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Section 124 of Trade Marks Act, 1999

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This article is written by Shreya Jad. This article exhaustively covers Section 124 of the Trade marks Act, 1999, which allows a stay on the ongoing proceedings in a suit for infringement of a trade mark in case the validity of a registered trade mark is brought into question. The article also covers the nuances of the defence taken by either party and the correlation of Section 124 with other relevant provisions of the Trade marks Act, 1999, which deal with the invalid registration of a trade mark. For better understanding, relevant case laws have also been discussed.

Introduction

The primary objective of a trade mark is to act as an identifier of a brand/business. This may be done using words, designs, symbols, phrases, packaging, etc., or a combination of all of them. 

Section 2(1)(zb) of the Trade marks Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as the Trade marks Act) defines a trade mark as a graphically represented mark, which is used to identify the goods or services provided by a specific person, and/or is capable of distinguishing the goods and services provided by one person from others. Such a mark is graphically represented using different colours, shapes, symbols, packaging, or a combination thereof. 

The essential conditions for identifying and using a trade mark are as follows:

  • The mark can be reproduced on paper, that is, it can be represented graphically.
  • The mark is distinguishable.
  • The mark creates a connection between the goods/services it is representing and the audience viewing the mark.

The sub-classification of trade marks has also widened the scope of protection offered to different products. Service marks, for instance, represent the services being offered by a company and cannot be used or replicated by any other existing company (ex: FedEx). In addition to this, word marks protect the textual representation of the trade mark, offering a wide range of protection (ex: iPhone). Device marks protect the visual and artistic  representation of a trade mark, using colours, fonts, and drawings, and also include the packaging of a product (ex: the packaging of Orion’s Choco Pie). 

A trade mark is generally protected from infringement by others through its continuous use and registration. Most trade mark laws across different jurisdictions combine both forms of protection, but complete legal protection of a trade mark is only guaranteed by way of its registration. In India, the process of registration of a trade mark follows the timeline and process laid down in Section 18 (application for registration), Section 19 (withdrawal of application), Section 20 (advertisement of application), Section 21 (opposition to registration), Section 22 (correction and amendment), and Section 23 (registration) of the Trade marks Act. Once a trade mark has been registered in the Trade marks Register, the registration remains valid for a period of ten years from the date of registration, after which the proprietor shall have to renew the registration of the trade mark.  

Infringement of a trade mark

Trade marks are susceptible to being exploited, copied, and used without authorisation, by various persons. Those who attempt to do so generally bank upon the goodwill and reputation of an established trade mark to mislead consumers into believing their products/services are being sponsored by the companies represented by those trade marks. 

The infringement of trade marks is covered by Section 29 of the Trade marks Act, which specifies that a registered trade mark is infringed when:

  1. An unauthorised person adopts a trade mark identical or deceptively similar to an already registered trade mark for the use of the same goods and services as the original trade mark. For instance, if a local shoe brand uses the swoosh sign of the brand Nike in its products to mislead people into believing it was selling Nike’s shoes.
  2. An authorised person adopts a mark identical or deceptively similar to a registered trade mark and uses it for promoting goods/services different from those related to an already registered trade mark to leverage that brand’s reputation to enhance its own image. For instance, if a local deodorant brand begins using the trade mark “Starbucks” to market its products.
  3. Unauthorised use of a registered trade mark as a trade name.

The remedies for infringement of a trade mark under the Trade marks Act are available only for a registered trade mark. For unregistered trade marks, the tortious remedy against passing off is applicable. The Trade marks Act provides for both civil and criminal remedies in case of infringement of a trade mark, depending upon the gravity of the offence. 

The criminal remedies for an act of fraudulent use of a trade mark are provided under Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade marks Act, which make the offence of falsifying a trade mark or possessing an instrument for the purpose of falsifying a trade mark, or selling or hiring any such good to which a false trade mark has been applied, punishable with imprisonment for a term of at least six months, which is extendable to three years, along with a minimum fine of fifty thousand rupees, which can extend to two lakh rupees. 

The civil remedies for infringement of a registered trade mark are provided in Section 134 of the Trade marks Act, which states that a claim against infringement of a trade mark shall be filed before the District Court, which holds the appropriate jurisdiction to hear the case, and Section 135 of the Trade marks Act, which specifies the civil remedies available to a claimant in a suit for infringement of trade marks, namely, injunction, damages, account of profits, seizure/destruction of infringing material.

Stay of proceedings

While Section 134 of the Trade marks Act provides the remedy of filing a suit of infringement against any unauthorised use of a trade mark, Section 124 of the Trade marks Act provides for the stay of such proceedings when the validity of the trade mark’s registration is questioned. It allows either party in the suit to raise a defence against the claim of infringement, citing invalid registration of a trade mark. The defendant may raise this defence in response to the plaintiff’s claim in a suit for infringement of trade mark, and the plaintiff may raise this in an infringement suit where the defendant relies on Section 30(2)(e) (limits on effects of registered trade mark) of the Trade marks Act to justify the use of the infringed trade mark. If the validity of the registration of either party’s trade mark is challenged, the court is required to satisfy itself of the prima facie existence of such a dispute and frame an issue in that regard, while staying the infringement suit to decide the validity of the registration of such trade mark. 

Clause-wise explanation of Section 124 of Trade Marks Act, 1999

Section 124(1) of Trade Marks Act, 1999

Clause 1 of Section 124 identifies the cases wherein the defence under Section 124 of the Trade marks Act can be relied upon by either party in a suit filed before the District Court for infringement of a trade mark:

  • In a suit for infringement of trade mark where the defendant pleads that the registration of the plaintiff’s trade mark is invalid
  • When the defendant relies on Section 30(2)(e) of the Trade marks Act in a suit for infringement, which provides an exception to the defendant if he is also the proprietor of a registered trade mark similar to an existing trade mark. In such a suit, the plaintiff may contend that the identical trade mark registered by the defendant is invalid. 

Sub-clause(i) of clause 1 of Section 124 discusses a scenario where the rectification proceedings against an invalidly registered trade mark have already been initiated and are pending adjudication before the Registrar of Trade marks or the High Court (previously the Intellectual Property Appellate Board or IPAB), as may be applicable. In case no such proceedings have been initiated and the court is satisfied of the tenability of the claim of invalidity of registration of the trade mark, it shall frame an issue in that regard and adjourn the case for three months from the date of framing the issue to allow the party to apply for rectification of the trade marks register, as per sub-clause (ii) of clause 1 of Section 124.  

Section 124(2) of Trade Marks Act, 1999

Clause 2 of Section 124 specifies that if the party has made such an application for rectification of the Register of trade marks, within the time provided by the court, the trial shall be stayed until the rectification proceedings have been disposed of.

Section 124(3) of Trade Marks Act, 1999

Clause 3 of Section 124 states that if no such application for rectification is made even during the time allotted by the court, the claim pertaining to the validity of the trade mark shall be deemed abandoned, and the court shall proceed with the suit and adjudicate upon other issues in the matter.

Section 124(4) of Trade Marks Act, 1999

As per clause 4 of Section 124 of the Trade marks Act, the final order made in the rectification proceedings by the Registrar or the High Court, shall be binding, and the court hearing the suit of infringement, shall also dispose of the suit in accordance with the final order passed in the rectification proceedings, to the extent of the issue of invalidity of a registered trade mark.

Section 124(5) of Trade Marks Act, 1999

However, as per clause 5 of Section 124 of the Trade marks Act, the stay ordered by the court in an infringement suit, as per the aforesaid clauses of Section 124, shall not prevent the court from making an interim order during the period the suit has been stayed to decide upon the validity of the registration of a trade mark. 

Interplay between Sections 47, 57, and 124 of Trade Marks Act, 1999

Section 47 and Section 57 of the Trade marks Act also provide remedies for removal or rectification of a trade mark if the proprietor of the trade mark fails to establish bona fide, regular usage of the registered trade mark or if the trade mark has been registered erroneously. The correlation between the challenge to the validity of a registered trade mark  under Section 47, Section 57, and Section 124 of the Trade marks Act has been the subject matter of much discussion and debate. 

Section 47 of Trade Marks Act, 1999

Section 47 of the Trade marks Act mandates that a trade mark that was registered without any bona fide intention and has not been used by the trade mark proprietor for three months prior to the date of filing of the trade mark registration application will be removed from the Register of Trade marks. Another ground for such removal would be when the proprietor of the trade mark cannot sufficiently prove bona fide use of the trade mark for a continuous period of five years from the date of trade mark registration. However, in certain cases of non-usage, the Tribunal may refuse to remove the trade mark:

  • If under Section 12 (registration in the case of honest, concurrent use, etc.) of the Act, the person has received permission to register a similar trade mark for those very goods and services, or if the Tribunal believes that he can do so.
  • If it can be established that the trade mark was put to use (either for goods and services of the same category of the trade mark or of a category related to the trade mark) by the owner of the trade mark during the concerned period.

As per Section 47(2), if a registered trade mark is not being used in the concerned markets or places, and if another person under Section 12 has received permission to register a similar trade mark for those very goods and services and wishes to use it in those concerned markets or places, they may apply to the Registrar or the High Court (previously, the IPAB), and they can limit the original trade mark’s scope to make way for the new one. 

Additionally, as per Section 47(3), if a registered trade mark is not being used due to special circumstances, such as an embargo for use put forth by an existing law, it shall not be removed from the Register for reason of non-usage of the trade mark.

Section 57 of Trade Marks Act, 1999

Section 57 of the Trade marks Act provides for cancellation/variation of a trade mark that has been erroneously registered or does not fulfil the requirements of a registered trade mark; they can apply to the Registrar or High Court (earlier the IPAB), and the Tribunal can then make an order for rectification/cancellation of the trade mark, as they deem fit. The Tribunal can also decide to do so on, on its own accord, but in such a case, it must ensure to notify the parties regarding the same and provide them with an opportunity to present their case.

An application for rectification or cancellation of a trade mark may be filed on the following grounds:

  1. Registration of a trade mark has been made due to fraud or misrepresentation of facts.
  2. A registered trade mark is similar to an already registered trade mark.
  3. There is an error or defect in the entry made in the register.
  4. An entry of a trade mark made contrary to the provisions of the Trade mark Act.
  5. Non-payment of the renewal fee for registered trade mark

Patel Field Marshal Agencies vs. P M Diesels Ltd. (2017)

The Supreme Court, in its decision in the matter of Patel Field Marshal Agencies vs. P M Diesels Ltd (2017), decided on the interplay between Section 47, Section 57, and Section 124 of the Trade marks Act with respect to the independent proceedings for rectification of a registered trade mark in the Trade marks Register and the question of validity of a registered trade mark arising in a suit of infringement of trade mark. 

The issue framed and discussed in the matter was whether the statutory authority (earlier, the IPAB) established under the Trade marks Act, that is, the Registrar of Trade marks, or the High Court, would be able to provide a remedy for rectification of a trade mark in the event that the issue of validity of the trade mark’s registration has already been raised in an infringement suit before the District Court. 

The conflict between Section 47, Section 57, and Section 124 is the result of the fact that in a proceeding under Section 124 of the Trade marks Act, the District Court is the sole authority that can ascertain the validity of the registered trade mark. If the District Court decides that the trade mark is invalidly registered, relevant proceedings shall be initiated before the statutory authority mentioned in the Trade marks Act (IPAB/High Court, Registrar of Trade marks).

On the other hand, if the claim of invalidity is not pursued within the three-month limitation period provided in Section 124, it shall be deemed abandoned. The Supreme Court was contemplating the issue of whether the effect of a proceeding for removal or rectification of a trade mark under Sections 47 and 57 shall be in conjunction with the proceedings under Section 124 or whether these two proceedings could continue independently of each other, even if they arise from the same cause of action.

It was seen that the High Courts of Delhi and Madras had also taken this question into account in a variety of decisions. In the case of Astrazeneca UK Ltd. vs. Orchid Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (2006), the High Court of Delhi decided that if the District Court determines that the trade mark is validly registered, then the only recourse available to the party relying on this defence, is an appeal against the District Court’s decision. The High Court also held that the aggrieved party shall be prohibited from challenging the validity of the registration of the trade mark for a second time by taking recourse through Section 47 and Section 57 of the Trade marks Act. Therefore, the proceedings under Sections 47 and 57 were deemed contingent upon the outcome of the court’s decision in a prima facie case of invalidity of a trade mark under Section 124. 

Contrary to this approach, the Madras High Court determined in B. Mohamed Yousuff vs. Prabha Singh (2008) that an adverse order by the court, under Section 124, would not preclude the aggrieved party from pursuing the remedies of rectification and removal of trade mark from the Register of Trade marks, under Sections 47 and 57 of the Trade marks Act. 

Its earlier decision in the Astrazeneca case was overruled by the High Court of Delhi in Data Infosys Ltd. vs. Infosys Technologies Ltd. (2016). If rectification proceedings have been filed before the appropriate authorities and the plea of invalidity of trade mark is pending prior to the filing of an infringement suit, the court shall have to adjourn the infringement suit until the final disposal of the order by those authorities. Therefore, these two claims of rectification and trade mark and infringement of trade mark cannot proceed independently.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Patel Field Marshal Agencies vs. P.M. Diesels (2017) contradicted the High Court of Delhi’s decision in Data Infosys Ltd. vs. Infosys Technologies Ltd. (2016). The Supreme Court held that, where the remedy of rectification/removal of a trade mark has been sought by the aggrieved party, the IPAB shall have the sole authority to determine the validity of a trade mark’s registration, and such a decision will be binding on the District Court. 

However, in a case wherein a suit is pending before the District Court for infringement of trade mark, the finding of the IPAB shall be contingent upon the District Court’s decision regarding the validity of the trade mark registration in the infringement suit. The parties shall abandon their plea for rectification if any of them fail to submit an application to the appropriate authority for rectification of the trade mark, following the District Court’s order that the registration of the trade mark is prima facie invalid. 

In the event that the plea for rectification is abandoned by the aggrieved party, the parties would not have the option of pursuing the remedy under Sections 47 and 57 of the Trade marks Act.

Anubhav Jain vs. Satish Kumar Jain and another (2023)

The High Court of Delhi, in its decision in Anubhav Jain vs. Satish Kumar Jain and another (2023), held that the Supreme Court’s decision in Patel Field Marshal Agencies vs. P.M. Diesels (2017) does not take away the aggrieved party’s right to seek rectification of the Trade mark Register under Section 57 of the Trade marks Act. The High Court further observed that since the Supreme Court in the Patel Field Marshal Agencies case did not directly deal with the right under Section 57 of the Trade marks Act. The judgement is not necessarily an authority on Section 57. This Section shall not be deemed to be subject to Section 124 of the Trade marks Act. In view of the same, the aggrieved party shall not require the District Court’s permission before instituting proceedings before the High Court, under Section 57. 

Relevance of Section 124 of Trade Marks Act, 1999

The primary objective of Section 124 of the Trade marks Act is to provide a defence to either party against the claim of infringement of a registered trade mark. Since the abolition of IPAB and the transfer of its jurisdiction and powers to the High Court, several attempts have been made to combine the two proceedings in order to expedite the final decision in a matter wherein the validity of the registration of a trade mark has been challenged. The rationale behind this, as held by various courts, is that since the rectification/ cancellation proceedings of a trade mark shall also be heard before the High Court itself, it would make better sense to club the proceedings in one matter and dispose of both issues in one go. This approach has also been taken in cases where the defendant has relied upon Section 30(2)(e) of the Trade marks Act to justify the use of its own trade mark and impugn the validity of the plaintiff’s trade mark. However, this approach has not always been unconditionally agreed upon by the courts. The same shall be clarified by way of the case laws discussed subsequently.  

Relevant case laws

Sana Herbals Private Limited vs. Mohsin Dehlvi (2022)

In Sana Herbals Private Limited vs. Mohsin Delhvi (2022), a suit for infringement of trade mark was filed by the proprietor of the trade mark “Dehlvi,” and the defence of invalid registration of trade mark was relied upon by the defendant. Consequently, an application was submitted to the High Court of Delhi, in accordance with Section 124 of the Trade marks Act, to initiate proceedings for the cancellation/rectification of the trade mark before the IPAB and to request that the current infringement litigation be suspended.

After the enactment of the Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021, the IPAB was abolished, and the jurisdiction of the IPAB was transferred back to the High Courts under Section 124. Therefore, the court of original jurisdiction under Section 124 would be the High Court of Delhi.  Additionally, Rule 26 of the Delhi High Court Intellectual Property Rights Division Rules, 2022 permits the High Court of Delhi to exercise powers of transfer under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for transfer and consolidation of such matters to itself. This means that the High Court may, at its discretion, transfer and consolidate the infringement suit and rectification/cancellation proceedings of the same trade mark, even if they are pending in separate forums. Thus, the pendency of the infringement suit while the rectification proceedings were being decided was deemed unnecessary.

Amrish Aggarwal Trading vs. Venus Home Appliances Pvt. Ltd. (2024) 

The decision in Sana Herbals vs. Mohsin Dehlvi (2022) was overruled by the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi in Amrish Aggarwal Trading vs. Venus Home Appliances (2024). The Division Bench noted in its decision that the view taken in the case of Sana Herbals was contrary to the decisions relied on in matters such as Elofic Industries (India) vs. Steel Bird Industries (1985), Puma Stationer P. Ltd. and Anr vs. Hindustan Pencils Ltd. (2010), and Patel Field Marshal Agencies vs. P.M. Diesels (2017). The High Court placed reliance on cases wherein a rectification petition was filed simultaneously with the written statement challenging the validity of registration of the trade mark in a suit for trade mark infringement before the court could frame any issues regarding the same or order a stay on the proceedings, in line with Section 124 of the Trade marks Act. In its decision in the present case, the court observed that the Trade marks Act dictates that the proceedings in an infringement suit be stayed while a decision on the rectification proceedings is pending. Merely imitating rectification proceedings of a trade mark shall not result in an automatic stay of the proceedings in a suit for infringement. Additionally, the court also observed that simply because the Act does not provide for an automatic stay of proceedings, it does not eliminate the need for the court to issue an order staying further proceedings in the infringement proceedings. Hence, the court overruled the decision in Sana Herbals vs. Mohsin Dehlvi (2022), to that extent. 

Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. vs. Basant Kumar Makhija (2023)

In the matter of Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. vs. Basant Kumar Makhija (2023), the plaintiff had filed a trade mark infringement suit against the defendant, claiming unauthorised use of their registered trade mark. The defendants argued that their use of the trade mark was protected under Section 30(2)(e) since they had a registered trade mark similar to the trade mark that was the subject of the suit of infringement. The fundamental issue before the High Court of Delhi was whether the plaintiff could raise the issue of invalidity of the defendant’s trade mark in their replication to the written statement or whether it would require the amendment of the original plaint filed.

The court held that as per the wording of Section 124(1)(b), the plaintiff could plead invalidity of the defendant’s trade mark registration only when the defendant had already relied upon the defence of Section 30(2)(e). Therefore, an additional issue was framed by the High Court to address the plaintiff’s claim regarding the invalidity of the defendant’s trade mark.

Intercontinental Great Brands LLC vs. Parle Products Pvt. Ltd. (2023) 

In Intercontinental Great Brands LLC vs. Parle Products Pvt. Ltd. (2023), the plaintiff was the owner of the registered trade mark, “OREO,” which was used to describe vanilla cream-filled chocolate sandwich cookies. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant, “FABIO,” which was sold by Parle and was also branded as a chocolate sandwich cookie with a chocolate cream filling. Both biscuit brands had a similar structure and even a similar blue and white packaging. It was alleged by the plaintiff that the biscuits being sold as FABIO were identical to the OREO cookies being sold by the plaintiff. The plaintiff further alleged that the pronunciation of the name FABIO was also deceptively similar to the word OREO. The plaintiff filed an infringement suit against FABIO on the above grounds. The court held that the defendant had made a deliberate attempt to make its product deceptively similar to OREO by using the alphabet “O” after the word “FAB,” and a consumer of average intelligence could be easily misled into believing that the two marks were being used by the same manufacturer. Thus, the defendant was restrained from using the mark FABIO and from manufacturing, packaging, or selling chocolate sandwich cookies with vanilla cream. 

In the course of the proceedings in this matter, OREO had attempted to file an application under Section 124(1) of the Trade marks Act, seeking stay on the infringement proceedings for rectification of the defendant’s registered trade mark, “FABIO.” However, this application was set aside by the court, citing that in order to seek such a stay for rectification of the defendant’s trade mark, it is imperative that the defendant rely upon the defence provided in Section 30(2)(e) of the Trade marks Act. The court relied on its decision in Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. vs. Basant Kumar Makhija (2023) to drive the point home that the plaintiff would have to specifically claim that the registration of the defendant’s trade mark was invalid, either in the plaint or in its replication. Furthermore, such a claim should be substantiated by arguable grounds. While the plaintiff had argued that even if they had made no such claim in the plaint or replication, it could make the claim for invalidity of registration of a trade mark in its application under Section 124. The High Court disagreed with this argument and held that while an application under Section 124 may elaborate upon the grounds of invalidity of the registration of the defendant’s trade mark,  the primary plea of invalidity has to be raised in the plaint or in its replication.

The petition was dismissed, as the plaintiff had not challenged the registration of the mark “FABIO” in favour of the defendant or presented any grounds for such a challenge.

Conclusion

The objective of Section 124 of the Trade marks Act is to prevent multiplicity of proceedings when the application for rectification/removal of a trade mark is already pending before the Registrar of Trade marks/High Court. The Supreme Court’s objective in pronouncing its decision in Patel Field Marshal Agencies vs. P.M. Diesels (2017), wherein the remedies under Section 47 and Section 57 are made contingent upon the findings of the Registrar/High Court with respect to the validity of registration of a trade mark, also emerges from the same desire to prevent multiplicity of proceedings. 

However, interlinking and making the rights of an aggrieved person for rectification/cancellation of the trade mark registration, to the extent of ensuring that they are dependent on the court’s prima facie finding, has also raised questions, which is why we see many decisions wherein different High Courts are attempting to break away from the interpretation given by the Supreme Court in the case of Patel Field Marshal Agencies vs. P.M. Diesels (2017).

One of the biggest grey areas left behind in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision is a scenario wherein the court does not frame an issue with respect to the invalidity of the registration of a trade mark or gives no other finding either. This situation would worsen if the High Court does indeed club the petitions for stay of an infringement suit and rectification of trade mark together, since the delay in providing a final finding regarding validity of a trade mark by the court would consequently delay the rectification proceedings, and the objective of expediting the decision-making process would be defeated. Moreover, there are chances that the cause of action for rectification or cancellation of registration of a trade mark arises once the infringement proceedings have been decided, which shall not be brought before the court. For instance, if the registered user fails to use the trade mark for five years from the date of registration of the trade mark. While the legal position on the applicability of the stay granted under Section 124 has been discussed at length in multiple decisions, the nuances of its applicability in the context of rectification and cancellation of trade marks, needs to be further examined by the courts to come to a constructive and definitive interpretation and application of the Section. 

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

Would the stay under Section 124 also be applicable in a suit for passing off?

Section 124 specifically depends on a scenario wherein the validity of the registration of a trade mark is put into doubt. Here, the emphasis lies on “registration.” Since a suit for passing off is filed for unregistered trade marks, the stay under Section 124 would not be applicable. 

Would the stay under Section 124 be applicable in criminal prosecution of a person infringing a trade mark?

No. The proceedings followed in the event of criminal prosecution for infringement of a trade mark are entirely different in nature, involving arrest and imprisonment of the concerned person. A stay would not be applicable in such a situation. 

In which court is a suit for infringement of a trade mark filed?

A suit for infringement of a trade mark may be filed in:

  • District Court
  • Commercial Court (As per the definition given under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015)
  • High Court having ordinary civil jurisdiction

If there are two trade marks registered for similar products, can claims be made against the other registered trade mark?

No. However, if the two trade marks are deceptively confusing, the Court can order an interim injunction or any other interim order even when the stay under Section 124 is operational. 

References 

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Section 145 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

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This article is written by Arkadyuti Sarkar. This article discusses in detail the provisions relating to affidavits in a trial under Section 145 of the Negotiable Instruments Act of 1881. It also discusses in detail the recent case laws in relation to this section. 

Introduction

The Negotiable Instruments Act of 1881 is a significant law concerning the governance of negotiable instruments in India and is concerned with regulating promissory notes, cheques, and bills of exchange. The Act was enacted by the British to provide uniformity in the legal framework for using negotiable instruments in India. It has been subjected to multiple amendments to comply with the changing commercial practices and legal requirements. The most notable among these amendments is the Amendment of 2022. Several new sections, i.e., Sections 143 to 147 were introduced by this amendment for widening the scope and mitigating the limitations of the parent statute that came into force on 1st March 1882. The sections were introduced under Chapter XVII which was primarily for penal provisions as an accused under this act could be charged with offences of cheque dishonour arising from the deficiency of funds. The Ministry of Finance is the nodal organisation regulating the system concerning negotiable instruments. The transfers from one person to another in dealings of legal documents of monetary value are known as negotiable instruments. The legal term for negotiable stands for something transferable from the transferor to the transferee through delivery involving the transfer of title without any endorsement from the transferee.

This article is going to provide a clause-to-clause analysis of Section 145 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 which is concerned with adducing evidence through an affidavit by the complainant, as well as examining a witness upon an application for the same made either by the accused or the complainant/prosecution). Such analyses are supported by several case laws that have been referred to by the courts from time to time.

Let’s understand the meaning of Section 145 of the Negotiable Instruments Act of 1881. 

Section 145 of Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881

To understand and explain the provisions of Section 145 of the Act of 1881, let us give it a reading:

  1. Not being affected by anything in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (now Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the complainant may give his evidence through an affidavit subject to all just exceptions and be read during evidence in any inquiry, trial, or other proceeding under the said Code.
  2. The Court may, at its discretion, and on an application of the prosecution or the accused, summon, and examine any person who is adducing evidence on affidavit as to the facts contained therein.

It can be seen that Section 145 (1) is concerned with adducing evidence through an affidavit by the complainant, while Section 145 (2) discusses the discretionary power of the Court to summon and examine any witnesses related to the proceeding under the Act of 1881.

Let us separate the ingredients of both subsections to have an overall understanding. However, let us conceptualise evidence on the affidavit.

Evidence on affidavit

An affidavit accounts for someone’s evidence or factual statements in written form. The word has its Latin roots meaning “he has stated on oath”. The benefit of presenting evidence through an affidavit is that each party to the case is aware of what the other party or its witnesses will say at the trial. This way both the parties to the case will benefit while preparing for the trial and hence each can obtain sufficient advice on the prospect of success.

Section 145 (1) of the Act of 1881

  • Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: This means that no provision present in the Criminal Procedure Code (now Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) will impact this provision of the Act of 1881.
  • The evidence of the complainant: The word complainant is not defined anywhere in the Act of 1881. However, as with the legislative intent of the Act of 1881, we can infer that a complainant can be any person or entity who was promised a certain amount by the accused through some negotiable instrument with the same being dishonoured and has remained unpaid even after sending the demand notice, thereby compelling the complainant to file a complaint under this Act. 

Section 145(1) is only concerned with adducing evidence on affidavit by the complainant in cases under the Act of 1881 as the same has been observed in cases like Mandvi Cooperative Bank Ltd. vs. Nimesh B. Thakore (2010), Prabhudas Panjainmal Rice and Dal Mill vs. Avon Trade Link Shakti Nagar, Katni (2020), etc. The aforementioned cases have been discussed subsequently in later portions.

  • The meaning of “subject to all just exceptions”: Since Section 145 (1) does not list any exception anywhere we can infer from the wording that it refers to judicial discretion concerning the consideration of “just exceptions” and may vary from case to case. Mandvi Cooperative Bank Ltd. vs. Nimesh B. Thakore, (2010), Prabhudas Panjainmal Rice and Dal Mill vs. Avon Trade Link Shakti Nagar, Katni (2020), etc are a few examples wherein the said principle has been upheld.
  • The meaning of “be read in evidence in any inquiry, trial, or other proceeding under the said Code”: Here, it is inferable that reference has been made to any inquiry, trial, or other proceeding under the Criminal Procedure Code (now Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 w.e.f. 01.07.2024). 

Thus, we can conclude that Section 145(1) of the Act of 1881 entitles the complainant to adduce evidence by making an affidavit. Such evidence can be used in any other trial/proceeding under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (now Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023).

Section 145(2) of the Act of 1881

  • The Court may, if it thinks fit: This clearly indicates the discretionary power vested upon the concerned court with regard to the summoning and examining of any person who has adduced his evidence on an affidavit in a proceeding under the Act of 1881.
  • Shall on the application of the prosecution or the accused: The proceeding under the Act of 1881 is inherently criminal and resembles any other criminal proceeding, it comprises the prosecution and the accused. Now, apart from the Court’s discretionary power to summon any witness, who has adduced his evidence through an affidavit, for examination, it can also call/re-summon for such witnesses for re-examination if the prosecution or the accused makes an application before the Court requesting the same.
  • Summoning and examining: For examining anyone, the very first step is securing their attendance before the Court. Such attendance can be secured either by service of summons or by issuing a warrant of arrest. Now this subsection provides for the issuance of summons to secure such attendance for examination, either at the discretion of the court or upon the application by the prosecution or the accused.

Summoning and examining under Section 145 (2) includes re-summoning and re-examining the witnesses who have already adduced their evidence through an affidavit under this section. For references see Mandvi Cooperative Bank Ltd. vs. Nimesh B. Thakore, (2010), Sumitra Devi vs. Kapoor Chand (2023), etc. as have been discussed afterwards.

  • Any person giving evidence on affidavit: As per the wording of this subsection, summons can only be issued to a person under this section of the Act of 1881 if such person has adduced his evidence in a proceeding under this Act through an affidavit.
  • Facts contained therein: Now the summoning and examination to be done under this proviso can only be with respect to the facts contained in the evidence adduced before the Court under a proceeding under this Act and nothing else. Section 145(2) expressly mentions the same.

Case laws relating to Section 145 of Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881

Sumitra Devi vs. Kapoor Chand (2023)

Facts of the case

  • In this case, the petitioner had approached the Himachal Pradesh High Court against the rejection of an application filed by her;
  • The application was requested for her re-examination by the First Class Judicial Magistrate, Anni, Kullu District, Himachal Pradesh;
  • The petitioner had preferred a complaint under the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1882 for cheque dishonour by the accused/respondent for payment towards her salary;
  • In the complaint, she claimed that the said cheque was issued by the respondent as Director of BHK Construction Company; 
  • An affidavit in evidence was filed by the petitioner during the examination in chief and afterwards, she was cross-examined by the respondent;
  • At one point of such cross-examination, she admitted it to be correct that the respondent was also an employee of the company just like her;
  • During cross-examination no liberty was prayed by her counsel for re-examining her regarding this part of the statement made by her in cross-examination as in examination-in-chief she stated that the respondent was the Director of the Company;
  • Afterwards, however, a petition was filed on behalf of her for her re-examination by proposing the filing of an affidavit in re-examination, stating that the respondent was Chairman of the Company and had issued the cheque in her favour on behalf of the referred company.

Arguments by the petitioner

  • The learned counsel of the petitioner referred to various cases like Rajendra Prasad vs. Narcotic Cell (1999), P. Chhaganlal Daga vs. M. Sanjay Shaw (2003) and argued that a fact has come in the record during cross cross-examination;
  • The said fact is in conflict with the contents of the examination-in-chief;
  • Further, it was argued that in view of the provisions of Section 138 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (now Bharatiya Saksha Adhiniyam) and Section 145 of the Act of 1881, the petitioner is entitled to re-examination;
  • Such right for re-examination arises because clarification and truth about the said point is necessary for complete, final, and proper adjudication of the case;
  • Therefore, the petitioner further argued that the proposed re-examination of the petitioner shall not result in filling up the lacuna by the petitioner.

Arguments by the respondent

Judgement of the court

  • The Hon’ble High Court duly considered the provisions of the Act of 1881, especially Section 145(2); 
  • The court held that it is apparent that after filing an affidavit by the complainant or his witness/witnesses, any person adducing evidence on affidavit can be summoned and examined by the Court upon an application filed by the prosecution or the accused; 
  • The summoning should be concerned with the facts present in such an affidavit;
  • The court further noticed that the section further provides for examining a person, including re-examining a person, but does not entitle the complainant or anyone filing an affidavit in examination-in-chief to re-file an affidavit in evidence; 
  • Therefore, such a person, including the complainant, can be summoned and examined by the Court upon application by either party; 
  • The court finally concluded that Section 145 does not provide or entitle the complainant or anyone to file a fresh affidavit during examination on summoning by the court under Section 145 (2) though the same does not explicitly mention re-examining the complainant or any other witness;  
  • The court also opined the term summon and examined any person giving evidence in an affidavit including the judicial power of the court to summon and re-examine such witness/person.

Harihar Mishra and Anr. vs. M/s. Acrux Realcon Pvt. Ltd (2023)

Facts

  • In this case, the complainant/respondent had filed the complaint after the cheques issued by the accused persons/petitioners were dishonoured due to insufficient funds;
  • The complaints were supported by affidavits and based on the affidavits S.D.J.M. Bhubaneswar took cognizance of the offence under Section 138 of the Act of 1881 and summoned the petitioner;
  • However, when the trial commenced, affidavits as evidence were filed by the complainant and the same became the subject matter of dispute in this case;
  • The reason was that the petitioner/accused vehemently argued that the reproduction of the affidavits by the complainant was unacceptable as they had already been filed while filing the suit, based on which the court had proceeded and taken cognizance;

Issues raised

Whether the complainant is entitled to file a second lot of affidavits if the same were filed already in the beginning of the trial as evidence?

Arguments by the petitioner

  • The petitioner argued that for the purposes of Section 138 of the Act of 1881, the lower court could not have received the affidavits for the second time as they were already filed at the beginning by the accused;
  • The petitioner contended that since the court rejected his applications on the ground that the initial affidavits were received for and at the time of taking cognizance of the offence and thereafter the affidavits were filed in conformity with Section 145.

Arguments by the respondent

  • Contrarily the respondents justified the impugned orders and contended that the affidavits have been adduced as evidence and the court has accepted them;
  • They further contended that such acceptance has no linkage with initial affidavits that were submitted alongside the complaints.

Analysis

The Odisha High Court cited the case of Indian Bank Association and others vs. Union of India and others (2014) and opined, “The Supreme Court held that Section 145 of the Act of 1881 provides complete freedom to the complainant either to give his evidence by way of affidavit or by oral means and the court has to accept the same even if it is in the form of an affidavit… In the said decision, it has been further observed that the affidavit and documents filed along with complaint for taking cognizance of the offence are good enough to be read as evidence at both the pre-summoning and post-summoning stages”.

Judgement

  • The High Court rejected the petitioner’s contention while holding that the authorities and the decisions relied upon by the petitioner do not make it appear that the complainant/respondent is debarred from filing such an affidavit in evidence;
  • The court further held that the initial affidavits, if at all had been received by the learned court with the complaints, the same were and may be said to be for a limited purpose, for setting the criminal action into motion;
  • That afterwards at the trial stage any such affidavit so furnished as evidence is to be accepted as the court is not debarred under Section 145 against the same;
  • The court further held that it is one thing to claim that an affidavit filed and received by the court may be treated as evidence and is sufficient for the purpose of trial, however, it is altogether different to claim that an affidavit adduced as evidence under Section 145 cannot be accepted as evidence as the same has already been filed in the inception by the complainant.

Prabhudas Panjainmal Rice and Dal Mill vs. Avon Trade Link Shakti Nagar, Katni (2020)

Facts of the case

  • The appeal was filed before the Himachal Pradesh High Court in the above-mentioned case;
  • The appeal was filed against an impugned order on 8th April 2019, passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate;
  • The order had led to the dismissal of an application filed under Section 145(2) of the NI Act that the accused/petitioner had filed.

Issues raised

  • Whether the court has any discretion concerning an application under Section 145 (2) of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881, for summoning and examining any person giving evidence on the affidavit?
  • Whether the procedure adopted by the Magistrate Court while entertaining the above-mentioned application is just and proper?

Arguments of the petitioner

Arguments of the respondents

Judgement of the court

  • The Hon’ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh referred to all the judgements presented by both the Petitioner and the respondent and held that a clear legal proposition had been laid down in Mandvi Co-operative Bank Ltd. vs. Manish B. Thakore (2010) and Rajni Dhingra vs. Sanjiv Chug (2019);
  • The petitioners being the accused were facing trial due to complaint made by the respondents under the provisions of the Act of 1881 and were held to be non-eligible to tender their evidence through affidavit;
  • The court dismissed both the petitions and further held that no error was committed by the trial court while declining permission to this effect to the accused petitioners;
  • It was concluded that a court can entertain evidence to be adduced through an affidavit, only if an application is made by the complainant under the provisions of Section 145 (1) and the same does not extend to the accused.

M/S. Mandvi Co-Op Bank Ltd vs. Nimesh B.Thakore (2010)

Facts

  • In this case, the High Court had a large number of writ petitions and applications before it under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure where most were filed on behalf of the accused and a few at the instance of the complainants;
  • Based on the grievances and reliefs prayed in those petitions the High Court had to consider two questions:
  1. Whether Section 145(2) of the Act of 1881 confers unfettered right to the complainant and the accused to apply to the court to seek direction for giving oral examination-in-chief of a person adducing evidence on affidavit, even for facts stated therein and upon exercising such right whether the court is obliged to examine such a person despite the mandate under Section 145 (1)?
  2. Whether the amended provisions of Section 145, as amended by the Amendment Act of 2002 have a retrospective application? 
  • The High Court held that the complainant or his witness may be summoned by the court, if they have adduced their evidence on affidavit, for questioning. The Court further held that such a witness can also be summoned on an application by the accused, however, the right would be limited to cross-examination of the witness;
  • Concerning the second issue the High Court held that provisions of Section 145 were not substantive but only procedural in nature, and therefore, and thus have retrospective effect;
  • The High Court also laid down several guidelines upon being requested by both the parties concerning the procedure to be followed by the trial court, the accused, and the complainant in a complaint made against cheque dishonour under Section 138 of the Act of 1881;
  • Seven appeals in the form of special leave petitions were filed against the decision out of which three were referred before the concerned bench of the Supreme Court.

Issues

The appeal was filed before the Supreme Court to consider the special provisions enshrined in Section 145 of the Act of 1881 for a trial concerning dishonoured cheques and to consider how far certain assertions made by the accused comply with the provisions contained in the two subsections.

Arguments by the petitioner

The petitioners raised their contentions on several points with most pointing towards the admissibility of evidence tendered by the accused through an affidavit under Section 145 (1).

Judgement

The Supreme Court held that the High Court has erred in considering that upon a request made by the accused, the Magistrate may allow him to adduce evidence on an affidavit under Section 145 and set aside the High Court direction and judgement and held that only the complainant is entitled to tender such evidence.

Radhey Shyam Garg vs. Naresh Kumar Gupta (2009)

Facts

  • In this case, the respondent/appellant had filed a complaint before the Court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi around 7th June 2004;
  • The case was concerned with the commission of an alleged offence under Section 138 of the Act of 1881 wherein the complainant recorded the pre-summoning evidence by adducing an affidavit;
  • The court took cognizance of the offence and directed the summons by an order on 9th June 2004;
  • The complainant had further adduced post-summoning evidence through an affidavit on 26th March 2007;
  • The respondent examined himself and was cross-examined in detail starting from 12th September 2008. However, before the cross-examination, the respondent/appellant had proven his affidavits;
  • An application under Section 145 (2) of the Act was filed by the appellant on 7th March 2008 against an order dated 14th March 2008, which was dismissed;
  • Then the appellant filed an application before the Delhi High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 for setting aside the said order and the same went against him.

Issues Involved

Whether the deponent who has already adduced his/her evidence through an affidavit under Section 145 (2) be re-summoned for examination?

Arguments by the petitioner

  • The petitioner contended that a plain reading of section 145 of the Act of 1881 would make it evident that the same is imperative in character;
  • The petitioner further urged based on the said provision that the court has no option other than examining a witness including the complainant who adduced an affidavit to support his statement;
  • The petitioner’s counsel drew the court’s attention to Section 145(2) and Section 296 of the Criminal Procedure Code and urged that the same being in pari materia with Section 145 of the Act of 1881, and therefore the learned Trial Judge as well as the judge of the High Court to be held liable for committing a serious error in passing the impugned judgement.

Arguments by the respondents

  • The respondent appeared in person and drew the attention of the court to some disturbing facts concerning the signature of the respondent;
  • The signatures of the respondent/appellant appearing at the end of the verification portion as well as his signatures appearing in the affidavit affirmed in support of the stay application would appear different.

Judgement

The court did not find any justification for arriving at a finding that a witness can be re-summoned for his examination-in-chief despite tendering evidence on that behalf and thus dismissed the appeal accordingly.

Conclusion

After going through the above-mentioned points, we can conclude that Section 145 of the Act of 1881 allows only the complainants to tender their evidence through an affidavit in any criminal proceeding under the Criminal Procedure Code (now Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023).  The same was clarified in notable cases like Mandvi Co-operative Bank Ltd. vs. Manish B. Thakore (2010), Rajni Dhingra and Sanjeev Chug (2019), and Jabalpur Bus Association & Ors vs. State of M.P. & Anr. (2002). In all these cases the Court held that the statutory language clearly mentions the word “complainant” and hence the judiciary cannot consider the same as unintentional and fill any gap left by the legislature by including “the term accused” in the purview of Section 145 (1).

Now with regards to summoning any person who has adduced their evidence through an affidavit, under a proceeding under the Act of 1881, the court is under a mandate to summon such witness if an application is made either by the complainant or accused on this behalf. So clearly speaking the court is vested with both the discretionary as well as mandatory actions under Section 145 of the Act of 1881.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)?

Can an accused tender his evidence under Section 145 (1)?

Only the complainant is entitled to adduce his evidence under the above-mentioned section and the same has been clarified in several judgements like Prabhudas Panjainmal Rice and Dal Mill vs. Avon Trade Link (2010) and Indian Bank Association & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors (2014).

Is the provision of Section 145 (1) mandatory provision?

No. It is discretionary for the court to permit such evidence by the complainant.

Who can be summoned under Section 145(2)?

Any witness who has adduced the same through an affidavit can be summoned by the court at its discretion if requested by the complainant or the accused.

References

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Work permits for minors

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Tripartite agreement

This article has been written by Sohankita Mukherjee pursuing a Diploma in M&A, Institutional Finance and Investment Laws (PE and VC transactions) from LawSikho.

This article has been edited and published by Shashwat Kaushik.

Table of Contents

Introduction

A work permit or working visa is an official authorisation (legal work card) issued by the government of a country to foreign workers. It is a legal document for foreign nationals to work legally. The procedure of obtaining these permits is open to any willing investor and often varies famously per the hosting country. It is deemed a criminal offence if you work at all without the permits and it could mean losing your immigration status, screwing up any future visa applications or even being banned from re-entry.

This article outlines the international and Indian standards for minorities and their classifications. It touches upon the guidelines for both minors and adolescents and the consequences of non-compliance. It explores various alternative paths for minors by involving them in work while protecting their fundamental rights. The article also talks about the different work permit policies of different countries.

An overview of Indian and international standards of work permits for minors

Age of minority: international standards

Minor means an individual who has yet to attain 18 years (the age of majority) and has yet to gain the capacity to make legal decisions. There are various international instruments responsible for the protection of the rights of children. Some of them are:

  • The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC).
  • International Labour Organisation (ILO) Conventions.
  • Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict.
  • Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption.

The above international laws provide a global legal framework that mentions the types of work minors can perform and allows every country to abide by the basic standards of minimum work age and according to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), under Article 1, it is mentioned that every human being is below the age of 18 years unless the applies to the child. According to Article 5, individuals under the age of 18 possess all the rights outlined in the convention and are granted special protection measures. 

The Inter-American Convention of International Traffic in Minors, borne out of the Organisation of American States (OAS), is a vital legal framework endorsed in Mexico City on March 19, 1994. It encompasses both civil and criminal aspects of international trafficking involving minors, demonstrating a steadfast commitment to safeguarding their best interests.

At its core, the Inter-American Convention defines minors in a manner that closely aligns with the description provided in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). This alignment ensures a consistent and comprehensive approach to protecting the rights and well-being of minors on a global scale.

The Inter-American Convention primarily focusses on combating the illicit trafficking of minors across international borders. It recognises that such trafficking can take various forms, including adoption, exploitation, and sexual abuse. The convention aims to prevent these heinous acts by establishing legal frameworks and mechanisms for international cooperation.

To achieve its objectives, the Inter-American Convention outlines several fundamental principles and guidelines. It emphasises the importance of respecting the rights and dignity of minors, upholding their best interests as paramount, and prioritising their physical, mental, and emotional well-being. The convention also calls for the effective prosecution of traffickers and the provision of comprehensive support services to victims of trafficking.

Furthermore, the Inter-American Convention recognises the significant role that families and communities play in protecting minors. It encourages the active involvement of families and guardians in safeguarding minors from trafficking and promotes the creation of supportive environments where minors can thrive.

By establishing a robust legal framework and fostering international cooperation, the Inter-American Convention of International Traffic in Minors contributes to the global fight against the trafficking of minors. It serves as a valuable tool for governments, organisations, and individuals working tirelessly to protect the rights, dignity, and well-being of minors everywhere.

Below is a tabular representation of the legal working ages of several countries:

CountriesLegal working age
UK16
Japan15
Brazil14
Argentina14
United States14
India14
Canada13
Australia13
Nigeria12
Bolivia10

From the above chart, Bolivia has the lowest legal age for a work permit and the UK has the highest.

Age of minority: Indian standards

The Indian Constitution

Article 21A

The government is mandated to ensure that all children between the ages of 6 and 14 receive free and mandatory education as prescribed by law.

 Article 24

Prohibition of employment of children in factories, etc. Children under the age of 14 are prohibited from being employed in factories, mines, or any other hazardous occupations.

Article 39

According to this article, every government’s policy should focus on ensuring the physical well-being of workers (both male and female), who are compelled by economic constraints to pursue occupations that are not. This included children of a vulnerable age.

Other legislations

  • The Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act 1976: Bars the hiring of any individual, including children.
  • The Explosive Act, 1984: It is forbidden to employ individuals under the age of 18 years.
  • The Merchant Shipping Act, 1958: Children under the age of 14 are not permitted to work in any capacity on any ship at sea, with specific exceptions.

Work permit options in India and other countries

The purpose of a work permit is to ensure that the minor employed in the industry is not underaged and physically fit for work.

India

There are different types of work permits based on their age and the nature of work. Depending upon the nationality of the child, the work permits vary.

  • Children under 14 years of age
  • Adolescents (14 to 18 years of age)

Full-time and part-time work permits: If the parent or guardian is incapacitated for labour through illness or injury, or if the minor is unable to reside with their family and the earnings are necessary for the support of the minor, in such circumstances a full-time work permit may be issued for a 14-16 year old. The same goes for part-time work.

Special permits: There are no special permits available for minors in India.

The purpose of a work permit is to ensure that the minor employed in the industry is not underaged and physically fit for work.

The Factories Act, 1948

Section 67 of this act prohibits the employment of young children in factories who have not completed their 14th year. 

Section 71 of the act talks about the working hours of children: No child shall be employed or permitted to work in any factory:

  • for more than four and a half hours on any day;
  • during the night.

Explanation: For this sub-section, “night” shall mean at least twelve consecutive hours, which shall include the interval between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.

Children employed in a factory are restricted to working two non-overlapping shifts, each lasting a maximum of five hours. Furthermore, each child is assigned to only one shift and can only be reassigned with written permission from the Chief Inspector, not more frequently than once in thirty days.

Section 52 shall equally extend to child workers, and no exceptions from its provisions can be sanctioned for any child, as per Section 57 of the Factories Act of 1948, which addresses night shifts and the application of holiday provisions. It specifies that if a worker works after midnight, the regulations regarding holidays in sections 52 and 53 are applicable for 24 hours following the conclusion of their shift, with the hours worked after midnight being considered as part of the previous day.

Children are not permitted to work in more than one factory on the same day.

No female child shall be required or allowed to work in any factory except between 8 a.m. and 7 p.m.

The Mines Act, 1952

Section 43 of the act has mentioned that if an inspector thinks that:

  • Someone working in a mine (who isn’t an apprentice or trainee) might not be an adult,
  • An apprentice or trainee in a mine might be younger than 16 or not fit to work.

The inspector can do the following:

  • Give the mine manager a notice saying this person needs to be checked by a doctor (called a certifying surgeon).
  • Order that this person can’t work in any mine until they’ve been checked.

The doctor needs to confirm that:

  • The regular worker is an adult, or
  • The apprentice or trainee is at least 16 years old and is fit to work.

Until this happens, if the inspector says so, the person isn’t allowed to work in the mine.

The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009

The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, also known as the Right to Education (RTE) Act, proscribes the employment of children in some specific occupations and processes. Section 3 of the Act addresses the subject.

Section 3(1) of the RTE Act 2009

The Child and Adolescent Labour (Prohibition & Regulation) Act balances child protection with family economic realities:

  • Generally, prohibits child labour under 14 years.
  • Allows limited family work exceptions:
    • During vacations or after school hours.
    • In family enterprises.
    • Work must not harm health or development.
    • Must not interfere with education.

This approach aims to:

  • Prioritise children’s education and well-being
  • Recognise the economic realities of some families
  • Ensure any allowed work is safe and limited.

The Act strives to protect children’s rights to education and healthy development while allowing some flexibility for family circumstances.

The Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961

This Act prohibits the employment of children less than 14 years old in any motor transport undertaking.

The Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966

This Act prohibits the employment of children less than 14 years of age in any industrial premises manufacturing beedi or cigars.

In conclusion, all of these laws prohibit the employment of children below the 14-age group. Even children and adolescents below 18 are prohibited from working in mines and any other hazardous sites of factories.

Saudi Arabia

A minor has been defined as any person of 15 years and below 18 years of age. Details of employment of minors are mentioned in PART X EMPLOYMENT OF MINORS

Article 161

To protect young people, there are rules about where they can work.

  • Minors cannot be employed in:
    • Hazardous jobs
    • Harmful industries
    • Occupations that could put their health at risk
    • Jobs that might compromise their safety
    • Work that could negatively affect their moral development
  • These restrictions apply to both the nature of the work itself and the conditions under which it’s performed.
  • A government minister will determine and list the specific jobs, industries, and occupations that fall under these restrictions.
  • This list will officially specify which types of work are considered unsuitable or dangerous for minors.
  • These rules aim to ensure that young workers are protected from potentially harmful or inappropriate work environments until they reach adulthood.

Article 162

Basic rule:

  • No one younger than 15 years old can be employed or allowed in workplaces.
  • The Minister has the power to increase this age limit for certain industries, areas, or groups of minors.

Exception for light work:

  • In some cases, 13 to 15-year-olds may be allowed to do light work.
  • The Minister decides when this exception applies.

Conditions for light work:

  • For 13 to 15-year-olds to be employed in light work, the job must:
  • Not be potentially harmful to their health or growth.
  • Not interfere with their:
    • School attendance
    • Participation in career guidance programs
    • Involvement in vocational training
    • Not reduce their ability to benefit from their education.

Article 163

Night work rule for minors:

  • Minors cannot work at night for at least 12 consecutive hours.
  • The Minister can make exceptions to this rule.
  • These exceptions will be specified in an official decision. 

This rule protects minors’ rest time, with flexibility for special cases determined by the Mmnister.

Article 165

  • ID: National card or birth certificate.
  • Health: Doctor-certified fitness report.
  • Consent: Guardian’s written approval.

Employers must obtain and keep these in the minor’s file before hiring.

Canada

The Employment Standard Code, under Part 2, Part 5 regulation, portrays the rules for employing people under 18. Same for the Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) legislation.

The general rules

According to the basic rules mentioned by the government of Alberta, Canada, there are restrictions on minors who are under 18 years of age.

Those who are 14 years and under require a government permit, which varies by age group and the type of work.

Those who are 14 years of age or under must need a permit to work from their guardian or parent.

There are restrictions on the working hours for those who are under the age of 18.

The important exceptions are:

  • The rules for youth employment do not apply to self-employed contractors or volunteers but only to employees.
  • For students in different approved training courses or integrated training programs.
  • These rules do not apply to farms and ranches.  

All the employees, including those under 18, are eligible for the minimum standards of employment, such as general holidays, vacations, minimum wage, and termination notice or pay.

As per hazardous workplace guidelines, employees are to perform hazard assessments and control workplace hazards.

Self-employed and contractors

The above rules do not apply to those who are self-employed, working as a volunteer or an independent contractor. The below casual work is listed as self-employed and contractor work but this list is not limited to the below tasks:

  • Lawn cutting
  • Snow shovelling
  • Babysitting

The main goal of the rule about the self-employed or contractors is to identify whether the person is a true employee or not and not just what type of job they are doing.

Employees 12 years of age and under

  • May only be employed in an endeavour.
    • A permit for required work in artistic endeavours
    • Allowable hours and any other restrictions shall be determined during the permit approval process. 
  • Consent of the parent and guardian is required.

Artistic endeavours

To get employed in the industry, those who are under 15 years of age need to get a special work permit. 

Artistic endeavour means of work are:

  • Recorded entertainment: Film, radio, video, television, radio commercials
  • Voice recordings for video or computer gaming
  • Live performance/entertainment industry: Theatre plays, musical performances.

Employees 13 to 14 years of age

The main aim of these provisions is that if the employment is hurting the life, health, education, or welfare of the employee, then such employment is not allowed.

Some jobs can be a good fit for such age groups for employment:

  • Clerk or messenger in a retail shop or office
  • Delivery boy for small merchandise or goods for a retail shop
  • Delivering flyers, handbills or newspapers
  • Light janitorial work in offices
  • Tutorial
  • Coach for recreational athletic club or association
  • Food service employee

Even though there are specific roles in food service industries for specific age groups. Some of the jobs that people of this age can do are:

  • Host/hostess
  • Cashier
  • Dishwasher
  • Busing or cleaning tables
  • Server or waiter
  • Providing customer service
  • Sweeping and mopping in common areas
  • Assembling food orders

Employees of food service employees aged 13 and 14 must ensure that employees of the age of 13 or 14 years are under continuous adult supervision.

Restrictions of hours of work

The restriction for the hours of work for employees of the age group of 13 to 14 years of age

  • Not allowed to work between 9 pm and 6 pm.
  • Can’t work during school hours unless they’re enrolled in an off-campus education program.
  • Can only work for up to 2 hours outside school hours.
  • Can work up to 8 hours for non-school days.

Employees aged 15 to 17 years 

May be employed in any type of work with minimum restrictions.

  • No permits are required.
  • Parents and guardians consent are only required to work during restricted hours.

Restrictions on working hours    

  • Employees cannot work during regular school hours.
  • Those who work in the hospitality or retail industry are only allowed to work from 9 p.m. to 12 a.m. with adult supervision. They can’t work between 12:01 a.m. and 9 p.m. They’ll require parental or guardian consent and adult supervision.

The retail industry includes selling the following goods

  • Any food or beverage.
  • Any other comedies, wares, goods, or merchandise.
  • Gasoline, diesel fuel, propane, or any other product or byproduct of petroleum

Hospitality services include

  • Hotels
  • Motels
  • Anyplace that provides overnight accommodation to the public.

Work permit rules and regulations : restrictions and guidelines

The Child and Adolescent Labour (Prohibition & Regulation) Act, 1986, as amended in 2016:

  • Prohibits employment of children under 14 in all occupations.
  • Aligns with the Right to Education Act, 2009.
  • Bans employment of adolescents (14-18 years) in hazardous jobs.
  • Imposes stricter punishments for violations.

This amendment strengthens protections for children and adolescents in the workforce, extending the original 1986 Act’s scope.

Jurisdiction under the Act:

  • The Central Government oversees:
    • Establishments under its control
    • Railway administrations
    • Major ports
    • Mines
    • Oilfields
  • State governments handle all other cases.
  • The Ministry’s State Action Plan outlines responsibilities for state governments/UTs following the Amendment Act.

This division ensures clear implementation roles for both central and state authorities.

Child Labour (Prohibition & Regulation) Amendment Rules, 2017:

  • Key provisions:
    • Prevention, rescue, and rehabilitation
    • Definition of “help” in family enterprises
    • Regulation of child artists’ safety and security
  • Implementation structure:
    • District Nodal Officer (DNO)
    • Task Force chaired by District Magistrate
  • Purpose: Ensure proper enforcement of the amended Child Labour Act

These rules provide a framework for implementing the amended Act, focussing on child protection and local-level enforcement.

Guidelines for adolescent employment

Employer record-keeping requirements:

  • Maintain a register documenting:
    • Adolescent workers’ names and birthdates.
    • Work schedules, including hours, periods, and rest intervals.
    • Job descriptions for each adolescent.

Notification process: Within 30 days of hiring an adolescent, employers must inform the local inspector of:

  • Establishment details:
    • Name and location
    • Manager’s name
    • Official correspondence address
  • Business description:
    • Nature of operations or processes conducted

These regulations ensure transparency in adolescent employment and facilitate oversight by local authorities.

Following the amendment to the Child Labour Act, the government has revised and expanded the Schedule of Hazardous Occupations and Processes, based on recommendations from the Technical Advisory Committee (TAC). The updated schedule now features a two-part structure for more comprehensive protection. Part A lists hazardous occupations and processes where both adolescent employment and child assistance in family enterprises are prohibited. Part B provides an additional list of occupations and processes where children are specifically barred from helping in family or family enterprises, supplementing the restrictions in Part A. This new framework aims to offer more robust safeguards for both children and adolescents by clearly delineating prohibited activities across various work environments, including family businesses.

Below are the hazardous occupations and processes that have been mentioned in the schedules under Section 3 of the Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986.

Occupation

An occupation connected with:

  • Transport of passengers, goods, or mail by railway;
  • Cinder picking, clearing of an ash pit or building operation in the railway premises;
  • Work in a catering establishment at a railway station, involving the movement of a vendor or any other employee of the establishment from one platform to another or into or cut off a moving train;
  • Work relating to the construction of a railway station or any other work where such work is done close to or between the railway lines;
  • A port authority within the limits of any port;
  • Work relating to the selling of crackers and fireworks in shops with temporary licenses; 
  • abattoirs/slaughter houses;
  • Automobile workshops and garages;
  • Foundries;
  • Handling of toxic or inflammable substances or explosives;
  • Handloom and power loom industry;
  • Mines (underground and underwater) and collieries;
  • Plastic units and fibreglass workshops;
  • Employment of children and domestic workers or servants;
  • Employment of children in dhabas (roadside eateries), restaurants, hotels, motels, tea shops, resorts, spas, or other recreational centres;
  • Diving;
  • Circus;
  • Caring for elephants.

Processes

Any of the following processes:

  • Bidi-making;
  • Carpet weaving, including preparatory and incidental processes thereof;
  • Cement manufacture, including bagging of cement;
  • Cloth printing, dyeing, and weaving, including processes, preparatory, and incidental to it;
  • Manufacture of matches, explosives, and fireworks;
  • Mica-cutting and splitting;
  • Shellac manufacture;
  • Soap manufacture;
  • Tanning;
  • Wool-cleaning;
  • Building and construction industry, including processing and polishing of granite stones;
  • Manufacture of slate pencils (including packing);
  • Manufacture of products from agate;
  • Manufacturing process using toxic metals and substances, such as lead, mercury, manganese, chromium, cadmium, benzene, pesticides, and asbestos;
  • ‘Hazardous process’ as defined in Section 2(cb) and ‘dangerous operation’ as notified in Rules under Section 87 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
  • Printing as defined in Section 2(k)(iv) of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
  • Cashew and cashew nut descaling and processing;
  • Soldering processes in electronics industries;
  • “Aggarbatti’ manufacturing;
  • Automobile repairs and maintenance, including processes incidental to it, namely, welding, lathe work, dent beating, and painting;
  •  Brick kilns and roof tile units;
  • Cotton ginning and processing and production of hosiery goods;
  • Detergent manufacturing;
  • Fabrication workshop (ferrous and non-ferrous);
  • Gem cutting and polishing;
  • Handling of chromite and manganese ores;
  • Jute textile manufacture and coir making;
  • Limekilns and manufacture of lime;
  • Lock making;
  •  Manufacturing processes having exposure to lead, such as primary and secondary smelting welding and cutting of lead-painted metal construction, welding of galvanised or zinc silicate, polyvinyl chloride, mixing (by hand) of crystal glass mass, sanding or scraping lead paint, burning of lead in enamelling workshops, lead mining, plumbing cable making, wire patenting, lead casting, type founding in printing shops, store typesetting, assembling of cars, shot-making, and lead glass blowing;
  • Manufacture of cement pipes, cement products, and other related work;
  • Manufacturing of glass and glassware, including bangles, fluorescent tubes, bulls, and other similar glass products;
  • Manufacture of dyes and dyestuffs;
  • Manufacturing or handling of pesticides and insecticides;
  • Manufacturing or processing and handling of corrosive and toxic substances, metal cleaning and photoengraving and soldering processes in the electronic industry;
  • Manufacturing of burning coal and coal briquettes;
  • Manufacturing of sports goods involving exposure to synthetic materials, chemicals and leather;
  •  Moulding and processing of fibreglass and plastic;
  •  Oil expelling and refinery;
  •  Papermaking;
  •  Potteries and ceramic industry;
  •  Polishing, moulding, cutting, welding, and manufacture of brass goods in all forms;
  •  Process in agriculture where tractors, threshing and harvesting machines are used and chaff cutting;
  •  Sawmill all processes;
  •  Sericulture processing;
  •  Skinning, dyeing, and processes for manufacturing of leather and leather products;
  •  Stone breaking and stone crushing;
  • Tobacco processing, including manufacturing of tobacco, tobacco paste, and handling of tobacco in any form;
  • Tyre making, repairing, re-treading, and graphite beneficiation;
  • Utensil making, polishing, and metal buffing;
  • `Zari making (all processes);
  • Electroplating;
  • Graphite powdering and incidental processing;
  • Grinding or glazing of metals;
  • Diamond cutting and polishing;
  • Extraction of slate from mines;
  • Ragpicking and scavenging.
  • Processes involving exposure to excessive heat (e.g., working near the furnace) and cold;
  • Mechanised fishing;
  • Food Processing;
  • Beverage Industry;
  • Timber handling and loading;
  • Mechanical Lumbering.
  • Warehousing;
  • Processes involving exposure to free silica, such as slate, pencil industry, stone grinding, slate stone mining, stone quarries, and agate industry.

The consequences of non-compliance: penalties and fines

The primary goal of both international and national frameworks is to recognise and prevent children from engaging in hazardous labour, aiming to protect them from physical and psychological harm. These frameworks emphasise the importance of safeguarding children’s well-being and education, ensuring that they are not subjected to detrimental working conditions. To achieve this, various initiatives have been established to rehabilitate rescued children and provide them with support through child labour centres.

These centres offer comprehensive assistance to aid in the children’s reintegration into society. Education plays a crucial role in this process, as rescued children are given the opportunity to catch up on their studies and acquire essential knowledge and skills. Additionally, vocational training programs are provided to equip them with practical skills that can help them find sustainable employment in the future. Emotional assistance is also an integral part of the rehabilitation process, as children rescued from hazardous labour often carry deep psychological scars.

While the aim is to prioritise the child’s well-being and education, some exceptions may apply in specific sectors, particularly within family-owned businesses. In certain instances, children may be permitted to work within their family’s business under strict conditions and limitations. This is done to ensure that the work is not hazardous and does not interfere with the child’s education or overall well-being.

Overall, the international and national frameworks provide a comprehensive approach to addressing child labour, encompassing prevention, rehabilitation, and reintegration. The initiatives implemented through child labour centres aim to provide rescued children with a supportive environment where they can heal, learn, and develop the skills and resilience needed to lead fulfilling lives. By working together, governments, organisations, and communities can create a future where every child is free from the burden of hazardous labour and has the opportunity to reach their full potential. The enforcement process encompasses legal measures and inquiry measures against those violating the law. The non-compliance investigation is done by the labour commissioner or deputy magistrate.

Legal consequences for violating child labour laws

Employers who engage children in work contrary to the Child and Adolescent Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act face severe penalties:

  • Imprisonment:
    • Minimum term: 6 months
    • Maximum term: 2 years
  • Financial penalties:
    • Fines ranging from Rs.20,000 to Rs.50,000

These punishments apply to those who either directly employ children or allow them to work in violation of the Act. The law aims to deter exploitation by imposing both custodial sentences and substantial monetary fines on offenders.

Legal consequences for parental involvement in child labour

The law extends accountability to parents who compel their children to work illegally:

  • Prohibited activities include:
    • Forcing children into family businesses
    • Exploiting children as performers at the expense of education
    • Involving children in any occupation banned by law
  • Penalty structure:
    • First offence: Official warning
    • Subsequent violations: Fine up to ₹10,000

This approach aims to discourage familial exploitation while recognising the potential for reform after an initial warning. It underscores the importance of prioritising children’s education and well-being over economic gain.

Alternative paths for prevention of illegal employment of minor labourers

Giving work permits to minors means getting adolescents involved in the industry. This can open doors to many opportunities for them and their family. A way to earn money and to support the family. Schemes of the government have made it happen. But those ways are more children-friendly than making the children work in the mainstream industries. 

National Child Labour Project SCHEME

The government initiated the National Child Labour Project (NCLP) Scheme in 1988 to rehabilitate working children in 12 child labour endemic districts of India.

Objectives of this scheme

  • The major goal of this sector scheme is the rehabilitation of children from illegal labour employment.
  • The special schools and rehabilitation centres provide:
    • Non-formal/bridge education
    • Skilled/vocational training
    • Mid-Day Meal
    • Stipend @ Rs. 150/- per child per month.
    • Medical care services are provided through the appointment of a doctor who oversees a cluster of 20 schools.

Implementation of the project

The entire project shall be implemented through a registered society with the administrative head of the district, i.e., the district magistrate/collector/deputy commissioner as chairperson. Society’s membership may consist of representatives from the concerned departments, PRIs, NGOs, trade unions, and any other persons as deemed fit.

Central government funding for child labour projects

The projects are fully financed by the Ministry of Labour & Employment according to the level of implementation in project societies. This approach gives way to direct federal oversight and links funding to real results in the fight against child labour. The reduction of funds to projects that are lagging in implementation versus those not linked with project advancement plans and milestones is the government’s approach to attaining efficient management and better accountability in addressing this very critical social problem.

The status of the NCLP scheme in the current days

Rehabilitation of child labourers in the era since 1988 when the National Child Labour Project (NCLP) Scheme was launched, is being executed by the District Administration and its machinery through a mechanism structure known as District Project Societies chaired by the Deputy Commissioner. Under the NCLP scheme, children in the age group of 9–14 who are rescued from labour and enrolled at NCLP Special Training Centres (STCs) are provided bridge education, vocational training, etc., along with other support such as nutrition, health care, etc., before mainstreaming them into the formal education system. This scheme is now subsumed into the Samagara Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) as of April 1, 2021. Hence, rescued child labourers would be mainstreamed into the formal education system through STCs under SSA. Currently, no Special Training Centres (STC) are functioning under the NCLP scheme.

Child labour is a controversial issue, based on poverty and necessity across markets in India, despite government efforts to abolish child labour through legislation. Laws exist that aim to protect children from both working in hazardous (worst forms) and non-hazardous industries but many poverty-stricken families have no other choice than to rely on the income earned by every member of a family, including their little children for survival. Without educational resources and information, families are often stuck in the impossible situation of choosing to survive today or provide for their children’s future. This situation is prevalent in rural areas, where limited options are making families more vulnerable to exploitation and manipulation. The lack of alternatives in rural areas often leads to circumvention of child labour laws, which highlights the gap between legislative and on-the-ground realities in many parts of India.

Strategies to combat child labour and prevent exploitation

Project-Based Action: National Child Labour Project (NCLP) Scheme

The government introduced the National Child Labour Project (NCLP) Scheme in 1988 to rehabilitate children working as labourers in districts where child labour is substantial. At the last count, this scheme was operating in 313 districts across 21 states and UTs. Aimed at top child labour endemic areas in the country, this program stands out as the largest single initiative towards tackling and preventing child labour on a national scale.

The centrally managed initiative, the NCLP scheme, aims to rehabilitate child labourers. The key features are mentioned below:

  • District-level project societies led by collectors and district magistrates.
  • Special Training Centres for children aged 9-14 are offering the below options:
    • Bridge courses
    • Vocational training
    • Mid-day meals
    • Stipends
    • Healthcare facilities
  • Direct integration of 5-8-year-olds into formal education via Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan
  • Vocational training for adolescents (14-18) in hazardous occupations
  • Support for families through government welfare programs
  • Awareness campaigns and law enforcement

The scheme has managed to mainstream around 1.3 million working children into streamlined education. At present, there are nearly 3.000 centres that are operating nationwide, which are serving approximately 120.000 children.

Supreme Court regulations on child labour

There are various directions issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India to the state governments from time to time. These are the below directions:

  • To conduct a thorough assessment of children who engaged in dangerous work environments.
  • To impose a penalty of Rs. 20,000 on the employers for each child hired in violation of the provision of the Act.
  • To offer an option of either an alternative employment for the adult family member of the rescued child or to provide Rs 5,000 per child from the funds of the government. 
  • To ensure interest accrual on the Rs 25,000 corpus (Rs. 20,000 from the employer, Rs. 5,000 from the government)
  • To facilitate suitable educational placement for children removed from hazardous occupations.
  • To establish a dedicated Child Labour Rehabilitation and Welfare Fund.
  • To initiate a specialised unit within the Labour Department to oversee implementation and compliance.
  • All of these above measures aim to discourage child labour, ensure compensation to the affected families, and promote rehabilitation and education for the rescued.

Positive spectrum of work permit for minors : a room for changes

There are certain questions on the topic based on the impact of work permits for minors on improving their educational outcomes in several ways:

  • Increased educational attainment: A study shows that raising the work permit age leads to higher educational attainment, particularly for immigrant minors. The system of work permits helps in retaining students in school and prevents premature dropouts from entering the workplace. Another study by Fortune shows that those students who work while enrolled in college are about 20% less likely to complete their degrees than similar peers who don’t work.
  • Monitoring and oversight from the authoritative bodies: the work permit process allows schools and authorities to monitor minors’ employment and academic performance. The permit can be revoked if their schoolwork suffers. This helps maintain a balance between work and education.
  • Better job security and working conditions and compliance with labour laws: Work permits provide minors with legal employment status, protecting them from exploitation and ensuring that they have access to formal jobs with better wages, benefits, and working conditions.

Work permits also help enforce labour regulations regarding working hours, and safety standards.  

There are several specific types of work permits in countries like America and Canada that are more beneficial for students.

Post-graduation work permits (PGWP): This open work permit allows international students who have graduated from a Canadian-designated learning institute to gain work experience in Canada for up to 3 years after graduation, without requiring a job offer. The key benefits include:

  • Ability to work full-time.
  • Freedom to choose any employer and job, even if the candidate has done unrelated coursework.
  • Head start on gaining valuable work experience.

Curricular practical training (CPT) and optional practical training: For students in the U.S., CPT allows part-time work during studies related to the student’s major, while OPT provides 12 months of work authorisation after graduation, which can be extended to 36 months for STEM graduates. These provide opportunities to gain U.S. work experience.  

The above work permit programs are not typically for minors but for undergraduates and postgraduates to provide them with strategic support in their academic and professional domains.

Conclusion    

In conclusion, there are several restrictions stated by UNCRC and other related conventions for minors to have work permits. Different countries have their policies concerning the granting of work permits to minors. But those regulations comply with the framework given by the international conventions. In India, there are schemes initiated to help poverty-stricken populations and prevent the illegal employment of children. Also, the article portrays the positive spectrum of the work permit in various countries.   

References

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Rakesh Kumar Paul vs. State of Assam (2017)

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This article is written by Shamyana Parveen. In this case, there were complaints about involvement in corruption of Rakesh Kumar Paul, who is a former Chairman of the Assam Public Service Commission (APSC). It is mainly related to the legal analysis of ‘default bail’ under Indian laws with references to cases. The case related to Sections 120B, 420, and 468 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which pertain to criminal conspiracy, cheating, and forgery, respectively. It also contains provisions from the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Introduction

Rakesh Kumar Paul vs. State of Assam (2017) is the case where the petitioner was charged under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act) and the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The court’s decision is evident in the case of Rakesh Kumar Paul vs. State of Assam, where the court held that the police had to stick to the procedural timeline in a criminal investigation. It re-affirms the rationale of the existent default bail to be one of the defense mechanisms that the accused persons possess against oppressive detentions without any legal charges being preferred against them. The ruling also reminds the judicial system that its job is to protect people from being mistreated by those in power while at the same time acknowledging the need for regular and effective investigations by the police.

Details of the case

Case name: Rakesh Kumar Paul vs. State of Assam (2017)

Case no.: Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 2009 of 2017

Type of case: Criminal Appeal

Name of the Court: The Supreme Court of India

Bench: Justice Madan B. Lokur, Justice Deepak Gupta and Justice Prafulla C. Pant

Date of the judgement: 16th August, 2017

Equivalent citations: AIR 2017 SC 3948

Petitioner: Rakesh Kumar Paul

Respondent: State of Assam

Laws involved in the case:

Facts of the case

An FIR was filed under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and the Indian Penal Code, 1860, but the petitioner in this case, Rakesh Kumar Paul, was never mentioned in that FIR. On 5th November 2016, Rakesh Kumar Paul was arrested and taken into custody under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. He attempted to seek bail before the Special Judge on December 20, 2016; however, the application was denied. 

Then, he again moved for bail under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. before the Gauhati High Court on January 01, 2017, which was rejected. On January 03, 2017, the period of 60 days of detention for the petitioner had to end. This is the maximum period for detention during the continuance of the process of investigation (no charge sheet or challan has been produced) allowed by clause 2(a)(ii) of Section 167 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. 

The State further argued that the provisions of Section 167(2)(a)(i) would apply because the Petitioner had committed offences which attract a sentence of not less than ten years imprisonment, and therefore the period of detention was extended to 90 days. On January 11, 2017, the petitioner prayed for bail before the Hon’ble Gauhati High Court, whose order was also turned down. He had sought ‘ordinary’ or ‘normal’ bail and not ‘technical’ bail, known as ‘default bail’. Default bail is filed when the duration of the detention of 60 days comes to an end, and within that duration, there was a failure to prefer a charge. After that, a charge sheet was filed against Paul on January 24, 2017.

Issues raised

  1. Was the petitioner entitled to ‘default bail’ starting from 3rd or 4th January 2017, and definitely by 11th January 2017, when the Gauhati High Court rejected his application for ‘regular bail’?
  2.  Whether Paul could be detained without a charge sheet for 60 days or 90 days?

Contentions of the parties

Petitioner’s arguments

  • The Petitioner argued that the phrase “not less than” 10 years of imprisonment should be interpreted as a minimum sentence of 10 years, referencing the case of Rajeev Chaudhary vs. State (NCT) of Delhi (2001).
  • The argument of the petitioner was that under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act) in Section 13(2), the maximum sentence is seven years only, and the charge sheet should have been filed within 60 days, which is by January 4, 2017.The failure to do so entitled the accused to ‘default bail’ under Section 167(2) of the Code.
  • Even if the PC Act was amended by the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013, to extend the punishment to 10 years, the charge sheet should still have been filed within the 60-day window.
  • The Investigation Agency had not filed the charge sheet within 60 days, so it was in default for not doing so. Section 167(2) of the Code furnishes the grounds to release the accused, even though the charges against the accused could lead to a maximum sentence of seven years.

State’s response

  • The State contended that the appropriate punishment for a case is determined by the court based on the specific facts and circumstances, as established in Bhupinder Singh vs. Jarnail Singh (2006).
  • The State argued that the ‘impregnable right’ to bail is valid only until a charge sheet or challan is filed, and it ceases to exist once the charge sheet or challan is submitted in court, citing Sanjay Dutt vs. State (1994).
  • The State authority said that there is no record of the petitioner having moved this court or any other court for default bail during the period between 4th January and 24th January 2017, when he lost his right for default bail with the filing of a charge sheet.

Laws involved in Rakesh Kumar Paul vs. State of Assam (2017)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC)

Section 167 (2) of the CrPC

Section 167(2) of the CrPC mandates that if the investigation is not completed within a specified period of 90 for offences punishable with imprisonment of at least 10 years and 60 days for other offences, then the accused is entitled to bail by default.

The main issue in this case was the interpretation of Section 167 (2) of the CrPC, which deals with the maximum period for which an accused can be detained without a charge sheet being filed. If the investigation is not done within the said period (90 days for crimes that attract a jail term of not less than 10 years and 60 days for other crimes), the accused person is released on bail, referred to as “default bail.”

Present status of the provision

The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, is the new Act which was introduced on the 11th of August, 2023, to replace the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). It came into effect from 1st July, 2024. The provision of Section 167 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), which deals with the procedure when an investigation cannot be completed in 24 hours, has been incorporated into the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) Act, 2023. In the BNSS, 2023, this provision is reflected in Section 187(2). It is the mirroring provision of Section 167 (2) of CrPC. Section 187 (2) of BNSS Act, 2023 provides that the Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this Section may, irrespective of whether he has or has no jurisdiction to try the case, after taking into consideration the status of the accused person as to whether he is not released on bail or his bail has not been cancelled, authorise, from time to time, the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding 15 days in the whole, or in parts, at any time during the initial 40 days or 60 days out of the detention period of 60 days or 90 days, as the case may be, as provided in Sub-Section (3).

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

Section 13 of the PC Act, 1988

This section deals with criminal misconduct by a public servant of property with intent that is not related to public service or where such an act displeases the owners of such property. Intentionally enrich themselves illicitly during their period of office. This includes having cash or property which is inconsistent with one’s identified means of income, which one cannot explain adequately. The criminal misconduct of any public servant shall make them liable to imprisonment for a term not less than one year but which may be longer than seven years and be liable for a fine. 

In this case, Rakesh Kumar Paul engaged in misconduct by taking advantage, which is undue and procured by misuse of his position for gain that may involve misappropriation of property and money. The charges preferred against Rakesh Kumar Paul were being in possession of things of value or pecuniary gains without making any compensation, which is a connotation of corruption.

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC)

Section 120B of IPC

This section deals with the crime of criminal conspiracy. The essence of the offence is where, by agreement, two or more persons commit an offence or do a legal act by wrong means. If the conspiracy is to commit an offence for which some punishment is provided in this code, and such punishment is death, imprisonment for life, or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or more, the punishment is the same as if such person had abetted the offence. Where conspiracies are to be made on other offences, penalties include imprisonment not exceeding six months, a fine or both. Rakesh Kumar Paul, being part of a group, was charged with abetting the commission of corrupt activities and fraud.

Present status of the provision

The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, was enacted on 25th December 2023, repealing and replacing the Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860. It came into effect from 1st July, 2024. The provision of Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860, which deals with the punishment for criminal conspiracy, has been incorporated into the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, under Section 61. There is no change in the content of the new Section 61 of the BNS Act, 2023. The Section has been rearranged, and the format has been modified without changing the content.

Section 420 of IPC

Section 420 of the IPC pertains to the offence of cheating and dishonestly, including the delivery of property. The Section applies where a man cheats and dishonestly causes the person deceived to deliver any property or goods to any person or to alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security or anything which is signed or sealed and capable of being converted into any valuable security. The punishment that can be given for this as an offence is up to seven years, with a fine also included. In the case, the allegations included that Rakesh Kumar Paul, through fraudulent means, caused others to deliver any property or money to him, which is recognised by this Section as cheating.

Present status of the provision

The provision of Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860, which deals with cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property, has been consolidated into the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, under Section 318(4). There is no change in the content of new Section 318 (4) of the BNS Act, 2023.

Section 468 of IPC

Section 468 of the IPC deals with forgery for the purpose of cheating. This Section applies to any person who commits forgery with the purpose of making it appear or knowing that it will be made to appear that a document or electronic record has been created when it has or has not been altered. The offence committed in this regard attracts a penalty that may not exceed seven years, and the offender is also punishable by a fine. This case made allegations that Rakesh Kumar Paul counterfeited the documents or records for corrupt practices and for the purpose of cheating others.

Present status of the provision

The provision of Section 468 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860, which deals with forgery for the purpose of cheating, has been consolidated into the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, under Section 336 (3). There is no change in the content of new Section 336 (3) of the BNS Act, 2023. It is the same as the previous Section 468 of the IPC Act, 1860.

Judgement in Rakesh Kumar Paul vs. State of Assam (2017)

The Supreme Court of India delivered its judgement in the case of Rakesh Kumar Paul vs. State of Assam (2017) on 16th August 2017, which concluded that the ‘default bail’ was recognized for Rakesh Kumar Paul under Section 167(2) of CrPC, 1973.

According to the opinion of Justice Madan B. Lokur, the bail is said to be the bar that cannot be beaten, and any petitioner shall be released after a period of sixty days if the charge sheet is not filed. The petitioner had complied with all the aspects of an application for default bail. In the case where the minimum period has been prescribed, the sentencing judge cannot but give a sentence of at least that amount prescribed. Hence, the words ‘not less than’ are used in clause (i) to proviso (a) of section 167(2) of the Cr. P. C. (and in other provisions) must be given its natural and obvious meaning, which is to say, not below a minimum threshold and in the case of Section 167 of the Cr.P.C. These words must refer to an offence for which the person convicted is liable to be punished with not less than ten years imprisonment. On the question of personal liability, the court should not be too technical and must proceed on the broad principles of liberty of the subject. On questions concerning liberty and Article 21 of the Constitution, it would be very unwise to be strictly technical. The criminal magistrate shall order the giving of the so-called default bail.

Justice Deepak Gupta stated that even if the power was sought to be exercised by filling the charge sheet after the accused had offered to furnish bail, the indefeasible right could not be defeated. Even though the period had expired, the Accused would be deemed to be in legal custody till he does not furnish the bail.

The original demand was to furnish the bail. In all cases where the minimum is less than 10 years but the maximum sentence is not death or life imprisonment, section 167(2)(a)(ii) will apply. The accused does not have to plead any cause for the grant of bail. He does not have to complete the paperwork for a detailed application. In the application, all he has to affirm is that since 60 days have expired and no charge sheet has been filed, he should be released on bail. The Bail shall be granted, in case a bail has been provided.

Justice Prafulla C. Pant stated that an offence where the penalty can attract imprisonment for 10 years, the accused is only allowed bail on default after 90 days. This allegation not only involved an economic offence but also a violation of the constitutional rights of the victim of the crime. In any case, it was not fit to grant bail at this stage, even on merit. The intention of the legislature was that if an offence was punishable with imprisonment up to 10 years, then it comes under Section 167(2)(a)(i). As it is seen, the bail on default is contingent upon the application asserting the statutory right under section 167(2) of the code. For example, in the case of enforcement of statutory rights, such an application has to be made before the magistrate. It is a matter of constitutional fraud and not only economic fraud. The Accused should be in custody for 90 days.

The Supreme Court decided that if the punishment for a crime can be more than 10 years then the rules for default bail under Section 167(2) of the CrPC apply. The court interpreted the idea of personal liberty by stating that it is founded and unchangeable regardless of the State’s perspective of justice. The Apex Court held that Paul was legally capable of receiving the default bail since no charge sheet had been filed within sixty days from the date of his arrest.

Rationale behind

The rationale behind the judgement in this case is mainly on the interpretation of legal provisions related to default bail and the protection of personality. Some of the points are discussed below:

  1. Explaining about the eligibility for bail: The petitioner satisfied all the circumstances for “default bail”, as per the provision given legal time limit, which was justifying his freedom, this was stated by the judge who believed in equality.
  2. Majority vs. minority opinion on bail: The majority of the judges held that after the period of 60 days default bail should be granted, for the crimes that are punishable by up to 10 years. The minority opinion was attentive to the fact that the petitioner had earlier pleaded for default bail and must be permitted to leave as per legal schedule.
  3. Explanation of not less than ten years: According to Section 167(2)(a)(i), the dissenting judge expressed an opinion that “not less than” must be interpreted in its direct sense, which specifies that the offence should have a minimum sentence of not less than ten years. Where the offence specifies a minimum sentence of less than ten years and the maximum sentence is neither death nor life imprisonment, the provisions of Section 167(2)(a)(ii) would be pertinent in that case.

Dissenting opinion

The Supreme Court of India in Rakesh Kumar Paul Vs State of Assam (2017) has been split with the majority holding that for offences for which the punishment is imprisonment up to 10 years, if the charge sheet is not filed within sixty days, the accused should be entitled for ‘default bail’. In such cases, default bail should apply after the 90 days.

However, Justice Prafulla C. Pant had a different view. Justice Prafulla emphasised those words that the right to bail is absolute and that this should not be spoiled by a detained charge sheet for the accused once bail is appealed. He also provided a hint that the case involved not just the aspect of lawbreaking in money matters but also a constitutional violation of the victims’ rights and, therefore, was not fit for consideration of bail at that stage, no matter the merits of the case.

The other party’s argument was based on the fact that the term “not less than” connotes a positive degree of something fixed. Thus, it was recommended that in the application of section 167 CrPC, this should be speaking of an offence that is punishable with imprisonment of at least 10 years.

Critical analysis of Rakesh Kumar Paul vs. State of Assam (2017)

The judgement given by the Supreme Court of India in the case of Rakesh Kumar Paul vs. State of Assam is to analyse how the court protects individuals in the criminal justice system. The decision declares the need to recognise the values of personal freedoms with special reference to the right of ‘default bail’ without undue adherence to the technicalities of procedure. It involves a matter-of-fact overview of legal justification, as well as a view of its conclusion regarding the rights of the accused.

  1. Logical perspective: The court’s investigation was mainly focused on the protection of an individual’s liberty from tyrannical custody, and it is very deeply rooted in a diligent knowledge of the legal system. The decision of the court accurately examined the clause of ‘default bail’, underscoring its importance as a defense against the possibility of the State corrupting the legal procedure.
  2. Legal Interpretation: The phrase “imprisonment for a term not less than ten years” was very important as the court carefully analysed it. In terms of laws, there is a need for clarity, which is highlighted by the court, including the 90-day period for ‘default bail’ so that the rights of the accused can be understood. The court asked for a clear and straightforward interpretation. It ensures that the law is applied exactly as it is clearly stated, leaving no ambiguity that could affect the rights of the accused.
  3. Effect on law enforcement and execution: In the disposal of the case, the rules and regulations particularly in the criminal justice chain may be over emphasised with a potential for systematic gains. Thus, the time frame for inspection and charge sheets that the law enforcement agencies and attorneys will have to be more proactive.
  4. Argument for judicial decision: If the matter is looked at from an advocate of judicial activism, then it may be said that in the case of Rakesh Kumar Paul vs. State of Assam, the decision of the court rightly signifies that the judiciary actively plays the part of a sentinel for the rights of the people of this country. As they do not allow for infringement on certain rights, such as freedom, they would perceive the court’s approach as an accountability mechanism to the legislature and the executive arm of the government.

Conclusion

The case of Rakesh Kumar Paul vs. the State of Assam is important for understanding personal freedom and the right to bail in India. It shows how complex the judicial process is and its impact on individual rights. The case also highlights the judiciary’s role in protecting constitutional principles from state interference. Studying this case helps uncover its detailed aspects and emphasises its significance in the judicial system.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

What is the meaning of ‘default bail’?

If the authorities don’t file a charge sheet within a specified time, the accused can be released on bail. This is known as “default bail” under Section 167(2)(a) of the CrPC, which protects the rights of the accused. 

Can a judicial decision be an essential moment for the rights of personal liberty?

Indeed, this case is seen as transformative because it emphasises that personal freedom should not be compromised when the state is delivering justice.

In the same regard, how is the right to bail being collided due to this case in India?

Default bail can be granted if certain conditions are met, as shown in the case. This case highlighted the importance of personal freedom and the requirements the state must meet to follow proper procedures.

References

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Hiba (gift) under Muslim Law

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Islamic-Law-Law-of-the-Muslim-World-eJournal.-June-14

This article was written by Abhinav Rana and has been further updated by Sakshi Kuthari. In this article, the concept of gift under Muslim law has been discussed in detail. The focus is on the requisites of gifts, the donor’s right to gift, modes of making a valid gift, void gifts, oral gifts, the doctrine of ‘mushaa’, revocation of gifts, kinds of gifts and the differences between them.

This article has been published by Shashwat Kaushik.

Introduction

Under Mohammedan law, the concept of Hiba (a gift under Muslim law) has been in existence since 600 A.D. A ‘Hiba’ or a disposition inter vivos is defined as the donation of a thing from which the donee may derive benefit. It is an unconditional transfer of property, made immediately and without any exchange or consideration, by one person to another and accepted by or on behalf of the latter. According to the Mohammedan Law, the transfer of property as a gift is not regulated by the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. It is instead regulated by the Mohammedan Law. It allows an individual to donate their entire property during their lifetime. Muslims have various modes of transferring their property, one of which is “Hiba.”  In India, it is often considered that the term ‘gift’ is similar to ‘Hiba’  and both are understood to connote all transfers of property without consideration. Whereas in English law, ‘gift’ has a much wider expression that is applicable to each and every transaction where an individual transfers his or her property to another without any consideration for the same. In contradiction to this, the term ‘Hiba’ in Mohammedan law has a much narrower connotation. 

Definition of Hiba (gift) under Muslim Law

According to the Mohammedan law, a Hiba or simple gift inter vivos, is the donation of an item from one living person to another, allowing the donee to derive certain benefits. In other words, it can also be defined as an unconditional transfer of property, executed instantly and without any exchange of consideration (something in return), from one individual to another, with acceptance by or on behalf of the recipient. In this type of unrestricted transfer, payment of consideration is not necessary. According to Mulla’s definition, a gift is made immediately, with no exchange involved, and is accepted by or on behalf of the recipient.

A person has the legal right to give their property to another individual during their lifetime or to transfer it through a will, which takes effect after their death. When a gift is made between two living beings, it is referred to as a disposition inter vivos, and when the gift is made by way of will, it is known as a testamentary disposition. The difference between a disposition inter vivos and a testamentary disposition is that in the case of a disposition inter vivos, a person is not restricted from giving away the whole of his property, while in the case of a testamentary disposition, the right is limited to transferring one-third of the net estate. 

A misnomer exists between the terms ‘gift’ and ‘Hiba’ in India. ‘Gift’ and ‘Hiba’ are understood to signify all types of property transfers that are made without consideration. But it is important to note that a ‘gift’ has a wider connotation than ‘Hiba’. Hiba, under Mohammedan law, is treated as a type of contract that involves an offer made by the donor to give a thing, which is then accepted by the donee. When the gift involves the entire property, it is referred to as a Hiba,  while a gift of only the property’s usufructs is called an ‘Ariyah’. 

Essentials of Hiba (gift)

Three things are necessary for a valid Hiba, i.e., it must be immediate and complete and there must be a declaration for the same. The Hon’ble Kerala High Court in P. Kunheema Umma vs. Ayissa Umma (1981) held that under Muslim law, the following are the essentials for a transfer of immovable property by way of gift:

  1. The donor must make a gift’s declaration;
  2. The donee must receive the gift’s acceptance, and
  3. The donee must get possession of the gift from the donor.

There are four key conditions that must be met by a Muslim person to make a gift. The following are the essentials for a valid transfer of property by way of gift:

  1. Parties to a gift;
  2. Subject-matter of a gift;
  3. Extent of the gift; and
  4. Mode of transfer of the gift.

Parties to a gift

At the time of making a valid transfer of a gift, two parties are involved. The person who expresses his or her willingness to transfer property  to another person is called the donor. Conversely, the person who gives his or her consent to accept the gift from the donor is referred to as the donee.

Donor

To make a valid gift, the following conditions must be met by the donor:

  • Firstly, the donor of the gift must be a Muslim. A Hiba can only be made by a Muslim.     
  • Secondly, the person must be of legal age, meaning they must have attained the age of majority. It is important to note that the age of majority for the purpose of gifting shall be governed by the Indian Majority Act, 1875. A person is considered to have reached the age of majority for the purpose of making a valid gift if they have attained eighteen years of age, according to Section 3 of the said Act. If a minor is under the guardianship of the Court of Wards, they will reach the age of majority upon reaching twenty-one years of age.
  • Thirdly, the donor’s consent must be given freely. If consent is obtained through force, coercion, or undue influence, the gift transaction will not have legal enforcement.
  • Fourthly, it is necessary that the donor be of a sane mind at the time of making the gift. If the gift is made by a person of unsound mind,  it is considered an invalid gift. 
  • Fifthly, the donor must have ownership of the property they intend to give as a gift. 

A Pardanashin Muslim lady is also capable of being a competent donor. But it is necessary that the gift by her be made voluntarily and should be legally operative. In the case of Mt. Hussaina Bai W/O Mohammad Hussain vs. Mt. Zohra Bai W/O Taherali (1960), the Hon’ble Madhya Pradesh High Court was of the opinion that in the case of a pardanashin Muslim lady being the donor of the gift, she should have a full understanding of the gift execution, its nature and its effect. The Court shall, in each case, carefully examine the gift transaction, whether it is a fair one or not. In cases where the gift deed is not in her mother tongue, it is a legal requirement  to ensure she understands the content of the gift deed rather than merely hearing it read aloud. The protection granted to the pardanashin Muslim lady by the said rule applies equally to women who are unable to read and write and are ignorant of its contents. 

An insolvent person is also capable of making a valid gift. The donor should have a true and real intent to give the gift and it should not be done to defraud the creditors.

The intention of the donor is determined by his or her declaration to make a gift. It must be made clearly and without any ambiguity. The declaration can be made in two ways by the donor, either orally or in writing. In Ilahi Shamsuddin vs. Jaitunbi Makbul (1994), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that under Mohammedan law, both the donor’s declaration and the donee’s acceptance can be expressed orally, whether the property is movable or immovable. If the declaration and acceptance of the gift are made in written form by way of a gift deed, under Mohammedan law, it is called a Hibanama. It need not be on the stamp paper or registered. The Hon’ble Guwahati High Court in Md. Hesabuddin vs. Md. Hesaruddin (1983) held that where a Muslim woman transfers her property by way of gift or Hiba and the gift-deed was not on the stamp paper, it was still valid. The declaration must be in express form. A gift made in an ambiguous manner is null and void. 

Donee

The person who accepts the gift is referred to as a donee. The following points should be taken into account when donee gets the gift:

  • Firstly, religion does not restrict the acceptance of a gift made by a Muslim. The donee can belong to any religion, Muslim or non-Muslim.  
  • Secondly, age is not a barrier for a donee; they can be of any age, whether of the majority or minority. If a gift is made in favour of a minor by someone other than the father or guardian, it must include the delivery of possession to the father or guardian of the minor.
  • Thirdly, a gift cannot be made in favour of an unborn child. However, a gift of future usufructs (the right to use and enjoy the property) to an unborn person is valid as long as the donee is born and exists when the interest becomes effective. A gift can be made in favour of a minor child. A father, his executor, paternal grand-father, or paternal grandfather’s executor can make a valid gift for their minor son, as established in the case of Valia Peedikakkandi Kutheessa Ummaand vs. Pathakkalan Naravanath Kumhamuand (1963) by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The provisions mentioned below of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 are important points to be taken into consideration in this connection:
  1. Section 13 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, provides for the transfer of property for the benefit of an unborn person. According to this provision, the transfer must establish an interest for the unborn person that is subject to any prior interests created by the same transfer, and this interest must encompass the entire remaining interest of the transferor in the property. The intent of this section is to prevent the transferor from hindering the free disposition of the property by future generations.
  2. The rule against perpetuity under Section 14 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, should be followed, i.e., a property cannot be transferred in a way that makes it inalienable for an indefinite period. In cases where the transferor has restricted the transferee’s ability to transfer the property or has established interests that are too remote, it can result in a perpetual disposition of the property, which is not permissible.
  3. Section 15 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, provides that if the gift is made for a class of persons and is void under Sections 13 or 14 of the said Act, it will only fail for those specific persons, not for the whole class;
  4. Section 16 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, provides that if a gift to an unborn person is considered void under Section 13 or 14 of the said Act, any subsequent gift intended to take effect after that will also be void.
  • Fourthly, for a religious entity, the transfer of property can also be made, i.e., a mosque or other institution. For this purpose, they are considered both juristic persons and competent donees.

For a gift to be valid, it must be accepted by the donee. If there are multiple donees, each must accept the gift individually and separately.

Subject-matter of a gift

For a property to be a valid subject of a gift, it must fulfil the following conditions:

  • Anything over which property rights can be exercised; 
  • Any property that can be taken into possession;
  • Anything that exists as a separate entity or as an enforceable right;
  • Anything that falls under the definition of “Mal”. In Arabic, “Mal” refers to anything that one can acquire and possess, whether it is tangible (such as gold, silver, animals, and plants) or involves the use and enjoyment of something (like using vehicles, wearing clothes, or living in houses);
  • The property must exist at the time the gift is made; any gift of something to be created in the future is considered void.
  • The donor must possess the subject matter of the gift. If the gift is made by a trespasser and the donee does not gain possession, the gift is regarded as void.

Under Mohammedan law, it is the court’s responsibility to determine whether the gift made by the donor involves the corpus (the complete ownership rights over the property that are inheritable and indefinite in duration) or the usufruct (the right to use and enjoy the property). If a gift of the subject matter of property includes a condition that conflicts with absolute ownership, that condition is considered void and repugnant. Only temporary interests can affect the enjoyment of the property, while ownership of the subject matter of the property is subject to any such temporary interests.

Requisites of a valid gift

The most important requisite of Hiba is that it must fulfil the rules laid down under the Mohammedan law for making a valid gift. The presence of the donor and donee, their ability to make and accept the gift and the existence of a valid subject matter of the gift will not have the effect of a valid gift. It is important that certain formalities and tests of the validity of a gift transaction are satisfied. The following three conditions must be fulfilled to make a valid gift:

Declaration of gift by donor 

To make a valid gift, it is necessary that there be a clear and unambiguous intention of the donor to make the gift. If there is an absence of real or bona fide intent on the donor’s part, the alleged gift is considered void. The declaration of the gift must be made voluntarily. The donor must give free consent before making the gift. If the declaration of the gift has been made under coercion, fraud, misrepresentation or undue influence, such a gift will be considered a void gift.

Acceptance of a gift

A gift is a bilateral transaction. For a valid gift, it is also necessary that it be accepted by the donee. Acceptance signifies the intention of the donee to take the property and become its owner. Without acceptance, a gift is not complete. Under Mohammedan law, acceptance of a gift on behalf of a minor or a person of unsound mind can be given by the guardian of his property. In case the gift of a donee is to a group of persons, all the persons constituting that group must be ascertainable. A gift made in favour of two or more donees must be accepted by all of them separately. If the share of each donee is clearly defined, the donor need not separate or divide these shares and give possession to each of them. However, a gift of two or more donee without specifying their respective shares and without giving them separate possession has also been held to be valid. In such cases, the donees take the property as a tenant-in-common.

Delivery of possession

The declaration of a gift and its acceptance must be followed by the delivery of actual possession. Under Mohammedan law, a gift is complete only after the delivery of possession. The gift comes into effect on the date on which possession of the property is delivered to the donee, not on the date on which the declaration was made. Mohammedan law does not recognise the transfer of ownership rights from donor to donee until the delivery of possession of the property takes place. The donor must completely divest himself of not only  ownership but also possession in favour of the donee to complete the gift. Delivery of possession is so important in the Mohammedan law of gifts that without delivery of possession to the donee, the gift is void even if it has been made through a registered document.

The mode of delivery of possession is dependent upon the nature of the property gifted. To legally transfer possession to a donee, a donor must take an action that allows the donee to gain physical control of the property. A donee is said to be in possession of a property when he can exercise exclusive control over it for the purpose of deriving from it such benefit as it is capable of rendering or as is usually derived from it. The term possession means ‘only such possession as the nature of the subject matter of the gift is capable of giving’. The mode of delivery of possession of property can be either actual or constructive. 

  • Actual Delivery: In actual delivery, the gift that is being made is physically transferred to the donee. Actual delivery of the possession is possible when the gift that is being transferred is of a tangible nature. Tangible means something that we can feel, see and touch. But in the case of tangible goods, they can be both movable and immovable. Actual delivery can be done in the case of only movable goods. For example, if a person wants to gift a laptop to another person,  he can make his actual delivery tangible and movable in nature.
  • Constructive Delivery: The transfer of immovable and intangible property is not possible so it is just a symbolic transfer of property. For example, if a man wants to gift a house to someone, he can just hand over the keys and the related documents to the donee. He cannot pick up the house and hand it over to the donee. So, in this case, the delivery made is constructive in nature.

When the delivery of possession not an essential

Under Mohammedan law, the general rule is that a gift is invalid without a delivery of possession. The Mohammedan law of gift attaches great importance to possession of property, especially immovable property. The other elements of Hiba will have no legal effect unless they are accompanied by the delivery of possession. However, there are certain exceptions to this general rule. In the following cases, a gift is considered valid even without the actual or constructive delivery of property:

  • Donor and donee living in the same property: In Hayatuddin vs. Abdul Gain and Ors. (1974), it was observed that where the subject matter of the gift is a house in which both the donor and donee are living together, the delivery of possession is not important. There is no need for a formal physical departure or formal entry of property. But there must be the bona fide intention of the donor for the transfer of property. In the case of Humera Bibi vs. Najim Un Nissa (1905), there was an old lady who used to live with her nephew. She transferred the property to her nephew, who was living with her in the same house. However, when the property was given on rent, the rent was collected in the name of the donee. The court held the gift valid. 
  • Gift by the spouses to each other: Where a gift of immovable property is made by one spouse to the other, the delivery of possession is not mandatory nor are the formalities regarding it. It is not required to vacate the house or remove the donor’s belongings when a gift is made from a husband to a wife, or vice versa. It could be inferred from the surrounding circumstances that the donor had a bona fide intention to make the gift. The Hon’ble Bombay High Court held in the case of Ma-Mi vs. Kallander Ammal (1926) that a gift will not be invalidated in the house if it is donated by the husband to the wife and the husband still stays there. In the case of Fatmabibi W/D Abdulkarim Haji vs. Abdulrehman Abdulkarim (2000), the husband made an oral declaration of transfer of property in the name of his wife. The stepson, who was living with the mother, challenged the validity of the gift, as no delivery of possession was made and the gift was not accepted. The gift was considered valid by the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court. It was considered a valid gift because the gift was made in the presence of two witnesses, which amounts to the declaration of the gift. In the registration deed, the name of the wife was mentioned, which amounts to acceptance of the gift and in the mutation, the name of the wife was mentioned, which amounts to delivery of possession.
  • Gift by one co-sharer to another: When one co-sharer makes a gift to another, it is regarded as valid even if no actual delivery of possession has occurred. The only requirement for a valid gift made between co-sharers is that the donor should have a real and bona fide intention to make a gift in favour of the donee.
  • Part Delivery of Gift: If there is sufficient evidence to prove that some of the gifted properties have been delivered, the delivery of possession for the remaining properties may be inferred.
  • Zamindari villages: In case the subject-matter of the gift consists of Zamindari villages and parcels of land and the physical possession of the same is not possible, then the gift can come into effect by mutation of names and transfer of rents and incomes.
  • Gift of property already in possession of the donee: In cases where the possession of the property is already with the donee, only the declaration by the donor and acceptance by the donee are enough to make this gift a valid gift. For example, if A has a car and he is using it for his own use and now his father transfers it to his name, the declaration by the father and the acceptance by the son are enough to make this gift a valid gift.

Kinds of gifts under Mohammedan Law

The absolute gift of the corpus of the property without any return is known as a ’’Hiba’’ or simple gift. It is called a proper gift if all the essentials laid down in the Mohammedan law are fulfilled. There are also other types of gifts that are essentially variations of hiba, yet they differ from it in some respects. Those kinds of gifts do not strictly fulfil the essentials of a valid Hiba as laid down in its definition. They are as follows:

Hiba-bil-iwaz

Under Islamic law, ‘Hiba’ means gift and ‘iwaz’ means consideration. Hiba-bil-iwaz, thus, means the gift for the consideration already given. Under all the laws, there is no system where there is consideration for the gift. But under Muslim law, there is a system of gifts with an exchange. It involves two mutual or reciprocal gifts exchanged between two individuals. In other words, when one gift is given by the donor to the donee and the other gift is given from the side of the donee to the donor, it constitutes Hiba-bil-iwaz. The gift given by the donor to the donee is a separate and independent transaction from the gift made by the donee to the donor. For instance, if A gifts his bungalow to his friend B, and in return, B gifts his car to A, it is referred to as Hiba-bil-iwaz. The second gift from B to A is known as iwaz, meaning “return.”

In India, Hiba-bil-iwaz was introduced to give effect to a gift of mushaa to all types of properties that are capable of division. In other words, it must be carried out in accordance with the rules governing simple gifts. In Moideenkutty vs. Pathumma And Others (1984), it was held that the registration of hiba-bil-iwaz is mandatory, as in the case of a sale.

Requisites of a valid Hiba-bil-iwaz

  • Firstly, there must be a complete and valid gift made by the donor to the donee. If the gift made is not according to the rule of Muslim law, then it is no gift. 
  • Secondly, there must be a payment consideration made by the donee.

Hiba-ba-Shart-ul-Iwaz

The term ‘Shart’ means stipulation. Hiba-ba-Shart-ul-Iwaz means a gift made with a stipulation for return. In this case, the consideration is not paid by the donee by his own choice but it is paid because it is a necessary condition here.The transaction is finalised upon the delivery of possession. When the donee pays the consideration, the gift takes on the nature of a sale. Either party has the right to return the subject of the sale if any defects are discovered.

Requisites of a valid Hiba-ba-Shart-ul-Iwaz

  • Firstly, the delivery of possession is important;
  • Secondly, it can be revoked anytime until the iwaz (return) is paid; 
  • Thirdly, as soon as the iwaz is paid, it becomes irrevocable; and 
  • Fourthly, a transaction, when completed by payment of Iwaz, assumes the character of a sale.

It is important to note here that the point of similarity between these two types of gifts is that they are given on the basis of reciprocity. The Mohammedan law of Hiba applies to both of these two types of gifts. It must be executed in accordance with the rules governing simple gifts.

Difference between ‘Hiba-bil-iwaz’ and ‘Hiba-ba-Shart-ul-Iwaz’

Basis of differenceHiba-bil-iwazHiba-ba-Shart-ul-Iwaz
Inclusion of “Iwaz” in the gift contractIwaz (return) is included in the gift contract as it serves as a direct and immediate consideration.Iwaz is stipulated for and included in the original gift contract.
Delivery of possessionFor the validity of this type of gift, delivery of possession is not a required condition.For the validity of this type of gift, delivery of possession is a necessary condition to be met.
Irrevocability of the giftAs soon as this type of gift is made, it becomes irrevocable.This type of gift becomes irrevocable once the donee makes the payment of iwaz.
Nature of the transactionIt is just like a contract of sale.Initially, it is a type of gift; however, once the donee makes the payment of iwaz, it takes on the nature of a contract of sale.

Comparison between ‘Hiba’, ‘Hiba-bil-iwaz’ and ‘Hiba-ba-Shart-ul-Iwaz’

Basis of differenceHibaHiba-bil-iwazHiba-ba-Shart-ul-Iwaz
Transfer of ownershipIn this type of gift, the property’s ownership is transferred to the donee without consideration.In this type of gift, the property’s ownership is transferred for consideration. It is known as an ‘iwaz’. There is no express condition for an ‘iwaz’. The consideration received by the donee is voluntary in nature.In this type of gift, ownership of the property is transferred for consideration, known as ‘iwaz.’ An explicit condition is attached for its return.
Requisites for delivery of possessionThe prerequisite for a Hiba to be valid is the delivery of possession to the donee.Delivery of possession is not an essential element in this type of gift.For this type of gift, it is necessary that the delivery of possession take place.
Gift of MushaaA gift of mushaa is invalid when the property is divisible.A gift of mushaa is valid in this case, even if the property is divisible.A gift of mushaa is invalid in this type of gift, if the property is divisible.
Revocability of the giftExcept in certain cases, this type of gift is revocable in nature.This type of gift is irrevocable from the moment it is made.This type of gift becomes irrevocable only once it is promised. condition is fulfilled, not before that.
Nature of the transactionHiba is a pure and simple type of gift.Hiba-bil-iwaz is just like a contract of sale.Initially, Hiba-ba-Shart-ul-IwAz functions as a gift but takes on the nature of a sale once the promised condition is fulfilled.

Sadaqah

The term ‘Sadaqah’ comes from the Arabic word “sadq” or “sidq,” which literally means “to tell the truth or to be sincere”. In the context of Islamic jurisprudence, however, ‘Sadaqah’ is specifically defined as a charitable gift given to the poor for the sake of God or to seek rewards from him.

Requirements of Sadaqah

Islamic jurists have established specific conditions and pillars to classify a charitable act as Sadaqah. There are three essential pillars of Sadaqah, each with its own requirements that must be met for the act to be recognized as Sadaqah. These pillars are as follows:

Donor (al-Mutasaddaq): The donor is an individual who allocates their property for Sadaqah. To be considered a valid giver of Sadaqah, the following requirements must be met:

  • The donor must be mature (baligh) and of sound mind (caqil); and
  • The property being donated must either belong to the donor or be under their legitimate representation.

Recipient (al-Mutasadaq ‘alaih): The recipient is the individual who receives the money from the donor. Unlike the donor, the criteria for qualifying as a recipient of Sadaqah are as follows:

  • The recipient does not need to have reached maturity, according to the concept of al-Bulugh;
  • The recipient does not need to be of sound mind (‘Aqil), as per the concept of al-Rushd, to qualify for receiving Sadaqah.

Donated Property: The donated property can consist of either movable or immovable assets, or a combination of both. In principle, the property must be acquired from lawful sources, meaning it should be legally recognized as permissible within the framework of Shariat.

Types of Sadaqah

There are five types of Sadaqah classified according to their obligations. They are as follows:

  • Sadaqah Wajibah (Property): Mandatory charity related to one’s property;
  • Sadaqah Wajibah (Body): Mandatory charity related to one’s body (e.g., Sadaqah al-Fitr);
  • Nazar: Mandatory charity resulting from a personal vow;
  • Kafarah and Fidyah: Mandatory charity required when someone violates a specific Shariat law;
  • Sadaqah Tatawu: voluntary charity.

Ariyat

‘Ariyat’ refers to a gift granting the right to use a property for a specified period on a particular estate and can be revoked at the discretion of the grantor. It functions more like a licence, being personal and neither inheritable nor transferable. Ariyat gifts are revocable and do not confer ownership rights over the property itself but only the right to the income or benefits derived from it.

Gift of ‘Musha’ (Hiba-bil-Musha)

‘Musha” has been derived from the Arabic word meaning ‘saayu,’ which refers to “an undivided share in the property”. It is the ‘undivided part’ or share in the property, which could also be a common building or land. The gift of a divisible part of an item is only valid if that specific part is physically separated from the donor’s ownership. In contrast, the gift of an indivisible item is always considered valid. Musha is thus a co-owned property, which is also a joint property. Moreover, if one of the several owners of that particular property makes a gift of their own share, there may be confusion regarding which part of the property has to be given to the donee. In other words, there could be a real difficulty in delivering the possession of the gift if it is of joint property that is made by a donor without partition of that gifted share. 

Under the Hanafi Law, a gift of Musha is considered irregular but can be validated through separation and delivery of possession. The Shafei and Ithna Ashari Schools accept a gift of Musha only if the donor relinquishes control of the subject matter in favour of the donee. Except for the Hanafi School, all other schools of Muslim law view the gift of an undivided share in indivisible property as valid and lawful. According to Shia Law, a gift of Musha is regarded as valid in all cases, whether the property is movable or immovable, provided the donor transfers possession by vacating and allowing the donee to take control.

In Sk. Aftab Husain And Anr. vs. Smt. Tayabba Begum And Anr. (1972), the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court held that where Mohammedan co-sharers are in actual joint possession of a house, their possession is legally recognised as being on behalf of all co-sharers, including those who are not in actual possession. In this case, the non-possessing co-sharer is regarded as having constructive possession. If a co-sharer who has constructive possession gifts their undivided share of the house and has also divested themselves of proprietary rights while delivering constructive possession to the donee, the gift is not impacted by the said doctrine and is considered valid.

The Hon’ble Patna High Court in Musammat Bibi Bilkis vs. Sheikh Wahid Ali (1927) held that the validity of a gift of mushaa should be evaluated in the same way as any other gift.

Kinds of Musha

A gift of Musha or an undivided share in a joint (immovable or movable) property, is of the following two kinds:

Musha Indivisible

The gift of Musha, which is indivisible, is valid. There are some properties that are, by their very nature, indivisible. The physical partition or division of those properties is not practical. Moreover, if it is against the nature of such properties, their partition or division is affected at all and hence their identity is lost entirely, they do not retain the same properties that they were before the partition. For instance, a bathing ghat, a staircase or the cinema house cannot be divided as Musha properties. However, if, on the bank of a river or a tank, there is a bathing ghat that is in the co-ownership of two or more persons, then each of the owners has the right to deal with his share as he deems fit, including the right to make a gift of his share. 

However, if a sharer has attempted to separate his share, the utility of the ghat will be completely finished. Where a staircase is jointly owned by, for instance, two persons, then each being the owner of half of the stair-case, is entirely entitled to make a gift of his or her share, but if the stair-case is divided into two parts, it would either be too narrow to be used by anyone, or the upper half may come in the share of one and the other lower half is in the other’s share hence, in both cases, the staircase would become useless for both of them and also for the donee as well. It has also been provided that to every Hiba, the doctrine of musha applies, except insofar as it must be taken that the creators of the doctrine could not have contemplated that it should be applied to the subject matter of any particular gift.

Musha Divisible

In Hanafi law, the gift of Musha of the divisible property is termed irregular (fasid) if made without partition, however, a co-owned piece of land, house or garden is Musha, which is divisible. The land can be divided and a specific share can be separated by a visible mark of identification. Similarly, a house that is jointly owned may be divided by a partition wall without changing its entire identity. However, under the Hanafi doctrine of Musha, the gift without partition and the actual delivery of possession are not void ab initio; they are merely irregular, which means fasid. The result is that where such a gift has been made, it may be regularised by the successive partition and by giving to the donee the actual possession of the specified share of the property. 

There are certain instances where a gift of Musha, even if divisible, is considered valid. These cases include:

  • Gift from one heir to another: The transfer of a gift Musha amongst co-heirs is considered a valid Musha. In the case of Mahomed Buksh Khan And Others vs. Mussumat Hussaini Bibi And Others (1888), it was ruled by the Hon’ble High Court of Judicature in Bengal that the mother of the deceased can make a valid gift of her share to both the deceased’s son and daughter, or to either of them.
  • Gift of a share by a co-sharer in a Zamindari or Talauqa: The gift of Musha is valid in this case because the donee has been granted the right to separately receive and collect a specific share of the produce or rent from that share.
  • Gift of a share in a company: In a company where the ownership consists of several definite shares, the gift of a share  by separating the share physically from the rest would create confusion and inconvenience and this would be against the object of this doctrine. It would be inconsistent to apply the doctrine of Musha to shares in companies because the doctrine originated for very different kinds of properties. Therefore, in such cases, this doctrine is inapplicable.
  • Gift of an undivided but divisible property: If the property is owned jointly by two or more persons, it is considered a valid Musha.
  • Gift of Musha that includes a prerequisite: A gift of Musha requiring the donee to pay certain periodic sums to someone is not restricted by the laws governing Mushaa.

Void gifts

The following types of gifts mentioned below are considered void gifts, i.e., not legally enforceable:

Gift to an unborn person

A gift cannot be made in favour of a person who does not exist at the time when the gift is made. The reason for it being a void gift is because the donee’s acceptance is the prerequisite for the validity of a gift. If the donee is not yet born to accept the gift, his or her consent cannot be received. It is important to note that a gift made in favour of an unborn person is considered void from the outset. However, a life interest can be granted to an unborn person if they come into existence when that interest takes effect.

Future gift

A gift cannot include something that will only come into existence in the future. For instance, a gift of the crop harvest expected to be produced in the following year from the donor’s field is not valid. It is a point of consideration that the subject matter of the gift exists when the gift is made.

Contingent gift

A gift that is receivable upon the occurrence or non-occurrence of a future uncertain event is known as a contingent gift. It is not a valid gift because contingency is a mere chance for something to happen or not happen.

Conditional gift

A gift made with a condition that diminishes the full value of the gift is known as a ‘conditional gift’. In that case, the gift is considered to be a valid gift, but the condition attached to it is considered void. The validity of the gift would be the same as if no condition were attached to it. In Mohamed Naziruddin vs. Govindarajulu Appah And Others (1970), the Hon’ble Madras High Court determined that if the donee’s power of alienation is restricted, the restriction is deemed invalid under Mohammedan law.

Oral gifts

According to the Mohammedan Law, a gift made of movable or immovable property need not be made in writing to be valid. The Transfer of Property Act, 1882, under Sections 122 to 129  provides provisions relating to gifts. It is provided in Section 123 of the said Act that when a gift of immovable property is made, it shall be enforceable through a registered deed signed by the donor. It should be signed and attested to by at least two witnesses. On the contrary, when a gift of movable property is made, it becomes enforceable either through a registered instrument signed or by delivering that movable property. However, the gifts made by Muslims are not governed by the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act. Section 129 of the said Act states that Sections 122 to 129 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, do not apply to Mohammedans.

It is provided under Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908, that any gift of immovable property valued over one hundred rupees is to be made by a registered instrument. Mohammedan law allows one to make an oral gift of immovable property, regardless of its value. A gift made under Mohammedan law takes effect if executed according to the procedures prescribed.  If the legal obligations are fulfilled, it is regarded as a valid gift, even if it is not registered or attested. If the formalities required are not followed, the gift is considered invalid, even if the provisions of Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, are completely followed.

Revocation of gift

Although old traditions show us that the prophet was against the system of revocation of gifts. Today, it can be seen that it is a well-established principle of Muslim law that all the gifts that are made voluntarily can be revoked. Under Shia law, revocation of a gift takes place by a mere declaration and there is no need to obtain a court’s decree or the consent of the donee. Gifts made to parents under this law cannot be revoked and gifts made to other relations by consanguinity, whether within the prohibited degree of relationship or not, are irrevocable. Under the Sunni Law, revocation of a gift takes place by the court’s intervention or by the donee’s consent. It is not sufficient that the donor declare the gift to be revoked. According to Shafei School, a gift between consanguine relations is revocable only when the donor is either the father or another paternal ancestor of the donee. A gift between all other relations by consanguinity is considered irrevocable.

The Mohammedan law classifies the revocation of a gift into two categories:

  • Revocation of gifts prior to the delivery of possession: A gift is considered incomplete until the delivery of possession of the subject matter of the gift is made. It is an unimpeded right of the donor to revoke a gift before the gift is delivered to the donee.
  • Revocation of gifts after delivery of possession: After the delivery of possession of the gift, the donor possesses the right to revoke the gift. It could be done with the donee’s consent or by obtaining a formal court’s decree. The Court can issue a decree to revoke a gift except in the following circumstances. Therefore, the gifts mentioned below are completely irrevocable:
  1. In case the donor dies, no decree can be passed by the court to revoke the gift;
  2. Similarly, in case of the death of the donee and the delivery of possession of the gifted property, it could be revoked;
  3. Where there exists a prohibited degree of relationship (consanguinity) between the  donor and donee (i.e., brother and sister), it can not be revoked;
  4. Where there exists a marital relationship between the donor and the donee (i.e., husband and wife), the gift could not be revoked;
  5. Where the donee has transferred the subject matter of the gift through sale, gift, or any other means, the gift could not be revoked;
  6. Where the subject matter of the gift has been lost, destroyed or altered in such a way that it has lost its original identity, in that case, the gift could not be revoked;
  7. The gift could also not be revoked when the subject matter of the gift has appreciated in value to the point that it has become inseparable.
  8. Where the gift is a ‘sadaqah’ then also a gift cannot be revoked. A ‘sadaqah’ is an act of giving without receiving anything in return and done with the intention to please Allah.
  9. Where something has been received in exchange for the gift, there can also be no revocation of the gift.

Revival of revocation

In the following situations, a revoked gift can be revived:

  • Where the donee transfers the gift by giving a new gift to a third party, and that new gift is later revoked by the donee;
  • Where an increase in the gift’s value occurs due to an accession, and that accession has been lost or destroyed.

Difference between revocation of gifts in Shia law and Sunni law

Basis of differenceShia LawSunni Law
Irrevocability of Gifts to Blood RelativesGifts to any blood relative (regardless of the prohibited degree) become irrevocable upon delivery of possession.Gifts to blood relatives are not necessarily irrevocable upon delivery; revocability depends on the circumstances and intentions.
Gifts Between SpousesGifts from husband to wife or vice versa are generally considered revocable.Gifts between spouses are generally considered irrevocable once given.
Revocation ProcessA gift can be revoked without court proceedings; a mere declaration from the donor is sufficient.Revocation of gifts typically requires court proceedings or a formal legal process.

Conclusion

The concept of ‘Hiba’ under Mohammedan law is a longstanding tradition that has been passed down from our history. It provides a way for individuals to demonstrate their generosity and support for others without expecting anything in return. While grounded in tradition, Hiba is continually evolving to address contemporary legal, social, and technological changes. Recent case laws and legislative reforms highlight an increasing awareness of the need for equitable and inclusive practices within Islamic jurisprudence, ensuring Hiba’s relevance and significance in today’s world. As societies advance, the principles of Hiba will remain a guiding force for goodwill and solidarity, promoting harmony and mutual support among individuals and communities.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

What is the traditional prerequisite under Mohammedan law for the transfer of gifted property ?

The traditional requirement is that the donor must physically vacate the premises along with all their belongings, while the donee must formally take possession of the property. The donor must fully relinquish ownership of the property.

How does a gift deed come into effect when it is made to a minor or lunatic other than the father or their guardian ?

In the case of Musa Miya Muhamad Shaffi vs. Kadar Bax Khaj Bax (1928) it was held by the Hon’ble Privy Council that when a gift is made to a minor or a lunatic by someone other than the father or guardian, the gift can be completed by delivering possession to the father or guardian of the minor.

Is the mutation of names essential to completing the transfer of possession of the gifted property to the donee?

No, it is not necessary to complete the transfer of possession of the gifted property to the donee. As long as possession has been delivered to the donee, mutation in the Revenue Register is not required to finalise the transfer process.

References

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Vijay Kumar Sharma and others vs. State of Karnataka and others (1990) 

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Cossijurah case

This article is written by Lavanya Gupta. It analyses the decision of Vijay Kumar Sharma with respect to the application of Article 254 of the Constitution and the doctrine of pith and substance in the context of the Motor Vehicles Act,1988.

This article has been published by Shashwat Kaushik.

Introduction 

Vijay Kumar Sharma vs. State of Karnataka (1990) is a landmark decision concerning the doctrine of repugnancy with respect to Article 254 of the Constitution wherein provisions of a Union law are in direct conflict with the provision of State legislation on a subject falling within List III of the Seventh Schedule. The case determines the effect of such repugnancy between a Union Law and a State law, in the specific instance of The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1988). It explains which law shall prevail and what should be the extent of repugnancy to provoke the operation of Article 254. Further, it also clarifies the scope of the doctrine of pith and substance which discusses the true purpose behind a law. 

The Court clarified that if the dominant nature of both laws is quite different, there is no question of repugnancy. The doctrine of repugnancy has an important effect on our federal structure and on the sanctity of the division of powers, making this case a landmark decision in constitutional law. This article will cover the afore-mentioned case which primarily dealt with the inconsistency between the provisions of the Act, 1988 and a Karnataka State law on the subject of contract carriages. The Supreme Court held that there is no repugnancy under Article 254 in the instant case and upheld the State law. 

This article will discuss the facts, issues, and laws involved in the case of Vijay Kr. Sharma vs. the State of Karnataka (1990) and the judgement along with its analysis. 

Background of the case

With the introduction of federalism and division of powers along with a Concurrent list that contains subjects on which both the Union and the States have the power to legislate, Article 254 was introduced as a rationalising provision for the same. It was modelled after Section 107 (“Inconsistency between Federal laws and Provincial, or State laws”) of the Government of India Act, 1935 and a further proviso was inserted after the second clause of Article 254 to mitigate the difficulties experienced during that time period involving conflict between provincial and federal laws. It allowed the Parliament to enact any law on the same subject matter as that of a State law. Parliament may through legislation further modify the provisions of the State law or even repeal the same. 

The Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the “Carriages Act”)  was enacted by the State legislature of Karnataka by taking the aid of Entry 42 List III (Acquisition and requisitioning of Property) of the Seventh Schedule and Articles 31 and 39 (b) and 39(c) of the Constitution. The Act provides for the acquisition of contract carriages by the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation and for other connected matters. It received the assent of the President on 11 March 1976. The Act, 1988 was enacted in 1988 and received presidential assent on 1 July 1989. It replaced the erstwhile 1939 Act on the subject matter.

Facts of the case

The Carriages Act vested exclusive rights over running contract carriage services with the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation and further denied private operators from applying for fresh permits or for renewal of existing permits. The Union legislation, the Act, 1988 did not contain any such provisions that prohibited private contract carriage services.

The petitioners who operated contract carriages were denied permits under Sections 73, 74 and 80 of the Act, 1988 in view of Section 14 and Section 20 of the Carriages Act. Sections 73 and 74 of the Act, 1988 provide for the application for contract carriage permit and grant of such applications respectively, while Section 80 delineates the procedure for applying for and granting of the permit. None of these provisions impose any bar on private operators. Whereas Section 14 of the Carriages Act prevented any application for fresh permit or for renewal of existing permit from the date of commencement of the Act. 

Section 20 further states that the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation shall have exclusive rights over running any contract carriages in the State. This repugnancy between the two laws with respect to the role of private operators affected the livelihood of the petitioners.  Consequently, they filed a writ petition under Article 32 questioning the action of the Regional Transport Authority and further contending repugnancy of the provisions of the Carriages Act with respect to the Act, 1988, the latter being a Union law.

Issues raised in the case

  • Whether Sections 14 and 20 of the Carriages Act are repugnant to sections 73, 74 and 80 of the Act, 1988 and are therefore impliedly repealed by operation of Article 254?
  • Whether the doctrine of pith and substance is applicable to the case at hand? 

Arguments of the parties

Arguments of Petitioner

In order to support their point that Sections 14 and 20 of the Carriages Act were in conflict with Sections 74 and 80(2) of the Act, 1988, the counsel for the petitioners argued that-

  • The Act, 1988 enjoined the Regional Transport Authority under the Act not to refuse to grant an application for a permit, however, the afore-mentioned provisions of the Carriages Act, prohibited any person from applying for or any authority from granting any application for running contract carriages in the State of Karnataka.
  • Considering the Act, 1988 was later legislation on the same subject matter (under the Concurrent List), it should be deemed to have impliedly repealed the impugned provisions of the Carriages Act, even if the same had attained Presidential assent in view of the proviso to Article 254(2) of the Constitution.
  • It was also contended that in a case involving repugnancy under Article 254, the doctrine of pith and substance does not apply. If some of the provisions of the State legislation are repugnant to the Central law, the latter shall prevail, and the repugnant provisions of the State legislation shall be void. 

Their applications under Sections 74 and 80 of the Act, 1988 should, thus, be accepted without reference to the provisions of the Carriages Act which are in direct conflict with the Act, 1988.

Arguments of Respondent

  • It was contended that the Carriages Act was enacted in exercise of power under a different entry and was not on the same subject, thereby falling outside the scope of Article 254. 
  • The same further being reserved for consideration of the President and consequently having received his assent as per Article 254(2), shall prevail over the Union Act (Act, 1988) in the State of Karnataka.

Laws involved in Vijay Kumar Sharma and others vs. State of Karnataka and others (1990)

Article 254 of the Constitution

This provision clarifies the position when there is an inconsistency between a Union law and a State Law. 

  • According to the first clause of Article 254, If any provision of a State law is inconsistent to a Parliamentary law or any other existing law on the same subject matter in the Concurrent list, the Parliamentary law shall prevail and the State law shall be void to the extent its provisions are inconsistent with that of the Parliamentary law. So, if the Union enacts a law related to the acquisition of property under the third list, and a State law enacted later contains certain provisions repugnant to the same, the Union law shall prevail. The State law will not be repudiated in its entirety. Only those provisions that are in conflict with the Union law shall be void. The second clause further provides an exception to this general provision. 
  • It states that such a State Law containing provisions repugnant to the Union law, or an existing law with respect to that matter, shall prevail in the state if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent.
  • The proviso to the second clause further clarifies nothing shall prevent Parliament from enacting any law with respect to the same matter even if it adds to, amends, repeals or varies the State law.

The present case deals with repugnancy between a Union and State law with respect to a matter in the Concurrent List. While the State law has received presidential assent under Article 254(2), Parliament is well within its scope to enact a new law which modifies the provisions of the earlier State law as contended by the petitioners. The Supreme Court in this case was required to assess whether repugnancy between both the laws indeed existed, and if it did, to what extent. Based on this analysis, it would be concluded which law shall prevail and to what extent the State law shall be void if its provisions were repugnant to the Union law. 

Doctrine of Repugnancy 

As per Black Law’s dictionary, repugnancy refers to an inconsistency, opposition, or contrariety between two or more clauses of the same deed, contract or statute, or between two or more material allegations of the same pleading or any two writings”. Repugnancy thus refers to an inconsistency between two or more clauses of the same statute or agreement or between provisions of different statutes or writings. In the context of Article 254, repugnancy means a conflict between the provisions of a Union law and that of a State law with respect to any matter in the Concurrent List. The Supreme Court in the case of M. Karunanidhi vs. Union of India (1979) has laid down the following conditions for the doctrine of  repugnancy to be invoked – 

  1. Clear and direct inconsistency between Centre and State legislation;
  2. Such inconsistency is absolutely irrevocable; and
  3. Inconsistency is of such a nature as to bring the two legislations in a direct collision such that it is impossible to obey one without disobeying the other.

Relevant provisions of The Carriages Act, 1976

  • Section 4: Vesting of Contract Carriages 

As per Section 4, the contract carriage vesting in the State government shall be deemed to be acquired for a public purpose. 

  • Section 14: Prohibition on applications for fresh permits or renewal of existing permits 

Section 14 prohibits any application for a fresh permit or for renewal of an existing permit for running contract carriages in the State and further states that any pending applications for the same shall abate. 

  • Section 20: Corporation to have exclusive privilege over running of any contract carriage 

Section 20 vests exclusive power with the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation for running contract carriage services in the State to the exclusion of any other operators. 

Relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988

  • Section 73: Application for Contract Carriage Permit

Section 73 prescribes the particulars for an application for a contract carriage permit including the type and seating capacity of the vehicle and the area for which the permit is required.

  • Section 74: Grant of Contract Carriage Permit

As per Section 74, the Regional Transport Authority may grant a permit on an application made under Section 73 subject to such conditions it may think fit, such as specifying routes or maximum number of passengers or conditions related to handling of goods, fares etc. 

  • Section 80: Procedure for applying for and granting permits 

As per Section 80, The Regional Transport Authority shall ordinarily grant permits for running of contract carriages. In case it rejects any such application, it must provide reasons for the same and afford an opportunity to the applicant to be heard. 

Relevant judgements referred to in the case

  1. M. Karunanidhi vs. Union of India (1979): The case dealt with the inconsistency between the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Public  Men (Criminal  Misconduct) Act, 1973, State legislation and the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 & Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 (Union laws). The Supreme Court held that as far as clause 1 of Article 254 is concerned, it clearly lays down that when there is a direct conflict between the provisions of Parliamentary legislation and State legislation on the same subject under the Concurrent list, the latter shall (subject to clause 2) be void to the extent of such repugnancy. Thus, when both the State Act and the Parliamentary Act occupy the same field under the Concurrent List, then the Parliamentary Act being prior in time will prevail over the State Act.
  2. Deep Chand vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (1959): The constitutionality of the Uttar Pradesh Transport Service (Development) Act, 1955 and the nationalisation scheme for bus transport in the State of UP was challenged vis-a-vis the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 in the Supreme Court. The case laid down the test to determine repugnancy after referring to its earlier decisions in Tika Ramji v State of UP (1956)  and Saverbhai Amaidas vs. State of Bombay (1954)

The Supreme Court laid down the following test to determine repugnancy between two statutes: (i) whether there is a direct conflict between the two provisions; (ii) whether Parliament intended to lay down an exhaustive code in respect of the subject matter replacing the Act of the State Legislature; and (iii) whether the law made by Parliament and the law made by the State Legislature occupy the same field.

  1. State of Karnataka & Anr. vs. Shri Ranganatha Reddy & Anr. (1977): The validity of the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976 was the subject matter of this decision. A Seven-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the statute holding that the same was an ‘acquisition Act’ within the scope of Entry 42 of the Concurrent List. The Court observed that even though it may have had some incidental impact on inter-State trade or commerce it did not suffer from any lacuna on that count. Since the Act had been reserved for Presidential assent, to the extent Section 20 made provisions contrary to those in the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939, it was taken to be valid under Article 254(2) of the Constitution.

Judgement in Vijay Kumar Sharma and others vs. State of Karnataka and others (1990)

The case was heard by a three-judge bench. By a majority of 2:1, J. Misra and J. Sawant upheld the validity of the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976 while J. Ramaswamy dissented. J. Misra wrote a separate judgement concurring with the opinion of J. Sawant while J. Ramaswamy wrote a dissenting opinion.

J. Misra’s opinion

There is no direct inconsistency between the Act, 1988 and the Carriages Act. As per Article 254(1) of the Constitution, the conflicting legislation must be on one of the subjects mentioned in the Concurrent List. The State Act i.e., the Carriages Act as under the case, an Act for acquisition came within Entry 42 of List III, whereas, the Parliamentary Ac i.e. the Act, 1988, on the other hand, falling within Entry 35 of List III (mechanically propelled vehicles including the principles on which taxes on such vehicles are to be levied). Both the legislations do not fall within the same matter enumerated in the Concurrent List. Even the second clause of Article 254 requires both laws to be related to the same subject matter.

Further, considering that repugnancy occurs if there is direct conflict between both the statutes which have to operate in the same field, the provisions of the Carriages Act are not repugnant to the Act, 1988. The State Act was enacted with the objective of eliminating private operators from the state of Karnataka with regard to contract carriages and by effect bestowing monopoly status on the State Undertaking (Section 20). The Parliamentary Act does not have any such objective for the acquisition of contract carriages which is the foundation of the State legislation. Sections 73 and 74 of the Act, 1988 further do not specify as to who the applicant shall be while laying down how the application shall be made, and the permit shall be granted. While Section 80 of the Act, 1988 does liberalise the granting of permits, Section 20 of the Carriages Act does not run counter to the scheme of the Act, 1988.  

Therefore, there exists no repugnancy between the two legislations and this is not a fit case for invoking Article 254.

J. Sawant’s majority opinion

J. Sawant also concluded that there is no repugnancy between the two legislations, and Article 254 does not apply to the situation at hand.

In order to find out whether State legislation and Parliamentary legislation are allegedly in conflict with one another, the same subject shall be covered, and it is necessary to evaluate the dominant intention of the two legislations. If the subject matters of the two legislations are indeed different, mere connection with some allied subject will not mean that they operate in the same field.  A provision in one legislation in order to give effect to its dominant intention may incidentally be on the same subject as that of the provisions of any other legislation. However, that form of coverage with a different purpose does not mean repugnancy under Article 254. Thus, neither legislation should merely partially cover the same subject matter. 

The subject matter and the purpose of the two legislations involved were substantially different in the present case as well. 

The Carriages Act and the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 were enacted under different entries in the Concurrent List with different objectives and thus, occupy different fields. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988was primarily enacted to regulate the operation of motor vehicles. On the other hand, the Carriages Act was enacted not only to prevent private players from operating such vehicles but indeed the very objective behind it was substantially different from that of the Act, 1988. The aim was to nationalise the contract carriage services in order to serve the public interest and provide efficient transport services.

The special provisions of both the old 1939 Motor Vehicles Act and the 1988 Act are pari materia with respect to State undertakings with few changes, the legal consequences of the two schemes being largely similar. Section 98 of the Act, 1988 provides for an overriding effect with respect to Chapter VI of the Act that relates to State undertakings. The Act, 1988 thus, also provides for a route to nationalisation of such contract carriages to the exclusion of private operators in the area so specified. Hence, no such direct conflict exists between the provisions of both the legislations.

He also discussed the Doctrine of Pith and Substance. When the repugnancy between the two statutes is under consideration, the main issue to be examined is whether the State legislation on the subject though otherwise constitutionally valid, becomes void owing to a conflicting parliamentary legislation on the same.  If conflicts between entries in different lists can be reconciled by examining the dominant purpose or pith and substance of the legislation, conflicts regarding repugnancy under Article 254 can be examined on the same anvil as well.  

J. Ramaswamy’s minority opinion

Section 14(1) of the Carriages Act to the extent of prohibition on making fresh applications for grant of permit and Section 20(3) of the Carriages Act which provides for an embargo on the Regional Transport Authority to receive applications of the Carriages Act are void. These are the provisions which have been challenged as violative of the Union law. J. Ramaswamy in his judgement discussed the doctrine of repugnancy and the test to determine repugnancy: 

The repugnancy to be found is the repugnancy of the provisions of the two laws and not the predominant object of the subject matter of the two laws. The proper test is whether effect can be given to the provisions of both the laws or whether both the laws can stand together. If both the pieces of legislation deal with separate and distinct matters though of cognate and allied character repugnancy does not arise.

Both Section 14 and Section 20 of the Carriages Act freeze the right of private players to apply for a permit for contract carriage services under the Act, thereby conferring State monopoly over contract carriages. But the intent of the MV Act is to liberalise the same, which is particularly highlighted in Section 80(2) which obliges the Regional Transport Authority not to refuse a grant of permit ordinarily. The Act, 1988 provides the right while the Carriages Act refuses the right to obtain a permit and run contract carriage services and further prohibits the authorities from entertaining applications or granting permits for the same. Thus, two different schemes of provisions are provided under both the Acts which result in inconsistent effects in the same field. Thus, the irreconcilability of the two sets of provisions does exist in this scenario. By operation of the proviso to Article 254(2), the impugned provisions become void.

The State legislature may amend the Central Law to suit their local conditions. They reserve power for the same is provided under Article 254(2). However, till the time the new law is enacted, the same is reserved for the President’s consideration and which if assented by him, the Central law will continue to operate. In this instance, the permits may be obtained as per the scheme of the Act, 1988 and no embargo may be imposed. Parliament may repeal a law by express repeal or by necessary implication. In the instant case, the Union law does expressly repeal the provisions of the State law, however, repugnancy exists.

“The doctrine of pith and substance or the predominant purpose or true nature and character of law is applied to determine whether the impugned legislation is within the legislative competence under Arts. 246(1) and 246(3) of the Constitution, and to resolve the conflict of  jurisdiction. If the Act in its pith and substance falls in one List it must be deemed not to fall in another List, despite incidental encroachment and its validity should be determined accordingly.”

The doctrine is inapplicable when the entry falls in the Concurrent List and occupies the same field in both the Union and State legislation. Both the Parliament and State Legislature have powers to legislate on subjects falling in the third list. The question of incidental encroachment or true nature and character is thus of no relevance.

Analysis of the case

The case clarified the scope of the doctrine of repugnancy using the dominant purpose test. Since the State Law and the Union Law covered different fields, there was no irreconcilability, and both the State and Union laws could operate in their respective separate fields. However, this demarcation of fields or of the dominant intention of legislation is not as simple.

Different interpretations of the same law could yield different results, indeed different intentions behind the law. While one interpretation could see the state law’s objective as the nationalisation of contract carriages, another reading of the law combined with its historicity could yield another reason that may conflict with the dominant purpose of the Union legislation on the subject. There are no watertight compartments to this doctrine of pith and substance. The nature of two supposedly conflicting laws will be measured on different anvils in different cases and it would perhaps be difficult to follow a uniform approach, particularly, using the litmus test of pith and substance. Other opinions such as in this case could also argue the inapplicability of the doctrine. Further, terms such as incidental encroachment too could carry varied meanings or lend different consequences in different cases.

The doctrine of repugnancy as stated earlier, has an important effect on the federal character of the Constitution. A textual reading of the same provides for a greater edge to Union legislation in case of conflict with a State law. However, as constitutional jurisprudence on the same evolves, State laws may continue to operate with Union laws, even if on the surface, they are apparently contradictory. As this sphere of constitutional interpretation continues to grow, the ambiguities in the application of the doctrine of repugnant and the dominant intention test must be resolved, and due weight must be given to both Union and State laws. 

Conclusion

By a majority of 2:1, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vijay Kr. Sharma vs. State of Karnataka held that the provisions of the Carriages Act are not repugnant to the Act, 1988. The doctrine of pith and substance or dominant intention was applied, and it was held that both the purpose as well as the subject matter covered under the case were different in both the Union and State law. Therefore, the touchstone of repugnancy required for the application of Article 254 was not fulfilled and the State law continued to be in operation.

The dissent however highlighted the irreconcilability of both the laws and held some provisions as repugnant. Further, the application of the pith and substance doctrine was ruled out.

However, in effect, considering the majority ruling, in cases of conflict between a Union law and a State law on the same subject or field in the Concurrent List, the doctrine of repugnancy will be applied based on the earlier precedents and in order to ascertain such repugnancy and evaluate legislative competence, the doctrine of pith and substance or dominant purpose of the legislation will be applied. 

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

How can the legislative competence of the Parliament or State Legislatures be determined under the Constitution? 

Article 246 and the three lists under the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India help determine the legislative competence of the concerned legislative body and whether the encroachment onto the field of another legislature is merely incidental or significant enough so as to be within the competence of the concerned legislature. 

Whether the doctrine of repugnancy is applicable to List I and List II of the Seventh Schedule (Union and State List)?

The doctrine of repugnancy is only applicable to the third List of the Seventh Schedule, where both the Union and State legislature are competent to enact laws. In the case of List I and List II, the legislative competence of the Parliament and State legislature has been defined exclusively and the subjects listed therein fall within the purview of the respective legislatures. Thus, no concept of repugnancy exists in case of List I and List II.

References

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Trademark Class 5 : pharmaceutical and medical products

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Pharmaceutical merger

This article is written by Shreya Patel. This article exhaustively explains trademark class 5 and its importance in trademark protection and registration. It also delves into the specifications of the goods and services that are covered under trademark class 5. Relevant case laws have also been discussed, to depict the importance of trademark class 5.

This article has been published by Shashwat Kaushik.

Introduction 

Trademarks are one of the most popular and commonly protected intellectual property rights in India, as well as around the world. In today’s time, when the market is highly competitive, a trademark plays a key role in helping a business create a unique and distinct position for itself. Indian businessmen and craftsmen have been using trademarks for approximately 3000 years. The craftsmen in India have been carving their mark on the products that they make, such as on jewellery or other creative products. These markings were used to identify the source of the maker. In the world of international commerce, a trademark is one of the crucial elements that emerged as the result of industralisation. 

A distinctive logo or sign that indicates that a product is manufactured by a specific business, person, or industry, is known as a trademark. Trademarks are used on products, while the service marks are used on services to differentiate amongst the various service providers. A single company can have numerous trademarks. Each product can have its own trademark, which is distinctive in nature and distinguishes the goods of that company from the others present in the market. The key element of trademarks, is that they can easily help the consumers distinguish the products and services of one company from the other. 

What is a trademark

The intellectual property that grants an owner the exclusive right over a sign, logo, symbol, design, sound, phrase, or expression, is known as a trademark. Different countries around the world protect different types of trademarks. For instance, the United States accepts registration of a sound as a trademark, while India does not protect a sound or smell mark. 

A trademark can only be used for the product for which it has been registered. Only the owner of the trademark has the sole right to use the mark. No other person, organisation, or entity can use the same mark for their products or services. If any individual, organisation, or entity wishes to use the mark, they would first have to take the consent of the trademark owner. Using the trademark for any commercial purpose by such an entity, individual, or organisation, amounts to infringing the rights of the owner of the trademark. 

Trademark, as defined under Article 15 of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) is – 

A sign or any combination of signs that is competent in setting apart the goods and services of one enterprise, from that of others and is also capable of forming a trademark. A trademark is legally recognised as an industrial property. Exclusive rights are given to the owner of the trademark, to use such a sign whose purpose is to identify the goods and services that are produced. A third party is allowed to use a trademark, in exchange of a fee. 

Section 2(1)(zb) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 defines trademark as –

A mark that is distinctive in nature and is capable of distinguishing the goods and services of one entity from those of another. A trademark is also capable of graphical representation. The validity period of trademark protection, helps in reducing the unnecessary registrations of trademarks that have no applicability. In India, a trademark registration is valid for a period of ten years. Trademarks act as a hallmark of origin and associate the company’s standing and quality with the product or services or both.

A trademark registration can be renewed unlimited times. For registration, the applicant is required to apply to the Trade Mark Registry Office, which has offices in Kolkata, Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai, and Ahmedabad. Trademark registration is very crucial in order to protect a trademark. At the time of applying for trademark registration, there are various classes of trademarks, which are determined on the basis of the goods and services for which the trademark is being registered.  

Need for a trademark

Trademarks act as a strategic asset for companies that are involved in a highly competitive market. In terms of markets that consist of products and services which are homogeneous in nature, trademarks play the crucial role of boosting the visibility of such products and services and helps in attracting the loyalty of consumers. A successful trademark assists the company in establishing a positive image in the market, and consumers associate the mark with its value. Trademarks being one of the common intellectual properties,  are used in both non-innovative and innovative businesses.

Trademarks also play a vital role in brand recognition amongst the consumers in the market. When a business registers their trademark, they get protection from infringement by way of third parties trying to use the registered trademark without the permission of the owner. It is also considered as a crucial intangible asset for the business. With registration, the business creates an asset that can be sold for monetary purposes in the future. A trademark helps in building as well as increasing the credibility of the business. 

What is trademark class

Products and services are classified into various classes, which are referred to as trademark class. The total number of trademark classes that include both the classes for products and for services, are 45. These trademark classes are divided under the Nice Classification. The first 34 classes consist of products and the services are categorised under the remaining 11 classes, that is, from trademark class 35 to 45. 

The products and services of specific characteristics are listed in each class. It is significant to find and select the trademark class under which the product or service belongs before starting the application for trademark registration. As trademarks play a key role in distinguishing the products or services in a competitive market, it is vital to ensure that no one is using a sign, phrase, logo or symbol similar to what we are applying for. As it is considered infringement if someone tries to register a trademark similar to one that already exists. When a trademark is being applied for registration, the trademark class under which the product or service belongs is to be specified in the application form.

The trademark classes are also known as Nice classification. Certain types of goods and services are categorised together under the same trademark class. For instance, the trademark class 23 includes all the goods that are related to synthetic and natural threads  and yarns that are used by the textile companies. Explosives and firearms come under the trademark class 13. A trademark class helps in determining the usage of the product or service in the industry and helps in defining the mark. Trademark classes often play the role of identifier to the mark. It is vital to choose the right trademark class for the goods or services for which we are filing the trademark application. The trademark applicant can file the trademark for goods and services under multiple trademark classes as well. 

Nice classification

An agreement was reached at the Nice Union – Diplomatic Conference on the Revision of the Nice Agreement, which resulted in the establishment of The International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks on 5th June, 1957. This was further revised in 1967 at Stockholm, then in 1977 at Geneva, and later amended in 1979.

The Nice Agreement was accepted by India on 7th September, 2019 and is used by the trademark office of India to classify trademarks and register them accordingly. The Nice Classification is to be obliged by all the countries that are part of the Nice Agreement. The Nice Classification can be applied either as a subsidiary classification or as a primary classification method. The Nice Classification not only applies at a national level, but also affects registration on an international basis. Many countries that are not a part of the Nice Agreement also apply the Nice Classification. 

Trademark classification list

Trademarks are classified under two categories, that is, goods and services. These are categorised under separate classes. Certain goods can be registered under specified classes only. For example, advertising services come under trademark class 35, which consists of services related to business and consulting. 

Trademark class for goods

The finished goods can be classified according to their function and purpose if the goods do not belong to any other class. The goods are mainly classified as per their main purpose, while goods can be classified under more than one class also as per their function. In case the function of the goods does not fall under any of the trademark class, they are often classified under as per the raw materials used or on the basis of the transport mode.

If the semi finished goods or raw materials itself are being applied for trademark registration, then the materials used in making these raw materials are used for the classification. On the basis of the dominant material, the trademark class is chosen if the goods consist of multiple materials. 

Trademark class for services

This classification of trademark includes all the major services which are provided. The services are categorised on the basis of branches of the activities that are carried by an entity, individual or the company applying for the trademark. 

Trademark class 5 : pharmaceutical and medical products

The category of goods that are covered under trademark class 5 consists of veterinary, pharmaceutical, or sanitary preparation goods, along with goods required in disease prevention or treatment in animals or humans, dietary supplements, antiseptics, and other goods that are related to or similar in nature. 

Any kind of vaccines, drugs, minerals, shampoos, soaps, deodorants, vitamins, dressing used in hospitals, sanitizers and mouthwashes, are some of the goods covered under trademark class 5

The key categories under trademark class 5 are:

  • Plasters, materials for dressings
  • Veterinary and pharmaceutical preparations
  • Food supplements and dietetic substances
  • Sanitary preparations for medical purposes
  • Antiseptics and disinfectants

Importance of trademark class 5 

Applying for a trademark registration also requires specification of the trademark class under which the trademark is going to be registered. If a trademark is going to be used for products and services under multiple classes, a separate application must be filed for each trademark class. Trademark class 5 is very significant for businesses that are into manufacturing or distributing pharmaceutical, sanitary, or veterinary preparations. 

A trademark when registered under trademark class 5, ensures that such goods are protected from infringement by any third party. Primarily, this classification builds consumer trust in medical products, which is crucial. Further, registering goods under trademark class 5 would help the business or individual or entity in effectively protecting their brand identity and also prevent future trademark infringement. The business would be able to establish a brand image that is distinct and unique. 

Detailed list of goods under trademark class 5 : pharmaceutical and medical products

Following is the detailed list of all the goods which come under the trademark class 5:

  • Acaricides, absorbent cotton / absorbent wadding
  • Acetates and acids for purposes related to pharma
  • Aconitine and acne treatment preparations
  • Sticking plasters or adhesive plasters
  • Adhesive tapes/adhesive bands/adjuvants used in medical reasons
  • Adhesives which are used in dentures
  • Air deodorising purifying preparations
  • Albumin dietary supplements
  • Albuminous preparations  and albuminous foodstuffs intended to be used in medical purposes
  • Alcohol/ aldehydes for purposes related to pharma industry
  • Algicides
  • Alginate dietary supplements
  • Alginates and alkaline iodides for pharmaceutical applications
  • Alkaloids for medical applications
  • Alloys of precious metals for dental purposes
  • Preparations of aloe-vera for purposes related to pharma
  • Aluminium acetate which is used in relation to pharmaceutical purposes
  • Amino acids which are used for medical purposes
  • Amino acids used in or for veterinary purposes
  • Anaesthetics and analgesics
  • Angostura bark used of medical purposes
  • Bracelets which are anti-rheumatism
  • Anti-rheumatism rings, Antibiotics, Antioxidant pills, Animal washes
  • Anti-uric/anticryptogamic/antiparasitic preparations
  • Collars for animals that is antiparasitic
  • Antiseptic cotton/antiseptics
  • Appetite suppressants used in medical purposes
  • Pills that are appetite suppressant
  • Articles for headache/asthmatic tea/aseptic cotton
  • Napkins and diapers for babies
  • Diaper pants and napkin pants for the babies
  • Bacterial preparations/ Bacteriological preparations used in veterinary and medical use
  • Bacterial poisons
  • Balsamic preparations/balms for medical purposes
  • Bandages which are used in dressings
  • Barks used in pharmaceutical purposes
  • Bath preparations utilised for medical purposes
  • Bath salts used in relation for medical purposes
  • Sanitary napkins’s belts [towels]
  • Bicarbonate of soda which is used for pharmaceutical purposes
  • Biocides
  • Biological tissue cultures, biological preparations intended for medical purposes
  • Biological preparations, biological tissue cultures in relation for veterinary purposes
  • Bismuth preparations and bismuth subnitrate utilised for pharmaceutical purposes
  • Blood plasma
  • Blood when used for medical purposes
  • Bone cement when used for orthopaedic or surgical purposes
  • Bacteriological culture mediums/ bouillons for bacteriological cultures / media for bacteriological cultures
  • Bracelets which are used in relation to medical purposes
  • Pads used in breastfeeding
  • Bromine when is used for pharmaceutical use
  • Bronchodilating preparations
  • Bunion pads
  • Cachets and cachou for pharmaceutical uses
  • Preparations for calluses
  • Calomel
  • Camphor oil, camphor and castor oil for medical purposes
  • Candy which is medicated
  • Capsules which are medicines
  • Carbolineum
  • Casein dietary supplements
  • Washes for cattle
  • Caustic pencils and caustics when uses for pharma purposes
  • Cedar wood when used as an repellent for insects
  • Cellulose esters and cellulose ethers for pharmaceutical related usage
  • Cement when used for animal hooves
  • Charcoal when used in relation for pharmaceutical purposes
  • Chemical conductors for electrocardiograph electrodes
  • Chemical contraceptives
  • Chemical preparations which are used to treat mildew and diagnosis of pregnancy
  • Chemical preparations to treat wheat smut, for treating phylloxera, for pharmaceutical purposes, medical purposes, veterinary purposes
  • Chemical reagents for veterinary or medical purposes
  • Chemico-pharmaceutical preparations
  • Chewing gum when specifically used for medical use
  • Chilblain preparations
  • Chinoline for medical purposes
  • Chloroform, Collyrium, Compresses, Cocaine, Cod liver oil
  • Collodion intended for pharmaceutical purposes
  • Condurango bark and Cooling sprays for medical purposes
  • Contact lens solutions/ solution which is used along with contact lenses
  • Cleaning preparations for contact lenses
  • Corn rings for the feet
  • Curare
  • Croton bark
  • Corn remedies
  • Cotton swabs, Cotton, cotton sticks when used in relation to any medical purposes
  • Creosote and cream of tartar in pharmaceutical purposes
  • Cultures of microorganisms for veterinary and medical use / preparations of microorganisms for veterinary and medical use 
  • Decoctions used in relation to pharmaceutical usage
  • Dental – abrasives, amalgams, cements, impression materials, lacquer, mastics, amalgams of gold
  • Deodorants, other than for animals and human beings
  • Clothing and textiles deodorants
  • Depuratives
  • Preparations for destroying noxious animals, dry rot fungus, destroying mice
  • Detergents (medical purpose)
  • Diabetic bread – used for medical purpose
  • Diagnostic preparations, diagnostic biomarker reagents (medical purposes)
  • Diagnostic preparations (veterinary purposes)
  • Pet diapers
  • Diastase for medical purposes
  • Dietary fibre
  • Digitalin
  • Animals’ dietary supplements
  • Dietetic foods and beverages or dietetic substances used for medical purposes
  • Digestives (pharmaceutical purposes)
  • Dill oil for medical purposes
  • Disinfectants when used for hygiene purposes and chemical toilets
  • Disinfectants
  • Lotions and washes for dogs
  • Douching preparations for medical purposes
  • Dressings, medical
  • Drugs for medical purposes
  • Elixirs when used in pharmaceutical preparations
  • Enzymes and enzyme preparations for veterinary purposes
  • Enzymes and enzyme preparations for medical purposes
  • Enzyme dietary supplements
  • Ergot, esters, ethers, eucalyptol, eucalyptus, extracts of hops for pharmaceutical purposes
  • Eye-washes
  • Eye-patches (medical purposes)
  • Preparations to facilitate teething
  • Febrifuges
  • Fennel in relation to medical purposes
  • Ferments (pharmaceutical purposes)
  • Filled first aid boxes
  • Fish meal – pharmaceutical purposes
  • Flour for pharmaceutical purposes / meal for pharmaceutical purposes
  • Flowers of sulphur in pharmaceutical purposes
  • Fly catching paper, fly glue, fly catching adhesives
  • Fly destroying preparations
  • Baby food
  • Formic aldehyde, frostbite salve for pharmaceutical purposes
  • Fumigating pastilles, fumigating sticks, fungicides
  • Fumigation preparations – medical purposes
  • Gases/ gamboge – medical purposes
  • Gauze used in dressings
  • Gelatine and glucose – medical purposes
  • Gentian – pharmaceutical purposes
  • Germicides
  • Glucose dietary supplements
  • Glycerine – medical purposes
  • Glycerophosphates
  • Greases for medical purposes and veterinary purposes
  • Guaiacol for pharmaceutical purposes
  • Gurjun balsam and gum – medical purposes
  • Haematogen / haemoglobin / hematogen / hemoglobin
  • Haemorrhoid/ hemorrhoid preparations
  • Haemostatic/hemostatic pencils
  • Headache pencils
  • Herbal teas used in medical purposes
  • Herbicides / preparations for destroying weed killers/ noxious plants
  • Hydrastine, hydrastinine
  • Hydrated chloral – pharmaceutical purposes
  • Hydrogen peroxide for medical purposes
  • Repellents, repellent incense for insects
  • Insecticides
  • Iodides/ Iodine – pharmaceutical purposes
  • Iodoform
  • Isotopes/ irish moss – medical purposes
  • Jalap, laxatives
  • Jujube – medicated
  • Lacteal flour used for the babies
  • Larvae exterminating preparations
  • Goulard water/ Lead water
  • Lecithin, Leeches for medical purposes
  • Lecithin dietary supplements
  • Preparations of lime – pharmaceutical purposes
  • Liniments
  • Linseed / flaxseed/ linseed meal/ flaxseed meal for pharmaceutical purposes
  • Linseed and linseed oil dietary supplements / flaxseed and flaxseed dietary supplements
  • Lint – medical purposes
  • Liquorice/ lotions – pharmaceutical purposes
  • Lotions used in veterinary purposes
  • Lupulin used in pharmaceutical purposes
  • Magnesia and malt – pharmaceutical purposes
  • Malted milk beverages used for medical purposes
  • Mangrove bark used for pharmaceutical purposes
  • Medical preparations used for slimming purposes
  • Animal feed that is medicated
  • Medicinal – tea, oils, herbs, roots, drinks, infusions, alcohol, mud, sediment
  • Preparation for medical hair growth
  • Medicine cases, filled, portable
  • Medicines used in alleviating constipation
  • Medicines for dental purposes, human purposes, veterinary purposes
  • Melissa water – pharmaceutical purposes
  • Menstruation sanitary pads and bandages
  • Menthol
  • Mercurial ointments
  • Milk ferments – pharmaceutical purposes
  • Milk sugar/ lactose – pharmaceutical purposes
  • Milk of almonds – pharmaceutical purposes
  • Milking grease
  • Mineral waters utilised for medical purposes
  • Mineral water salts
  • Mineral food supplements
  • Mint – pharmaceutical purposes
  • Moleskin – medical purposes
  • Mothproofing preparations
  • Mothproof paper/ mothproofing paper 
  • Moulding wax used by dentists
  • Mouthwashes – medical purposes
  • Mud used in baths
  • Mustard oil for medical purposes
  • Myrobalan bark/ mustard for pharmaceutical purposes
  • Mustard plasters / mustard poultices
  • Napkins/ diapers for incontinents
  • Narcotics, Nervines, Opodeldoc, Opiates, Opium
  • Nutritional supplements
  • Nutritive substances for microorganisms
  • Oil of turpentine used in relation to pharmaceutical purposes
  • Ointments used in relation to pharmaceutical purposes
  • Opotherapy preparations / organotherapy preparations
  • Oxygen baths
  • Oxygen –  medical purposes
  • Pants, absorbent, for incontinents
  • Liners for panty
  • Paper for mustard plasters and mustard poultices
  • Pastilles / lozenges for pharmaceutical purposes
  • Pearl powder –  medical purposes
  • Pectin, Pepsins, Peptones for pharmaceutical purposes
  • Pesticides, Parasiticides
  • Petroleum jelly used in medical uses
  • Pharmaceutical preparations
  • Skin care related pharmaceutical preparations
  • Treating dandruff – pharmaceutical preparations
  • Phenol and Phosphates intended for pharmaceutical purposes
  • Poisons, poultices
  • Pollen dietary supplements
  • Pomades when used in relation to medical purposes
  • Porcelain – dental prostheses
  • Potassium salts when used in relation to medical purposes
  • Powder of cantharides
  • By-products of processing of cereals which are for dietetic or medical purposes
  • Propolis when used in relation to pharmaceutical purposes
  • Propolis/ protein dietary supplements
  • Animal’s protein supplements
  • Purgatives / evacuants
  • Pyrethrum powder
  • Sunburn preparations – pharmaceutical purposes
  • Ointments for sunburn
  • Suppositories
  • Surgical dressings, glues
  • Surgical implants consisting living tissues
  • Syrups – pharmaceutical purposes
  • Tanning pills
  • Tartar – pharmaceutical purposes
  • Materials for teeth filling
  • Therapeutic preparations for the bath
  • Thermal water
  • Thymol used for pharmaceutical uses
  • Tincture of iodine and medical purposes
  • Tonics
  • Preparations of trace elements for animal use and human usage
  • Preparations in relation to treatment of burns
  • Turpentine – pharmaceutical purposes
  • Vaccines, vaginal washes, vesicants
  • Vermifuges / anthelmintics
  • Vulnerary sponges
  • Vermin destroying preparations
  • Veterinary and vitamin preparations
  • Chemicals that treat vine disease treating
  • Tissues infused with pharmaceutical lotions
  • Tobacco extracts – insecticides
  • Tobacco-free cigarettes for medical purposes
  • Wadding – medical purposes
  • Wart pencils
  • Wheat germ dietary supplements
  • Yeast – pharmaceutical purposes
  • Yeast dietary supplements
  • Quebracho/ quinine/ quinquina/ cinchona for medical purposes
  • Radioactive substances and radiological contrast substances – medical purposes
  • Radium for medical purposes
  • Rat poison
  • Reagent paper for veterinary purposes or medical use
  • Preparations for lessening activities that are sexual in nature
  • Foot perspiration remedies
  • Perspiration remedies
  • Dog repellents
  • Rhubarb roots / Royal jelly when intended to be used for pharmaceutical purposes
  • Royal jelly dietary supplements
  • Rubber when is used for dental purposes
  • Salts used in mineral water baths
  • Salts – medical purposes
  • Sanitary panties / sanitary knickers / menstruation knickers/ sanitary pants
  • Sanitary/ menstruation tampons
  • Sanitary towels/ napkins
  • Sarsaparilla – medical purposes
  • Scapulars for surgical uses
  • Sea water when used in medicinal bathing
  • Sedatives / tranquillisers
  • Serums
  • Semen when used for artificial insemination
  • Serotherapeutic medicines
  • Lubricants for sexual activities 
  • Siccatives which are drying agents when used for medical purposes
  • Pills for slimming
  • Slug exterminating preparations
  • Smelling salts
  • Smoking herbs and sodium salts when used for medical purposes
  • Soil-sterilising preparations
  • Solvents for removing plasters that have adhesives
  • Starch for pharmaceutical purposes or dietetic
  • Stem cells for medical purposes and veterinary purposes
  • Sterilising preparations
  • Soporifics, steroids, strychnine
  • Stick liquorice intended for pharmaceutical usage
  • Styptic preparations
  • Sugar – medical purposes
  • Sulfonamides (medicines), sulphur sticks (disinfectants)

What is not classified under trademark class 5

There are some goods which are not covered under trademark class 5, despite being similar to the other goods which are included under it. 

Sanitary products are covered under class 5, but sanitary preparations such as toiletries (goods that are used for sanitation and cleaning, but not particularly for any medical purpose) are not included under class 5. Instead, they are classified under class 3 of trademark classes. The next product that is not classified under class 5, is deodorant, which is meant for personal use or for animals. This also falls under the ambit of class 3. Supportive bandages are also not covered under class 5. Many dietary supplements are categorised under class 5, but meal replacements which are not meant for medical or dietary use, are not. 

Landmark judgement related to goods under trademark class 5

Cadila Healthcare Limited vs. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Limited (2001)

In this landmark case, the court particularly laid down standards with respect to trademarks in the pharmaceutical industry, which is what class 5 mainly deals with. The court rightly stated “drugs are poisons, not sweets”. The products and services in this field hold the potential to have lasting negative impacts and hence, must be addressed with caution. Class 5 enables us to focus on and specifically deal with matters relating to the same. Standards applicable to medical products and other products, cannot be the same.

Both the appellant and the respondent in this case, were engaged in the same business (manufacturing  pharmaceutical products) and they had the same name as well. The right to use ‘Cadila’ was held by both the companies after the restructuring of the Cadila group took place. The appellant’s drug ‘FALCIGO’ was registered under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. The defendant was also using a very similar trademark- ‘FALCITAB’, which would have easily caused confusion. An appeal was filed by the appellant in the High Court, which was dismissed on the ground that both the drugs had no similarity when it comes to price, appearance, or formulation. 

The appellant further appealed before the Supreme Court, which laid down some factors in this case which can be used to decide whether the marks are deceptively similar or not. The factors to be considered are:

  • The resemblance between the two marks along with their phonetic similarity.
  • The nature of the marks.
  • The nature of goods.
  • The performance, similarity, and character of the rival’s goods.
  • The class of people who are purchasers- whether they are educated enough to tell the difference, and take care when purchasing the goods.
  • The purchasing mode of the goods, and how the order is placed for them.
  • Other relevant circumstances surrounding the marks in question.

The Supreme Court disposed of the appeal and directed the Trial Court to decide the case by considering the factors laid down. It is very important to note that as both the products belong to the same trademark class, it is very easy for the consumers to get confused. Hence, deciding whether the marks are deceptively similar or not plays a very important role. 

To learn more about this case, click here.

Mankind Pharma Limited vs. Novakind Bio Sciences Private Limited (2023)

In this case, the plaintiff was the owner of ‘MANKIND’, with 78 registrations under 45 different trademark classes, out of which class 5 was one. Under trademark class 5, the plaintiff held 120 registrations, wherein ‘KIND’ was used as a suffix in various marks, such as ‘METROKIND’, ‘DEXAKIND’, and ‘MOXIKIND’. The trademark of the plaintiff was also given the status of a well-known one. The plaintiff wanted to stop the defendant from using this suffix, which clearly held importance for the plaintiff, and hence sought a temporary injunction. 

The Delhi High Court, referring to the landmark case of Cadila HealthCare Limited vs. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Limited (2001), stated that it can be dangerous to have similarity in two pharmaceutical items. As per the court, the suffix ‘KIND’ had already become distinctive, and its use by the defendant would infringe upon the right of the plaintiff. It could lead to misrepresentation. As both the plaintiff and defendant’s product belonged to the same trademark class, which is class 5, it would lead to confusion among the consumers in the market. 

Merck Kgaa vs. Galaxy Hompro And Anr (2012)

In this case, the decision of the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) was challenged by a writ petition under Article 226 (power of High Courts to issue certain writs) of the Constitution. The respondent’s trademark, ‘RECIBION’, was approved by the Assistant Registrar of Trademark. The petitioner, owner of a manufacturing company that manufactures pharmaceutical formulations falling under trademark class 5, was already holding a trademark for the marks ‘BETABION, POLYBION, and CEBION.’ 

The petitioner argued that the mark ‘RECIBION’ was very similar in nature to his already registered mark ‘CEBION’, as they both had ‘BION’ as a suffix. as per the Assistant Registrar, there was no similarity, either visually or phonetically. This decision was also supported by IPAB. Further, the Delhi High Court also held the same view, stating that the mark should always be observed as a whole. The consumers in the markets will differentiate on the basis of more than just the prefixes that are used in both marks. Hence, it was stated that there was no deceptive similarity. 

Conclusion

Trademark classes play a key role at the time of applying for trademarks. The primary purpose of classifications in trademarks, is to enable standardisation and simplification in the process of registration of trademarks. This method of categorisation helps reduce ambiguity and conflicts and brings in some much needed clarity in this confusing field.

Trademark class 5 is of great importance, since it is primarily concerned with the pharmaceutical and medical industry, which must be dealt with in a careful manner due to the repercussions it could have on humans, in case of errors. The pharma industry is huge in India. Registering a trademark in a highly competitive market, increases the chances of brand protection, legal protection and increasing consumer trust.

However, this system could also be seen as a disadvantage, in terms of rigidity. With new products and services emerging every day in this age of advanced technology, at times, it would become difficult to properly categorise them. Hence, it is vital and this system is modified and updated accordingly with the passage of time.

Frequently asked questions

What is the total number of trademark classes present in India?

In total, there are 45 trademark classes in India. Classes 1 – 34 consist of goods and classes 34 – 45 consist of services. 

Why is it important to know the trademark class under which your product or service belongs?

One of the main requirements at the time of applying for a trademark is trademark class. The applicant must specify the class under which their goods or services fall, to register and deal with them accordingly.

Can a trademark be registered under more than one class?

In India, a trademark can be registered under more than one trademark class. If a product or service offered by a business or individual falls under the scope of more than one trademark class, then the trademark can be registered under all those classes. The applicant can also register their trademark under class 99, which stands for all classes. Under this, a trademark can be registered under multiple classes through one application.

References

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Kedarnath Bhattacharji vs. Gorie Mahomed (1886)

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Image Source: https://www.quora.com/What-are-the-functions-of-contract-law

This article is written by Vidushi Kachroo. The article gives a detailed analysis of the landmark case of Kedarnath Bhattacharji vs. Gorie Mahomed (1886). This is one of the most important cases in which it was held that when a subscriber, with full knowledge of the purpose, makes a subscription in his name, he is under a legal obligation to fulfil the subscription promised as and when required. The article includes the details and facts of the case, the arguments presented, and the judgement given by the Hon’ble High Court of Calcutta.

Introduction

The case of Kedarnath Bhattacharji vs. Gorie Mahomed (1886) is one of the landmark cases related to the concept that once a promise is made for consideration, it can not be taken back after the fulfilment of the consideration. The Calcutta High Court held in this case that a subscription agreement can be considered a perfectly valid contract if the subscribers have knowledge about the purpose of their subscription.

Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, lays down that any agreement made without a consideration is void in the eyes of law, with certain exceptions. Consideration is the most important essential which is to be fulfilled for a promise to be called a contract. Section 2(d) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 defines the term consideration. In the present case, the respondent was sued by the appellant for not fulfilling his promise of paying the subscribed amount which had to be used for erecting the Town Hall in Howrah.

The main question on which both the parties presented their contentions was whether it was correct to hold the respondent liable to pay the promised amount when it was the appellant who had actually made himself liable by entering into a contract with the contractor, for recovering the costs incurred in the process of building the proposed Town Hall or not.

Details of the case 

  • Case name: Kedarnath Bhattacharji vs. Gorie Mahomed
  • Type of case: Civil Reference
  • Citation: ILR 14 CAL 64
  • Date of judgement: 26 November, 1886
  • Court: High Court of Calcutta
  • Bench: Chief Justice W. Comer Petheram and Justice Beverley
  • Appellant: Kedarnath Bhattacharji
  • Respondent: Gorie Mahomed
  • Laws involved: Section 2 and Section 10 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872

Facts of the case 

In the present case, Kedarnath Bhattacharji (hereinafter referred to as the appellant) was a Municipal Commissioner of Howrah and also the vice chairman of the Municipality. It was decided to build a Town Hall at Howrah and for this purpose, a fund was created to gather subscriptions to cover the cost of construction. For this, the commissioners of the Howrah Municipality entered into a deed, hence declaring themselves as the trustees of the Howrah Town Hall fund. 

When the required subscriptions for erecting the Town Hall were achieved, the commissioners, including the appellant, entered into a contract with a contractor to proceed with the work to build the proposed Town Hall. The plans were submitted by the contractor, which were approved by all the commissioners, and the total estimated budget for building the Town Hall was an amount of ₹26,000. 

After some time, the subscriptions made to the Town Hall fund were calculated to cover an estimated budget of ₹40,000. Hence, due to an increase in the budget, the plans of construction were also enlarged. This was done with the due approval of all the commissioners.

Gorie Mahomed (hereinafter referred to as the respondent) was one of the subscribers of the Howrah Town Hall fund, who had promised to pay ₹100 for the purpose. However, when he was finally asked to pay the promised amount, he refused to make the payment. This led to the appellant, as a trustee of the Town Hall fund and the vice chairman of the municipality, to sue him for not fulfilling his promise. 

The appellant was one of the persons who had made themselves liable to the contractor for fulfilling the costs of the project. The appellant sued the respondent on behalf of all others in the same interest as himself in the Howrah Court of Small Causes. The Registrar of that Court granted the appellant the right to sue under Section 30 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882.

The respondent contended that the appellant had no right to sue. The judge of the Small Causes Court agreed to this contention and stated that the Registrar had no authority to grant the appellant the right to sue and that the case fell under the ambit of Section 437 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882, as the Howrah Town Hall was a trust property. 

Hence, it was held that the suit was bad ab initio. Moreover, the judge, by referring to the case of Kedar Nath Mittra vs. Alisar Rohoman, held that the respondent was a man with no education, which meant that he entered into the subscription without having full knowledge about what he was subscribing to. Therefore, it was held that the respondent was not liable to pay any amount to the appellant. This judgement was then challenged before the High Court of Calcutta.

Issues raised 

After coming across the facts of the case, the Hon’ble High Court of Calcutta had to adjudge the following two issues:

  1. Whether the suit instituted by the appellant was legally maintainable?
  2. Whether, on the basis of the facts stated, the appellant and other trustees were entitled to have the judgement in their favour?

Arguments of the parties

The main argument in this case was based on the question of whether the respondent could be held liable for the payment of the promised subscribed amount when it was the appellant who, among others, had entered into a contract with the contractor. 

Appellant

The appellant put forward his contention that the Howrah Town Hall Fund was created to gather subscriptions from the people to cover the cost of the construction of the Town Hall. The respondent had entered his name into the subscription list and made himself liable to pay an amount of ₹100 for the same purpose. The trustees of the fund, including the appellant, entered into a contract with the contractor and made themselves liable for recovering the cost incurred in the construction of the Town Hall on the basis of the subscriptions made by people. 

According to the appellant, the respondent entered into a contract with the trustees of the fund because he knew the purpose behind the subscription and was fully aware that on account of those subscriptions, the trustees entered into a contract with the contractor. Hence, the respondent was at fault for refusing to pay the subscribed amount as he was breaching his promise. 

Respondent

The respondent on the other hand put forward that though he had subscribed to the Town Hall fund, he was not aware of the purpose for which he was agreeing to subscribe. He defended that being a man of low educational qualification, he had no knowledge as to what he was subscribing for. 

He stated that due to his low educational qualification, he could not be expected to be aware of the legal implications that would follow after putting his name on the subscription list. The respondent argued that he did not make any promise for any consideration and hence, he should not be faced with any legal obligation for the payment of the subscribed amount.

Laws involved in Kedarnath Bhattacharji vs. Gorie Mahomed (1886)

This case revolves around the legal concepts entailed in the following sections of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which have been discussed in detail.

Section 2 of Indian Contract Act

Section 2 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) is the interpretation clause, which lays down all the definitions of the terms used in the Act.

For understanding and defining the term ‘contract’, it is important to understand the terms ‘promise’, ‘consideration’ and ‘agreement’. It is by following this chain of terms that we finally come to the understanding of what is a contract.

Section 2(b) of the Act defines the term promise. It states that when a proposal is accepted it becomes a promise. According to Section 2(a), when a person offers to perform or abstain from performing any act to some other person, he is said to have made a proposal. This proposal is made with the intention of obtaining the consent or acceptance of such other person regarding the performance or abstinence from the performance of the act. When such a proposal is accepted by the other person, it becomes a promise. The one who makes a proposal becomes the promisor and the one who accepts the proposal becomes the promisee.

Section 2(e) states that a promise or set of promises becomes an agreement whenever they are backed by some consideration. Hence, if a promise is made for some consideration, it becomes an agreement.

The term consideration is defined under Section 2(d) of the Act. When the promisor at the desire of the promisor has done or abstained from doing an act, or does or abstains from doing any act, or promises to do or abstain from doing any act, such an act or abstinence is called as consideration. Basically, it means something of a certain value in the eyes of the law in return for which a party to the contract agrees to do or abstain from doing any act.

Section 2(h) states that an agreement enforceable by law is called a contract. This means that an agreement must possess certain essentials for it to be enforceable in the court of law. An agreement must be between competent parties with their free consent while having a lawful consideration for a lawful object. An enforceable contract means that if the contract is breached by any party to the contract, the aggrieved party has the right to institute a suit for breach of contract in the court.

Section 10 of Indian Contract Act

Section 10 of the Act lays down the essential ingredients which make an agreement a valid contract. The essentials of a valid contract are as follows:

Offer and acceptance

There must be an offer made by one party to another in respect of doing or abstaining from doing an act. This offer must be accepted by the other party to whom it was made. There must be consensus ad idem which means that both the parties must accept and understand the terms of the contract in the same sense.

Free consent

The consent must be free from any coercion, fraud, misrepresentation of fact or deception. The parties must enter into the contract on their own will or voluntarily.

Competent parties

The parties must be competent or in the capacity to enter into a contract. They must be of a sound mind and have attained the age of majority, i.e., 18 years. 

Lawful consideration and lawful object

There must be a consideration in a contract. The consideration and the object of the contract must be lawful. They should not be anything which is illegal or opposed to public policy.

Intention to create a legal obligation

There must be an intention of both parties to create a legal obligation.

Must not be expressly void

The contract must be something which has been expressly declared as void in the Act.

Judgement of the case

In this case, the judgement was delivered by Chief Justice Petheram. The court held that the suit instituted by the appellant was legally maintainable and gave its decision in the favour of the appellant. The court held that the arrangement between the appellant and the respondent can be considered a perfectly valid contract with good consideration. Hence, making it legally valid to sue the respondent for evading his liability as promised by him initially. 

The court ordered that the Small Causes Court ought to decree the suit for the amount claimed by the appellant. Hence, it was held that the appellant is entitled to the amount claimed by him and also to recover the cost incurred by him on the litigation process from the respondent.

The Hon’ble High Court of Calcutta reached this conclusion by observing the facts of the case very carefully and hearing the contentions made by both the appellant and the respondent. The court gave its opinion on the two issues raised separately. 

Issue 1: whether this suit was maintainable

The court gave an affirmative opinion on this issue. It was held that the appellant did have the right to sue the respondent for recovering the amount of subscription promised to be paid by him. The court laid down a dissenting opinion on the judgement given by the Judge of the Howrah Small Causes Court. 

When the case was initially heard before the Small Causes Court, the Judge of that Court held that the appellant had no right to sue the respondent. The appellant was allowed by the Registrar to sue the respondent under Section 30 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882; however, the Judge of the Small Causes Court did not find the Registrar to be authorised to allow such a right. Hence, the appellant’s claim was dismissed.

The Calcutta High Court, in its proceedings, stated that the suit filed by the appellant is legally maintainable as he possesses the right to bring a lawsuit on behalf of others having similar interests. It was also held that even if there was any technical fault in the filing of the suit, the court could allow it to proceed by accepting the appellant to act on behalf of other trustees. This was held to ensure that justice is done without giving much importance to the minor procedural issues. 

Issue 2 : whether the trustees are entitled to recover the subscribed amount from the respondent

This issue was the focal point of the entire suit. It had to be decided whether the respondent is under any legal obligation to pay the amount subscribed in his name to the appellant or he can evade this liability on the contention put forward by him before the court. Initially, the Small Causes Court held the decision in favour of the respondent by stating that he was not under any legal obligation to pay the amount subscribed under his name. 

The judge gave the rationale behind his judgement that the respondent was a man of low educational qualification, which clearly meant that he had no knowledge about what he was subscribing to. It was held that he was clueless about the implications which would follow if he did not pay the amount to which he had subscribed in the fund list. Hence, he can not be held liable for something he was not aware of.

The Calcutta High Court dissented from the opinion of the Small Causes Court. The court held that there are numerous subscriptions made by people under their names in various funds and it is not possible to recover such subscriptions. 

This is because such subscriptions are made for the trusts which are public property and people make such subscriptions without having the knowledge as to where their money is going to be spent. In such cases, the subscribers can not be held liable for the payment of the amount subscribed under their names. However, in the present case, a different scenario appears before the court. 

The trust, i.e., the Howrah Town Hall fund, was established for the sole purpose of collecting subscriptions which would be enough for erecting a Town Hall at Howrah. This intention was made clear by all the trustees, including the appellant, of the fund. There was no ambiguity as to what were the subscriptions collected going to be used for. 

The respondent can not claim having no knowledge about the purpose of the fund to which he promised to pay the amount of ₹100 by putting his name in the subscriber’s list. The educational qualification does not matter here as the respondent was already aware that on the basis of the subscriptions collected by the fund, the trustees were going to enter into a contractual liability with the contractor to cover the costs incurred in the construction of the Howrah Town Hall.

This, in the eyes of the court, was a good contract. The court held that the promise made by the respondent to pay ₹100 was against the consideration of the Town Hall being constructed. Hence, it can be considered that he had entered into a contract with the appellant and all the trustees because this arrangement consists of all the essential requirements of a valid contract. 

The court held that this was a perfectly valid contract with good consideration and all the essentials of a contract which is enforceable in the court by the appellant acting on behalf of other persons having the same interest. 

Rationale behind the judgement

The rationale behind the judgement given by the Calcutta High Court was that the promise made by the respondent to pay ₹100 to the Town Hall fund was against the consideration of having the Town Hall constructed. The court observed that a contract was formed between the appellant and the respondent because all the essential requirements of a valid contract were present in the arrangement. 

There was a promise, good consideration, parties of sound mind and a lawful object, all of which make a perfectly valid contract enforceable in a court of law. This created a legal obligation on the respondent to pay the amount promised by him to the appellant. 

The court overturned the decision of the Small Causes Court which was given in the favour of the respondent. The opinion of the judge that the appellant had no right to sue on behalf of other trustees and the inability of the respondent to understand the legal implications of not paying the amount on the grounds of low educational qualification was denied by the Calcutta High Court. 

The High Court held that the appellant was entitled to the right to sue the respondent on behalf of other trustees because all of them had the same interest. The court also stated that even if there were defaults in the procedural aspect of instituting the suit, the court could allow it to meet the ends of justice. 

The court’s findings clearly state that the respondent was fully aware that on the basis of the subscriptions made to the fund list, the trustees, including the appellant, would be entering into a contract with the contract, making themselves liable for the recovery of the amount incurred in the construction of the Town Hall. Hence, the court held the respondent liable for the payment of the subscribed amount.

Analysis of Kedarnath Bhattacharji vs. Gorie Mahomed (1886)

This case lays down the concept of once a promise is made, it can not be taken back. The respondent had subscribed to the Howrah Town Hall fund, promising that he would pay an amount of ₹100 for the purpose of erecting the Town Hall. The trust or the fund was established by the appellant and other Municipal Commissioners, who became the trustees of the fund by forming a deed, for the purpose of collecting subscriptions from the general public so that the costs of constructing the Town Hall could be covered. 

After a certain period, when it was felt that the fund had collected a sufficient number of subscriptions, the appellant along with the other trustees entered into a contract with a contractor, on the faith that the subscribers of the fund would pay the amount promised by them. This contract created a legal liability on all the trustees to cover the costs incurred in the construction of the Town Hall.

The denial of the respondent to pay the subscribed amount on the grounds of having no knowledge as to what he was signing up for was dismissed by the Calcutta High Court. It was held that once a promise is made for good consideration and full knowledge, such a promise constitutes a perfectly valid contract and can not be taken back. 

Hence, when the respondent promised to pay ₹100 for the purpose of constructing the Town Hall, he made himself legally obligated to pay that amount whenever he was asked by the appellant to do so. He can not evade his liability by saying he had no knowledge when the facts make it clear that the appellant and other trustees were going to enter into a contract with the contractor on the faith that the subscriptions made in the fund list would cover the entire cost of the construction.

Conclusion 

The case of Kedarnath Bhattacharji vs. Gorie Mahomed (1886) made it clear that once a promise is made, for good consideration and with the knowledge that a legal liability would occur on the basis of that promise, such promise can not be taken back after the fulfilment of the consideration. The respondent had to pay the amount subscribed under his name because he was fully aware that on the faith that the subscribers would fulfil their promise of paying the subscribed amount, the appellant, along with other trustees, was going to enter into a contract, making themselves liable for covering the cost incurred in the construction of the Howrah Town Hall. 

The Calcutta High Court rejected the contention of the respondent that he was not aware of what he was subscribing to because he did not possess good educational qualifications. The court held that the promise made by the respondent had no relation to him being a man of low education. He was fully aware of the purpose with which the fund was established and the legal liability which the appellant and other trustees made themselves liable for, from the very beginning.

It was held that the respondent could not evade his liability of fulfilling the promise made by him after the consideration, which was the construction of the Howrah Town Hall, was fulfilled. He is under a legal obligation to pay the amount promised by him to the appellant. Hence, the judgement was given in the favour of the appellant. 

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

What are the essentials of a valid contract?

For a contract to be valid, there must be parties competent to contract, an offer made and acceptance, free consent, lawful consideration, lawful object and an intention to create a legal obligation.

Is a contract made with no consideration valid?

No, a contract made without consideration is not valid. Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 clearly states that a contract made without any consideration is void.

What was stated by Section 30 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882?

Section 30 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882 stated that when a single suit consists of numerous persons having the same interest, the court may allow any one or more of such persons to sue or be sued or to defend on behalf of all the persons. However, the court shall give notice of the suit to all the persons involved in the suit. 

References

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Issues related to patentability of biotechnological inventions

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This article has been written by Sarita Sah pursuing a Remote freelancing and profile building program from Skill Arbitrage.

This article has been edited and published by Shashwat Kaushik.

Introduction

It has been a boon to fields like healthcare, or even agriculture and environmental management, which have been dished out with radical solutions—really holding out hope of solving some of the gut-wrenching problems of humanity. At the same time, the question of their patenting really gets debated across the world, with a host of legal, ethical, and economic considerations getting interwoven into this controversial debate. In India, the biotech patenting landscape is never static, affected as it is by international agreements, domestic laws, and, more recently, government initiatives to promote innovation while still protecting public interest.

Understanding patentability

Patentability, a crucial legal concept in the realm of intellectual property, establishes whether an invention meets the criteria to be granted a patent. By obtaining a patent, the patent holder gains exclusive rights to use and exploit their invention for commercial purposes for a specified period, typically up to 20 years. However, not all inventions are eligible for patents. To be considered patentable, an invention must satisfy specific conditions that ensure its uniqueness, non-obviousness, and practical applicability.

One fundamental condition for patentability is novelty. An invention must be genuinely new and not part of the existing public knowledge. This means that the invention should not have been disclosed or made available to the public in any form before the patent application is filed. The purpose of this requirement is to protect the rights of the inventor and prevent others from claiming ownership of an idea that was already in existence.

Another critical condition is inventive step or non-obviousness. An invention cannot be considered patentable if it is merely an obvious modification or adaptation of existing technology. The invention must demonstrate a level of creativity and inventiveness that would not be readily apparent to a person skilled in the relevant field. This condition ensures that patents are granted only for genuine innovations that contribute to technological progress.

Finally, an invention must possess industrial applicability to be patentable. This means that the invention must have practical use and can be applied in an industrial or commercial setting. The purpose of this requirement is to encourage inventions that have the potential to benefit society through their practical applications.

These patentability requirements can be particularly challenging to satisfy in the case of biotechnological inventions. The inherent nature of biological material and processes often poses unique obstacles. For example, the complexity and variability of biological systems can make it difficult to establish novelty and inventiveness. Additionally, the ethical and regulatory considerations surrounding biotechnology can further complicate the patenting process.

Despite these challenges, biotechnological inventions have the potential to make significant contributions to various fields, including medicine, agriculture, and environmental sustainability. Therefore, it is essential to strike a balance between protecting intellectual property rights and ensuring that these inventions are accessible and available for the benefit of society.

Legal framework of biotechnology patents in India

India has a system of patents governed under the statute called the Indian Patent Act of 1970, with significant amendments made in 2005 in order for it to align with the TRIPS agreement, where under this regime, it introduces product patents for pharmaceuticals and biotechnological invention. Key provisions touching on biotechnology patents include:

  • Section 3(b): Excludes those inventions whose use would go contrary to public order or morality or which could be harmful to human, animal, or plant life, health, or the environment.
  • Section 3(c): It outlines the exclusion of mere discoveries of scientific principles or abstract theories.
  • Section 3(d): It does not permit the patenting of substances known but for new forms, for the new forms only if they increase the efficacies.
  • Section 3(j): It makes provisions for the inclusion of plants and animals but excluding microorganisms. Therefore, the patentability of seeds, varieties, and species remains excluded.
  • Section 3(k): The provisions of this section of the law exclude from patentability mathematical methods or business modules or algorithms.

These sections therefore approach patents concerning biotechnological inventions in India with extreme caution by moving the tightrope between promoting invention and concerns regarding morals and public health.

Patentability challenges of biotechnological inventions

Moral and ethical issues

Since most biotechnological renditions involve manipulating living organisms, commodification of life forms is fundamentally an ethical issue. To compass this, section 3(b) of the Indian Patent Act provides that an invention, the primary or intended use, which may be potentially against public order or morality, shall not merit patents.

Definition of inventive step and novelty

Determining what is inventive and novel in biotechnology is especially problematic. Many biotechnological inventions are based on naturally occurring processes or genetic sequences; it makes it more complex to determine what is genuinely new or non-obvious.

Patenting life forms

It is an ethical matter that Section 3(j) prohibits patenting of plants and animals and opens potential socio-economic implications. Microorganisms can be patented, so what is the boundary line then?

Biodiversity and traditional knowledge

Unique challenges in India arise, among others, from rich biodiversity and traditional knowledge. On the one hand, these resources need to be safeguarded from biopiracy; on the other hand, innovation needs to be encouraged. The Biological Diversity Act of 2002 will operate along with and in support of the provisions of the Patent Act to avoid conflicting situations.

Current scenario and government initiatives

The Indian Government is well aware of the strengthening role of biotechnology in boosting economic growth and enhancing public health. Indeed, the newer initiatives reflect a lot more openness toward biotechnological innovation:

  • National biotechnology development strategy: The Department of Biotechnology has enunciated a strategy in order to give a push to the sector of biotechnology. Policy support, infrastructure development, and skill enhancement are the major ideals that endeavors to position India as a global hub of biotechnology research and development.
  • Biotechnology industry research assistance council: BIRAC is a not-for-profit company that helps early-stage biotech enterprises through several activities. It turns out to be a public-private partnership and helps the start-up and SMEs with funding, mentorship, and networking.
  • Make in India and Start-up India initiatives: The Make in India and Start-up India initiatives are twin engines that have revolutionised the biotechnology sector in India. These initiatives, launched by the Indian government, aim to create a conducive environment for biotechnology start-ups to flourish.

Easing of regulatory procedures

One of the key challenges faced by biotechnology start-ups is the complex regulatory framework. To address this, the Make in India and Start-up India initiatives have simplified and streamlined regulatory processes. This includes reducing the number of approvals required, fast-tracking the review process, and providing greater clarity on regulations. As a result, biotechnology start-ups can now navigate the regulatory landscape more efficiently, saving time and resources.

Financial incentives

To encourage innovation and growth, the Make in India and Start-up India initiatives offer a range of financial incentives to biotechnology start-ups. These incentives include tax breaks, subsidies, grants, and access to venture capital. This financial support enables start-ups to invest in research and development, expand their operations, and bring new products and services to market.

Access to infrastructure and markets

The Make in India and Start-up India initiatives recognise the importance of infrastructure and market access for biotechnology start-ups. To address this, the government has established biotechnology parks and incubators that provide state-of-the-art facilities and equipment. These facilities enable start-ups to conduct research, develop prototypes, and pilot their products. Additionally, the government has created platforms and networks that connect start-ups with potential investors, industry partners, and customers. This helps start-ups gain visibility, build partnerships, and secure funding.

Impact of the initiatives:

The Make in India and Start-up India initiatives have had a significant impact on the biotechnology sector in India. These initiatives have led to an increase in the number of biotechnology start-ups, attracted foreign investment, and fostered a culture of innovation and entrepreneurship. As a result, India has emerged as a global hub for biotechnology research and development.

  • Revision of patent examination guidelines: Periodically, the Indian Patent Office revises guidelines for examination of biotechnological inventions, which clearly define the criteria for patentability and streamline their application process more lucidly.

Comparative perspective

Policies toward patents of biotechnological inventions follow different paths in different countries. In the United States, the Bayh-Dole Act encourages patenting this kind of invention resulting from federally funded research. USPTO policies have been relatively liberal, allowing the filing of patents on isolated genes, genetically modified organisms, and biotechnological processes, provided that they abide by the criteria of novelty, non-obviousness, and utility.

The European Patent Convention aims to provide a balanced approach in this field; allowing for patents on biotechnological inventions but not on plant or animal varieties, or essentially biological processes for producing plants or animals. It has always been important for the EPO to have clarity and explicitness in patent claims to avoid overly broad or ambiguous patents.

In contrast, the cautious stance of India foregrounds the need for balancing innovation with pressing social and ethical concerns like access to medicine, biodiversity protection, and the rights of small farmers and indigenous remnants.

Ethical considerations

Ethical considerations raise a number of very complex questions in the patentability of biotechnological inventions that cover issues related to commodification of life forms, environmental effects, and human/animal welfare.

  • Commodification of life forms: Patenting life forms raises various controversial ethical issues related to the control and ownership of genetic resources. Critics spur on the idea that this invention might end up creating a monopoly, limiting access to needed, basic biological materials and technologies.
  • Environmental impacts: Biotechnological inventions, even more those involving GMOs, emit in general an environmental impact. Among the ethical considerations, one can include the possible ecological consequences, gene flow to wild populations of the same species, and the sustainability of biotechnological interventions.
  • Human and animal welfare: Biotechnological research is very commonly conducted on human and animal subjects, so there are concerns about the care and welfare of these research subjects. Naturally, ethical regulations are of the utmost importance to guarantee the exemplary performance of practices that cause the least harm.

Legal issues

Legal issues include transparent and uniform patent laws, genetic resources and traditional knowledge protection, and efficient enforcement of patent rights.

  • Clear and consistent patent laws: The laws must be updated regularly in view of advances in biotechnology for legal certainty and predictability.
  • Protection of genetic resources and traditional knowledge: The protection of genetic resources and traditional knowledge is of utmost importance, especially in countries of high biodiverse nature like India, in order to avoid biopiracy and to ensure fair benefit-sharing.
  • Enforcement of patent rights: Effective systems of dispute settlement, prevention and control of infringement, and providing adequate means for the exercise of patent grantee’s rights are important for the advancement of innovation.

Social factors

Social factors relate to access and equity, perception and acceptance by society or people, and the impact on the vulnerable groups in society or people.

  • Access to and equity in biotechnological developments: A fair share in benefits arising out of the biotechnological developments is a serious concern. In this direction, issues relating to access to genetic testing, biopharmaceuticals, and agricultural biotechnology have to be addressed.
  • Public perception and acceptance: The level of public awareness and confidence in the scientific and regulatory bodies affects the acceptance of biotechnological innovations. Creating goodwill necessitates involvement and awareness creation among all stakeholders.
  • Impact on vulnerable groups: Pay attention to the prospects the work has on small-scale farmers, indigenous groups, and patients left abandoned suffering from rare health conditions. Policies should safeguard their rights and guarantee that the biotechnological innovations benefit all sections of society.

Future prospects

The issues of patentability are likely to get complicated with progress being made in this field. Areas in which the developments are going to take place in the near future include the following:

  • Regulatory harmonisation: The harmonisation of India’s patent laws with international trends would have to be in such a manner that one should ensure that this is without being rigid to address domestic concerns. There is thus a need to harmonise the guidelines of examination, transparency in the procedure followed, and international cooperation.
  • Ethics frameworks: Develop good ethical frameworks, especially for technologies like CRISPR, so that a balance can be drawn between innovation and ethical and social considerations.
  • Public awareness and participation: Increase public information and involvement in policy discussions to ensure different forms of experience are taken on board.
  • Innovation ecosystem: Increase R&D support, public-private partnership mechanisms, and investment in biotechnology startups and SMEs.

Conclusion

The patenting of biotechnological inventions is a fusion of legal, ethical, and social dimensions in one basket. It is perhaps for this very reason that India treads carefully, ensuring that the balance between these competing pulls tilts more in favour of stimulating innovation rather than just protecting private interests or vice versa. Continuous dialogue based on adaptive policies is of utmost importance to navigate the patentability dilemma and achieve optimum social benefits of biotechnological developments for societal applications. Addressing these complex implications will enable the realisation of maximum benefits of genetic testing and other biotechnological innovations, hence improving health outcomes and facilitating sustainable development across the world and in India.

References

  • https://ipindia.gov.in/writereaddata/Portal/ev/sections-index.html
  • https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/2046/4/a2003-18.pdf
  • https://www.eeoc.gov/statutes/genetic-information-nondiscrimination-act-2008
  • https://dbtindia.gov.in/sites/default/files/uploadfiles/Draft%20National%20Biotechnology%20Development%20Strategy%202020-25.pdf
  • https://www.birac.nic.in/
  • https://www.epo.org/en/legal/epc/2020/EPC_conv_20240401_en_20240401.pdf
  • https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2011-title35/html/USCODE-2011-title35-partII-chap18.htm
  • https://ipindia.gov.in/writereaddata/Portal/IPOGuidelinesManuals/1_38_1_4-biotech-guidelines.pdf
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Lakshmi Kant Pandey vs. Union of India (1986)

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This article is written by Lavanya Gupta. It analyses the case of Lakshmi Kant Pandey vs. Union of India (1987) that laid down guidelines for adoption and connected matters, placing the welfare of abandoned and destitute children at its core.

Introduction

The case of Lakshmi Kant Pandey vs. Union of India (1986) clarified and modified the directions relating to adoption that were laid in the earlier decisions of the court. The aim of the judgement was to ensure a speedy and child-friendly process of adoption, one that promotes the paramount welfare of the child. It streamlined the process of adoption by foreign parents and laid down the roles of various stakeholders in the adoption regime – from scrutinising agencies to welfare organisations to juvenile courts as well as placement agencies.The right of children to an affectionate and secure household was recognised and given practical implementation through the guidelines of the Supreme Court.

Details of the case 

Name of the case Lakshmi Kant Pandey vs. Union of India

Name of the court– Supreme Court

Name of the petitioner– Lakshmi Kant Pandey

Name of the respondent– Union of India

Date of judgement– 3 December,1986

Equivalent citations-1987 AIR 232, 1987 SCR (1) 383, AIR 1987 SUPREME COURT 232, 1987 (1) SCC 66

Bench– J. PN Bhagwati and J. Ranganath Misra

Author of the judgement– J. PN Bhagwati

Facts of the case 

The Apex Court in Laxmi Kant Pandey vs Union of India (1984) decided on 6th February 1984 had laid down the normative and procedural safeguards to be followed in case of adoption of an Indian child by foreign parents.The safeguards for inter-country adoption were laid down and the entire process of adoption was delineated by the Supreme Court. This was followed by a supplementary judgement of the Supreme Court in 1985. 

However, various stakeholders in the adoption process faced practical issues in implementing the directions ranging from fees to the status of abandoned children as well as other problems surrounding child trafficking. In order to resolve the difficulties faced in the implementation of the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court, the petitioners filed these criminal miscellaneous petitions seeking further directions from this Court to strengthen the adoption regime in India. 

The first application considered by the court was the application filed by The Indian Council for Child Welfare asking the court to direct the payment of a particular amount for the scrutinising services rendered by it on being asked to act as a scrutinising agency by the Apex Court. The Delhi Council for Child Welfare along with the Church of North India and other organisations also filed an application seeking modifications or clarifications with respect to directions given by the Supreme Court in the 1984 judgement. This application forms the crux of the case.

Issues raised in the case

  • Whether the representative of the recognised placement agency must become joint guardians with the foreign parents until the adoption process is completed?
  • Whether the process of adoption laid down by the court requires modification so as to prevent delays?
  • Whether inter-state transfer of children for adoption is permitted, and if so, what are requirements thereto?
  • Whether prospective foreign parents living in India for one year or more, also need to secure sponsorship from a child or social welfare agency in their home country?
  • Whether security for due performance of obligations must be imposed on the foreign parents?

Arguments of the parties

The Indian Council for Child Welfare in its application contended that a certain amount of fees should be paid to it for any scrutinising services rendered by it on the direction of the court, taking into account the expenditure for the employment of staff or such other necessary expenses.

The Karnataka Council for Child Welfare in its application argued that the purpose behind the 1984 judgement is being violated, due to a prevalent practice in the State of Karnataka. Some unrecognised agencies were using recognised placement agencies as mere post offices or “conduit pipes” for processing the cases of children which were in the former’s custody and with whom the recognised agencies had virtually no contact. This practice was challenged in the Supreme Court.

The Delhi Council for Child Welfare in its application highlighted the direction of the Supreme Court laid down in the 1984 judgement as per which abandoned children should not be assumed as free for adoption but must be produced before the juvenile court so that further inquiries can be made, and their parents or guardians can be traced. Further, when children are held as free for adoption, the court directed that the release order must be passed expeditiously, and due vigilance must be exercised by the concerned High Court. However, the Delhi Council for Child Welfare in its application (for clarification of the directions given by the Supreme Court), contended that the juvenile courts were mechanically interpreting this direction and were taking the view that release orders for such children must be passed expeditiously only where it is clear that children are selected for adoption. However, no child can be offered for adoption unless declared legally free for adoption by the juvenile courts. This means that the earlier direction laid down by the Apex Court is meaningless and must be suitably modified. 

In another application, the Delhi Council along with other applicants, raised several points. First, they highlighted a prevalent practice in Delhi wherein the representative of the concerned recognised placement agency and the prospective foreign parents were both duly appointed as joint guardians of the child until the child is adopted by the parents in the foreign country. This in turn, creates an unnecessary obligation on the said representative. Further, the applicants also contended that the present procedure for adoption as laid down by the court is  quite delayed and drawn-out which would take at least 8-9 months. It involves the three-month time period given to the biological parents who surrender the child to reconsider their decision as well as other steps in this long process. It was argued that this prolonged period must be curtailed and suitable modifications in the procedure must be made. 

The applicants also highlighted the case of foreign parents living in India for a year or more, who consequently face difficulty in obtaining foreign sponsoring and thus asked for suitable clarifications in this regard as well. Other issues raised in the application include inter-state transfer of children for adoption. Finally, the application sought clarification with respect to security for due performance that was discussed in the 1985 supplementary judgement. It was argued whether security or cash deposit or bank guarantee by the foreign parent is necessary or whether execution of a bond by the concerned recognised placement agency is sufficient.

Laws/ concepts involved in Lakshmi Kant Pandey vs. Union of India (1986)

Guardians and Wards Act, 1890

The Act was passed to amend and consolidate the law relating to guardianship and is a secular Act on this subject matter. It covers the procedure for the appointment and declaration of guardians and also lays down the duties, rights and liabilities of the guardian both in case of person and property. Section 7 of the Act delineates the power of the court to pass an order as to guardianship. Section 8 declares the persons who shall be entitled to file an application for such an order. Section 9 lays down which court shall have the jurisdiction to entertain such an application. Section 11 further specifies the procedure to be followed on admission of application. 

Section 9(4) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956

Section 9 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act,1956 specifies who shall be entitled to give the child in adoption. Sub-section (4) further declares that where both the father and mother of the child are dead or have renounced the world or have abandoned the child or are of unsound mind (as declared by a court of competent jurisdiction) or where the parentage of the child is unknown, the guardian of a child may give the child in adoption to any person including the guardian himself with the previous permission of the court.

Judgement of the case

On prevalent practice in Delhi as to joint guardianship 

The Court held that this procedure (for appointment of the foreigner as well as the representative of the agency as joint guardians of the child) is unique to Delhi and further places an unnecessary obligation on part of the recognised placement agency.  In order to ensure the care of the child in the meantime and its eventual adoption, the court held that it would be quite sufficient to take a bond from the recognised placement agency so as to ensure fulfilment of the conditions laid down by the court and no such continued obligation is required.  It directed that the court hearing such an application should not mandate the representative of the agency to act as co-petitioner on the application or as joint guardian of the child. Where such a representative has already been declared as a joint guardian prior to this order, they shall stand discharged after the adoption of the child by the foreign parents. 

On drawn-out process for adoption

The Court noted the point raised by the applicant that when a child is surrendered by the biological parents, a period of three months is given for them to reconsider. Similarly, for an abandoned or destitute child, a period of three months is provided to the Juvenile court/ Social Welfare Department/ District Collector to declare the child free for adoption. After the child is so declared, a maximum period of two months is provided to find a suitable Indian family (which has been reduced to 3-4 weeks) . It takes another four weeks in mail to send the child study and medical reports to the sponsoring agency abroad to be handed to the foreigner for their approval and after the approval is received, a further period of two months is allowed to the court to process the application. Another month may be taken for other formalities like passports, making the entire process lengthy, drawn-out and delayed. The court agreed with this contention and laid down suitable modifications.

The court passed the following directions-

  1. In cases where the child is surrendered by the biological parents or unwed mother under a Deed of Relinquishment, it shall not be necessary to approach the Juvenile court/Social Welfare department/District Collector as the case may be, to obtain a release order. The Deed of Relinquishment shall be enough to be produced before the court hearing the application for guardianship. 
  2. It is only in cases of abandoned or destitute children, that the entire process through the Juvenile court or other authorities shall be completed.
  3. As soon as such a child is found with a social or child welfare agency, a report shall be lodged with the local police station along with the child’s photograph.
  4. The Commissioner of Police, or the Inspector General of Police, should instruct all police stations to promptly undertake an inquiry for tracing the parents of the child and the inquiry shall be completed within a month of lodging of the report.
  5. Meanwhile the social welfare agency that has found the child may make an application to the Juvenile court or other authorities as the case may be, for a release order declaring the child legally free for adoption. Since the police inquiry is to be completed in one month, it shall be possible for the Juvenile court or other concerned authority to issue the release order within five months of the application.
  6. If the biological parents are indeed traced due to the inquiry, notice shall be issued to them to reconsider their decision after explaining the implications of the release order. Only one week shall be provided to them to make the decision.

This procedure will reduce the time taken to give the child in adoption.

  1. During the pendency of the application for the release order, the recognised placement agency to whom the child has been transferred by the social or child welfare agency may explore the possibility of adoption and the child may be offered for adoption to both Indian and foreign parents subject to the clearance of the child for adoption by the Juvenile court/ Social Welfare Department/District Collector.
  2. The recognised placement agency need not wait for the release order before offering the child for adoption otherwise a delay of six weeks may still occur before the child is offered for adoption. By allowing this, even the two month period that is undertaken to find Indian parents before offering the child for adoption to foreign parents is also removed, leading to an expeditious process of adoption.

If this procedure is followed, it shall now be possible to find suitable Indian parents or failing that, foreign parents within a period of six to eight weeks from the time the child is found by the welfare agency. 

On inter-state transfer of child for adoption

When an abandoned or destitute child is brought before a recognized placement agency or is found by it, it shall be open to the agency to transfer the child to a branch in another State after the inquiry by the Juvenile court/Social Welfare Department/District Collector is completed. If it has as associate social or child welfare agency in another State, it may transfer the child there provided that the inquiry is completed, and release order is issued and that such an associate agency has been notified by the placement agency as its associate to the governments of the respective States where the placement agency and the associate agency are operating.  If such a transfer to an associate agency or branch in another State is necessary before the completion of inquiry, the recognised placement agency may do the same after obtaining requisite permission from the Juvenile court/Social Welfare department/ District Collector. 

The court also directed the GoI to publish at least yearly, the list of recognised placement agencies and their associate social or child welfare agencies operating in each State in two leading newspapers having wide circulation in the State, one in English and the other in the regional language of the State so that people may be aware regarding the same. It further directed the GoI to send the District courts through the concerned High courts a list of recognised placement agencies operating in the State along with the particulars of their associate agencies. Such a list must be furnished at least once a year to the District courts and any modifications must be informed through the concerned High Court.

On difficulty in obtaining sponsoring 

The court agreed that difficult conditions of sponsorship, and of obtaining a home study report from a foreign agency in their home country, on foreigners living in India shall be quite impractical. The court ordered that in case of a foreigner living in India for a year or more, the home study report may be prepared by the recognised placement agency processing the application and the concerned court shall not stress on such sponsoring or report by a social or child welfare agency of the home country of the foreigners. The home study report prepared by the recognised placement agency shall suffice.

On security for due performance

The court clarified the position with regard to security to be deposited by the foreigner as was previously outlined is supplementary judgement- 

“Ordinarily the court entertaining an application on behalf of a foreigner shall not insist on a security deposit by the foreigner for due performance of the obligations undertaken by him, but in an exceptional case, the court may pass an order requiring him to make such deposit. The execution of a bond would ordinarily be sufficient.”

The Supreme Court held that the concerned court need not insist on security or cash deposit or bank guarantee by the foreigner for due performance of obligations. A bond from the recognised placement agency shall suffice who may further take such bond from the sponsoring child or social welfare agency in the home country of the foreigner. Ordinarily, the latter would honour such a bond but if it is broken, the recognised placement agency shall not be liable to deal with it and the sponsoring agency’s name shall be liable to be removed from the list of such child or social welfare sponsoring agencies that are recognised for the purpose of adoption.

Other observations made by the court

On payment to scrutinising agencies

The Bench held that when the court makes an order appointing a foreign parent as a guardian of a child with a view to its eventual adoption in the foreign country, the court shall direct such an amount to paid to the agency for its scrutinising services as it deems reasonable, taking into consideration the nature of the case and the kind and extent of scrutinising services rendered. The court may fix a reasonable amount between Rs. 450-500 but may even exceed the same if it thinks fit. This amount shall be paid by the recognized placement agency which has processed the application of the foreign parent, and the placement agency shall have the right to recover the same from the concerned foreign parent. The directions shall be applied mutatis mutandis (with necessary changes being made) in cases where an Indian parent makes an application for appointing himself or herself as the guardian of a child or a Hindu parent applies for adoption of a child under Section 9(4) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act,1956 and the case is referred to a scrutinising agency for its consideration. However, the amount in such a case shall not exceed Rs. 150. 

On unrecognised placement agencies

The Karnataka State Council for Child Welfare in its application had argued that the purpose behind the judgments of 1984 and 1985 is being violated due to the prevalent practice in Karnataka where unrecognised agencies are using recognised agencies as post offices for processing cases with respect to children in their custody which the recognised agencies in fact have nothing to do with. The court noted that due to this practice, recognized placement agencies become mere ‘conduit pipes’ for making or processing applications for appointment of foreign guardians with no communication either with these prospective foreign parents or with the foreign sponsoring agency. This practice was criticised because if the child is not in the custody of the recognized placement agency, proper observation and collection of information of the child would not be possible. This would vitiate the entire process as it is the recognised agency which has to furnish the child study report, the medical report and the application for the appointment of foreign guardian to the court after proper examination. Thus, the recognised placement agency must have the concerned child in its custody for at least a month in order to prepare a comprehensive and satisfactory report. 

On procedure for abandoned children/prevention of illegal selling of babies

While a fool-proof formula to completely stop such illegal acts could not be formulated, the court highlighted the need to devise a procedure that would reduce the number of such instances.  It held that all nursing homes and hospitals which come across abandoned or destitute children shall give information regarding such discovery of children to the Social Welfare Department of the concerned government where such nursing homes or hospitals are situated in the Capital of the State. In other cases, such information must be furnished to the District Collector. Copies of such intimation shall also be sent to the Foster Care Home (where such a home is run by the State Government) as well as the recognized placement agencies operating in the town or city where such nursing home or hospital is located. The Social Welfare Department and the District Collectors shall ensure that this direction shall be followed in their respective jurisdictions and in cases where necessary, if the intimation to the Foster Home or Placement agencies regarding the discovery or finding of such children is not sent by the nursing home or hospital, the Social Welfare Department or the District Collector shall forward the same.

The Government run Foster Care Home as well as the recognized placement agencies shall communicate with each other as to available Indian parents who wish to adopt children. The Foster Care Home and the placement agencies shall through this collaboration, have a consolidated list of such prospective Indian parents. Each such parent registered as a prospective parent with either shall be entitled to information about all the children in the group specified by him/her according to the list.

On expeditious release orders

It was held that when a recognised placement agency produced the child for a release order before the Juvenile court declaring the child is abandoned or destitute and thus legally free for adoption, the Juvenile court must complete the inquiry within a period of one month from the date of application  and the High Court must exercise due vigilance in order to give effect to the directions of this Court.

The Supreme Court further asked the High Courts for monthly reports from juvenile courts as to the number of pending applications for such release orders, when they were filed and if the period of one month has passed, what is the reason for delay. The Court expressed its worry that abandoned children must be placed with prospective Indian parents and failing Indian parents, to foreign parents as soon as possible without procedural delays so that they receive a loving family environment. 

Analysis of Lakshmi Kant Pandey vs. Union of India (1986) 

The present case clarified and modified the directions given in the main judgement as well as the supplementary judgement in order to streamline the implementation of the adoption framework as envisaged in Lakshmi Kant Pandey vs. Union of India (1984). By discussing the various modalities and procedures in the adoption process, particularly pertaining to inter-country adoption relating to costs, processes as well as other child welfare concerns, the procedural and normative safeguards as specified in the earlier judgments were strengthened and certain difficulties in the process were ironed out. The court hoped that the 1986 judgement would further lead to timely adoption and prevent child abuse.

The process of adoption was further streamlined, and unnecessary delays were removed thereby bringing down the time taken for eventual adoption, ensuring that children are offered familial love and security, and their welfare is treated as paramount. Further, the role of scrutinising agencies, sponsoring agencies, the costs of various factors involved in this process as well as expediency in release orders or mitigation of unnecessary difficulties faced by foreign parents are also elaborately dealt with, ensuring a timely and efficient adoption process.

Relevant judgement related to the case

Re: Rasiklal Chhaganlal Metha (1981)

The case is a landmark decision pertaining to inter-country adoption. One of the first cases concerning inter-country adoption, it pertained to a German couple who had converted to the Hindu faith and sought adoption of a minor girl child under Section 9(4) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. The Gujarat High Court affirmed the decision of the District Court which had permitted the adoption of the child under the 1965 Act and held that inter-country adoption under Section 9(4) of the HAMA was indeed valid. The adoptive parents, however, must comply with the adoption laws in their own country and the court must ensure that such adoption is legally permissible under the laws of both the countries. Further, the adoptive parents must have the requisite permission of the authorities in their country, so that the child may immigrate and adopt the nationality of his/her adoptive parents and does not face any difficulties in doing so.

Conclusion 

By streamlining the entire process of adoption and making it more efficient and free of delays, the law especially for intercountry adoption has been strengthened. The new norms keep the interests of the child as paramount. Although complications in the new regime may exist, a basic framework for processing inter-country adoptions has been laid down which may further be reformed by government interventions in this area. The adoption regime must continue to recognise the need for a stable and affectionate family in each child’s life and ensure that the guidelines laid down for the process do not have any adverse effects on the child or the adoptive family.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

What is the current legal framework with respect to adoption in India?

Besides the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act,1956 which applies to adoption amongst Hindus as defined under the Act, Chapter VIII of the Juvenile Justice(Care and Protection) Act, 2015 and the rules framed under the Act as well as the norms laid down by the Central Adoption Resource Authority are the guiding framework with respect to adoption in India.

What are some of the international laws governing transnational adoption?

Article 21 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989 as well as the Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Inter-country Adoption, 1993 are some of the prominent international laws concerning inter-country adoption and child welfare in this respect.  

References


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