This article is written by Kartikeya Awasthi, a student from SVKM’s NMIMS SCHOOL OF LAW, Navi Mumbai. In this article, the author has drawn a comparison between Mercy and Justice.
What is Mercy?
If mercy requires a departure from strict justice, it is calling for injustice, a vice; if mercy never requires a departure from strict justice, it is then merely a part of justice, the purpose of this paper is to analyze charges on mercy. Murphy describes mercy as “As a moral virtue, mercy derives its value at least in part from the fact that it flows from a certain state of character – a character disposed to perform merciful acts from love or compassion while not losing sight of the importance of justice. ”
It is a principle of justice that a judge has a prima-facie duty to be dispassionate, to avoid being influenced by feelings they might have towards the litigants before them. A judge motivated by justice alone will therefore tend to set aside feelings of compassion. Mercy and justice, considered as states of character ,are thus quite distinct. This concept is taken into consideration in criminal procedure code of India (section 211 & 236). A sense of empathy could let a judge know what sort of suffering a particular penalty will cause that convict. But empathy for the suffering of another is compassion and compassion. when it motivates its subject to leniency, is mercy. Merely being merciful as judge will have just a tangent touched to the projectile motion of justice, and for sure we aren’t expecting mercy or justice. A judgment which is just, fair and reasonable
Justice not always mean like Aristotle’s paradigm of friendship. Where one of the friends in name of justice ask for the gift which he receives must be equivalent to the gift he gave. It is thus at least conceivable that mercy may function like that. But in a liberal political culture, with its intense suspicion of discretionary power, the connection brings mercy into disrepute. Hence Kant’s scathing description of the right to grant clemency as the ‘slip- priest’ of a sovereign’s powers, ‘for it must be exercised in such a way as to show the splendor of his majesty although he is thereby doing injustice to the highest degree.
What is Justice?
The apparent conflict between justice and mercy has been the subject of much recent discussion. If,
(a) giving someone a deserved penalty is an act of justice and sparing someone a deserved penalty is an act of mercy, and
(b) if failing to act justly is immoral while showing mercy is supererogatory, then showing mercy is immoral (since showing mercy is a failure to act justly) and failing to act justly is not immoral (since sparing deserved suffering is supererogatory). The insult or informing is a “mere offence”, then the perpetrator of such an act is worthy of moral criticism for having acted badly (though she is not worthy of moral condemnation for having acted immorally). The one who punishes justly, however, is not worthy of any sort of moral criticism. Hence, punishment cannot be counted as an offence. One should not doubt the spirit of justice.
If the one who punishes were praiseworthy for having acted beyond the call of duty by inflicting deserved suffering, then how could one who fails to punish be praiseworthy for failing to do that which is good but not obligatory?
Capital punishment in India is hang by neck till death. This concept has always been in the spectrum of debate, being UltraVires or IntraVires. Considering the fact that till date this concept has sustained the test of time and it is IntraVires in accordance to the constitution of India.
Every wing who have been entrusted by the constitution of India to vest certain powers are subject to due process of law. Now it’s time to bring a reservoir between vesting a particular power and exercising them. The constitution of India has made three independent -cum- dependent wings i.e. legislation, executive and judiciary
The problems which this paper will point out is not limited to one wing, but all. In brief all wings have short comings to enhance the capability of awarding capital punishment to the extent of using it reasonably. The legislation fails to have any structured guidelines for sentencing. Executive can accept a mercy petition in case of death penalty and by this act of executive, it has the power to overrule a judgment coming from judiciary. The judgements are set aside which are coming all the way from lower court to supreme court. For sure the time, reasoning, analytical and critical approaches applied by the judiciary to arrive at a conclusion is more than the time invested by the executive in any mercy plea. Lastly, judiciary came be with the doctrine of “rarest of rare” to overshadow the flaw in legislation, but that seems to be an old school thought.
“The penalty of death from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability. It is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice. And it is unique, finally ,in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity.”
When a judgement is given to convict is death punishment because the nature and the gravity of the crime but not the criminal. In fixing the degree of punishment or making the choice of sentence for various offences……..the court should not confine its consideration ‘principally’ Or merely to the circumstances connected with the particular crime, but also give due consideration to the circumstances of the criminal
The problems with capital punishment are the delay in the execution of a death sentence Precedents in capital punishment establish that a delay in executing a death sentence would become material for commuting the conviction to life. However, this delay has to be occasioned by non-judicial proceedings, and as the apex court has specified, this delay is to be computed from the day the death sentence become final. It is important to highlight the issue which went largely unnoticed by the media, the executive and judiciary, that is, the delay in the execution of death sentence. In the case of T N Vatheeswaran vs State of Tamil Nadu. The petitioner had been on death row for over eight years. The final decision came as it is a delay of two years in providing justice irrespective to whose mistake. The sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. The court has faltered in holding that a person can exasperated execution, by using the due process of law. This would be tantamount to saying that person can benefit from his/her own wrong. But what has rightly been stated is that if a delay occurs because of circumstances beyond the person’s control, then the death sentence should not be carried out. Because of this judgement in sheer Singh vs State of Punjab the convict commuted their punishment to life imprisonment but in the case of Smt Triveniben vs State go Gujarat. The supreme court overruled the moment of TN Vatheeswarna and addressed the question what should be the starting point for computing the delay in the execution of a death sentence?
The court said that the period of two years should be computed from the date the apex court pronounces its decision i.e from the date when the judicial process has come to an end. A delay in the disposal of mercy petitions occurring at the instance of the executive would be material for consideration in commuting a sentence on the account of delay. “As between funeral fire and mental worry, it is the latter which is more devastating for, funeral fire burns only the dead one while the mental worry burns the living one… If therefore, there is inordinate delay in execution, the condemned prisoner is entitled to come to the court requesting to examine whether it is just and fair to allow the sentence of death to be executed”.
Mercy Within Law
Long neglected, the concept of mercy has been regaining philosophical respectability of late. Murphy argues that while there is room for mercy in civil law, the place for mercy in criminal law is very limited and generally the practice of mercy there is either vicious or redundant
Murphy’s claim that mercy is inappropriate in criminal law is most explicitly argued in Forgiveness and Mercy. He argues that in criminal law doing justice is the sworn obligation of the judge. But there is a general problem with reconciling the concepts of mercy and justice
He develops at some length the point that many cases of legal mercy are nothing more than a “seeking to tailor our response to morally relevant individual differences”. Murphy believes there is no room in criminal law for this sort of legal mercy, not because there is no room for such activity, but because such activity is not mercy at all and to refer to it as such is confusing and dangerous”
an examination of the historical development of mercy in criminal law will explain why legal mercy has come to be a way of doing justice and why if there is a danger, it would be in eliminating legal mercy. There is no reason to doubt that most of what takes place under the rubric of legal mercy is an attempt to do justice. Often the merciful exercise of judicial discretion is simply a product of a judge’s attending to the particulars of a given case in order to be fair in sentencing. Also, the exercise of the executive prerogative to pardon is frequently based on a need to right a wrongful conviction. Murphy believes that it is confusing to label such activity as mercy because it makes us think that the “rich literature” of mercy, such as Shakespeare’s soliloquies, which stresses mercy as a free gift rooted in compassion is “somehow relevant to these attempts to be fair
In its earliest form English law was primarily a system for main training order and keeping peace rather than a system of justice.
When one broke the law, the means for amending one’s breaches of the peace was to make a payment to those persons one had wronged. This included making “bot” betterment to the injured individual and to the kin of the injured, as well as payment of fine to the king. The latter was required because all criminal offences were understood to be breaches of the King’s peace, and thus offences against the king. Eventually some of the most serious criminal offences, such as homicide, came to be considered “botleas”- that is, unredeemable. In such cases, the offender was considered to be at the king’s mercy .Now to be in mercy was no small thing. It meant that one’s life and Timberlands and goods were considered forfeited to the king. It was up to the king’s discretion just how much would be taken. Persons guilty of the botleas crimes had no right to any particular punishment. Thus the convicted could not complain if a door was taken instead of his eyes, or if he was hanged instead of beheaded. As the legal system developed, the concept of being in mercy” was extended so that to be found guilty of any criminal offence whatsoever was to be in mercy of someone king. sheriff or lord this, the system of discretionary bots and wires eventually disappeared to be replaced by a system of relatively fixed penalties for relatively well-defined offences.
In spite of the fact that an extreme penalty was attached to conviction for homicide, there were no legal principles by which unintentional manslaughter could be distinguished from intentional murders. As Maitland notes, “such manslayers as no one would wish to hang are not acquitted but are recommended to the ‘mercy’ of judges and princes, for the rigor juris holds them answerable for all the effects of their actions”
Thus it was that those who committed homicide either in self-defense or by accident, as well as those who caused death but could not be thought accountable for their actions such as children, came to constitute the class of persons who, in Maitland’s phrase, deserve but need a pardon
Constitution agreed there was both room and need for a pardoning power in a democracy. Alexander Hamilton defended the inclusion of a pardoning power in the Constitution on the grounds that such a power is required by considerations of justice and of public policy
Constitution of America was not whether there ought to be a pardoning power but where such power should be vested. Despite concerns about the oppressive power of monarchy they were eschewing, those drafting the Constitution decided to give pardoning power to the executive. Citing the likelihood that the House and Senate would be moved by the passion of the moment, they hoped that the executive would be motivated to be restrained by the fact that the late of person depended on his sole fiat. They were also counting on the fact that the executive’s reputation would be on the line should the pardon be thought ill-deserved.
thereby linking it strongly to mercy, more recent applications have stressed pardon’s function in promoting the general welfare. As the concept has developed, one of its key roles has been as an instrument of equity in criminal law, a means of preventing injustice and ensuring fairness for those wrongly convicted or harshly sentenced. An even more specific connection between pardon and equity was drawn in the case State v. Alexander, where the court stated that the pardoning power answers about the same purpose in the administration of criminal matters that equity is in the administration of civil matters. Equity supplies that wherein the law by reason of its universality is deficient, and pardons supply that wherein the criminal law by reason of its universality is deficient Obviously, law has changed. The notion of law as a system of order established by a king has been replaced by a view of the legal systems a system of justice established by lawyer in this column, the case has remained that law needs to retain guaranteeing equity. So it is that those wrongly convicted, whom the criminal justice system has failed, constitute a new class of person who deserve burned a pardon. Microvilli mechanism for a new potion. Attention to a need for individuation among case is also at the heart of modern judicial mercy. It is this which Black’s law dictionary defines as legal mercy
“In criminal law, the discretion of the judge within the limits prescribed by laws to remit altogether the punishment to which a convicted person is liable or to mitigate the severity of his sentence…”.While the judge is bound to do legal justice, legal justice is not always identical with moral justice. Specifically, legal justice may fall short of moral justice in its ability to adequately distinguish between relevantly different cases. Thus, built into what it is the judge may do to effect justice is discretion. And when that discretion is exercised in order to remit or reduce a punishment which the law prescribes the discretion is mercy. Elimination of mercy in the name of justice seems to suggest that our system of justice, unlike those of the past, is or could be perfectly sufficient to effect full justice
Yet such legal mercy is but one sort of mercy Murphy himself recognizes that mercy must be extended to include mercy towards debtors as well as offenders. He might have also considered other contexts in which we talk of mercy. divine mercy to sinners, the Catholic works of mercy, mercy-killing, and so on. The autonomous virtue of mercy, then, would be that which underlies all of the specific forms of mercy,
Is one who is shown legal mercy a recipient of genuine mercy?
Apparently so. For in the context of the criminal justice system such a one is in need of real bur powerless to effect it Legal mercy all, or the convicted. Mercy is not for one united: hope for the untried is to be placed in due process of law. Nor is it for one wrongly convicted who has yet to appeal Mercy is for one with no legal power left, one who are is in the hands of the judge. So it is that a person found guilty under the law of a punishable offence is liable to punishment, such a person has no effective means of avoiding punishment whether he deserves to be punished or not Even if the punishment to which he is liable is unfair, that does not confer on him a legal right to avoid it. It is precisely because the law defines justice narrowly, limiting power before the law to the instrumental power of entitlements and rights that it can require genuine mercy to achieve genuine justice.
Pardons are conceived narrowly by me to refer to the actions of the executive in modifying or overturning judicial decisions. In my view, pardon should be used rarely and only to redress manifestly unjust verdicts or outcomes. Anything further than such technical corrections would constitute constitutional impropriety: one branch of government dabbling in the proper sphere of another. Punishment and pardon are intimate partners in the exercise of state authority over the bodies of subjects and citizens.
By depriving the subject of liberty, property or even life, the state shows the violence implicit in its exercise of power. By providing forgiveness, the state shows both its strength and its weakness: its authority extends to moderating or preventing violence, but its own survival depends in part on the selective withholding of force rather than its routine deployment. Amnesties in particular, as Murry points out, have very little to do with providing individual justice and much to do with restoring political order. Like punishment, pardon, mercy and forgiveness tap into the visceral, subliminal and non-rational side of public policy. Just as moral outrage finds its outlet in punishment, so compassion finds its expression in pardon.
Pardoning was the prerogative of the executive before the days of constitutional government, but so too was appointing and controlling the judiciary, and frequently summoning and dismissing legislative bodies. With a separation of powers came the possibility of providing an independent source of authority that could make its own decisions about the life and liberties of individuals. One key judicial decision is exercising clemency. Yet in many situations, the executive still clings to this apparently judicial power. Most commentators see better regulation of this power as the most appropriate policy option. This paper suggests that a greater sharing of that power is another option to be considered.
it raises the more fundamental constitutional question of where pardon should be exercised. The first option is to leave the decision about penalty and pardon in the hands of those who live in the community, hear the evidence, see the faces and gestures of witnesses, and hear both sides of the argument. The second option is to have clear written guidelines prescribed by the legislature, whether in the form of the Napoleonic Code or sentencing rules. This would ensure consistency and fairness between cases. The third option (to correct the defects of the second) is to rely on executive clemency to overturn unduly excessive sentences. So, the issue comes down to the extent and form of popular sovereignty in the justice process. Is direct democracy (in the jury) the best way of achieving a just outcome in a criminal matter, is it fairer to rely on representative democracy (through the Parliament), and what role should the executive play in regulating the actions of the other two branches of government?
I have attempted to explicate the concept of mercy within legal justice and show that mercy is possible within an institutional context, so long as the actors within that institution possess discretionary powers. I have also argued that institutional actors should be merciful and suggested that a community should encourage the virtue of mercy in its officials who possess this, I am well aware that mercy is a high level of autonomy and self-sufficiency but with few modifications.
the fourth option which is the jury system was alive till year 1959 and later it was not the pattern followed in India. Jury system fails to understand the jurisprudence. In case Nanavati vs State of Maharashtra, the jury found K.M Nanavati as not guilty on two grounds, first was sudden provocation which is legal part and the second was that he is a valuable asset to the Indian navy, so we can’t afford him to put behind the bars. This case of merit was a miscarriage of justice but as per public option Nanavati was exempted .this case reserves as the reason why jury was abolished, the second case which is Priyanka reddy case is the reason why jury system shouldn’t be introduced. Because as per the survey of The Hindu 88% of people are satisfied by the police’s instant justice (they see nothing wrong). Post this case people went to put the phone numbers in social media or public platform in order to call them up for pick up and drop service, a good initiative but was it reliable? It has two reasons why it shouldn’t be that reliable, whosoever giving their phone number on social media they are voluntarily waiving their fundamental right (right to privacy), secondly what is the assurity that people who gave there number are of high and progressive moral value. people are triggered by incidence and take so emotional decision . There are 2 kinds of people either you are emotional person without any experience , or you are emotion less person with a lot of experience. To back this, a simple example is when people see a fight on street no one tends to control it because they aren’t interested to get indulged in any case.
(As between a funeral fire and mental worry, it is the latter which is more devastating, for, the funeral fire burns only the dead body while the mental worry burns the living one). It has always remained shy of either fixing a time limit for disposal of mercy petition or directing the executive to frame essential guidelines for the same.
Here we need to understand that chapter 17 of criminal procedure code talks about charges, in simple words the allegation against the person accused. The judge has the option to try all charges at once or try them separately. If the offence in one transition is such that it deems fit to be referred as rarest of rare, if we can separate the each of the offence from each other, they fail to be rarest of rare. For example, 3 people form a gang, first person robs the girl’s purse, second person rapes he, and the last person burns her. This is rarest of rare and they are awarded capital punishment. But if these 3 people are separate and commits each of the offence after one, one month then they might not get a capital punishment . This is the flaw of judiciary threshold for death penalty
The trauma and stress during the inevitable the sentence and the actual infliction of death is better known as the “death row phenomenon”. Courts across the globe have recognized the dehumanizing effect of the procrastination due to lengthy imprisonment prior to execution. In Noel 10 Riley vs Attorney General of Jamaica,” Leslie Scarman of the judicial committee of the privy council, observed:
It is no exaggeration, therefore, to say that:
the jurisprudence of the civilized world, much of which is derived from common law principles and prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments in the English Bill of Rights, has recognised and acknowledged the prolonged delay in executing a sentence of death can make the punishment when it comes inhuman and degrading. As the Supreme Court of California commented in Anderson case, it is cruel and has dehumanizing effects. Sentence of death is one thing: sentence of death followed by lengthy imprisonment prior to execution is another.
Judicial footprints on this issue are marked by three seminal pronouncements, in, the TV Vatheeswaran’s case, Sher Singh’s case and Triveniben case.”
Courts for long entertained petitions for commutation of sentences due to inordinate delay, either due to lengthy judicial proceedings or the time taken in disposal of mercy petitions.” In TV Vatheeswaran’s case, the division bench of the Supreme Court went a step further to observe:
There are provisions in the Constitution (Articles 72 and 161) which invest the president and the governor with power to suspend, remit or commute sentence of death. Making all reasonable allowance for the time necessary for appeal and consideration of reprieve, we think that delay exceeding two years in execution of a sentence of death to invoke Article 21 and demand the quashing of sentence of death.
Thereafter, in Sher Singh’s case,’ in a powerful indictment, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court observed:
“We must take this opportunity to impress upon the Government of India and the state governments that petitions filed under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution or under Sections 432 and 433 of the Criminal Procedure Code must be disposed of expeditiously. A self-imposed rule should be followed by the executive authorities rigorously, that every such petition shall be disposed off within a period of three months from the date on which it is received.”
The Constitution bench of the Supreme Court in Triveniben case (1989) considered this issue in detail, and observed that delay in execution consists of two parts.
The first part covers the time taken in the judicial proceedings for trial, appeal and review. The second part is the time taken by the executive in exercise of prerogative clemency. With respect to the first part, the court rightly observed that the time taken by way of trial, appeal and review is for the benefit of the accused and was intended to ensure a fair trial. However, it exercised restraint in fixing any time limit for the executive to dispose of the mercy petitions and overruled. “two-year” rule laid down in the TV Vatheeswaran case. However, the Court did take into account the implications of undue delays in disposing mercy petitions, and observed”:
The Court may only consider whether there was undue delay in disposing of mercy petition; whether the State was guilty of dilatory conduct and whether the delay was for no reason at all. The inordinate delay may be a significant factor, but that by itself cannot render the execution unconstitutional
Delays and Dilemma
The Government of India recently acknowledged in reply to a right to information application, that as of 13 July 2011, there were 32 mercy petitions pending before the president of India. This number was 26 in 2009, and as pointed out by the Supreme Court, in some cases the courts had awarded the death sentence more than a decade ago. The interest of the “dead man waiting”, is to take advantage of the delay and he has no reason to agitate unless the petition stands rejected. Basic human nature tells us that we will endure hardship, rather than accept death. Humans will cling to the slimmest hope of life, enduring dehumanizing conditions for years, rather than acquiesce to execution (Hudson 2000: 855). Can we really blame a person who acts on this survival instinct?
Furthermore, though a time limit cannot be fixed, a certain discipline must be imbibed in the executive practice to dispose of mercy petitions within a reasonable period. In 2009, the Supreme Court once again reminded the executive of its responsibility in the following words: The observations reproduced above become extremely relevant as of today on account of the pendency of twenty-six mercy petitions before the President of India, in some cases, where the courts had awarded the death sentences more than a decade ago. We too, take this opportunity to remind the governments concerned of their obligation under the aforementioned statutory and constitutional provision.
Delays involved in disposal of mercy petitions which often run into years are not only because of the onerous nature of responsibility and political considerations, but because of a confusion that the executive is performing “an act of grace” rather than a constitutional duty while disposing of a mercy petition. Often, the State finds itself in a difficult position when it has to explain the “embarrassing or yawning gap” leading to avoidable delays in disposal of such petitions.”
Finally, in my view, fixing a time limit may send the wrong signal regarding the period within which execution must take place and fetter judicial discretion (which must be exercised) on a case to case basis. Nevertheless, failure to dispose of a mercy petition within a reasonable time must entitle the prisoner to have the benefit of commutation of sentence.
Indian Legislative flaw for punishment of crime
The topic name is important because in India the punishment is given for the crime, not for the criminals but clemency is practiced over the criminal and not over the crime.
Absence of Structured Sentencing Guidelines
Currently, India does not have structured sentencing guidelines that have been issued either by the legislature or the judiciary. In March 2003, the Committee on Reforms of Criminal Justice System (the Malimath Committee), a body established by the Ministry of Home Affairs, issued a report that emphasized the need to introduce sentencing guidelines in order to minimize uncertainty in awarding sentences, stating,
the Indian Penal Code prescribed offences and punishments for the same. For many offences only the maximum punishment is prescribed and for some offences the minimum may be prescribed. The Judge has wide discretion in awarding the sentence within the statutory limits. There is now no guidance to the Judge in regard to selecting the most appropriate sentence given the circumstances of the case. Therefore, each Judge exercises discretion accordingly to his own judgment. There is therefore no uniformity. Some Judges are lenient and some Judges are harsh. Exercise of unguided discretion is not good even if it is the Judge that exercises the discretion. In some country’s guidance regarding sentencing options is given in the penal code and sentencing guideline laws. There is need for such law in our country to minimize uncertainty to the matter of awarding sentence. There are several factors which are relevant in prescribing alternative sentences. This requires a thorough examination by an expert statutory body
The Committee advised further that, in order to bring “predictability in the matter of sentencing,” a statutory committee should be established “to lay guidelines on sentencing guidelines under the Chairmanship of a former Judge of Supreme Court or a former Chief Justice of a High Court experienced in criminal law with other members representing the prosecution, legal profession, police, social scientist and women representative.” In 2008, the Committee on Draft National Policy on Criminal Justice (the Madhava Menon Committee), reasserted the need for statutory sentencing guidelines. In an October 2010 news report, the Law Minister is quoted as having stated that the government is looking into establishing a “uniform sentencing policy” in line with the United States and the United Kingdom in order to ensure that judges do not issue varied punishment.
In 2008, the Supreme Court of India, in State of Punjab v. Prem Sagar & Ors., also noted the absence of judiciary-driven guidelines in India’s criminal justice system, stating, “in our judicial system, we have not been able to develop legal principles as regards sentencing. The superior courts, except for making observations with regard to the purport and object for which punishment is imposed upon an offender, had not issued any guidelines.” The Court stated that the superior courts have come across a large number of cases that “show anomalies as regards the policy of sentencing, “adding, “whereas the quantum of punishment for commission of a similar type of offence varies from minimum to maximum, even where the same sentence is imposed, the principles applied are found to be different. Similar discrepancies have been noticed in regard to imposition of fines.” In 2013 the Supreme Court, in the case of Soman v. State of Kerala, also observed the absence of structured guidelines:
“Giving punishment to the wrongdoer is at the heart of the criminal justice delivery, but in our country, it is the weakest part of the administration of criminal justice. There are no legislative or judicially laid down guidelines to assist the trial court in meting out the just punishment to the accused facing trial before it after he is held guilty of the charges. However, in describing India’s sentencing approach the Court has also asserted that “the impossibility of laying down standards is at the very core of the Criminal law as administered in India, which invests the Judges with a very wide discretion in the matter of fixing the degree of punishment.”
Sentencing procedure is established under the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides broad discretionary sentencing powers to judges. In a 2007 paper on the need for sentencing policy in India, author R. Niruphama asserted that, in the absence of an adequate sentencing policy or guidelines, it comes down to the judges to decide which factors to take into account and which to ignore. Moreover, he considered that broad discretion opens the sentencing process to abuse and allows personal prejudices of the judges to influence decisions.
The mercy petition should be directed to the apex court judges instead of president, the bench should be comprised of odd numbers of judges, provided the judges who previously decided case shall not be allowed to be in that bench for the particular case. Therefore, a guideline can be made and which can be implemented over themselves, because the judiciary can give advice, recommendation to the executive but they aren’t binding. Diverting the petition will show efficiency as per my analysis and lastly it must be considered 2 kinds of mercy petition. If the offence is against the state or relating to the armed forces or in relation to public servants or election or relating to the coin and government stamps as per the chapters in Indian Penal Code, 1860 the mercy petition will be filed to the President of India. Mercy petition rest of the offences must be filed in supreme court only.
Division of this sort is because president is just a nominal head of India, and the mercy is the virtue drawn from the monarchy, and we are having a democratic setup keeping this in mind it is necessary to remove the trait of monarchy from our democratic setup.
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