a structured filing: the document itself, the Section 63 certificate, the chain-of-custody affidavit, and (increasingly) hash verification of the export. Some commercial benches are starting to require all four as standard.
For tier-1 corporate disputes, this is now the norm. For mid-cap commercial suits, it’s becoming the norm. For smaller commercial suits, the pressure is one-sided (parties with deeper pockets push for full e-discovery; parties without push back). How this settles is a 2027 question.
Police training and BSA implementation reality
A practical reality check. The Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPRD) circulated comparison materials in 2024, including a BSA-to-IEA Comparison Summary that became the de facto trainer’s manual for police academies. State police training reach is uneven. Tier-1 city police stations (Delhi, Mumbai, Bengaluru) are fully BSA-compliant. Rural police stations in many states are still adapting.
For the practitioner, the implication is that you may encounter chargesheets and police diaries that cite IEA section numbers in 2026. This is a procedural defect (the cite is wrong) but rarely a fatal one (the substantive evidence rules largely overlap). Flag the defect on the record. Don’t expect dismissals on a citation-only ground.
Critical analysis: is the BSA an improvement?
A balanced question. Most explainers either celebrate the BSA as a decolonisation milestone or criticise it as a renumbering exercise. The truth is somewhere in the middle.
In our view, the BSA is a meaningful but incremental improvement on the IEA. It does three things well, leaves two important things unchanged, and introduces two new concerns.
What the BSA does well
The Section 63 codification of the Anvar-Khotkar electronic-evidence rule is the single biggest substantive improvement. Eighteen years of judicial argument is now resolved by statute. Practitioners can cite the rule from Section 63 directly, without having to navigate five overlapping Supreme Court rulings.
The formal Schedule format for the Section 63 certificate (now built into the statute itself) is a modest but meaningful procedural improvement. Under the IEA, the certificate format was prescribed in a separate schedule. Now it’s part of the statutory text, and practitioners can lift the language directly without a separate look-up.
The express coverage of absconding co-accused in Section 24 BSA fills a genuine gap in Section 30 IEA. The doctrinal improvisation that lower courts had been doing for years is now codified.
The language modernisation across the 170 sections is uneven, but on balance the BSA reads more cleanly than the IEA did. Section sequencing is more intuitive (the electronic-evidence provisions cluster together at Sections 57, 61, 63 instead of being spread across Sections 65A and 65B). The Hindi-rooted vocabulary is, for many lawyers, a cosmetic change. For others, it’s a substantive signal of the legislative direction.
What concerns remain [FUTURE]
The Vinod Boinapally constitutional challenge (filed in 2024 and reported by LiveLaw) is pending in the Supreme Court. It challenges aspects of the BSA’s electronic-evidence and confession provisions as overbroad. Whether the challenge succeeds remains to be seen. Either outcome will produce the first major BSA-specific Supreme Court ruling, and either way, the doctrinal landscape will shift.
The Standing Committee minority dissent flagged language inconsistency in the Hindi nomenclature of certain technical terms. Most of those concerns have been absorbed into the post-enactment commentary, but they remain a low-grade source of interpretive uncertainty.
The Section 63 dual-signature requirement creates a practical question of expert availability, particularly for trial advocates in tier-2 and tier-3 cities. In Delhi, Mumbai, Bengaluru, and Chennai, empanelled digital-forensics experts are abundant. In Patna, Ranchi, or Imphal, the practical supply is thinner. This is a 2026-2027 problem that will sort itself out as the forensic-expert market expands. But for the moment, it’s a real constraint on Section 63 compliance in non-metro practice.
Second-order effects [SECOND-ORDER]
The forensic-expert market expansion is real and growing. Section 63’s “expert plus person-in-charge” dual signature creates a captive demand for empanelled digital-forensic experts at every bar association and court complex. This is a meaningful new market for forensic-tech firms and (for the LawSikho audience) for lawyers who add a digital-forensics certification to their practice profile.
The cross-border evidence and cloud-server certification problem (Section 12 above) is a litigation-time-bomb that hasn’t gone off yet. When it does, the doctrinal answer it produces will reshape commercial-evidence practice.
Increased professional-misconduct exposure for lawyers who rely on AI-generated case citations (per the 2026 SC observation) is a third effect that will only grow. The BSA’s Section 39 framework (expert evidence) gives courts a doctrinal hook to exclude AI-derived analyses unless properly verified. Combined with Bar Council scrutiny, this is going to professionalise legal-research workflows in a way the IEA never had to.
Frequently asked questions
What is the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023?
The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) is India’s new law of evidence. It replaced the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 with effect from 1 July 2024. Enacted as Act No. 47 of 2023, it has 170 sections across 12 chapters and 4 parts and applies to all judicial proceedings in or before any court (civil and criminal), with the express exception of arbitration proceedings and affidavits before any court or officer.
When did the BSA 2023 come into force?
The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam came into force on 1 July 2024. The Act received Presidential assent on 25 December 2023, and the Ministry of Home Affairs notified 1 July 2024 as the commencement date through a Gazette notification. From that date, the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 stood repealed across the whole of India, including Jammu and Kashmir.
How many sections does the BSA 2023 contain?
The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam contains 170 sections, organised across 12 chapters and 4 parts. By comparison, the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 had 167 sections in 11 chapters and 3 parts. The BSA’s additional sections are concentrated around electronic-evidence procedure, joint trial expansion (Section 24), and accomplice corroboration (Section 138).
Why was the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 replaced after 152 years?
The IEA was replaced for three reasons: a 152-year accumulation of judicial gloss had layered the statute with interpretive baggage (the Section 65B saga is the canonical example); the original 1872 framework couldn’t cleanly handle modern electronic-evidence forms (mobile phones, cloud servers, social media, AI-generated content); and the Union Government framed the replacement as part of a comprehensive break from colonial-era criminal-law architecture, alongside the BNS and BNSS.
What is the difference between the Indian Evidence Act and the BSA?
The BSA preserves roughly 90% of the IEA’s substance. The 10% that has changed concentrates on electronic-evidence procedure (Section 63 with its dual-signature certificate), joint trial provisions for absconding co-accused (Section 24), and accomplice corroboration (Section 138). Almost every section has been renumbered. A handful of provisions have been merged or omitted. The substantive evidence doctrines (res gestae, dying declarations, hearsay, burden of proof) survive almost verbatim.
What replaced Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act in the BSA?
Section 65B of the IEA is now Section 63 of the BSA. The substantive rule (electronic records require an authentication certificate) is preserved. The certificate format has changed: where Section 65B(4) required a single signature from a person in charge of the device, Section 63 BSA now requires two signatures: the person in charge of the computer and a digital-forensics expert. The Schedule format for the certificate is built into the statute itself.
What replaced Section 27 of the IEA in the BSA?
Section 27 of the IEA (the discovery exception to the bar on confessions to police) is now contained in the proviso to Section 23(2) of the BSA. The Pulukuri Kottaya doctrine, which limits the admissible portion of an accused’s information to what relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, survives intact. Police panchnama (recovery memo) drafting practice continues unchanged.
Are there any IEA sections that have no BSA equivalent?
A small number. The Standing Committee report flagged that “apparent omissions” are often merges. Genuine omissions (provisions with no BSA equivalent at all) are rare. Most IEA provisions have been renumbered, some have been merged into broader BSA sections, and a few have been quietly dropped as redundant. Before claiming an IEA doctrine has been discarded, check the merged provision in the BSA.
Can WhatsApp chats be primary evidence under the BSA?
Yes. Under Section 57 read with Section 61 BSA, electronic records (including WhatsApp messages) qualify as primary evidence in their own right. To make them admissible, you must file a Section 63 BSA certificate signed by both the device owner and a digital-forensics expert, plus a chain-of-custody affidavit. A WhatsApp printout without the Section 63 certificate is inadmissible (the Anvar-Khotkar logic, now codified, applies).
What is the Section 63 BSA certificate format and who must sign it?
Section 63 BSA prescribes a certificate format in the appended Schedule. The certificate must be signed by two persons: the person in charge of the computer or electronic device, and an expert (a person possessing knowledge of digital forensics or equivalent expertise). Both signatories certify that the device was operating properly during the relevant period and that the record is derived from data fed into the computer in the ordinary course of activities.
Do I need a fresh Section 63 certificate for emails I already filed under Section 65B IEA?
Generally no for evidence already on record before 1 July 2024 in a proceeding still at trial stage. Generally yes for fresh tendering of any new electronic exhibit post-1 July 2024. The reasoning rests on an analogous BNSS authority (Anil Kumar Yadav v. Directorate of Enforcement, J&K HC, April 2025): procedural law of the day governs fresh procedural acts. The earlier Section 65B(4) certificate retains its procedural validity for the procedural acts already completed under the IEA framework.
Can deepfake videos be admitted as evidence under the BSA?
A deepfake video can clear the Section 63 procedural threshold (a valid certificate authenticates the device of origin and the chain of custody, but not the truthfulness of the content). The substantive question of whether the video accurately represents what actually happened is a separate matter, addressed through cross-examination, expert challenge, and Section 39 BSA scrutiny of expert opinion. Best-practice now requires hash verification, metadata preservation, and (where available) deepfake-detection forensic analysis as part of the expert co-signatory’s certification.
Does the BSA apply to cases pending on 1 July 2024?
The BSA applies to fresh procedural acts post-1 July 2024, even in cases whose underlying FIR or cause of action pre-dates the cutoff. Procedural acts already completed before 1 July 2024 (witness testimony already led, certificates already filed) retain their validity under the IEA framework that was in force at the time. The rule is granular, not blanket.
Do I still need to comply with the Anvar v. Basheer rule after 1 July 2024?
Yes, in substance. The Anvar v. P.K. Basheer rule (mandatory certificate for electronic-evidence admissibility) has been codified into Section 63 BSA. The Section 63 certificate is now a statutory requirement (not just a judicial gloss on Section 65B), and it carries an additional dual-signature element. Practitioners who complied with Anvar under the IEA need to upgrade their compliance template for Section 63 BSA. The 2020 Arjun Khotkar carve-out (where the original device is produced) carries forward in substance.
What evidence law applies to a 2022 FIR being tried in 2025?
The IEA applies to procedural acts already completed before 1 July 2024 (witness testimony already on record, electronic-evidence certificates already filed). The BSA applies to fresh procedural acts post-1 July 2024 (new evidence tendered, new certificates filed). The case as a whole isn’t governed by one law uniformly, it’s governed by whatever law was in force at the time of each procedural act.
What is the rule on accomplice evidence under Section 138 BSA?
Section 138 BSA collapses the IEA’s two-step rule (Section 133 plus Illustration (b) of Section 114) into a single provision. The text arguably tilts toward mandatory corroboration in material particulars, though the position remains unsettled until the Supreme Court rules on it. The practical takeaway: treat the provision as creating a strong corroboration expectation, build corroborative material from independent sources, and assume that uncorroborated accomplice testimony will likely lead to acquittal.
Are confessions to police officers still inadmissible under the BSA?
Yes. Section 22 BSA (formerly Section 25 IEA) preserves the bar on admissibility of confessions to police officers verbatim. A confession to a magistrate (under Section 183 BNSS, formerly CrPC Section 164) remains admissible. Statements to police that are not strictly confessions (information leading to the discovery of a fact) come in through the Section 23 BSA proviso (formerly Section 27 IEA), preserving the Pulukuri Kottaya doctrine.
What does Section 24 BSA say about joint trials when an accused is absconding?
Section 24 BSA (formerly Section 30 IEA) preserves the rule that confessions of one accused, jointly tried with another, may be considered against both. Section 24 expressly extends this to absconding co-accused: where one accused has been declared a proclaimed offender under Section 84 BNSS, that accused is deemed to be jointly tried for confession-admissibility purposes, and confessions of the present accused may be considered against the absconder.
References
Case Law
- Anil Kumar Yadav v. Directorate of Enforcement, (J&K HC, 16 April 2025)
- Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473 : AIR 2015 SC 180; (2014) 10 SCALE 660
- Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1 : AIR 2020 SC 4908
- Pulukuri Kottaya v. King-Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67 : Privy Council, 19 December 1946
- Ravinder Singh @ Kaku v. State of Punjab, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 461 : Criminal Appeal No. 1307 of 2019
- Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2018) 5 SCC 311 : SLP (Crl.) No. 2302 of 2017
- State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, (2005) 11 SCC 600 : AIR 2005 SC 3820
- Tomaso Bruno v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 7 SCC 178 : AIR 2015 SC (SUPP) 412; 2015 Cri LJ 1690
Statutes
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (repealed by BSA 2023 with effect from 1 July 2024): sections cited 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 25, 27, 30, 32, 45, 60, 65A, 65B, 73A, 81A, 84, 88A, 90A, 92, 101, 113A, 113B, 114, 114A, 121, 123, 133, 138, 161
- Information Technology Act, 2000 : cross-referenced as the source of the IEA’s Sections 65A and 65B insertions
- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 46 of 2023): sections cited 84 (proclamation order), 183 (magisterial confession)
- Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (Act No. 47 of 2023): sections cited 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 22, 23, 24, 26, 39, 54, 57, 61, 63, 73, 80, 88, 92, 95, 96, 104, 116, 117, 120, 124, 129, 138, 143, 167
This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance, consult a qualified legal professional.
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