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M/S Topcem India v. Union of India & Ors 2021 : case study

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This article is written by Rida Zaidi, a law student of Faculty of Law, Aligarh Muslim University. This article seeks to answer the question regarding the subsequent change in law affecting the position of the parties in respect of the case in M/S Topcem India v.Union of India.

This article has been published by Shoronya Banerjee.

Introduction

This article deals with the question of whether a subsequent change in law will affect the position of the parties. The present question was decided by the Guwahati High Court in the landmark case of M/s Topcem India v. Union of India & Ors (2021). The said case was regarding the exemption of the people working in the industrial units of north-eastern states from the education cess and secondary and higher education cess as a part of the Industrial Policy 1997 and 2007 to encourage the workmen regarding the production of the excise goods. The appellants that were the people working under the industrial units of north-eastern states raised the contention that they were particularly exempted from paying the cess. The case of M/S Unicorn Industries v. Union of India (2019) overruled the case of M/S SRD Nutrients Pvt Ltd v. Commissioner of Central Excise Guwahati (2021)where it was held that the cess which is already paid should be refunded back to the parties as they were exempted from this cess. The case of Unicorn Industries v. Union of India (2019) overruled the judgment of the case of M/S SRD Nutrients Pvt. Ltd v. Commissioner of Central Excise Guwahati (2021), declaring the judgment as ‘per incuriam’ meaning thereby ‘through lack of care’ stating that the refunds that were made to the people of north-eastern states working under the industrial units were erroneous and should be revoked. 

This article shall be inclusive of the above-mentioned question in respect to the case of M/S Topcem India v. Union of India (2021) and would deal with the answer to the question in detail.

An overview of the case of M/S Topcem India v. UOI & Ors

The appellants for the case- M/S Topcem

The Respondents for the case- Union of India & Ors.

  1. In this case, there were several petitions filed by the people who were working in the industrial units of the state of north-east whose refunds were not granted before the Guwahati High Court. The appellant contended that they were exempted from paying the education cess and the secondary and higher education cess by the industrial policy of 1997 and 2007. Though they had already paid it, they prayed for a refund.
  2. The Supreme Court in the case of SRD Nutrients Pvt Ltd v. Union of India (2021), held that as the workmen of the industrial units were exempted from paying both the cess they are entitled to a refund and the Department of Excise Duty should do the needful.
  3. The Apex Court sanctioned the refund as under Section 11A of the Central Excise Act,  1944 which deals with the recovery of duties, not paid, not levied, shortly paid, shortly levied or erroneously refunded.
  4. The Guwahati High Court in the case of M/S Unicorn Industries v. Union of India (2019) overruled the judgment of the SRD Nutrients Pvt Ltd v. Union of India (2021) that no notification was published stating that this group of the society is exempted from paying the education cess and the secondary and higher education cess and therefore, they are not exempted.
  5. The Department of Excise Duty asserted that the refund was erroneous in the light of the previous judgment being held ‘per incuriam’ and has to be revoked.
  6. The appellants were issued a show-cause notice by the Central Excise Department to show reasons as to why the refunds should not be revoked as they fall under Section 11A of the Central excise Act, 1944. 

Issues involved

  1. Whether the refunds granted in the judgment of M/S SRD Nutrients Pvt Ltd v. Union of India (2021) were erroneous as the judgment of Unicorn Industries v. Union of India (2019) overruled it and held the SRD case as per incuriam?
  2. Whether a quasi-judicial body under the Department of Central Excise Duty granting refunds can revisit the order passed by a collateral authority under the Central Excise Act?

The contentions of both parties in the case 

Petitioner’s contentions

  1. The petitioner raised the contention that the circulars being issued from time to time by the Government of India regarding the Industrial Policy Resolution, 1997, that wherever any excise duty is charged, the education cess and secondary and higher education cess is calculated altogether and it is not to be calculated separately. The excise duty along with the education cess is charged on all excisable goods and if excise duty is not levied upon the workmen of industrial units, no education cess will be levied as well.
  2. The petitioners asserted that the refund sanctioned to them was held by the Court in the case of SRD Nutrients Pvt Ltd v. Union of India (2021), which was relevant and enforceable at that point in time and it is immaterial that a subsequent case changed the law regarding the matter. Thus, the show-cause notice issued by the Central Excise Department does not fall under Section 11A(i) of the Central Excise Act,1944.
  3. The learned counsel contended that for the application of Section 11A of the Central Excise Act,1944, subsection(4) of the Act has to be fulfilled.
  4. The counsel contended that the respondent’s only ground for issuing a show-cause notice is that the case of SRD Nutrients Pvt Ltd v. Union of India (2021) was overruled by M/S Unicorn industries declaring the previous judgment as per incuriam.
  5. The petitioners contended that, to revoke the refunds on grounds as mentioned under Section 11A of the Central Excise Act,1944 such as fraud, collusion, misstatements, etc. are invoked and thus, Section 11A cannot be attracted.
  6. The learned counsel asserted that if a judgment is declared as per incuriam, only its precedential value is deteriorated and not its binding facts and it will still act as a conclusive judgment.
  7. The learned counsel asserted that the show cause notice is contrary to the provisions of Section 11A of the Act and is only issued on the ground that it is erroneous.
  8. The petitioners asserted that no officer of the concerned department can revisit the orders made by him or his predecessor officer and only an appeal can be filed if he is aggrieved from the concerned order under Section 35 of the Act, but no such appeal has been filed, and thus, the writ petitions have attained finality.
  9. Applying the principle of res judicata they cannot reopen the issue already decided in finality in the previous case.

Respondent’s contentions

  1. After the Apex Court pronounced the judgment in M/S Unicorn India v Union of India (2019) the department issued show-cause notices to the appellant to show causes as to why they are entitled to the refund. As the Court has held the view observed by the Guwahati High Court in SRD Nutrients Pvt Ltd v Union of India (2021)that the petitioners who were entitled to the refund, that particular judgment was held per incuriam and shall not be binding upon the subsequent case laws.
  2. The respondents’ issued show-cause notices to the appellant asking them as to why they should not be inquired about the recovery of the refund. The respondent also framed the show cause in a tabular form informing the petitioners the amount to be extracted from each of them, authorities issuing the notice and the goods manufactured by them.
  3. Because the writ petitions involve common questions of law, they represent all the petitioners. As the judgment made in M/S Unicorn Industries v Union of India (2019) has declared the previous case of SRD Nutrients per incuriam, so the show-cause notices were issued in pursuance of the obedience of the law and were not erroneous.
  4. The show-cause notices were issued within the period of stipulated time and are covered under the provisions of Section 11A of the Central Excise Act.
  5. The judgment passed in the M/S Unicorn industries had overruled the previous case as per incuriam so the effect of the latter case would be retrospective, and which, in turn, has made the refunds erroneous and are bound to be recovered.
  6. The learned counsel for the respondents asserted that the judgment was based on a pure and abstract question of law and thus the principle of res judicata cannot be applied.
  7. The refund will result in unjust enrichment.

Observation of the court of law 

  1. The Guwahati High Court observed that the main issue which arose, in this case, was that the refunds that were granted were erroneous and as the meaning of the word ‘erroneous’ is defined in several judgements by the Apex Court, that the error of law or deviating from law and/or  an order which is not in accordance with law can be treated as erroneous, but where a law has subsequently changed or reversed it cannot permit the revisional authority to reopen or re-evaluate it. 
  2. A subsequent change in law will not affect the decisions which are already decided conclusively and will not have a retrospective effect making the decided cases improper and illegal. And if the effect is applied as retrospective, it will lead to endless litigation and wastage of the Court’s time and resources. If the subsequent law will affect retrospectively it will be notified in the particular judgment. There is absolutely no ground involved in the said case which declares the refunds as erroneous under Section 11A of the Central Excise Act. And the only ground is that the SRD case is held per incuriam by the Apex Court. 
  3. The second issue which was involved in this case was whether the Department of Central Excise Duty exercising quasi-judicial authority can reopen or re-evaluate an order passed by the Court or not. As per the provisions of the Central Excise Act, the officers of the department can revisit or re-evaluate the decisions under the provisions of the statute or judicial remedy. And under Section 35 of the Act, it can be done through the means of appeal or review application. 
  4. The essential question which was decided in M/S Topcem v. Union of India (2021) is whether a subsequent change in law will affect the position of parties or not. Here the Court was of the view that where a case has been decided in finality and when the rights of the parties are determined, the subsequent reversal or change in law will not affect the position of the parties. The judgment will cease to have precedential value but will still be conclusive. 
  5. The Court dismissed and quashed the show cause notice issued by the Department as they were issued without jurisdiction under Section 11A, but the writ petitions filed by the petitioners were permitted.

Precedent judgments referred to in this judgment

  1. In the case of M/S Malabar Industrial Limited v. Commissioner of Income Tax State Kerala,(2000), the Court defined the term ‘erroneous’ as the incorrect assumption of facts or incorrect application of the law.
  2. In the case of PV George & Ors v. State of Kerala & Ors (2007), the judgment was that, unless indicated by the Court regarding an order to operate prospectively, it will always operate retrospectively.
  3. In the case of HP Nurpur bus operators Union  (1995) ,the judgment observed that, once the Court has declared some provisions as invalid, all the subsequent orders passed under the same head would be invalid.
  4. In the case of Indian Railway SAS Staff v. Union of India (1955), the judgment was referred to,, as the Court held that, as the present case involves a pure question of law, the principle of res judicata cannot be applied.
  5. In the case of Karnal Leather Karamchari v. Liberty Footwear Co. (1989), the petitioners referred to its judgment that once the tribunal has decided a case, no subsequent proceedings where the tribunal has given a contrary view will affect the former proceedings already decided or will not declare them as improper or invalid.
  6. In the case of Union of India v. Madras Telephone, SC & ST Welfare Association (2006) was referred where the Court held that when the rights of the parties are already decided in a suit, no subsequent proceedings where a contrary view is observed would affect the position of the parties in the former case.
  7. In the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd v. Union of India (2006), the judgment was referred where it was held that, overruling by the Court would not cease to take away the binding nature of the decided case and the principle of res judicata will continue to operate for the former case.
  8. The case of Sanchalakshri & Anr. v. Vijaykumar Raghuveer Prasad (1998) was referred to in the present case that here, the Court has not laid down any new law but has only interpreted what already existed.

Conclusion

While answering the question of whether a subsequent change in law will affect the position of the parties, the Court held that a subsequent change in law will not ipso facto reverse or alter the position of the parties in a case which has been already decided and the rights of the parties determined in finality. The principle of res judicata applies and the Department of Central Excise Duty has no authority to reopen or re-evaluate an order passed by the Court. 

Under Section 25 of the concerned Act, an appeal or review application can be filed, that is, it could be done through statutory or judicial remedies. The former judgment will operate as binding and conclusive and only the precedential value gets concluded. The case of M/S Topcem v. Union of India & Ors (2021) also laid down that where a show-cause notice is issued by the Department without jurisdiction, it would be dismissed and quashed, but where it is issued by authority wrongfully or there has been misuse of power, the aggrieved party can approach the Court.

References

  1. https://www.livelaw.in/news-updates/subsequent-change-in-law-reverse-position-of-parties-viz-their-rights-the-earlier-order-gauhati-high-court-171501
  2. https://taxguru.in/excise-duty/ec-shec-refunded-revoked-co-laterally-authorities-hc.html
  3. https://www.lawyersclubindia.com/judiciary/m-s-topcem-india-v-union-of-india-ors-2021-subsequent-change-in-law-will-not-reverse-the-position-of-parties-to-a-case-5066.asp
  4. https://itatonline.org/digest/verdicts/topcem-india-vs-union-of-india/ 

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Startup benefits in India

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This article is written by Himanshu Mahamuni, a student of Government Law College, Mumbai. This article analyzes various benefits provided to startups in India including finance, tax, laws and other benefits.

This article has been published by Sneha Mahawar.

Introduction

Start-ups are developed by entrepreneurs who aim to bring innovation in the sector of products or services. Start-ups being new in the market are vulnerable to high competition and often fail even before expanding on scalable business. Such ventures are needed to be protected and supported to grow in the marketplace. Their skills and intellectual properties are to be nurtured with various incentives such as a suitable ecosystem and financial resources. A startup recognized by the Department of Promotion for Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT) under the Ministry of Commerce is entitled to various benefits. There are various steps taken by the government to foster entrepreneurial work. This includes various initiatives and exemptions in order to encourage innovative ideas. Various benefits and exemptions aimed at boosting start-ups are discussed in detail in this article.

This article focuses on the benefits that a startup can avail in India. The benefits include benefits in obtaining finance, the exemption in tax, flexible rules and regulations and many other benefits.

Startup India initiative

Startup India initiative was launched on the 16th of January, 2016 by Prime Minister Modi. It is a flagship initiative by the government to build a strong ecosystem, improve sustainable economic growth and generate employment opportunities. Its vision is to transform India into a country of job creators instead of job seekers. The benefits to registering under the Initiatives are as follows-

  1. Self-Certification based compliance;
  2. Tax Exemption for 3 years;
  3. Easy winding of company;
  4. Startup patent application and IPR protection;
  5. Easier public procurement norms;
  6. SIDBI fund of funds.

Some other benefits under the initiative by government schemes also include the Ayurvedic Biology Program, the Venture Capital Assistance, the Technology Development Program and the scheme for the Promotion of Innovation, Rural Industries and Entrepreneurship by their respective ministries. Startup India is also responsible for conducting various programs and providing tools and resources to startups.

DPIIT has defined which entity is to be recognized as a startup to be able to enjoy the benefits under schemes such as the Startup India initiative. Following conditions are to be met for an entity to be considered as a startup:

  1. Ten years have not been completed since the date of incorporation or registration.
  2. The entity must be a private limited company or a partnership firm or an LLP.
  3. Turnover of the entity shall not exceed one hundred crore rupees for any of the financial years.
  4. The entity should be working towards innovation, development or improvement of its business with a high potential of employment generation and wealth creation.

Setting up of incubators

Incubators offer office space, administrative support, legal compliance, training and mentoring as well as funding through angel investors or venture capitals to develop business ideas or a prototype. The resources and services are provided in exchange for an equity stake ranging from 2%-10% in it. The incubation period can be 2-3 years and its admission is rigorous.

Atal Incubation Centres (AICs) have been set up under the Atal Innovation Mission by NITI Aayog. They take applications from academic as well as non-academic institutions from both public and private sector organizations. An aid of 10,000 crores is granted under the mission for a maximum period of 5 years to support the Startup with Capital and Operational costs.

The National Science and Technology Entrepreneurship Board (NSTEDB) under the Department of Science and Technology (DST) introduced the mechanism of Technology Business Incubators (TBI). TBIs play an important role in facilitating technology-led and knowledge-driven enterprises which have also proven to improve its survival rate. Startups can utilize TBI for a period of 2-3 years. There are many TBIs set up under the ministry as well as by NIDHI. Most of these TBIs are prominent educational institutions.

Finance

The government has set up various loans and funds especially reserved for the benefit of startups. These benefits are available to startups in search of financial support. Following are the options specifically beneficial for startups.

  1. Funds for Startups (FFS)

The government has created an FFS at Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI) with a fund of Rs. 10,000 crore which is strictly spent on the operational guidelines for startups.  It is approved by the Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs) registered with SEBI. Startups who intend to borrow from FFS are obliged to invest at least twice the amount borrowed from FFS.

  1. CGTMSE loans

The Credit Guarantee Trust for Micro and Small Enterprises (CGTMSE) scheme was launched by the Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME). This scheme provides loans of up to Rs. 1 crore without collateral or surety. A Credit Guarantee Fund created under CGTMSE for startups is being set up by the government of an amount worth Rs. 500 lakh per year, for the period of four years, to provide Credit guarantee cover to banks and lending institutions as providing loans are considered risky to startups.

  1. MUDRA Bank

Micro Units Development and Refinance Agency Bank (MUDRA) is a public financial institution that aims to provide low rate credits to non-corporate, non-farm small/micro enterprises only. These institutions then provide loans to MSMEs through various Commercial Banks, RRBs, Small Finance Banks, MFIs and NBFCs. It can be availed by new and small businesses only who are above 18 years of age. It provides loans in three categories-

  1. Shishu- loans up to Rs. 50,000
  2. Kishore- loans up to Rs. 5 lakh
  3. Tarun- loans up to Rs. 10 lakh

Tax Exemptions under the Income Tax Act, 1961

Startups are already exempt from filing tax returns for 3 years from incorporation under the Startup India scheme. Along with the exemption, there are various other provisions made under the Income Tax Act, 1961 to facilitate the growth of startups. Following exemptions are given by the government.

Section 80 IAC

Section 80 IAC– Startups which are incorporated after April 1, 2016, are eligible for getting a 100% tax rebate on profit for a period of three years from incorporation. The startups recognized under the Startup India scheme whose turnover does not exceed Rs. 25 crores in any financial year up to 31 march 2021 can claim tax benefits in three out of the first seven years under this section.

Section 54EE

Section 54EE – Long Term Capital Gains (LTCG) investment which may go up to Rs. 50 lakh, can be invested by the government’s special funds within a period of six months from the date of transfer of assets and exempt from tax on LTCG. The exemption is applicable for a period of three years.

Section 79

Section 79 – If the startup founder in continuity holds 51% of shareholding/voting power or 100% of original shareholder, then the startup can carry forward its losses.

Section 56

Section 56 – If a startup is recognized by DPIIT and the aggregate amount of paid-up share capital and share premium of the startup does not exceed Rs. 25 crores the startup can apply for Angel Tax Exemption post recognition.

Section 56(2)(viib)

Section 56(2)(viib) – A DPIIT recognized startup is exempted from the tax on any consideration received for the issue of shares that exceeds the Fair Market Value of such Shares. The startup has to file a declaration in form 2 to DPIIT regarding the same.

Section 115JB

Section 115JB – The applicable rate of Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT) for startups is 18.5% along with the applicable surcharge and cess. In case a startup fails to make any profit in the first 5 years, it has been exempted from Mat.

Benefits under Companies Act

Startups are ‘to be companies’ which require encouragement from the government to flourish. The Companies Act, 2013 is proactive in realising the needs and provides the following benefits to them-

  • In case a startup receives an amount of Rs. 25 lakh or more by way of a convertible note which is convertible into equity shares or repayable within a period of not exceeding five years from the date of issue, in a single tranche, from a person shall not be treated as a deposit.
  • A start-up need not comply with the provisions for acceptance of deposits given in clauses a to e of section 73 of the companies act for five years from the date of incorporation
  • A startup may convene at least one meeting of the board of directors in each half of the calendar year with the gap between the two meetings of not less than 90 days is sufficient.
  • A promoter or a director or any person belonging to the group who holds more than ten percent of the outstanding equity shares of the company up to ten years from the date of incorporation or registration may be allotted with Employee Stock Options.
  • A private company which is a startup is not required to follow the maximum limit in respect of deposits to be accepted from members for a period of five years from the date of its incorporation.
  • A startup company may issue sweat equity shares not exceeding 50% of its paid-up capital up to 10 years from the date of its incorporation or registration which was earlier restricted to only 5 years.

Other benefits to a startup

Some of the other benefits to a budding start-up includes:

Simple Registration Process

The registration process of startups have been completely shifted to online through mobile apps and websites. This has made the process very easy. By filling a simple form and uploading certain documents on a website anyone can set up a startup.

Startups IPR protection (SIPP)

This scheme facilitates quick filling of IPs i.e. patents, trademarks and design by startups. The fee for filing patents is also reduced by 80% for startups. Panels of facilitators are formed to facilitate the process of filing and provide legal guidance through the entire process of application.

Research and development parks

There are already 7 research parks set up for the functioning of research purposes for startups as per the startup India action plan. These research parks are mostly prominent educational institutes of India such as IITs. This facility develops the product or service provided by the startups and brings more innovation.

Self-certification

Various compliance norms relating to environmental laws and labour law are simplified as well as reduced. This allows startups to save money and time spent on compliance checks. Startups are currently allowed to self-certify compliance with 9 labour laws and 3 environmental laws.

Make connections

To enable the various stakeholders of a startup to meet and spread their connections, the government has proposed to conduct two startup fests annually. These fests are to be conducted both at the national and international levels. This provides the chance for budding entrepreneurs to amplify their network for further opportunities.

Easy entry and exit options

As discussed above, the entry process has been eased tremendously by online registration and lesser compliance. Along with entry, the exit options are also made easier for the startups. A startup can close or wind up its business within just 90 days from the date of application of the same.

Conclusion

The government of India is constantly working towards the encouragement of young minds to create and develop their ideas with many incentives to strive towards the goal. Various tax exemptions, exemption from tiresome compliances and financing are some of the positive steps recently taken for the purpose. India is one of the largest internet and apps users. It was important to digitalize the process for the simplicity of the process. When these startups grow and bring their own IPO, they are considered to be successful. Some of the successful startups that flourished in India are Paytm, Byjus, Razorpay, Upgrade, etc. The Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal recently said that simplification, facilitation and ease of doing business have helped India create more startups.

However, in a study by the IBM institute, it was found that 90% of Indian startups fail within the first five years of inception. The study said that the reason for the failure of startups was weak business models, poor planning, faulty customer insights, or lack of original ideas, focus, agility and tech capability. The venture capitalist also hesitates to invest in the startup due to a weak business model. Five basic steps to overcome the challenges suggested are “framing the challenge, creating an opportunity portfolio, managing the strategic project, connecting the plans to financials and converting the assumptions into knowledge”. India has seen a great increase in Startup success after the introduction of reforms but there still lacks awareness about it among young minds. The right approach to solve the problem in addition to the benefits given by the government may increase the entrepreneurs to grow and develop the country.

References


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Inventorship and non-obviousness standard in artificial intelligence

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artificial intelligence

This article is written by Harsha Aswani, pursuing a Diploma in IP, Media and Entertainment Laws from LawSikho. The article has been edited by Tanmaya Sharma (Associate, LawSikho).

This article has been published by Shoronya Banerjee.

“The new generations bring with them their new problems which call for new rules, to be patterned, indeed, after the rules of the past, and yet adapted to the needs and justice of another day and hour.”

Introduction

Until quite recently, creation and innovation were exclusively associated with the human mind, and so our legal framework and various theoretical justifications were built around this very aspect, focusing on incentivizing or encouraging the highly intellectual and innovative species of the world to come up with new and better solutions to our problems. 

However, the exponential development in the field of artificial intelligence has not only revolutionised the globe but has caused a shift in the paradigm and made it seem imperative to redefine the interpretations of our existing framework of IPR laws.

This shift in the paradigm is largely attributed to that area of artificial intelligence technology which per se can generate newer inventions in varied fields with little or insignificant human intervention or exclusively by itself. It has changed the dynamics of the interface between AI and traditional IP Laws.

While the Patent Offices and the Courts of many countries such as the US, the EU, China, Australia, Africa, Japan have tried to interpret the existing patent laws to respond to the patent applications centered around AI being an inventor and has made some efforts to accommodate this massive breakthrough technology, Indian Patent Office or Courts have yet not taken any such initiative.

This article shall attempt to analyse the positions taken by EPO and USPTO concerning those patent applications embodying AI as an inventor, and will try and substitute the considerations to see how Indian Patent Act would respond to AI being an ‘Inventor’, and whether the standards of ‘Non-Obviousness’ and ‘Person Skilled In The Art’ (PSITA) need any amendment or new interpretation. 

In late 2018, Dr. Stephen Thaler filed two patent applications in the patent offices of three major jurisdictions, namely, the European Union, the UK, and the US, in his name as an “applicant” while designating DABUS, a “Creativity Machine”, as an “inventor”. The claims in one of the patent applications were largely related to a fractal design of a beverage container while the other application claimed a patent for a “neural flame” device used in search-and-rescue missions. The major contention put forth by Thaler in his application, which draws a line between AI-assisted and AI-generated inventions, was that the machine called DABUS has, without any human intervention, not only conceived the present inventions but it has been able to appreciate, on its own, that it had an invention, which was novel, non-obvious and useful.

While Thaler did not provide how DABUS appreciated that he had a patentable invention, nor was this challenged by anyone, but Thaler did clarify that the machine was fed only the data related to the general knowledge of the field for training, distinct from the field of the present inventions and yet has independently been able to devise and generate the potential solution in response to the unspecified problem.

The team “Artificial Inventor Project”, which is behind DABUS and similar technology, does not say that a patent should be owned by an AI, but only that it should be identified as an inventor, for two-fold reasons:

  1. That hundreds and thousands of employees have contributed code to such a system, as such patent protection over such innovations generated by AI will enable all such humans to reap benefits and recoup the investment made in Research & Development over the years.
  2. That it would promote creativity as it would be more explicitly known for the values such AI systems add.

In response to the respective patent applications listing DABUS as the only inventor, all the three patent offices− EPO, UKIPO, and USPTO, have refused the application being invalid. Even during the appeal preferred by Dr. Stephen Thaler in the UK High Court, Justice Marcus Smith ruled that the application is not a valid application, despite the invention meets the three qualifiers of patentability, for a Machine Learning Model cannot be listed as an “Inventor”. The rationale behind the decision was straightforward, i.e. the inventor must be identified as a natural person such that the designation of inventorship as prescribed by UK Patent law must contain “a family name, given names and full address of the inventor.” Merely giving a name to the machine, DABUS, does not identify ‘a person’ required by law. Further, Marcus J. also pointed out that since, currently, there is no such legislation or jurisprudence that accords rights to a Machine Learning Model so they have no legal personality comparable to natural or legal persons, as such DABUS cannot transfer/assign those rights that he is not himself entitled to hold in the name of Dr. Stephen Thaler, who is listed as an ‘applicant’ in the Patent Form 7.

Similarly, the USPTO while refusing to accord patent protection to DABUS ruled that the US Patent Law defines an ‘inventor’ as an ‘individual’ or ‘individuals’ (in case of Joint inventorship) and consistently uses human-like words such as “whoever” and pronouns like “himself” and “herself” to refer to ‘inventors’, which reinforce the idea that only ‘natural persons’ may be named as an ‘inventor’ in a patent application, and it shall be too broad an interpretation to include machines thereunder. In addition to it, the USPTO relied on a decision of the Federal Circuit to explain that US Patent law requires only a natural person to be an inventor. It states, 

“Conception is the touchstone of inventorship, the completion of the mental part of the invention. It is the formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in practice. Conception is complete only when the idea is so clearly defined in the inventor’s mind that only ordinary skill would be necessary to reduce the invention to practice, without extensive research or experimentation. Conception is a mental act. …”

The takeaway from this decision is that one, Conception is an inherently human activity, and two, such conceived invention must be reduced to practice by such a person who conceived it without any undue experimentation or research. The first part “Conception” of an idea is what creates a major hurdle for AI does not seem to have a mind of its own, and it is believed that the output is majorly the product of the input, in the form of data, fed into the AI system. But what if the output that is generated by AI is nowhere related to the input fed into it? Does it suggest that AI has a mind of its own, or if not a mind of its own, but can the self-learning ability of an AI be held responsible for such conception? Is this self-learning ability due to the algorithm designed by the developer? If that is so, won’t he be the rightful inventor or can he be given the ownership of such a patentable invention along with holding AI as an inventor? 

The decisions above, instead of settling down the uncertainty surrounding the Patenting of an AI, have opened a Pandora’s Box filled with many significant questions that can no longer be ignored. The question substantially relate to –

  • Should the law permit or require that the AI model be named as an ‘Inventor’ or should it be required that a human being be named as the ‘Inventor’; or
  • For the purposes of naming a human being an ‘inventor’ for an invention which was perhaps majorly conceived by the AI, what level of involvement is needed by a human, or what level of human interaction is needed to list that human as an ‘inventor’, in addition to or in place of an, AI such that the application is deemed to be valid; or
  • If AI is named an ‘Inventor’, then will it bear the burden to prove that it was the first to conceive as well as appreciate the invention; or
  • How would an AI even go about appreciating that it has an invention; or
  • What happens if the human steps in to recognize the conceiving of the invention by AI, and says, “Hey, this is an invention”; 
  • What would it take for an AI to be an ‘inventor’; 
  • If the machine enjoys the legal status of the inventor, will such the machine be able to be held liable for infringement; 
  • Even if a law permits an AI to be named as an ‘Inventor’ and grants the patent to inventions autonomously generated by AI, how would then the standard of the hypothetical person skilled in the art be set for determining the prior art and the non-obviousness of the future inventions, whether created by humans or by the AI? 

These are a few of the questions that naturally fall into the lap of a human being while dealing with the patentability of an AI-generated invention.

 What happens after DABUS?

Seeing the plethora of uncertain questions hovering around the patenting of inventions autonomously generated by DABUS and similar technology, the EPO and the USPTO have laid down following comprehensive guidelines as to what extent AI-related inventions can be protected by patents.

European Patent Office (EPO)

Every year, new guidelines are furnished by the EPO that demonstrate the current practice of patenting inventions undertaken by it. This time, in November 2019, EPO made some substantive changes to accommodate the AI-based inventions, including the Machine Learning (ML) Models, by granting them the status of technical solutions, which is a prerequisite for recognizing an invention as such.

AI and Patentability

With specific reference to the Patenting of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, initiated due to the exponential advancement in the field of Artificial Intelligence, the earlier approach adopted by EPO was that it considered AI-based inventions to be of non-technical nature. However, the latest 2019 guidelines issued by the EPO, suggest that AI-generated inventions may be assumed as having a technical character, provided they pursue a technical purpose.

For instance, classifying text documents solely in respect of their textual context is not regarded to be per se a technical purpose but a linguistic one.

Complying with Article 27 of TRIPS Agreement, Article 52 of EPC, para 1 provides that the patent shall be accorded to all inventions, in all fields of technology, without any discrimination, provided they are novel, have an inventive step, and are susceptible of industrial application. However, para 2 explicitly keeps certain inventions out of the patentable subject matter, including programs for computers. Thus, core AI, for example, algorithms as such, are not patentable whereas AI-generated inventions might be eligible for patent protection if they have features, realized wholly or in part, that show sufficient technical character.

Hence, AI-related inventions requesting for the grant of the patent must conform to the following requirements:

  1. The invention must have a technical character. It implies that such an invention must-have features that contribute to the solution of a technical problem by providing a technical effect.
  2. The technical features of an invention must involve an inventive step. It implies that the technological advancement made over such an invention, as compared to the prior art, must be not obvious to the hypothetical person skilled in the art.
  3. The claims and description must be clear and devoid of any marketing terms, slang or jargon.
  4. The application must be disclosed sufficiently to enable the hypothetical person skilled in the art to implement the patented invention without undue experimentation, after the patent term expires, merely by reading the claims and the description.

Inventorship of AI Inventions

The extraordinary advancement in the field of artificial intelligence and machine learning has initiated a debate all around the globe, forcing the G20 nations to embark on a journey to curate, apply and find the leveragability of artificial intelligence. The debate has stirred various views, the significance of which is that AI must be acknowledged as an “inventor” since it has the capacity to invent just as a ‘human’.

The EPO, for clarification, has divided AI inventions into three broad categories from the perspective of ‘inventorship’:

  1. Human-made inventions using AI for the verification of the outcome;
  2. Inventions in which a human identifies a problem and uses AI to find a solution;
  3. AI-made inventions, in which AI identifies a problem and proposes a solution without human intervention.

The first two categories fall within the domain of AI-assisted inventions where AI is used as an inventing tool for human inventors, augmenting their capabilities. This domain of AI-inventions does not create any grave issues as such, as against the third category which is that of AI-generated inventions, whereby AI, autonomously and independently invents without any human intervention in the form of any direction, instruction, and oversight. This very area of inventions is what we have always read and heard about in science fiction, and has both its pros and cons that need to be approached in a healthy and balanced fashion.

So far the common understanding that prevails in the EPO, and as confirmed by the EPC, is that the inventor can only be a human being and not the machine and that such a person must create the invention by their creative activity. The view is supported by the rationale that the designation of an inventor attracts a variety of legal implications ensuring that the named inventor is a rightful and a legitimate inventor, who can, in practice, reasonably exercise the rights and privileges attached to such a status. Since AI systems or machines do not have a personality recognized by law, they cannot enjoy any such benefits accruing therefrom.

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Clause 8 of Article 1 (8) of the US Constitution empowers Congress to promote the progress of science and useful arts by way of securing exclusive rights of the authors and inventors concerning their respective writings and discoveries, for a limited period. Maintaining the foregoing object laid down by the framers of the American Constitution, especially concerning the emerging technology such as Artificial Intelligence, the USPTO sought feedback from various stakeholders and experts and had issued in the latter half of 2020, certain guidelines about this breakthrough technology, which is majorly a compilation of the numerous comments that it received on some significant issues related to patenting of AI inventions. 

AI and Patentability

The report defined an AI invention to be a “computer functionality that mimics cognitive functions associated with the human mind (e.g., the ability to learn).” The USPTO, for now, considers AI inventions as part of Computer-Implemented Inventions, as such, they do not possess any unique patent eligibility considerations which may be otherwise specific to AI inventions. Therefore, they are treated like any usual invention that comes before the US Patent Office. Apart from this, the USPTO also divided the AI inventions into the following broad categories:

  1. Inventions that embody an advance in the field of AI (e.g., a new neural network structure of an improved machine learning (ML) model or algorithm);
  2. Inventions that apply AI (to a field other than AI);
  3. Inventions that may be produced by AI itself.

Largely the commentators were of the view that such AI-generated inventions are more likely to be classified as abstract ideas, or mathematical concepts, or mental processes, thereby attracting the subject-matter exceptions created judicially. However, one commentator noted that complex algorithms substantiating an AI invention can generate an output having some technological improvement as compared to the prior art, and therefore, may be patent-eligible. Additionally, the report suggests that even the claims directed to abstract ideas may be patent-eligible if the additional claim elements, whether individually or as a combination, show significant transformation as compared to the earlier abstract idea.

 AI and inventorship

The development of an AI system is usually attributed to a large number of innovators, as such the law requires careful determination of the identity of such a person who has, in the true sense, contributed towards the conception of the AI invention to be legally called an “inventor”.

35 U.S.C. § 100 defines an “inventor” as the “individual” or “individuals” (in case of joint inventorship) who invent or discover the subject matter of the invention. Further, 35 U.S.C. § 116 explicitly lays down that an invention may be made by two or more persons jointly despite:

  1. They did not physically work together or at the same time;
  2. Each did not make the same type or amount of contribution; or
  3. Each did not contribute the subject matter of every claim of the patent.

An additional clarification is afforded by 35 U.S.C. §115 which provides that an Inventor must only be a natural person, for the words “whoever”, “himself” or “herself” can be attributed to a human being only, who shall make an oath or declaration that such a person believes himself/herself to be an original inventor of the claimed invention.

Moreover, the Federal Circuit has also clarified and explained the importance of “conception” as the “touchstone of inventorship” and has affirmed time and again that inventorship can be attributed to such person in whose mind “the formation of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention” takes place.

Since the US Patent Law doesn’t recognize the machine or a company as an “inventor”, so one could infer that the existence of human contribution is mandated both by the legislator and the judiciary and that the amount of contribution required by a human to validate the application for grant of a patent shall be evaluated on a case-to-case basis. A similar line of argument was put forth by even one of the commentators in the report compiled by the USPTO.

The majority of the commentators negated the idea of revising the US Patent Laws and regulations, for now, to include machines or any entity or entities other than a natural person as an “inventor” because first, “conception is inherently a human activity” such that an entity other than the human being could not, in a real sense, contribute to the conception of an invention; and second, “the current state of AI technology is not sufficiently advanced at this time and in the foreseeable future to completely exclude the role of a human inventor in the development of AI inventions.”

Patenting of AI inventions in India

India is emerging as a new destination for the filing of patent applications involving AI. In the year 2015, India was ranked eighth for first filings and has enjoyed a high rate of annual growth, with an average of around 33 percent in the 3 years up to 2015. However, despite being one of the predominant choices for filing patent applications in the field of AI-driven technology, the Indian Patent Office has maintained its silence on the issue of patentability of such inventions. 

AI and Patentability

To become TRIPS-compliant, Section 3(k) was introduced in the Patents (Second Amendment) Bill, 1999, which explicitly categorized mathematical methods, computer programs, and algorithms as non-patentable subject matter. The bill was then referred to the Joint Parliamentary Committee, which recommended adding the term ‘per se’ as a suffix to a computer program. 

The term ‘per se’ has not been defined anywhere in the Indian Patent Act, and therefore, it has been a subject that is debated too often. The views expressed by the Joint Parliamentary Committee during the introduction of the 2002 Amendment, however, attempts to clear the intent of suffixing the word ‘per se’ to computer programs as:

“In the new proposed clause (k), the words ‘per se’ have been inserted. This change has been proposed because sometimes the computer program may include certain other things, ancillary thereto or developed therein. The intention here is not to reject them for the grant of the patent if they are inventions. However, the computer programs as such are not intended to be granted patents. This amendment has been proposed to clarify the purpose.”

This section does not, however, impose a blanket ban on patenting of Computer-Related Inventions (CRI). Only inventions that disclose computer programs per se are not regarded as inventions under the Indian Patent Law. 

There have been debates about treating AI-based inventions similar to Computer-Related Inventions (CRI) which include software programs because, at its core, such AI systems use a complex set of algorithms that enable them to achieve the intended result. This approach is similar to that of the EPO, which requires an AI-based invention to have some specific technical purpose, i.e., it must demonstrate some specific use, and specify the technical effect of the use of the algorithm, to be patent-eligible; otherwise, such inventions shall fall within the domain of non-patentable subject-matters as per the EPO. 

Similarly, the guidelines for examination of CRI issued by the Indian Patent Office also demand that for such inventions to be patentable, they must possess some technical character, which shall be determined by the substance or the nature of the claims. The claims must sufficiently demonstrate that such inventions have some ‘technical effect’ and have made certain ‘technical contributions’ to the prior art, to be patentable. In other words, it must solve a technical problem, and the method claim should clearly define the steps involved in carrying out the invention.

“The focus should be on the underlying substance of the invention, not the particular form in which it is claimed.”

Under Section 3(k) and the Guidelines concerning Computer Related Inventions (CRI), the single judge bench of the Delhi High Court, in 2019, while adopting a liberal approach, remarked that the IPO’s guidelines are too restrictive in light of the technological advancement as well as the global practice adopted worldwide. The court observed:

“The bar on patenting is in respect of ‘computer programs per se…’ and not all inventions based on computer programs. In today’s digital world, when most inventions are based on computer programs, it would be retrograde to argue that all such inventions would not be patentable. Innovation in the field of artificial intelligence, blockchain technologies, and other digital products would be based on computer programs, however, the same would not become non-patentable inventions simply for that reason. It is rare to see a product that is not based on a computer program. Whether they are cars and other automobiles, microwave ovens, washing machines, refrigerators, they all have some sort of computer program in-built in them. Thus, the effect that such programs produce, including in digital and electronic products is crucial in determining the test of patentability.”

This judgment attempts to clear the air around the patentability of computer-related inventions which are made up of complex algorithms.

However, the optimization of the heuristic algorithms has lessened scope for human intervention in the creative or the development process of an invention involving AI, and the identification of an actual inventor has become a major hurdle. The question boils down to the fact− whether an AI system that has, because of its self-learning abilities, itself developed an invention that meets the threshold of patentability, could be called an actual ‘inventor’, or is the title of inventorship only related to a human being? What happens when all the persons associated with an AI system cannot reasonably say that they have contributed towards the conception of such an invention and have been able to reduce it to a working invention?

AI and inventorship

While the EPO and USPTO have made it amply clear that the legal definition of an ‘inventor’, for now, is primarily restricted to including a ‘natural person’, India has not made any such clarifications officially. Moreover, the Indian Patent Act does not explicitly define the term ‘inventor’, unlike EPC and Title 35 U.S.C, so the question of restricting the title of inventorship to only natural persons does not seem to be the only approach. 

Article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement which provides only the criteria for qualifying an invention is patentable, does not explicitly state that if the invention, whether products or processes, must be made by humans or may also be made by an AI system. In other words, TRIPS, in principle, does not explicitly restrict the right of inventing to humans only in any explicit terms. 

In the Indian context, Section 6 (1) of the Patent Act requires that the application for the grant of a patent may be filed by any ‘person’ who is the ‘true and first inventor of the invention or the ‘assignee’ of the true and first inventor. Further, section 2(1) (p) also defines a ‘patentee’ as a ‘person’ entered on the register as the grantee or the proprietor of the patent. One may assume that an ‘inventor’ or a ‘person’ only includes a ‘natural person’. 

However, the term ‘person’ as defined in section 2 (1) (s) includes ‘government’, which is a non-human entity. Since the definition is inclusive, it may be broadly interpreted to include an ‘artificial person’ or a ‘non-human entity’. 

Clause (42) of section 3 of the General Clauses Act, defines a “person” to include a company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not. The term ‘shall include’ makes it clearer that the term ‘person’ is not merely restricted to include a natural person, and may include an artificial person too.

Even the term “true and first inventor” as defined in section 2(1)(y) is merely an exclusionary definition and makes no mention of a natural person as such.

The only difference concerning government, as a non-human entity or the ‘company, association or body of individuals as a non-human entity, on one hand, and AI system, on the other hand, boils down to the fact that law has attributed legal personality to the former category of non-human entity, which is why they are regarded as ‘Legal Persons’, while this isn’t the case concerning AI. The rationale behind attributing legal personhood to the above category of non-human entities is that the decision-making power behind such entities vests in the humans, ultimately, which is understandably not the case with AI. 

So, before attributing ‘inventorship’ to AI, the question of attributing legal personality must also be answered objectively, after weighing the pros and cons of the same, in light of all the social, moral, and societal implications. Recently, ‘Sophia’, a social humanoid robot developed by Hanson Robotics, a Hong-Kong based company, has been granted full citizenship by Saudi Arabia. The question now pertains, which is for the legislature to decide, if Sophia after being given citizenship may be considered a natural person or not, and the implications that may follow from it.

Also, the further argument against it could be from the point of ‘conception’ of the invention, which is the ‘touchstone of inventorship’. AI system, being the complex set of algorithms, and involving multiple people behind its development, the question of inventorship shall again fall into the trap of ambiguity, especially when it is not known who is responsible for the conceiving of the invention, at first place− the AI itself (using its self-learning ability) or the human who developed the algorithms for such AI that it can self-learn, or the person who feeds the data as an input to the AI, or the one who reviews the result and recognizes that an invention has been made.

This may be determined once the legislature lays down sufficient guidelines to set the required threshold limit of the amount of contribution required by the human inventor to be named as an ‘inventor’ in the patent application along with an AI or place of an AI. The idea behind attributing inventorship is to acknowledge the contribution made by the persons involved in developing such an invention. If such an invention is made by an AI, the law can acknowledge the contribution of AI by way of the “right of attribution that exists vis-à-vis the inventor.”

“The right of attribution for an AI which is envisioned forms a part of a pseudo-patent application wherein the AI involved is named. Such recognition should be conditioned on the extent of real intellectual efforts towards developing the invention itself which was not initially perceived by the inventor himself. Such a right might seem rather useless for the AI, however, it can be helpful when− one, it provides traceability to the extent of liability that the human inventor may be awarded; and two, buried in the right of such attribution to AI is the repute of the human inventor involved which would not die out even after assignment thus, providing a flexible degree of control over one’s creation. The pseudo-patent application is a superficial patent application, supplementary to the main patent application. The details regarding the extent of intellectual efforts by the human inventor and the AI involved should be recorded in the pseudo-application. Since the inventor cannot manually distinguish for an AI which logic is wasteful and should be avoided, the AI sans discernment reflects the system biases thus, inflicting liability on the inventor or even the corporate assignee.”

So far, the Indian Patent Act does not conclude that only human inventors should be named as ‘inventors’. In case, the legislature desires to prohibit an AI to be named as an inventor, it would require amendments in the existing patent law to explicitly state the same.

AI and ownership

The question of ownership, in the case of AI-generated inventions, is far more pressing than that of inventorship, given the legal implications and the rights that follow. Ownership in AI-generated inventions will encourage and push the persons behind the development of the AI system towards further innovation and shall enable the businesses to invest more in the technology leading to better commercialization of the invention.

Generally, an inventor is deemed to be the first owner of the invention. However, it is amply clear that for now AI cannot be deemed to be an owner of the invention. Thus, to determine the rightful ownership of AI-generated inventions, it is imperative to determine, first, the actual inventor of the invention, as without acknowledging who the ‘true and first inventor is, it is not possible to identify who owns the invention. This sequence is important and cannot go the other way round especially concerning AI inventions as it is argued that an AI system cannot be named as an ‘inventor’ because it can neither exercise the ownership rights in the patent nor can it assign something which it does not have in the first place, for it lacks legal personality.

One approach could be simply to attribute ownership to the inventor of an AI system (hardware) that generates ideas and makes the patentable invention. Another approach could be to grant ownership to the developer of the algorithms (software) incorporated into such an AI system where it is argued that it is the input that is responsible for what the AI generates as an output. This shall not only act as an incentive for such people to innovate further, but it may also act as a self-regulatory check on the AI and will hold such inventor or the developer morally as well as legally responsible to keep the AI within the bounds, at least, up to the initial phase where such human can exercise sufficient control over the output an AI generates. Although some argue that it isn’t correct to make the innocent human liable for things that might go wrong with AI and that it violates human rights as well, then the line has to be drawn that shall, at least to some extent, if not absolutely, hold the human behind such AI responsible, even if that can be limited to only the initial phase of control. This may be regulated by certain contractual agreements laying down specific terms and conditions, and setting some bounds and limitations which may be subject to judicial review.

Further, this may also ease the right of a human inventor to assign or license the right to practice such AI-generated inventions to any person he deems fit in the same manner as it is usually done in the case of other patentable inventions. 

AI, non-obviousness, and the person skilled in the art 

The non-obviousness of an invention is the second qualifier of patentability. It is a subset of inventive steps and is determined from the perception of a hypothetical person, known as “Person Skilled in the Art” (abbrev. as PSITA), in the context of India.  

Section 2(1) (ja) defines inventive step, which has two parts:

Technical advancement or economic significance or both

The features claimed in the invention must show sufficient technical advancement when compared to the prior art. In other words, such an invention must add some value, which is of technical nature, to the existing prior art; or such an invention must be economically viable as compared to the existing prior art, making the invention more affordable by utilizing machinery to help the public to have more access to the invention.

Non-obviousness

Such technical advancement or economic significance must be non-obvious to the hypothetical PSITA. The PSITA places the prior art alongside the claimed invention to identify the difference between the two. If he is unable to see through any difference as a whole, after mosaicing all the prior art documents, before the effective filing date of the application, then the invention shall be deemed to satisfy the test of non-obviousness, and consequently, be deemed to have an inventive step. Under AI-generated inventions, the question largely revolves around two major issues:

1. Should the standard of the hypothetical PSITA be maintained where the invention is autonomously generated by an AI? What shall be the probable implications if AI is elevated to the position of PSITA?

In the context of AI inventions, the determination of who such a hypothetical person is shall be a major question− the AI or the human contributor. Although generally, the hypothetical person is a construct of legal fiction, which possesses average or ordinary knowledge of the prior art of the relevant field such that when he looks at the claimed invention, he must not be in a position to carry out such an invention without undue experimentation. He is not deemed to possess the knowledge of the inventor, which makes the claimed invention non-obvious in the eyes of PSITA. 

However, with the rapid advancement in technology, one fears the time when such AI shall become super-intelligent and all the future inventions shall start to become obvious for the ‘inventor’ AI, which might demand recognizing AI as a hypothetical PSITA. However, elevating AI to the position of PSITA has its consequences that make this approach less feasible in the light of future innovations, particularly those coming from the end of humans. Placing AI in the position of PSITA shall set the patentability standard too high and will act as an impediment to the deserving innovations generated by humans. Theoretically, this might seem like a bar to junk patents, but practically, the risks seem to be too high to even consider taking such a step. It shall force redefining of all the existing qualifiers of patentability, including novelty, enablement, and the disclosure requirement; particularly enablement and disclosure requirement which is viewed from the standpoint of the person skilled in the art.

2. What art does the standard refer to?

Since AI-generated inventions belong to not one but a combination of fields, the question as to what the prior art standard should be limited to demands attention. Given the versatile and continuously evolving character of AI, the definition of ‘AI-invention’ must be first articulated in a well-defined manner to determine the standard the prior art must refer to. For now, owing to so much uncertainty around the AI, it seems feasible to restrict the standard of prior art to the field to which the claims invoked essentially relate, rather than establishing any peculiar standards of legality for particular technical art.

Conclusion

Artificial Intelligence is here to stay. It is not even a question anymore if inventions involving AI technology should be patentable or not. Not affording patent protection to AI-driven inventions would force the applicants to conceal the involvement of an AI, which has been a predominant practice so far in this area of technology. Apart from this, exclusion of AI-based inventions from the patentable subject matter will lead to an increase in the use of trade secrets, which is any day better, from the standpoint of the patent applicant, as compared to allowing the invention to fall into the public domain. The ramifications of such practice will decrease the flow of information and technology advancement, as such, it is in the interest of both, the applicant as well as the legislature and the Indian Patent Office to start reacting to the developments within the field of AI technology by way of either enacting appropriate laws and policies, or by interpreting the existing laws to accommodate such inventions, and if required, introducing the amendments for the same.

Further, the question of inventorship and ownership are important not only from the perspective of acknowledging and encouraging the ‘person’, whether natural or artificial, behind the patentable inventions, but also for commercialization of the invention, and analyzing the more pressing issues linked to it, including statutorily mandated standard of hypothetical PSITA, the sufficiency of disclosure, infringement, liability, and dispute resolution. 

As discussed above, the question of identifying PSITA is important to restrict its use exclusively to the statutorily appointed role during the non-obviousness determination, and not for other purposes, like enablement. The question of Enablement poses another level of difficulty, for instance, will AI be able to, at all, disclose the process of bringing about an invention in the patent specification? Will the Human owner, who is not involved in the process of making the AI, be able to back-track and reverse engineer the same process to produce the definite output, if at all disclosed by AI, by looking at such specification? Wouldn’t the “inherent randomness in AI-algorithms” make it difficult for such a PSITA to essentially understand the functioning of the invention, and reverse engineer the same without undue experimentation? If at all it is possible, the other questions will then become more difficult to answer, like if AI is granted the status of inventorship, would it be able to bear the burden of proving that it was the first to come up with such invention, in case of any conflict between the title of inventorship between two separate inventions made by separate inventors, one of them being the AI? Will the litigators be able to question the AI, during depositions, to explain the logic behind the concerned invention?

Recently, in 2021, the Australian court and South African court have ruled in favor of recognizing AI as an inventor, but the above issues still remain unanswered. The timely recognition and response towards such issues is the only way forward to keep pace with this multifaceted and evolving AI technology.

References

  1. BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO, SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 417 (Margaret E. Hall ed., 1947).
  2. (Creativity Machine is a type of Connectionist AI which generates intelligent behavior by representing rules in interconnected networks of simple and uniform units such as artificial neurons, and includes Machine Learning, Artificial Neural Networks and Deep Learning.) 
  3. WIPO Conversation on IP and AI, second session, Draft issue paper on Intellectual Property and Artificial Intelligence, 5, https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/wipo_ip_ai_2_ge_20/wipo_ip_ai_2_ge_20_1.pdf (last visited Jan.3, 2021).
  4. Jon Porter, US patent office rules that artificial intelligence cannot be a legal inventor, THE VERGE (Jan. 1, 2021, 1:00 PM), https://www.theverge.com/platform/amp/2020/4/29/21241251/artificial-intelligence-inventor-united-states-patent-trademark-office-intellectual-property, see id. (RYAN ABBOTT (Artificial Inventor Project) suggesting that recognizing the value of machines in the creative process will inevitably make the machine become more valuable).
  5. Univ. of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Forderung der Wissenschaften e. V., 734 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
  6. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, Patents and the Fourth Industrial Revolution (Guidelines, Part G, Patentability, Chapter II- Inventions, 3.3.1. Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning), https://www.epo.org/news-events/in-focus/ict/artificial-intelligence.html (last visited Jan.1, 2021).
  7. Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, Annex 1C, art. 27, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/31bis_trips_04c_e.htm (hereinafter TRIPS).
  8. USPTO, Public Views on Artificial Intelligence and Intellectual Property Policy, I, 1 (2020), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTO_AI-Report_2020-10-05.pdf.

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NCLT- general practice and procedure

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This article is written by Sharanya Ramakrishnan, pursuing a Diploma in General Corporate Practice: Transactions, Governance, and Disputes from Lawsikho. The article has been edited by Tanmaya Sharma (Associate, LawSikho).

Introduction

The laws of procedure, under regular civil process, although provided for remedies such as appeals, revisions, reviews, also enabled the parties aggrieved to file numerous applications and raise frivolous objections due to which important matters were pushed to the background. All the proceedings in the court were certainly delayed, which led to frustration and discontent among litigants. In view of the huge pendency, courts were unable to provide attention and give precedence to cases arising under certain special legislations. Therefore, there was a need to transfer some selected areas of litigation dealt with by traditional courts to special Tribunals. As Tribunals are free from the fetters of procedural laws and laws of evidence, they can provide easy access to justice in a “cost-affordable” and “user-friendly” manner.

Considering the above, in order to handle the rising corporate civil disputes, the National Company Law Tribunal  (hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal”) was established under Section 408 of the Companies Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). It is a body that has powers and procedures analogous to those vested in a court of law. It has the duty to determine facts objectively, decide matters as per the principles of natural justice and draw inferences from them in the form of orders.  Such orders can alter a situation, correct a wrong, or impose costs/penalties and may affect the legal rights, duties, privileges of the specific parties.

The National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as “the NCLT Rules, 2016”) provide the general procedures and practices for working of the Tribunal. The Tribunal is empowered to devise its own procedure for dealing with the cases that are filed before it. The Tribunal also has the discretion to require or dispense with any step provided thereunder.

This article endeavours to explain the general practice and procedure followed by the Tribunal while dealing with cases filed before it. It analyses the relevant provisions of the Act and the NCLT Rules, 2016 to help understand the working of the Tribunal. 

Territorial jurisdiction

Every petition, application, reply, or any related documents shall be filed to the Registry of the Tribunal or such Bench(s) having territorial jurisdiction. For instance, as per Section 60(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the territorial jurisdiction of NCLT comprises the place where the registered office of the corporate person is situated. 

Preparation of petition/application

Procedure (Rule 20)

  1. Every application or petition presented to the Tribunal shall be in English. However, in cases where it is in some other Indian language, the same shall be accompanied by a copy translated in English.
  2. The application or petition shall be fairly and legibly type written, lithographed or printed.
  3. The cause title shall contain the words “Before the National Company Law Tribunal” and shall also mention the Bench to which it is presented.
  4. Immediately after the cause title, every proceeding must stipulate the legal provision under which it is preferred.
  5. The petition or application shall be divided into paragraphs and numbered consecutively such that each paragraph shall state a specific or definite fact, allegation or point.
  6. The beginning of the application or petition shall contain details regarding the full name, age, parentage, description of each party and address. In cases where a party sues or is being sued in a representative character, the same shall also be mentioned.
  7. The names of the parties shall be numbered consecutively and a separate line shall be allocated to the name and description of each party.
  8. The aforesaid numbers shall not be modified. In cases where a party dies during the pendency of any petition, his legal heir(s) or representative(s) shall be indicated by sub-numbers.
  9. In cases where new parties are brought in, they shall be numbered consecutively as per their respective categories.

Matters to be set out in the address for service (Rule 21)

The address for serving of summons shall be filed along with every petition or application and it shall contain the following details:

  1. The name of the road, street, lane, Municipal Division, Municipal Door and other numbers of the house;
  2. The name of the town or village;
  3. The post office, postal district and PIN Code; and
  4. Any other details to help identify and locate the addressee such as mobile number, e-mail address, etc.

Presentation of petition or application 

1. Who can file? 

Every petition or application shall be presented by the petitioner or applicant either:

  • in person; or
  • by his duly authorised representative; or
  • by an advocate duly appointed on this behalf. (Rule 23)

The Tribunal may also permit a joint petition to be filed by two or more persons if it is satisfied, having regard to the cause of action and the nature of the relief prayed for, that they have a common interest in that matter.  However, the Tribunal may permit such a joint petition only if it is specifically permitted under the Act. (Rule 23A)

2. How to file a petition or application? (Rule 34)

  • Every petition or application shall be filed in triplicate in Form No. NCLT 1 with necessary attachments accompanied by Form No. NCLT 2 was verified by an affidavit in Form No. NCLT 6.
  • Interlocutory applications shall also be filed in Form No. NCLT 1 with accompanying documents in Form No. NCLT 3 was verified by an affidavit in Form No. NCLT 6. 

3. Documents accompanying the petition or application (Rule 23)

A petition or application shall be accompanied by documents:

  • as prescribed in “Annexure B” of NCLT Rules, 2016.
  • index of documents in triplicate.

4. Endorsement or verification (Rule 26)

  • The name and signature of the authorised representative shall be indicated at the foot of every application or petition.
  • Every petition or application shall be signed and verified by the party concerned.

5. Production of authorisation for and on behalf of an association (Rule 31)

In cases where a petition or application is to be filed by or on behalf of an association, the person who signs or verifies the same shall, along with such petition or application, produce a true copy of the resolution authorising such person to do so for verification by the Registry. 

The Registrar may at any time call upon such person to produce such further materials as he may consider necessary to satisfy himself as regards the said authorisation. 

6. Advertisement (Rule 35)

  1. The advertisement of every petition or application shall be made in Form No. NCLT 3A, unless the Tribunal otherwise orders or the NCLT Rules, 2016 otherwise provide.
  1. Additional compliances for an advertisement:
  • If an advertisement is made by the company, the same should also be placed on its website.
  • The advertisement shall be made at least 14 days before the date fixed for hearing, at least once in a vernacular newspaper in the principal vernacular language of the district in which the proposed company is situated and at least once in the English language in an English newspaper circulating in that district.
  • Affidavit stating that the advertisement is as per the terms of this Rule shall be filed with the Tribunal at least 3 days preceding the date of hearing along with proof of advertisement.
  1. The contents of the advertisement are as follows:
  • The date on which the petition or application was filed;
  • The name and address of the petitioner or applicant and his authorised representative, if any;
  • The nature and particulars of the petition or application;
  • The date fixed for the hearing;
  • A statement stipulating that any person who intends to oppose the petition or application or whose interest is likely to be affected by reason of such filing shall send a notice of his intention to the concerned Bench as well as to the petitioner or his authorised representative, if any specifying the nature of interest and grounds of opposition, such that it reaches the concerned person at least 2 days prior to the day fixed for hearing.

7. Notice to the opposite party (Rule 37)

NCLT shall issue a notice in Form No. NCLT 5 accompanied by a copy of the application with supporting documents to show cause against the petition or application on the date of hearing as specified therein.

8. Service of notice and processes issued by NCLT (Rule 38)

Notices or processes by the Tribunal may be served:

  • by electronic means to a valid e-mail address as provided in the petition or application; or
  • by physical modes, as may be determined by the Tribunal:
  • by hand delivery by means of a process server or respective authorised representative; or
  • by registered post or speed post with acknowledgement due; or
  • by courier; or
  • by the party himself.

9. Filing of reply and other documents by the respondent (Rule 41)

  1. The respondent may file his reply along with copies of the documents on which he relies to the petition or application either in person or through an authorised representative, with the Registry as stipulated by the Tribunal. A copy shall also be served on the applicant.
  2. In the reply filed, the respondent shall explicitly admit, deny or rebut the facts detailed by the applicant in his petition or application and may also specify any additional facts as may be found necessary. 

10. Filing of rejoinder (Rule 42)

In case the respondent states such additional facts in his reply, the Tribunal may allow the petitioner or the applicant to file a rejoinder rebutting to what is stated in such reply. A copy of the same needs to be served to the respondent. 

Framing of issues 

If the Tribunal thinks fit, it can frame issues, which have to be decided in order to decide the case.

Admission and denial of documents/discovery and production of documents 

Akin to a civil suit, the Tribunal may, before framing issues, establish from the parties or their authorised representatives, whether they admit or deny documents accompanying the petition or the application or reply, if any, and shall record such admission or denial. The following rules provide for discovery, production, and return of documents:

  1. An application for a summons to produce documents shall be on plain paper and shall stipulate the document the production of which is sought, the relevancy of the document and in the case where producing a certified copy would serve the purpose, whether an application was made to the proper officer and the result thereof. [Rule 131(2)]
  1. The summons for producing a document in the possession of a public officer other than a court shall be in Form No. NCLT 15 and shall be conveyed to the concerned Head of the Department or such other authority as the Tribunal may specify.[Rule 131(3)]
  1. The Tribunal may also issue summons suo moto, for producing public documents in the custody of a public officer. (Rule 132)
  1. An application for return of the documents shall be numbered and such an application shall not be entertained after the destruction of the records. (Rule 134)

Filing of affidavit of evidence [Rule 39(1)]

If the petition contains facts that need to be proved, the Tribunal may direct parties to give evidence, if any, by affidavit in Form No. NCLT 7.

Cross-Examination of any deponent [Rule 39(2)]

When a party gives evidence of any person, the opposing party, as a principle of natural justice, should have a right to cross-examine the witness. As a result, the Tribunal may, if it considers necessary for just decision of the case, order cross-examination of the deponent on points of conflict either through information and communication technology facilities like video conferencing or otherwise as decided by it. 

Summoning the witness and method of recording evidence (Rule 52)

  1. If any party to the proceedings presents a petition or application for summoning of witnesses, the Tribunal shall issue a summons for the appearance of such witnesses unless it considers that their appearance is not necessary for a fair decision of the case.
  2. When the Tribunal issues summons to any witnesses to give evidence or produce any document, such person shall be eligible for such travelling and daily allowance as would enable him to meet such travelling and other expenses as may be determined by the Registrar. Such allowances shall be paid by the party as determined by the Registrar.

Hearing of petition or application (Rule 44)

The Tribunal shall notify the date and place of hearing of the petition or application by way of general or special order as may be directed by the President or any Member of the Tribunal.  However, if the applicant wishes to withdraw his petition or application, as the case may be, he shall file an application to the Tribunal. On doing so, the Tribunal on hearing such applicant or if it considers necessary, the opposite parties, may permit such withdrawal on imposition of costs as it may deem fit in the interests of justice. 

Rights of a party to appear before the Tribunal (Rule 45)

  1. The parties to the case may appear before the Tribunal, either in person or through an authorised representative.
  2. The authorised representative shall appear before the Tribunal only on filing of Vakalatnama or Memorandum of Appearance in Form No. NCLT 12.
  3. The Central Government, Regional Director, or Registrar of Companies or the Official Liquidator can authorise an advocate or an officer (who shall either be an officer not below the rank of Junior Time Scale or a company prosecutor) to represent them in the proceedings before NCLT.

Effects of non-appearance of the applicant (Rule 48)

Non-appearance of the applicant on the date of hearing of the petition of application shall entail any of the following two consequences:

  1. The Tribunal may dismiss the application for default; or
  1. The Tribunal may decide it on merit.

In case of such dismissal, if the applicant within a period of 30 days from the date of dismissal files an application to the Tribunal showing sufficient cause for such non-appearance, the Tribunal, on being satisfied, shall set aside the order of dismissal and restore such application or petition. On the other hand, the decision shall not be re-opened where the case was disposed of on merits.

Ex-parte hearing and disposal of petition or application (Rule 49)

If the respondent fails to appear on the date of the hearing, the Tribunal can take any of the following actions:

  1. Adjourn the hearing; or
  1. Hear and decide the petition or application ex-parte.

In cases where the hearing and the decision was made ex-parte, such respondent may by application satisfy the Tribunal that the notice was not properly served or that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the petition or application was called for hearing. The Tribunal, on being satisfied may make an order setting aside the ex-parte hearing as against him upon such terms as it thinks fit.

The decision of the Tribunal (Section 422 of the Act)

The Tribunal shall strive to decide every petition or application made to it as expeditiously as possible and it shall make an endeavour to dispose of the same within 3 months from the date of its presentation.

In cases where the petition or application is not disposed of within the said 3 months, the Tribunal is required to record the reasons explaining the delay. The President shall on taking into consideration such reasons, extend the limit for a further period not exceeding 90 days.

Order of the Tribunal

  1. The Tribunal shall, on receipt of a petition or application, pass such orders as it thinks fit after providing the parties to the case, a reasonable opportunity of being heard. (Rule 146)
  1. The Tribunal may choose to pass such orders regarding costs incidental to the proceedings, as it may deem fit. (Rule 149)
  1. The Tribunal after hearing the applicant and respondent shall pronounce the order either at once or reserve the order. If the order is reserved, it shall be passed within a period of 30 days from the date of the final hearing. [Rule 150(1)]

In the case of Kamal K. Singh vs Union of India, The Bombay High Court issued a writ of certiorari for quashing and setting aside the admission order of NCLT, Mumbai Bench on the ground that the order was not pronounced in accordance with Rules 150 to 152 of the NCLT Rules, 2016.

  1. An order of the Tribunal shall be executable as a decree of civil court and provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 shall apply as provided in Section 424(3) of the Act.
  1. Every order of the Tribunal shall be in writing and shall be signed and dated by the President or Members constituting the Bench, who heard and pronounced the order. [Rule 150(2)]
  1. A certified copy of the order shall be given to the concerned parties. [Rule 150(3)]
  1. Every order shall bear the seal of the Tribunal. [Rule 150(5)]
  1. The order of the Tribunal may be rectified in case there is a clerical or arithmetic mistake therein either by the Tribunal suo moto or on an application made to it by any party. Such an application shall be made in Form No. NCLT 9 within 2 years from the date of the final order. (Rule 154).

Preservation of record (Rule 103)

All the relevant documents and records pertaining to petitions or applications handled by the Tribunal shall be stored and preserved in the manner provided by the NCLT, Rules, 2016 and the remaining physical records set aside in a record room shall be preserved for a period of 5 years after passing of the final order. 

However, in case of an electronic record of the petitions or applications handled by the Tribunal including directions and orders passed by it, the same shall be kept by the Registry of the Tribunal for a period of 15 years after passing of the final order. 

Representation before NCLT (Section 432 of the Act)

As stated above, a party to any proceeding may either appear in person or through an authorised representative. The following persons can be authorised to appear before the Tribunal for presenting the case :

  • Chartered Accountants;
  • Company Secretaries;
  • Cost Accountants;
  • Legal practitioners;
  • Any other person, such as the officer of the company.

Certain additional provisions regarding authorised representatives are stated as under:

  1. Consent for engaging another legal practitioner (Rule 120)

In case a legal practitioner proposes to file a Vakalatnama or Memorandum of Appearance in any pending case where there is already a legal practitioner or authorised representative on record, he can do so only:

  • with the written consent of the legal practitioner or authorised representative on record; or
  • in case of refusal of consent, with the approval of the Tribunal on an application made to it for revocation of the Vakalatnama or Memorandum of Appearance after service of such application on the counsel already on record.
  1. Restrictions on appearance (Rule 121)

A legal practitioner or authorised representative is restricted from appearing in a case or proceeding for any person whose interest is conflicting to that of his former client by reason of him:

  • tendering advice in connection with the institution of any case or proceeding before the Tribunal; or
  • drawing pleadings in connection with any such matter; or 
  • acting for a party during the progress of any such matter.

He can however make an appearance with the prior permission of the Tribunal.

  1. Limitation on party’s right to be heard (Rule 122)

In case a party has engaged a legal practitioner or authorised representative to appear for him before the Tribunal, he may be prevented from making a presentation before it.

  1. Empanelment of specially authorised representatives by the Tribunal (Rule 123)

The Tribunal is empowered to establish a panel of specially authorised representatives. It may draw up a panel of legal practitioners or company secretaries or chartered accountants or cost accountants or valuers or other experts as may be required for assisting the Tribunal in several proceedings that are before it. The president may require any of the persons from this panel to render assistance in the proceedings before the Bench. The remuneration and other compensation and allowances payable to such persons shall be determined in consultation with the Tribunal.

General powers of Tribunal 

  1. Power to exempt from compliance of NCLT Rules, 2016 (Rule 14)

The Tribunal may, on an application made to it, exempt the parties from compliance with any of the requirements of these Rules and provide directions in matters of practice and procedure as it may consider just and prudent.

  1. Power to extend the time for doing any act (Rule 15)

The Tribunal has the power to extend the time appointed by these Rules or fixed by any order for doing any act upon such terms as it may think fit.

  1. Inherent powers  (Rule 11)

The Tribunal has inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary for meeting the ends of justice or to thwart abuse of the process of the Tribunal. 

Conclusion 

The NCLT Rules, 2016 provide a detailed framework of the procedures and practices to be followed by the Tribunal while dealing with cases filed before it. The Tribunal’s procedures and method to oversee the preparation of cases and their hearing is simpler and more informal than those followed by the court of law.  As a result, the Tribunal may be better at finding facts, using flexible standards, and implementing discretionary powers as compared to the traditional courts. Lastly, it not only reduces the burden on the High Courts but also endeavours to provide speedy justice.


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State of Gujarat v. Narayana, 2021 : difference between furlough and parole

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This article has been written by Ayush Tiwari, a student of Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA. This article aims to provide a distinction between furlough and parole with the help of a case study.

This article has been published by Diva Rai.

Introduction

The terms furlough and parole have distinct meanings. Parole and furlough laws are elements of the criminal and prison systems, with the goal of making them more humane. These guidelines allow the prisoner to be released and return to the outside world for a set amount of time. In the case of State of Gujarat v. Narayana (2021), the Supreme Court refused Narayan Sai’s request for a furlough, he was convicted of rape and is still incarcerated. Furlough is frequently mistaken for parole. However, the two terms have different meanings and are used in different situations. So, what does “Furlough” represent in criminal law, and how do the terms “Furlough” and “Parole” differ?

What is furlough

Temporary leaves, home visits, and temporary community release are all terms used to describe furloughs. For decades, prisons have provided temporary furloughs to convicts who have been incarcerated for a lengthy time. It is needed to be given to the prisoner on a regular basis and is considered his right. It allows the prisoner to maintain his links to society and is regarded as a decrease in his sentence. It can’t be turned down.

What is parole

Parole is a mechanism that allows a prisoner to be released while their sentence is suspended. The release is conditional, and it is largely contingent on the prisoner’s behaviour and after he has completed a portion of his term in the state’s continuous custody. It necessitates reporting to the authorities on a regular basis for a certain amount of time. Parole is a “reformative” way of imprisonment. Parole is thus a grant of partial liberty or lessening of restrictions to a convict prisoner, but release on parole does not change the status of the prisoner. To humanize the jail system, the provision of parole was established. It is governed under the 1894 Prisons Act. Since prisons fall under the State List within the Constitution, each state has its own rules under which parole is granted to any prisoner. 

Difference between parole and furlough: State of Gujarat v. Narayana

The Supreme Court has debated the differences between “furlough” and “parole,” as well as the rules that govern their granting.

The State of Gujarat filed an appeal against a Gujarat High Court judgement granted two weeks’ furlough to self-proclaimed godman and rape criminal Asaram’s son Narayan Sai, who is also serving a life term for rape in a 2014 case. After his plea for furlough was dismissed by the DGP, the convict went to the High Court.

Observation of the court

The judgement pointed out that the Bombay Furlough and Parole Rules, (1959) do not give a prisoner a legal right to be released on furlough. Rule 3 and Rule 4 govern the granting of vacation. While Rule 3 establishes the conditions for granting furlough to convicts spending varying periods of time in jail, Rule 4 puts restrictions. Rule 3’s usage of the phrase “may be released” denotes the lack of an absolute right. This is further emphasised in Rule 17, which stipulates that the rules do not grant a prisoner a legal right to request furlough. The Court further observed that the Jail Superintendent had acquired a negative impression of the respondent as a result of their unlawful use of a mobile phone within the jail and attempts to contact the outside world.

Judgment

The court under a bench composed of Justice DY Chandrachud and Justice BV Nagarathna established guidelines for parole and furlough. The following are the guidelines:

  • The phrases “furlough” and “parole” allude to a brief time of temporary release from incarceration.
  • Unlike parole, which is granted for a specific cause, furlough can be granted for any reason once a certain number of years have been served.
  • Furlough is granted to break up the monotony of imprisonment and to allow the convict to maintain touch with his or her family and social integration.
  • While a prisoner has the ability to request furlough without stating a reason, he or she does not have an absolute legal right to do so.
  • Furloughs must be justified in the public interest, and particular categories of offenders may be denied to them.

Important cases which were taken as precedents

The bench further noted, citing several precedents, that while awarding parole or furlough, a balance must be struck between two competing objectives: the convict’s reform and the public purpose and interests of society.

State of Haryana & Other v. Mohinder Singh (2000)

In this instance, the Supreme Court distinguished both words quite clearly when it stated that- 

  • Parole and furlough are both forms of conditional release.
  • Parole can be awarded in the case of a short-term detention, whereas furlough is allowed in the case of a long-term detention.
  • Parole lasts for one month, whereas furlough lasts for a maximum of fourteen days.
  • The Divisional Commissioner grants parole, whereas the Deputy Inspector General of prisons grants furlough.
  • Parole requires a particular cause, whereas furlough is intended to break up the monotony of jail.
  • In the case of furlough, the duration of incarceration is not taken into account for calculating the term of parole.
  • Parole can be given an unlimited number of times, whereas furlough has a restriction.
  • Furlough might be rejected in the interest of society because it is not provided for any specific purpose.

Asfaq v. State of Rajasthan, (2017)

In this case, it was discussed that a parole is a conditional release of a prisoner, which is described as an early release conditional on good behaviour and regular reporting to the authorities for a specified duration. It is also a type of conditional pardon in which the offender gets released before the end of his sentence. As a result, parole is granted for good behaviour on the condition that the parolee report to a supervising officer on a regular basis for a fixed period of time. A prisoner on parole might be released on a temporary basis for various reasons. In that case, it is to be viewed as a temporary suspension of the punishment, with the penalty’s quantum being unchanged. The purpose of parole is to provide some respite to inmates in certain circumstances.

Furlough, on the other hand, is a time period spent outside of jail. It’s conditional, and it’s only offered if you’ve been imprisoned for a long time. The period of sentence spent on furlough by the prisoners need not be undergone by him as is done in the case of parole. Furlough is given as a reward for excellent behaviour.

State of Maharashtra v. Suresh Pandurang Darvakar, (2006)

In this case, it was discussed that while both parole and furlough are temporary releases from incarceration, parole is only issued for a specified reason. Once a prisoner has served the required number of years as provided in Rule 3, he is eligible to request for furlough.

The terms “furlough” and “parole” have two distinct meanings. When releasing a prisoner on furlough, it is not essential to explain the reasons, but in the event of parole, the reasons must be stated in accordance with Rule 19. However, as extracted from Rule 17, release on furlough cannot be regarded to be an absolute entitlement of the prisoner. It is subject to the requirements of Rules 4(4) and 6. Furlough is granted on a regular basis under Rule 3 for no specific reason other than to allow the prisoner to maintain family ties, familial and social relationships, and to prevent the negative effects of prolonged prison life. Furlough is considered as if it were a term spent in prison. However, Rule 20 states that time spent on parole does not contribute toward sentence remission.

Conclusion

The distinction between parole and furlough has been adequately explored in the decision. This reduces the chances of making a mistake or being confused about the issue. This case law, as well as the other aforementioned case laws, are relied upon. The main distinction is that, although parole is provided to allow a prisoner to address a specific need, furlough can be granted once a certain number of years have been served without any reason. Every citizen should have a vested interest in assisting recidivists in effectively reintegrating into society. Ex-offenders who don’t have a strong support structure once they leave prison are more likely to never reintegrate back into society since they have no employment prospects, no understanding of communal coexistence, and no financial means to get back on their feet.

References


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Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea

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This article has been written by Oishika Banerji of Amity Law School, Kolkata. This article provides a detailed analysis of the legal maxim, ‘actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea’. 

This article has been published by Sneha Mahawar.

Introduction 

The Latin expression ‘actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea’, loosely translated as “an act does not render a man guilty of a crime unless his mind is equally guilty,” expresses a foundational concept in criminal law. This means that proving criminal culpability necessitates not only the presence of the actus reus and the mens rea, but also the coincidence or concurrence of the mens rea with the conduct that creates the actus reus. This article aims to explore the concerned maxim with respect to the criminal laws in India. 

Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea 

The Supreme Court of India while deciding on the case of C.K. Jaffer Sharief vs State (Thr C.B.I.) (2012) had observed that an individual’s criminal culpability would be attached if they broke the law. The norm, however, is not absolute, and it is subject to the constraints set out in the Latin maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. It means that there can’t be a crime without a criminal mind. To hold someone criminally responsible, it must be proven that their actions resulted in an illegal act and that their actions were accompanied by a legally blameworthy mental attitude. As a result, every crime has two components, a physical element and a mental aspect, i.e. actus reus and mens rea respectively.

Mens rea is the source of the Latin maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea clarifies the application of mens rea in criminal law. It asserts that a person is only guilty of committing a crime if the conduct is done with the purpose to commit a crime. This maxim is used to judge whether certain conduct is illegal or not. Crimes done with a particular intent, rather than unforeseen or inadvertent acts, are subject to harsher penalties. However, no violation of the law may go unpunished. 

The origins of this adage are yet unknown. Pollock and Maitland tracked the earliest and most distant reference to this maxim to St. Augustine, but they were unable to provide a sufficient context for the maxim discovered. This principle was later acquired from contemporary theology by Lord Edward Coke, and it is now universally used in the common law. He traced the origins of this aphorism back to St. Augustine’s Sermon 180. In the sermon’s body, St. Augustine discusses an instance of perjury. In one instance, he talks of a man who was asked if it rained in a certain location. The man believed it did not rain but had further believed it was in his best interests to testify that it did. It did, in fact, rain there, but the man was unaware of this and believes it did not. The man, according to Augustine, was, therefore, a liar.

Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea under the Indian Penal Code, 1860

The maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea has been integrated into the Indian Penal Code, 1860 in two basic ways: 

  1. Through express inclusion of the required state of mind (mens rea) in the definition of an offence.
  2. Through ‘General Exceptions’ enumerated in Chapter 5 of the Code, some of which, such as mistake of fact, accident, infancy, and insanity, deny the existence of mens rea.

Exceptions of actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea 

In certain situations, the law can create offences based only on the physical act, disregarding ‘the state of mind’ of the person committing the crime. These situations are likewise punished and are considered exceptions to the general rule of actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. In basic terms, a crime for which mens rea is not a necessary criterion is an exception to this rule.

While hearing the case of Ranjit D. Udeshi v. the State of Maharashtra (1964), the Supreme Court of India observed “We do not accept the notion that the prosecution must establish that the person who sells or holds for sale any obscene object knows that it is obscene before he can be declared guilty”. As a result, mens rea is less significant than the act committed. If obscene material is discovered in a person’s possession, he will be prosecuted under Section 292 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. It is not necessary to show his purpose or awareness of the obscene material.

Ignorance of law  

Because every citizen and non-citizen is expected to know the laws of the nation they are in or visiting, ignorance of the law cannot be used as a justification to commit a crime. As a result, in such circumstances, the existence or lack of purpose is not taken into account, making it an exception to the rule. 

In the case of the State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George (1964), the Indian Government had issued an order on November 24th, banning gold transportation outside of India in order to save foreign exchange and combat smuggling. The appellant, M.H George, a German national, boarded an aircraft in Zurich on November 27th to travel to Manila. On the 28th of November, the plane made a stopover in Bombay, where he was apprehended by a customs official with 34 kg of gold. He was held liable under Sections 8 and 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. Later, the matter went to the Bombay High Court, where he was acquitted since he had been exposed to the law recently and, as a German national, he was unaware of the Indian legislation and had no intention of smuggling the gold. However, when the matter went to the Supreme Court, he was found guilty since ignorance of the law could not be used as an excuse, even though he had no intention of smuggling the gold.

Public nuisances 

A public nuisance is a criminal offence in which an act or omission obstructs, harms, or causes trouble to the general public’s right. It may also be described as conduct that jeopardises the broad public’s interest or comfort. In such circumstances, strict responsibility is applied since the public’s interest is jeopardised. As a result, these offences are penalised whether or not there is a mental purpose.

Petty offences 

Petty offences are the least serious kind of offences. When it comes to minor offences like running a red light, proving the mens rea behind such an act might be challenging. As a result, in such instances, acts such as that of jumping the red light may be considered criminal. As a result, it is an exception to the general rule of actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea.

Strict liability 

Strict liability offences are those in which the prosecution does not need to show that the defendant behaved with a guilty mental state since the conduct is sufficient to establish the crime. The activities that fall under these categories are damaging to society or the State. For example, under Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, rape is defined as an act of sexual intercourse without consent. In this situation, even if mens rea is not required, the physical act alone is sufficient to convict a person under this provision.

Insanity 

A criminal purpose cannot be attributed to a person who, due to a mental illness or immaturity, is unable to comprehend the nature of the conduct he has performed or to discern between good and evil. As a result, the defence of insanity is an exception to the rule of actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. The essential precept of criminal law, actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, is embodied in Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. 

While discussing the case of Hari Singh Gond v. the State of M.P. (2008), the Supreme Court of India had viewed that in circumstances of suspected insanity, Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 establishes the legal standard for determining culpability. In the aforementioned Code, there is no definition of ‘unsoundness of mind.’ The courts have largely equated this term with insanity. However, there is no clear meaning of the term ‘insanity.’ It is a phrase that is used to characterise various levels of mental illness. As a result, a mentally ill individual is not automatically free from criminal liability. It’s important to distinguish between legal and medical insanity. A court of law is concerned only with legal insanity and not medical insanity. The burden of proof is on the accused to show his insanity, which arises under Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and is less onerous than the prosecution’s burden of proof to prove that the accused did the act for which he is charged.

The Madhya Pradesh High Court while deciding the case of Ram Bahadur Thapa v. the State Of M.P. (2021) had viewed that under Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, a person is immune from culpability for an act committed due to insanity if, at the time of the act, he is either incapable of understanding;

  1. The nature of the conduct, or
  2. That he is doing something that is either improper or illegal.

The accused is protected not only when, on account of insanity, he was incapable of knowing the nature of the act, but also when he did not know either that the act was wrong or that it was contrary to law, although he might know the nature of the act itself. He is, however, not protected if he knew that what he was doing was wrong, even if he did not know that it was contrary to law, and also if he knew that what he was doing was contrary to the law even though he did not know that it was wrong. The onus of proving unsoundness of mind is on the accused.

Vicarious liability 

The term “vicarious liability” refers to a situation in which the master is held liable for the actions of his servant while on the job. If the servant has committed a criminal offence without the master’s knowledge, this general norm becomes an exception under the maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. The servant’s condition of mind shall not be blamed on the master in such a circumstance. This was the finding in the notable case of Chisholm v. Doulton (1889).

Conclusion 

The Latin maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea have been playing the role of a catalyst in criminal law. The very essence of the criminal law system has been embodied in this maxim. This maxim has not only confined itself in criminal statutes but also in its practical implementation has been reflected in several judgments discussed in this article. Overall, the criminal law system would have been paralysed if this maxim would not have come into existence. 

References 

  1. https://bnblegal.com/actus-non-facit-reum-nisi-mens-sit-rea/
  2. https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095349253
  3. https://www.lawcommunity.in/maxim/actus-non-facit-reum-nisi-mens-sit-rea
  4. https://lawpage.in/legal_language/actus_non_facit_reum_nisi_mens_sit_rea_3_inst._107._173518122018

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Limitations relating to the alteration of articles of association of a company

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This article is written by Sharanya Ramakrishnan, pursuing Diploma in General Corporate Practice: Transactions, Governance and Disputes from Lawsikho. The article has been edited by Tanmaya Sharma (Associate, LawSikho) and Indrasish Majumder (Intern at LawSikho).

This article has been published by Abanti Bose.

Introduction

The Articles of Association (Articles) of a company is one of the most important documents for the formation of a company and for its functioning thereafter. It enables the company to conduct its business smoothly and governs the management of its internal affairs. It essentially contains the company’s bye-laws, rules and regulations that define the rights, duties and powers of the company’s officers and establishes a contract between the company and the members and between the members inter-se. It also provides the mode in which the company’s business should be carried on and thus plays a significant role in regulating the affairs of a company.

As per Section 2(5) of the Companies Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), ’articles’ means “the articles of association of a company as originally framed or as altered from time to time or applied in pursuance of any previous company law or of this Act.” It also includes the regulations contained in Table A in Schedule I of the Act, in so far as they apply to the company.

It can therefore be seen that the articles, being only internal regulations, the members of a company have control over it and may alter them in the manner they consider fit. However, care must be taken to ensure that the articles do not go beyond the company’s sphere of action so as to render them void and inoperative.

This article endeavours to explain the manner of alteration of articles, the procedure for alteration and the limitations subject to which the alteration can occur.

Manner of alteration of articles

As per Section 2(3) of the Act, “alter” or “alteration” includes the making of additions, omissions and substitutions. Thus, the articles of a company can be altered in the following manner:

  • By adopting a new set of articles,
  • By the addition of new clauses,
  • By deletion of clauses,
  • By the amendment of certain clauses,
  • By substitution of certain clauses.

Procedure for alteration of articles

A company possesses a statutory right to alter its articles. This right has been provided under Section 14 of the Act which states that the power of a company to alter its articles is subject to the provisions of the Act and the conditions contained in its memorandum of association. A company must observe the following procedure in order to alter its articles:

  1. Sending notice to call a board meeting: The company must issue not less than 7 days’ notice and agenda of the board meeting, or shorter notice in case of urgent business in writing to every director of the company at his registered address.
  2. Conducting board meeting: the company must hold a meeting of its directors for the purpose of:
  • deciding the articles sought to be altered.
  • passing the necessary board resolution for approving the proposal to alter the articles subject to shareholders’ approval.
  • empowering a director of a company to sign, certify and file the necessary forms with the Registrar of Companies (ROC) and do all such acts, deeds as may be required to give effect to the proposed alteration.
  • fixing the day, date, time and venue to hold the general meeting of the company and passing a special resolution.
  • Approving the draft notice and explanatory statement of the general meeting and authorising a director or company secretary to sign and issue a notice of the general meeting.
  1. Sending notice of general meeting: Notice of general meeting should be sent to all shareholders, directors, auditors and other persons permitted to receive it at least 21 clear days prior to the date of holding the general meeting. Shorter notice may be sent on receiving the consent of at least 95% of members entitled to vote at such meeting, either in writing or through electronic mode in terms of Section 101 of the Act.
  2. Conducting general meeting: A general meeting should be held on the date fixed, and a special resolution needs to be passed for altering the articles.
  3. Filing with ROC: A certified copy of the special resolution passed must be filed with the ROC in e-Form No. MGT- 14 under Section 117 of the Act within 30 days of passing the resolution.

Section 14 of the Act read with Rule 33 of the Companies (Incorporation) Rules, 2014 also provides that, in case of alteration of articles by a private company wherein the restrictions and limitations pertaining to it are no longer included, such a company ceases to be a private company. Moreover, if a public company seeks to convert itself into a private company by virtue of alteration of its articles, it can do so only after taking prior approval of the Central Government by filing an application in Form No. INC 27 along with necessary fees.

Key considerations in altering the articles

  • By amending the articles, a company may insert provisions for entrenchment to the effect that certain provisions of the articles may be altered if conditions or restrictions greater than those prescribed in the Act are complied with. [Section 5(3) of the Act]
  • Such provisions of entrenchment can be embedded only if consented by all the members of a private company or by way of a special resolution in the case of a public company.
  • Every alteration made in the articles shall be noted in every copy of such articles failing which, the company and every officer who is in default shall be liable to a penalty of Rs 1000 for every copy of such articles issued without incorporating such alteration. [Section 15 of the Act]

Limitations on alteration of articles of a company 

A company’s right to alter articles is so significant that a company cannot in any manner, either by way of inserting express provisions in the articles or by virtue of an independent contract, deprive itself of the power to alter its articles.

A company can wield its power to alter articles subject to certain limitations or restrictions. They are as under:

  1. Any alteration in the articles cannot result in the exercise of powers by a company in excess of what is contained in its memorandum.  In the event of any conflict between the memorandum and the articles, the memorandum will undoubtedly prevail.

In the case of Hutton v Scarborough Cliff Hotel Co, the company’s memorandum of association expressly provided that the capital of the company was divided into a certain number of shares. There was no provision in the memorandum indicating that the shares might be of different classes. A special resolution was passed in a general meeting whereby the articles were altered by inserting a power to issue new shares with preferential dividends. The court held that the alteration was inoperative as there was an implied stipulation in the memorandum that all the shareholders would stand on an equal footing as to the receipt of dividends and such an act amounted to altering the constitution of the company fixed by the memorandum.

Subsequently, the aforesaid view was changed in the case of Andrews v. Gas Meter Co Ltd In this case, the memorandum of the company stated that the company’s nominal capital was Rs 60,000, divided into 600 shares of  Rs 100 each. The articles of the company contained the power to increase the capital. The issue of preference shares, however, was not authorized or contemplated either in the memorandum or the articles. 

Consequently, the company passed a special resolution altering the articles and authorising the issue of fully paid-up preference shares. It was held that the issue of such preference shares is valid as the memorandum of association was silent on the point and did not expressly or impliedly prohibit such an issue. 

Therefore, it can be seen that the articles may be altered to explain ambiguous portions or to supplement the memorandum with regard to those things upon which it is silent.

  1. The alteration must not be inconsistent with the provisions of the Act or any other statute.

In the case of, Madhava Ramachandra Kamath v. Canara Banking Corporation the company contained a clause in its articles empowering it to expel a member if he unjustly or unlawfully has recourse to law in any matter whatsoever connected with the company and on such expulsion, he shall never again be admitted into the company. Acting under such provision, the company at a general meeting expelled the petitioner herein. Subsequent to the passing of the resolution of expulsion, the company altered its articles by making an addition to the aforesaid clause which allowed the company to force an expelled member to sell his shares to any person at a price fixed under the provisions of the articles and authorise a director to sign the necessary transfer instrument on behalf of such transferor if he fails to do so.

The company by virtue of such addition, authorised a director to register the transfer of the shares of the petitioner without a valid instrument of transfer. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner approached the court which held that the provision contained in the articles expelling a member and authorising the transfer of his shares is invalid as it is against the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956.

However, as already mentioned above, it is always open for a company to add provisions in the articles imposing conditions stricter than those provided by the Act. For instance, they may provide that a matter should be passed by a special resolution when the Act requires it to be passed by an ordinary resolution. 

  1. The articles should not be altered so as to include provisions that are illegal or opposed to public policy. Therefore, clauses that unreasonably restrain trade or create interest perpetuity on property transfer shall be included in the articles.
  2. The alteration should be bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole.

In the case of Sidebottom vs Kershaw, Leese & Co Ltd, the criterion of whether the alteration to the articles was “bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole” was applied. In that case, the alteration to the articles gave the majority shareholders the right to expropriate the shares of any shareholder who was in business in direct competition with the company. The court held that such an alteration was within the competence of the company as it was for the benefit of the company as a whole.

  1. The alteration must not constitute a fraud on the minority shareholders by the majority. If the articles are altered in such a manner as to only benefit the majority shareholders and not the company as a whole, such alteration would be bad in law. This principle has been illustrated in the case of All India Railway Men’s Benefit Fund v. Jamadar Basheshwarnath Bali, wherein the court opined that an alteration to the articles must not discriminate between the majority and the minority shareholders’ so as to give the former an advantage over the latter.

Also, in the case of Mathrubhumi Printing & Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Vardhaman Publishers Ltd., the petitions were filed at the instance of certain transferors and transferees of the equity shares of Mathrubhumi Printing and Publishing Company Ltd. (for short, “the company”) in the court seeking rectification of share register mainly on the ground of unnecessary delay in entering in the register the fact of the transferees having become members. They also filed an application seeking an injunction to restrain the company from holding an extraordinary general meeting to amend its articles by inserting a provision that allowed the board of the company to decline registration of transfer of any equity share without assigning any reasons whatsoever. 

The Hon’ble Kerala High Court held that no majority of shareholders can, by altering the article retrospectively, affect, the prejudice of the consenting owners of shares, the right already existing under a contract nor take away the right accrued, e.g., after a transfer of share is lodged, the company cannot have a right of lien so as to defeat the transfer.

  1. The articles should not be altered in such a manner as to compel an existing member to subscribe for more shares or enhance his liability to contribute to the share capital unless he signifies consent in writing.
  2. The company cannot alter its articles so as to escape from its contractual obligation with any person. The company will always be liable in such a case. However, sometimes alteration of articles may constitute a breach of contract with an outsider.

In Chidambaram Chettiar vs. Krishna Aiyangar, the court held that If the contract with a third party was purely on the terms contained in the articles, the company would not be liable for damages and the alteration will be effective. On the other hand, if the contract is an independent one, the third party will have a remedy against the company in terms of damages for breach of contract.

Consequently, in the case of Southern Foundries Ltd v. Shirlaw, the claimant had been employed as a Managing Director Southern Foundries Ltd (“the company”) for a term of ten years. Subsequently, Federated Foundries acquired a controlling interest in the company and altered the articles to empower two to remove directors. The claimant was thereafter dismissed prior to the completion of his term. The company was held liable for breach of contract.

  1. The Articles of Association cannot be altered so as to have retrospective effects. The articles only operate from the date of the amendment.
  2. When an alteration results in the conversion of a public company to a private company or vice-versa, then the company needs to follow the procedure as prescribed in Sections 13, 14 and 18  of the Act along with Rule 33 of the Companies (Incorporation) Rules, 2014.
  3. A company registered under Section 8 of the Act cannot alter its articles except with the previous approval of the Central Government.

Conclusion

The Articles of Association is a document of great importance as it contains rules, regulations and bye-laws which ensure that the affairs of the company are conducted in an appropriate manner, and the objects of the company are carried out effectively. However, it is crucial not to lose sight of the fact that the articles are still subordinate to the memorandum of the company and the provisions of the Act. A company may have a statutory right to alter its articles, but the power to alter is subject to certain limitations as specified above. Nevertheless, once the articles are altered, they bind the members the same way as the original ones.

References 


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Difference between managing director and whole-time director

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Companies-Act

This article has been written by Sharanya Ramakrishnan, pursuing a Diploma in General Corporate Practice: Transactions, Governance and Disputes from LawSikho

Introduction

The executive division of a company is in charge of its day-to-day functioning. As per the Companies Act. 2013 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act, 2013”), the expression “Key Managerial Personnel” is used to define executive management. They are the point of first contact between the company and its stakeholders. While the board of directors of a company are saddled with the responsibility to exercise oversight over the affairs of the company, it is the Key Managerial Personnel who are empowered to lay down strategies and implement them. 

As per Section 2(51) of the Act, 2013, Managing Director and Whole-Time Director are considered as a company’s Key Managerial Personnel. In general terms, a Managing Director is a person who is responsible for administering the daily operations of a company. He is also liable to plan, direct and control the functioning of the company. On the other hand, a Whole-Time Director includes a director who is in the whole-time employment of the company, commits whole of his time and attention to carry on the affairs of the company in question and has a considerable personal interest in the company as his source of income. 

This article endeavours to explain the meaning of the terms “Managing Director” and “Whole-Time Director”, their roles and responsibilities, provisions pertaining to them under the Companies Act, 2013 and based on the same, analyse the salient differences between the two roles. 

Provisions of Companies Act, 2013 Pertaining To Managing Director

Meaning of Managing Director

As per Section 2(54) of the s Act, 2013, “Managing Director” means a director who, by virtue of:

  • the articles of the company; or
  • an agreement with the company; or
  • a resolution passed in its general meeting; or
  • a resolution passed by its board of directors;

is entrusted with substantial powers of management of the affairs of the company and includes a director occupying the position of managing director, by whatever name called.

The Explanation to the definition expressly provides that the power to perform clerical or administrative acts of a routine nature on being authorised by the board of directors shall not be considered to fall within the substantial powers of management.   Such acts include:

  • power to affix the common seal of the company to any document; or
  • power to draw and endorse any cheque on account of the company in any bank; or
  • power to draw and endorse any negotiable instrument; or
  • power to sign any certificate of share or to direct registration of transfer of any share.

In the case of Wasava Tyres v. Printers (Mysore) Ltd, the Managing Director of the respondent company filed a suit on the company’s behalf against the appellant-tenants for possession. The trial court decreed in favour of the company and directed the tenants to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the tenanted premises. The appellants contended that the Managing Director did not have proper authorisation from the board of directors to file the suit so as to make it binding on the company, and thus the suit filed was bad in law.

Rejecting the said contention, the court held that, the institution of the suit on behalf of the company by the managing director is deemed to be within the meaning of “substantial powers of management” as occurring in Section 2(26) of the Companies Act, 1956 [corresponding to Section 2(54) of the Act, 2013] as such power is essential and incidental to manage the day-to-day affairs of the company. Therefore, the institution of suit for the benefit of the company was within the power and authority of the managing director. 

The erstwhile Companies Act, 1956 contained a stipulation in the proviso to Section 2(26) that the managing director shall exercise his powers only under the superintendence, control and directions of the board of directors of the company. Although the Companies Act, 2013 does not contain any such stipulation, it certainly does not augment the position of the managing director as he continues to operate as per the terms of reference set by the Board. 

Prerequisite for Appointment Of Managing Director 

It is important to note that the prerequisite for the appointment of the Managing Director is that he must first be appointed as a director of the company. However, in lieu of the powers vested in him , he cannot be equated with an ordinary director. Moreover, a Managing Director can resign in the capacity of a Managing Director and continue to be the director of the company.

Companies Required to Appoint A Managing Director 

Section 203 of the Act, 2013 read with Rule 8 of the Companies (Appointment and Remuneration of Managerial Personnel) Rules, 2014, mandates the appointment of whole-time Key Managerial Personnel and makes it obligatory for every listed company and every other public company having a paid-up share capital of rupees 10 crores or more, to appoint a Managing Director.

Holding of office of managing director 

As a general rule, Section 203(3) of the Act, 2013 provides that a whole-time Key Managerial Personnel shall not hold office in more than one company except in its subsidiary company at the same time. However, an exception has been made with respect to a Managing Director, wherein a company may employ or appoint a person as to its Managing Director, if:

  1. if he is the Managing Director or Manager of one, and not more than one, other company; and 
  2. such appointment or employment is approved by means of a board resolution passed with the unanimous consent of all directors present at a board meeting, provided that, a specific notice is given to all the directors then situated in India specifying the details of the meeting and the resolution proposed to be moved thereat. 

Filling Up of Vacancy In the Office of a Managing Director 

If the office of a Managing Director is vacated, such vacancy has to be filled within the next 6 months through a board resolution. [Section 203(4) of the Act, 2013]

Appointment of Managing Director 

  1. Restriction – A company shall not appoint a Managing Director and a Manager at the same time.
  1. Period of appointment – A Managing Director can be appointed for a maximum term of 5 years.
  1. Disqualifications for an appointment – No company shall appoint or continue the employment of any person as Managing Director who:
  • is below 21 years of age or has reached 70 years of age;
  • is an undischarged insolvent or has at any time been adjudged as an insolvent;
  • has suspended payment to his creditors or makes or has made a composition with them at any given time;
  • has at any time been convicted of an offence by a court and sentenced for a period exceeding 6 months.

However, a person can be appointed as Managing Director even after he has attained the age of 70 years on the passing of a special resolution wherein the explanatory statement annexed to the notice for such motion shall specify the justification for appointing such a person. In cases where the passing of such resolution fails, but the votes cast in favour of the motion exceed the votes cast against the motion, the board may apply to the Central Government for consideration of such appointment. If on being satisfied that such appointment would be beneficial to the company,  the Central Government may approve the same, and the appointment of such person may be made. (Section 196 of the Act, 2013)

  1. Conditions to be fulfilled for appointment of Managing Director without the approval of Central Government –

The following additional conditions are required to be fulfilled:

Procedure for appointment of managing director

  1. Hold a board meeting after giving due notice to all directors for transacting, inter alia, the following business:-
  1. Decide on the person to be employed as Managing Director based on recommendations of the Nomination and Remuneration Committee, wherever applicable, after ensuring that he is not disqualified as per provisions of Sections 164, 196, 203, Schedule V or any other applicable provisions of the Act, 2013;
  2. Approve the draft agreement to be signed and executed by and between the company and the proposed Managing Director;
  3. Fix time, date and venue for holding a general meeting of the company;
  4. Approve notice of the general meeting along with the explanatory statement; and
  1. Authorise Company Secretary to issue a notice of the general meeting on the Board’s behalf.
  1. Hold a general meeting and obtain approval of shareholders for appointment of Managing Director by means of a resolution.
  1. Suppose the appointment of the Managing Director is not as per the provisions of Schedule V. In that case, the company shall obtain approval of the Central Government by filing an application as per Section 201 of the Act, 2013. The following conditions are required to be complied with in order to obtain Central Government’s approval:
  1. The company shall give general notice to the members of the company detailing the nature of the application to be made. 
  2. The notice has to be published in a newspaper in the principal language of the district and in an English newspaper circulating in the district where the company’s registered office is situated.
  3. The copies of the aforesaid notices along with a certificate by the company signifying due publication thereof shall be attached to the application.
  4. The application shall be filed electronically in E-Form MR-2 along with the prescribed fees within a period of 90 days from the date of such appointment.
  1. Execute the agreement with the Managing Director as approved by the Board.
  1. Make appropriate entries in the register of directors and other records and registers of the company.
  1. File the following documents with the Registrar of Companies:
  1. Return of appointment of Managing Director in E-Form MR- 1 within 60 days from the date of appointment along with the prescribed fees. The mandatory attachments for Form MR- 1 are:
  1. Copy of board resolution
  2. Copy of shareholders resolution
  3. Copy of letter consent to act as managing director 
  4. Copy of approval of Central Government, if applicable
  5. Copy of certificate by Nomination and Remuneration Committee, wherever applicable
  1. Form DIR-12 pertaining to particulars of appointment of Managing Director within 30 days of appointment thereof.
  2. Form MGT-14

It is pertinent to note that, if the appointment of the Managing Director is not approved in the general meeting of the company, any act done by him prior to receipt of such approval shall not be held invalid.

Provisions of Companies Act, 2013 pertaining to managing director

Meaning of whole-time director 

In the Companies Act, 1956, the terms “Whole-Time Director” and “director in whole-time employment” were used in several sections. As a result, a request was made seeking clarifications as to whether or not the two terms can be regarded as synonyms.  This position was clarified by the Department of Company Affairs vide letter no. 2/19/63- PR dated 29.06.1964 which stipulated that the two terms are synonymous and can be used interchangeably. 

Furthermore, there was also confusion as to whether a whole-time employee is a Whole-Time Director. The Company Law Board clarified that a whole-time employee appointed as a director of the company is in the position of a Whole-Time Director. 

As per Section 2(94) of the Act, 2013, “Whole-Time Director” includes a director in the whole-time employment of the company. This definition is inclusive and refers to a director who has been in employment with the company on a full-time basis and is entitled to receive remuneration.

Position of a Whole-Time Director 

A Whole-Time Director occupies a significant position under the Act, 2013.  He is recognised as a Key Managerial Personnel [Section 2(51)] as well as an Officer-in-default [Section 2(60)] for any violation of the provisions of the Act.

Companies are required to appoint a whole-time director 

Section 203 of the Companies Act, 2013 read with Rule 8 of the Companies (Appointment and Remuneration of Managerial Personnel) Rules, 2014 provides that:

  • Every listed company; and 
  • Every other public company having a paid-up share capital of rupees 10 crores or more

shall appoint a Managing Director, or Chief Executive Officer or Manager and in their absence, a Whole-Time Director as a whole-time Key Managerial Personnel.

Holding of office of a Whole-Time Director 

As the services are rendered whole-time, rationally, a director cannot be in whole-time employment in more than one company. Nevertheless, the Companies Act, 2013 by virtue of Section 203(3) allows a Whole-Time Director to be appointed as a Whole-Time Director in a subsidiary company at the same time. 

The Company Law Committee, 2015 while considering the provisions of Section 203 of the Companies Act, 2013 noted in its report that, as per Section 13 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the term “singular” shall include “plural”, unless there is anything repugnant or contrary in the subject or context. Considering the same, the Committee opined that whole-time Key Managerial Personnel may hold office in more than one subsidiary company.  However, as far as the whole-time director is concerned, doing so wouldn’t be practical or feasible given that he has to dedicate his whole time to the conduct of affairs of a particular company. 

Appointment of Whole-Time Director

The conditions for the appointment of a Whole-Time Director are similar to that of the Managing Director as provided hereinbefore as the same is governed by Section 196 read with Schedule V of the Companies Act, 2013.

Resignation by Whole-Time Director 

As per Section 203(4) of the Companies Act, 2013, such vacancy has to be filled within a period of the next 6 months by means of a board resolution.

Difference Between Managing  Director and Whole-Time Director

Taking into consideration the various provisions mentioned above, the position of Managing Director and Whole-Time Director can be distinguished as under:

S.NoBasisManaging directorWhole-time director
1.MeaningThe Managing Director represents the Board in the day-to-day activities of the company.The Whole-Time Director is a director who devotes his whole time to the working of a company.
2.Power A Managing Director possesses substantial powers of management.The powers of a Whole-Time Director are provided in his terms of appointment. He, therefore, does not have discretionary or arbitrary power to take decisions on policy matters.
3.Holding of office A person can be appointed as Managing Director of one other company provided the same is approved by a board resolution with unanimous consent.A person cannot be a Whole-Time Director in more than one company except in a subsidiary company at the same time. 
4.Manager A person can be appointed as Managing Director of one other company provided the same is approved by a board resolution with unanimous consent.A company can appoint both a manager and a Whole-Time Director at the same time.  

Conclusion 

Although the conditions and procedure of appointment of Managing Director and Whole-Time Director are more or less the same, there are certainly significant differences between the two positions. However, as both are considered to be the company’s Key Managerial Personnel their key role is to oversee a company’s operations, performance, investments and provide strategic guidance and direction to the Board to ensure that the objectives of the company are successfully accomplished. 

References 


Students of Lawsikho courses regularly produce writing assignments and work on practical exercises as a part of their coursework and develop themselves in real-life practical skills.

LawSikho has created a telegram group for exchanging legal knowledge, referrals, and various opportunities. You can click on this link and join: https://t.me/joinchat/L9vr7LmS9pJjYTQ9

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Essential clauses in an inter-corporate loan agreement

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Image Source: https://rb.gy/aoefib

This article has been written by Mukul Vats, pursuing the Diploma in Law Firm Practice: Research, Drafting, Briefing and Client Management from LawSikho. The article has been edited by Tanmaya Sharma (Associate, LawSikho), Ruchika Mohapatra (Associate, LawSikho) and Indrasish Majumder (Intern at LawSikho).

This article has been published by Oishika Banerji.

Introduction

Inter-corporate loans are defined as any loan, guarantee, or security given by one company to another company or individual. Inter-corporate loan, as defined by the Companies Act of 2013, plays a critical role in the development of Indian enterprises. There is a constant flow of finances for the group as well as other enterprises in need of capital. Inter-corporate loan means when one firm gives a loan, security, or guarantee to another company or corporation. Inter-corporate investment occurs when one firm invests in another company in any way. After receiving approval from the board of directors or shareholders, a corporation can give loans, investments, guarantees, or security to another company. Section 186 of the Companies Act describes the regulations by which a corporation can give a loan and to whom it can provide, as well as the legislation governing company loans and investments. Given India’s ongoing industrialization, the corporation may require additional capital. As a result, they may require the assistance of an inter-corporate loan. Section 186 of the Companies Act, 2013 has made a few changes to the Inter Corporate Loans and Investments made by a company to simplify the company’s operation and processes. This statute establishes the rules under which a firm may or may not grant a loan, provide a guarantee, or make an investment.

Objectives behind inter-corporate loans 

The inter-corporate loan serves a variety of purposes. Loans provided from one business unit of a firm to another are known as inter-corporate loans. This is frequently done for the following reasons and goals:

  • To transfer cash to a company unit and to avoid a cash shortage.
  • To move money into a business unit (typically corporate) where it will be pooled for investment.

For the following reasons, an inter-corporate loan is particularly beneficial:

  • There is no need to go through the elaborate and tedious process like a bank loan which requires a lot of documentation and approvals.
  • Cash is available to any corporation on very short notice.
  • The payback terms are substantially more favourable.

Inter-corporate loan limit

Inter-corporate loans are subject to significant restrictions under the Companies Act of 2013. The maximum amount of an inter-corporate loan is capped at the following for all the companies-

  • A company can lend, guarantee, or secure a loan, guarantee, or security above 60% of its paid-up share capital to any person or corporation.
  • If the total amount of inter-corporate loans does not exceed the prescribed limit, the loan and investment will be processed by board resolution.
  • The board resolution will be approved by all of the directors present at the meeting.
  • If the total amount of inter-corporate loans exceeds the set limit, a special resolution must be passed beforehand.

Restrictions on inter-corporate loans

The limits listed below must be considered while establishing arrangements for an inter-corporate loan.

  • If a corporation defaults on interest payments, it is forbidden from making any inter-corporate loans under the Companies Act of 2013, and this prohibition will remain in effect until the problem is fully addressed.
  • No inter-corporate loans shall be made at a rate lower than the current bank lending rate.

According to Section 186(4) of the Companies Act, 2013, if a company makes inter-corporate loans, it must disclose the following information to its members in its financial statement:

  • Amount of loan provided.
  • The investment made/guarantee given.
  • Purpose of providing the loan.
  • Source of funding for meeting the proposal.
  • The particulars of the body corporate interested in making such loans.

Board of directors and public financial institution approval

  • Before making any inter-corporate loans, every company must obtain the consent of all directors under Section 186 (5) of the Companies Act, 2013.
  • If a company has already taken a loan from a public financial institution, it is mandatory to obtain prior approval from that public financial institution.

Procedure for granting inter-corporate loans 

The procedure to be followed when offering inter-corporate loans is as follows:

  • The firm can lend or guarantee up to 60% of its paid-up capital and 100% of its free reserves and security premium, whichever is more, through board decision.
  • A meeting of the Board of Directors must be held with notice, and no investment may be made unless the board resolution is passed.
  • If a loan from a public financial institution is already in place, prior approval from that financial institution is required.
  • However, if the total loan amount does not exceed the restrictions set out in Section 186(2) of the Companies Act, 2013, no prior authorization from that financial institution is required.
  • The Company Board can approve one of the directors or any other person to apply for financial institution permission after deciding on the source of funds and the amount required.
  • The holding of a general meeting of shareholders is essential.
  • Within 30 days of passing the resolution, the copy must be filed in form No. MGT-14 (Filing of resolution and agreements to the Register) with the fees stipulated in the Companies Rules, 2014.
  • The corporation must attach essential documentation by the resolution form’s requirements.
  • Every company that makes a loan or provides a guarantee must keep a record in Form MBP-2 (Register of loans, guarantees, security, and acquisition). Entries in the register must be made for each loan transaction.
  • The company must ensure that no loan is given at a rate of interest lower than the current rate of Government security, and it must publish the loan’s full details in the financial statement.

Essential clauses of an inter corporate loan agreement

The loan

It includes the loan amount. The loan is made on the terms and conditions outlined in the deal. The loan clause also specifies how the borrower shall use the proceeds of the loan. For example- It can be for general working capital purposes or business expansion.

Representations and warranties of borrower

There are many declarations and statements made by the borrower in a loan agreement. These representations and statements are relied on by the lender, to decide whether or not to enter into the loan agreement and to decide whether or not to advance money to the borrower. These declarations and statements are generally referred to as “representations and warranties”

Pending cases

Borrower must specify that there is no litigation pending against the company. As of the date hereof, the borrower is not aware of any action, suit, or procedure pending in any court, or before any arbitrator of any sort, or before or by any governmental body.

Taxes

It states that the borrower has filed all required tax returns and paid and discharged all taxes, assessments, and governmental charges presently due and payable on it or against its properties, failure to file or pay which, as applicable, would have a material detrimental effect on the borrower.

Covenants of borrower

Preserving a corporation’s existence, according to laws, and so on

The borrower must preserve and maintain its corporate existence, rights (charter and statutory), and material franchises, and must follow all applicable laws, rules, regulations, and orders in all material respects (including all environmental laws and laws requiring payment of all taxes, assessments, and governmental charges imposed on it or its property).

Visitation rights

The borrower shall permit the Lender to visit the borrower and discuss the borrower’s affairs, finances, accounts, and reserve performance with officers of the borrower and independent certified public accountants of the borrower and any of its subsidiaries at such reasonable times and intervals as the lender may desire, provided that an event of default, or an event which with the giving of notice or the passage of time, or both, occurs, the borrower shall allow the lender to visit the borrower.

Books and records 

The borrower shall keep proper books of record and account, and shall cause each of its subsidiaries to keep proper books of record and account, in which full and correct entries shall be made of all financial transactions, as well as the borrower’s and each subsidiary’s assets and business, by generally accepted accounting principles.

Events of default

This clause clarifies the events of default. The following events are deemed to be “Events of Default:” 

Sample clause

(a) If the Borrower fails to pay any principal or any interest or any other amount payable hereunder within two business days after it is due, or any interest or any other amount payable hereunder within five business days after it is due; or 

(b) If any representation or warranty made or deemed made by the Borrower herein or by the Borrower (or any of its officers) in connection with this Agreement proves to be incorrect in any material respect when made or deemed

(c) The Borrower fails to perform or observe any other term, covenant, or agreement contained in this Agreement that the Borrower is required to perform or observe, and any such failure remains unremedied for 30 days after the Lender has provided the Borrower written notice of such failure; or

(d) The Effect of a Default Event: The Lender may, upon notice to the Borrower, declare all interest thereon, and all other amounts payable under this Agreement to be immediately due and payable, whereupon all such interest, and all such amounts shall become and be immediately due and payable, without presentment, demand, protest, or further notice of any kind, all of which are hereby expressly waived by the Borrower.

Miscellaneous

Notices 

It provides clarity regarding notices and other means of communication. All notices and other communications required hereunder shall be in writing and mailed by certified mail, return receipt requested and postage prepaid, or telecopied, telefax, or otherwise, tele transmitted or delivered, if to the Borrower, at the agreed-upon location to each party, at such other address as such party shall designate in a written notice to the other parties.

Indemnification 

The borrower agrees to indemnify and hold the lender harmless from and against any claims, damages, liabilities, and expenses (including legal fees and disbursements) incurred by or asserted against the lender in connection with or arising out of any investigation, litigation, or proceeding (whether or not the lender is a party thereto) related to any use or proposed use of the debt proceeds by the borrower (excluding any claims, damages, liabilities, or expenses).

Conclusion

Money is one of the most critical resources required to run any business. Share capital, loans, and other forms of financing are available to businesses. For most businesses, loans are the primary source of capital. Nowadays, an inter-corporate loan is one of the most effective ways for businesses to raise funds. The inter-corporate loan satisfies all of a company’s capital needs and requirements. A company must only provide an inter-corporate loan to another company or body corporate with the authorization and approval of the board of directors and shareholders.

References


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Miheer H. Mafatlal v. Mafatlal Industries Ltd : case study

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This article is authored by Akash Krishnan, a student from ICFAI Law School, Hyderabad. It discusses in detail the changes in the procedure for sanctioning the schemes of mergers under the Companies Act 1956 and the Companies Act 2013 in light of a landmark judgment by the Supreme Court in this regard.

Introduction

India has been a commercial hub since time immemorial. However, the first Act that governed the functioning of a company in post-independent India was the Companies Act, 1956. This Act governed the Indian company law regime for over 50 years and was repealed in 2013 with the enactment of the Companies Act, 2013.

This article specifically focuses on the provisions of merger and amalgamation under the old and new company law regimes by critically analysing the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Miheer H. Mafatlal vs. Mafatlal Industries Ltd (1996). Before moving on to the case, let us first try and understand the procedure for sanctioning a scheme of merger under the old company law regime.  

Procedural aspects of sanctioning the scheme of arrangement in the old regime

Companies Act, 1956

Sections 391, 392, 393 and 394 of the Companies Act 1956 deal with the procedure for sanctioning the scheme of merger and amalgamation. Let us understand this procedure in detail.

Memorandum of Association (MOA) and Board meetings

Both the companies who wish to merge or amalgamate with each other, i.e., the transferor and transferee companies should be empowered by the objects clause in their MOA to undertake such merger or amalgamation. However, this is not an absolute rule and even if the MOA does not inherently empower the merging entities, the companies are free to merge.

Once the merging entities have decided on the plan/scheme of merger, this scheme has to be approved in a joint meeting of the board members of both companies.

Valuation of shares and fairness of exchange ratio

The valuation of shares of both the merging entities has to be carried out by qualified chartered accountants. Once the valuation of shares is done, these chartered accountants will be responsible for determining the exchange ratio of these shares. This exchange ratio has to be accepted by 3/4th majority shareholders of both the merging entities. The exchange ratio is calculated through a combination of the yield method, asset value method and market value method.

The Court is not empowered to change or to issue directions to substitute the exchange ratio if the shareholders have accepted it. This is called the principle of non-interference and the same was laid down by the English Court in the landmark case of Foss vs. Harbottle (1843). The same was recognised and adopted by the Supreme Court in the case of Rajahmundry Electric Supply Co. vs. Nageshwar Rao (1956). However, the exchange ratio or valuation can be set aside by the Court on the ground of fraud.  

Filing of Petition with High Court and order of the High Court

Once the scheme of amalgamation has been approved by the board and the process of valuation of shares and preparation of exchange ratios has been completed, the next step is to file a petition in the High Court for the approval of the scheme of amalgamation. If both the companies are situated in the jurisdictions of different High Courts, then a separate petition has to be filed in each High Court. However, if both the companies are situated within the jurisdiction of the same High Court, a joint petition for the approval of the scheme can be filed.

The High Court after hearing the petition will pass the order convening a meeting of the shareholders and creditors of both the companies for the joint approval of the scheme.

Approval of the scheme

The shareholders and creditors of the company will meet on the predetermined date and vote on the scheme of the merger. The voting is conducted by a poll and a 3/4th majority is required for the adoption of the scheme of merger. Once the scheme has been adopted, it is binding on the dissenting minority as well.

Now that we have understood the procedure in detail, let us now look into the case at hand. 

Miheer H. Mafatlal vs. Mafatlal Industries Ltd

Brief Facts

  1. The transferee company, Mafatlal Industries Limited (MIL), was incorporated in 1913. The objects clause present in the MOA of MIL indicated that the company was incorporated for carrying out all kinds of businesses involving cotton spinning, wool, silk, jute etc. The authorised share capital of the respondent company was Rs. 100,00,00,000 divided into 30,05,500 equity shares of Rs. 100 each and 69,94,500 unclassified shares of Rs. 100 each.
  2. The transferor company, Mafatlal Fine Spinning and Manufacturing Company Limited (MFSL) was incorporated in 1931 and the objects clause of this company indicated that the company was incorporated for carrying out the business of manufacture and sale of textile piece goods and chemicals. The authorised share capital of the transferor-company was Rs. 30 crores divided into 30,00,000 ordinary shares of Rs. 100 each.
  3. Due to the limited financial resources that were available to both the companies, they had to let go of several business opportunities. In light of the same, the directors of MFSL proposed a merger with MIL and the same was accepted by the directors of MIL. A proposal for the merger was drafted and resolutions were passed for the formation of a detailed scheme of merger and the scheme of the merger was successfully formed thereafter.
  4. Since both the companies were not part of a common jurisdiction of a High Court, separate applications were filed by both companies for the approval of the scheme of merger. MFSL filed an application in the Bombay High Court and the Bombay High Court after considering the application, sanctioned the scheme. When the scheme was sanctioned by the Bombay High Court, the Court had directed MFSL to conduct a meeting of the equity shareholders for the approval of the scheme. When the meeting was conducted, the scheme was approved by an overwhelming majority. Over 5000 members voted in favour of the merger whereas only 143 members voted against it. The appellant participated in this meeting through a proxy.
  5. MFSL filed an application in the Gujarat High Court. However, before the scheme could be sanctioned by the Court, the appellant, a director of MFSL and a shareholder of MIL, filed an objection to the scheme of merger.  
  6. The Single Judge at the Bombay High Court after listening to the objection filed by the appellant ruled in favour of the merger. On an appeal to a Division Bench, the Court upheld the order of the Single Judge. In light of the same, the appellant had knocked on the doors of the Supreme Court through this appeal.

Findings of the Supreme Court

Non-disclosure of material interests

The contention of the appellant

  1. The first contention raised by the appellant was that the statutory procedure for the approval of the scheme in the meeting of shareholders as prescribed under Section 391(1)(a) of the Companies Act, 1956 was not followed.
  2. To support this contention, he relied on the explanatory statement that was placed for consideration in the meeting of equity shareholders. He contended that the explanatory statement failed to disclose the material interests of the director of MIL and the effects of the merger on the material interest.
  3. The material interest as contended by the appellant was a private dispute between the appellant and the director of MIL that was under consideration in the Bombay High Court. In that case, the appellant was claiming the shares of the director of MIL by relying on a family settlement agreement and the director was claiming otherwise.
  4. In light of these contentions, he claimed that the equity shareholders could not make an informed decision due to the non-disclosure of material interests.

Observations of the Court

  1. The Court interpreted Section 393(1) and held that there were 3 essential requirements for the establishment of a material interest of the director and the effects of the merger on the material interest. These essentials have been enumerated below:
  • The director’s interest must be different from the interests of the other voting members in the meeting.
  • The merger should have an effect on the material interest.
  • The effect of the merger on the interests of the director should be different from the effect of the merger on the interests of the voting members.  
  1. In light of the same, the Court held that a private family dispute between the appellant and the director of MIL had no substantial connection with the merger nor had an effect on the interest of the director w.r.t the merger. Thus, it was not mandatory to disclose the details of the dispute in the explanatory statement.
  2. Further, from the total number of equity shareholders who voted in the meeting, over 95% voted in the favour of the scheme. Out of this 95%, only 8% votes came from the individuals who were part of a trust formed by the director of MIL. The rest of the votes had come from financial institutions and other private entities. Thus, irrespective of the disclosures, the intent of the equity shareholders to approve the scheme was clear and since the disclosure was not mandatory, it cannot be deemed that the equity shareholders did not make an informed choice.   

Absence of requisite majority

The contention of the appellant

The appellant contended that the scheme was not approved by a requisite majority as prescribed under Section 391(2) of the Companies Act, 1956. To support this contention, he relied on the fact that the majority shareholders had acted as a class and not as individual members while casting the vote.

Observations of the Court

  1. The Court relying on the English case of Hellenic and General Trust Limited (1976) concluded that while sanctioning a scheme of merger, the Court has to look into the bonafide actions of the majority acting as a class and not as individual members. Just because the appellant was part of a different class of shareholdings, it cannot be deemed that the majority had acted unfairly against him.
  2. The Court further noted that before the applications for sanctioning of the scheme were filed in the respective Courts, the directors of both the companies had agreed to the scheme of merger. The appellant was the director of MFSL and had given his approval to the scheme at that time. Also, he did not object to the scheme when the sanction was sought from the Bombay High Court by MFSL.
  3. In light of the same, the Court concluded that the actions of the appellant indicated that he was in approval of the merger and because the requisite majority had voted in favour of the scheme, this contention was invalid.

Suppression of minority interest

The contention of the appellant

The appellant contended that the class of equity shareholders had acted in concert and the actual intent behind the majority decision was to suppress the minority shareholders. He, therefore, claimed that the voting was unfair and the minority/dissenting shareholders will not be bound by it.

Observations of the Court

  1. The Court noted that the object of the merger was to increase the financial resources of the merged entity so that they could take up new projects and expand the scope of their services and thus the merged entity would bring more profits to all the shareholders. In light of the same, the Court held that the voting was neither unfair nor prejudicial to the interests of the minority shareholders.  
  2. To support this conclusion, the Court stated that in order to prove suppression of a minority, it has to be proved that the majority has acted in a manner that is prejudicial to the interests of the minority. But in this case, the interests of the majority and the minority were aligned because the resultant entity was going to generate more profits than the individual companies and thus, there was no question of differing interests or suppression of the interests of the minority.

Sub-class of creditors

The contention of the appellant

  1. The appellant contended that he belonged to a different class of equity shareholders, i.e., by virtue of the family arrangement that was in dispute, he belonged to a special minority class of equity shareholders and thus, he had special rights of voting.
  2. He further contended that the meeting that was convened was of equity shareholders only and a separate meeting for his class of special minority shareholders was not convened. Thus, the voting regarding the approval of the scheme was still incomplete.

Observations of the Court

  1. The Court rejected both these contentions on the ground that the articles of association of the transferee company only recognises two classes of shareholders, i.e., equity shareholders and preference shareholders. It did not recognise any separate/special class of shareholders. Thus, the appellant would come under the same class of shareholders, i.e., equity shareholders.
  2. According to Section 393(1), if a scheme of a merger has been proposed between a company and any class of its members, a meeting of such a class of members has to be convened. In this case, the class of members involved is the equity shareholders and thus the meeting convened was in accordance with the provisions of law. There was no provision in the law that recognised the right to hold a special meeting for a sub-class.

Exchange ratio

The contention of the appellant

  1. The appellant contended that the exchange ratio should be prepared by the chartered accountants before an application for sanction is filed to the High Court. However, in this case, even though the exchange ratio was determined before, it was unfavourable to the shareholders of the transferee company because for every two shares of the transferee company, five shares of the transferor company were being issued.
  2. The appellant contended that applying this exchange ratio will cause significant loss to the shareholders of the transferee company and at least 6 shares of the transferor company should be exchanged for every 2 shares of the transferee company.

Observations of the Court

  1. The Court noted that the valuation of shares is based on 4 factors, i.e., capital cover, yield, earning capacity of the company and marketability. The chartered accountancy firm involved had used several reliable methods to determine the value of the shares like earnings per share method, break value method, market value method etc. The Court further noted that the appellant had approved this exchange ratio at the initial states itself.
  2. The Court on the basis of the aforesaid details held that it is not the duty of a Court of appeal to question or analyse the credibility of such expert opinions. Moreover, the appellant had failed to provide an alternative opinion in this regard. Therefore, the Court held that it will not interfere within these internal affairs of the company and because the offer was accepted by the statutorily recognised majority, the shareholders will be bound by the same.  

Now that we have understood the principles laid down in this case, let us look into how the law regarding the sanctioning of the scheme of a merger has changed under the new regime. 

Procedural aspects of sanctioning the scheme of arrangement in the new regime

Companies Act, 2013

Sections 230, 231 and 232 of the Companies Act 2013 deal with the procedure for sanctioning the scheme of merger and amalgamation. Let us understand this procedure in detail.

Meeting of the creditors and members

  1. When two companies come together and propose a scheme of merger, an application to convene a meeting regarding the same has to be filed with the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT). The NCLT after going through the application may pass an order for convening a meeting to vote on the scheme of merger.
  2. In the meeting, at least 3/4th majority of the creditors/members should vote in the favour of the scheme for its adoption.

Sanctioning of the scheme by NCLT

  1. Once the creditors/members vote in favour of the adoption of the scheme, the scheme has to be submitted to the NCLT for its sanction. The NCLT after considering the scheme and the votes may pass an order sanctioning the scheme.
  2. While sanctioning the scheme, the NCLT can also pass orders w.r.t transferring of liabilities, allotment of shares, provisions for dissenting shareholders etc.
  3. The NCLT also has the power to pass directions w.r.t supervision of the implementation process or pass orders w.r.t any modifications that have to be made in the scheme for its better implementation.

Conclusion

This case brings to light several important aspects of the sanctioning of the scheme of merger. This includes the inapplicability of sub-classes, material disclosures, suppression of minorities etc. In the modern regime, even though the procedures for the formation and sanctioning of the schemes have changed, the core principles remain the same and thus the principles laid down, in this case, are even applicable in this modern regime.  

References

  1. https://taxguru.in/company-law/mergers-amalgamations-companies-act-1956.html 
  2. https://taxguru.in/company-law/merger-amalgamation-companies-act-2013.html 
  3. https://blog.ipleaders.in/procedure-for-compromises-arrangements-and-amalgamation-under-the-companies-act/ 
  4. https://d1.manupatra.in/ShowPDF.asp?flname=Miheer_H_Mafatlal_vs_Mafatlal_Industries_Ltd_110910421s970844COM556440.pdf 
  5. In Re Hellenic & General Trust Ltd [1976] 1 WLR 123 

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