“FinTech” has been the buzzword in India’s business and entrepreneurship sector for quite some time now. India is home to several FinTech giants, offering a wide range of products and services. The FinTech sector has been growly steadily and is like to witness unprecedented growth in the coming decade. This article presents a brief about India’s FInTech sector and provides an overview of some of the key statutes and regulations applicable to FinTech companies in India.
A brief about the FinTech sector
The word “FinTech” pertains to technology-driven start-ups that are upending incumbent financial actors, and traditional banking practices. Even though there isn’t a single definition that applies to all instances of FinTech, the Financial Stability Board of the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) defined it as “technologically enabled financial innovation that may result in new business models, applications, processes, or products with an associated material effect on financial markets and institutions and the provision of financial services.” In other words, FinTech may be seen as the union of financial firms with cutting-edge technology to create, enhance, and automate the supply of banking and finance.
FinTech was first thought of as computer technology that had been solely utilised in the back-end facilities of banks, trading companies, and financial intermediaries. FinTech is nowadays most closely associated with offering customers more solution-oriented services, such as chatbot and artificial intelligence platforms to help customers with simple chores, supervising, reducing fraud, and keeping low operational and employee costs. Furthermore, modern tools like informatics marketing, predictive behavioural analytics, and machine learning or artificial intelligence are now being utilised to help customers make better financial decisions without relying just on assumption.
FinTech can significantly improve productivity and save costs while promoting financial inclusivity by changing how consumers perceive financial services. Transaction processing and settlements, deposit lending and capital generating, market liquidity, asset management, data analytics, and risk mitigation are the major areas into which FinTech innovations may be divided.
India has one of the fastest-growing FinTech-related sectors in the world, and the same is home to a growing FinTech industry. There are currently over 2100 FinTech businesses operating in the nation, with more than 67 per cent of them having only been founded in the previous five years. The sector is predicted to reach an estimated $150 billion by 2025.
Laws regulating the FinTech Sector in India
The obligation to regulate the goods and services that FinTech offers grows as technology develops. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI), the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (IRDAI), the Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI), the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, and the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MEITY) are the primary regulatory agencies in charge of this sector. A FinTech company would be governed by the appropriate regulatory body in charge of its goods and services. For instance, the FinTech businesses that engage with account aggregation, peer-to-peer credit, cryptocurrencies, payments, etc are governed by RBI.
The FinTech regulatory framework in India is largely disjointed, and no one body of laws or standards governs all FinTech services. This sector is difficult to manage since there isn’t a unified set of FinTech laws. The paragraphs below discuss some of the key regulations applicable to FinTech companies in India.
The Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007
The Payments and Settlements Systems (PSS) Act, 2007 (PSS Act) regulates payments in India. A “payment system” cannot be created or operated, in accordance with the PSS Act, without the RBI’s prior consent. The PSS Act defines a “payment system” as “a system that permits payment to be made from one person to another,” but it specifically excludes a stock exchange. Payment methods include PPIs, money transfer services, smart card operating systems, and debit and credit card operating systems. RBI authorisation is required before a payment system may start up or be put into operation. As a result, compliances under this enactment are essential for FinTech companies to operate.
The Companies Act, 2013
FinTech businesses must register under the Companies Act 2013 and abide by all of the Act’s laws and regulations, just like any other business in India. FinTech businesses like Paytm, Bharat pe, etc, are incorporated and authorized under the Act.
The Consumer Protection Act, 2019
Companies in the FinTech industry are considered service providers for purposes of the Consumer Protection Act. According to Section 2(47)(ix) of the Act, “disclosure of consumer’s personal information supplied in confidence, unless required by law or in the public interest,” is an unfair trade practises. The Information Technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or Information) Rules, 2011, which prohibit the disclosure of a consumer’s personal information without the person’s prior authorization unless required by law, are comparable to this. FinTech businesses must abide by this law since they handle sensitive personal data belonging to their clients.
The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002
The principal rules that set anti-money laundering standards and operational directions for firms that offer financial services in the nation are the Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2002 (PMLA), the Prevention of Money Laundering Rules 2005, and the KYC Master Directions. The aforementioned laws require banking firms, financial institutions, and intermediaries to confirm the identification of clients, preserve records, and provide information to the Financial Intelligence Unit – India in a defined format (FIU-IND).
The IT Act’s regulations must also be followed by FinTech businesses. In accordance with Section 43A, businesses are liable for damages if they fail to take reasonable security precautions to protect the sensitive personal data of their customers. Section 72A establishes penalties for leaking info in breach of a valid contract. Personal data about individuals is very important to FinTech firms. It is crucial to adhere to the mandated data security laws in order to avoid legal difficulties.
The Reserve Bank of India Rules
The principal regulatory tools that apply to NBFCs are the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 and a series of governing guidelines and circulars. Certain FinTechs are subject to RBI regulation either directly through the issuance of NBFC licences to them or indirectly through the regulation of banks and NBFCs connected to FinTech. The organisation must fulfil a number of standards in order to receive licensure from the RBI. In India, there are several digital lenders who have received NBFC approval.
The registration and operation of payment banks in India are governed by regulations that were published by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) in November 2014 and October 2016, respectively. Among the rules governing payment banking institutions are the eligibility requirements for registration, suitable practices, and other operational standards.
According to the Governor of the RBI’s remarks, the RBI has implemented surveillance technologies known as SupTech for data collecting and analysis. Another illustration of supervisory tech is the risk-based supervision of banks, which is heavily data-driven.
RegTech, also known as regulatory technology, has the potential to be useful in a number of areas, including simplifying the regulatory reporting system, compliance and risk monitoring, safeguarding consumer interests, and identifying financial crime. India’s RegTech industry is growing quickly in the banking and insurance sectors.
The Insurance Act, 1938
Companies involved in insurance technology, or InsurTech, are collaborating with many stakeholders and upending the insurance industry’s value chain. They have helped to speed up application procedures, and automate the testing, and claim processes through their collaborations with insurance firms. Some businesses also serve as online aggregators from time to time, allowing clients to examine the breadth of coverage, the term, the premium, and other pertinent parameters before making a choice. The Insurance Regulatory Development Authority of India (IRDA), the country’s top insurance industry regulator, must grant these web aggregators clearance.
When several prominent FinTech businesses in India received direct insurance broker licences from the IRDA to facilitate the distribution and sale of insurance products, this became a big flashpoint. A few participants have also obtained an IRDA insurance corporate agent licence.
The Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA), 1999
According to the RBI’s regulations released under the FEMA, countless cross-border transaction services have been created due to advancements in India’s FinTech industry. The Foreign Exchange Management Act of 1999 (“FEMA”) and the rules and regulations issued thereunder control transactions involving foreign currency. Accredited Dealer Category II Entities, such as usurers, are allowed to offer foreign currency pre-paid cards in India to Indian citizens in accordance with the FEMA, according to the RBI’s regulations released under the FEMA. The PPI (Prepaid Payment Instruments) Master Directions also permit PPIs to be issued by qualified entities for international transactions. Authorised dealer category I can provide semi-closed and open-system PPIs for FEMA-compliant, FEMA-compliant, and payments that do not exceed ₹ 10,000 per transaction and ₹ 50,000 per month acceptable current account transactions (including all the procurement of goods and services).
Correspondingly, as long as the PPIs are wholly KYC-compliant, reloadable, and granted in electronic form, and the inward disbursement does not exceed ₹ 50,000 per transaction, authorised bank and non-bank PPI issuers (designated as agents of an authorised overseas principal) are permitted to accept inward remittances under the money transfer service scheme.
Conclusion
The use of contemporary innovation to deliver financial services has greatly increased financial inclusion. In contrast to traditional financial institutions, the FinTech industry faces obstacles from confusing laws, consumer distrust, and a tiny client base. The emergence of technology requires regulation as the law cannot always pace up with technology.
Government legislative actions and the expansion of the Indian Stack have contributed to the FinTech boom that is about to take place in India. The innovative items are just the start. From a legal standpoint, many issues arise. Thus, the right balance between promoting emerging technology developments and the need to oversee them effectively must be found.
The data-driven FinTech sector will be directly impacted by both current law and prospective legislation, such as the new “Digital Personal Data Protection Bill, 2022”. Data is needed by modern technology to develop new goods and services. For FinTech businesses, the inconsistent nature of current law has produced a wide range of operating difficulties. A range of limitations and rules from various agencies apply to FinTech companies that offer various services. They hope that the government’s supporting approach will likely provide the FinTech industry and other financial institutions with an equal playing field. Industry 4.0 and universal financial inclusion will make it easier for FinTech businesses to grow.
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This article is written by Tarini Kalra, a student of BBA LL.B. from Fairfield Institute of Management and Technology, GGSIPU. The present article provides exhaustive information about prospectuses and their types.
It has been published by Rachit Garg.
Table of Contents
Introduction
Capital in a company is vital because it indicates a company’s available finance and is used by businesses to pay for the ongoing production of goods and services in order to produce a profit. More the capital, the more the expansion of the company. Companies can raise funds through debt or equity financing. In such cases, a prospectus becomes an essential tool. A prospectus is a detailed document containing information on the securities issued by a company to invite the potential public and investors to subscribe to the securities.
Prospectus under the Companies Act, 2013
Section 2(70) of the Companies Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as CA, 2013) defines a prospectus as “any document described or issued as a prospectus and includes a red herring prospectus referred to in Section 32 or shelf prospectus referred to in Section 31 or any notice, circular, advertisement or other document inviting offers from the public for the subscription or purchase of any securities of a body corporate.”
In other words, a prospectus is any advertisement, circular, or document that invites public deposits or offers to subscribe or purchase any shares or debentures of a corporate body. The company’s operations and objectives, along with the purpose of the securities being offered are disclosed in a prospectus. A prospectus may only be issued by a public company to offer its shares and debentures. A private company cannot issue a prospectus because private companies are relatively small in size, thus, they issue fewer shares, and share transferability is limited, resulting in low liquidity of the private company’s stocks. A prospectus is released by or on behalf of a public company with regard to the company’s formation or on behalf of any individual who is, has been, or has expressed interest in the creation of a public business. The individual is known as the ‘promoter’ of the company. A promoter is defined under Section 2(69) as a person who is acting solely in a professional capacity and who is:
A person that the company has recognised in the annual return under Section 92; or
A person with the authority over the company’s operations directly or indirectly, acting as a shareholder, director or in another capacity; or
A person under whose advice, directions, or instructions the company’s board of directors ordinarily acts.
Section 2(71) of the CA, 2013 defines a public company, whereas Section 2(68) of the CA, 2013 defines a private company.
A company that prohibits the transfer of its shares to the public is a private company. It forbids public requests for an invitation to subscribe to any of the company’s securities. The number of members in a one-person company is restricted to two hundred. When two or more persons own one or more shares of a company together, they are recognised as a single member in the situations mentioned below:
Persons who are employed in the company;
The number of members will not include those who were members of the company at the time of employment and remained members after their employment terminated.
Contents of a prospectus
A prospectus must enlist the following details:
Name of the company,
The registered address of the company,
Objectives and purpose of the company,
Purpose of the issue of prospectus,
Nature and capital structure of the business,
Name, location, and the number of shares that signatories have subscribed,
Qualification shares of the directors,
Details on redeemable preference shares and debentures,
Remuneration of directors and promoters,
Minimum subscription for allotment,
Date of opening and closing of the issue,
Information on underwriting commission and brokerage,
Name and address of the company’s auditor, secretary, banker, and trustee,
Particulars of material documents,
Forecasted rate of dividend and voting rights.
Requirements for the issuance of a company’s prospectus
Section 26 deals with the legal requirements for the issuance of a prospectus. The requirements are as follows:
Every prospectus must be issued by or on behalf of a public company or behalf of a person involved in or interested in the establishment of the company. The prospectus has to be duly dated and signed. It must provide the information and set out the financial information reports required by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (hereinafter referred to as SEBI) under the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 (hereinafter referred to as SEBI Act, 1992) in consultation with the Central Government.
A company is required to certify that the provisions, rules, and regulations under the CA, 2013, as well as a statement that nothing in the prospectus is in violation of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 and the SEBI Act, 1992.
The issue of a prospectus or application form for shares or debentures to existing members or debenture holders of a company is exempt under Section 26(1) even if an applicant has a right to surrender the shares in favour of any other person or not under Section 62(1)(a)(ii). The issuance of prospectus or application forms for securities that are similar to securities that have previously been issued, traded or listed on recognised stock exchanges will also be exempt from its applicability.
The date stated in the prospectus will be regarded to be the date of its issuance of a prospectus or a form of application regardless of whether it was released prior to, in compliance with, or after the foundation of a company.
It must be ensured that on or before the date of its publication, a copy duly signed by every person who is named as a director or proposed director of the company or by his duly authorised attorney must be delivered to the Registrar for filing otherwise a prospectus cannot be issued by or on behalf of a company.
A statement claiming to be made by an expert may not be included in a prospectus issued under Section 26(1) unless the expert is a person who is not, and has not been, involved in any form of management or operations of the company. Written consent to the issue of the prospectus must be given, and must not withdraw his consent prior to delivery of a copy of the prospectus to the Registrar for filing. A statement to that effect must also be included in the prospectus.
Every prospectus issued must mention that a copy has been supplied to the Registrar for filing and must specify any documents that must be attached to the copy supplied. It may also refer to statements within the prospectus that list the requisite documents as per the provision of Section 26(1).
If a prospectus is issued more than 90 days after a copy is delivered to the Registrar, it is deemed to be invalid.
If a prospectus is issued in violation of provisions mentioned under Section 26, the company will be penalised with a fine not less than fifty rupees and not exceeding three lakh rupees. Any individual who voluntarily participated in the issuance of the prospectus would be penalised to a fine of not less than fifty thousand rupees and cannot exceed three lakh rupees.
Types of prospectus
According to the CA, 2013, there are four types of prospectus: Red Herring, Shelf, Abridged, and Deemed;
Red Herring
A red herring prospectus is defined under Section 32 of the CA, 2013. A red herring prospectus does not provide detailed information about the quantum, or quantity, and price of the securities offered. It is used for the book-building process. The process through which an issuer seeks to identify the price at which an initial public offering (IPO) will be offered is known as book building. An issuer often creates a book for institutional investors to make offers for the quantity of shares and the estimated amount of money they will pay. The issuer examines the data and estimates the final price for the security using an average value.
A company that intends to offer securities to the public can issue a red herring prospectus before issuing the original prospectus. It must be filed with the Registrar at least three days prior to the opening of the subscription list and offers.
A red herring prospectus is subject to the same obligations as a prospectus, and any difference between the red herring prospectus and the prospectus must be identified as ‘deviations in the prospectus’. Following the close of the offer of securities, the prospectus must state the total capital raised, whether by debt or share capital, and the closing price of the securities, as well as any other details not included in the red herring prospectus, and must be filed with the Registrar and the SEBI.
Shelf
The shelf prospectus is outlined under Section 31 of the CA, 2013. A shelf prospectus offers securities for subscription in one or more issues over a specific period of time without the need for a fresh prospectus to be issued. This is done especially in projects where the issue size is substantial, and large sums of money are required to be raised in order to save on the expense of filing a new prospectus every time.
Any company may file a shelf prospectus with the Registrar at the stage of the first offer of securities, and the validity period of such prospectus shall not exceed one year, which shall begin from the date of opening of the first offer of securities under the prospectus and in respect to subsequent offers of securities issued during the period of validity of that prospectus in accordance with the guidelines issued by SEBI. A fresh prospectus is not required to be issued for the offer of securities.
A company filing a shelf prospectus must file an information memorandum under Form PAS.2 with the Registrar within one month under Rule 10 of the Companies (Prospectus and Allotment of Securities) Rules, 2014, prior to the issue of a second or subsequent offer of securities, containing all updated charges in the facts, the company’s financial position that changed between the previous offer of securities and the succeeding offer of securities, or any other changes. Prior to applying any changes, a company or any other person shall inform applicants of the changes, and if they express willingness to withdraw their application, the company or other person shall reimburse money received as a subscription within fifteen days.
When an information memorandum is submitted with the shelf prospectus at the time of the offer for securities, it is considered a prospectus.
Issuers authorised by the notification of the Central Board of Direct Taxes to make a public issue of tax-free secured bonds, with respect to such tax-free bond issuances; or
Infrastructure debt funds and non-banking financial companies regulated by the Reserve Bank of India; or
Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs) registered with the Reserve Bank of India and Housing Finance Companies (HFCs) registered with the National Housing Bank that meet the following criteria:
Having an audited net worth of at least Rs.500 crore balance sheet from the previous fiscal year;
Has a track record of sustained distributable profit over the previous three years;
Securities issued under the shelf prospectus have been assigned a rating of not less than the “AA-” category or equivalent by a credit rating agency registered with the Board;
There are no pending regulatory actions against the firm or its promoter or directors before the Board, Reserve Bank of India or the National Housing Bank;
The issuer has not defaulted on any payments on deposits or interest due, redeemed debentures or preferred stock, paid dividends to shareholders, or repaid term loans or interest due to any public financial institution or banking company in the prior three fiscal years.
The listed entities complying with the following requirements:
Whose public issued equity shares or debt securities are listed on a recognised stock exchange for a period of minimum three years immediately preceding the issue and have been in compliance with the listing agreement entered into between the issuer and the recognised stock exchanges where the issuer’s securities are listed;
According to the previous fiscal year’s audited financial statement, with a net value of at least Rs.500 crore;
Having a three-year track record of consistent distributable profit;
Securities issued under the shelf prospectus have received a credit rating of minimum “AA-” or an equivalent credit rating from a credit rating agency registered with the Board;
There are no pending regulatory actions against the firm or its promoter or directors before the Board, Reserve Bank of India or the National Housing Bank;
The issuer has not defaulted on any payments on deposits or interest due, redeemed debentures or preferred stock, paid dividends to shareholders, or repaid term loans or interest due to any public financial institution or banking company in the prior three fiscal years.
The issuer who files a shelf prospectus must immediately submit a copy of the information memorandum with the recognised stock exchanges and the Board after filing it with the Registrar.
The disclosures must be included in the information memorandum required by the CA, 1956 or the CA, 2013, as applicable, and the rules promulgated thereunder, including disclosures regarding the summary term sheet, material updates, including rating revisions, if applicable along with the rating rationale, and financial ratios specified in Schedule I, specifying the pre and post issue change.
A single shelf prospectus shall not be used for more than four issuances.
Abridged
Section 2(1) of the CA, 2013 outlines an abridged prospectus. It means a memorandum containing the salient features of a prospectus as per the regulations specified by the Securities and Exchange Board. Section 33 mandates the issuance of application forms for securities along with an abridged prospectus.
Section 33 shall not be applicable to the application form issued for:
A valid invitation to a person to engage in an underwriting agreement with regard to such securities; or
Securities that were not offered to the public.
A copy of the prospectus shall be sent to any individual who requests it prior to the close of the subscription list and the offer. If a corporation fails to comply with the provisions of Section 33, it would be liable for a penalty of fifty thousand rupees for each default.
SEBI released regulations governing disclosures in the abridged prospectus and front cover page of the offer document via circular number SEBI/HO/CFD/SSEP/CIR/P/2022/14 dated 4th February 2022.
Deemed
Section 25 of the CA, 2013 discusses deemed prospectuses. A deemed prospectus is a document that is assumed to represent a company’s prospectus. A deemed prospectus is a document that contains an offer for sale made by the intermediary or issuing house on behalf of a company that allots or agrees to allot its shares or securities through an intermediary, such as a merchant bank, another business, or an issuing house. A company usually opts for a deemed prospectus to avoid complying with regulations issued by the SEBI.
A deemed prospectus is considered a document of offer for sale if it meets any of the following criterias:
The intermediary made an offer to sell shares to the public within six months of the allotment of shares; or
The company which allotted its shares to the intermediary has not received payment in exchange for the shares the offer for sale was made by the intermediary.
Liability for misstatement in a prospectus
The SEBI Complaints Redressal System (SCORES), introduced by SEBI, requires all listed businesses to address shareholder complaints. The SEBI’s centralised online grievance redress system allows investors to file complaints, follow up on them, and see the progress of their resolution from any location. The SEBI Act, 1992, imposes penalties on the corporation for non-compliance. The liabilities for misstatement in a prospectus can be classified into civil liability under Section 35 and criminal liability under Section 34 of the CA, 2013.
Civil liability under Section 35
A person who subscribed to the securities must prove that the prospectus was issued by the company and the statements were untrue. A person who has subscribed to the securities of a company can claim compensation for misstatements in the prospectus against:
The company,
The director of the company,
A person who has authorised to be named as a director of the company or has consented to become a director, either immediately or after a period of time,
A promoter of the company,
A person who has authorised the issue of the prospectus, or
An expert under Section 26(5).
shall be liable to pay compensation to every subscriber of securities of the company who has incurred loss or damage.
The following are the exceptions to civil liability:
The person withdrew his permission or consent prior to the prospectus’s release, and it was issued without his authority or consent, or
The prospectus was released without his knowledge or consent, and upon discovery of its release, a reasonable public notice is released stating that the prospectus was released without his knowledge or consent,
The individual had reasonable grounds to believe that the expert was competent to make the assertion and that the document is an accurate copy, or a right and appropriate extraction of the report or valuation.
Criminal liability under Section 34
If any statement in a prospectus is untrue, false, deceptive, or likely to mislead in any form, context, or omission in which it is offered, and the person who approves the distribution of such a prospectus is accountable under Section 447.
It exempts any person who proves that the statement or omission was irrelevant or the person had reasonable grounds to believe the statement was accurate, or that the omission was significant at the time the prospectus was issued
Conclusion
A prospectus contains information about the company, its management, financial stability, and other essential information, and it is distributed to the general public and investors to encourage them to subscribe to the securities of the company. A prospectus can be classified into four types: Red Herring, Shelf, Abridged, and Deemed. Each prospectus performs differently, which may help a company make a reasonable investment decision. Identifying the appropriate type of prospectus for issuing securities helps the company to make an informed investment strategy. As a result, a prospectus is essential for every public company, and it must be issued in accordance with the terms of the Companies Act, 2013.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
Why is a prospectus issued?
A prospectus is issued to invite the potential public and investors to subscribe to the securities.
How may investors benefit from a prospectus?
The prospectus includes details about the company, its management, financial stability, and other relevant information pertinent to potential investors.
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The powerful and contentious study of DNA, the substance that makes up the biological code of most creatures, is one of the many new instruments that science has supplied for the investigation of forensic evidence. DNA analysis, also known as DNA profiling, studies DNA contained in tangible evidence such as saliva, hair, and sperm to see if it can be linked to DNA collected from specific people. In criminal prosecutions, DNA analysis has emerged as a regular kind of evidence. It is frequently used in civil proceedings, notably in matters requiring a determination of parentage or identity.
Since the initial use of DNA in a criminal case in 1986, technology and scientific research have opened up new avenues for using DNA in the legal sector and beyond. Today, DNA not only assists in the identification of offenders at crime scenes, but it also allows forensic genealogists to solve mysteries that became dormant decades back. In criminal trials across the nation, DNA evidence is utilised more frequently than ever before, both to condemn the accused and to clear people who have been falsely charged or convicted. The capacity of victim support providers to comprehend the possible value of DNA evidence in the circumstances of their clients is given more weight as a result of this expanded responsibility. This article talks about how DNA forensics is utilized in criminal investigation and trial, and delves into the national and international jurisprudence on the same.
Usage of DNA as evidence
DNA may be used to spot potential offenders and connect individuals to a crime by showing they were present in a specific location. DNA profiling also improves the criminal justice system’s efficiency. Spectator reports are untrustworthy, especially under high-pressure circumstances such as during a crime’s commission. Memory abnormalities can put fear in eyewitness evidence, according to academics in the study “The Neuroscience of Memory: Implications for the Courtroom.” DNA, on the other hand, is scientifically correct and hence more challenging to deny.
The Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) is the most used type of DNA analysis (PCR). Investigators have been able to successfully evaluate evidence samples of varying quality and quantity thanks to PCR. Countless copies of extremely little quantities of DNA are produced by the PCR process.
If the DNA sample of an accused’s specimen matches that of the evidential sample, the accused remains a prospective source of the specimen. Because just a subset of STR markers is examined, there is a chance that another person has the same DNA profile. If the genes in the DNA sample are uncommon, the profile may be traced to just a few people in a given community, increasing the possibility that the suspect is indeed the source of the evidence. As a result, the importance of matching profiles must be assessed using well-established statistical principles.
Furthermore, all DNA results given to courts must include match probabilities and/or possibility percentages to aid in accurately assessing the significance of the evidence found. The inclusion or elimination of a suspect considerably aids in the reconstruction of facts and the advancement of criminal inquiries. In this way, DNA evidence is precise and irreversible, in contrast, to witness accounts, which might be incomplete or prone to numerous psychological factors.
Application of DNA forensics in criminal investigation
In 1986, police requested a young geneticist called Alec Jeffreys, who had created the genetic fingerprint two years ago, to help them solve a murder mystery. In this case, two 15-year-old girls were sexually raped and slaughtered. An adolescent guy with learning difficulties was charged with the offense. In truth, he admitted to only one killing, not both. The police engaged Jeffreys and the crew to show that the adolescent was responsible for both deaths. They couldn’t do it. Instead, they established that the youngster executed neither offences. With no leads in hand, investigators and Jeffreys began creating DNA profiles of individuals in the region. When it was discovered that a local baker called Colin Pitchfork had bragged about submitting a friend’s DNA, authorities apprehended him. Pitchfork’s DNA was successfully matched with that recovered at the crime site by Jeffreys and his colleagues.
Jeffrey’s efforts caught the attention of the public. Even today, famous crime shows like CSI and NCIS regularly employ DNA evidence as narrative twists, educating the audience and, as a result, prospective jurors on the significance of DNA.
Since then, the application of DNA forensics has found a centre stage in criminal investigations and trials.
DNA forensics in the Indian Legal System
Section 53 of the 1973 Code of Criminal Procedure allows a police officer to seek the aid of a medical professional in good faith to conduct an inquiry. However, it does not allow a complainant to collect blood, sperm, or other evidence to establish criminal charges against the suspect.
The Cr. P. C. (Amendment) Act of 2005 included two new provisions that allow the investigating official to acquire DNA samples from the bodies of the suspect and the complainant with the assistance of a medical practitioner. These clauses permit medical investigation of the rape suspect and medical assessment of the rape victim, respectively. However, the acceptability of these pieces of evidence has continued to be an issue due to different opinions of the Supreme Court and several High Courts in various rulings. Judges do not reject the scientific correctness and conclusiveness of DNA testing, but in some situations, they refuse to recognize this evidence due to statutory or constitutional prohibitions, as well as public policy considerations. There is an urgent need to re-examine such sections and laws since there is no rule in the Indian Evidence Act of 1872 or the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973 to deal with science and technology concerns.
There are provisions in the Indian Evidence Act 1872 that determine a child’s parentage, such as Section 112, which specifies that a newborn child born to a mother within 280 days of the dissolution of marriage with a man, and the mother remaining unmarried, demonstrates that the newborn belongs to the man, unless proven otherwise, but there is no specific provision that would cover modern scientific techniques. In situations of civil disputes, DNA analysis is essential in determining the parentage of a child. This evidence is especially important in criminal trials, civil matters, and maintenance proceedings in criminal trials as per Section 125 of the Cr. P. C.
Admissibility of DNA forensics in criminal trials
The admissibility of DNA evidence in court is always dependent on its correct and efficient collection, storage, and recording, which can convince the jury that the evidence submitted is credible. There is no explicit statute in India that may offer precise directions to investigative agencies and courts, as well as the method to be followed in instances used as evidence. Furthermore, there is no explicit provision in the Indian Evidence Act of 1872 or the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973 for dealing with science, technology, and forensic science concerns. Due to the lack of such a regulation, an investigating officer faces significant difficulties in gathering evidence that utilises current mechanisms to prove the accused individual.
The DNA Technology (Use and Application) Regulation Bill introduced in 2019 seeks to regulate the use of DNA evidence and contains a Schedule of offences for which DNA evidence can be used. This Schedule mainly consists of offences under the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and some civil issues, like a suit for determination of paternity. The Bill also delves into the procedure to be followed for collecting DNA evidence, establishing and managing DNA Data Banks at national and regional levels, and establishing authority for supervising the functioning of DNA Data Banks and DNA labs. Further, the Bill lays down the collection of DNA without authorization, and unwarranted disclosure of DNA information as offences.
Challenges presented by the use of DNA forensics in criminal trials
The development of DNA technology has presented a severe threat to certain personal legal and functional rights of an individual, such as the “right to privacy” and “right against self-incrimination.” And it is for this reason that judges are often hesitant to accept testimony based on DNA testing. The right to privacy is included in the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Article 20(3) offers the right against self-incrimination, which helps protect an alleged offender in a criminal case from providing evidence against himself or evidence that could convict him. However, the Supreme Court has ruled on multiple occasions that the right to personal liberty and life is not unlimited.
The Supreme Court decided in Govind Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh that a basic right must be subject to restrictions based on compelling public interest. In another case, Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Supreme Court ruled that the right to privacy is not a constitutionally guaranteed right. It is obvious from different rulings issued by the Supreme Court over time that the rights to life and liberty guaranteed by our Indian Constitution are not absolute and may be subjected to certain restrictions. And it is on this premise that the Supreme Court upholds the validity of the laws concerning the right to life and Individual Liberty, including a medical inspection. And it is on this premise that many courts around the nation have permitted the use of DNA technology in the inquiry and production of evidence. To ensure that contemporary technology may be utilised efficiently, a special regulation that provides criteria for DNA analysis in India is urgently needed.
The Supreme Court unanimously ruled in the case of Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) & Anr. vs. Union of India & Ors. that the right to privacy is safeguarded as an integral aspect of the right to life and liberty given by Article 21 and as an aspect of the liberties established by Part III of the Constitution. In doing so, it reversed prior Supreme Court decisions in M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh, which found that confidentiality was not acknowledged under the Constitution of India. With establishing personal privacy as a basic right, this case established the need for the execution of a new data privacy legislation, broadened the extent of privacy within personal areas, and considered privacy as an essential value. This is also bound to have wide-ranging implications for the use of DNA forensics for criminal investigations and trials.
The Supreme Court’s reluctance to overturn the Delhi High Court’s ruling requiring veteran Congress politician N.D. Tiwari to submit to a DNA test is critical in terms of the admissibility of such evidence. In this instance, Rohit Shekhar claimed to be N.D. Tiwari’s biological son, however, N.D. Tiwari was unwilling to undertake such testing, claiming that it would violate his rights to privacy and subject him to public humiliation. However, the Supreme Court dismissed this argument, adding that there was no force in that argument as the results of the test would not be divulged to anybody and would be kept in a sealed envelope. The Supreme Court went on to say that they wanted the young man to seek justice and that he should not be left without recourse. It would be extremely fascinating to observe how Indian courts will enable DNA technology to be admissible in the future.
International jurisprudence on the use of DNA forensics in criminal trials
Anna Anderson claimed to be Grand Duchess Anastasia Nikolaevna of Russia in the 1950s. Following her death in the 1980s, samples of her tissue held at a Charlottesville, Virginia, hospital following a medical procedure were examined using DNA fingerprinting and revealed that she had no tie to the Romanovs. Despite admitting to the rape and murder of a girl in Leicester, the place where DNA testing was first discovered, Richard Buckland was acquitted in 1986. It was the first time DNA fingerprinting was used in a criminal inquiry.
DNA evidence was utilized in 1992 to confirm that Nazi physician Josef Mengele was cremated in Brazil as Wolfgang Gerhard. Samples from one palo verde plant were utilised to convict Mark Alan Bogan of homicide in 1992. DNA from seed pods of a tree recovered at the murder scene matched DNA from seeds found in Bogan’s vehicle. This is the first time plant DNA has been introduced in a criminal prosecution.
Kirk Bloodsworth became the first person to be accused of murder and condemned to death in 1993, whose sentence was reversed thanks to DNA evidence. The homicide and rape of Mia Zapata, lead vocalist of Seattle punk band The Gits, in 1993 went unexplained for nine years. Several years after the murder, a basic search in 2001 was unsuccessful, but the murderer’s DNA was recovered after he was arrested. In 2002, he was convicted in Florida for robbery and domestic abuse.
In the current world, DNA evidence plays a major role in determining the crime of the accused, and several countries, including but not limited to the UK, Australia, Kuwait, etc. use this as significant evidence.
Representatives of the Scottish Executive proposed retaining the DNA of innocent people before the passage of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003. So far, the Scottish Executive has opposed the keeping of DNA from people who have not been convicted of a crime.
In England and Wales, approval to allow the authorities to use a freely provided DNA sample must be received in two ways: first, the authorities must seek an individual’s express permission to use a DNA test for the specific purpose of the particular examination in which it is used taken; second, consent must be acquired for that profile to be updated onto the NDNAD. In England and Wales, the agreement to have a freely collected sample placed in a database is irrevocable. In Scotland, a new law in the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 allows approval to be provided for a profile to be placed onto a ‘volunteers database.’ One feature of the consent provisions in Scotland is that it can be revoked at any time in the future, and the individual’s personal profile can be erased from the system.
According to recent figures, the UK DNA database has over five million profiles, the majority of which are active offenders, and it is regarded as the largest repository on an international scale.
The UK Government has agreed upon the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, which specifies that every convicted or suspected criminal shall be fingerprinted and have DNA analysed. If a person is no longer considered a suspect and there are no criminal records for three years in a row, DNA data can be erased from the database. If a DNA sample matches a profile in the UK database, police may arrest the accused, but only if such testimony is supported by further evidence in the case. Furthermore, if a guilty plea is entered, the Crown Prosecution Service in the United Kingdom will proceed with the investigation.
Australia
Most Australian forensic laboratories that frequently work on criminal matters have employed Profiler Plus, a professional profiler tool licensed by the USA-based Perkin Elmer Corporation since 1999. On various occasions, Australian courts have authorised a person qualified in one profession to submit an opinion based on other subjects. Furthermore, there is substantial debate regarding how DNA evidence should be presented in a way that is both factual and understandable to individuals with no scientific experience, particularly judges (Roberts 1998, p. 36; Heyes 2001, p. 13; Jowett 2001). In presenting the jurors, Australian trial attorneys and judges are not entitled to define the phrase “beyond a reasonable doubt,” but the remarks regarding the use of forensic evidence may have a significant impact on how jurors approach their assignment. Jury members deciding on a judgement must evaluate the DNA evidence, as well as any other evidence presented during the trial, in determining if or not the accused’s involvement has been established beyond a rational doubt.
Conclusion
The most evident advantage of using DNA recognition in criminal cases is when the technology establishes a connection between such a suspected person and an offence, ultimately leading to the perpetrator’s conviction and punishment. This may also avoid costly options such as the employment of inefficient, traditional investigative procedures, which may lead investigators to target the incorrect individual in some situations. The availability of DNA evidence may also influence offender behaviour in beneficial ways, such as motivating admissions or damning attempts to avoid DNA analysis or adequately explain a profile match. The greater chance of identification, particularly with the development of DNA profiles, may even dissuade some offenders from engaging in additional illegal conduct.
DNA evidence’s investigative capability may potentially generate pressures to collaborate with police investigations, undermining the safeguard against self-incrimination. The application of DNA evidence entails intrusions of physical integrity and the examination of personal genetic data, some of which could be legally and illegally compelled. While the privacy violations caused by DNA sample processes and the analysis of non-coding DNA are relatively minimal, the greater use of Forensic evidence by detectives may result in a significant shift in the entire realm of criminal investigative practice.
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This article has been written by Sarthak Mittal, a student at the Vivekananda Institute of Professional Studies of Indraprastha University, Delhi. The discussion in the article will be supported by various provisions of the Act and relevant court judgments. Moreover, it also sheds light on the Act’s history, applicability, and important definitions, among other things. This article elucidates the operation of the Karnataka Shops and Establishment Act, 1961.
it has been published by Rachit Garg.
Table of Contents
Introduction
India is dominated by the unorganised sector, where there are no formal agreements between the workers and the employer. This gives rise to the question of whether there is any legislation that provides for such workers, who are mostly employed in shops or other services rendered by commercial establishments. The Department of Labor supervises all the premises where any trade, business, or profession is carried out. The Department of each state also ensures that there exist shops and establishment act in each state to regulate the working of all shops and commercial establishments within its state.
The Karnataka Shops and Establishment Act, 1961, is a local Act of Karnataka that aims to regulate all shops and commercial establishments operating within the state of Karnataka. The Act makes registration for all such establishments mandatory and provides for the appointment of a labor inspector to supervise such establishments. This creates a legal framework that ensures that there is a record of all such establishments, The Act also deals with aspects like hours of work, intervals for rest and meals, leave policy, cleanliness, etc. As a result, the unorganized sector falls within the purview of the court and the chief inspector appointed under this act.
Historical background of the Karnataka Shops and Establishment Act, 1961
Every state has its Shops and Establishment Act, which helps in the regulation of conditions of work and employment in shops and commercial establishments present in the respective states. These acts are mostly based on a model act provided by the center, which is adopted with necessary implications by all states. All acts are pari materia to each other as all have a common issue to resolve. The Act has an expansive definition of shops and commercial establishments, which helps in the inclusion of almost all the establishments operating within the territory of Karnataka.
Applicability and extent of Karnataka Shops and Establishment Act, 1961
The Karnataka Shops and Establishment Act, 1961, came into force on 1st October 1964 by notification of the state government and applies to a set of 80 districts mentioned in Schedule I and also to the Belgaum Area, Gulbarga Area, Mangalore and Kollegal Area, and Mysore Area, which have been repealed by Section 42 of the Act with prospective effect. Further, Section 43 repeals the Weekly Holidays Act, 1942, with prospective effect. Furthermore, the State Government has been conferred with the power to make rules under this Act through Section 40 of the Act.
Premises exempted from the operation of the Act
The following premises has been exempted from the operation of this Act by Section 3 of the Act:-
Offices except for commercial undertakings under the control of the Central Government, State Government, or any local authority.
Railway services, railway dining cars, water transport services, communication services like telephone, telegraph, or postal, any system of public conservancy or sanitization, and Industries which supply electricity or water to the public.
Establishments like hospitals where sick, infirm, or mentally unfit people are taken care of.
Offices of banking companies, the establishment of food corporation of India.
Offices of medical or legal practitioners given that less than 3 employees should be employed.
Persons who have been excluded from the purview of the Act include any person who is employed at a position of management in any occupation, persons who have intermittent nature of work, clearing and forwarding clerks which are responsible for the dispatch of goods as they are employed in preparatory or complementary work.
Further, the Section provides that the State Government, by notification, can remove such exemptions and include any person or establishment within the purview of such an Act.
Important definitions under the Karnataka Shops and Establishment Act, 1961
Commercial establishment
The word “commercial establishment” has been defined in Section 2(e) of the Act, which is divided into two parts exhaustive and inclusive. The first part of the definition uses the word “means,” which gives it an exhaustive interpretation, and defines a commercial establishment as being an establishment for commercial, trading, banking, or insurance purposes or an establishment or any administrative service where people are employed mainly for office work, hotels, restaurants, boarding houses, eating houses, cafes, other refreshment houses, theatres, or any other establishment or place for public amusement.
The second half of the definition is inclusive, as it allows the state government to include any other establishment or place under the ambit of a commercial establishment by notification.
Employee
In accordance with Section 2(g) of the Act, the employee can be any person who has been wholly or for most of the time employed directly in such an establishment or in relation to such an establishment. This gives the definition a wider ambit, as it will not only include the employees who are employed for a full day but also those employees who are hired seasonally or hired part-time. The definition also includes those employees who may be employed for any activity that is not the primary activity of the establishment. Further, the definition goes on to clarify its ambit by expressly including all workers who are employed permanently, periodically, on a contractual basis, on a piece-rate basis, or on a commission basis. Further, by including apprentices, the definition specifies that even if an employee is not getting any reward for his labour, he can be included in the definition.
Furthermore, the residuary clause has been added to the definition, which aims to include all members of the staff of a factory or industrial establishment who fall outside the ambit of the Factories Act, 1948. The definition also excludes any family member of the employee from its ambit, as they have been included in the definition of the word “employer.”
Employer
Section 2(h) of the Act defines an employer as a person who has ownership of the establishment or someone who has control over the affairs of the establishment. The definition expressly includes family members of the employer, any person who has general control over the establishment’s affairs, and any agent who works within the given capacity.
Shop
The word “shop” has been defined in Section 2(u) of the Act as a premise where trade or business of any kind is carried on or where services are carried on for the customers. The word “shop” includes its offices, storerooms, godowns, and warehouses, which can be in the same premise or in another premise, given that when they are claimed to be in another premise, there has to be a nexus drawn between another premise, and the usage in such trade or business. The definition also excludes “commercial establishments” and shops attached to factories falling within the scope of the Factories Act, 1948, from its ambit.
In the case of Airfreight Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (1999), the Supreme Court held that one of the most essential elements of any premise to fall within the ambit of a commercial establishment or shop is that it should be running for a profit-making motive, and the definitions of commercial establishments and shops should be construed liberally in line with the purpose of the act, which is to have government supervision over the functioning of such establishments.
The Apex Court upheld the decision of the High Court observing that the main activity being led in the premise was handling the incoming and outgoing ships and acting as a clearing forward agent. Other activities being led included acting as a facilitator in the export and import of goods and also delivering the goods domestically through door-to-door delivery. The Supreme Court held that all the activities seen in toto fall under the ambit of the definition of “commercial establishments.“
Further, in the case ofHindu Jea Band v. Regional Director, ESI Corpn (1987) the question arose whether a place of retail services can be called a shop under the definition of the Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court clarified and affirmed that such kinds of retail, when done for profit-making purposes, can fall under the ambit of “shop.”
Furthermore, in the case of International Ore and Fertilizers (India) (P) Ltd. v. ESI Corpn (1987), the petitioner in the case provided services related to the unloading and surveying of the goods. No goods being aided ever came to the petitioner’s premises but were directly sent to the purchaser’s premises. The question arose whether the mere lending of services in this case made the premises from where the petitioner operated a shop. The Court in the following case observed that even in such cases, the premises from where the person retails the services will amount to a “shop.” The same question arose in the case of Cochin Shipping Co. v. ESI Corpn. (1992), where the court again reiterated that the company that operates from a premise to render services systematically for commercial purposes will be said to be operating in a “shop.” In the case of ESI Corpn. v. R.K. Swamy (1994), the court held that an expansive meaning should be given to the word “shop” and held that premises from which advertising services are rendered will also fall into the definition of “shop.”
Registration process under the Karnataka Shops and Establishment Act, 1961
Registration
Every commercial establishment and shop has to get registered under the Act, and for the same purpose, such establishments are to send the statement in the prescribed form along with the fees. If the establishment exists before the commencement of the Act the application should be made within 30 days from the date of commencement of the Act and if it is a new establishment that came into existence after the commencement of the Act then the application should be made within 30 days from its establishment. If the officer is satisfied with the correctness of the statements, then the certificate shall be issued, which will remain valid for 5 years and can be renewed later. Earlier, the validity of the certificate was only for a period of one year, but through an Amendment in 1997, the period was extended up to 5 years, and the amendment was given prospective effect. The process of renewal and registration is pari materia to each other.
Deemed registration
On the other hand, if the officer is not satisfied with the correctness of the statements, he shall return the statements and fees within 30 days from the date of receipt, along with the reasons for refusing to register the establishment. It is pertinent to note that on failing to do the same, the establishment will be deemed to be registered. On such legal fiction being carved out, the employer shall send a self-certification statement along with an acknowledgment of the fact that he has got the deemed benefit by registered post to the authority, and the employer shall display the same self-certification in the establishment in lieu of the registration certificate. However, the same is to be replaced with the registration certificate if he subsequently receives it. If any employer falsely claimed the benefit of the deemed registration, then he will be liable to punishment of imprisonment for at least 6 months and a fine of up to Rupees 5,000. The provisions concerning the registration of an establishment have been provided under Section 4 of the Act.
Changes in the establishment or closure of the establishment
Even if there is any change in the statements given during registration, the employer should inform the inspector of the changes, and on being satisfied with such changes, the inspector shall make changes to the existing registration certificate or issue a fresh certificate, as the case may be. The changes shall be notified to the inspector within 15 days of such changes being made. Further, even the closure of the establishment should be communicated to the inspector, and the certificate should be returned to the inspector, who, being satisfied with the correctness of the statements, may remove such establishments from the register and cancel the registration certificate. It is pertinent to note that the inspector has been empowered to cancel the registration suo moto if he believes that the establishment has been closed. The provisions regarding the changes in the establishment and closure of establishment have been provided in Sections 5 and 6 of the Act respectively
Appointment order
Further, the Act also aims to document the terms of services of any employee being hired by the employer in such an establishment by mandating the issuance of an appointment order by the employer to the employee within 30 days of the date of such appointment, and if the employee has been appointed before the commencement of the Act, then the issuance of the appointment order should be within 30 days of the commencement of the Amendment Act of 1997. The provisions with respect to the appointment order have been provided under Section 6A of the Act.
Hours of work
A humane work environment
The directive principles embedded in Part IV of the Indian Constitution direct that the state come up with suitable legislation for securing just and humane conditions of work under Article 42 and that all workers should be guaranteed a minimum wage, and working conditions that ensure a decent standard of living along with social and cultural opportunities. The same directives have been followed in all the state acts to ensure that the unorganized sector is regulated properly and no employee working under such establishments is forced to work under inhumane conditions due to his economic difficulties. To ensure the same, the Act provides for the maximum number of hours of work that an employee can be subjected to.
Working hours in a day
Section 7 of the Act provides that no employee can be forced to work for more than 9 hours a day and 48 hours a week. Further, no child between the ages of 14 and 18 should be allowed to work for more than 5 hours a day. Furthermore, Section 9 of the Act provides that there should be at least 1 hour for the rest of the employees in such a way that the employee doesn’t have to work for a stretch of more than 5 hours continuously. Section 10 enumerates that, inclusive of such periods of rest, the total time for which an employee has to be in the establishment spread over a day shall not exceed 12 hours a day.
Overtime
The proviso to Section 7 also provides that there can be overtime working hours for an employee, however, the total number of work hours should not exceed 10 in a day, inclusive of such overtime. The provision provides an exception to such a rule on days of stock-taking and preparation of accounts. The proviso to such proviso provides that overtime hours should not exceed 50 hours in a period of continuous 3 months. Further, Section 8 provides that such overtime work is entitled to wages at a double rate than normal wages where the provision also defines what constitutes “normal wages”.
Weekly holidays
Section 12 of the Act provides for a mandatory holiday every week. There should be a day that has been specified by the employer at the beginning of the year that will be the day of the weekly holiday. The notice regarding such a day should be placed in a conspicuous part of the establishment. The employer shall not alter such days more than once every 3 months and shall also inform the inspector about such alterations. Further, the employer can seek permission from the state government to make his establishment function for a whole week, ensuring that each employee in the establishment gets to rest for one whole day in a week. The employee should not be called to an establishment for anything related to the work on such a day, and no wages shall be deducted due to such a weekly holiday.
Annual leave
The Act provides for basic annual leaves with and without wages and how the same should be computed in ratio to the working days. However, the Act makes it clear that if a contract, award, or agreement between the employer and employee entitles the employee to more leave than what has been mentioned in this Act, then no such right of the employee should be prejudiced by the Act.
Paid leaves
The computation of paid leaves should be at a rate of one day for every 20 working days in the case of an adult and 15 working days in the case of a child between the ages of 14 and 18 years. Paid leaves also include maternity leave not exceeding 12 weeks. It is pertinent to note that Article 43 of the Indian Constitution provides for the directive policy of state-making laws for providing maternity leave. Paid leaves can also include leaves of up to 12 days on account of sickness, accident, or any other reasonable cause during the first 2 years of continuous employment.
The paid leaves that have been earned but not taken as per the above computation can be carried forward to the succeeding year; however, the number of paid leaves carried forward should not exceed 45 days. In the case of unpaid leave, there is no such limit on carry forwarding.
The Act further provides that paid leaves that are not taken make the employee entitled to cash benefit equivalent to the same on discharge or dismissal from his employment. Such wages for untaken paid leaves can also be recovered through the initiation of proceedings under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. Further, the Act also lays down an elaborate procedure that should be followed for applying for leave.
Protection of children and women in such establishments
Article 24 of the Constitution of India prohibits the employment of children in any factory, mine, or other hazardous form of employment. However, it is Section 24 of the Act that prohibits the employment of children under the age of 14 in any establishment.
Section 25 of the Act before the Amendment of 2020 contained a prohibition on the employment of women during the night in any establishment; however, the state government could have exempted only information technology services-related establishments from the operation of this Section upon such establishments fulfilling requisite conditions pertaining to transportation and security of women. However, Section 25 was substituted by amendment on 19th October 2020 whereby, all establishments were able to employ women during the night given that they follow a set of 16 conditions enumerated in the Section and also provides cancellation of registration certificate as an effect of non-compliance with any condition in Section 25.
Section 30(3) of the Act provides that, in contravention of Sections 24 and 25 of the Act, the employer should be liable to punishment of imprisonment from 3 to 6 months on the first offence and on any subsequent offence to imprisonment from 6 months to 1 year, and along with or in lieu of such terms of imprisonment, the employer should be liable for a fine that may extend from 10,000 to 20,000 rupees. Section 33A of the Act provides that the labour officer, instead of prosecuting, can compound any of the offences punishable under this Act except for contravention of Sections 24 and 25.
A written complaint made by the Inspector initiates prosecution under this Act. Such a complaint should be made within 6 months from the date of the commission of the alleged offence. Further, only courts of Judicial Magistrate Second Class and above can try such offences.
Conclusion
The Act helps in the regulation of the working of shops and commercial establishments in the state of Karnataka by providing a legal framework governing the terms of employment between the employer and the employee. The economic problem in India can be solved through an increase in production, and one way of increasing production is to have an efficient workforce, which can be obtained by giving due regard and consideration to the needs of the employee and not by exploitation. The Act aims at providing a healthy working environment for employees in such shops and establishments by allowing them due compensation for their overtime and earned leaves, by fixing working hours and working days, and also by providing them the benefit of maternity leave. Apart from the economic advantages, the Act helps in protecting the fundamental rights of employees and ensures that no person gets exploited due to his economic exigencies.
It is pertinent to note that the efficacy of law depends on its draftsmanship and more than that, on its implementation. The legal provisions are articulate and cogent; thereby, now that the authorities are in charge of the implementation of the act, they should make sure that the benefits of the Act reach the citizens.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
Does Karnataka Shops and Establishment Act, 1961 have a mandatory application in Karnataka?
As per Section 1, the application of the Act extends to the whole of Karnataka, and Schedule I of the Act provides a list of 80 districts that are governed by this Act. The Act has repealed all the other acts on the same matters that are dealt with under this Act under Sections 42 and 43 of the Act. It is also pertinent to note that each establishment comes under the purview of the chief inspector as soon as it gets registered under this Act, and such registration has been made mandatory by Section 4 of the Act, as the word “shall” has been used in the given provision. Further, it is pertinent to note that the Act ensures registration by imposing a penalty under Section 30 of the Act, which extends to Rs. 1,000 on the first conviction and Rs. 2,000 on the second conviction.The language used in the Act clearly emphasizes the fact that all establishments should mandatorily follow all the provisions of the Act.
Is leave encashment mandatory as per the Karnataka Shops and Establishment Act, 1961?
Section 16 of the Act deals with the encashment of leaves and makes it mandatory for the employer to provide an equivalent cash benefit to the employee where the employee has not taken the leaves he was entitled to, based on the employee’s average daily working hours and earnings for the day. The Act goes further and clarifies that the employee should not be deemed to be working overtime during any of such days, and thereby, the overtime bonus should be excluded from such encashment. However, the provision provides benefits like clearness allowance and food grains, and other articles that are provided to the employees during the concessional sales should be calculated monetarily and then should be compensated to the employee. Section 18 of the Act further provides that employees can initiate recovery proceedings under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, in case the employer denies such payment. It is the right of the employee to claim encashment of leaves and the mandatory duty of the employer to provide him with the same; however, if the employee has been negligent with his right and fails to claim the same, there is no provision to compel the employer to pay out of his own free will.
Is the Act mandatorily applicable in Banglore?
Schedule I of the Act, read with Section 1, Sub-Section (4) expressly provides a list of places where the Act is applicable. Item No. 3 in the Schedule also mentions Bangalore as a place where the Act is applicable. Thereby, it can be concluded that all establishments within the city of Bangalore are regulated by the Karnataka Shops and Establishment Act, 1961.
What is e-Karmika?
E-Karmika is an electronic platform that has been set up by the Department of Labour in Karnataka in accordance with the Karnataka Establishment and Shops Act, 1961. Through this portal, an employer can file an application to get his shop or commercial establishment registered under the Act. The portal can also be used to apply for the issuance of a duplicate certificate, the renewal of a certificate, or to file for any amendments to an existing certificate. The portal can also help any employer seek exemptions from the provisions of weekly holidays or women being employed on night shifts. The registration fees vary from Rs. 300 to Rs. 75,000 depending on the number of employees employed in the establishment, the fees may also vary from district to district. Apart from the online mode, registrations can also be through physical applications, which are filed at KarnatakaOne Centres. The registration process has been made easy and transparent by allowing online registrations and providing all information regarding the registration process on the e-Karmika portal.
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The article is written by Tushar Singh Samota, a law student from University Five Year Law College, Rajasthan University. This article discusses the concept of The Trade Marks Act, 1999 along with its evolution and features. The article will also address registration and its related provisions.
It has been published by Rachit Garg.
Table of Contents
Introduction
With the globalisation of commerce, brand names, trade names, marks, and so on have become extremely valuable, necessitating consistent minimum standards of protection and effective enforcement mechanisms, as recognised by the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,1994 (TRIPS). In light of this, the previous Indian Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 (repealed), was thoroughly reviewed and amended, and the new Trade Marks Act, 1999, was adopted. The aforementioned Act of 1999, adheres to TRIPS and is in compliance with international systems and practices.
The Trade Marks Act, among other things, allows for the registration of service marks, the filing of multiclass applications, the extension of the period of registration of a trade mark to ten years, and the recognition of the idea of well-known marks. India observes not only codified law but also common law principles, and as such allows for infringement and passing off lawsuits against trade mark infringement.
The author will analyse The Trade Mark Act, 1999 in this article by discussing its genesis or history, as well as the necessity for and aspects of the Act. The author will also go over the subject of trade mark registration in depth in the article.
What is a trademark
Trade Marks are significant corporate assets, and while registration is not required by law, it is recommended since unregistered trademarks receive little protection. If another firm tries to use the same or a similar mark after registration, there will be a suitable legal procedure to block it. A trademarked name distinguishes all of the proprietor’s products and services from those of others, and it also protects the proprietor’s reputation from damage due to counterfeit items.
A trademark is valid for ten years and can be renewed indefinitely if further payments are paid from time to time in the manner prescribed by the country’s laws. Trade Mark rights are private property rights that are enforced by judicial orders. Because India is a party to the Paris Convention and the TRIPS agreement, the Act complies with its principles.
To comprehend the legal definition of a trademark in India, we must first comprehend ‘The Trade Mark Act, of 1999’. (Hereinafter the Act). A Trade Mark must be a ‘mark’ in addition to possessing other basic features and being free of prohibited characteristics. As a result, the legal definition of the mark as provided in Section 2(1)(m) of the Act is critical, which states that a mark comprises a device, brand, heading, label, ticket, name, signature, word, letter, numerical, form of products, packaging, or combinations of colours or any combination thereof.
As a result, the definition is inclusive rather than exhaustive. So, everything that can be represented graphically in single-dimensional, two-dimensional, or three-dimensional space may be regarded as a mark. A company’s emblem is a mark, as is a graphical depiction of a certain combination of characters, style, or combination of multiple colours on a product or in the company’s name.
Similarly, the definition of the term “trade mark” is defined under Section 2(1)(zb) of the Act. It can be stated as follows:
The trade mark must be a mark. That is, nothing else than a mark as defined in Section 2 (1)(m) of the Act is capable of being designated as a trade mark if additional conditions are met.
That such a mark is capable of being represented graphically. That is to say, if a mark cannot be represented visually, it cannot be accorded trade mark registration.
Such a mark must be capable of identifying one person’s goods or services from those of others. It implies that the mark must have certain distinguishing qualities, either phonetically, structurally, or aesthetically, to allow consumers to associate a product bearing that mark with a certain proprietor or authorised user without much misunderstanding. Such differentiation can be innate, as in coined and created terms, or learned.
To sum up, a trade mark must be a mark that can be graphically represented and has specific distinguishing qualities that allow a customer of ordinary intelligence and faulty recall to associate it with the proprietor or user without generating confusion.
A growing number of nations also permit the registration of non-traditional trade marks such as single colours, three-dimensional signs like product packaging shapes, audio signals or sounds, or olfactory indicators like smell, etc. A trade mark is always a brand, but a brand is not necessarily a trade mark. This is mentioned because there is sometimes confusion between trade marks and brands; a brand is just a name, logo, or symbol, but a trade mark is a unique sign or signal of some type in a commercial organisation; as a result, trade marks have a broader connotation than brands.
A trade mark may also serve to represent or ensure the quality of the items bearing the brand. People are frequently persuaded to purchase a certain product because of its distinguishing trade mark, which symbolises quality. Trade Marks represent the value or goodwill connected with the goods, which may be measured by the extent to which the public perceives their quality and specific source. In general, trade marks are placed in any fashion on the items, their containers, and displays, as well as on tags or labels linked to the goods or services. The great economic value of a successful trade mark is the key reason for legal protection.
Trade mark owners generate brand loyalty and product uniqueness through compelling advertising campaigns in conjunction with licensees. This results in the establishment of enviable goodwill and market strength, thus preventing new enterprises from entering that specific sphere of operation.
Legal history of Trade Marks Law in India
Until 1940, there was no statute law governing trade marks in India, and the relevant law was based on common law, which was essentially the same as that in England prior to the passage of the first Registration Act in 1908. The Trade Marks Act of 1940 (repealed) established for the first time in India the machinery for the registration and legislative protection of trade marks. This Act was repealed in 1958 by the Trade and Merchandise Act of 1958. This Act was likewise abolished by the Trade Marks Act of 1999, which took effect in 2003. The law governing trade marks has undergone significant revisions since the Trade Marks Act of 1999. Some legal principles relating to unregistered trade marks are codified, while others are still dependent on common law, necessitating the use of court rulings.
In addition to safeguarding the purchasing public from imposition and fraud by infringers of genuine trade marks, it has been determined that the statutory rights granted by the registration of a trade mark are so broad and complex that it is necessary to protect the legitimate interests of other traders from litigation and harassment by registered owners of trade marks. As a result, the Act has evolved into a complex body of legislation with long Sections, numerous cross-references, and several provisions and exclusions.
The more essential elements have been clarified through judicial interpretation, while several portions have yet to be subjected to judicial inspection and study. Apart from streamlining the legislation, the current Act of 1999 has added several additional rules that benefit both trade mark owners and consumers of goods. For historical reasons, both Indian common law and statutory trade mark law have largely followed the pattern of English law.
Apart from significant changes to the previous law, this Act unified the Merchandise Marks Act, of 1889, and various regulations about trade marks found in the India Penal Code,1860 the Criminal Procedure Code,1973 and the Sea Customs Act,1878 into a single piece of legislation.
Need for trade marks
A trade mark safeguards your brand and gives you the means to stop someone from profiting off of your brand. The shape of the items, their packaging, and a colour combination are all examples of trade marks that may set one person’s goods or services apart from those of another. They enable clients to pinpoint a company as the provider of a good or service. Let us know more reasons for the need for Trade Mark Registration in India.
Important assets
For your business, a registered trade mark might prove to be a significant asset. These assets continue to increase in value over time. Over time, as your firm expands, the value of your trade marks increases naturally. As a result, the value of your trade mark increases as your business does.
Safeguarding your brand
A trade mark registration establishes ownership of a brand, name, or logo. It safeguards your brand against unlawful third-party use. The registered trade mark establishes that the product is entirely yours, and you have the exclusive right to use, sell, and change the brand or items in any way you see fit. Aside from that, having a trademark fosters a trusting relationship with clients, allowing a firm to build a loyal customer base and boost its reputation.
Bringing individuality to a brand
Every firm requires a distinctive brand or logo that sets it apart from the competition, hence, such a brand must be registered. As a result, a registered trade mark provides your brand with a distinct identity. It also helps to avoid customer confusion by indicating the source of the items as well as a constant degree of quality.
Tool for simple communication
Trade Marks may prove to be useful and simple communication tools. They are self-explanatory. With a registered trade mark, the brand to which your goods belong may be determined. For instance, you can tell that a gadget is an Apple when you see a half-bitten apple in silver on it, whether it’s a laptop or a phone.
Customers can easily locate you
A registered trade mark makes it easier for buyers to locate the goods since it attracts the consumer’s attention and makes the product stand out. It is also an effective instrument with a distinct identity; registered trade marks are easily traceable, and buyers can quickly find your goods.
A trade mark lasts forever
Once registered, a trade mark can remain in effect in perpetuity. Any company’s registered trade mark is theirs forever, and thus a trade mark registration must be renewed every ten years as it will maintain the brand’s identity and go on in perpetuity.
Objectives of The Trade Marks Act
The goal of a legal system for trade mark protection in India can be deduced from an examination of constitutional provisions to protect trade, statutory provisions and common law rights, and their judicial interpretation, as well as fulfilment of international obligations under various international treaties to which India is a signatory.
Based on Constitution’s provisions
Article 19 of the Indian Constitution lists freedom of trade and movement as one of the essential rights. In addition to this, several additional fundamental rights ensure the safety of the trade and profession of its residents as well as non-citizens including jural/legal people. As a result, one of the goals of the Trade Mark Act is to secure the preservation and fulfilment of these fundamental rights.
Based on statutory provisions and common law rights
The granting of specific civil rights in each civilised society to protect its people, trading partners, and others from any harm, whether criminal or civil, is essential to the civilization’s survival and progress. The fundamental right to freely trade includes the freedom to establish, develop, and grow one’s own business by legal means.
As a tool for promoting one’s own business, a trade mark must be protected from illegal uses to safeguard the legitimate owner from dishonest and criminally motivated individuals. Additionally, safeguarding the standard of goods and services is the only way to advance the greater good of the public. The availability of identical items on the market results in the duplication of well-known and well-liked products and services by unlicensed users, as well as the original proprietor’s incapacity to maintain the quality owing to losses in terms of revenue, reputation, and public confidence. As a result, the Trade Marks Act was created to safeguard people’s basic, constitutional, and civil rights, as well as to serve the public interest.
Based on Act’s preamble
The Trade Marks Act, 1999’s preamble states that the Act’s purpose is to protect trade marks and prohibit fraudulent use of trade marks. Similarly, one goal of the Indian Penal Code involves the preservation of people’s civill rights, including the right to grow one’s own business through the creation of a brand through the use of certain trade marks and the advancement of public interest. As a result, both Acts allow for the penalty of any unauthorised person who uses a trade mark fraudulently.
The goal of trade mark law is to defend the rights of individuals who produce and sell items bearing distinctive trade marks against infringement by third parties that misrepresent the origin of their products by using trade marks that are not their own.
In light of India’s duties to other countries
India is required to consolidate its municipal law by such treaties and conventions because it is a signatory to numerous significant international treaties, such as the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and because it is a part of various conventions and agreements under these conventions, such as the Paris Convention and Madrid Agreement. Additionally, it must safeguard the commercial interests of local traders from unwarranted harm brought on by unfair competition from outside. With these goals in mind, India has modernised and strengthened its legal framework for trade marks.
Salient features of The Trade Marks Act
The Trade Marks Act, of 1940 was India’s first trade mark law. Before then, trade mark protection was controlled by common law. The Trade Marks Act, 1999, as modified, is the current controlling legislation in India for trade marks. The 1999 Act was passed to comply with the TRIPS rules. The salient features brought about in Indian trade mark law by the Trade Marks Act, 1999, are as follows:
Including a service mark in the definition of a trade mark;
A new clause for collective marks’ registration;
Prohibition on registering some marks that are merely replicas or imitations of well-known marks;
Provision for filing a single registration application for several classes of products and/or services;
Increasing the term of registration of a trade mark from 7 to 10 years, including a six-month grace period for payment of renewal costs.
Expansion of conditions under which registration validity may be challenged;
Giving the Registrar ultimate power over applications for registration of Certification Trade Marks;
Aligning the punitive provisions of the Trade Marks Law with those of the Copyright Law;
Provision for the formation of an Appellate Board.
Registration of Trade Marks under the Act
Anyone claiming to be the trade mark’s owner or who intends to use the trade mark in the future may submit an application in writing to the relevant Registrar by the established procedures. The application must include the name of the goods, mark, and services, as well as the class of goods and services it belongs to, the applicant’s name and address, and the amount of time the mark has been in use. Here, the term “person” refers to a group of businesses, a partnership, a corporation, a trust, a state government, or the federal government.
Application for registration
Section 18 of the Act outlines the process for registering a trade mark. Thus, in order to apply for registration, the applicant must meet the requirements outlined in the Act.
Subsection 1 states that any person claiming the trade mark may submit an application in writing to the Registrar in the appropriate way. A single registration application can be submitted for many classifications of products or services. However, as stated in Section 2 of the Act, various fees will apply to each kind of product or service. If the applicant or joint applicants desire to apply, they must do so within the geographical limitations of their primary place of business. If they do not conduct any business, the application must be lodged inside the geographical limits of the site for services.
Subsection 4 specifies that the Registrar has the authority to accept, reject, or make certain adjustments and revisions subject to specific restrictions or limits. If the Registrar refuses or imposes restrictions, he must explain why and what materials were utilised.
Registration requirements
The central government appoints a person to be known as the controller general of patents, designs, and trade marks, who will be the Registrar of the trade mark, by stating it in the official gazette. The central government may designate additional officials if they believe they are appropriate for discharging, and the Registrar may permit them to discharge under the supervision and control of the Registrar.
The Registrar has the authority to transfer or remove cases by a written request with justification. It is covered under Section 6 of the Act on how to keep a registered trade mark active. Except for the trust notice, all specified details, including those of registered trade marks, must be recorded at the main office. Each branch office is required to maintain a copy of the register. It permits the preservation of documents on diskettes, computers, or in any other electronic format.
Absolute grounds for registration denial
Section 9 of the Act defines absolute grounds for registration refusal. Any trade mark that falls under one of the reasons specified in this Section cannot be registered. The following are the absolute grounds for denying registration:
Trade Marks that do not have any distinguishing characteristics. Distinctive character refers to trade marks that are capable of differentiating one person’s goods or services from those of another.
Trade Marks that consist only of markings or indications used in commerce to designate the kind, quality, amount, intended purpose, values, or geographical origin of products or services delivered.
Trade Marks that only comprise markings or indications that have become usual in the present language or established trade practices.
Trade Marks that deceive or confuse the public.
Trade Marks that contain anything likely to offend the religious sensibilities of any class or section of Indian people.
Trade Marks containing or including scandalous or indecent material.
Marks are derived from the form of the items themselves and are used as trade marks.
Trade Marks consist of markings on items whose shapes are required to achieve a technological outcome.
Trade Marks are made up of symbols resembling the form that provides products with their significant value.
The Act makes an exemption for the first three points, namely where the trade marks lack uniqueness, comprise exclusive marks used in the trade to indicate sort, quality, etc., or contain marks that have become usual in trade practices.
Similarity test
In conclusion, if one mark appears to be deceptively similar to another, the essential features of both must be considered. They should not be placed side by side to determine whether there are any differences in the design and, if so, to prevent one design from being mistaken for the other. It would suffice if the disputed mark is so similar to the registered mark that a person normally dealing with one would be duped into accepting the other if it were offered to him.
In addition to structural, visual, and phonetic similarity or dissimilarity, it is also important to consider the average human intelligence and imperfect data collection. Thirdly, the question of his impressions is raised because it is viewed as a whole.
In the case of Mohd. Iqbal v. Mohd. Wasim (2001), it was said that it is common knowledge that ‘bidis’ are being used by persons belonging to the poorer and illiterate or semi-literate class. They don’t have a lot of knowledge. They cannot be expected to comprehend and understand the subtle distinctions between the two labels, which can often be seen when comparing the two labels. Thus, it was held that the two labels seemed to be misleadingly similar in light of the aforementioned.
Relative grounds for registration refusal
Section 11 of the Act provides related reasons for denying trade mark registration. A trade mark cannot be registered if there is a likelihood of confusion due to its identity with an earlier brand and resemblance of products or services, or its likeness to an earlier trade mark and similarity of goods.
It also states that a trade mark that is identical or similar to an earlier brand cannot be registered. Also, if or to the extent that the previous trade mark is well recognized in India, which is to be registered for products and services that are not identical to those for which the earlier trade mark is registered in the name of a different proprietor. It further states that a trade mark cannot be registered if or to the extent that its use in India is likely to be prohibited by law.
Rule 42 talks of notice of opposition, it states that within four months of the date of publication of the trade mark journal in which the application for registration of the trade mark was advertised or re-advertised, a notice of opposition to the registration of a trade mark under the sub-section (1) of Section 21, with the particulars specified in Rule 43, shall be filed as prescribed.
Rule 43 mentions the requirements of a notice of opposition, it states that a notice of objection must include the grounds for the opposition in the case of an application, an earlier trade mark or earlier right on which the opposition is based, or in the case of the opposing party.
Rule 44 states that the counter statement required by subsection (2) of Section 21 must be submitted within two months of the applicant receiving a copy of the notice of opposition from the Registrar. It must include a list of any facts the applicant has admitted that were alleged in the notice of opposition. The Registrar must typically serve a copy of the counterstatement to the opponent within two months of the date of receipt.
Rule 45 talks of evidence in favour of the opposition, it states that:
The opponent must either leave with the Registrar any affidavit-based evidence he may wish to present in support of his opposition within two months of the service of a copy of the counterstatement, or;
He must notify the Registrar and the applicant in writing that he does not wish to present any evidence in support of his opposition but intends to rely solely on the information provided in the notice of opposition.
By this sub-rule, he must give copies of any evidence, including any exhibits, to the applicant and notify the Registrar in writing of the delivery. An opponent is assumed to have given up on his opposition if he does not take any action under sub-rule (1) within the time frame specified therein.
Rule 46 talks about supporting documentation for application purposes.
It states that within two months of the applicant receiving copies of affidavits in opposition or notice that the opposition’s opponent does not wish to provide any evidence in opposition, the applicant must leave with the Registrar any affidavit-based evidence he wishes to present in support of his application and deliver copies to the opposing party.
Alternatively, the applicant may inform both the Registrar and the opposing party that he does not wish to present any evidence and instead intends to rely on the facts outlined in the opposing party’s counterstatement and/or on any evidence previously left by him in connection with the application at hand. If the applicant provides additional information or relies on material previously provided by him in connection with the application,
He shall give copies of the same to the opponent, including any evidence, and shall notify the Registrar in writing of such delivery. If an applicant does not take action under sub-rule (1) within the period specified, he is presumed to have abandoned his application.
Rule 47 talks of the opponent’s evidence in reply.
The opponent may provide the Registrar with evidence by affidavit in reply within one month of receiving copies of the applicant’s affidavit from the applicant and shall give copies of the same to the applicant, along with any exhibits, and shall notify the Registrar in writing of such delivery. Following the conclusion of the evidence, the Registrar is required to notify the parties on the first day of the hearing.
Rule 50 mentions the provision for hearing and decision.
The hearing must take place at least one month following the initial notice date. A hearing between the two parties may be requested by the Registrar. He will then make a decision based on the arguments made by the two sides. If he grants the applicant’s request, the trade mark will be registered. The trade mark will be taken down from the Journal and the registration request will be denied if he rules in favour of the opposing party.
Procedure and registration period
Section 25 states the procedure and registration period of a trade mark, and subsection 1 provides that the Registrar after receiving an application from the trade mark owner in the required format, within the allotted time frame, and with the required payment of costs, may register a trade mark for a term of ten years, and it may also be renewed for a further ten years after the initial registration or the most recent renewal of registration has expired.
Before the final registration expires, the Registrar must give the registered proprietor a notification in the manner specified. If the criteria have not been properly met by the period specified in the notice, the Registrar may withdraw the trade mark from the register. The notification specifies the date of expiration, the payment of fees, and the circumstances under which a renewal of registration may be acquired. However, if the implication is made in the prescribed manner and the prescribed fee is paid within six months of the trade mark’s final registration expiring, the Registrar shall not remove the trade mark from the register and shall instead renew the registration of the trade mark for ten years.
If a trade mark is withdrawn from the register due to non-payment of the specified fee, the Registrar must renew the registration within six months and one year of the expiration of the last registration of the trade mark as mentioned in subsection 3 of the Act.
In addition, upon receipt of an implication in the specified form and payment of the prescribed fee, the Registrar restores the trade mark to the register and renews the registration of the trade mark for ten years from the expiration of the previous registration, as mentioned in the subsection 4 of the Act.
No action for an unregistered trade mark
This is defined under Section 27 of the Act, which states that no infringement will lie concerning an unregistered trade mark but recognises the common law rights of the trade mark owner to take action against any person for passing off goods as the goods of another person or as the services of another person or the remedies thereof.
Trade mark infringement
Infringement of trade marks occurs when someone other than the registered proprietor uses the same mark or one that is confusingly similar in the course of business in relation to the same products or services for which the trade mark is registered. In general, trade mark infringement suits entail the problems of the likelihood of confusion, counterfeit marks, and mark dilution. The likelihood of misunderstanding occurs when customers are likely to be confused or misled regarding two parties’ usage of marks.
The plaintiff must demonstrate that many customers are likely to be confused or misled regarding the origins of the items bearing these marks as a result of the identical markings. Dilution is a trade mark law term that prohibits the use of a well-known trade mark in a way that diminishes its distinctiveness. Most incidents of trade mark dilution involve the unlawful use of another’s trade mark on items that do not compete with and have little in common with, the trade mark owners.
Section 29 talks about the infringement of registered trade marks under the Act. Infringement refers to the violation of someone’s rights. As a result, trade mark infringement implies a breach of trade mark rights. Infringement of a trade mark occurs when an unauthorised use of a trade mark or a substantially similar mark on goods or services of a comparable type occurs. In such a scenario, the court will consider whether the use of the trade mark would lead to consumer confusion about the genuine brand they are purchasing. Thus, the following elements must be completed to categorise trade mark infringement as provided under Section 29 of the Act:
If the trade mark is a copy of an existing trade mark with minor modifications or changes.
If the infringing trade mark is printed or utilised in advertising.
If the infringing mark is employed in commerce
If the mark utilised is sufficiently similar to a registered mark a customer is likely to be confused or misled when picking a product category.
Apart from this, Section 103 of the Act talks of the provisions for penalties for applying false trade marks, trade descriptions, etc. According to this Section, a person is deemed to be filing for a trade mark incorrectly under the following circumstances:
If a trade mark fabrication has occurred;
If a trade mark has been wrongfully applied to products or services;
Makes, acquires or disposes of any device with the intent to falsify a trade mark;
Falsely represents the name of the nation or location where the items were manufactured, as well as the name or address of the person responsible for their production.
Tampers with the origin indication that is applied or needed to be applied to a product.
Infringement of trade marks as a consequence of falsification shall result in a penalty of not less than six months, but not less than three years, and a fine of not less than fifty thousand rupees, but not less than two lakh rupees. Provided, however, that the accused offender did not perpetrate such deception on the following grounds:
All reasonable efforts were taken to avoid the commission of such fabrication, and there was no legitimate reason to doubt the legitimacy of the trade mark at the time of the alleged violation.
That he had done lawfully.
On the prosecutor’s request, such relevant documentation about the way and person from whom the products were received.
Concept of Passing Off
The term “passing-off” is not defined in the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Section 27 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 acknowledges the trade mark owner’s common law rights to pursue legal action against anybody who misrepresents his goods or services as those of a third party or seeks to exploit such rights. In Cadila Healthcare Ltd v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd, (2001) the Supreme Court of India defined “passing-off” as a type of unfair commercial competition or actionable unfair dealing in which one person, by deceit, seeks to get an economic benefit from the reputation earned by the other in a particular trade or company.
A few key elements must be proven for a passing off action, as maintained by courts in a series of judgements, which are listed below:
Misrepresentation,
The defendant must do the conduct in the course of his or her business.
The plaintiff’s goods and services have been misrepresented to prospective or final clients.
Such deception is intended to harm the plaintiff’s company or reputation, and
Such conduct creates genuine harm to the plaintiff’s company or reputation.
The defendant’s motive is irrelevant in a passing-off suit. Once the plaintiff has created a reputation, no additional proof of the defendant’s fraudulent intent is necessary to be proven or established.
The comparison between an infringement action and passing off is portrayed below:
Infringement Action
Passing Off Action
It is a legal remedy.
It is a remedy under common law.
The defendant must use the infringing mark on the same items as the plaintiff’s registered mark.
Defendant’s products do not have to be identical; they might be related or even distinct.
The sole requirement to prove trade mark infringement in relation to a registered trade mark is that the infringing mark is identical to or misleadingly similar to the registered mark.
In a passing-off lawsuit, it is not enough to simply show that the markings are the same or confusingly similar. The mark’s usage must be liable to mislead or create misunderstanding.
There is no requirement that the defendant’s use of the mark harms the plaintiff in any way.
It must be demonstrated that the defendant’s use of the trade mark is likely to harm or impair the plaintiff’s goodwill.
Appeals to the Appellate board
Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act of 1999 addresses appeals to the appellate board.
Earlier, the applicant’s ultimate recourse, once the registration is rejected, is to file an appeal with the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (hereinafter referred to as the “IPAB”) within three months after the day the Registrar issued the rejection decision. But recently, the Tribunals Reforms (Rationalisation and Conditions of Service) Act, 2021, was proclaimed, dissolving the Intellectual Property Appellate Board by revising the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Some of the most recent modifications to the Trade Marks Act, 1999, are detailed below:
The IPAB has been abolished.
Any procedures for cancellation of a mark based on non-use under Section 47 of the Act will henceforth be heard exclusively by the Registrar or the High Court.
In addition to the Registrar of Trade Marks, any procedures for correction of a mark under Section 57 of the Act can now be brought before the relevant High Court possessing jurisdiction.
All appeals under Section 91 of the Act will be heard by the High Court rather than the IPAB.
A claim for trade mark infringement is delayed under Section 124 of the Act if the defendant pleads invalidity of the mark or raises a defence under Section 30(2)(e) of the Act and if rectification procedures against the defendant’s mark are underway before the Registrar or the High Court prior to the initiation of suit, the plaintiff pleads invalidity.
If rectification proceedings are not ongoing and the court determines that the invalidity of the mark claim is plausible at first glance, it will raise the matter and postpone the case for three months so that the party in question can apply to the High Court for rectification of the mark. It will also raise the issue if the rectification application is made within three months, at which point the court may permit the trial of the claim.
Appeals from the Registrar of Trade Marks orders will henceforth be heard by the relevant High Court depending on the jurisdiction of the Registrar making the orders and must be submitted within three months of the date the order was informed to the appellant. In such cases, the phrase “prescribed” has been enlarged to cover regulations imposed by the High Court as well as rules made under the Trade Marks Act.
Relief in lawsuits for passing off or infringement
According to Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, a lawsuit for trade mark infringement may be filed before a District Court or High Court if the person filing the lawsuit, or if multiple people are filing the lawsuit, any of them, actually and voluntarily resides, conducts business, or engages in gainful employment within the local limits of the court’s jurisdiction at the time of filing the lawsuit or other proceeding. A person, according to the Act, includes both the registered proprietor and the registered user. Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, governs an action for passing off. Section 20 of the Code grants jurisdiction to courts within the geographical borders of where the defendant resides, conducts business, or personally works for gain, or where the cause of action has arisen entirely or partly.
According to Section 135(1), the following are typical reliefs that a judge may issue in a complaint for infringement or passing off:
Permanent and temporary injunctions preventing further trade mark usage.
Compensation or profit account.
The requirement to transmit the infringing labels and destruction or erasure of markings.
An order seeking any of the following may be among the interim reliefs sought in the lawsuit:
A local commissioner is appointed to conduct searches, seize illegally obtained commodities, preserve them, prepare inventories, and more.
Restricting the infringement from disposing of or dealing with the assets in a way that may jeopardise the plaintiff’s capacity to recover damages, costs, or other monetary remedies that may be awarded to the plaintiff in the end.
A criminal complaint can also be brought in the event of trade mark infringement or passing off. The limitation period for commencing an action for trade mark infringement/passing off is three years from the date of infringement/passing off. When the infringement/passing is ongoing, a fresh course of action is required each time an infringement occurs.
Acquired distinctiveness
Each trade mark designates the products sold under it as coming from a certain source. With time, it becomes stronger, and a specific trade mark is either registered or becomes conceptually connected with the product and its source in the minds of the consumers. Some trade marks receive legal protection right once after being used as a trade mark because of their distinctive characteristics, while other marks do so because of a secondary meaning they gradually come to have. Thus, there is a connection between a trade mark’s strength and secondary meaning.
In essence, this suggests that some words, even while they are primarily used to describe the personality and calibre of products or services, may lose their descriptive connotations and come to have distinctive meanings as a result of usage. A mark that is not fundamentally unique but, by prolonged and meaningful usage over time, persuades consumers to associate the mark with a product or service that is said to have ‘acquired distinctiveness’ or ‘secondary meaning.’
Sections 9(1) and 32 of the Trade Marks Act of 1999 deal with “acquired distinctiveness” or ‘secondary meaning’ in a roundabout way. It specifies that even if a trade mark has acquired a secondary meaning or importance, it will not be refused registration if it falls into one of the categories stated in Section 9 of the Act.
It is a well-known rule that no merchant may trade mark common language terms, descriptive words, or common words and names until such trade names have created such a strong reputation and goodwill in the market that the common language word has acquired secondary significance. The secondary meaning here is that other traders in that line of business realise that such common phrases have evolved to designate things unique to that trade. Section 9(1)(b) of the Act prohibits the registration of descriptive trade marks. However, a provision to Section 9(1) states that a trade mark should not be rejected for registration if it has developed a distinctive character as a consequence of usage before the date of application for registration or is a well-known trade mark.
Section 32 also states that where a trade mark is registered in contravention of sub-section (1) of Section 9, it shall not be declared invalid if, as a result of the use which has been made of it, it has acquired a distinctive character about the goods or services for which it is registered after registration and before the commencement of any legal proceedings challenging the validity of such registration.
The Act is notably silent on the considerations to be examined for determining whether a mark has ‘acquired distinctiveness’ or ‘acquired secondary meaning,’ in contrast to the US and other countries that have defined standards to deal with these issues of law. In India, the Court and the Intellectual Property Appellate Board have played critical roles in establishing standards for determining whether a mark has acquired uniqueness or not. The mere usage of a mark does not constitute it unique, and increased use does not either. The usage and expanded use of any substance should be done separately. It is both allowed and required to ascertain the meaning and significance of a sign on a certain day. The usage in question extends not only to the customers or end users of the items, but also to others involved in the trade, such as producers, distributors, and retailers.
In Godfrey Phillips India Ltd v. Girnar Foods and Beverages Ltd (1997), it was determined that a descriptive trade mark may be protected if it has acquired a secondary meaning that identifies it with a certain product or as coming from a specific source. Developing uniqueness is a time-consuming and arduous process. Nonetheless, no time limit has been set for a trade mark to become unique, unlike the British Act of 1919, which stated that two years of bona fide usage was sufficient. There may be instances where a trade mark becomes unique in a very short period of time for various reasons, or where a brand never gains distinctiveness. As a result, there is no clear and fast rule governing the period necessary to achieve uniqueness.
It was ruled in Ishi Khosla v. Anil Aggarwal (2007), that a product does not have to be on the market for years to gain secondary meaning; if a new idea is exciting and appealing to the public, it may become a hit immediately. Although it has been demonstrated in various determined decisions that a common descriptive word can acquire a secondary distinctive meaning by being used about the products. However, establishing that such a term has become unique in actuality and has acquired a secondary meaning separate from its original meaning can be exceedingly difficult. When the mark is not just descriptive but also incorporates the name of the product, such as Diabolo for top or shredded wheat, the complexity increases. This challenge can be addressed if the putative trade mark includes a description of products, but the public recognizes it as a fancy term rather than a descriptive word.
The petitioner must demonstrate that the term, which is largely descriptive of the quality of products, has become descriptive. The applicant must discharge the onus with respect to each piece for which the trade mark is registered, not simply one of the numerous products for which the mark is used. When a case is on the borderline, the Registrar will normally decline to issue the registration; nevertheless, he will not investigate the grounds for the refusal. However, the merchant should be given a fair chance to demonstrate his entitlement to statutory protection.
The competent authority must undertake an overall evaluation of the evidence that the mark has come to identify the goods in question as coming from a certain source when deciding whether a mark has developed a unique character as a result of long and continuous use. The following factors should be considered when analysing the unique character of a mark for which registration has been applied:
The mark’s share of the market.
The extent to which the mark has been used intensively, geographically, widely, and for a long time.
The amount expended by the company in the market promotion.
The proportion of the relevant class of people who identify the items as emanating from a certain enterprise.
Statements from numerous business and trade organisations.
If based on these characteristics, the competent authority determines that a considerable number of people recognize the products as coming from a certain source because of the trade mark, it must conclude that the condition for registration of the mark has been met.
Judicial pronouncements
Yahoo!, Inc. v. Akash Arora and Anr,1999
For the first time ever in India, the Delhi High Court ruled in the case of Yahoo!, Inc. v. Akash Arora and Anr (1999), that a domain name serves the same purpose as a trade mark and is entitled to the same level of protection. The accused’s domain name was “Yahoo India!” This was the same as the plaintiff’s trade mark “Yahoo!” and was phonically comparable. According to the court, internet users would be misled and duped into thinking that both domain names originated from the same source. The argument used by the defendant was that a disclaimer had been posted on its website.
However, it was revealed that a mere disclaimer was insufficient since the internet is structured in such a way that the use of a similar domain name cannot be corrected by a disclaimer, regardless of whether ‘yahoo’ is a dictionary term. The appellation has gained distinctiveness and originality, and it is strongly associated with the plaintiff.
Milmet Oftho Industries et al. v. Allergan Inc., 2004
A well-known international brand was given trade mark protection by the Supreme Court in the case of Milmet Oftho Industries et al. v. Allergan Inc. (2004). The court barred an Indian firm from using the OCUFLOX trade mark. The decision was made despite the fact that the mark has never been used or registered in India. According to the court, the respondent was the first to enter the market and use the mark. If the respondent is the first to join the global market, it makes no difference that they have not utilised the mark in India. In the realm of healthcare, it is critical to eliminate any possibility of deceit or confusion, while also ensuring that the public interest is not threatened.
Sony Corporation v. K. Selvamurthy, 2021
In the case of Sony Corporation v. K. Selvamurthy (2021), Sony Corporation filed a lawsuit for trade mark infringement against a sole owner operating a tours and travel company under the name Sony Tours and Travels, alleging dilution of its well-known ‘SONY’ trade mark. The District Court concluded after considering the available evidence that Defendant had not unfairly exploited or damaged Plaintiff’s SONY mark’s unique character or reputation. The Court reached this determination because Sony Corporation’s business is restricted to electronics and media, which may be distinguished from the defendant’s tours and trips business.
The Court further recognised that there was no misunderstanding among consumers as a result of Defendant’s usage of the phrase “Sony.” Additionally, it noted the plaintiff’s excessive delay in contacting the court and awarded the defendants Rs. 25, 000 as costs.
ITC Limited v. Maurya Hotel (Madra) Pvt Ltd, 2021
The Madras High Court inITC Limited v. Maurya Hotel (Madra) Pvt Ltd (2021), allowed the plaintiff to add a remedy for trade mark infringement to a passing off complaint based on the plaintiff’s later registration of the trade mark. The Court in the case stated that adding a remedy is permissible and aids in avoiding several litigations. It further said that the conclusion may change if the application was for the conversion of the plaintiff from passing off relief to an infringement remedy.
Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Limited v. Cipla Limited, 2021
In this case of Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Limited v. Cipla Limited (2021), the respondent/plaintiff filed a perpetual injunction suit against the applicant/defendant before the Madras High Court for violation of its copyright and trade mark. In this case, the Court awarded an interim injunction in favour of the respondent/plaintiff. Following that, the applicant/defendant filed three petitions, each with a request to dismiss the temporary relief granted on the grounds of urgency. The appeal was predicated on the fact that the medications were in large quantities, had a one-year expiration date, and were in high demand because of the ongoing epidemic since they helped relieve Covid-19 symptoms. The balance of convenience remained in favour of the respondent/plaintiff, thus the court determined that they had shown a prima facie case for the continuation of the interim injunction.
Despite the nation dealing with an unprecedented medical emergency, the Court noted that they could not let a party violate another person’s intellectual property rights when ruling. The interim injunction was maintained by the court, and it was decided that it would remain in effect pending the outcome of the case.
Conclusion
The whole of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, does away with the cumbersome requirements of the previous Act, and it has undoubtedly greatly bolstered the rights of business owners and other service providers. This Trade Marks Act functions as a warning to those who infringe. Positively, this Act takes into account changes in business and commercial practices, the growing globalisation of trade and industry, the need to promote investment flows and technology transfers, the need for trade mark management systems to be simplified and harmonised, and it also gives effect to pertinent judicial decisions. The legal and corporate communities both eagerly awaited this law. The long-standing ambition has now been satisfied.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
Is it required to register a trade mark?
No, it is not required to register a trade mark. However, the registration is the initial proof of ownership of the trade mark covered by the registration. It should be emphasised, nonetheless, that no legal action may be taken for the infringement of unregistered trade marks. Any individual can be sued for passing off products or services as the property of another person or as services rendered by another person for unregistered marks.
Is it possible to change a registered trade mark later?
Yes, the submitted mark may be modified with Section 22 of the Trade Marks Act, which permits such amendments as long as they do not result in a material alteration of the mark’s distinctiveness. Any surface-level or unimportant aspect of the mentioned mark may be changed with the submission of a request in the required format.
Can a trade mark be registered for sound or smell? In what way are these markings defined?
Yes, odours and sounds can be registered as trade marks. However, they must be recognisable and able to be graphically replicated. For sound marks, a recording of the same that is no more than thirty seconds in duration must be supplied in MP3 format, coupled with a graphic showing its notations. Along with the sample, the scent can be expressed as a chemical formula.
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This article has been written by Uzma Fatima, from Jamia Hamdard.
It has been published by Rachit Garg.
Table of Contents
Introduction
A small number of voters have access to postal voting. By marking his/her choices on the ballot paper and handing it back to the election official before the vote is recorded, a voter can cast a remote ballot using this service.
Armed personnel, including those in the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as members of a state’s armed police force who serve outside the state, as well as government employees who are stationed outside of India and their wives, are only entitled to cast ballots by mail. They cannot vote in person, to put it another way. Only individuals who are in preventive custody are eligible to vote via mail.
Postal ballots may be cast by the President of India, the Vice President, Governors, Union Cabinet Ministers, Speaker of the House, and government employees who are on election duty. Individuals must use a specific form to apply for this benefit, though.
The Law Ministry has established a new category of “absentee voters” who can now cast ballots via mail at the request of the Election Commission. These are voters who are unable to cast ballots because of their employment in vital services. At this time, representatives of the Northern Railway (Passenger and Freight) Services, the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation, and the media have been selected as absentee voters.
The process of votes recorded by a post
Within 24 hours of the final day for withdrawal of nominations, the returning officer must print and distribute ballots. This is done to ensure that the concerned voter receives the ballots well before the election, allowing her plenty of time to return them before the counting day.
Postal ballots are distributed to military personnel by their record offices. Members of a state’s armed police force (serving outside the state), government employees deployed outside India, and their spouses may receive the voting paper via mail or electronically. The ballots for the following categories can be delivered in person or mailed.
After receiving it, the voter can place a checkmark or a cross next to the candidate’s name to show her preference. Additionally, they need to sign a declaration that is legally proven and states they have marked the voting paper. Prior to the start of the vote counting, the ballot paper and declaration are sealed and delivered back to the returning officer.
Why is no proxy, postal or e-ballot voting for inter-state migrants as per Election Commission
A request to allow interstate migrants to vote electronically or by mail rather than going to their home districts in person was denied by the Election Commission (EC).
400 million Indians are thought to travel to other states in pursuit of employment; they are unable to cast ballots in their own states.
The Representation of the People Act’s provision stating that only those who are “ordinarily resident” of a constituency can vote from that constituency and that migrants must register in their current place of residence if they wish to vote, according to the EC, was unambiguous in this regard. This was stated in the EC’s response to the Supreme Court on Saturday.
The EC claims that because the Act’s architecture makes it plain that a person can only be enrolled in the place where he or she resides on a regular basis, there can be no problem with a person signing up in his or her home constituency and voting after moving. The EC’s affidavit was provided in response to a request made by petitioner Dr. VP Shamsheer, a Kerala native who currently resides in the United Arab Emirates, through attorney Haris Beeran.
Private citizens cannot be compared to government officials, members of the armed forces, or other unique groups of persons who are allowed to cast postal ballots, according to the EC.
According to the EC, they are given this privilege as a result of their duties to the public as representatives of those offices. According to the court, the differentiation is not discriminatory and the classification is fair and reasonable.
According to the European Commission, several measures have been made to inform, encourage, and make it easier for people to exercise their right to vote, and it will deal with any problems that migrants may encounter when enrolling in local schools after they have migrated.
Postal vote for migrants
The national movement’s revolutionary momentum and the egalitarian and anti-discriminatory principles it upheld helped India transition from a restrictive 15% of Indians having (limited) voting rights to a universal adult franchise, while the United States gradually granted a universal adult franchise.
Article 326 of the Constitution, which mandates that elections be held based on the adult universal franchise and ensures that elitist notions of qualifications, such as property ownership, do not disqualify people from voting or holding office, was made possible thanks to B R Ambedkar’s foresight in the area of voting rights.
Ambedkar testified before the Southborough committee in 1919, which was tasked with establishing representative institutions for the Indian Dominion, and had long influenced public opinion on the issue. He highlighted that voting would be (one of) the harbinger(s) of political education and that, in the end, a democratic government was intimately related to the right to vote.
After COVID-19, India needs to reflect on its lengthy past. The decisions of the ruling parties made at the polls and the way in which the desire of the Indian people is reflected in policy are the fundamental pillars of representative democracy. India is unable to explain how such a sizable portion of its population is denied this fundamental constitutional right merely by its work definition, which is defined as being away from home, with all the negative effects of unchecked money power in politics, class, caste, and community interests obscuring a modern and truly transparent electoral process.
Making sure they have the right and ability to vote is essential to ensuring that Indian democracy learns the proper lessons from the suffering that a sudden lockdown caused this significant portion of the population, a situation that has been brought before the more settled and privileged sections of the population, including politicians.
The Constitution guarantees everyone the freedom of movement and the right to reside anywhere in the nation. According to the 2011 Census, there are 450 million (45 crore) internal migrants, an increase of 45% over the 2001 Census. Among them, 26% of the movement, or 117 million (11.7 crores), occurs within the same state’s districts, whereas 12% of migration, or 54 million (5.4 crores), takes place across states. Both government and unaffiliated experts agree that this number is underestimated. Circular migration is the movement of people back and forth between host cities without settling there permanently.
The majority of migrant workers come from underdeveloped rural areas and the most marginalised groups, including Muslims, SC/STs, OBCs, and other minorities. They lack assets like land and are largely illiterate. The largest interstate migration sources in 2011 were Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, with 83 lakh and 63 lakh migrants, respectively.
Voter registration cards for their home district are present among the majority of migrant voters. In a 2012 study, 78% of migrant workers were found to have voter identification cards and to have their names on voter registration lists in their home cities. The bulk of them are unable to cast ballots because they cannot travel back to their home states on election day owing to financial constraints. Only 48% of those surveyed, compared to the national average of 59.7%, participated in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections, claims one survey. These trends have not changed. With voter turnout percentages of 57.33 percent and 59.21 percent, respectively, in the 2019 Lok Sabha elections, major sender states like Bihar and Uttar Pradesh were among the lowest. The national average was 67.4 percent.
Due to the cyclical and seasonal nature of migration, migrants do not qualify as “ordinary inhabitants” under Section 20 of the Representation of People Act (RP Act) in the host state, making it impossible for them to get voter identification cards. They are unable to change their electoral district as a result. Only 10% of the migrant workers surveyed in their host cities possessed voter identification.
Section 60(c) of the RP Act gives the Election Commission of India the power to notify a particular group of voters to cast postal ballots. The ECE’s well-known pledge to make sure “no voters are left behind” has sparked initiatives to build a secure postal voting system. In the 2019 Lok Sabha elections, more than 28 lakh ballots were mailed in. Under a similar framework, the migrant worker from India has a secure right to vote.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the right to vote as extending the fundamental right to free expression. The ECI is now under a positive commitment to offer the optimal conditions for exercising this freedom. No of their caste, gender, colour, ethnicity, or religion, all Indian migrant workers are entitled to this fundamental freedom under the constitution of the ECI. This “class of Indians” security, dignity, and general well-being must be erased from the political vocabulary of the nation if their right to vote is not upheld.
The postal vote should be available to migrant workers: rights groups tell EC
In a letter to the Election Commission, a number of human rights organisations argued that migrant workers should also have access to postal ballots (EC).
According to a Memorandum from Citizens for Justice and Peace, Lok Shakti Abhiyan, Bangla Sanskriti Manch, All India Union of Forest Working People, and Bharatiya Nagrik Adhikar Suraksha Manch, migrant workers frequently lack the ability to cast ballots because they are employed outside of their home state.
The memorandum reads, “By allowing migrant workers to vote by postal ballot, the Election Commission of India would be taking a step toward a more inclusive democracy, making sure that every segment of the adult and eligible Indian population has the opportunity to vote and is not excluded due to the demands of their profession.”
According to the memorandum, “migrant labourers constitute a particular class of persons who, effectively, are barred from exercising their franchise, resulting in and in turn producing tremendous economic and social suffering.”
Following the recommendations of the Standing Committee on Defence, the EC increased the postal ballot option to include members of the armed forces and their families in 2016. Voter registration has surpassed 16 lakh military men. People over 65 can now use postal ballots thanks to a recent decision by the Election Commission. They were compelled to take it down after protests from the opposition party.
The 2011 Census indicates that there are 45 million migrant labourers in India. The memorandum states that 78% of the migratory workers reviewed in 2012 had voter identification cards and their names were on the voter rolls of their home cities or villages. Most of them could not travel by themselves to cast their votes.
Postal vote: The only way migrant workers can cast a vote
The COVID-19 lockdown has brought the plight of migrant workers to the fore of public discourse.
Beyond concerns about survival, the crisis response must involve real enfranchisement of migrant workers since this will likely allow them to talk in terms of political rights and compel political parties to pay attention to them.
It will therefore open the door for legislation and the implementation of a system that unifies citizenship and employment rights. We believe that the request for remote voting for internal migrants is more legitimate given that the Election Commission of India (ECI) has previously granted voting rights to Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) and promised them postal ballot voting rights if they are unable to travel to their constituency.
Conclusion
Aside from accessibility concerns and technological advancements, India’s voting process requires physical presence. The voter must locate their name on the voters list and present identification. Voting by mail is the lone exemption. Immigration restrictions, however, preclude voters from utilising postal ballots to cast their ballots.
A proxy voting provision for them, which is currently only available to armed personnel, police, and government officials stationed outside of India, may also be part of a comprehensive migration policy. Under this proxy voting system, a voter may give permission to a neighbour who resides in the same polling place to cast their ballot on their behalf.
Aajeevika Bureau conducted a study that found that the ECI had excused homeless people from documentation and permitted verification through block officers. To give circular employees a voice in the government of the cities they help create, similar options might be looked into.
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The current research is being conducted to understand the plethora of problems faced by the Indian legal system specifically in relation to the frustration of contracts when the COVID-19 pandemic that came in the year 2020. During the same period, there were several conflicts appeared and created a dilemma in the minds of the Indian judiciary. The present research aims to explain the doctrine of frustration of contract and then dives deeper into how the Indian Judicial system tackled the systematic application of the doctrine of frustration of contract to various commercial agreements during the Covid-19 pandemic. The current paper seeks to analyse the exceptions, aims, objectives and legislative intent behind the frustration of contract.
This research project focuses on a variety of aspects of frustration of contracts wherein there is a detailed explanation of the situation that was existing before the pandemic hit the Indian sub-continent and the changes that were brought about by the pandemic when the pandemic duration was at its peak. The implications the pandemic has on the current Indian legal system especially, in relation to the contracts that were freshly formed or the past contracts that were formed way before the pandemic and were not being followed through by one party that might be again due to several reasons like financial hardship being one of the most common reasons. The research paper argues from an Indian perspective in comparison with the UK perspective.
Introduction
COVID-19 a big backlash to the legal system of the world had brought down a lot of conflicting cases in the face of the courts. The worldwide lockdown initiated by different governments made certain contracts that were to be performed by either of the parties rendered to be difficult or impossible to perform the contract. Thus came the doctrine of force majeure into play and the major question whether the contract is to be rendered to be impossible or to decide upon the liabilities of the parties based on the situation.
Sections 56 and 32 do not particularly define force majeure but it comes within the scope of the aforesaid sections. Along with force majeure, the doctrine of frustration is used to define whether the contract comes within the scope of force majeure or not. The frustration of contract is rendered to a contract if the performance of the contractual obligations is rendered to be ‘impossible’. But mere impossibility is not the only reason that a contract can be rendered as impossible. The constitutional courts of India have expressly stated that the frustration of a contract is an elliptical expression. The remedy under section 32 and 52 are only available when the due duties by both parties have been performed.
The chapters mentioned below focus on a variety of legal problems that came before Indian and UK courts and the future implications of the decisions given by the courts and a detailed analysis and a comprehensive comparison has been conducted for the same. Solutions along with the way forward will be given at the end of this research project.
Chapter I – Covid-19 as a force majure event
The declaration of the existence of the COVID-19 pandemic shook the government which further on led to the imposition of a nationwide lockdown in India. In such circumstances came a major doubt in the minds of the Indian legal system is whether to consider this event as a force majeure event, i.e., whether this event should be considered an unanticipated event or not.
A notification dated 19/2/2020 and titled “ OFFICE MEMORANDUM” was issued by the Ministry of Finance of India that declared COVID-19 pandemic as a force majeure event (the aforementioned memorandum was not binding), but the central question that comes is whether will consideration of the pandemic as a force majeure event render every existing or pre-existing contract as null and void. If the same is done many parties might take advantage of that fact and escape from liability even if there is an existing negligence or inability of the party to perform the obligations of the contract. So the major question that comes before us is what event can be declared as an “event that is beyond reasonable control”. To answer the scope of force majeure we can take of the following past case laws that have been decided by the constitutional courts of India:
In the case of Alopi Parshad & Sons Ltd. v. Union of India the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in its operative part of the judgement and while interpreting the ratio stated that even though there is an increase in the prices of ghee due to the heavy impact of the second world war, the parties often face these types of circumstances wherein they cannot predict the turn of events but still the same will not per se impact the bargain made by them. Herein the court even though there was an escalation in prices due to the war, still, did not excuse the army to be excused of the prices of ghee though the war was an unforeseeable event. Thus comparing the impact of COVID-19 and the world war we can conclude that even the pandemic is still not an excuse to bring into the scope of force majeure.
Moreover, in the recent case of Energy Watchdog v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, the apex court stated that the rise in the price of coal due to a sudden change in the Indonesian law cannot come under the scope of a force majeure though an alternative remedy can be given under the performance of a contract.
In conclusion, there is no clarity or a conclusion that can be inferred on the basis of precedents that should the COVID-19 pandemic be brought under the scope of force majeure. The courts seem to take a decision on the factual matrix of the case presented before it. If the facts are in satisfaction of the court, then there is a possibility that the case might be brought under the scope of a force majeure event. The courts fail to bring out the aspect that whether this pandemic should be considered as a force majeure incident.
Chapter II- the frustration of contract post covid-19
The doctrine of Frustration of contracts established from the maxim ‘lex non cogit ad impossibilia’ is covered under S. 56 and 32 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 ( herein referred to ICA,1872/ ICA), it occurs mainly due to the destruction of the subject matter of the contract which compels the contract to be held impossible to be performed thus the contract is rendered to be ‘frustrated’. Under S. 56 and 32 of ICA, the scope of an agreement that will be held to be void due to an impossibility of the contract to be performed has been envisaged. The word impossibility itself is a very wide term in law. An impossible event can be characterized as an unlawful agreement mentioned in the contract or an impossible event that might be by a reason of an event that neither the promisee or the promisor could not prevent. In India, the word impossibility has to be interpreted more in the ‘practical’ form rather than the ‘literal’ sense.
Before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the courts of India were mainly faced with the challenge of interpreting the feasibility of a contract that can be frustrating and what type of contract and on what basis is the contract to be rendered impossible and henceforth declared to be frustrated. To understand the impact of COVID-19 on the frustration of contracts it is more important to envision the dilemma the courts faced post-COVID-19 period. To illustrate the same there are a variety of cases that display the basic conception of frustration of a contract and these cases enlighten us with the concept of the same. The following cases can be of help:
One of the problems that came up before the Supreme Court relating to the sale of land and the main question that came before the court in the case of Satyabrata Ghose versus Mugneeram Bangur & Co & Anr was related to the unexpected events which affected the substance of the contract and will those events lead to the contract getting frustrated and hence lead to the discharge of the contract on the basis of the same. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judge ruling against the respondent and in favour of the appellant stated that the principle of Frustration of contract was not applicable here since the performance of the said contract has not been rendered as impossible and henceforth it was ruled that the contract fails to come within the purview of section 56 of the ICA 1872.
The case of Ganga Saran versus Firm Ram Charan Ram Gopal decided by the Supreme Court of India said that the doctrine clearly falling under the purview of section 56 of ICA has a restriction attached alongside it. The parties cannot simply take the plea of a supervening event that could not have been reasonably foreseen by them. They should take precautions or safeguard themselves for any surprising or unexpected event.
In the case of Naihati Jute Mills Ltd vs Hyaliram Jagnnath the Apex court ruled that a contract cannot be rendered to be frustrated on the grounds that there was an alter in the happening of the events or there is a turn of events because of some situation. Hence clarified the stance that a turn of events cannot be considered as a force majeure event.
In Satyabrata Ghose vs Mugneeram Bangur & Co the Supreme court did the interpretation of the word ‘impossible’. The court held that for a performance to be held impossible it is not important that the performance should be literally or physically impossible.
The High Court of Orissa in Sri Ananda Chandra Behera vs Chairman, Orissa State Electricity Board established that ‘immediate and direct cause’ of the happening of the situation will be taken into consideration for deciding whether there is an existence of an act of god or the act has been done by a man and further to render the contract as frustrated the immediate and direct cause of the act must be an act of god.
It can be seen from the aforementioned cases that there was a wide interpretation done for the frustration of contracts before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. But still, there is no precise interpretation done for the different types of issues that came before the court. The courts failed to give a precise understanding of acts of God, impossible events and foreseeability and under what all circumstances can these words be used and then a contract be rendered as frustrated. In conclusion, we can say that the scope of S. 56 r/w 32 has been decided on a case-to-case basis, hereby a restrictive interpretation has been given to the provisions of frustration of the contract, it is observed that the court has shied away from giving a wide interpretation but instead applied a stricter interpretation to the said provisions of the ICA in context of frustration of contract. Since frustration of contract can be attributed to an unforeseen event thereby from the aforesaid cases, we can conclude that there is no specific rule or principle to the applied throughout all arising causes of action falling within the purview of S. 56 ICA and S. 32 ICA but instead application differs on a case basis, in simpler words, there is no specific rule of interpretation but the application is mainly based upon different factual matrixes and causes of action.
Chapter III- Covid 19 and frustration of contracts
The COVID-19 pandemic had a heavy impact on the Indian economy and furthermore, the impact of the pandemic on the diverse nature of contracts that existed or were freshly introduced was heavy. Suppliers had difficulty performing the contracts because of the economic shutdown the Central government had imposed. Not only the suppliers the enforcement of rent deeds during the same time was a big issue that the courts were facing at that point of time. The doctrine of Force majeure played a major role in the performance of contracts throughout the Indian territory during the same time. The Delhi High court in Ramanand & Ors vs Dr Girish Soni & Anr laid down unequivocally that section 56 of the ICA 1872 will not apply to claim waiver, suspension or the claim of exemption of rent agreement the only claim that the aggrieved party can take is of financial difficulty due to the extreme changes in the circumstances.
A major issue during COVID-19 was bringing the pandemic under the ambit of Force Mjaure clause. In the case of National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation of India vs Alimenta S.A a case that was decided by the Supreme Courts in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Courts, in this case, introduced the concept of “self-induced frustration”, wherein the courts mentioned that the principle of frustration of contract will not be induced in contracts that are self-frustrated or where the party introduces frustration by election by one party. Here in the contract, the appellant had no option except selling of chicory to the respondents, there was a licence preventing the appellant to sell the product to anybody else except the respondent and was only allowed to use it as a raw material for his own factory.
Foreign legislations and courts also introduced a lot of new interpretations to the scope of the doctrine of frustration and the clause of force majeure. In the case of Bank of New York Mellon (International) v. Cine-UK Ltd, the courts rejected the tenant’s plea on the point of temporary frustration due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The court said that a 15-year-old contract cannot be rendered to be void just because of the closure brought down by the government for the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, in Dwyer (UK Franchising) Ltd v. Fredbar Ltd, the franchisor was given the power to establish an event as a supervening event because it was impossible to take into consideration that the defendant had to self-isolate himself merely due to a reason that one member of the household was clinically extremely vulnerable. This gave the franchisor the discretion to render an event a supervening event, in this particular case the event was not declared supervening by him since the business could still be continued during lockdowns, but it can be inferred that there was a wide amount of power given to the franchisor in this case.
There should have been a wider interpretation done by the courts for the same terms and by the UK courts the power given to the franchisor was too wide which should have been culled and therefore looked after thereon. On a comparative analysis of British approach and the Indian Approach, we can see that the Indian Approach has been liberal and accommodating whereas the English approach has been stricter and restrictive because England tries to preserve the sanctity of a contract and in India apex court has adopted a more humanitarian approach.
Conclusion
There is a uniform approach that can be observed in the context of the Indian courts wherein the courts took a humanitarian and factual approach to decide the cases that came forward during the COVID-19 pandemic. The constitutional courts failed to define the scope of frustration of a contract and the events that can be brought under the scope of force majeure. During the course of the pandemic, the declaration of the COVID-19 pandemic as a force majeure was a major question that came before the Indian legal system, but the courts did not give a clear and precise interpretation of the nature of cases that could be frustrated on the basis of the principle of force majeure but instead, the principle was applied on a case-to-case basis.
It can be inferred that though there is no clear definition given by the Indian courts it is still a more viable option that was selected by the courts. The constitution of India has established a strong and independent judiciary under the scheme of checks and balances which follows the rule of law and separation of powers. Though giving a precise and clearer interpretation looks like a tempting option in the short term, it will be harmful to the concept of separation of powers in the long term. Since a force majeure event itself carries extreme ambiguity within itself and giving it a precise definition might have backfired on the Indian legal system. It might result in restricting the discretionary powers of the judiciary in the near future, if a new exceptional case comes in front of the courts, due to the precedent and the precise interpretation a wrong decision might be given out by the courts which might affect the legal system in the near future.
When we see the interpretation done by the constitutional courts of the UK it can be felt that a stricter interpretation has been carried out by them but as mentioned in the aforementioned case there has been a lot of power given to the plaintiffs in that case thereof we can seek to draw an inference that it seems like a big fault of the court on giving the franchisor the power to decide whether to render an event as a supervening event is something that is the court’s duty and something that should not have been given to the franchisor thus a big fault from the side of the UK courts.
Bibliography
Statutes
Indian Contract Act, 1872
Articles
A Tale of Two Things of Frustration and Force Majeure Clauses in the Time of Covid-19, 2020 SCC OnLine Blog Exp 1
Applicability of Force Majeure and Frustration to Lease Deeds: A Critical Analysis in Light of Covid-19, 2020 SCC OnLine Blog OpEd 26
Intertwining of Force Majeure, Frustration and Contingency, 2020 SCC OnLine Blog OpEd 104
Force Majeure- The Sudden Uprising 2020 SCC OnLine Blog OpEd 77
Applicability of Force Majeure and Frustration to Lease Deeds: A Critical Analysis in Light of Covid-19 2020 SCC OnLine Blog OpEd 26
Reported case laws
Alopi Parshad & Sons Ltd. v. Union of India, 1960 (2) SCR 793
Energy Watchdog v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, (2017) 14 SCC 80
Satyendra Bose v. Mugneeram Bangur & Co & Anr ,AIR 1954 SC 44
Ganga Saran v. Firm Ram Charan Ram Gopal, AIR 1952 SC 9
Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur & Co, 1954 SCR 310
Sri Ananda Chandra Behera v. Chairman, Orissa State Electricity Board, 1998 85 CLT 79
Ramanand & Ors v. Dr Girish Soni & Anr 2020 SCC OnLine Del 635
National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation of India v. Alimenta S.A 2020 SCC OnLine SC 381
Bank of New York Mellon (International v. Cine-UK Ltd [2021] EWHC 1013
Dwyer (UK Franchising) Ltd v. Fredbar Ltd [2021] EWHC 1218
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This article is written by Kishore V, pursuing LLM from Warsaw Bootcamp.
Table of Contents
Introduction
The Covid-19 pandemic brought the world to a screeching halt. Offices, schools, colleges, entertainment – everything we interacted with in our physical world on an everyday basis – was forced to move online. During the same period, India’s new National Education Policy was introduced, marking the shift of the Indian education system’s hitherto traditional approach to a modern, practical and clinical pedagogy. The new policy brings the Digital India initiative to the education system to keep pace with the changing times, making technology the front and center of India’s new education model. This opens up new doors and unprecedented opportunities for the incorporation of technology into education. This article presents a brief of the National Education Policy, 2020, with a special focus on its technological reforms, in an attempt to capture the new face of India’s education system.
The National Educational Policy, 2020
The National Education Policy, 2020 (“the 2020 Policy) was introduced by the Ministry of Human Resource Development in July, 2020, incorporating changes at all stages of education, ranging from lower kindergarten to Doctorate. The 2020 Policy aims to provide universal access to quality education to achieve Goal 4 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. It builds upon the traditional value systems of the country while simultaneously introducing major reforms to make the education system more experiential, scientific, flexible, creative and individualised to meet the unique needs of each student. It aims to lessen the burden of education by making the students choose their educational careers on their own rather than creating a burden on parents or teachers. These changes have been made with a futuristic view so that it is able to cover the issues that might materialize in the future.
Previous National Education Policies of India
The first National Education Policy, introduced in the year 1968, undertook the challenge of reconstructing the Indian education system, which was seen as key to economic and cultural development and an integrated, socialist nation. The second National Education Policy was introduced in 1986 by adapting the previous policy to provide compulsory education. The same was modified in 1992, making entrance exams for all professional fields of education for colleges a mandate to maintain professional educational standards and ensure the improvement of standards and quality in the education systems.
Use of technology in education by the 2020 Policy
The 2020 Policy discusses the future of education in India, empowered by technology. Schools, colleges and other educational institutions had to incorporate online modes due to the pandemic. The Policy addresses and recognises the same, with a view to making this integration of technology into education stronger in order to establish an alternative mode of education when the traditional, physical methods cannot be availed. While acknowledging its potential risks and dangers, the importance of leveraging the advantages of technology is recognized by the National Education Policy, 2020. It considers the benefits of online/digital education, recognising that the initiatives under it must be carefully initiated, designed and formulated not to have a negative impact. In order to make education available and accessible to all without discrimination, the 2020 Policy recognizes the need to overcome the issues associated with technological and practical aspects. The location should not matter; be it a city, village or any other remote area, stable internet and electricity along with a competent academic professional and laptop device should suffice. With the help of the Digital India campaign, it is possible to execute everything in accordance with global standards.
The key technology-powered changes brought by the 2020 Policy are summarized below.
The National Educational Technology Forum
One of the major changes introduced by the 2020 Policy is the establishment of the National Educational Technology Forum to provide a platform for the free exchange of ideas on the use of technology to enhance learning, assessment, planning, administration and also the management of the same. With the innovational aspects of the 2020 Policy, new and latest technologies like artificial intelligence, blockchain, machine learning, smart boards, computing devices, adaptive computer testing for student development and other forms of educational software and hardware will be integrated into all levels of education to improve classroom process, support teachers’ professional development, enhance educational access for non-benefited groups and streamline educational planning, administration and management. The 2020 Policy also talks about integrating existing e-education platforms like SWAYAM and DIKSHA into schools, colleges and universities.
These changes will become accessible very soon in all educational institutions, and the knowledge of students and teachers will also be upgraded to the latest standards. The major functional obligation of the NETF is to advise the Central and State government to educate the students through technical and technological methods. It has been established to build more intellectual capability and institutional capacity in the education’s tech areas.
E-libraries
The 2020 Policy utilizes technology by providing access to e-libraries to both teachers and students for easy access to books, materials, question banks, the latest syllabus, journals and manuscripts. These services can be availed by teachers via their devices, such as mobile phones, tablets, laptops, etc, which will have access to the digital library. Similarly, students can use any of their educational institution’s authorised devices to access the digital library.
The 2020 Policy also targets public libraries in order to give access to everyone to enable flexible reading. Rather than staying at their institutions for longer hours, the students and teachers will have the choice of studying at a convenient time and place. For students and teachers with a disability, whether visual or physical, a separate access and service team monitors them to give them these benefits. Training sessions will be held with teachers, students and library teams to use these platforms and technology to raise awareness of the latest educational standards. The 2020 Policy also endeavours to provide assistive devices and technology-based tools to help specially-abled children integrate better into classrooms as well as interact with their teachers and classmates.
Virtual labs
Virtual labs entail carrying out experiments in a lab remotely through the internet. Virtual labs provide better access to experimental aspects related to scientific and technical areas using the internet. A normal lab would have limited access to students, and also the materials would be insufficient. In comparison, a virtual lab will have unlimited access irrespective of availability and timings. The major advantage is that there are more experts helping the students and the teachers to have a better exposure in this regard. The 2020 Policy utilizes virtual labs for students to focus more on practical and technical aspects than theoretical aspects.
Academic Bank Account
The 2020 Policy finally opted for a digital credits storage database system called the Academic Bank Account. This mainly focuses on storing the student’s certification in a digital database where it is secured without causing any tampering and misrepresentation. All certificates, diplomas and degrees will be issued based on this cumulation of credits. This also means that undergraduate programs will have multiple exits and entry points, enabling students to explore vocational training in addition to their professional studies. Digital certification would be more globally recognized irrespective of the countries and other barriers. In terms of assessing the work, it would be easier. If anybody moves abroad to have their career, then this plays an important role in showing that their recognition is equivalent to foreign standards.
Linking technology and professional education
The 2020 Policy specifically emphasizes incorporating technology into agricultural and legal educational institutions. Agricultural institutions will be mandated to establish Agricultural Technology Parks in order to educate graduates and technicians on sustainable methods through technology incubation. With respect to legal education, the 2020 Policy recognises the growing need to embrace new technologies for competing globally and ensuring better access to and delivery of justice.
Technology in the administration of education
An interesting facet of the 2020 Policy is its focus on utilizing technology to ensure efficiency and transparency of regulatory bodies such as the State School Standards Authority, the Higher Education Commission of India as well as its four verticals: the National Higher Education Regulatory Council, the National Accreditation Council, the Higher Education Grants Council and the General Education Council. Incorporating technology in the administrative and regulatory areas of education will reduce human interference in the system, thereby increasing efficiency and transparency.
Conclusion
The 2020 Policy has appropriately assessed the demands of educating a generation brought up in the age of technology and the internet. It departs from the traditional view where technology is seen as a distraction to learning and attempts to integrate technology into education to reap unimaginable benefits. A step in the right direction, the 2020 Policy provides a firm foundation to build new systems and efficient processes and empower an entire generation of students and teachers. The penetration of technology into every sphere of life is now closer than ever; thus, using technology for the right purposes is the need of the hour.
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This article is written by Monesh Mehndiratta, a law student at Graphic Era Hill University, Dehradun. This article explains the essentials of Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It also provides relevant case laws and other sections related to it.
It has been published by Rachit Garg.
Table of Contents
Introduction
Do you know what an accused does after he is found guilty and punished by a lower court?
The answer is that the defence lawyer files an appeal with a higher court. But have you wondered what happens to the offender who has been punished? Does he go to jail or remain out in public? And if he is in jail, does his sentence continue or is it suspended for the time being until the decision is announced in the particular appeal made by his defence lawyer?
Wait. You need not panic or worry about finding the answers to these questions. At the end of this article, you will be able to find an answer to all these questions.
There are five types of punishments under Section 53 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which can be imposed on any offender. A sentence is one of them and includes imprisonment, which may be simple or rigorous. Whenever a criminal is punished, he has to serve the years of his sentence in jail. In case he is not satisfied with the decision of the court he has the right to appeal to higher courts. But while the appeal is pending in the appellate court, his sentence may be suspended according to Section 389 under Chapter XXIX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. This article further explains the applicability of this section and provides different case laws.
Suspension of sentence
Suspension means to stop somebody from continuing what he/she is already doing or to remove them from their post temporarily. When the sentence of a criminal is temporarily suspended and he is released from jail even though his imprisonment period is not over yet, it is called suspension of sentence. Section 389 of CrPC provides that when a criminal undergoing a sentence files an appeal in the appellate court, his sentence may be suspended on reasonable justifications and causes. But before the suspension, such appellate courts have to record the reasons in writing, and if the offender is kept in jail, he might be released on bail or on the basis of his own bond.
However, if the offender is punished with life imprisonment, death, or imprisonment that is not less than 10 years, the public prosecutor will be given an opportunity to produce reasons and causes for not releasing the offender while the appeal is pending in the appellate court. He may also file an application for the cancellation of bail in cases where the crime committed was grave and serious in nature.
The section gives the trial court the power to release the offender on bail if, by application, he satisfies the court that he is willing to file an appeal in the higher court. The court has to release him unless there are special reasons for not doing so. The sentence of such a person will be suspended till the time any order is obtained by the appellate court in this regard. This period of suspension will be excluded from his actual sentence period.
Applicability of Section 389 CrPC
Section 389 CrPC can be applied only under the following conditions:
The power given under the section can only be applied when the accused is convicted by a court.
The power given under sub-section (3) can be exercised only by a convicting court or trial court, and the term of imprisonment in cases where a trial court has to exercise this power must not exceed 3 years.
There must be an appeal or the intention to appeal to the higher court.
The Section also requires that the convicted person have the right to appeal, and only then can his sentence be suspended and he be released on bail.
The Section does not confer the right to bail on the convicted person, but he may be eligible to be released on bail if there is no objection by the public prosecutor and the court is satisfied that there will be no threat if he is released.
The trial court has the power to refuse the release and suspension if there are special reasons for doing so.
The object of this section is that when a convicted person is not satisfied with the decision of the trial court, he may appeal to the higher court.
The Section does not provide any maximum limit to which the person is released on bail. But only provides that he be released till the time an order is obtained from the higher court in this regard.
The suspension of the sentence given by the trial court in sub-section (3) of the Section is considered a ‘deemed suspension’.
When an offender or convicted person is released on bail, it also means that his sentence is suspended for that time.
Meaning of convicted persons
The words ‘convicted persons’ include any person who is punished for any offence and is kept in prisons. When a Special Leave to Appeal is filed in the Supreme Court against the acquittal by Sessions Court, the Highest Court in such a situation is given the power to release the person on bail. However, words like ‘may’ used in the section provide that it is not mandatory to release a person on bail.
It was held in the case of Anurag Baitha v. State of Bihar, 1987, that if the High Court is not able to hear the appeal within a reasonable time limit due to any reason, it must release the accused on bail if the appeal is a substantial appeal and the charges are still pending.
Grant of bail during appeal
This is given under sub-section (3) of the Section and is contrary to what is given under sub-section (1). The two subsections are different from each other. sub-section (3) makes it mandatory for the court to grant bail to the convicted person who is willing to file an appeal and the court is satisfied with his application, keeping in view all the conditions given therein.
However, this applies only in cases where the convicted person has the right to appeal. For example, Article 136 of the Constitution does not confer any right to appeal as a matter of right. It gives discretion to the Supreme Court to grant special leave to appeal in any matter and so a convicted person cannot be granted bail when such an appeal is taken by the Supreme Court itself under this Article (B. Subbaiah v. State of Karnataka, 1992). The court, in another case, held that in cases where a serious crime like murder is committed, relevant principles must be considered while granting bail to the accused (Vijay Kumar v. Narendra, 2002).
Other powers of the appellate court
Section 386 of the Code gives various powers to the appellate court. Whenever any party to a case is dissatisfied with the decision or judgement of the court, they have a right to appeal to a higher court. This higher court, where an appeal is made, is called the appellate court and has the following powers:
It may issue an order of acquittal, reverse the order, and direct an inquiry into the case.
It may also order to retry a case and pass a sentence.
If the appeal is made after conviction, it may
Reverse the sentence, acquit or discharge the accused, or order a competent subordinate court to retry him,
Alter the findings of lower courts,
Change the nature or extent of a sentence.
If an appeal is made for enhancement of sentence or punishment, it may reverse the finding, change the nature or extent of the sentence, or change the findings.
In case an appeal is made against any other order, it may change or reverse such an order.
It can also make amendments to the orders or pass consequential or incidental orders.
Case laws
Navjot Singh Sidhu v. State of Punjab (2007)
Facts of the case
In this case, the appellant was a Member of Parliament (MP) and was convicted for an offence that he committed before becoming an MP. As soon as he was convicted, he resigned from his position, did not take advantage of his office or position, and was ready to face the consequences. The evidence in the case was in his favour and his act of resigning from the position of MP was considered to be a moral act.
Issues in the case
One of the issues was whether his conviction would be suspended during the appeal.
Judgement in the case
The court in this case suspended his conviction during his appeal, considering the irreparable injury to him that would have taken place if his conviction had not been suspended. The court also observed that it is the obligation of the appellant to draw the attention of the court to the consequences that he may face if his conviction is not suspended. It was held that such a power of suspension must be exercised in rare cases, considering the facts of the case. It is not mandatory to order a suspension of conviction in every case of appeal.
Ashish Widhwani v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2022)
Facts of the case
In this case, the appellant was convicted under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and sentenced to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment. In an appeal, the appellant submitted that the trial court failed to consider the evidence regarding the social media blogs of the prosecutrix, where she mentioned that she does not believe in the institution of marriage and that she was also aware that the appellant was married and had two children, thus making the alleged story of the promise of marriage fake and false.
Issues in the case
Whether the allegations made against the appellant were false and should he be released on bail during the appeal?
Judgement of the case
The appellate court, after taking into consideration the appellant’s submissions, held that the sexual intercourse between them was voluntary and that there was a need to deeply scrutinise the facts and evidence of the case. All the evidence must be reassessed and the execution of the sentence must be reconsidered at this stage. The court also ordered the suspension of the appellant’s sentence on a personal bond of Rs. 25,000/- with two sureties and certain conditions till the time appeal is disposed of.
Conclusion
Section 389 gives the power to the appellate court to grant interim bail to the convicted person until the court passes an order in this regard. Sub-section (3) of the Section gives a restrictive power to the trial court convicting the accused to suspend his sentence and grant him bail. This is done to give him an opportunity to appeal to a higher court and present his case with the help of his defence lawyer. It can also be applicable where a person convicted is on bail, has been sentenced to imprisonment not exceeding 3 years, or the offence committed by him is bailable and he is on bail.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
What is the normal rule during an appeal with respect to the suspension of a sentence?
The normal rule under the Section is that when the appeal made by the convicted person is pending or he satisfies the trial court that he wants to make an appeal, his sentence is suspended by the court. The trial court has to grant him bail unless it has some special reasons for not doing so (subsection 3 of Section 389).
Do High Courts have the power to suspend a sentence for an offence under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act 1985?
The High Courts have been given the power to suspend the sentence of a convicted person in such cases under Section 36B of the Act, which is subject to various conditions and limitations under Section 37 of the Act.
Can a sentence be suspended in the case of murder?
Generally, the sentence is not suspended in serious crimes like murder, but in some exceptional cases, it is, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In one case, the accused was convicted of murder and his sentence was suspended while his appeal was pending. The High Court did not record any reasons for the same, so the order was set aside and the suspension was not allowed (Ramji Prasad v. Rattan Kumar Jaiswal, 2002).
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This article is written by Richa Joshi of the New Law College, Bharati Vidyapeeth University, Pune and Kishita Gupta, a graduate of the Unitedworld School of Law, Karnavati University, Gandhinagar. This article provides exhaustive information about the offence of dacoity.
It has been published by Rachit Garg.
Table of Contents
Introduction
Hindi cinema has highlighted the lives of dacoits in classic movies like Sholay and Paan Singh Tomar. These movies tell the story and lifestyle of dacoits. That is far from reality. Earlier, the term used for dacoity in the Indian subcontinent was “banditry.” “Bandits or Dakoo” are the terms in local colloquia in India for dacoits. Some of the laws were the Prevention of Crime of Dacoity Act, 1843, introduced by British India under East India Company rule to curb dacoity. Later, dacoity was mentioned under the Indian Penal Code (I.P.C), 1860 and made a punishable offence. Sections 391 to 402 elaborately talk about dacoity and its punishment. In Malaysia and Singapore, “gang robbery” is the term used for dacoity. In this article, the authors have explained in detail the concept of dacoity as per the Indian Penal Code and all the related provisions.
Definition of dacoity
The offence of dacoity is explained by Section 391 of the IPC, 1860.
Section 391 defines dacoity as follows: “When five or more persons conjointly commit or attempt to commit a robbery, or where the whole number of persons conjointly committing or attempting to commit a robbery and persons present and aiding such commission or attempt amounts to five or more, every person so committing, attempting, or aiding is said to commit dacoity.”
The major difference between robbery and dacoity is the number of people present during the commission of the offence. If the number of persons committing robbery is five or more, the offence will be dacoity. For example, A, B, C, D, and E are the persons who decided to rob the bank during the night. E was standing at the door with a gun in his hand so that nobody could enter the bank while the other four were busy breaking the locker. All five people will be liable for the offence of dacoity.
In the case of Om Prakash v. State (1956), the Court mentioned that the offence of dacoity consists of the cooperation of five or more persons to commit or attempt to commit robbery. All the persons must share the common intention of committing robbery.
Essentials of dacoity
Some key ingredients are necessary to define the specificity of an offence. These ingredients are necessary to keep a distinction between one offence and another. The following are the key ingredients that constitute the offence of dacoity:
The accused had committed or attempted to commit robbery.
Persons committing or attempting to commit robbery must be five or more. This includes the person present and aiding.
All such persons should act conjointly.
In the case of Lachaman Ram v. State of Orissa (1985), the Court held that all the accused persons committed dacoity in the houses of the complainants one after the other and looted and took away various kinds of property in the nature of watches, ornaments, etc. All the accused were held guilty under Section 391 of the Indian Penal Code.
The Supreme Court, in the case of Ganesan v. State Rep. By Station House Officer (2021), while discussing the essential element of Section 391 IPC, observed that the offence under Section 391 IPC punishable under Section 395 IPC cannot be declared to not have been made out just because some of the accused fled and less than five individuals turned up to be punished in the trial. It is necessary to take into account that five or more people participated in and committed the robbery, not whether those people were put on trial. When five or more people jointly commit the robbery offence or attempt to commit the robbery, the case is brought under Section 391 IPC and is considered to be a “dacoity,” depending on the evidence.
The Orissa High Court noted in the case of Madan Kandi v. State of Orissa (1995) that the theft must be committed using either actual violence or threatened violence in order to be classified as a dacoity offence. The behaviour and nature of the mob may imply threatened violence. Any overt act does not necessarily need to convey threat or force. A person cannot be charged with dacoity unless they have actually committed robbery or helped another person commit it. The only crime that the law has made criminal in four different phases is possibly dacoity. Each person who gathers with five or more others to commit a dacoity is subject to Section 399 punishment. The definition of ‘dacoity’ in Section 391 demonstrates how the other two stages of robbery, including planning and carrying out the heist, have been considered equally and are covered by the term. There might come a day when committing dacoity is just an agreement. The conspiracy offence, which is penalised under Section 120, is finished if there is evidence of agreement.
In another judgement by the High Court of Patna,Musafir Rajbanshi v. State of Bihar (2001)it was held that the theft must be committed using either actual violence or threatened violence as it is an essential element of a dacoity offence. The behaviour and nature of the mob may imply threats of violence. It is not necessary for any overt act to demonstrate the force or threat.
Section 395 IPC
Section 395 of the Indian Penal Code prescribes the punishment for dacoity. This Section says whoever has committed the offence of dacoity shall be punished with
Life imprisonment, or
Rigorous imprisonment up to ten years of the term, and
Liable to a fine.
The offence of dacoity is
Cognizable (means that any person who came to know about the offence can inform the police regarding the offence),
Non-bailable ( no bail to be granted under such offence as a matter of right),
Non-compoundable (the offence is non-negotiable), and
Triable by the court of the session (the first court of the trial is the court of session).
Types of dacoity
Dacoity with murder (Section 396)
Section 396 fixes joint liability for all the persons who cause murder and jointly commit dacoity. For instance, if in a group of dacoits, one dacoit murders along with a dacoity. All will be equally liable for the act. The punishment given by this section may be death, life imprisonment, or rigorous imprisonment for a term that may extend to ten years and a fine.
If one of the accused commits murder while they are being chased, the question of whether the other could be convicted for the offence of dacoity with murder depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case, i.e., whether the act of dacoity could or could not be said to be continuing at that time. This was held in the case of Shyam Behari v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1956).
In another case, Rafiq Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2011), the Supreme Court noted that as Section 302 is incorporated into and a fundamental component of Section 396, it is claimed that the word ‘murder’ in Section 396 has the same meaning, connotation, and elements as those found in Section 300. Therefore, if the accused is charged under Section 396 with four other people for the commission of dacoity and murder but the charge of dacoity is not proven and the other co-accused are found not guilty, then in such a scenario the accused may still be found guilty. He will be punished under Section 302 for the commission of murder without changing the charge if the necessary elements are satisfied on the merits, beyond a reasonable doubt, and the accused did not suffer any harm to his right to a defense for a fair trial.
Dacoity with the attempt to cause death or grievous hurt (Section 397 IPC)
Section 397 prescribes a minimum sentence of seven years for using deadly weapons or causing grievous hurt in committing robbery and dacoity. It postulates an individual act and allows no scope for constructive liability.
It was observed by the Bombay High Court in the case of Wilson Abraham Chouriappa v. State of Maharashtra (1995) that, according to Section 397 of the Penal Code, the aforementioned section only applies if there is proof that the accused used a deadly weapon, injured someone seriously, or attempted to murder or seriously injure someone while committing robbery or dacoity. Section 396 of the Penal Code of 1860 contains the principle of vicarious liability explicitly and states that if one or more people involved in a dacoity commit murder while it is being committed, then all of them would be subject to the same punishment. In contrast, Section 397 of the Penal Code of 1860 contains the principle of individual liability. The offender is the language used. Before Section 397 of the Penal Code of 1860 may be used in any way, the prosecution must prove who the offender or accused person was who used a dangerous weapon while committing a robbery or a dacoity, injured someone seriously, or attempted to murder or seriously injure someone. This conclusion is supported by a study of the terminology used in Sections 396 and 397 of the Penal Code of 1860.
The Court went on to observe that the difference in language between Sections 396 and 397 of the Penal Code, 1860, makes it clear that the term ‘the offender’ used in Section 397 only refers to the accused person who, at the time they committed the robbery or dacoity, uses a deadly weapon, causes or attempts to cause grievous hurt to anyone, and does not include all those who take part in the commission of such a robbery or dacoity. In order to apply Section 397 of the Penal Code of 1860, it must first be proven that either robbery or dacoity occurred.
Attempt to commit dacoity when armed with deadly weapons (Section 398 IPC)
Section 398 applies to cases of attempted dacoity. It has no application to cases in which robbery has been committed. A person is said to be “armed with a weapon” when he has a weapon with him and carries it, intending to use it should the occasion require so. It is sufficient if the offender carries a dangerous weapon in such a manner that a person feels that it can be used at any moment against him. Section 398 will be subject to punishment.
In Pappu v. State (2011), both Sections 397 and 398 of the IPC allow for the accused to employ a weapon while committing robbery or dacoity or attempting to do so. When the crime of dacoity/robbery has finally been committed, Section 397 IPC is applicable. On the other hand, attempts at robbery or dacoity are covered by Section 398 IPC. For attempts at robbery or dacoity paired with the use of a dangerous weapon, Section 393 IPC translates to Section 398 IPC, whereas Section 392 IPC relates to Section 397 IPC. Since the offender has already achieved his goal and robbery has been actually committed with the use of a deadly weapon under Section 397 IPC, Section 398 IPC prescribes the punishment in a case of attempted robbery while carrying a deadly weapon. The offence committed is punishable under Section 398 IPC since only an attempt to commit robbery with the use of a lethal weapon is made out by the circumstances established by the prosecution. Since Section 398 IPC is a minor offence under Section 397 IPC, the conviction of the appellant is changed from Section 397 to an offence punishable by up to two years in prison under Section 398 IPC.
The Supreme Court in Ashfaq v. State (Govt. of the NCT of Delhi (2004) noted the language of Section 398 IPC, where the words “the offender is armed with any deadly weapon” are used, when interpreting Section 397 IPC. According to the Supreme Court, brandishing and displaying a lethal weapon in such a way as to inspire dread and threat in the victim’s mind so that he does not resist out of fear of harm is sufficient for the purposes of Section 397 IPC.
Preparing to commit dacoity (Section 399 IPC)
Section 399 punishes mere preparation to commit dacoity. Dacoity is an offence that is punishable at the stage of preparation itself. The preparation implies that a plan for committing dacoity has been drawn up. The preparation is in pursuance of such a design. Preparation includes devising, planning, or arranging for the commission of the offence of dacoity.
The Allahabad High Court held inRam Kishore v. State (2021)that the prosecution must prove that further steps were taken during the preparation for committing dacoity in order to establish the offence under Section 399 of the IPC.
In another case, Asgar v. State of Rajasthan (2003), it was held that a preparation act must be proven in order to establish an offence punishable under Section 399 IPC, and it must also be proven that the act for which preparation was being made was a dacoity or robbery to be committed by five or more people.
Punishment for belonging to the gang of dacoits (Section 400 IPC)
Section 400 provides punishment for those who belong to a gang of persons who have made dacoity their usual business. The association with the habitual pursuit of dacoity is the gist of the offence. Association means a combination for a common purpose.
In a 1971 case, State v. Hetep Boro, the Gauhati High Court established that it is not essential to show that the accused engaged in a specific dacoity in order to establish responsibility under Section 400 of the Indian Penal Code. Instead, evidence that was disbelieved in order to establish guilt under Section 395 may still be used to establish guilt under Section 400.
As observed by the Patna High Court in the case of Lalchand Khatri v. the State (1959), looking to the evidence of association is the correct approach to take in cases under Section 400 of the Indian Penal Code, and this approach must be held to be independent of whether an accused man has been found guilty of a crime or has been found innocent because there was insufficient evidence against him. It’s possible that the evidence used by the prosecution to show an accused person’s complicity in the gang’s activities that were predicated on a specific crime may not be applicable in cases where the accused person has been declared fully innocent of the crime. However, the mere fact of his release from custody would not lessen the strength of the evidence presented against him because, as Section 400 stipulates, it is the evidence of association that is really relevant rather than participation in any specific dacoity, and for the purpose of proving association, the evidence that has been found to be insufficient for a specific charge of dacoity may still be relevant for instituting an association of the members of the gang with the intention of committing the crime of dacoity.
Assembling to commit dacoity (Section 402 IPC)
Section 402 provides punishment for assembling for the purpose of committing dacoity. It applies where the case is mere assembly. without proof of any preparation or attempt. The essential element of the offence is the intention of committing dacoity.
It was noted in Jagsir Singh Alias Sira v. State of Punjab (2011) that it is very essential to prove that the accused persons assembled at the scene of the crime with the intent of committing dacoity, as this is an essential ingredient of Section 402 of the Indian Penal Code.
In another case, Mohd. Wahid and Ors. v. State (2018), the Delhi High Court observed that Section 402 penalises assembling with the intent of committing dacoity, in contrast to Section 399, which penalises preparation to commit dacoity. Therefore, it is clear that the prosecution must demonstrate that the accused gathered there with the aim of conducting dacoity in order to establish a violation of Section 402. The stage for Section 402 is less than preparation and more than intention, or between the two. Even though the intention of the accused can be inferred from the fact that they gathered with the weapon, this is insufficient to convict them of the crime punishable under Section 402 IPC because they could have gathered for any other crime, such as murder or another offence for which mere assembly is insufficient.
Difference between robbery and dacoity
Basis of difference
Dacoity
Robbery
Meaning
When five or more people jointly commit robbery, dacoity is committed. including the person present and aiding the other in the commission of the offence.
Robbery is an extension of the offence of either theft or extortion.
The number of people
The minimum number of perpetrators is five or more.Those who aid or abet the offence will come under the purview of the offence as its perpetrators.
The minimum number of perpetrators required is one.
Punishment
Section 395 prescribes punishment for dacoity. The punishment may be either imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment of up to ten years and a fine.
Section 392 prescribes punishment for robbery. The punishment may extend to ten years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine.When the robbery is committed on highways. Between sunset and sunrise, the punishment may extend to fourteen years of imprisonment.
Triable by court
It is triable by the court of the session (COS). This offence is cognizable, non-compoundable, and non-bailable.
This offence is triable by the judicial magistrate of the first class (JMFC). It is cognizable, non-bailable, and non-compoundable
Gravity
The offence of dacoity is the gravest form of crime against property.It is an advanced form of robbery, as dacoity includes robbery.
Robbery is graver but not more than dacoityA robbery is an advanced form of either theft or extortion.
The Delhi High Court observed inRaj Kumar @Raju & Anr. v. State (2009) that, technically speaking, the distinction between robbery and dacoity is the number of people involved. The use of violence in the theft offence’s commission is a shared factor between the two. The same actions would be considered dacoity if there were five or more people present, and robbery if there were fewer.
In another judgement by the Allahabad High Court, Gopali Prasad v. State of U.P. (2019), the Court observed that the only distinction between robbery and dacoity is the number of persons. If there are five or more individuals involved in the robbery, it is considered dacoity. The act of cooperating with five or more people to commit or attempt to commit robbery constitutes the crime of dacoity. It is essential that everyone involved have the same intent in mind when committing the robbery.
Case laws
State v. Sadhu Singh and ors. (1972)
In State v. Sadhu Singh and ors. (1972), five people, one of whom was Kurda Singh, together committed dacoity at the house of Gharsiram. They were armed with deadly weapons like rifles and pistols. During this act of dacoity, they injured three people. Personal items of one Mr. Santai’s were taken by the dacoits. The dacoits were not able to escape successfully with the looted property because of the hue and cry caused by the inmates. This attracted the attention of nearby people. The villages, however, gave the dacoits a tough chase as they fled for a safe retreat. One of the dacoits fired a shot while escaping, which led to the death of one chaser, Dharma. The villagers were brave enough to apprehend one of the dacoits during this act. Hence, the court held them liable for dacoity and punished them under Section 395 of the I.P.C.
Shankar and Ors v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2003)
In the case of Shankar and Ors v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2003), the prosecution placed before the court its argument that the accused drove to Kalamaduga Village in a jeep. They were carrying knives and sticks with them. They stopped the vehicle in front of the victim’s house. They claimed to be police and had come to see whether the victim was providing food to Naxalites so they could get the owner of the house (the victim) to open the door. As he opened the door, he was caught by four accused, who dragged him towards the jeep and asked him to hand over the gold ornament to them. When he refused to do so, they went inside his house forcefully and searched his Kirana store. They also threatened his wife and took away the gold ornament, wristwatch, and Rs. 1,75,000 cash. This was done by them in several houses, one after another. The court held them liable for the offence of dacoity under Section 395 IPC.
Raj Kumar alias Raju v. State of Uttranchal (2008)
In another case,Raj Kumar alias Raju v. State of Uttranchal (2008), the prosecution submitted that one Tilak Raj submitted a written police report at Khatima Police Station and that when he reached home for lunch at about 12.30 pm, he saw a few people standing inside his house. Those five were Raj Kumar @Raju, Pushpendra Singh, Swadesh Chandra, and Nirankar, who was dragging his wife. His wife was soaked in blood. According to Tilak Raj, on seeing him accused, he fled away. He tried to catch hold of them but was unsuccessful, as they all had knives with them. They looted the items in his house and also murdered his wife. The Court held that the accused is liable along with other participants under Section 395. They have to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and also have to pay a fine of Rs 2,000. In default of the fine, they have to undergo additional imprisonment for one year.
Raju Sampath Darode v. The State of Maharashtra (2022)
In the case of Raju Sampath Darode v. The State of Maharashtra (2022), the Bombay High Court has awarded the death sentence to the accused for committing dacoity along with the murder of his employers. On December 2, 2007, the accused entered the residence of his employers, Ramesh and Chitra, by tricking their watchman, who was on duty. Ramesh was found with a pool of his blood in the living room. The accused stabbed his heart and forehead. He sealed his mouth with tape. His wife Chitra was tried with telephone wire in a chair, with her throat slit. Jewellery, foreign currency, and nine lakhs in cash were also stolen from the house.
Conclusion
Under Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, dacoity is the gravest offence done on the property of a person. But to have a good understanding of dacoity, one needs to be clear on the concepts of robbery, theft, and extortion. These offences are different in the gravity they hold compared to each other. Their punishment also increases with gravity. For example, if theft is the first offence, the property gets the minimum sentence, then comes extortion, thereafter robbery, and finally dacoity.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
Is the preparation of dacoity punishable?
Section 399 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 says that preparation to commit dacoity is a punishable offence. It is one of the few crimes that are punishable at the preparation stage itself.
What is the nature of the offence of dacoity?
Dacoity is a cognizable offence that is also non-bailable and non-compoundable. It is the offence that is triable by the court of session.
What will be the consequence, if any offender kills a person while committing dacoity?
If any person, while committing dacoity, also murders in the same event, then all the persons who are involved in dacoity will be held punishable for the offence of murder also. They shall be punished with death, life imprisonment, or rigorous imprisonment for a term of up to 10 years.
References
K.D. Gaur, I.P.C. 1860, Fourth Edition
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