This article is written by Harshita Agrawal. The article signifies the legal interpretation of wills concerning ancestral property within the Hindu Mitakshara law framework. The Supreme Court held that if a will explicitly states that property should be treated as ancestral, then the son would inherit it as such with respect to his male descendants. The article highlights key principles under Mitakshara law and examines the court’s judgements and subsequent decisions, coupled with various statements and arguments pertinent to this legal precedent.

This article has been published by Shashwat Kaushik.

Introduction

The evolution of Hindu law during the age of commentaries and digests marked the formation of various schools with opposing doctrines. Mitakshara is a highly significant school of Hindu law, as it provides a comprehensive commentary on the Smriti authored by Yajnavalkya. This school is followed throughout India except in West Bengal and Assam. The inheritance law of the school of Mitakshara is based on the concept of propinquity, which means that the closest blood relative inherits. The provision of the Hindu law is that the father acting as a Karta has the authority to give a portion of the movable joint family assets to any close relatives as an expression of love and affection. Karta, under Mitakshara law, has also the right to gift or will of his property according to his choices and the decision cannot be questioned by anyone. The contention arises when a father gifts or wills his movable or immovable property to one of his sons, excluding the others, and whether the son inherits the ancestral property or self-acquired property, and the subsequent impact on the rights of male descendants. However, there are no clear words describing the kind of interest from the will or gift as mentioned in the case of C. N. Arunachala Mudaliar vs C. A. Muruganatha Mudaliar, (1953) which further complicates the issue.

Details of the case

Name of the case: C. N. Arunachala Mudaliar vs. C. A. Muruganatha Mudaliar and Another

Name of the court: Supreme Court of India

Date of the judgement: 14 October, 1953

Equivalent citations: 1953 AIR 495, 1954 SCR 243, AIR 1953 SUPREME COURT 495, 1966 MADLW 1072

Bench: J. B. K. Mukherjea, J. Mehr Chand Mahajan, J. B. Jagannadhadas

Authored by: J. B. K. Mukherjea

Petitioner: C. N. Arunachala Mudaliar

Represented by: P. Somasundaram with R. Ganapathy Iyer

Respondent: C. A. Muruganatha Mudaliar and Another

Represented by: B. Somayya with K. R. Chowdhury

Facts of the case 

C. N. Arunachala Mudaliar had two sons from his first marriage, Muruganatha and his brother. After the death of his wife, he remarried. The Plaintiff, Muruganatha Mudaliar (respondent No. 1 in this appeal), filed a case seeking specific allotment of one-third of his father’s property. He alleged that these properties were jointly owned by himself, his father, C.N. Arunachala Mudaliar (Defendant No. 1 in this appeal) and his brother (the plaintiff’s brother). 

According to the allegations in the complaint, the conflict arose after the arrival of his stepmother in the household, as the father began to claim sole ownership of the joint family property, refusing to acknowledge any rights of his sons, resulting in the filing of the suit. 

The plaintiff sought partition of various assets, including agricultural land, a house, jewellery, furniture, brass utensils, and cash in his father’s name. However, the father denied the existence of property that the plaintiff could claim, as he stated that the agricultural land and houses were his separate property and he inherited them through a will from his father. The other assets, like cash, furniture, and brass utensils, were his separate property, and jewellery belonged exclusively to his second wife (defendant No. 3). 

The will of C. N. Arunachala was straightforward, as he owned all the properties independently, acquired without any ancestral fund. The will stipulated that upon his demise, the properties would pass to all his sons, as mentioned, and they should be granted full ownership rights, including the ability to sell, gift, or exchange the properties to their descendants. The father had previously allocated certain properties to his brother’s wives and his own wife during their lifetimes, with these properties reverting to one of his sons after their demise as specified in the will. 

The plaintiff’s brother supported his brother (Muruganatha Mudaliar), and the second wife of their father clearly stated that she was not a part of this proceeding in any manner, and regarding the question about the jewellery, it solely belonged to her, so nobody could have the right to claim it.

As the trial proceeded further, the trial judge concluded that the properties inherited by Defendant No. 1 from his father should be held to be ancestral properties in his hands, and those acquired using ancestral income were deemed to be joint properties.

The subordinate judge issued a preliminary decree in favour of the plaintiff and granted relief as requested in the complaint, with the exception of certain jewellery articles considered non-existent.

The High Court ruled in favour of C. A. Muruganatha Mudaliar and stated that the properties gifted by his father were self-acquired and not ancestral. The decision of the High Court underscored the clarifications regarding ancestral and self-acquired properties and the rights associated therein.

Issues raised 

• Whether the son has any claim to property independently acquired by the father?
• Whether the properties acquired by defendant No. 1 through his father’s will should be classified as ancestral or self acquired properties in his possession?

Arguments of the parties

Petitioners 

The petitioner cited the Mitakshara law, which emphasises a man’s religious duty to ensure support, and concluded, “They who are born, and they who are yet conceived and those still in the womb need support. Therefore, no gift or sale should be made.” The petitioner also claimed that the properties in his possession were ancestral and he had a claim to them, including the right to partition, and the father had claimed sole ownership of the joint family property and self-acquired rather than the ownership being a shared asset within the family. The properties were exempted by the father from division under customary joint family rules.

Respondent  

The respondent argued before the court that all of the father’s assets were self-acquired and he received them through his father’s will. He also contended that under the Hindu law, the father retained absolute authority over his self-acquired assets including the right to gift them to his son. This perspective emphasised that such gifted properties remained as self-acquired in the ownership of the son rather than automatically converting into ancestral assets subject to partition among family members.

Laws/concepts involved in the case

Section 1, Chapter 5 of the well-known text of Yagnavalkya- It refers to the fact that where the division of a grandfather’s wealth among his grandsons was mentioned, the grandsons had a right by birth to the estate of the grandfather and were entitled to shares upon partition, though their shares would be determined per estate of descendants and not per capita.

Section 1, Chapter 1 of Mitakshara- It concerns a father’s rights over his self-acquired property and the interests of his sons and grandsons in such property. The property in the paternal or ancestral estate was acquired by birth, and though the father had independent power over the disposal effects other than the immovables for indispensable acts for essential duties and legally prescribed purposes such as gifts made out of affection, family support, or relief from distress, consent should be obtained regarding immovable property. It applied whether the immovable property was acquired by the father himself or inherited from his ancestors since it stipulated though immovables or bipeds had been acquired by a man himself, a gift or sale should not be made without convening all the sons.

Text of Narada- It was referred to as per the above-mentioned section that there were three types of property which were exempted from division and any favour conferred by a father i.e., what is earned through bravery, the wife’s wealth and the knowledge acquired through education. The Mitakshara is fairly clear on placing the father’s gift separately and in several places that were exempted from partition.

Section 2, Chapter 1 of Mitakshara- It stated that a gift from a father to his son automatically became ancestral property in the hands of the recipient and with this viewpoint, a clear response was provided to the argument that such gifted property should be divided between the father and sons as it did not fit the definition of “self-acquisition”.

Section 4, Chapter 1 of Mitakshara- It stated about properties not subjected to partition and property obtained through the father’s favour and listed among those that could not be divided. As per paragraph 13 of this relevant section through a son born after the partition took the whole of his parent’s property, any property affectionately given to a separated son remained with him. As per paragraph 28 of the above-mentioned section, property obtained through the favour of the father possessed significant meaning. Both the ancestral and self-acquired property could be divided by a Mitakshara father even without his sons’ agreement, but the law guidelines must be followed if he chooses to divide it. However, when a father gave gifts as acts of generosity, no legal rule should be bound at his discretion, as the text also outlined the permissible inequality between elder and younger sons.

Section 5, Chapter 1 of Mitakshara- It stated that the grandson had a right to prohibit his undivided father from donating or selling effects inherited from the grandfather. However, he lacked the authority to intervene in assets acquired by the father. The notion that the father’s right to dispose of his self-acquired property was as restricted as it was for ancestral property was countered. Although the son had a right by birth in both his father’s and grandfather’s property, he remained dependent on his father regarding the paternal estate. Since the father had a predominant interest in the property he acquired himself, the son should acquiesce in the father’s disposal of his self-acquired property.

Yagnavalkya, Book 2, Verse 129- These treaties are foundational texts in Hindu law, and Book 2 focuses on civil law, including property and inheritance. Verse 129 is significant in the context of property rights and inheritance. This verse underscores the father’s intention and decision regarding the importance of property and affirms his complete autonomy over self-acquired property. It also stated that his family members have no grounds to challenge his decisions regarding the disposal of this property.

Mayne’s Hindu Law- Mayne’s Treatise on Hindu Law is a significant work in the field of Hindu law and provides valuable insights into the legal principles and customs governing Hindu society including the Manusmriti, the Dharmashastra, and Yagnavalkya’s Smriti. The original treatise was first published in 1878, has been widely referenced, and remains a valuable resource for legal scholars and practitioners. Despite the ancient origins of Mayne, the conflicting texts on various legal matters make it challenging to determine a definite version of classical Hindu law. The treatise covers various aspects of Hindu law, including property rights, adoption, joint families, widowhood, and more. It also includes commentaries on several important acts, such as the Hindu Marriage Act, Hindu Succession Act, Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, and Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act.

Judgement in C.N. Arunachala Mudaliar vs. C.A. Muruganatha Mudaliar (1953)

The Supreme Court referred to the principles of Yagnavalkya, Book 2, Verse 129 which underscored the significance of the property of the owner in determining the status of the property and Mayne’s Hindu law to support the interpretation that if a father would clearly express the intention for the property to remain separate. It also asserted the pivotal role of the testator’s intent in property determination under the Mitakshara school of Hindu law.

The Honourable Court gave the judgement that the father’s intention regarding whether the property should be considered separate or joint family property is significant. The High Court of Madras addressed the issue of whether properties inherited by a Hindu son from his father should be deemed ancestral or self-acquired. The High Court’s ruling laid the groundwork for a subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court, which upheld the interpretation and reinforced these principles. The decision of the lower court was reversed, and the plaintiff’s lawsuit was dismissed. This signifies that the testator chose to grant his son complete ownership of the property as specified in his will. 

The Supreme Court concluded the appeal was to be upheld, setting aside the judgements and decrees of both lower courts and thereby dismissing the plaintiff’s suit. The significance of the fact, which had sparked considerable judicial debate, was that the plaintiff himself was a pauper. Therefore, the court ordered each party to bear their own costs across all of the court’s proceedings.

Relevant judgements referred to in the case

A reconciliation was attempted in an early Calcutta case by suggesting that the rights of the sons in their father’s self-acquired property were imperfect and unenforceable by law. In the case of Rao Balwant Singh vs. Rani Kishori, (1898) the issue was addressed by the Judicial Committee, and while delivering the judgement, Lord Hobhouse noted that Hindu law texts often mix religious and moral considerations with legal rules. It was held that in a joint Hindu family, the father had complete and unrestricted discretion over the disposal of his self-acquired property. Under Mitakshara law, the male descendants had no right to challenge the father’s unfettered rights. The various High Courts in India had rightly held that a Mitakshara father could sell his self-acquired property to a stranger without his son’s consent and gift such property to one son over another, even distributing his property unequally among his heirs.

The Calcutta High Court in the case of Gurumukh Singh vs. Kamod Singh, (1863) 1 M.I.A. 367 ruled that the property inherited from the father became ancestral in the hands of the son. The judicial opinions were divided, with each case being interpreted based on its unique circumstances.

The High Court of Madras held in the case of Bavisetti Venkata Surya Rao vs. Muthayya, (1963) that if a father did not specify or determine whether the bequeathed property be ancestral or self-acquired, the property should be considered ancestral. The judgement is supported by the full bench of the Patna High Court, and the decision of the Calcutta High Court interpreted this as well.

On the other hand, the Bombay High Court in the case of Thamma Venkata Subbamma vs. Thamma Rattamma (1987) was of the opinion to hold such gifted property as self-acquisition of the donee unless the donor explicitly stated it to be ancestral. The same perception is supported in the case of Lallu Singh vs. Gur Narain, (1922) by the Allahabad High Court and the Lahore High Court.

This judicial conflict was brought to the attention of the Privy Council in Lal Ram Singh vs. Deputy Commissioner of Pratapgarh, (1923) but the judicial committee did not resolve the issue as it was not necessary for that particular case.

The 11th edition, paragraph 280 and page 344 of Mayne’s Hindu Law presented another argument favoured by the Patna High Court in a full bench case, which stated that the exception for a father’s gift applied only to partitions between the donee and his brothers and remained partial when it came to the donee’s male descendants. The theory of equal ownership of ancestral property between a father and son did not apply to a father’s gifts. Therefore, a property gifted by a father to his son did not become ancestral property simply because the son received it from his father or ancestor.  

Rationale behind this judgement

As referred to in the Calcutta case Vide Muddan vs. Ram Doss, (1872), 31 M.I.A. 358 the court shared views on two main points. The first ground is Mitakshara, following Yagnavalkya’s authority, which states that there will be equal ownership of ancestral property shared by father and son. The other ground includes that the definition of “self-acquisition” given by Mitakshara does not include such a gift of this character and should be considered as property that can be divided between the son and the children.

The Supreme Court, in its reasoning, stated that in the case of ancestral or grandfather’s property passed down to the father, the son shared equal rights with his father, and in the father’s self-acquired property, the rights would be unequal as the father had independent control and greater interest in it. The court noted that the son could only claim the right equally with his father only when the property of the grandfather had passed down to the father upon the death of the grandfather or through a will made by the grandfather during his lifetime and became ancestral property in his hands. As per the above-mentioned conditions, the grandfather’s property came down to the father due to his legal right as a son or descendant of the former, and if the father received the property as a gift and not by virtue of the latter’s legal rights, but his father chose to bestow a favour on him that could have been given to anyone else, the rights in such property solely depended on the grandfather’s intentions.

Hence, the court asserted that to determine whether a property is ancestral in someone’s possession, it is crucial to consider not only their relationship with the owner but also the process of transfer.

It was well established in Mitakshara law that a father had sole authority over his self-acquired property; it could explicitly be decided by him when he made a gift whether the recipient would receive it solely for themselves or for the benefit of their family. When the deed of gift or will includes clear provisions, there should be no confusion and the son’s interest would depend on these terms only. However, if there were no clear words describing the nature of the interest, the court would need to interpret the intention of the donor based on the language of the document or the circumstances laid thereupon. Essentially, the court would determine whether the donor intended to gift the property outright or set it aside for future partition. The focus would be on understanding the intent behind the disposition rather than its formal wording.

Analysis of C.N. Arunachala Mudaliar vs. C.A. Muruganatha Mudaliar (1953) 

As per Mitakshara law, the father had absolute authority over his self-acquired property to which no objections were taken from his male descendants, and as per the opinion of the Supreme Court, it was incorrect to assume that property given or willed to a son automatically becomes ancestral property in which the son’s children would acquire co-ordinate interest.

Upon reviewing the will and considering the circumstances surrounding it appeared that the primary intention of the testator was to provide adequately for close family members whom he held in affection and wished to bestow. He did not want to divide his property among his heirs in a customary manner, likely to prevent future disputes expected after his death. He would certainly have granted his wife an equal share as his sons and allocated a quarter share to his unmarried daughter if he had intended a partition as per Hindu law.

The current consideration in this case was his intent regarding the kind of interest that his sons were to take in the properties passed to them. The will was explicit in granting the son absolute rights with full powers of alienation by way of sale, gift, and exchange. These properties were not intended to be held for the benefit of their families or future generations. The testator desired that his sons should have full ownership of the properties bestowed on them and entrusted them entirely with the responsibility of caring for their families and children.  

Conclusion 

The case of C. N. Arunachala Mudaliar vs. C. A. Muruganatha Mudaliar (1953) represents a notable balance in support of the order authored by J. B. K. Mukherjea that the father’s intention regarding whether the property should be considered separate or joint family property is significant, and in the absence of any clear intent, the nature of the property is determined on the basis of the language of the deed and the surrounding circumstances. As per the interpretation of the will by the judge, the testator did not intend for the property to pass to the sons as ancestral property. This signifies that the testator chose to grant his son complete ownership of the property as specified in his will. The judgement underscores the principle of the Mitakshara school as it recognises the self-acquired property along with the individual’s autonomy over his self-acquired assets, as the property acquired by an individual through personal efforts or received via gift is considered a self-acquired one and intended to remain separate. These properties do not become part of coparcenary property.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

What are the types of schools in Hindu law?

The schools of Hindu law are the commentaries and digestives of the smritis and broaden the scope contributing to its development. The two major laws of Hindu law are:

• Mitakshara: It is one of the significant schools of Hindu law. It is a comprehensive commentary on the Smriti authored by Yajnavalkya. This school is applicable throughout India except in West Bengal and Assam. Although it has broad jurisdiction, the different parts of the country practice law differently because of regional variations in customary law.
• Dayabhaga: It is also recognised as one of the most significant schools of Hindu law and a comprehensive digest of the leading Smritis. It prevails in Assam and West Bengal and primarily addresses the issues related to partition, inheritance and joint family matters. The Dayabhaga School aims to rectify the shortcomings and limitations of previously established principles.

How do the Dayabhaga and Mitakshara schools of Hindu Law differ from each other?

Grounds	Dayabhaga	Mitakshara
Involvement	Both male and female members are included in this school	Only male members are included
Inheritance	The right to acquire property is only after the father’s death	The right to acquire properties is by birth
Partition	It is based on individual ownership	It is based on shares
Rights	This school has a concept of stridhan and equal rights of women in husband’s property	There is no concept of equal rights in this school
Significance	It is more of a liberal school	It is a conservative school

What do you mean by will under Mitakshara law?

As per the Mitakshara law, the allocation of parental property follows the principle of inheritance by birth. Moreover, a man has the right to bequeath his property through a will. Coparceners are the individuals to whom the joint family properties are passed and belong to the next three generations.

What is will under Hindu law?

A will under Hindu law is a legal declaration that expresses the intention of a person to transfer their property to another person, who may or may not be a legal heir. A will becomes effective after the death of a person.

What are the key characteristics of ancestral property under Mitakshara law?

Ancestral property refers to property inherited from a parental ancestor. As per the Mitakshara law, any property inherited by a male Hindu from his father, grandfather, or great-grandfather is considered as ancestral property, and any property inherited from another relative is deemed separate property. The key characteristic of ancestral property is that the sons, grandsons, and great-grandsons of the person who inherits it automatically acquire an interest in and rights attached to such property from the moment of their birth.

What is a testator in a will?

A testator refers to a person who made a will that was valid at the time of their death. Even if they have already passed away, they are referred to as the testator if a legal and valid will exists. While the term is somewhat old-fashioned, it remains commonly used in discussions related to wills.

References

• https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/essay/yajnavalkya-smriti-vyavaharadhyaya-study/d/doc628217.html
• https://www.indiacode.nic.in/show-data?actid=AC_CEN_3_20_00027_195630_1517807324239&sectionId=29918 section=6 order no=6
• https://blog.ipleaders.in/historical-perspectives-hindu-law-inheritance/
• https://blog.ipleaders.in/hindu-law-notes/
• https://blog.ipleaders.in/sources-schools-hindu-law/