Both the concepts of intellectual property and open software systems are interrelated and have significant significance in the field of software development. Open source is and has been a reaction to the IP. As we use or interact with the open source, we interact with the IP. A source code that is distributed freely and the programmers can alter the code as per their need or requirement. Understanding the relationship between both of these concepts is crucial for developers, businesses, consumers, etc. However, the concept of the open software system is different from the closed software system in a way that the closed software system is protected by copyright, trademarks, patents, and other IPRs and is not allowed to edit or mould the software, whereas the open software system is open, and the developers or users can edit it in a way they like it because the code of the open software system is open for all. This article shall discuss an overview of IP and OSS and other informative things in relation to that.
What is intellectual property
Intellectual property is the legal right that creators have over their intellectual creations, which can include inventions, artistic work, symbols, names, images, etc. In the context of software, IP rights are typically protected through patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets.
Patents: Patents provide inventors with exclusive rights to their product or process for a limited period of time, typically 20 years from the date of filing. This protection allows inventors to recoup their investment in research and development and to profit from their innovation. Patents are granted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) after a rigorous examination process that ensures that the invention is new, useful, and non-obvious.
Trademarks: Trademarks protect brand names, logos, and other distinctive marks that identify a particular product or service. They serve to prevent confusion in the marketplace and to protect businesses from unfair competition. Trademarks are granted by the USPTO after a review process to ensure that the mark is not already in use by another business and that it does not infringe on any existing trademarks.
Trade secrets: Trade secrets are confidential business information that provides a company with a competitive advantage. They can include things like algorithms, formulas, recipes, and manufacturing processes. Trade secrets are not protected by law, but they can be protected through a variety of means, such as non-disclosure agreements and physical security measures.
Copyrights: Copyrights protect original works of authorship, including literary, dramatic, musical, and artistic works, as well as software code. Copyright protection subsists for the life of the author plus an additional 70 years. Copyrights are granted automatically upon the creation of an original work, but they can be registered with the USPTO to provide additional protection.
Open source software
Meaning
Open Software System is licensed in a way that allows anyone to use, modify, and distribute the software and its source code freely.
Open source is contrary to the closed-source software applications, such as Adobe, MS Word, etc. The creator sells the closed-source software to users, who are not allowed to make any changes or edit, enhance, or redistribute the product.
Background
Richard Stallman was a computer scientist who founded the Free Software Foundation in the 1980s. He is also known as the Father of Open Source.
The mission of this foundation was to promote the study, use, modify, enhance, copy, and redistribute the software programs. By promoting the OSS, it reduces the demand and use of closed-source software, which is also known as proprietary software.
Some common OSS:
Android
Linux
Symbian
Apache
Php
Python
Mozilla firefox
NRCFOSS (National Resource Centre for Free/Open Source Software)
NRCFOSS is an Indian government organisation established in the year 2005 through its Department of IT under the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology.
This organisation fosters the growth of free and open source software in India by conducting research, developing talent, building networks, and supporting entrepreneurship.
Additionally, it serves as the focal point for all national FOSS-related initiatives.
Key features of OSS
Flexibility of the source code
The software can be customised as per the specific needs of the developer or businesses without incurring any cost to the user that is associated with the licensing.
Easy evaluation
The source code is open and transparent, which allows the user to evaluate or analyse its competency, incompetency, bugs, or flaws.
Collaborative approach
OSS is developed and maintained wholly through open collaborations. It is developed through community involvement; contributors are from different backgrounds like companies, individual developers, institutions, etc.
Flexible licensing
Open-source software is generally released under licenses that have been authorised by OSI (Open Source Initiative). Popular examples include MIT, Apache, BSD, and GNU General Public Licence (GPL). Users are granted particular rights under these licences, including the capacity to use, alter, and distribute the program.
Facilitates innovation
OSS helps the software and the code to evolve and improve while putting in more technological efforts. It allows the developers to save time and effort by manipulating the software code that was being developed by others.
Zero to low cost accessibility
OSS is usually affordable because it is free of cost or incurs a very low cost in comparison to the other softwares like the commercial softwares and the closed source or proprietary software.
Secure and reliable
Open-source software development often involves collaboration among diverse individuals with varying skill levels. This collaborative process can sometimes introduce inconsistencies in the software code.
However, the open-source model allows other developers to review, correct, and improve the code, enhancing its security and reliability.
Understanding the relation between IP and OSS
“Open source” and “closed source” are two contrasting approaches to ownership and distribution of intellectual property (IP), particularly in the context of software.
In the open-source model, the source code of the software is made freely available to anyone. This allows users to inspect, modify, and distribute the software as they see fit. The primary motivation behind open-source software is to foster collaboration and community-driven innovation. Developers can contribute to the project, fix bugs, and add new features, which helps improve the overall quality and functionality of the software. Prominent examples of open-source operating systems include Linux and Android, while popular open-source web browsers include Mozilla Firefox and Chromium.
In contrast, closed-source software is developed and owned by a single entity or organization. The source code is kept secret, and users are typically required to pay a subscription or license fee to use the software. Closed-source software is often developed by commercial entities that want to protect their intellectual property and generate revenue from their software products. Examples of closed-source software include proprietary operating systems like Microsoft Windows and macOS, as well as commercial software applications such as Adobe Photoshop and Microsoft Office.
One of the key differences between open-source and closed-source software is the level of control users have over the software. With open-source software, users have the freedom to modify and redistribute the software, which gives them more flexibility and customisation options. In contrast, closed-source software users are limited to the features and functionalities provided by the developer, and they may not be allowed to make any modifications without violating the license agreement.
Another difference is the cost of the software. Open-source software is typically free to use, download, and distribute, as it is developed and maintained by a community of volunteer developers. Closed-source software, on the other hand, often requires users to pay a license fee or subscription, which can range from a one-time payment to a recurring monthly or annual fee.
Ultimately, the choice between open source and closed-source software depends on individual preferences and requirements. Open-source software can be a great option for users who value customisation, transparency, and community involvement. Closed-source software, on the other hand, may be preferred by users who prioritise stability, security, and professional support.
Computer software (object code and source code) and data compilations are to be protected under the Copyright Acts, as per the Amendment to the Copyright Act under the Berne Convention, 1986. Section 2(o) of the Copyright Act broadened the definition of “literary work” to include computer programs and computer databases.
Open source software creators created a twist in traditional copyright, what they named “copyleft,” which permits free use of open source software to the public and also the modification and redistribution of the source code.
Software’s source code needs to be made public before it may be copy-lefted. Software that has been made publicly available may be copyleft or not. Software must first be declared copyrighted by the owner before a condition can be added in order to make it copyleft. Everyone is free to use, alter, and distribute the source code and object code in either their original or modified form as long as the previously stated requirement is met—that is, as long as the modified version’s source code and object code are still available for distribution and modification. It is therefore free to alter the software, and anyone who distributes it again, altered or not, has to grant others the same freedom.
Open source initiative
The Open Source Initiative (OSI) is a global non-profit organisation that advocates for the open-source software movement and sets the standards for what constitutes open-source software. To be considered open-source, software must meet specific criteria, known as the OSI’s Open Source Definition (OSD).
The OSD outlines the essential freedoms that users of open-source software must have. These freedoms include:
The freedom to run the program for any purpose.
The freedom to study the source code and make modifications.
The freedom to distribute copies of the software, both modified and unmodified.
The freedom to distribute the software with other software, either free or proprietary.
The freedom to use the software in any field of endeavour.
In addition to these freedoms, the OSD also requires that open-source software licenses be non-discriminatory, technology-neutral, and free of any restrictions that would prevent the software from being used or distributed in a particular way.
The OSD is widely recognised as the authoritative definition of open-source software. It is used by software developers, distributors, and users around the world to determine whether a particular software license qualifies as open-source.
The OSI also provides a certification program for open-source software licenses. This program allows software developers to submit their licenses for review and approval by the OSI. If a license is approved, it is added to the OSI’s list of certified open-source licenses.
The OSI’s certification program helps to ensure that open-source software licenses are compliant with the OSD and that they meet the highest standards of quality. It also provides software developers with the assurance that their licenses will be recognised by the open-source community.
Limitations
Open source incentives are not equally effective for every endeavour. For this reason, open source’s shortcomings in providing some components like documentation or tech assistance can hinder otherwise worthwhile projects.
According to Henkel and Tins (2004), the most frequently mentioned barrier to embedded Linux (57.5%) is a lack of documentation. In a similar vein, Gambardella and Hall’s (2005) paper makes the case that open source incentives are ill-suited for compiling knowledge in an approachable manner.
While open source promotes collaboration, it also complicates IP management. With multiple contributors, tracking and protecting individual rights becomes challenging. Data modelling is crucial for efficient project management. However, it may require a lot of time and complexity. For developers to successfully arrange data, substantial preparation and experience are required to be intricate and laborious. For developers to successfully arrange data, substantial preparation and experience are required. It may have a few security concerns, but it is community-driven so the open source projects may face security vulnerabilities.
Conclusion
Thus, with the upsurge in open source software, intellectual property is also becoming popular. Intellectual property is important because it protects the rights of authors, developers, or the contributors of the software. Open source software development is sometimes seen as a defect of intellectual property protection because it does not ask for the disclosure of source code. Also, the management of intellectual property in open source becomes a difficult task sometimes. But keeping in view and understanding the problems and challenges faced by the users and developers, effective strategies must be implemented that will negate these problems successfully.
This article is written by Isha Garg. The article aims to provide a thorough analysis of the landmark judgement given by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Archna vs. Dy. Director of Consolidation Amroha (2015). It primarily focuses on centre-state relations with respect to legislative powers provided under the Constitution.
Table of Contents
Introduction
In patriarchal society, women have been historically marginalised in numerous aspects, including property rights. In this context, women were often denied property rights, both on ancestral property and on the property of their fathers. Even after marriage, ‘stridhan’ (a woman’s personal property) was not considered her absolute right. However, the legislature, by enacting the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act of 2005 (hereinafter referred to as the Amendment Act of 2005) amended the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 ( hereinafter referred to as the HSA) and brought about a radical change in the position of women by promoting gender neutrality. It gave equal coparcenary rights to women, the same as it did to sons. Additionally, it deleted Section 4(2) of the said Act, which had previously excluded tenancy rights in agricultural land from the purview of the HSA, 1956 and left these rights to be governed by state laws. Despite these changes, the legal framework regarding property rights for women remained complex and inconsistent, leading to various interpretations by different High Courts to establish a clear and definitive law.
The High Court in the case of Archna vs. Dy. Director of Consolidation Amroha (2015)clarified the property rights of women in respect of agricultural lands. In its landmark judgement, the High Court decided that in cases of inheritance regarding agricultural land, state law will prevail over the law made by Parliament.
Details of the case
Case Title:Archna vs. Dy. Director of Consolidation, Amroha (2015)
Case Type: Writ No. 64999 of 2014
Court: The High Court of Allahabad
Date of decision: 27.03.2015
Parties:
Petitioner: Archna
Respondent: Deputy Director of Consolidation and others
Bench: Ram Surat Ram (Maurya), J.
Counsel:
Petitioner: Shri Gyan Shankar Ojha and Manoj Srivastava.
Respondent: Mithilesh Kmar Mishra and Nitiya Prakash Tiwari.
On 08.12.2008, the petitioner, Archna, filed an objection under Section 9(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, for deleting the name of Veer Singh from the records in regard to the disputed land and substituting her name along with that of Uttam Singh, Bhanu Singh and Shashi Bhushan Singh. She stated that her grandfather, Hardeo Singh, died intestate, leaving behind ancestral property. After his death, the property was passed down to his sons, Khajan Singh and Uttam Singh and their sons. Later on, they jointly converted it into joint family property under Hindu law, which was administered by Uttam Singh, a Karta of the joint Hindu family, until 1989.
On 14.11.2005, Uttam Singh and Khajan Singh executed a sale deed in favour of Veer Singh. Based on the sale deed, Veer Singh’s name was recorded in the revenue records by the order dated 19.12.2005. She stated that, as per the amendment to Section 6 of the HSA, 1956, along with other coparceners, she became the owner of 1/4th share.
However, Veer Singh stated that the disputed land was agricultural land and sections of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the UP Zamindari Abolition Act) were applicable, not the law provided under HSA, 1956. Moreover, during the lifetime of her father, she had no rights to the disputed land.
The consolidation officer, after hearing the parties, rejected the petitioner’s objection on the ground that the HSA of 1956 did not apply to the agricultural land. Since the petitioner’s father, Uttam Singh, was still alive, she could not inherit the property. Additionally, the petitioner, being a married daughter, was not considered a successor under Section 171 of the U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951. Consequently, the objection was dismissed and an appeal (registered as Appeal No. 20/312) was filed with the Settlement Officer Consolidation, who upheld the previous decision by order dated 14.03.2014. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a revision against these orders, which was also dismissed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation on 09.06.2014.
As a result, aggrieved by the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation, the petitioner filed a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court. She prayed for the direction to consolidation authorities to give the share to the petitioner at the time of the partition of the disputed land and declare the aforesaid sale deed executed in favour of Veer Singh as void.
Issues raised
Whether the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 or the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951, will take precedence in case of a conflict?
Whether there was any overlap between subjects listed in Entry 18 of List-II (state list) and Entry 5 of List-III (concurrent list)?
Whether the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 was enacted under Article 253 of the Constitution of India and if it has an overriding effect?
Arguments of the parties
Petitioners
The petitioner claimed that her grandfather, Hardeo Singh, left behind the disputed property, which was inherited by his sons, Uttam Singh and Khajan Singh, along with their descendants. Together, they constituted a joint Hindu family and Uttam Singh served as Karta until 1989. She argued that by virtue of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, as amended by the Amendment Act of 2005, she became a coparcener along with her father and brothers. The Amendment Act of 2005 removed Section 4(2) and amended Section 6(1)(c) which established equal rights for daughters as for sons. Therefore, the provisions of HSA will also apply to agricultural lands.
Furthermore, ‘succession’ is a subject that comes under Entry 5 of the concurrent list (List III) of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. By virtue of Article 246(2), both the Parliament and the State Legislature have authority to enact laws on this subject. However, in cases of conflict, parliamentary laws take precedence over state laws. Therefore, the provisions of HSA, 1956 (as amended), would prevail over Section 171 of the UP Zamindari Abolition Act as per Article 254 of the Constitution.
Section 171 of the UP Zamindari Abolition Act reflects gender inequality, which is violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. It is void under Article 13 of the Constitution as it violates the rights of daughters by denying them equal inheritance rights to agricultural land.
She further stated that Uttam Singh lacked the authority to carry out the sale deed dated 14.11.2005 in favour of Veer Singh, rendering the transaction void and transferring no property rights to the purchaser. With her status as coparcener under amended Section 6 of HSA, 1956, the petitioner’s objections to the sale deed were maintainable. Therefore, she stated that the orders issued by the consolidation officer were illegal and should be overturned.
Respondent
Veer Singh, the respondent no. 7, asserted that respondents Uttam Singh and Khajan Singh were “bhumidhars with transferable rights” over the disputed land. Therefore, they executed the sale deed dated November 14, 2005, within their authority. On this basis, his name was recorded in the revenue records. He further stated that as the disputed land was agricultural land, provisions of the UP Zamindari Abolition Act were applicable to it.
Laws or concepts involved in this case
Centre-State relations
One of the essential features of federalism is the division of powers between the Union and the state government. The Constitution of India establishes this distribution of legislative powers in two ways:
Based on territorial jurisdiction
Based on the subject matter
Distribution with regard to subject matter is provided under Article 246 of the Constitution.
Article 246 of the Indian Constitution
It delineates the division of legislative powers between union and state governments through three lists, the union list, the state list, and the concurrent list. These lists are provided under Schedule VII of the Constitution.
The framework of Article 246 is outlined as follows:
Clause 1 provides that the Parliament has sole authority to make laws on the subjects mentioned in the Union List (List-I).
Clause 2 provides that, subject to the exclusive power of the Parliament, the state legislature has the power to make laws with respect to matters enumerated under the Concurrent List (List-III).
Clause 3 provides that, subject to clauses 1 and 2, the state has the exclusive power to make laws on the subjects mentioned in the State List (List -II).
Clause 4 provides that the Parliament has the authority to enact laws for any part of the Indian territory that is not covered by a state, even if that area is also covered by one of the subjects mentioned in the State List.
Article 248 of the Indian Constitution
Article 248 is the residuary provision, which provides that the Parliament has sole authority to enact laws on any subject that is not covered by the Concurrent List or the State List. This is also stipulated in Entry 97 of the Seventh Schedule, which covers matters that are not enumerated in Lists II and III, including any tax not mentioned in any of the lists.
Article 254 of the Indian Constitution
It addresses conflicts between laws made by the Parliament and laws made by the legislature of the states, particularly as it relates to the doctrine of repugnancy.
It provides that in case any law enacted by the state legislature is in conflict with the law made by the Parliament, the latter will have precedence over the former. The state law will be declared void to that extent. However, if the repugnant law, that is, a state law, conflicts with a central law on the same subject, making it invalid to the extent that the inconsistency is passed by the state legislature, then the state can enforce it only after receiving the assent of the President.
Doctrine of Pith and Substance
The doctrine of pith and substance is a legal principle that is used in constitutional law to establish the true nature and extent of the law. Pith and substance mean the true nature of law.
Makers of the Constitution have determined the areas of law on which the state and central government can enact the law. This bifurcation of subjects has been provided under the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. But sometimes, the subjects under List I and List II may overlap, and conflict may arise over whether one is encroaching upon the sphere of the other. To tackle this problem, Indian courts evolved a few doctrines, one of which includes the doctrine of pith and substance.
Under this doctrine, courts identify the main and important purpose of the law. Once the pith and substance are determined, the court determines whether the law is enacted by the authority that has the competence to enact it. If it does, the law is deemed to be valid.
The main reason behind this is to ensure that legislative authorities operate within constitutionally determined powers and prevent encroachment on subjects reserved for others.
In the landmark case of Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee vs. The Bank of Commerce (1947), the Bombay High Court held that a clear-cut distinction between the legislative powers of the centre and state government is not feasible, they are bound to overlap. While applying the doctrine of pith and substance, courts are bound to consider the following:
The scope of the Act
The object of the Act
The effect of the Act as a whole.
Article 253 of the Indian Constitution
Article 253 of the Constitution authorises the Parliament to enact laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India for implementing any treaty, agreement or convention that is entered into with another country or countries, or any decision made at an international conference or association. This Article ensures that the Parliament can implement these treaties or agreements in any part of the territory, regardless of the distribution of legislative powers under Article 246 of the Constitution.
Article 51 of the Constitution
Article 51 of the Constitution is part of the Directive Principles of State Policy. It discusses the promotion of international peace and security by the state. In particular, it urges the Indian government to:
Promote international peace and security.
Maintain honourable relations between nations.
Foster respect for international law and treaties.
Encourage the settlement of international disputes through arbitration.
U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950
This Act came into force on 26th January, 1951. The main object of this Act was to abolish the zamindari system, which involved intermediaries between farmers and the state. It aimed to remove these intermediaries, procure their rights, and reform land tenure laws. By enacting this law, the legislature intended to ensure that the land goes directly to the people who worked on it.
To achieve land reform, the act included provisions that guaranteed rights to the actual occupiers of land. Under the Act, Sections 9 and 123 granted absolute rights to those living on and using the land, while other sections outlined the rights of different types of landholders, such as transferable and non transferable bhumidars, asamis, and government lessees.
The law that provided that land should belong to the actual tiller also applied to inheritance. However, widows and daughters could inherit land, Section 172 removed this right if they married or remarried. This was based on the idea that after marriage, women usually moved to their husband’s home, making it impractical for them to cultivate land in two different places.
Hindu Succession Act, 1956
This Act deals with the rules of inheritance in case a person dies intestate and the devolution of property among the heirs of the deceased. This Act contained several gender-biased provisions, particularly concerning the rights of women. Before the Hindu Succession Amendment Act of 2005, only male heirs had the right to inherit the property of the deceased. The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act of 2005 introduced equal coparcenary rights for women. It was a landmark step towards gender equality among Hindus regarding inheritance laws. This Act amended Sections 6, 30 and omitted Sections 4(2), 23, and 24.
Section 6 of HSA
Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, deals with the transfer of interest in Hindu coparcenary property. Before the Amendment of 2005, daughters were not part of coparcenary property. Only male members of the family had coparcenary rights. However, after the amendment, daughters have been granted the status of coparceners of the family property. They have the same rights and liabilities as the son. Like the son, a daughter also becomes a coparcener in her own right from birth.
Section 4(2) of HSA
Section 4(2) acted as the saving clause. This section provided that the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, would not apply to agricultural lands, meaning that the provisions of the HSA, 1956, would not affect the provisions of any other law that prevented the division of agricultural holdings, established land ownership ceilings or provided for the devolution of tenancy rights in such holdings. Thereby, the inheritance of agricultural lands was left under the purview of state tenurial laws.
The Amendment Act of 2005 omitted this section, which means the HSA of 1956 would now apply to agricultural lands. Therefore, Section 4(1)(b) will prevail, and all the other agricultural holdings, fixation of ceilings or devolution of tenancy rights in respect of such holdings are now inconsistent with the 2005 Amendment Act.
Section 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953
This section discusses the process of revising the records regarding rights during land consolidation. It requires the consolidation officer to issue a public notice inviting landholders to submit any objections or claims with respect to their land rights. After reviewing these submissions, the officer conducts an inquiry and modifies the land records, ensuring they accurately reflect ownership and rights, before proceeding with the consolidation.
Relevant judgements referred to in the case
Gramophone Co. of India Ltd. vs. Birendra Bahadur Pandey and others (1984)
In Gramophone Co. of India Ltd. vs. Birendra Bahadur Pandey and others (1984), the Supreme Court ruled that nations are not required to align with the international community’s standards and that municipal law does not have to abide by the rules of international law. According to the comity of nations, rules established by municipal law may take into account international law without any need for explicit legislative endorsement. However, if both laws are in conflict with each other, then the sovereignty and integrity of the Republic will take precedence. It will not be governed by external rules unless expressly accepted by the legislature itself. The principle of incorporation also mentions that the rules and norms of international law become part of national law unless they are in contradiction to the laws made by Parliament.
Moreover, national courts cannot adopt the principles of international law if the Parliament has rejected their incorporation into domestic law. National courts should necessarily interpret domestic law within their legislative limits.
State of West Bengal vs. Kesoram Industries Ltd. and Ors. (2004)
In the State of West Bengal vs. Kesoram Industries Ltd. and Ors. (2004), the Apex Court highlighted certain principles in regard to the legislative powers of the Union and the state governments mentioned under Lists I, II and III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, which are stated below:
The numerous entries provided in the three lists of the Seventh Schedule are merely fields of legislation and not powers.
Even though the Constitution delineates the legislative powers of both the central and state governments, there are still chances of overlapping in certain areas, especially with matters enumerated in the concurrent list. If there is a conflict between List II (State List) on one side and Lists I and III (Union and Concurrent List) on the other, then the law enacted by the Union government will have precedence over the state law.
Since the entries listed in the Seventh Schedule simply remove topics for legislation, they should be interpreted liberally, reflecting their broad intent rather than a narrow, pedantic approach. The power to legislate on the principal matter also encompasses the power to address incidental and ancillary matters related to the subject.
When questioning the competence of the state legislature on the ground that it encroaches on matters reserved exclusively for the Parliament, the issue that has to be decided is whether the law relates to the matter listed in List I or III. If it relates to the said lists, then no further question needs to be decided, and the law enacted by Parliament will take precedence. In cases of overlapping subject matters provided in lists, the rule of pith and substance must be applied to examine which entry a law pertains to.
The doctrine of occupied field is relevant when there is an overlap between the Union and the State lists. In such instances, the doctrine of pith and substance is applied. If the contested legislation predominantly falls within the jurisdiction explicitly conferred upon the enacting legislature, the incidental authority of the other legislature must be disregarded. Under the Seventh Schedule, List I takes precedence over Lists II and III and List III takes precedence over List II.
State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Raja Anand Brahma Shah (1967)
In the case of the State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Raja Anand Brahma Shah (1967) , the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the UP Zamindari Abolition Act. This act is preserved under the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution, and its validity cannot be challenged under Article 31-A of the Constitution.
S.P. Watel and others vs. the State of U.P. (1973)
In S.P. Watel and others vs. the State of U.P. (1973), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the U.P. Zamindari Abolition Act is constitutionally valid and does not violate fundamental rights. Additionally, it is protected under the Ninth schedule of the Constitution.
Judgement of the case
The High Court of Allahabad held that agricultural land falls exclusively under the jurisdiction of the State Legislature and the Parliament has no authority to enact any law in this regard. Therefore, the Court found no merit in the writ petition and dismissed the writ petition.
Issue-wise judgement is discussed below for thorough perusal:
Whether the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 or the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act ,1951 will take precedence in case of conflict
In order to answer this issue, the High Court examined the provisions outlined in Chapter I of Part XI of the Constitution, which pertain to the legislative relations between the centre and the state. The Court mentioned that Article 245 of the Constitution limits the territorial scope of Parliament’s and the state legislature’s legislative powers. Further, Article 246 divides various subjects between the Parliament and the state legislatures. The Court also reviewed the entries in the Seventh Schedule of the Government of India Act, 1935 and the Constitution of India.
It determined that Entry 7 of the Concurrent List (List-III) of the Government of India Act, 1935 included the expression “save as regards agricultural lands,” from which it was clear that rights in or over land and land tenures were within the absolute authority of the State Legislature under the said Act. Correspondingly, Entry 5 of the Concurrent List (List-III) of the Constitution uses the expression “all matters regarding which parties in judicial proceedings were immediately before the commencement of this Constitution subject to their personal law.” This further mentioned that the rights in or over land and land tenures were within the absolute domain of the State Legislature under Entry 21 of the Provincial Legislative List (List-II) of the Government of India Act, 1935, corresponding to Entry 18 of the State List (List-II) of the Constitution.
Therefore, the Legislature of the state has exclusive jurisdiction to enact laws in respect of rights in or over land and land tenures, under which the UP Zamindari Abolition Act was enacted. The phrase ‘rights in’ also includes inheritance and devolution of interest. Thus, it is comprehensive in nature. Thus, the UP Zamindari Abolition Act will prevail over the HSA of 1956.
Whether there was any overlap between subjects listed in Entry-18 of the List-II (State list) and Entry-5 of List -III of (Concurrent list)
As discussed above, an entry related to “rights in or over land tenures” is mentioned in Entry 18 of the State List (List-II). It also includes inheritance and the Court found that there is no overlapping of the subjects mentioned in Entry 18 of the State List and Entry 5 of the Concurrent List. As per Article 246(3) of the Constitution, the state legislature has exclusive power to enact laws in respect of rights in or over land and land tenure, including inheritance.
Under Entry 5 of the Concurrent List (List-III), the phrase ‘succession’ has very limited application as provided under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Even if ‘succession’ falls under Entry 5 of the Concurrent List (List-III), the assent of the President has been obtained for U.P. Act No.1 ,1951. As per Article 254(2) of the Constitution, in this case, the law enacted by the State Legislature will take precedence over the law enacted by the Parliament. Therefore, in this context, the U.P. Act No.1 ,1951 will prevail over the HSA of 1956.
Whether the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 was enacted under Article 253 of the Constitution and if it has an overriding effect
It was argued before the High Court that the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act of 2005 was enacted to meet the obligations set forth by the United Nations Organisation in order to suppress gender inequality and to comply with Article 51(c) of the Constitution. Therefore, it will take precedence by virtue of Article 253 of the Constitution.
The Court found that the Parliament had not enacted the Amendment Act of 2005 in accordance with the declaration made before the United Nations Organisation and Article 51(c). The Amendment Act of 2005 intended to provide equal rights with the son only to Hindu women and did not extend such a right to women belonging to other religions living in the country. Therefore, the Court concluded that the Amendment Act of 2005 was not enacted in pursuit of the declaration and Article 253 of the Constitution was not applicable in this case.
Conclusion
Numerous High Courts have attempted to harmonise the legislative powers of the centre and state with regard to the inheritance of agricultural land. A landmark judgement in this context was delivered by the High Court of Allahabad in the case of Archna vs. Dy. Director of Consolidation Amroha (2015). The Court in this case held that, generally, in cases of conflict, the law made by the Parliament will prevail over the state law. However, if, on the same subject matter, the state has obtained the assent of the President, then in that case, state law will take precedence. In this particular case, the U.P. government had secured the assent of the President regarding the UP Zamindari Abolition Act, giving it an overriding effect. Moreover, the Amendment Act of 2005, which grants daughters equal rights to coparcenary property under HSA, 1956, does not come under the purview of Article 253 of the Constitution. Thus, the HSA of 1956 will not override U.P. Act No. 1 ,1951.
Hence, the Allahabad High Court dismissed Archna’s claim because the state has exclusive jurisdiction to enact laws regarding agricultural lands and she could not claim any rights under HSA, 1956. However, a definitive ruling from the Supreme Court is still awaited to uphold the rights of daughters in agricultural lands.
This article is written by Meenakshi Kalra. It discusses the constitutional validity of Section 14(e) of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 which was challenged in the case of Ram Dial vs. State of Punjab (1965). Under this Section, the State Government could ask any elected municipal committee member to vacate a seat for what it deemed to be in the public interest. Further, the analysis of this case has placed emphasis on the principles of natural justice, procedural fairness and the need to tackle the arbitrary power of the state.
Table of Contents
Introduction
As the world’s largest democracy, India has deeply rooted values of justice, liberty, and equality. After gaining independence from colonial rule, India became a democratic nation in 1947, and it derived its democracy from the Indian Constitution.
The democracy in India emphasises the principle of political equality, which means that it promotes equal political rights for all citizens along with equality before the law. So the case of Ram Dial and Ors. vs. State of Punjab (1965)highlights the need for a deeper consideration of the nature of power and its limitations within a democracy.
The case at handis an important decision given by the Supreme Court of India that focuses on the constitutional validity of Section 14(e) of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911. This case emphasises the role of the judiciary in striking a balance between the authority and power of the state and the rights of individuals that are guaranteed to them under the Constitution.
This case also sheds light on the relationship between the state and its citizens. It emphasises the importance for laws to be not only just in their intent but also in their application. For this reason, it can be said that judicial oversight is important in maintaining the integrity of democratic institutions. This case also underscores the importance of judicial intervention in protecting civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution.
Author’s Note: This article references the provisions laid down in Section 14(e) and Section 24 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, as they existed prior to substitution made by Punjab Municipal Act of 1994. Additionally, the proviso of Section 16(1) was substituted by Act 3 of 1933, but the opportunity of being heard remains a relevant aspect. While the links provided direct to the current version of the Act, the readers are advised to consult the specific version of the Act relevant to the time frame discussed. Since the older version of the Act is not readily accessible online an explanation of the provisions as they were prior to the amendments has also been provided below.
Background of Ram Dial and Ors. vs. State of Punjab (1965)
Before independence, the laws in India were influenced by a blend of English common law and existing native laws. During the colonial era, the legal system in India was governed by various acts which were enacted only in specific regions and there was a lack of a unified legal system in the country.
The need was felt to establish an effective and accountable municipal administration and local self-governance for the better functioning of the country. The Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 was introduced in Punjab after receiving the assent of the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, James McCrone Douie on the 3rd May, 1911. Further, the Governor General, Charles Hardinge on the 7th July, 1911 gave his assent for better administration of the municipalities that existed in the state at that time.
The Act of 1911 laid down provisions for the establishment, composition, and functioning of municipal committees in Punjab along with provisions for the election and appointment of members of the municipal committee.
It also aimed at improving accountability and transparency in municipalities and their operations, along with promoting public participation in local governance. This Act also laid down the foundation for the development of urban infrastructure and services in the state of Punjab.
In the 1960s, India was dealing with the challenges presented by the post-independence governance infrastructure that existed in the country. The political landscape at that time was full of political parties trying to gain influence at local levels, which led to increasing tension between the different political groups. Recognising the need for more efficient governance systems to manage these challenges, the Punjab Municipal Act has been amended several times to deal with the present day issues and to enhance the efficiency of municipal governance, improve public services and promote local self-government.
Facts of the case
The three appellants in the present case won the elections conducted in Batala for the Municipal Committee on 22nd January, 1961 and the result for the same was published in the Punjab Government Gazette on 27th February, 1961. They assumed their role on 16th March, 1961 after taking oath.
The Governor of Punjab issued notifications dated July 26, 1961, wherein it was stated that the seats held by the appellants were to be vacated from the date of the publication of the notifications in the State Gazette for reasons relating to public interest.
The notifications also stated that the appellants would be barred from contesting in elections for 5 years from the date of publishing of the notifications under Section 16(3) of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911. (The words “or whose seat has been vacated under the provisions of Section 14(e)” were omitted by Punjab Municipal Act of 1935. This makes the scope of the amended Section alot narrower as the 5 year disqualification would no longer apply to the persons vacating their seats under this Section automatically.)
The appellants got to know that the notifications were issued due to the decision taken by the outgoing municipal committee to disqualify and remove them from their elected seats on 13th March, 1961. This was done because the appellants had engaged in a demonstration on 10th March, 1961 where they had broken some glass panes of the municipal building.
Aggrieved by the notification, three appeals were filed by the appellants against the judgement of the Punjab High Court, which was awarded in favour of the respondents. According to the High Court, the order given by the state to vacate the seats was in accordance with the power given to the state to carry out administrative functions. The High Court stated that the issue presented before it was not something that could be judged by the court, and as a result the petitions were dismissed.
Moreover, a writ petition had also been filed by Uma Shankar (appellant) which highlighted the same issue as the one stated in the appeals i.e. whether Section 14(e) of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This writ petition and the three appeals were dealt with together by the Supreme Court in this case since they shared the same issues and subject matter revolving around the constitutional validity of Section 14(e) of the Act.
Issues raised
Whether Section 14(e) of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 is constitutionally valid?
Whether 14(e) of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 is in contravention of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, 1950?
Arguments of the parties
Appellants
The appellants contended that they did not receive any notice for putting forward their arguments as to why their seats should not be vacated. They were not given a chance to be heard before disqualifying them. Further, they did not get the opportunity to put their points in front of the Governor of Punjab as to why they should be allowed to retain their seats, which disrupted their right to be heard.
According to the language used in the judgement of the Punjab High Court, it can also be inferred that they were disqualified because the municipal committee’s decision was based on the outgoing member committee and these members belonged to the Congress Party. The resolution which disqualified the appellants was advanced to cause hurt to them. Thus, the resolution was passed in bad faith and with an unjust intention. It indicates that the appellants might have felt the disqualification was a result of the committee’s bias against them.
Further, the appellants were of the view that Section 14(e) of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 was discriminatory and was in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India which assures the right to equality. They argued that the proviso of Section 16(1) of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 states that the state government shall provide reasons for the removal of an elected member and also give an opportunity to state their defence in writing before such removal takes place. However, it should be noted that under Section 14(e), if a member is removed by the state government on account of securing public interest then it is not required to provide an explanation or a hearing.
According to the appellants, both Section 16 and Section 14(e) talk about the removal of an elected member in the public interest. The difference between the two is that under the proviso of Section 16(1) the member has the right to a hearing before such removal takes place, but where no such right is given under Section 14(e). Thus, it can be said that the State Government has been given arbitrary power under Section 14(e). This makes it discriminatory in nature, as it does not give the members a chance to defend themselves when they are asked to vacate their seats. This is in clear violation of the principle of natural justice, as the appellants were not given an opportunity to be heard.
Respondent
The respondents contended that under the proviso of Section 24(3) of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 the State Government can refuse to notify the election of any municipal committee member under the provisions laid down in Section 16.
Further, if the state government feels that a member has engaged in any act that affects the public interest negatively and is unfit to serve in the committee because of his actions then if the State refuses to recognize the election then that election shall become void.
Thus, it can be said that the state is empowered to remove any elected member under Sections 14(e) and 16(1) if the actions of such a member are against the public interest.
Law discussed in Ram Dial and Ors. vs. State of Punjab (1965)
Section 14(e) of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911
Section 14 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 allowed the state government to take certain actions for public interest or at the appeal of the majority of the voters. Under this Section, the State Government could:
Increase or decrease the number of seats in any committee,
Appoint members on its own if members elected were less than the required number, or
Vacate the seats of both elected and appointed members, notwithstanding any other rules or provisions of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911.
Clauses (c) and (d) were omitted by the Punjab Municipal Act of 1951.
Section 16(1) of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911
Section 16(1) talks about the powers given to the state government to remove the members of the committee through the notification if the reason for such removal falls under the seven reasons listed in this Section.
If the member suffers from the inability to act owing to his incapacity, bankruptcy, conviction of an offence or a court order.
If the member has been disqualified from serving the public due to unfit character.
If the member has missed three consecutive months of meetings without a proper and sufficient reason.
If the member is a threat to public peace and security.
If the member has misused his position and power or misappropriated committee funds or property.
If the member has been disqualified after the election under any rule.
If the member has appeared in a legal proceeding against the committee as a legal practitioner and acted in a way that harms the interests of the committee.
Under this Section’s proviso the state government is obligated to inform the member being removed along with the reasons for such removal. This Section also provides them with an opportunity to explain themselves and their actions in writing.
Under Section 16(2) of the Act states that a person shall not be allowed to contest in the elections for a period of 5 years if-
the person is removed from their seat; or
Whose election is invalidated under Section 24(2); or
if the election has been declared void on the grounds of engaging in corruption or intimidation under Section 225; or
if the state government refuses to notify the election under Section 24.
Section 24 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911
Section 24 states the procedure laid down for taking oath by the elected members of the municipal committee. Under this Section, an oath must be taken by the elected member before starting their duties in the municipal committee as a municipal member.
The state government is required to notify the election of a Municipality President in the Official Gazette. The President is not allowed to begin his/her duties before such notification is made. However, the state government is not required to notify the election of the President if he/she has become disqualified under the provisions of the Punjab Municipal Act or any other law after the election. Further, the government is required to give the disqualified person a chance to be heard before refusing the notification.
In the present case, a reference was made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court to Section 24. Section 24 before the amendment in 1994 stated that the elected members must take their oath within 3 months of their election notification, otherwise the election would be declared invalid. If a member failed to do so then a fresh election was to be held to fill the vacant seat.
The proviso of the unamended Section also stated that the elected member could be removed from the seat under Section 16 of the Act or if the State Government felt that the elected member was unfit to be a member and it affected the public interest.
Article 14 of the Constitution of India, 1950
Article 14 is given under Part III of the Constitution of India, and it is regarded as one of the most important fundamental rights that are enshrined under the Constitution. Article 14 talks about equality before the law. Under this Article, the State cannot deny any person their right to equality before the law or equal protection of laws. This means that all persons are to be treated equally in the eyes of the law and that the protection granted by the law shall apply to all in the same manner without any discrimination on any basis.
The aim of Article 14 is to achieve equality, as has also been stated in the Preamble of the Constitution. Thus, not only does this Article make it obligatory for the state to practise non-discrimination, but it also makes sure that any existing inequalities in the society are also dealt with in an appropriate manner. It mandates that no special privilege is to be given to any individual or group under any provision of law, though there are some exceptions to the right to equality, such as:
The rights of public individuals are different from the rights of private individuals, i.e. the powers given to the public individuals can only be used by them and not by private individuals. For example, a private individual cannot arrest a person, the power to arrest can be exercised by a police officer only unless specified in any other law which is in force at the time.
The state is empowered to make special laws for people belonging to a particular section of the society for their upliftment. These laws can be for the people belonging to any specific caste, class or sex of the people living in India. For example, reservation which falls under the rule of reasonable classification and cannot be held to be in contravention of Article 14. Reasonable classification is when a certain group of people belonging to the weaker sections of the society are grouped together to provide them with certain privileges to aid in their upliftment.
Ministers and executive bodies may use the discretionary powers given to them as long as such exercise of power is reasonable and not arbitrary.
Under Article 361, the President and Governors are not answerable to any court for the actions undertaken by them while they were performing their duties. Further, they have immunity from all criminal proceedings during their tenure and no court can issue an arrest warrant for the same. In case of a civil proceeding, they have to be given a two-month notice before initiating such proceedings.
As per Articles 105 and 194, they cannot be held liable for any remark made by them in the Parliament or State Legislature during their speech. Further, immunity is also given to foreign sovereigns, diplomats, and ambassadors from all civil and criminal proceedings.
Different laws apply to different people according to their professions. Doctors, nurses, lawyers, police officers and the military are all governed by special laws as per their professions.
This applies to Members of Parliament (MPs of either of the houses), Member of legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State or a Legislative Assembly of a Union territory, during the continuance of any meeting of such House of Parliament or, as the case may be, of the Legislative Assembly or the Legislative Council.
This also includes member of committee of Parliament (either of the houses), member of committee of the Legislative Assembly of a State or member of committee of the Union territory or the Legislative council of a State, during the continuance of any meeting of such committee.
Further if a person is a member of Parliament (either of the houses) or a Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State having both such Houses then they shall be given protection against arrest and detention while attending a joint session, meeting, conference, or joint committee involving both Houses of Parliament or both Houses of the State Legislature and also for 40 days before and 40 days after these sessions, meetings, or conferences.
Judgement in Ram Dial and Ors. vs. State of Punjab (1965)
The Supreme Court in the case of Ram Dial vs. State of Punjab (1965) gave the judgement in favour of the appellants. The court stated that the proviso of Section 16(1) of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 provides for the removal of a member for reasons stated under clauses (a) to (g) which are all in the public interest. Such removal shall be done after the member is given a chance to explain as to why they should not be removed. Section 14 on the other hand, which also talks about the removal of a member in the public interest, does not make any provision to give the member an opportunity to be heard.
Section 14 had a wider ambit when compared to Section 16(1) but it did not provide the member asked to vacate the seat a chance to state their arguments. This meant that the state government could use this Section to remove a member for the reasons given in Section 16(1) without being required to provide a hearing. Due to this, Section 14(e) was stricter than Section 16(1) as decisions can be made without any hearing. This makes Section 14(e) discriminatory and unjust, thus violating Article 14 of the Constitution, which gives the right to equality before the law.
As a result, the court held that the part of Section 14(e) which gave the state the power to remove members without a hearing shall be struck down as unconstitutional. The notifications for the disqualification of the appellants also failed.
Rationale behind this judgement
The Hon’ble Supreme Court stated that Section 14(e) is discriminatory in nature as it did not contain any procedural safeguards, and it allowed removal of members without an opportunity to be heard. Further, under the proviso of Section 16(1) the members being removed must be notified of the same and be given an explanation for such a decision and a chance to be heard. In Section 16(3) it is stated that the member being removed will not be allowed to contest in elections for a period not more than 5 years, but no such provision has been made under Section 14(e). This makes the power given to the state under Section 14(e) dictatorial and absolute.
The court was of the opinion that there was a significant overlap in the two Sections and the powers given under them, with the only difference was of the right to be heard. The state government might use Section 14(e) to avoid the hearing procedure, which would result in unequal treatment and biases, thus violating Article 14.
The court also stated that the requirements under the proviso of Section 24(3) and Section 14(e) are separate and are not to be treated in the same manner. Section 24(3) talks about the refusal of election notifications in case an elected member does not take an oath within a specified period. Whereas, Section 14(e) talks about removal of the members after they have been elected and taken office.
Thus, even though Section 24(3) lets the state government reject the election of someone for public interest reasons without providing notice or a hearing, it does not mean that the same can be applied in the case of Section 14(e). Therefore, it was held by the court that Section 14(e) is seen as discriminatory and in contravention of Article 14 because it does not provide the opportunity for a member to be heard.
Relevant judgements referred to in the case
Shri Radeshyam Khare vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh (1958)
In the case of Shri Radeshyam Khare vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh (1958), the main point of contention was whether the executive officer appointed by the state government under the C.P. and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922 was done in a judicial or administrative capacity under Section 53A of the said Act. The appellants argued that the notification furnished to them for the enquiry should have been presented to them under Section 57 instead, as it would give them a chance to be heard and explain themselves. The Supreme Court held that Sections 53A and 57 differed in their scope and application and hence, it is upon the government to choose which Section they want to apply, if at all, they want to apply one. Thus, the court stated that the state government acted in an administrative capacity while appointing the executive officer as the purpose of appointing the executive officer under Section 53A was to ensure the proper and efficient administration of the municipality and not to penalise anyone or adjudicate on any matter. The focus of the State Government was to achieve efficiency in operations of the committee and not adjudication.
Harnam Singh Modi vs. The State (1958)
In the case of Harnam Singh Modi vs. The State of Punjab (1958), the Punjab and Haryana High Court analysed the scope of Sections 14 and 15 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911. (Note: Section 15 of 1911 Act was substituted by Section 6 of Punjab Municipal Act of 1933.)
It was stated by Chief Justice Bhandari after exploring various American and English cases that if a statute lays down the procedure for removing a member of the corporation, then it must be followed. If the law contained in the statute states that the removal must be done without giving notice or without a hearing, then it must be done in that way. If the law makes provisions for conducting a hearing or giving a notice before removal, then that process must be followed as well.
In the present case of Ram Dial vs. State of Punjab since Section 14(e) has no such requirement for conducting a hearing or giving a notice, it was not obligatory for the appropriate authority to make provisions for providing additional steps like giving notice or conducting a hearing before removing a member of the corporation. This was because Section 14(e) of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 did not explicitly mandate such procedures. If it was written under the procedure for removal in Section 14(e) only then the need would arise to give notice as when a law specifies the procedure for removal it should be followed as written.
Cooper vs. Wandsworth Board of Works (1863)
The case of Cooper vs. Wandsworth Board of Works (1863) is one of the earliest cases dealing with the principle of natural justice, the right to be heard and rule against bias.
In this case, the plaintiff who was a builder was employed and was given the task of building a house in the district of Wandsworth. The defendants without giving him any prior notice sent a surveyor to the building site and demolished the building. The plaintiff argued that he was not given a chance to defend himself or to state his arguments. The Court of Common Pleas was of the opinion that the defendants were not allowed to demolish the building without giving the plaintiff a chance to be heard and thus, they ruled in the favour of the plaintiff. The court highlighted the significance of the principle of natural justice and further stated that no one can be prevented from having their property by an administrative authority without being given an opportunity to be heard.
Analysis of the case
Positive features of the decision
Upholding the principle of natural justice
Article 14 of the Constitution is regarded as one of the most important fundamental rights given to the citizens of India, and it also forms a part of the golden triangle of the Constitution along with Articles 19 and 21.
The decision of the Supreme Court highlighted the ambiguities between Section 14(e) and Section 16(1) of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 which led to making Section 14(e) discriminatory and arbitrary. The court through this judgement reaffirmed the principles of natural justice by emphasising the concept of opportunity to be heard. It can be said that this decision upholds the idea of procedural fairness, which is essential for democratic governance.
Limiting the arbitrary power of the State Government under Section 14
By addressing the unchecked power of the state government under Section 14(e), the court promoted accountability and transparency through its decision in this case and made sure that this power was not used to promote any political or personal biases.
Section 14 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 allows the state to remove the elected members for any reason which is in the public interest without giving them a chance to defend themselves. This gives the state government a broad and vague power with no explanation as to what can constitute to be in the public interest. It makes the unchecked power given to the state government dangerous, making the government unaccountable to the citizens of the nation, which can hamper democracy and fairness.
Promoting equality under Article 14 of the Constitution
The court held that Section 14(e) violated Article 14 of the Constitution which ensures the right to equality before law. Under this Article all provisions and state actions must be just and free from any biases but Section 14(e) lacked the procedural safeguards which ensure this equality as any member could be removed without a hearing. This lack of safeguards led to unequal and discriminatory treatment of the members resulting in the encroachment of the rights of the elected members guaranteed under Article 14.
Strengthening democratic values
The decision of the court helped ensure that the representatives elected by the people of India are not removed from their positions without following the due process that has been laid down in the law. This ensured that there is increased accountability and transparency in the actions taken by the government. Moreover, this decision also promoted greater public participation by furthering the need for procedural fairness.
Promotion of judicial review
Judicial review is an important concept which secures the rights of individuals and makes sure that there is no curtailment of the same. The Constitution of India gives the Supreme Court and High Courts the power of judicial review wherein they can inspect, ascertain and overrule any law or action taken by the executive which is not in consonance with the provisions contained in the Constitution of India.
The judgement delivered by the court supported the power of judicial review by striking down Section 14(e) of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 because it was contrary to principles stated in the Constitution. This decision prevents the abuse of power, protects the rights of individuals and makes sure that the principles stated in the Constitution are protected from arbitrary abuses by the government authorities.
Negative features of the decision
Curtailment of executive authority
The court, by stating that Section 14(e) was against the provisions of the Constitution, curtailed the powers given to the executive. This Section gave wide powers to the State Government to remove an official in case of certain situations that were against the interest of the public such as corruption, arbitrary use of power, maladministration etc.
The judgement might lead to a situation where the government is required to make a swift decision, but it might not be able to do so because its hands would be tied and it would be required to give the member of the municipal committee a chance to be heard.
While the pros far outweigh the cons of the judgement, it still may lead to delays in addressing the situation at hand, which consequently might lead to harming the public interest rather than protecting it. It might also be argued that a legal vacuum was created after striking down the said Section as no other mechanism is present in the Act to remove elected members in case the public interest was being harmed and in case quick action was required to stop the same.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Ram Dial vs. State of Punjab(1965) strengthens the role of the judiciary as the guardian of the Constitution and the fundamental rights contained in it. This decision is admirable when it comes to upholding the principles of natural justice. It also helps put checks on the state’s arbitrary power and reinforces democratic values which ensure equality before the law.
This decision sets a precedent for safeguarding procedural fairness by striking down Section 14(e) of the Punjab Municipal Act and upholds the rule of law. Consequently, it also encourages the legislature to make sure that the laws passed by it are properly analysed before they are enacted to make sure they are in consonance with the Constitution of India.
Thus, this decision has a long-lasting impact on the understanding of principles of natural justice and procedural fairness, along with the political landscape of the country that existed in the 1960’s. It further strengthened the idea of a just and equitable legal framework in the country as it reassured the people that their elected representatives could not be removed erratically and without reason.
The Supreme Court by concurring with the arguments made by the appellants highlighted that a provision cannot be enforced under the guise of public interest if the said provision is discriminatory and arbitrary. Thus, this decision protects the right to a fair hearing and enforces the principle of ‘audi alteram partem’.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
What are the principles of natural justice?
The phrase principles of natural justice originate from an expression in Roman Law ‘Jus Natural’. These principles form an important part of administrative law in a country as they ensure fairness, transparency and equality in all proceedings. These principles have not been derived from the Constitution or from any statutes; rather, they have developed over time with the evolution of mankind.
Natural Justice is made up of three principles:
Nemo Judex In Causa Sua
The literal meaning of ‘Nemo Judex In Causa Sua’ is that no one should be a judge in his own case. If one is allowed to judge their own case then this would lead to bias which would be unfair. It is of the utmost importance that a judge is neutral and impartial for justice to prevail. There are 6 types of bias that might arise – personal bias, pecuniary bias, subject matter bias, departmental bias, policy notion bias and bias on the account of obstinacy.
Audi Alteram Partem
The literal meaning of ‘Audi Alteram Partem’ translates to ‘hear the other side’. This means that no person can be held guilty without being given an opportunity to be heard first. Under this principle, both parties of the case shall be given a fair chance to present their case before reaching a decision based on the merits of the arguments presented by them. It also states that a person shall be given a notice stating the charges against him. This is also known as the rule of fair hearing.
Reasoned decision
The concept of reasoned decision relies on the idea that for every decision made by the court, a reason must be provided. This is also known as the speaking order. Every reason provided must be clear and to the point to avoid arbitrariness and ambiguities. The court also must highlight the facts and on what basis it has given its decision, this guarantees that the parties have been given an opportunity to be heard during the proceedings.
What is the concept of public interest, and how is it determined?
According to the Black’s Law Dictionary, public interest can be defined as “something in which the public, the community at large, has some pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected.” In simple terms, it means something which is done for the welfare of the general public at large.
According to this concept, everything that the government does should be aimed at promoting the common good of the citizens in order to fulfil their needs. For something to fall under the ambit of public interest, it needs to be made sure that it affects a major part of the society rather than just a private individual’s interests.
To protect the public interest, a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) may be filed in the court. A PIL can be filed for matters relating to road safety, pollution, construction hazards, terrorism, neglected children, atrocities on women, exploitation of casual workers, bonded labour, non-payment of minimum wages to workers, food adulteration, disturbance of ecological balance, maintenance of heritage and culture, etc.
What is the golden triangle of the Constitution of India?
The golden triangle of the Constitution refers to the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14,19 and 21. Article 14 talks about the right to equality before the law and equal protection of the law irrespective of the religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth of a person. This ensures that there is no discrimination and that everyone is equally offered protection and treatment under the law.
Article 19 states that the citizens will be entitled to certain freedoms under the Constitution such as the freedom of speech and expression, the freedom to assemble peacefully, the freedom to form associations or unions, the freedom to move freely throughout the territory of India, and the freedom to practise any profession or carry on any trade, business or occupation. Article 21 states that every person shall have the right to life and personal liberty except when it has been warranted by the law.
These Articles together form the golden triangle and are regarded as the most important fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. They are interdependent and interconnected which means they are not to be interpreted in isolation. Fundamental rights are a part of the basic structure of the Constitution and thus, they cannot be amended by the Parliament. The rights guaranteed by these three Articles are essential in safeguarding the rule of law and the roots of democracy which run deep in India.
What is judicial review and how is it different from an appeal?
The origin of the judicial review doctrine can be traced to the USA. In India, the power of judicial review has been given to the Supreme Court and the High Courts. It has been regarded as one of the basic features of the Constitution, which means that it cannot be amended and removed in any case.
Judicial review refers to the power given to the judiciary to determine whether the laws made by the legislature and executive actions by the executive are in consonance with the provisions of the Constitution.
If the judiciary is of the opinion that the said laws and actions are against the provisions stated in the Constitution, then it shall be empowered to declare them as unconstitutional.
The doctrine of judicial review is vital when it comes to establishing the supremacy of the Constitution and the principles contained in it. It ensures that the fundamental rights contained in Part III of the Constitution are protected from arbitrary and unreasonable actions of the State and Central Government. Thus, it also helps in maintaining a check on the powers given to the State and Central Government.
Judicial review is different from an appeal on the basis that, in an appeal, the decision given by a lower court is reanalysed by a higher court on the basis of the facts of the case. Appeals are made when, according to the parties, an incorrect decision or an incorrect interpretation of a law is made. Appeals are of a statutory nature whereas judicial review is non-statutory in nature, i.e. provisions have been laid down for when a decision can be appealed and who it can be appealed to etc. Further, when it comes to judicial review, only public bodies can be brought under the scope of the same whereas, an appeal may be made against both private and public bodies.
Judicial review is an important concept which not only protects the law of the land but also helps in the promotion of the rule of law and provides safeguards from any misuse of power.
Traditional Knowledge (TK) includes the long-standing customs, practices, skills, and innovations by indigenous and local communities that were developed from centuries of experience. Indigenous communities possess extensive knowledge of local ecosystems and biodiversity. It touches everyday life of the community.
Traditional knowledge systems have knowledge about various fields such as agriculture, forestry, environmental management, etc. It is an essential component of a community’s cultural or spiritual identity. TK. Especially, it is an ancient, oral, and changing knowledge that is not protected by conventional IP systems.
Understanding traditional knowledge
Traditional knowledge covers various fields. TK includes tools and techniques for hunting, animal husbandry, fishing, and agriculture. These practical skills are adapted to local environments.
Indigenous communities have extensive knowledge about local plants, their uses, and medicinal properties. This includes herbal remedies, plant-based dyes, and sustainable harvesting practices. The holistic healing practices often combine physical, mental, and spiritual aspects to promote the well-being of the local communities.
The knowledge of understanding constellations, tides, and natural signs was used for navigation during sea voyages. Traditional craftsmanship, such as pottery, weaving, and carving, passed down through apprenticeship. Indigenous communities have developed seasonal calendars, weather prediction, and sustainable resource management.
The oral traditions such as stories, legends, folklore, and proverbs that transmit cultural values, history, and wisdom across generations. Their cultural heritage, which holds spiritual importance, is often part of rituals, songs, and their worldview.
When a language is lost, the specific ways of knowing and understanding the world encoded in that language are also at risk of being lost. UNESCO estimates that 43% of the 6,000 spoken languages are at risk of disappearing.
WIPO’s initiatives in traditional knowledge protection
The World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) collaborates with governments, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and international bodies to address TK-related issues. These partnerships focus on policy development, technical assistance, and capacity-building to ensure comprehensive protection and promotion of TK. The defensive protection prevents others from claiming rights over traditional knowledge, while positive protection gives communities control and benefits from their knowledge.
WIPO undertakes various initiatives to empower local peoples. The Intergovernmental Committee (IGC) also proposes solutions that respect the rights of Indigenous communities.
WIPO supports the creation of databases and digital repositories that store and manage TK-related information to prevent unauthorised use and support benefit-sharing. The Traditional Knowledge Digital Library (TKDL) protects India’s ancient medicinal information by providing extensive multilingual information to patent examiners to prevent wrongful patent claims. It safeguards India’s rich heritage in traditional medicine.
WIPO’s work in developing tailored solutions for TCE protection is ongoing.
In 1967, the Berne Convention was changed to include unpublished works by anonymous authors. This convention deals with the protection of literary and artistic works. Now traditional cultural expressions (TCEs) can be protected with copyright.
For TCEs, GIs can protect traditional products (e.g., handicrafts, textiles, food) by ensuring that only products genuinely originating from a specific place.
TCEs may be protected through collective trademarks, which represent a community’s identity and ensure fair use.
TCEs often involve special designs (e.g., patterns, motifs) that can be protected as industrial designs.
TK cannot be patented. For patenting, the novelty and/or inventive step criteria must be fulfilled.
Trade secrets may protect TK. The main conditions are that it is kept secret and has actual or potential monetary value.
Legal framework for traditional knowledge protection
Following are existing international conventions for the protection of TK and TCEs.
International instruments providing IP protection
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 1971
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, 1996 and the Beijing Treaty on Audio-visual Performances, 2012.
International instruments relating to other forms of protection
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,1966
International Labour Organisation Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, 1989
UNESCO Recommendation on Safeguarding of Traditional Culture and Folklore, 1989
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), 1992, and its Nagoya Protocol, 2010
International Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, 2003
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, 2005
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, 2005
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), 2007
The Paris Agreement on Climate Change (Global Warming), 2015
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) works on preserving traditional knowledge (TK), on indigenous peoples’ knowledge for environmental conservation, biodiversity, and endangered languages.
UNESCO plays a key role in protecting specific areas by designating them as biosphere reserves and World Heritage sites. These sites help preserve the rich biodiversity found in these regions.
Some countries are creating unique systems (Sui generis) to protect traditional knowledge (TK) and traditional cultural expressions (TCE). Sui generis systems may be needed, and it is crucial to identify gaps in current IP frameworks and learn from other countries’ experiences with such systems. It is important to safeguard cultural identity, prevent biopiracy, and consider environmental conservation and international laws.
Case studies of successful traditional knowledge protection
In 1995, the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) granted a patent to the University of Mississippi Medical Centre for a method of using turmeric to promote wound healing. This decision sparked controversy as the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) of India challenged the patent’s validity.
The CSIR argued that the use of turmeric for wound healing was not novel, as it had been practiced in traditional Indian medicine for centuries. To support this claim, the CSIR cited ancient texts and prior research that referenced the use of turmeric for wound care. The organization also pointed out that turmeric is a common ingredient in many traditional Indian dishes and has been used for its medicinal properties for generations.
The USPTO carefully considered the CSIR’s arguments and conducted a thorough review of the available evidence. After evaluating the provided texts and research, the USPTO concluded that the use of turmeric for wound healing was indeed not novel and that the University of Mississippi Medical Centre’s patent was invalid. The USPTO’s decision was a significant victory for the CSIR and for the preservation of traditional knowledge and practices.
The USPTO’s decision also raised important questions about the patenting of traditional knowledge. It highlighted the need for careful consideration when granting patents for inventions that are based on traditional practices and knowledge systems. The USPTO’s decision in this case set a precedent for future patent applications related to traditional knowledge and helped ensure that traditional knowledge is recognized and respected in the global patent system.
Samoan traditional healers helped develop prostratin medicine. It is an anti-AIDS compound from the mamala tree. Their knowledge guided researchers in finding this treatment. The benefit-sharing agreement ensures that the village and healers’ families receive revenue from prostratin. The benefit-sharing agreement will also fund further HIV/AIDS research and make the drug available to developing countries at low cost or for free.
In South India, the Kani tribes have extensive knowledge of medicinal plants. They helped develop a sports drug called Jeevani. This sports drug is made from the Arogya pacha plant, which helps with stress and fatigue. Indian scientists collaborated with the tribes to identify the active ingredients. They patented the technology and assigned the rights to Arya Vaidya Pharmacy, Ltd., a company specialising in Ayurvedic medicines. The profits from the drug were shared with the Kani tribes.
In the heart of the Peruvian Amazon, a remarkable chapter in Indigenous self-determination unfolded with the formation of the Wampis Nation. This autonomous territorial government, established in 2018, stands as a beacon of Indigenous sovereignty and environmental stewardship.
Spanning nearly 14,000 square kilometers, the Wampis Nation encompasses the ancestral lands of the Wampis people, who have safeguarded their traditions, cultures, and livelihoods for generations. The creation of this autonomous government was driven by a profound desire to protect their way of life from the encroaching threats of extractive industries and development.
The Wampis Nation operates on principles of self-governance, where the Indigenous Wampis people have the authority to make decisions concerning their lands, resources, and future. This autonomous government is a testament to the resilience and determination of Indigenous communities to preserve their cultural identity, traditional knowledge, and sustainable practices.
At the core of the Wampis Nation’s governance structure is a deep understanding of the interconnectedness between the environment and the well-being of their people. They recognise that their ancestral lands hold immense ecological significance, harbouring diverse ecosystems and a myriad of plant and animal species.
The Wampis Nation has implemented various initiatives to promote sustainable resource management and protect biodiversity. They have established community-managed conservation areas, implemented sustainable agriculture practices, and developed ecotourism programs that respect the natural environment and cultural heritage of the region.
The formation of the Wampis Nation has not been without its challenges. The autonomous government has faced opposition from external forces, including corporations and government entities with vested interests in exploiting the region’s resources. Despite these obstacles, the Wampis people have remained steadfast in their commitment to defending their rights and preserving their ancestral lands.
The Wampis Nation serves as an inspiring model of Indigenous self-determination and environmental stewardship. It demonstrates the capacity of Indigenous communities to govern their territories effectively, protect their cultural heritage, and contribute to global efforts for sustainable development and biodiversity conservation.
As the world grapples with the urgent need to address climate change and protect the environment, the Wampis Nation offers valuable lessons in how Indigenous knowledge and traditional practices can contribute to a more sustainable and equitable future for all.
Digital technology-based digital storytelling products use augmented reality to share stories of Aboriginal peoples in Australia. Users point their device at specific symbols or sites that trigger 3D animations that tell the stories. This helps preserve culture and engages younger generations.
In India, the Honey Bee Network involves farmers, NGOs, academicians, and indigenous people. Honey Bee showcases farmers’ solutions for crop diseases, pests, and conservation. It promotes sustainable agriculture and income generation.
Facilitating access and benefit-sharing agreements
The Intergovernmental Committee (IGC) is a body under WIPO. It focusses on negotiating international laws.
WIPO also collaborates with the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 1992 to address the interface between IP and genetic resources, including traditional knowledge. WIPO’s work aligns with the Nagoya Protocol which is a 2010 supplementary agreement to the CBD. It is contributing to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity.
Capacity building and empowerment
WIPO’s capacity-building and training programs cover various aspects, such as documenting TK, navigating the IP system, and leveraging IP tools for economic development. Women play a key role in passing down traditional knowledge in their communities. Local Community Women Entrepreneurs focusses on empowering women through practical IP support such as providing training, mentoring, and matchmaking programs on IP.
WIPO offers practical support in areas such as branding, certification marks, and geographical indications, which can enhance the marketability of products derived from TK.
WIPO celebrates the creativity of young Indigenous Peoples by encouraging impactful photographic storytelling. This year’s (2024) theme is “Indigenous Peoples’ Ways of Healing and Well-Being: Honouring Our Ancestors’ Wisdom and Knowledge”.
WIPO offers specialised courses related to traditional cultural expressions (TCEs) through its Distance Learning Program. These courses are free to indigenous communities.
WIPO organises webinars, workshops, and conferences to engage various stakeholders and promote the value of TK. WIPO publishes simple guides, manuals, and resources tailored to their needs. WIPO also helps entrepreneurs from these communities to use intellectual property tools for their businesses.
International collaboration and partnerships
WIPO works with governments and NGOs on IP policy development, training programs, and treaty negotiations. It supports innovation and capacity building in developing countries. However, the varying mandates and differing views of member states have slowed progress.
The SOLUTION project in Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada, aims to empower Indigenous learners by integrating traditional knowledge with modern technology. Through this initiative, learners gain access to culturally grounded educational resources, language tools, and community-driven apps. The project blends tradition and technology. It improves education, preserves cultural heritage, and supports community well-being. Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Solve helps similar projects for Indigenous communities in the U.S. and Canada. They focus on sustainable energy and climate resilience.
Indigenous reindeer herders in the Arctic are struggling with climate change and the encroachment of oil and gas development projects. The Eurasian Association of Liberal Arts Teachers (EALAT) project, in partnership with NASA, uses satellite imagery and GIS to help these communities monitor environmental changes and develop adaptive strategies.
In Australia, the International Savanna Fire Management Initiative (ISFMI) combines traditional practices with modern science. They conduct early burns to reduce fuel loads and prevent destructive wildfires. This approach lowers greenhouse gas emissions and creates opportunities in the carbon market.
Moreover, majority of the population in Africa and India rely on ancient medicine for their healthcare needs. The Foundation for Revitalisation of Local Health Traditions (FRLHT) in Bangalore researches medicinal plants and ancient Ayurvedic knowledge to improve healthcare in rural and urban India.
Future directions and emerging trends
It is difficult to protect traditional knowledge (TK) with existing laws. Existing IP systems focus on written records. Most of TK is passed down orally, which makes it hard to protect it under existing IP systems. TK belongs to communities and lacks clear ownership structures. Western IP laws may not fit well with indigenous cultures. Special laws should respect traditions, culture,, and collective ownership.
The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) consist of 17 interconnected objectives, including No Poverty, Zero Hunger, urgent climate change measures, and protection and sustainable management of oceans, terrestrial ecosystems, forests, and biodiversity.
These SDGs are aimed at addressing global challenges and improving the well-being of people and the planet. Indigenous knowledge assists communities in adapting to climate change and boosting food production. Traditional knowledge also provides guidance for sustainable land management and innovations in scientific research.
The Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) 2022 was agreed upon at the 15th Conference of Parties (COP 15). This framework aims to help achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. It sets a road map with 4 goals for 2050 and 23 targets for 2030. COP 15 also adopted a package to support the GBF’s implementation.
India has taken proactive steps to safeguard its rich traditional knowledge through comprehensive legal frameworks. The Biological Diversity Act of 2002 serves as a critical instrument in preserving India’s biodiversity and ensuring the equitable sharing of benefits arising from its utilization. This act recognises the value of traditional knowledge associated with biological resources and acknowledges the rights of indigenous communities over their traditional knowledge. It establishes a mechanism for prior informed consent and benefit-sharing when accessing biological resources or associated traditional knowledge.
Furthermore, the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act of 2001 aims to protect the rights of farmers and plant breeders while promoting the development of new plant varieties. This act recognises the role of farmers in conserving and improving plant genetic resources and ensures that they receive fair compensation for their contributions. It also provides a framework for the registration and protection of new plant varieties, encouraging innovation in the agricultural sector.
Additionally, the Geographical Indications of Goods Act of 1999 plays a crucial role in protecting the unique characteristics and reputation of certain products associated with specific geographical locations. This act safeguards the traditional knowledge and skills associated with the production of these products and prevents unauthorised use of geographical indications. It helps promote the economic well-being of producers and artisans while preserving the cultural heritage associated with these products.
These legal frameworks collectively contribute to the protection and preservation of India’s traditional knowledge. They recognise the value of traditional knowledge and ensure that indigenous communities and farmers benefit from its utilization. By establishing clear rights and responsibilities, these laws help promote sustainable development and preserve India’s rich cultural heritage.
Conclusion
Traditional knowledge (TK) is the intellectual creation of indigenous peoples and local communities through close observations of nature and experimentation. TK is passed on from generation to generation within a community. It touches the everyday lives of indigenous peoples. Many modern researchers and pharmaceutical industries have been making progress by utilising TK and genetic resources to produce novel pharmaceutical medicines.
WIPO plays a pivotal role in protecting traditional knowledge. It ensures that the rights and interests of indigenous and local communities are safeguarded.
This article has been written by Oishika Banerji and further updated by Kanika Goel. This article in itself is a detailed analysis of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 including all the details about negotiable instruments like promissory notes, bills of exchange, or cheques in India. This article also covers the relevant and important concepts underlying the statute. Let us delve into this article to understand every aspect of the Act including the relevant and important case laws, recent issues, and recent amendments.
Table of Contents
Introduction
Prior to the enactment of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as the NI Act), the English Negotiable Instruments Act was applicable in India in order to govern the functioning of the negotiable instruments. However, the question which arises here is, what exactly is a negotiable instrument? Before getting to know all the incidental concepts of a negotiable instrument, it is important to understand the concept of the same. The term “negotiable instruments” is not composed of just one meaning. Rather, it derives various meanings depending upon its mode of implementation or the laws through which it becomes applicable in a country. A negotiable instrument in general is considered to be a paper or a document that ensures that a sum of money is paid upon the demand of the payee or at times, immediately. It is pertinent to note that some of such instruments also guarantee unconditional payment of money (for example, in the case of a bill of exchange or a promissory note).
The NI Act basically covers three major types of instruments namely, bills of exchange, promissory notes, and cheques. Apart from these modes of payment via the instruments, NEFT (National Electronic Fund Transfer) and RTGS (Real Time Gross Settlement) also serve as two additional modes of payment.
This article aims to discuss all the aspects of the NI Act, 1881 which came into force on 1st March 1882, and is applicable to the whole of India.
Objective behind the Act
The objective behind the NI Act, 1881 is to ensure that the entire system by which the negotiable instruments are governed is strengthened and legalised in a way that one person can pass an instrument and pay a certain amount of money to another by way of negotiation. The intent behind the formation and enforcement of this Act was to put forth an orderly statement of rules relating to the negotiable instruments.
Composition of the Act
The NI Act aims to define and amend the law relating to the instruments covered under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The Act is composed of a total of 148 Sections divided into 17 chapters which are depicted below:
Chapter I (Sections 1 – 3): Preliminary
Chapter II (Sections 4 – 25): Notes, bills and cheques
Chapter III (Sections 26 – 45A): Parties to notes, bills and cheques
Chapter IV (Sections 46 – 60): Negotiation
Chapter V (Sections 61 – 77): Presentment
Chapter VI (Sections 78 – 81): Payment and interest
Chapter VII (Sections 82 – 90): Discharge from liability of notes, bills and cheques
Chapter VIII (Sections 91 – 98): Notice of dishonour
Chapter IX (Sections 99 – 104A): Noting and protest
Chapter X (Sections 105 – 107): Reasonable time
Chapter XI (Sections 108 – 116): Acceptance and payment for honour and reference in case of need.
Chapter XII (Section 117): Compensation
Chapter XIII (Sections 118 – 122): Special rules of evidence
Chapter XIV (Sections 123 – 131A): Crossed cheques
Chapter XV (Sections 132 – 133): Bill in sets
Chapter XVI (Sections 134 – 137): International law
Chapter XVII (Sections 138 – 148): Penalties in case of dishonour of certain cheques for insufficiency of funds in the accounts.
What is meant by negotiation
As per Section 14 of the NI Act, 1881, an instrument is said to be negotiated when that particular instrument is transferred to a person making that person the “holder” of the instrument. As per the provisions of the Act, there are two conditions to be fulfilled while negotiating an instrument:
The instrument must be transferable to any other person.
While transferring the instrument, it must be ensured that the transferee vests the stature of the holder of the instrument.
Modes of negotiation an instrument
An instrument may be negotiated in the following two ways:
As per Section 47 of the Act, an instrument may be negotiated by delivery of it. It means that whenever a negotiable instrument is payable to a bearer, it may be negotiated by mere delivery only. For example, C, a holder of the instrument payable to the bearer delivers it to A’s agent in order to keep it for A. Here, it can be said that the instrument is negotiated by delivery.
As per Section 48, a negotiable instrument can also be negotiated by endorsement. This means that when the maker of the instrument signs the same, it is endorsed and negotiated.
Who may negotiate
As per Section 51 of the Act, any maker, drawer, holder, payee, or even joint makers or payees can endorse or negotiate an instrument provided that they are not restricted to do so under Section 50 of the Act.
Negotiable instruments
The word “instrument” refers to a written document by virtue of which a right is created in favour of some individual. In order to understand the meaning of the term “negotiable instrument”, it is important to know the meaning of the term “negotiable”. An instrument is considered to be “negotiable” when it can be freely transferred from one party to another for some value and in good faith and the party to that instrument can sue in his own name. It is important to note that the term is not explicitly defined under the Act but Section 13 of the NI Act, 1881 gives an inclusive definition that a negotiable instrument means a bill of exchange, promissory note, or a cheque that is payable on order or otherwise.
The main distinction between a negotiable instrument and other documents (or a chattel) is that, in the case of a negotiable instrument, the transferee acquires a good title in good faith and for consideration even though the transferor’s title may have a flaw; in contrast, in the case of other documents, the transferee receives a similar title (or, to put it another way, no better title) than the transferor.
What is meant by a negotiable instrument
A document that is usually transferable from one person to another is often considered a “negotiable instrument”. Though the term is undefined in the Act, but as per Section 13(1), it includes a promissory note, a cheque, or a bill of exchange.
As quoted by Justice Willis, a negotiable instrument is defined as “an instrument, the property in which is acquired by anyone who takes it bona fide, and for a value, notwithstanding any defect or title in the person from whom he took it, from which it follows that an instrument cannot be considered as negotiable unless it is such and in such a state that the true owner could transfer the contract or engagement contained therein by simple delivery of instrument.”
For an instrument to be negotiable, there has to be fulfilment of certain conditions which are as follows:
An instrument cannot be considered as negotiable unless it can be transferred freely. It must be in a capacity to be transferred from the true owner to any other hand either by delivery or by endorsement of the instrument.
Transferee of the instrument should not be affected by any kind of defect in the transferor’s title.
The transferee must land into the capacity to sue in his name.
Common traits of negotiable instruments
Negotiable instruments are transferable by nature: A negotiable instrument may be freely transferred as many times as necessary until it reaches maturity. As mentioned earlier as well, an instrument is considered as negotiable when it is transferable upon delivery. When an instrument is “payable to the bearer”, it can be negotiated only by delivery but when an instrument is “payable to order”, it is accepted upon delivery and endorsement. In addition to becoming entitled to the money transferred with a negotiable instrument, the transferee also gains the ability to transfer the instrument again.
Possession of an independent title: It is an unsaid fact that a party cannot transfer a better title to the other party than what he possesses. However, such a rule becomes inapplicable when it comes to negotiable instruments. When a party receives a negotiable instrument for a value in good faith, the defect in the title of the transferor becomes immaterial. This results in the difference of the title status amongst the parties to an instrument. It ensures that the transferee can possess an independent title despite the transferor having a defective title over the instrument.
Presumptions: The negotiable instruments under the Act, 1881 are governed by certain presumptions which include those outlined in Sections 118 and 119 of the Negotiable Instruments Act of 1881.
Rights incidental to an instrument: When a negotiable instrument is dishonoured, the transferee of the negotiable instrument has the right to sue in his own name. In such a case, the transferee may bring a claim against a negotiable instrument in its own name without notifying the original debtor of the transfer, i.e., without telling the original debtor that the transferee has taken possession of the negotiable instrument.
Certainty of instrument: A negotiable instrument is considered “a carrier with no bags”. It must be framed in a manner that the negotiation be depicted in the fewest words possible indicating clearly the contract. A negotiable instrument must be free from any sort of irregularities that can pose a hindrance to its transferability and negotiation. A negotiable instrument must also include the payment of a specific (fixed or defined) amount of money (money only and on a specific time period).
Prompt payment: A negotiable instrument allows the holder of that particular instrument to receive a prompt and quick payment as the failure of it would mean the loss of the credit of the persons involved as the parties to that instrument.
Categorization of a negotiable instrument
There are various categories of negotiable instruments some of which find a place in the NI Act, 1881 as well. Let us understand about these classifications in brief:
Inland instruments
These instruments as mentioned under Section 11 of the NI Act, 1881 are the ones which are either payable in India or drawn upon a person who is a resident of India. These types of instruments include promissory notes, bills of exchange, or cheques as well.
Foreign instruments
Foreign instruments are the ones which are not considered as inland instruments. This also implies that such type of instrument shall be either payable or drawn upon a person who is not a resident of India or such type of instrument is drawn and made payable outside India. Foreign instruments are mentioned under Section 12 of the NI Act, 1881.
Bearer instruments
Bearer instruments include promissory notes, bills of exchange, or cheques under the conditions that such instruments are expressly payable or endorsed in blank.
Order instruments
Such types of instruments are usually payable on order which may be to a specific person or when there is no type of restriction in the transferability of that particular instrument.
Demand instruments
When there is no time mentioned for the instrument to be payable and the instrument can be made payable on either presentation or on sight, such types of instruments are considered to be demand instruments under Section 19 of the NI Act, 1881.
Inchoate instruments
As per Section 20 of the NI Act, 1881, an inchoate instrument is considered to be that instrument which is signed and delivered on a stamped paper by one party either wholly blank or as an incomplete negotiable instrument. It can also refer to an unregistered instrument which becomes effective only when the prima facie error is removed. In simpler words, an inchoate instrument is any cheque, pro note, or bill of exchange that is signed by the maker despite being unfilled or unrecorded. Few judicial pronouncements (e.g., Magnum Aviation (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. State and Ors(2010)) recognise or regard a cheque as an inchoate instrument if it lacks one or more essentials listed in the characteristics of the negotiable instrument.
Ambiguous instruments
The type of instrument that is unclear on the face of it as to how it is to be treated is known as an ambiguous instrument. Under Section 17 of the NI Act, 1881, the power to treat an instrument as a bill or a note vests with the holder of the instrument.
Important types of negotiable instruments under Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
As per Section 13 of the Act, the classification of the negotiable instruments is made into 3 broad categories which are as follows:
Promissory note as mentioned under Section 4 of the NI Act;
Let us understand the basics and the important characteristics of the above-mentioned instruments in detail.
Promissory Note (Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881)
Meaning
According to Section 4 of the NI Act of 1881, a written instrument (not a banknote or currency note) that contains an unconditional undertaking, signed by the maker with the promisor with the promise to pay a specific amount of money only to, or at the direction of, a specific person, or to the bearer of the instrument, qualifies as a negotiable instrument. Regardless of whether it is negotiable or not, an instrument that complies with the definition in Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, of 1881 must be regarded as a promissory note.
Specimen of promissory note
I _________ (debtor), S/o _______, PROMISE TO PAY ________ (creditor), S/o _________, or ORDER, on demand the sum of Rs. 1,00,000 (RUPEES ONE LAKH ONLY) with interest at rate of 5% p.a. From the date of the value received in cash/cheque no._____ dated _______.
PLACE:
DATE: SIGN:
Who are the parties to a promissory note
Following are the parties to a promissory note:
Maker of the instrument: the one who makes the promissory note and promises to pay a certain amount as stated in a pro note.
Payee of the instrument: the one to whom the promissory note is paid
Holder of the instrument: the person in whose name the pro note is endorsed
Characteristics of a promissory note
It must be signed by the maker which implies that the person promising to pay a certain amount must sign that pro note. It can also be signed by the authorised agent of the maker of the instrument.
It must be in writing in such a way that it cannot be altered in an easy manner.
There must be a commitment or undertaking to pay as mere admission of debt is insufficient.
There must be no conditions.
A promissory note must include an undertaking to pay money only. For example, A intends and promises to deliver paddy in alternative to money. This cannot be considered as a pro note.
A promissory note should clearly indicate about the parties agreeing to undertake the liability of the payment. A promissory note must be clear and unambiguous in terms of the certainty of the parties.
Even though the date on the promissory note is not an essential characteristic, it becomes material when the amount becomes payable at a certain time after the mentioned date.
The amount owing must be certain. This can be explained with a very simple example. Let’s say, A promises to pay Rs. 500 and all other sums which shall be due to him. However, this instrument cannot be construed as a promissory note because the amount mentioned is not certain.
Bill of Exchange (Section 5 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881)
Meaning
As per Section 5 of the Act, a “bill of exchange” (BOE) is considered to be a type of negotiable instrument that is made in writing consisting of an order which is unconditional, signed by the maker of that instrument, and directs a particular person to pay a certain amount of money only to or to the order of a certain person or to any bearer of that instrument.
The essence of a BOE lies in the fact that it is drawn by a creditor upon his debtor making him pay the amount of money to the person whose name is specified in the instrument.
Specimen of a bill of exchange
BILL OF EXCHANGE
Rs. 60,000/-
90 days after the date, pay Mr. X, or order a sum of RUPEES SIXTY THOUSAND ONLY for the value received.
ACCEPTED STAMP SIGN OF MAKER
(Drawee’s name) (Drawer’s name)
(Drawee’s address) (Drawer’s address)
Who are the parties to a bill of exchange
The following are the parties to a bill of exchange:
The Drawer: This person is the one who draws the bill and is vested with the secondary liability.
The Drawee of the Bill Of Exchange: Person with the primary liability and the one upon whom the drawer draws the bill.
The payee of the Bill Of Exchange: The person to whom the amount mentioned in the BOE is to be paid.
Characteristics of a BOE
A bill of exchange is required to be in writing. Along with being written, it should be suitably stamped and accepted by its drawee or on his behalf.
As the definition of a bill of exchange depicts, it must be an unconditional order to pay a certain amount of money.
A bill of exchange should be payable for a certain amount. One cannot agree to pay an uncertain sum of money through a bill of exchange.
Types of bill of exchange
Bills of exchange are further classified into the following categories on the basis of their usage and jurisdiction of their enforcement:
Foreign bills and inland bills: The bills which are drawn and paid within the same country are considered as inland bills. However, a foreign bill is one which may be issued in one country and executed in some other country. For example: If a bill of exchange is drawn and paid in India itself, it is considered as an inland bill. But, if a bill is drawn in India but executed outside the Indian territory, it is considered as a foreign bill.
Trade bills: When a bill of exchange is drawn to settle a credit transaction of a party and is accepted by the other party in lieu of it, it is considered a trade bill.
Demand bills: A bill of exchange which is paid on demand is known as a demand bill. In such cases, there is no time limit prescribed for the payment to be made.
Time bills: Where on one hand, demand bills are payable on demand, time bills are paid on a specific date and time which is usually mentioned on the bill.
Accommodation bills: An accommodation bill is one which is not drawn for a mode of payment in trade transactions but only acts as an agreement for providing financial assistance between the parties to the bill.
Difference between a promissory note and a bill of exchange
While on one hand, a promissory note is an unconditional promise to pay, a bill of exchange contains an unconditional order to pay.
There is a difference between the number of parties to various instruments. Where there are only two parties in a promissory note, a bill of exchange is dealt with by three parties.
Acceptance of a promissory note is not necessary but it is essential for a drawee to accept a bill of exchange.
The liability of the parties differs both in a promissory note and a bill of exchange. The drawer of a bill of exchange bears secondary liability, however, the liability of a drawer in the case of a promissory note is always absolute.
Parameters
Promissory Note
Bill of Exchange
Parties to the instrument
Mainly 2 parties; the debtor and the creditor
Mainly three parties: the drawer, the drawee, and the payee
Payment to the maker
Cannot be made payable to the maker itself
The drawer and the payee of the bill can be the same person
Unconditional promise/order
Promissory note contains an unconditional promise to pay
A bill of exchange contains an unconditional order to pay
Acceptance of the instrument
Maker need not give a prior acceptance in order to make the note payable
In order to make a bill payable, the drawee needs to accept it himself or by any other person on his behalf
Liability
Maker of pro note vests with the primary ability
The liability of the drawer of a bill of exchange is secondary and conditional
Relation
The maker of a pro note and the payee stay in an immediate relation
The drawer of a BOE stands in an immediate relation with the drawee and not with the payee
Cheque (Section 6 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881)
Meaning
As per Section 6 of the NI Act, 1881, the cheque is defined as “a bill of exchange drawn on a specified banker and not expressed to be payable otherwise than on demand and it includes the electronic image of a truncated cheque and a cheque in the electronic form”.
Classification of cheques under Section 6
As per Section 6, a cheque includes a cheque in the electronic form and also a truncated cheque. Let us understand these in brief.
Truncated cheque
As per Explanation I, a truncated cheque is the one that is cut short in the clearance cycle. This means that rather than using the cheque in a physical capacity, a scanned copy or the electronic image of the same is used for the transmission of the payment.
Cheque in an electronic form
Such a type of cheque is the one that is digitally signed by the maker and is drawn by a secure digital cryptosystem.
Parties to a cheque
There are three main parties to cheque. They are:
The drawer: The drawer of a cheque is the one who draws the cheque and signs it.
The drawee: It is the bank upon whom a cheque is drawn.
The payee: The payee of a cheque is the person to whom the amount stated in the cheque is to be paid.
Characteristics of a cheque
A cheque must always be in writing with the drawer’s signature upon it.
A cheque is a type of bill of exchange, the payment can only be made when demanded.
A cheque must bear the date of honour. In case of absence of such date, the cheque is considered to be invalid.
As per Section 18 of the Act, the amount of the cheque must be stated in both words and numbers. In cases where the amount stated in words and numbers is different, the amount mentioned in words will supersede and will be considered a sum to be paid.
No one other than the Reserve Bank of India or the Central Government may draw, accept, make, or issue any Bill of Exchange or Promissory Note payable to the bearer on demand, according to Section 31 of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 (RBI Act, 1934). Despite the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act of 1881, Section 31(2) of the RBI Act of 1934 stipulates the same.
A cheque is a bill of exchange written by the owner of an account payable on demand to a bank.
A post-dated cheque becomes a cheque under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act of 1881 on the date specified on the face of the cheque, and the 6-month term must be calculated from that date for purposes of Proviso (a) of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act of 1881.
The cheque is not made payable in any other way than on demand just because the payment date for it has been moved to a later date.
Legal action may be brought against the banker (the drawee in the case of a cheque) if it honours the cheque before the date stated on the cheque’s face.
When a cheque is described as “payable on demand,” the payee of the cheque is referring to “payable at once.”
Difference between cheque and bill-of-exchange
A cheque is always drawn upon a banker, however, a bill of exchange can be drawn upon anyone.
Where on one hand, in accordance with Section 19 of the Act, a cheque is always made payable immediately, a bill of exchange can be made payable at a certain time or immediately.
A bill of exchange cannot be crossed but a cheque can be crossed in order to make it non-negotiable.
A bill of exchange needs to be accepted by the drawee but there is no requirement for a cheque to be accepted.
A bill of exchange is always stamped which is not the case with a cheque. A cheque need not be stamped.
A 3-day grace period is allowed when a bill is due for presentation but no grace period is allowed in the cases of the presentation of a cheque.
A cheque and a post-dated cheque
The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India explained the distinction between a cheque and a post-dated cheque with reference to Sections 5 and 6 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, in the case of Anil Kumar Sawhney vs. Gulshan Rai(1993). According to the Supreme Court’s ruling:
A post-dated cheque is only a bill of exchange when it is written or drawn; after it is due on demand, it is a cheque.
A post-dated cheque is not cashable before the date printed on the document’s face. It remains a bill of exchange under Section 5 of the Negotiable Instruments Act of 1881 until the date indicated on it, at which point it becomes a cheque.
Since a post-dated cheque cannot be presented to the bank, the issue of its return would not come up. The requirements of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 only apply when the post-dated cheque becomes a “cheque” with effect from the date indicated on the face of the said cheque.
A postdated cheque is nevertheless valid as a bill of exchange until the date printed on it. However, as of the date printed on the face of the said cheque, it qualifies as a cheque under the Negotiable Instruments Act of 1881, and in the event that it is dishonoured, Section 138’s proviso (a) is triggered.
Other types of cheques
A cheque is classified into various types which are mentioned below:
Open cheque: With the help of an open cheque, one can withdraw cash from the bank’s counter.
Bearer Cheque: When the amount of the cheque is paid to someone whose name is mentioned upon the cheque, it is considered to be a bearer cheque.
Crossed Cheque: When the maker of a cheque crosses it by making two parallel transverse lines on the top left corner of the cheque with mentioning “not-negotiable” or “A/c payee” in order to make it payable only to be payee’s bank account, it is considered as a crossed cheque.
Order Cheque: When a cheque is made out to a specific person by cutting the word “bearer” upon it, it is considered an order cheque.
Holder and holder in due course
Holder of an instrument
As per Section 8 of the Act, every instrument initially belongs to the payee of that instrument because he has the right to its possession. However, the payee has the authority to transfer that instrument to any other person in order to pay his debt and such transfer is called negotiation. Therefore, it can be said that the holder of an instrument is either the bearer of the instrument or the endorsee.
Holder in due course
As per Section 9 of the Act, a holder in due course is the one who for consideration and in good faith becomes the possessor of a negotiable instrument even before the amount stated on that instrument becomes payable. It is pertinent to note that a holder in due course must have obtained the instrument prior to the lapse of maturity of that instrument and he should not have any notice of defect in the instrument. A person who has obtained a negotiable instrument in conformity with good faith and for value is referred to as a “holder in due process.” Each negotiable instrument holder is considered to be a “holder in due course.” It is the responsibility of a party liable for repayment to prove that the person holding the negotiable instrument isn’t the rightful owner in the event of a dispute.
In any case, the onus is on the holder to prove that he is a holder in due course, for instance by proving that he obtained the negotiable instrument in accordance with some good faith and for value, if the parties obligated for repayment demonstrate that the negotiable instrument was obtained from its legitimate proprietor by means of a crime or extortion. In law, the “burden of proof” is the requirement to establish specific facts.
Difference between holder and holder in due course
Any individual with the legal right to possess a promissory note, bill of exchange, or cheque in his or her own name, as well as to receive or obtain payment from the parties thereto, is referred to as the “holder” of that instrument. A holder who accepts the instrument in good faith, with due care and prudence, for value (consideration), and before maturity is referred to as a “holder in due course.” In the event of a “holder,” payment is not essential, and they are also permitted to purchase the instrument after it reaches maturity.
A “holder” does not have any particular rights, but a “holder in due course” does have some specific rights. For instance, a holder in due course cannot use the argument that the amount they filled out on an instrument exceeded the authority granted. It was decided that an endorsement was irregular and that the endorsee (AB and Co.) was not a holder in due course, albeit it might be a holder for value when a bill was prepared by X in favour of Z and Z further endorsed the bill in favour of AB and Co.
The key point is that the holder must have legal custody of the instrument in his own name. The possessor must be entitled to obtain or recoup that sum. An endorsee, payee, or bearer are all examples of holders. If someone has entitlement, it indicates that even if they don’t use it, they are still entitled to it and it cannot be taken away from them. In accordance with Section 8 of the Negotiable Instruments Act of 1881, the holder of an instrument must have a right to the instrument even if he does not possess it.
A “holder” does not receive a title superior to that of his transferor; rather, a “holder in due process” receives a title superior to that of his transferor. The status of a “holder” is less favourable than that of a “holder in due course. ” The title of a “holder in due course” becomes free from all equities, meaning that a “holder in due course” cannot raise the defence that can be raised against the prior parties. For instance, if a negotiable instrument is lost and then found by someone through criminal activity (theft), the person who received the instrument through criminal activity is not entitled to any rights regarding any money owed in relation to that instrument. However, if such a document is properly transferred to a person as a holder, he will get a good title.
Indorsement
Section 15 of the NI Act, 1881 clarifies as to what amounts to indorsement. When “the maker or holder signs the instrument otherwise than as a maker for the purpose of negotiation either on the back of it or on the face of it or on a slip annexed to it, then the instrument is said to have been endorsed”.
Essential ingredients of indorsement
Endorsement must be made on the instrument irrespective of the fact that it is made on the back of the instrument or on the front side. It may also be made on a separate document attached to the instrument.
It is necessary that the endorser signs the instrument. The signature may be in full or even the initials may work.
An instrument must only be endorsed by the maker or the holder and not by any stranger to it.
Delivery of the essential is an essential of the process of endorsement. It may be made by the endorser or by his agent.
Types of indorsement
As per the provisions of the NI Act, 1881, indorsement of an instrument can be done in four ways:
General indorsement (blank): As per Section 16 read with Section 54 of the NI Act, an instrument is said to be endorsed in “blank” when the person endorsing the instrument mentions his name as the sign. Such a type of instrument can be negotiated by mere delivery. For example, a bill is payable to Y and Y endorses it by just affixing his name as his signature. Here, the instrument is said to be endorsed in blank by Y.
Indorsement in full: As per Section 16 of the Act, where an endorser mentions the name of the person along with the signature, then it is said to be endorsed fully. As per Section 49, even an endorsement in blank can be converted into an endorsement in full if the last endorsement is a blank endorsement and the receiver of the instrument without writing his name mentions the endorser’s signature. For example, A is the holder of an instrument endorsed by C in blank. A writes over C’s signature, the words, “Pay to B or order.” This type of endorsement operates as an endorsement in full.
Restrictive indorsement: As per Section 50 of the Act, an endorsement is restrictive when the endorser while making the endorsement restricts/excludes the right of the endorser to further transfer the negotiable instrument. In other words, whenever the right to negotiate is restricted by an endorsement, then it is called a restrictive endorsement. For example, Pay B for the account of A. Here, the right of further negotiation is restricted by B.
Sans recourse endorsement: When we comprehend Section 52 of the Act, it becomes clear as to what sans-recourse endorsement is. When a person makes an endorsement and also excludes his own liability, it amounts to a sans-recourse endorsement. For example, Pay to B or order sans recourse. This means that in this case, the maker of the instrument being the endorser has opted to exclude its liability for paying the amount due to dishonour of the instrument.
Partial indorsement: As per Section 56 of the Act, negotiable instruments cannot be transferred for part of the amount mentioned on that instrument. But there is an exception to it as per Section 56, wherein if any part payment is already made, then in that case there can be partial endorsement for the remaining amount. For example, B is the holder of a bill worth Rs. 1500. He endorses it as “pay to C or order Rs. 1000.”
Legal effects of indorsement
Following are the legal effects of negotiating an instrument by way of endorsement:
Through endorsement, the property in the instrument gets transferred to the endorsee through the endorser.
Through endorsement, the right to further negotiate the instrument gets vested in the endorsee.
Endorsement gives the right to sue on the instrument.
In the case of A.V. Murthy vs. B.S. Nagabasavanna (2002), it was determined that a negotiable instrument is presumptively drawn for consideration and that a complaint of a dishonoured cheque at the threshold may be dismissed on the grounds that money had been advanced four years prior, the debt is not enforceable, and such a course of action is improper.
Parties to a negotiable instrument
Before getting to know about the types of negotiable instruments, it is important to know who can be a party to a negotiable instrument. As per Chapter III of the Act, any person who is capable of contracting as per the Indian Contract Act, 1872, is eligible to become party to a negotiable instrument.
Capacity of parties to the negotiable instrument
Minor: As per Section 26, a minor being incapable of contract, cannot bind himself by becoming a party to an instrument. A minor may be the drawer of the instrument, the maker, the acceptor, or even an endorser but he won’t be liable for the instrument. Even in such a case, the instrument remains binding upon all the parties to it.
Agency: As per Section 27 of the Act, a person can legally bind himself by an instrument by becoming a party to it either by himself or even through a duly authorised agent. The provision clearly states that even an agent of the party to an instrument can bind his principal by acting on his behalf but only when he is authorised to do it.
Liability of the parties
The liability of the parties to a negotiable instrument under Chapter III has been mentioned under Sections 30 to 32 and further under Sections 35 to 42.
Liability of agent signing
Section 28: A promissory note, bill of exchange, or cheque that an agent sign without specifying that he is acting as an agent or that he does not intend to assume personal liability makes the agent personally liable for the instrument, with the exception of those who persuaded him to sign under the impression that only the principal would be held responsible.
Liability of legal representative signing
Section 29: A promissory note, bill of exchange, or cheque that a legal representative of a deceased person signs binds him personally unless he expressly restricts his duty to the amount of assets he received in that capacity.
Liability of drawer
Section 30: If the drawee or acceptor of a bill of exchange or cheque dishonoured it, the drawer is obligated to pay the holder compensation, provided that the drawer has received or been given the proper notice of the dishonour as described further below.
Liability of drawee of cheque
Section 31: The drawee of a cheque must pay the cheque when required to do so and, in the event that payment is not made as required, must reimburse the drawer for any losses or damages resulting from the default. This is true even if the drawee has sufficient funds in his possession that are legally applicable to the payment of the cheque.
Liability of maker of note and acceptor of bill
Section 32: The maker of a promissory note and the acceptor of a bill of exchange prior to maturity are obligated to pay the amount due at maturity in accordance with the apparent tenor of the note or acceptance, respectively, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, and the acceptor of a bill of exchange at or after maturity is obligated to pay the amount due to the holder upon demand. Any party to the note or bill who is not paid as required by the note or bill must be reimbursed by the maker or acceptor for any losses or damages they suffer as a result of the default.
Liability of indorser
Section 35: Section 35, outlines the obligations of an endorser. In the case that the instrument is dishonoured, the endorser of a negotiable instrument undertakes the duty to the holder and any subsequent endorsers, unless there is a contrary arrangement. Significantly, the endorser’s liability will be secondary and arise only if the instrument is dishonoured after the proper procedures have been followed. Every indorser who does dishonour is accountable as if they were a demand-payable instrument.
Section 40 talks about the discharge of the indorser’s liability. The indorser is released from responsibility to the holder to the same extent as if the instrument had been paid in full when the holder of a negotiable instrument destroys or weakens the indorser’s remedy against a preceding party without the indorser’s consent.
Liability of prior parties to the holder in due course
Section 36: Every prior party to a negotiable instrument is liable thereon to a holder in due course until the instrument is duly satisfied.
Discharge from liability
Chapter VII of the Act deals with the concept of discharge from the liability of the parties. These parties include either the maker of the instrument, the acceptor, or the endorser. When a party is discharged from liability over a particular instrument, in such a case, only that party gets discharged but the instrument continues to be negotiable and all the other undischarged parties will be liable on that instrument.
Modes of discharge from liability
As mentioned above, Chapter VII not only deals with the concept of discharge from liability but also its various modes. Let us understand all the modes of discharge from liability of parties in brief.
Discharge by payment
As per Section 82(c), when a party is to be discharged from liability by the mode of payment, it needs to clear the payment in the due course of that payment. This means that the payment is to be made as per the terms and conditions and in accordance with good faith.
As per Section 79, the term “payment” is inclusive of the principal amount of the instrument along with the interest if any. Such interest if not mentioned while making the instrument remains 18% in accordance with the provisions mentioned under Section 80 of the Act.
Discharge by cancellation
As per Section 82(a), the maker, holder, or endorser is discharged from liability when such party cancels the name of the acceptor of the instrument. This results in the discharge of the liability of the maker, holder, or endorser against the person whose name is cancelled upon the instrument.
Discharge by release
In accordance with Section 82(b), when the maker, holder, or endorser of an instrument gives notice of discharge to the party against whom the liability is to be discharged, the holder gets discharged from all such liabilities thereafter.
Crossing of cheques
A cheque is considered to be crossed when the maker of the cheque draws two parallel transverse lines across the face of the cheque. In the usual instance, these lines are drawn on the upper-left corner of the cheque. Payment of a cheque is usually affected by the crossing of a cheque. The word “crossing of a cheque” is nothing but a sort of direction to pay the money at the hands of the paying banker. Chapter XIV deals with the crossing of cheques.
Significance of crossing a cheque
A cheque is crossed to ensure that the payment is obtained only by the rightful holder of that cheque and not otherwise. When a cheque is crossed generally, the banker gets the rightful authority to obtain the payment. Crossing of cheques ensures that even in incidents of wrongful delivery of payments, the maker can trace back the transaction through the banker.
Who may cross a cheque
Following parties to a cheque may cross it:
Drawer of the cheque: a cheque may be crossed generally or specially by the drawer of that instrument.
Holder of the cheque: if the holder receives an uncrossed cheque, he has the authority to cross it either generally or specially. He may even add the words “not negotiable” to the cheque in order to restrict the instrument from getting negotiated any further.
Banker: a banker who receives a specially crossed cheque can even cross it again in order to negotiate it with another banker.
Modes of crossing a cheque
There are various modes of crossing a cheque as explained below:
General crossing
As per Section 123, when there remains no words between the lines of crossing or the name of the bank alongside the words if any, the cheque is said to be crossed generally. The maker of the cheque has the discretion to add the words “not negotiable” upon the cheque.
Special crossing
As per Section 124 of the Act, when there remains the name of the banker between the transverse lines, the cheque is said to be crossed specially. In such a case, the payment of the cheque can only be made through a specific banker whose name is mentioned between the lines of crossing.
Not-negotiable crossing
As per Section 130 of the Act, a cheque is said to be crossed as “not-negotiable” when the word “not-negotiable” is mentioned between the transverse lines on the cheque. Such type of crossing restricts the instrument from being negotiated any further. When a cheque is crossed as “not-negotiable”, the maker becomes ineligible for any authority to pass on any title which he is devoid of.
The penal provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (Chapter XVII)
The criminal penalties found in Sections 138 to 148 of the 1881 Act have been put in place to make sure that contracts entered into using cheques as a form of deferred payment are upheld. Conditions for filing a complaint for cheque dishonour are outlined in Section 138 of the Act. The following are the components needed to comply with Section 138:
Cheques are a common form of payment, and post-dated cheques are regularly utilised in a variety of business operations. Cheques that have been postdated are issued to the cheque’s drawer as a convenience. As a result, it becomes important to make sure the cheque’s drawer isn’t abusing the accommodations made for him.
The NI Act, 1881 governs the use of negotiable instruments, including cheques, bills of exchange, and promissory notes. The purpose of Chapter XVII, which contains Sections 138 to 142, was to foster trust in the effectiveness of banking operations and lend legitimacy to the negotiable instruments used in commercial transactions.
A person must have drawn a cheque to pay money to someone else to satisfy any debt or other obligation;
The bank has received that cheque during the last three months;
When a cheque is returned unpaid by the bank due to inadequate funds or because it exceeds the amount specified in an agreement established with the bank to be paid from that account;
Within 15 days of learning from the bank that the cheque was returned as unpaid, the payee issues a written notice to the drawer demanding payment of the money;
Within 15 days of receiving the notice, the drawer fails to pay the payee.
Dishonour of negotiable instruments
A negotiable instrument may occasionally be dishonoured, which means the party responsible for payment neglects to make the payment. After submitting the proper notice of dishonour, the holder has the right to file a lawsuit for the recovery of the sum. However, he is allowed to have a Notary Public’s certification about the actuality of dishonour before he files the lawsuit. A statement like that is referred to as “protest.” The court will assume that there has been dishonour based on the verification of such dissent.
An overview of Section 138 of the Act
The “Negotiable Instruments Act” was first developed in 1866, and it was finally passed into law in 1881. Chapter XVII, which includes sections 138 to 142, was added to this statute in 1988, after more than a century. Section 138 of the Act essentially lays out the punishment for the crime of dishonouring a cheque. “A negotiable document drawn on a designated banker and not expressed to be payable otherwise on demand” is how one may define a cheque under the Section. The word “cheque” is defined in Section 6 of Chapter II of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 to include “an electronic image of a truncated cheque and a cheque in electronic form.” Before the recent addition, criminal prosecution of the accused in cases of cheque dishonour was not an option for the payee of the cheque; instead, only civil and alternative dispute resolution procedures were available. Now, the payee of the cheque has access to both civil and criminal remedies.
The Hon’ble Court stated in Modi Cement Limited vs. Kuchil Kumar Nandi (1998), that the major goal of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 is to increase the effectiveness of banking operations and to guarantee complete trust while conducting business using cheques. The laws of the commercial world, which are specifically designed to simplify trade and commerce by making provisions for giving sanctity to the instruments of credit that would be deemed to be convertible into money and easily transferable from one to another, are those that deal with negotiable instruments.
In the most recent decision of P Mohanraj vs. M/S. Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt. Ltd. (2021), a division bench composed of Rohinton Fali Nariman, and B.R. Gavai rendered their decision that when discussing whether Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 prohibits proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881, against corporate debtors, it was noted that the proceedings under Section 138 could be described as “civil sheep” in “criminal wolf’s clothing.”
Conditions to commit an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
The term “Negotiable Instrument” is defined as “a promissory note, bills of exchange, or cheque payable either to order or to bearer” under Section 13 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881. In other words, it basically says that “it is a sort of instrument which promises the bearer a sum of money that will be payable on demand or at any future date.” Section 138 essentially outlines the penalties for dishonouring a cheque as a criminal provision.
The provision itself outlines specific conditions that render dishonouring a cheque illegal, and the prerequisites are:
A cheque must first have been prepared by the person who will be the drawer, and it must be for the payment of money to another party to satisfy a debt.
The cheque should be handed to the drawee bank, and if there aren’t enough funds or the amount is greater than “the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement established with the bank,” the bank will return the cheque unpaid.
The bank must receive the cheque no later than six months after the day it was drawn or during the duration of its validity, whichever comes first.
The bank promptly provides the payee with the “Cheque return memo” if the cheque is dishonoured by the bank.
Following that, a demand notice for the return of the unpaid cheque must be sent by the cheque holder, who is also the payee, to the cheque drawer within 30 days of receiving the memo.
The drawer must make the payment within 15 days of receiving this notice, and if it is not made within that time frame, the payee may file a lawsuit within 30 days of the expiration of the 15-day period.
The court ruled in the case of Shankar Finance Investment vs. State of Andhra Pradesh(2008) and others that “Section 142 of the Negotiable Instrument Act makes it compulsory that the complaint must be filed by the payee or holder in due course of the cheque where a Payee is a natural person he can file a complaint and when the pay is a form of a company registered person it must be represented by a natural person.”
Decriminalisation of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
The decriminalisation of minor offices was announced in a public notice released by the Minister of Finance in the year 2020 with the goal of boosting business confidence and streamlining the legal system. for gathering feedback and proposals from interested parties about the decriminalisation of a variety of offences, including the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act of 1881.
The primary goal of the government’s proposal is to streamline business procedures and promote investment, but in a reasonable opinion, doing away with Section 138’s criminal penalties will not achieve this goal. Instead, it can be believed that this section was designed to have deterrent effects and to prevent people from breaking their agreements by paying by cheque.
Another goal of this proposal was to decriminalise certain offences in order to open up the legal system. However, this goal will not be achieved because there are already a lot of pending cases in the magistrate courts, and they are being resolved very slowly. Additionally, by decriminalising certain offences, the burden that was previously placed on the criminal courts will be transferred to the civil courts because the person who holds the cheque will now bear that burden.
Cognizance of the offence under Section 142 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881
Section 142 of the NI Act, 1881 talks about the cognizance of offence mentioned under Section 138. According to Section 142(1)(a), a court can only take cognizance for an offence under Section 138 on the written complaint of the payee of the cheque or the holder in due course whatever the case may be.
Limitation period for making a complaint
It is pertinent to note that as per Section 142(1)(b), the complaint of the dishonour of the cheque must be made within one month from the cause of action of the offence mentioned under Section 138. However, the court may take cognizance post the limitation time if the payee or the holder in due course satisfies the court that there was a sufficient reason for not making the complaint in the requisite time period.
Who may take cognizance under Section 142
As per Section 142(1)(c), the court of a Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate first class is authorised to take cognizance of the offence mentioned under Section 138.
Jurisdiction of the trial of the offence
As per Section 142(2), an offence under Section 138 may be tried in the following jurisdictions:
The branch of the bank in which the payee maintains his account, or
The branch of the drawee bank.
Defence that cannot be taken
As per Section 140 of the Act, the defence that the cheque presented may get dishonoured on presentment cannot be taken by the drawer of the cheque. However, the following defences may be considered by the court:
Wrong jurisdiction/ lack of jurisdiction
Absence of notice of 15 days
Cheque not returned by the payee
Complaint filed not in compliance with Section 142
Summary trial of the disputes as per Section 143
In accordance with Section 143 of the Act, the offences under Chapter XVII are to be dealt with summarily as per Sections 262–265 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for which the sentence passed by the magistrate must not exceed a term of one year and a fine for an amount of not exceeding 5000 rupees.
Speedy disposal of the matters under this provision
As per Section 143(3), every trial conducted by the magistrate under this provision must be concluded within a time span of 6 months from the date of filing of the complaint.
Speedy disposal of negotiable instrument cases in recent times
The Delhi High Court considered the issue of whether a criminally compoundable offence under Section 138 might be resolved by mediation in the case of Dayawati vs. Yogesh Kumar Gosain (2017). The Court ruled that even while the legislature did not clearly provide for such a provision, the criminal court is still permitted to send both the complainant and the accused to alternative conflict resolution procedures. Without mandating or limiting the method by which it may be reached, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, does permit and accept a settlement. Therefore, there is no prohibition against using alternative dispute resolution procedures, such as arbitration, mediation, and conciliation (recognised under Section 89 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908), to resolve disputes that are the focus of offences covered by Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code. Additionally, it was argued that the proceedings under Section 138 of the 1881 Act are unique from other criminal cases and really have more in common with a civil wrong that has been given criminal undertones.
After considering the purpose of enacting Section 138 and other sections of Chapter XVII of the Act, the Honourable Supreme Court stated in Meters and Instruments (P) Ltd. vs. Kanchan Mehta (2017) that an offence under Section 138 of the Act is principally a civil wrong. Section 139 places the burden of proof on the accused, but the standard for such proof is “preponderance of probabilities.” The case must typically be tried summarily in accordance with the provisions of summary trial under the CrPC, with any modifications necessary for proceedings under Chapter XVII of the Act.
As written, Section 258 of the CrPC principle will be in effect, and the Court may close the case and release the accused if it is satisfied that the amount on the cheque, as well as any assessed costs and interest, have been paid and if there is no justification for continuing with the punitive element. Compounding at the initial stage must be encouraged but is not prohibited at a later stage, subject to appropriate compensation as may be found acceptable by the parties or the Court. The purpose of the provision is primarily compensatory, the punitive element being primarily with the object of enforcing the compensatory element.
Cases brought under Chapter XVII of the Act must typically be tried in a summary manner. It is pertinent to note that the court having jurisdiction under Section 357(3) CrPC to try the case can also grant suitable compensation in addition to the sentence of imprisonment under Section 64 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and with further recovery powers under Section 431 of the CrPC. The Magistrate may decide, under the second proviso to Section 143 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, that it was undesirable to try the case summarily because a sentence of more than one year may need to be passed. With this strategy, a prison term of more than a year may not be necessary in every circumstance.
The bank’s slip is prima facie proof of the dishonoured cheque, so the Magistrate need not record any additional preliminary evidence. The complaint’s evidence can be provided on affidavit, subject to the court’s ruling and scrutinising the individual providing the affidavit. This type of affidavit testimony is admissible at all stages of a trial or other action.
Thus, the plan is to proceed in a summary manner.
Other important provisions under chapter XVII
Presumption in favour of the holder
As per Section 139, the court shall presume that the cheque issued in the favour of the holder was in discharge of the liability whether in part or in full.
Offences by the companies
As per Section 141, even a company can be held liable for an offence committed under Section 138. In such cases where the company commits an offence under Section 138 of the Act, the person in charge responsible for the company’s affairs at the time of the commission of the offence along with the company will be held liable and will be prosecuted against. Also, it is to note that the defence of due diligence and good faith cannot be taken in such cases where a company is accused of committing an offence under Section 138.
However, no proceeding can be exercised against the Director of a company employed by the Central Government or a State Government.
Mode of service of summons
According to this Section 144, a copy of the summons must be duly served upon the accused or the witness where they reside or work for gain.
Evidence on affidavit
Section 145 denotes that the evidence of the complainant is given on affidavit and the court has the authority to summon and examine the person giving evidence on affidavit.
Offences to be compoundable
According to this Section 147, all the offences under this Act shall be compoundable within the meaning of the provisions of CrPC.
Latest amendment in the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
The Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2018 which came into force on 1st September, 2018 inserted two important provisions to chapter XVII of the Act. Sections 143A and Section 148 were inserted by the Amendment Act.
Interim compensation
According to Section 143A, the court while trying an offence mentioned under Section 138 can also grant interim compensation to the complainant which must not exceed 20% of the cheque’s amount. Also, as per Sub-section (3) of Section 143A, such compensation must be paid within a time frame of sixty days further extendable to thirty days from the date of such order.
As per Sub-section 5, such compensation must be received as a fine in accordance with Section 421 of CrPC.
Power of Appellate Court
Section 148 denotes the power of the Appellate Court to order payment. As per this provision, the Appellant Court may order the appellant to deposit the sum of conviction for which the appeal has been preferred which would be 20% interest of the fine or compensation. However, such an amount would be in addition to the amount of compensation granted under Section 143A.
As per Sub-section (2), such an amount must be deposited within a time frame of 60 days further extendable to 30 days on sufficient cause.
Other important provisions of the NI Act, 1881
Notice of dishonour
Chapter XVIII of the Act deals with the provisions concerning notice of dishonour of a negotiable instrument. The following are the provisions mentioned in this chapter:
Section 91: It denotes the dishonour by non-acceptance of an instrument. When an instrument is not duly accepted on the presentment of it in a timely manner, it is considered to be dishonoured.
Section 92: This provision talks about the notice of dishonour by non-payment. An instrument is considered to be dishonoured by non-payment when the maker of that instrument makes a default in payment which he is required to pay.
Section 93: This provision talks about the parties by whom and to whom the notice of dishonour should be given. Whenever a negotiable instrument is dishonoured, the person or the maker of the instrument liable for the dishonour must give the notice to the holder or any other party to whom he is liable.
Noting and Protest
According to Section 99 of the Act, when an instrument gets dishonoured due to non-acceptance or non-payment, such dishonour may be called to be noted by the notary public upon that paper or any other affixed paper.
As per Section 100, when such noting is certified by the notary public, that certificate is considered to be a protest.
Reasonable time
Chapter X deals with the head of reasonable time. The important provisions in this chapter are dealt with as follows:
Section 105 deals with what reasonable time is. As per the provision, the reasonable time for the presentation of an instrument or for sending the notice of its dishonour depends upon the usual course of transmission and relevant details such as the exclusion of bank holidays or public holidays etc.
Section 106 talks about the reasonable time for the notice of dishonour of an instrument. As per the provision, “If the holder and the party to who notice of dishonour is given carry on business or live (as the case may be) in different places, such notice is given within a reasonable time if it is dispatched by the next post or on the day next after the day of dishonour.”
International law
Chapter XVI covers the provisions relating to international law in resonance with the negotiable instruments. As per Section 134 of the Act, a foreign negotiable instrument would be governed by the laws of the land where that instrument is made. However, this is not the case when a foreign instrument is dishonoured. As per Section 135, when the place of the making of the instrument is different from where it is made payable and such instrument gets dishonoured, the law of the place where it was to be made payable would apply.
Presumption as to foreign law
According to Section 137, unless the contrary is proved, the laws of the foreign land where an instrument is made would be considered similar to the Indian laws governing the negotiable instruments.
Presumption as to service of notice
It is assumed that a notice has been served if it has been sent by registered mail to the right address of the cheque’s drawer. The drawer, however, has the right to refute this assumption.
The Apex Court has ruled that a notice is considered to have been properly served if it is delivered to the correct address and returned with the words “refused,” “no one was home,” “house was locked,” or words to that effect.
Requirement of stamp
Despite the fact that the Act makes no reference of the stamp’s relevance or requirement, every style of promissory note and bill of exchange must have a stamp on it. The Indian Stamp Act of 1899 mentions a mandatory provision for stamp affixation on such documents.
Presumptions under Section 118 and Section 119 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
According to Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the plaintiff has the initial burden of proving a prima facie case in his favour. Once the plaintiff presents evidence to support a prima facie case in his favour, the defendant is then required to present evidence to the court of law that supports the plaintiff’s case. The burden of proof may return to the plaintiff as the case develops. The following presumptions shall be made unless the contrary is shown, according to Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act of 1881:
Consideration: When dealing with a negotiable instrument, the complaint must establish prima facie that he did so in good faith and without payment. Every negotiable document is deemed to have been drawn for consideration, and every time one of these instruments is accepted, inscribed, or transferred, it is assumed that this was done for (or against) consideration. As a result, in the event that the complainant files a complaint alleging dishonour of a cheque (or other negotiable instrument), the accused person may discharge his or her responsibility by demonstrating that there is no sum due to be paid to the complainant by the accused person under the terms of the instrument.
Date: It is assumed that a negotiable instrument was drawn on the date that is specified on the instrument’s face in the case of a negotiable instrument.
Time of acceptance: When it comes to negotiable instruments, it is assumed that they were accepted within a reasonable amount of time following their execution date and prior to their maturity.
Time of transfer: Every transfer involving a negotiable instrument is assumed to have taken place before the instrument’s maturity date.
Order of indorsements: The endorsements that appear on a negotiable instrument are assumed to have been made in the order or sequence that they do.
Holder in Due Course: A missing promissory note, bill of exchange, or cheque is assumed to have been properly marked, thereby, implying the concept of holder in due course.
Stamp: Every possessor of a negotiable instrument is deemed to have obtained it voluntarily and in exchange for value. The accused party must demonstrate that the negotiable instrument’s holder is not a holder in good standing.
The Negotiable Instruments Act of 1881 mandates that when a promissory note or bill of exchange has been dishonoured by non-acceptance or non-payment, the holder of such instrument may cause such dishonour to be noted by a notary public upon the instrument or upon a paper annexed (or attached) thereto, or partly upon each of them, i.e., the instrument and the paper annexed to the instrument. Additionally, according to Section 100 of the Negotiable Instruments Act of 1881, the holder of an instrument may have it protested by a notary public within a reasonable amount of time regarding the dishonour of the instrument.
Following Chinnaswamy vs. Perumal(1999), it was held that the assumption under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, had been refuted by the facts in the case of Ayyakannu Gounder vs. Virudhambal Ammal (2004). In Bonala Raju vs. Sreenivasulu(2006) it was decided that the presumption as to consideration under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, applies when the fulfilment of a promissory note is proven.
According to Section 119 of the Negotiable Instruments Act of 1881, the presumption of proof of protest is discussed. It specifies that if a lawsuit is filed over the nonpayment of a promissory note or a bill of exchange, the court will presume that the nonpayment occurred unless and until the acceptor of the promissory note or bill of exchange refutes (or refutes) the claim.
Recommendation for better functioning of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
It is recommended to double the number of Magistrates designated solely for instances involving cheque bounces. To deal with certain cases, special courts can be established. The Government is required to allocate the money required to cover the costs associated with hiring more Magistrates, their support staff, and other infrastructure. A judge shouldn’t have more than fifty cases before them on any one day (25 people attended the morning session and 25 people the afternoon session), presuming that the number is a reasonable one.
The court’s judicial clerk should sit for an hour, take roll calls, consider requests for adjournment by consent, and adjourn the cases that, in his opinion, need adjournment before the court’s time, which is before 11 AM. When the magistrate’s judicial attention or time is needed, those matters can be detained for judicial review until 11 AM with a note from the court clerk. The recording of the evidence should take up the entire hour of court time beginning at 11 AM. The aforementioned will spare the court between one and two hours per day. As he is not bringing a new financial claim, victims of cheque-bounce instances are not required to pay court costs.
According to Section 139 of the Act of 1881, it is presumed that the holder of a cheque received a cheque of the kind mentioned in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability unless the contrary can be proven. The accused may disprove this presumption by presenting convincing evidence that there was no debt or liability. The burden of proof then switches back to the complainant when such rebuttal evidence has been presented and accepted by the court.
Since it is a quasi-judicial proceeding, the Court should adopt a creative strategy and avoid becoming bogged down in details. Technicalities should be sought out and firmly rejected.
Magistrates must act on their own, and a four-hearing process must be used. A non-bailable warrant must be issued if the accused does not show up for the initial hearing. The accused must provide justification and present a defence at the second hearing. Cross-examination should be done during the third hearing. Arguments should be made at the fourth hearing, and then a decision must be made.
Credit is granted based on confidence and trust. To further simplify conducting business in India, it is in the judicial system’s best interest that these reforms are implemented as soon as practicable. It is against the law for someone who borrows money on credit to use Section 138 of the Act to put off making payments, and it is the Court’s responsibility to make sure that it does not become a party to such stalling measures.
Conclusion
According to the 213th Law Commission Report, the Indian judicial system is dealing with a significant backlog of cases, and roughly 20% of the litigation-related issues include cheque bounces. The lifeless sections of the Negotiable Instruments Act of 1881 would thus be given some life by the recently enacted provisions. Even though cases involving cheque bounces are penal in nature and result in criminal offences, the procedures for summary judgement are still on the books, and making the offence subject to bail has made these cases practically identical to civil issues. In this approach, newly introduced restrictions would in fact be a proactive measure to protect the legitimacy of cheques. Once the accused individuals or the appellant, if there is an appeal, deposit a sizable sum, they will begin to treat the situation seriously. Even while it is moving in the right way, there is still work to be done to make cheque bounce cases feasible, and summary trials must be given their actual meaning. Otherwise, the entire point of making a cheque bounce a criminal offence would become less significant.
Apart from the significance of NI Act, 1881 in the cheque bounce matters, it is considered a substantial piece of legislation because of its governance over the various negotiable instruments in the Indian territory. It is a comprehensive legal framework of provisions which deals with every aspect of the negotiable instruments ranging from their creation to their enforcement. It highlights the rights and liabilities of the parties and provides for an efficient mechanism of the disputes pertaining to negotiable instruments.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
What is the maximum punishment prescribed for the offence committed under Section 138 of the Act?
According to Section 138, any person accused of dishonour of a cheque due to insufficiency of balance in his bank account will be held liable for the offence mentioned under this Section and will be sentenced to imprisonment of a term not exceeding two years or with a fine which would not exceed twice the amount of the cheque.
How is an inland instrument different from a foreign instrument?
Inland instruments are the ones that are either payable in India or drawn upon a person who is a resident of India whereas foreign instruments are the ones that are not considered as inland instruments. This also implies that such type of instrument shall be either payable or drawn upon a person who is not a resident of India or such type of instrument is drawn and made payable outside India.
In which year, was Section 143A introduced in the Act?
Section 143A which talks about interim compensation was inserted into the Act of 1881 by the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2018 on 1st September, 2018.
Who can claim compensation under Section 143A?
The payee or the holder in due course upon the dishonour of the cheque can also file for a claim of interim compensation from the drawer of the cheque. This compensation is treated as a fine as per the provisions of CrPC.
Which court has the power to take cognizance of an offence committed under Section 138?
As per Section 142, the Judicial Magistrate First Class or the court of Metropolitan Magistrate has the authority to take cognizance of an offence under Section 138.
This article is written by Suryanshi Bothra. This article mainly discusses the schools of Hindu law that act as major sources in developing the roots of Hindu law. Different Sub schools of the classical schools are discussed in detail and it also distinguishes the features of the two major schools.
Table of Contents
Introduction
Hindu law refers to a system of personal law established to govern Hindus. Hindu law is considered to be one of the most ancient and prolific laws in the world. It is believed to be about 6,000 years old. The aim of the establishment of Hindu law was to facilitate people’s salvation. It was not established to remove crime or transgression from society. These laws were introduced for the welfare of the people. Sources of Hindu law consist of a wide range and variety of texts, traditions, and principles that together underpin one of the oldest systems not just in India but also around the world. At the core of this system lie the Vedas, regarded as the ultimate religious texts, which define spiritual philosophy and provide guidance for all aspects of Hindu living. Together with the Vedas, the Smritis-such as Manusmriti and Yajnavalkya Smriti, among others, lay down elaborate rules regarding matters like conduct and law. The literature of Dharmashastra, with its many commentaries and digests, includes general principles available for respective conditions in life but these are the acts of interpretation of laws that can vary between practical editions.
Besides these written sources, customary practices and traditions were also significant in moulding Hindu law. Puranas and historical epics such as the Mahabharata and Ramayana were critical to its development. Nibandhas (legal digests) also made important contributions to history, which have helped in developing primary aspects of Hindu Institutions. Judicial decisions and legislation have in modern times also become very important sources, filling the gaps left by ancient texts between doctrine and needed reforms. These ancient texts are interpreted and adapted by the courts based on contemporary social and legal contexts, making Hindu Law always relevant and up to date. The article will also be exploring the history and legacy of different versions of Hindu law. This article explores these various versions, along with their storied pasts and interpretive contexts, as well as how they continue to influence and shape the legal and ethical landscape of Hindu society.
Emergence of schools of Hindu Law
Schools of Hindu law are considered to be derived from the commentaries and digestives of the smritis. The presence of different schools has led to a widening of the scope of Hindu law. Furthermore, it has significantly contributed to its development. The schools of Hindu law have been developed and shifted over time in relation to the broader historical, social, and legal changes that occurred throughout India, especially during its colonial period.
The notion of “schools” is found within the Mitakshara and Dayabhaga traditions, which were conceived as part of British colonial administration efforts to delineate Hindu legal tradition for the purposes of compiling law books. Before British rule, Hindu law was not written or codified in the manner that modern legal systems are. Rather, it was a mosaic of customary laws and religious texts subject to interpretation by scholars. These laws came primarily from the Dharmashastras and their interpretations in different ways by various scholars over time.
Existence of schools
The Schools of Hindu law have a diversity of doctrine which is derived from different reasonings and interpretations but is based on the same premises. British scholar and administrator H.T. Colebrooke were among the early Indologists who labelled “schools” of Hindu law in the 19th century. In his attempt to learn and digest the Hindu law for colonial administration, Colebrooke got from all this vast variety of interpretations and practices in different parts of India what he called “schools.”
The British understood Islamic law better with its prescriptive schools of jurisprudence and so they tended to categorise accordingly. The distinction between them was formalised and perpetuated by the British colonial administration. The British sought to establish an unambiguous and orderly legal system for regulating their subjects by encapsulating aspects of Hindu law. First, this culminated in the acceptance and establishment of the Mitakshara and Dayabhaga schools in the legal system. The British also introduced the concept of precedent, further solidifying these schools as distinct legal traditions.
Mitakshara
The Mitakshara School of Hindu Law is one of the most important schools. It is a commentary on the Yajnvalkya Smrti. The commentary was written by 11th-century legal scholar Vijñaneśvara. Except for states like West Bengal and Assam, this school is applicable all over India. However, it is practiced differently in different parts of the country because of the different customary rules followed by them. This has led to the formation of various sub-schools and a wide jurisdiction. The purpose of Vijñāneśvara, a forest-dwelling sophisticated dharma philosopher and translator, was not to compile local laws but an encyclopaedic exposition on basic Hindu legal literature, starting with Yajnavalkya Smṛiti. The subject matter of his commentary is classified into three heads:
Dharma, dealing with daily rituals, rites and moral duties;
Vyavahāra comprising legal disputes, inheritance, etc. Consolation by ministers as well as the administration of justice to kings;
Prāyaścitta embracing operations for purification. It includes various karmic actions and rituals for atonement. It has a wide appeal which was made possible by thorough and systematic work Mitākṣarā.
This original intention of the code to not record regional customs meant that it was incidentally more versatile, with its detailed provisions across various regions, particularly in most parts of India except Bengal.
The Mitakshara School has three distinguished characteristics:
Blood relationships are very important in matters of inheritance.
The schools has placed restrictions on coparceners’ share in the joint family property
Distinction between male and female heirs.
In the Mitakshara School the property is owned by the coparcenary (joint heirship) and sons acquire a right by birth. Due to the birth or death of other coparceners, a coparcener’s share in joint family property constantly fluctuates and is not absolute. Therefore, they do not have the right to transfer their shares. The Mitakshara recognises agnate succession as far as the fourteenth in descent fourteenth ancestor i.e. twelfth cousins. This was clarified in Atmaram Abhimanji vs Bajirao Janrao (1935). The Mitakshara’s rules on cognate succession are similar to the current thinking of those of the Dayabhaga. The Mitakshara’s content, in other legal writings like the Sarasvati Vilasa, Vyavahara Mayukha, the Smriti Chandrika, the Vivada Chintamani, the Vyavahara Madhaviya, the Viramitrodaya, the Madana Parijata, and even the Dayatattva copy word-for-word or sum up, lays out the cognate succession in a clear way:
Bandhus (cognates) inherit the estate when Gotrajas (agnates) are not available. Bandhus fall into three groups:
Atma-bandhus (own cognates)
Pitr-bandhus (father’s cognates)
Matri-bandhus (mother’s cognates)
Proximity of relation decides the order of succession among Bandhus. Atma-bandhus inherit first. If there are no Atma-bandhus, Pitr-bandhus come next. Matri-bandhus inherit if there are no Pitr-bandhus.
Mitakshara is further divided into five sub-schools namely
Benaras school
Mithila school
Maharashtra school
Punjab school
Dravida or Madras school
These law schools come under the ambit of Mitakshara school. They enjoy the same fundamental principle but differ in certain circumstances.
Sub Schools of Mitakshara
Benaras law school
The Benares School of Hindu Law is also known as the Varanasi or Kashi School. It is one of the primary sub-schools of Mitakshara School. It is predominantly followed in northern and central India, including Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and parts of Orissa. Viramitrodaya, Vivada and Nirnyasindhu are some of the major commentaries that the Benaras school relies on. This school emphasises principles like coparcenary and joint family property, where male descendants inherit ancestral property by birth. Compared to other schools, the Benares School adheres strictly to the Mitakshara principles, focusing on male heirs. The courts in some cases emphasised the strict application of these sub-schools based on region in Ramaji Batanji vs. Manohar Chintaman And Ors. (1959).The court determined that the parties in the case were governed by the Benares School, based on historical precedents and the consistent application of this school in the Central Provinces (excluding Berar). It established that the Benares School was the lex loci of the Central Provinces. The principle of stare decisis, which emphasises legal certainty through adherence to precedents, played a significant role in this decision.
Mithila law school
Mithila law school holds jurisdiction over the regions of Tirhoot and North Bihar. The legal principles of the school are dominant in these northern areas. Vivadaratnakar, Vivadachintamani, and Smritsara are the main commentaries relied on by this school. It developed from the teachings and writings of ancient sages and scholars in the region, becoming formalised during the medieval period. The Mithila School is known for its strict adherence to ancient texts and rituals, often emphasising the importance of traditional ceremonies and customs in legal matters. In the Mithila School of Hindu Law, Gandharva form of marriage is not considered invalid. In Kamani Devi vs. Kameshwar Singh (1945), the Patna High Court held that Gandharva marriage is binding against husband and wife according to this school. Even in these cases, the husband has to maintain his wife, the husband cannot escape the liability solely due to the form of marriage. The Mithila School’s principles were subject to judicial scrutiny. For example, in cases like determining the validity of practices like the appointment of a daughter (putrika) to raise an issue (putrika-putra). The term “putrika” refers to a daughter who is appointed to perform certain rituals or act as a son (putrika-putra) in religious or familial contexts, typically to ensure the continuity of lineage or inheritance. This practice finds its roots in ancient Hindu texts and traditions. InShyam Sunder Prasad Singh & Ors vs. State Of Bihar & Ors (1980), the Court examined whether such practices had become obsolete and unenforceable. It was especially examined in light of societal changes and evolving customs. The judicial scrutiny of practices like putrika-putra under the Mithila School exemplifies how the law constantly adapts to societal changes. It underscores the role of courts in balancing tradition with contemporary values, ensuring legal principles remain relevant and equitable.
Maharashtra or Bombay Law School
This school has its jurisdiction over Gujarat, Karana and other parts where the Marathi language is proficiently spoken. Vyavhara Mayukha and Virmitrodaya are some of the main authorities of this school. The Bombay School of Hindu Law recognises female bandhus (distant relatives) as heirs. They did not refer to Baudhayana’s text while mentioning the females as heirs. The Bombay School of Hindu Law, as courts interpret it, acknowledges the inheritance rights of female heirs, called bandhus, to own the property outright. This group includes both agnates and cognates reaching relatives within five degrees of kinship from a shared ancestor through lines where women come in between. Legal texts like the Mitakshara list bandhus as examples rather than a complete set, opening the door to include daughters of descendants, ascendants, and collaterals. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council interpreted the term “gotraja” to mean individuals belonging to the same ancestral lineage or clan, and this included both males and females according to the prevailing practices in the Bombay Presidency. This interpretation extended the status of “gotraja” to the widows of “gotraja sapindas,”. These are the relatives within the same lineage up to seven degrees on the father’s side and five degrees on the mother’s side. This gave them the same relational standing as their husbands. As a result, a wider range of female relatives were recognised as heirs. The additional relatives included in the list were:
Stepmothers
Brothers’ widows
First cousins
Daughters-in-law
Widows of undivided brothers’ sons
Widows of half-brothers
Widows of predeceased sons
Daughters of descendants and collaterals, such as granddaughters, sisters’ daughters, fathers’ sisters, half-sisters, and mothers’ sisters, paternal grandfathers’ sisters’ sons’ daughters, and illegitimate daughters.
Sister, born into the same gotra as her brother
Court rulings confirm that female heirs through maternal lines can inherit, making sure their rights to inherit from the last male owner of the estate stay intact. This approach promotes inclusion and recognises the key role of maternal kinship in inheritance. In Vimla Bai (Dead) By Lrs vs. Hiralal Gupta And Ors (1989),the Bombay School of Hindu Law was pivotal in determining the rightful heir to the property. The primary issue in the case was whether the plaintiff, who was from Ahmednagar District and migrated to Indore, was governed by the Bombay School or the Banaras School of Hindu Law. The plaintiff claimed her right to inherit property based on the Bombay School of Hindu Law. Rights.
Madras law school
Madras School covers the entire southern part of India. Its authorities come under Mitakshara Law School. The Madras School is heavily based on authoritative texts such as the Smriti Chandrika, Parasara Madhaviya, and Viramitrodaya, with the Mitakshara being the principal text but secondary to these other works. The Madras school followed the Vedic doctrine of the general exclusion of women. Here, they interpreted the Sruti text to mean that except for the daughter, the mother and other female ancestors, whose right to inherit is expressly provided by special texts, females as a class are incompetent to inherit property. However, with time, certain other females, besides the expressly recognised female heirs, were given the ability to inherit. It was either as bandhus, or relatives connected through the female lineage, of the deceased. The list of additional members who were given the right to inherit as bandhus were-
Son’s daughter
Daughter’s daughter
Sister
Father’s sister
Brother’s daughter
Sister’s daughter
In the Madras School, a widow’s right to adopt was contingent upon the permission of the husband’s kinsmen. The court’s analysis in Venkanna Narasinha vs. Laxmi Sannappa (1950) elucidates that the Madras School of Hindu Law had a significant influence on the legal landscape of the regions under its jurisdiction. The case delved into the historical and legal context to determine whether the Hindu residents of North Kanara were governed by the Madras School or the Bombay School of Hindu Law. In the case of Mahableshvar v. Durgabai, the Madras School’s requirement for the consent of the husband’s kinsmen was pivotal in determining the validity of an adoption. InVithappa Kasha Hegde vs. Savitri Ganap Bhatta (1910), the court noted the Madras School’s view that daughters inherited as joint tenants, unlike the Bombay School’s tenant-in-common doctrine. The Madras school follows joint tenancy, which means that each daughter holds an undivided interest in the entire property. In this principle, in case of the death of one daughter, her interest in the property does not pass on to her heirs. Instead, it is absorbed by the surviving daughters. This principle is known as the right of survivorship, where the property remains with the surviving co-owners. In practice, this doctrine ensures that the family property remains consolidated. It ensures that control does not get diluted over successive generations through multiple individual ownerships.
Punjab law school
The Punjab school under Mitakshara school was predominantly established in east Punjab. The main commentaries of this school are Viramitrodaya. The customs of the territory also played a major role in the establishment of the sub-school.
Mayukha school
The Mayukha school of Hindu law is associated prominently with the western regions of India, like Gujarat and parts of Maharashtra. This school represents a significant sub-division within Mitakshara. The court in Ambabai Bhaichand Gujar vs. Keshav Bandochand Gujar (1940)clarified this stance, claiming that the Mayukha is a sub-division or branch of the broader Mitakshara school, not a separate school of law. It interpreted that the phrase “law of Mitakshara” mentioned in the Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929, includes all sub-divisions, including the Mayukha. According to the Mayukha school, succession on the principle of propinquity (blood relationship), which is in contrast with the Dayabhaga school. The court in Bhagwan Vithoba vs. Warubai Baburao Mudke (1908)observed that the Mitakshara is silent on the exact place of a uterine sister in the line of heirs. The Vyavahara Mayukha explicitly places the sister immediately after the grandmother in the order of succession. The court considers this positioning when interpreting Mitakshara school’s silence on the matter.
Dayabhaga school
This school was mostly prevalent in Assam and West Bengal. It is one of the most important schools of Hindu law. It is derived from digests and leading smritis. The school primarily focused on dealing with inheritance, partition, and joint families. P.V. Kane was a scholar, historian and former Rajya Sabha member. According to him, the Dayabhaga School was incorporated between 1090-1130 A.D. The principles of the school were formulated to eradicate all the other absurd and artificial principles of inheritance. It removed all the shortcomings and limitations of the previous principles. It included many cognates in the list of heirs, which were previously restricted by the Mitakshara school of Hindu law. Dayabhaga School relies on many commentaries, such as Dayatatya, Dayakram-sangrah, Virmitrodaya and Dattaka Chandrika.
Features of Dayabhaga school
Some of the key features of Dayabhaga school are-
Inheritance, according to Dayabhaga, arises from the spiritual offerings to the deceased ancestors.
In this school, the right over Hindu joint family property is passed down to the heir on the death of the father. Not like the Mitakshara School, which is passed down by birth.
Each share of each of the heirs is definite. The heirs can sell their particular fraction of the share.
In cases where there are no male descendants, a widow has the right to enforce partition and inherit her deceased husband’s share.
The Dayabhaga school recognises individual ownership. Property is solely owned by the person during their lifetime. Here, property is inherited by succession upon the death of an individual, rather than by birth. The property devolves upon the heirs, who take definite and determined shares in the property. After the death of the property owner, each heir has the right to demand partition of property under the Dayabhaga school. The property does not automatically become joint family property; rather, it is held in specific shares by the heirs. The concept of joint family property is not recognised, the property remains separate and distinct, even if the family members live together. The Dayabhaga school included five females in the list of heirs. They were:
Widow
Daughter
Mother
Maternal grandmother
Paternal great grandmother
Differences between Mitakshara and Dayabhaga schools
The difference in relation to the joint property
Aspect
Mitakshara
Dayabhaga
Right to Ancestral Property
The right to ancestral property arises by birth. The son becomes a co-owner at birth and has rights similar to the father.
The right to ancestral property arises after the death of the last owner. There is no birthright to ancestral property.
Father’s Right to Alienate Property
The father does not have the absolute right to alienate the ancestral property.
In this school, the father has the absolute right to alienate the ancestral property since he is the sole owner during his lifetime.
Son’s Right to Partition
Son/Sons can ask for partition of the ancestral property. They can ask for it even against the father and demand his share.
Son/Sons have no right to ask for partition of ancestral property against their father since they have no right over the property if the father is alive.
Rule of Survivorship
In case of the death of a family member, their interest passes on to other family members.
Here, in case of the death of a family member, their interest passes to their heirs (widow, son, daughters).
Right to Dispose of Property
Members of the joint family cannot dispose of their share of property while undivided.
Members have an absolute right over their share of the property and can dispose of their property.
The difference as regards to inheritance
Aspect
Mitakshara School
Dayabhaga School
Rule of Inheritance
The School follows the rule of blood relationship or having the same descendant.
In this school, inheritance is governed by the rule of offering funeral oblations or pinda.
Preference in Inheritance
Cognates are not preferred over agnates. Cognates are postponed.
The cognates are preferred over agnates.
Recognition of the doctrine of Factum Valet
The doctrine of factum valet is recognised to a very limited extent.
This doctrine is fully recognised and expanded.
The difference as regards to Stridhana
Since Mitakshara School didn’t recognise women’s rights to inherit property from their husbands’ families, women could only possess stridhan. This is a term that refers to women’s property or fortune. There are 2 types of Stridhan in Mitakshara.
Saudayika Stridhana– This includes property of a married or single girl that she gets from her husband or parents while she’s at her husband’s or father’s home. The woman has complete control over this type of property. She can spend it, sell it, or give it away as she likes. Her husband can’t tell her what to do with Saudayika Stridhana.
Non-Saudayika Stridhana– Non-Saudayika Stridhana covers all other kinds of Stridhana. A woman can’t get rid of this property during her marriage unless her husband agrees.
Mitakshara School recognises 9 heads of Stridhan. Out of these, the last 2 are the most controversial.
Gifts from relatives;
Gifts from strangers;
Property acquired through personal effort and technical skills;
Property purchased using stridhan;
Property acquired by compromise;
Property secured through adverse possession;
Property obtained in lieu of maintenance
Inherited Property;
Share of property obtained by partition.
On the other hand, Dayabhaga school talks about two types of Stridhan.
Yautaka
Yautaka refers to anything given at the time of marriage. It encompasses all gifts given to brides during marriage ceremonies. These gifts are presented while she and her husband sit together.
Ayautaka
Ayautaka includes all gifts not classified as Yautaka. This category covers gifts bequests made by the father. It also includes those given by other relatives before marriage. Included are gifts made by relatives other than the father after marriage.
The doctrine of factum valet
The doctrine of “factum valet quod fieri non debuit” translates to what ought not to be done and becomes valid when done. It highlights that certain acts become valid and binding once accomplished, even though they shouldn’t have been performed according to legal or religious rules. The principle was formulated by the authors of the Dayabhaga school. It was only recognised to a limited extent by the Mitakshara school. The key element of the doctrine is that it states that once an act is done or a fact is accomplished, it can’t be altered by subsequent written texts of laws. The fact is considered to be a concrete establishment and is deemed to be legally binding. This doctrine could be found in instances of marriages or property transfers that do not conform to the prescribed rituals or legal procedures. The validity of these is upheld despite the fact that they were initially performed without following proper procedure.
Conclusion
The diverse schools of Hindu law—namely the Mitakshara and Dayabhaga and Benares, Mithila, and Dravida sub-schools—demonstrate India’s rich legal heritage. It is one of the most prolific laws in the world. It has been around throughout every phase of history and is known for its complexity. It is believed to be about 6,000 years old. The diverse legal heritage continues to influence modern legal practices and reflect the cultural and philosophical landscape. Understanding these schools is essential to grasping the historical development and current application of Hindu law in India. The ancient sources, including the smritis and commentaries, played an important role in the formation of these laws. These laws continued to evolve with the help of modern sources of Hindu law, including landmark judgements and new legislation. These schools widened the scope of Hindu law and contributed to its development. Mitakshara and Dayabhaga historically followed separate rules but currently there is a uniform law of succession for all Hindus. Matters of marriage and inheritance are governed by the Hindu Marriage Act and Hindu Success Act, 1956, respectively.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
Who was the founder of Mitakshara school?
Mitakshara is a running commentary on Yajnvalkya Smrti written by 11th-century legal scholar Vijñaneśvara. Therefore, he is known as the founder of the Mitakshara school of Hindu law.
What are the classical schools of Hindu law?
Dayabhaga and Mitakshara are the classical schools of Hindu law. And each of them has many subschools.
In India, shareholder activism is becoming more of a phenomenon, and the growing importance of shareholders in shaping corporate strategy, governance, and decision-making inside businesses is captured by shareholder activism in corporate law. A more active role in the operation and administration of the business in which they have invested alludes to a notion of corporate governance whereby a company’s shareholders take. Shareholder activism arises when these passive participants choose to alter the company’s governance, although most shareholders are passive owners of the companies in which they have invested. Anything a shareholder does to advocate for changes to a company’s policies or management is known as shareholder activism. Shareholders are acting this way based on their ownership rights. To rectify a company’s error or bring about a significant change in business policy, it is mostly employed. An important factor in corporate governance in India that had grown to be the dynamic between companies and shareholders has been altered by shareholder activism. Seeking to impact business strategies, governance procedures, and overall decision-making processes, investors are taking a proactive approach to this developing trend. The regulatory framework that regulates corporate governance and shareholder rights is a key factor in identifying the characteristics of shareholder activism in India. Clauses concerning the makeup of the board, voting rights, transparency duties, and shareholder meetings have a significant influence on the effectiveness of shareholder activism strategies. Shareholder activism in India affects more than just particular companies. It affects investor views, market dynamics, and the advancement of business best practices. As shareholders become increasingly active and assertive, organisations are forced to reevaluate their governance structures and stakeholder engagement strategies in an effort to strike a harmonious balance between shareholder interests and bigger corporate objectives.
A shareholder who uses their ownership position in a publicly listed firm to pressure management to adopt a certain strategy is known as a shareholder activist. Usually, those who advocate for or initiate change within a corporation are known as shareholder activists. Including internal firm culture and business models, governance, profit sharing, and environmental issues, these modifications cover a wide range of topics. Shareholder activists, typically, acquire a minority investment in a business and then use a range of strategies, such as threats of litigation and public attention, to force a discussion and effect change. To launch a campaign, instead of using a pricey takeover to gain a controlling interest, shareholder activists use a small stake—less than 10% of the outstanding shares. Financial objectives like increasing shareholder value may be the focus of shareholder activism, as well as non-financial ones like enacting eco-friendly laws and pulling out of politically volatile nations, and demonstrating a stronger commitment to workers’ rights. To be eligible for a director position, activist shareholders must purchase a substantial portion of the target company. Through increasing their power within the corporation, shareholder activists can push for initiatives that will lower operating expenses, boost activity, remove investments from particular nations, and increase profits.
Shareholder activism types
Companies and promoting shareholder engagement can lead to better corporate governance practices, increasing value addition. Shareholders might engage in activist investment in several ways and with a range of tactics, to influence the company’s decisions. Section 100: Calling the extraordinary general meeting. Section 109: Demand for poll. The following are the primary forms of shareholder activism:
Contests through proxy: When an activist shareholder nominates candidates to replace departing board members, a proxy fight primarily aims to either seize control of the company or exert pressure on the board and management to change their objectives or policies, this type of contest is called a proxy contest.
Resolution by shareholders: Recommendations made by shareholders during a shareholder meeting are called shareholder resolutions. A variety of subjects, such as the appointment of independent directors, executive remuneration, social and environmental concerns, and other business-related matters, may be covered by these resolutions.
Litigation: Shareholders have the right to sue the firm or its management if there is a violation of securities laws or a breach of fiduciary obligations.
Engagement with management: the company’s management via letters, meetings, or other channels to express their concerns or suggestions can be corresponded with the Shareholders.
Media campaigns activist: Activist shareholders can use to highlight their issues and worries and to put pressure on the board and management to take action using activism as a tool. These diverse kinds of shareholder activism require a range of instruments, strategies, and methods. While some forms of activism are more aggressive, others are more cooperative and seek to build a relationship with the company’s management. Furthermore, activist shareholders can achieve their objectives by using multiple techniques at once. Apart from conferring several benefits to enterprises and investors, shareholder activism has the potential to substantially enhance corporate governance protocols. But there are also some limitations that need to be considered.
Key players in shareholder activism: Section 151[1]: Appointment of directors elected by small shareholders.
Importance of shareholder activism
Directors are principally in charge of managing the business’s operations and making decisions within Indian law. The fact that no third party is permitted to have any ability to hold the board and management responsible for their actions gives shareholders the power to influence or meddle in a company’s internal affairs. Because they were unhappy with the company’s current sale process, two large shareholders of Fortis Healthcare Limited, who held 12% of the company’s shares, successfully removed a director from the board and appointed three new independent directors in their place in May 2018.
The goal of the venture’s stockholders will determine whether shareholder activism is a good or bad concept. Should they force administrative modifications purely for their advancement, the company will suffer. Unprecedented progress will be ensured, though, if the decisions are informed and mentor the leadership. Corporate Social Responsibility Under Section 135 of Companies.
For SEBI, the idea that a publicly traded company must respond to its shareholders for every action it takes has always been a priority. Because they own a portion of the business, shareholders may lose the value of their investments as a result of any bad decision made by the management of the company. In India, particularly in light of the nation’s long history of corporate fraud, shareholder activism is becoming increasingly important to corporate governance. This keeps management accountable and prevents their dictatorship. The rise of activism is facilitated by governance intermediaries, while transparency and information for shareholders are improved by reforms and SEBI regulations. The company might keep making poor managerial and operational choices if shareholders do not get involved, which would cause its share price to plummet. Shareholder activism makes sure the business is headed towards success by monitoring the company’s profitability and preventing actions that can cause shareholders to lose their investment value. Furthermore, the corporation strives for maximum transparency since it understands that shareholder activists can start shareholder activism at any time, which could potentially harm the goodwill. It also has a favourable effect on the company’s market performance. Impact on Corporate Governance: Section 178. Nomination and Remuneration Committee – CAIRR
Shareholder Activism gives them a platform to express their grievances and highlights the management team’s incompetence. This is dependent on the goals that the venture’s stockholders have in mind. If they impose administrative changes purely for their own personal development, the company will suffer. On the other hand, tremendous progress will be ensured by making wise decisions and serving as a mentor to the leadership. Activism by shareholders guarantees management accountability and instills a sense of ownership in the company. They have the option to voice their disapproval of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues in addition to financial ones. This, needlessly, releases more wealth and increases the return on their investment.
Due to different legal systems, customs, and cultural considerations, India approaches shareholder activism and corporate governance differently than the US, UK, Japan, and Germany. India’s strategy is still more reactive, changing as a result of new regulations and greater participation from shareholders.
Benefits of shareholder activism
By pushing for transparency, responsibility, and moral conduct from the board of directors and management, shareholder activism promotes sound corporate governance principles.
By drawing attention to matters that are important to shareholders and advocating for better results and increased representation from shareholders, shareholder activism holds management responsible for their actions.
Activism has the potential to improve the alignment of management’s and shareholders’ interests, which will ultimately improve financial performance and inspire more trust in investors.
By voicing concerns about the management’s immoral or financially risky actions, shareholder activism can aid in the prevention of corporate scandals.
Rise of shareholder activism in India
The most significant shareholder activism is that institutional investors have increased, proxy advisory firms (PAFs) have proliferated across the country, and shareholders are now more informed about their investments and rights. PAFs are governed under theSEBI(Research Analysts) Regulations, 2014. A proxy advisor is somebody who counsels an institutional investor or shareholder of a corporation on how to maximise their rights in the firm (such as recommendations for a proposal public offering or voting recommendations on agenda items). PAF suggestions have been observed to impact the voting patterns of shareholders, which has resulted in a rise in shareholder activism.
The country’s expanding legal remedies, powers, and rights for shareholders are among the primary causes of the rise in shareholder activism. When discussing shareholder activism in India, the primary material of legislation to be mentioned is the Companies Act of 2013. It gives shareholders particular privileges and authority that let them participate in the company’s management. A resolution requiring the approval of shareholders by a simple majority or special majority would be an example of this. An additional illustration would be the shareholders’ authority to designate or dismiss directors.
Rise of social media in modern activism
For example, globally, The activist revolution – J.P. Morgan. it is also generally known that academics studying corporate governance continue to dispute how shareholder activism affects the industry. Supporters of the idea contend that shareholder oversight and involvement are essential to holding managers accountable and enhancing business success. Opponents argue that a powerful shareholder voice interferes with the board’s primary responsibility of developing and carrying out a long-term company business plan. Activist shareholders communicate with the management and other shareholders through a range of means and platforms. They are using online forums, blogs, YouTube, LinkedIn, Twitter, and other electronic platforms more and more. These platform’s real-time impact is what makes them particularly appealing. They make it possible for activists to quickly get involved in debates or start new causes.
Twitter has emerged as a prominent social media platform for issuers and activist investors seeking to engage in corporate communications. Among the many active users, Carl Icahn, a renowned Wall Street titan, stands out as the most well-known activist user. With his savvy approach to social media, Icahn has amassed over 1,60,000 new followers in less than a year, solidifying his position as a social media virtuoso.
Icahn’s success on Twitter can be attributed to several key factors. Firstly, he has a knack for crafting concise and engaging tweets that capture the attention of his audience. His ability to convey complex financial concepts and investment strategies in a simple and understandable manner has resonated with both retail investors and industry professionals.
Secondly, Icahn’s tweets often carry a sense of urgency and authenticity. He frequently uses Twitter to share his thoughts and opinions on current events, corporate governance issues, and market trends. This transparency and willingness to engage directly with his followers have built trust and credibility, making his tweets highly influential.
Thirdly, Icahn leverages Twitter as a platform for advocacy and activism. He actively uses his account to advocate for shareholders’ rights, challenge corporate management teams, and promote transparency and accountability in the business world. His tweets often serve as a catalyst for change, sparking discussions and debates on important topics within the investment community.
Icahn’s mastery of Twitter has not gone unnoticed. He has been recognised by publications such as The Wall Street Journal and Forbes for his innovative use of social media as an investment tool. His success has inspired other issuers and activist investors to embrace Twitter as a means of communicating with their stakeholders and shaping public opinion.
In conclusion, Carl Icahn’s remarkable success on Twitter serves as a testament to the power of social media in corporate communications. His ability to captivate his audience, convey complex ideas effectively, and drive meaningful conversations has set a new standard for activist investors. As Twitter continues to evolve, it is likely that Icahn and other savvy users will continue to push the boundaries of what is possible in the realm of digital activism.
Legal and Regulatory Framework: Section 245 – Class Action. Section 230-240 – Compromises, Arrangements, and Amalgamations. Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) Regulations: Particularly relevant for listed companies, including:
SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (LODR)
SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 2011.
The role of technology and social media: Section 120: Maintenance and inspection of documents in electronic form.
Shareholder activist examples
In Tata Sons versus Cyrus Mistry, a court struggle ensued after Cyrus was dismissed from his position as chairman of Tata Sons in 2016, causing controversy. This litigation, which accused the Tata Group of managerial irregularities in the corporation, was among the most well-known examples of shareholder activism in India. The court found that the respondent had not engaged in any oppressive or poorly controlled behavior. Many choices were made sincerely, not intending to hurt or deplete the company’s resources. Consequently, it was determined that the acts did not violate Section 241 of the Companies Act of 2013 and were neither oppressive nor poorly managed.
2019 saw L&T make a strong acquisition offer for Mindtree, a well-known provider of software services. The founders and management of Mindtree opposed this, which resulted in a high-stakes conflict that saw L&T take over the company.
Carl Ichan is a well-known activist shareholder in the financial industry, in addition to his accomplishments as a philanthropist, a successful businessman, and a traditional investor. Mr. Ichan became well-known in the 1980s as a “corporate raider” as a result of his hostile acquisition of TWA Airlines in 1985, among other noteworthy events.
Environmental Social Governance (ESG) is not the same as Mr. Ichan and Mr. Achman. ValueAct Capital, Red Mountain Capital Partners, Blue Harbour Group, and Train Partners are among the main funds that have prioritised environmental, social, and governmental (ESG) concerns.
Corporate Responses to Activism: Section 102: Statement to be annexed to notice. Section 134: Financial statement, board’s report, etc.
Conclusion
In the beginning, with few listed companies and little impact from retail investors, the Indian equities market was underdeveloped. Recent developments, which have sparked control transactions and an increase in shareholder agitation, however, include the significant stakes held by institutional and private equity funds. Activist shareholders are voicing their concerns and holding the company’s management accountable for their incompetence. In addition to keeping managers accountable, this prevents their dictatorship. It has a favourable effect on the firm’s market performance, value, and decision-making ability.
A number of initiatives have been put in place to support sound corporate governance and guarantee the preservation of shareholder rights, including the Companies Act of 2013 and SEBI regulations. With these rules in place, Indian businesses are moving towards more accountable and transparent operations, which enhance stakeholder participation and decision-making. India’s corporate governance environment is still changing, and further changes are probably on the horizon. With strengthened shareholder rights, and an emphasis on sustainability, potential development areas include more regulation. There is a chance that the role of institutional investors—in particular, mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies—will change and result in increased investor engagement.
Companies that disregard shareholder rights and corporate governance in this dynamic environment run the danger of losing the trust of investors and development prospects. By creating a strong corporate governance framework, implementing best practices, and taking shareholder concerns into consideration, businesses may guarantee their long-term viability and competitiveness. Enhanced oversight, better decision-making, and increased shareholder participation generally result from encouraging corporate governance standards. By encouraging accountability and transparency as well as a culture of responsible investing, effective shareholder activism can aid in the accomplishment of these goals. Indian businesses can contribute to the development of a more robust economy and improve the nation’s standing as a business destination by adopting these values. Regulators have not given up on their attempts, however. Changes in shareholder activism have been noted by several studies, and these reforms yield favourable results. The corporate sector as well as the country’s general efficiency may gain from increasing encouragement of shareholder activism.
This article aims to provide the readers with a simplistic explanation about what financial crises are and how they have affected the world globally. A lot of people do not know the difference between the different kinds of crises that haunt the world economies time and again and their implications worldwide. Is it even possible to stay unaffected even if it is happening in some other part of the world? Can these crises be predicted in advance? Is it possible to prepare ourselves for the future? All these topics are dealt with in this article for the readers to enhance their knowledge on the subject.
To assess the impact of financial crises on the global economies, we first need to understand their meaning, types, and causes. Only then will we be able to make sense of its implications on the world and the extent to which we have been able to learn from our past mistakes. Financial crises are an inherent feature of how modern capitalistic economies function. Where the business cycle fuels speculative growth during economic booms only to be met by contractions and recessions. Hence, it is imperative to gain proper and correct knowledge on the subject.
Definition of financial crisis
Financial crises, like earthquakes in the economic landscape, can cause sudden and severe disruptions in the financial markets, leaving behind a trail of devastation. These crises manifest as a steep decline in asset values, making it increasingly difficult for individuals and businesses to access capital and repay debts. The contagion spreads throughout the financial system, leading to liquidity shortages and a loss of confidence among investors. This loss of confidence is a critical element of a financial crisis, as it prompts investors to sell off their assets or withdraw money from savings accounts out of fear that the value of those assets will plummet if left within the financial institution.
The onset of a financial crisis can be triggered by various factors, such as a housing bubble bursting, a stock market crash, or a sudden loss of confidence in a major financial institution. These events can lead to a chain reaction, causing panic and uncertainty among investors and businesses. As asset values decline, lenders become more hesitant to extend credit, and borrowers find it more challenging to repay their debts. The liquidity crunch worsens, and the financial system becomes increasingly strained.
The consequences of a financial crisis can be far-reaching and long-lasting. Widespread unemployment, business failures, and economic contraction can ensue. Governments and central banks often intervene with emergency measures, such as stimulus packages and interest rate cuts, to mitigate the impact of the crisis. However, the recovery process can be slow and painful, as it requires rebuilding trust in the financial system and restoring economic growth.
Preventing financial crises is of paramount importance. This can be achieved through sound financial regulation, prudent risk management practices, and international cooperation to address systemic vulnerabilities. By learning from the mistakes of the past and implementing effective policies, we can strive to create a more resilient financial system that is better equipped to withstand shocks and mitigate the impact of future financial crises. They may be limited to a single country or one segment of financial services but are more likely to spread regionally or globally, requiring immediate policy responses like changes in monetary and fiscal policies in coordination with the global world.
Types of financial crisis
Financial crises can be broadly divided into the following types:
Banking: When banks face a sudden wave of withdrawal, leading to insolvency and a loss of confidence in the banking system.
Currency: When a country’s currency rapidly depreciates, causing a loss of value and potentially triggering a broader economic crisis.
Debt: When a country or company is unable to repay its debts, it leads to default and potentially a cascade of financial problems.
Stock market crashes: According to Investopedia, a stock market crash is an abrupt drop in stock prices, which may trigger a prolonged bear market or signal economic trouble ahead. They are often driven by speculation and economic bubbles.
Credit crunches: These are situations where it becomes difficult for businesses to borrow money, hampering economic activities.
Sovereign defaults: As per Investopedia, this is a situation in which a nation is unable to pay its debt obligations, making it expensive or impossible for it to borrow in the future.
Causes of financial crisis
Financial crises are complex events with multiple causes. Some of the most common factors include:
Excessive risk-taking: Financial institutions, in the pursuit of higher profits, often take on excessive risks. This can lead to a buildup of bad loans and investments that can trigger a crisis.
Asset bubbles: This is when the price of an asset like real estate or stocks becomes inflated beyond its fundamental value. When the bubble bursts, it causes a sharp decline in the price of that asset, causing a loss of wealth.
Financial contagion: Financial crises can spread rapidly from one country or institution to another. This is due to the interconnectedness of global financial markets and the fact that many financial institutions hold similar assets.
Irrational behaviour: For example, a rapid string of selloffs can result in lower asset prices, prompting individuals to dump assets or make huge savings withdrawals when a bank failure is rumoured.
Policy mistakes: Governments and central banks can sometimes make policy mistakes that lead to financial crises, such as maintaining a loose monetary policy or failing to regulate financial institutions effectively.
Looking at these factors, the world has survived many financial crises since the inception of “Money” as a concept. Tulip Mania (1637), Credit Crises (1772), Stock Crash (1929), OPEC oil crisis (1973), Asian Crisis (1997-98), Global Financial Crisis (2007-8), Stock market crash-Covid-19 (2019-20) are a few examples.
Global financial crisis of 2007-08
The global financial crisis of 2007–2008, often referred to as the “Great Recession,” was a severe worldwide economic crisis that began in the United States and had a significant impact on economies around the world. It is widely considered to be the most significant financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The crisis originated in the United States housing market, particularly in the subprime mortgage sector. Subprime mortgages are loans made to borrowers with poor credit histories and low credit scores. These loans often come with higher interest rates and fees, making them riskier for both the borrower and the lender.
The crisis was triggered by a combination of factors, including reckless lending practices by banks, a lack of regulation in the financial industry, and a housing bubble fuelled by speculation and easy credit. Banks began offering subprime mortgages to borrowers who had little chance of repaying them. These loans were often bundled together and sold to investors as mortgage-backed securities (MBS). The value of these MBS was artificially inflated due to the high demand and lack of transparency in the market. As a result, many investors, including large financial institutions, were exposed to significant losses when the housing bubble burst and subprime borrowers defaulted on their loans.
The crisis quickly spread to the global financial system through interconnectedness and complex financial instruments. The failure of major financial institutions, such as Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns, led to a loss of confidence in the financial system and a freeze in credit markets. This, in turn, caused a sharp decline in economic activity and a rise in unemployment rates worldwide. Governments and central banks responded to the crisis with a range of measures, including fiscal stimulus packages, interest rate cuts, and quantitative easing. These measures helped to stabilise the financial system and prevent a deeper recession, but the recovery from the crisis was slow and uneven.
The crisis had a profound impact on the global economy, leading to job losses, business failures, and a decline in living standards. It also raised questions about the stability of the financial system and the effectiveness of financial regulation. In the aftermath of the crisis, governments and regulators implemented a number of reforms aimed at preventing a similar crisis from occurring in the future, including stricter lending standards, increased capital requirements for banks, and the creation of new regulatory bodies. Rating agencies considered them extremely safe as they were backed by big banks, which caused the reckless investors to start to invest in them hugely. To fuel the situation, big insurance companies, who also got greedy, started to promise a reimbursement to the investors if anything went wrong. As more and more people who could not afford homes otherwise started buying homes with these below-average loans. Housing prices started to rise, creating a bubble. When this real estate bubble finally burst in 2007, it cascaded into other sources of debt as people now could not repay loans, leading to a general mistrust towards the financial system. All the large financial banks that had invested heavily in these loans were in trouble as the value of these securities plummeted, creating huge losses. The collapse of big banks and insurance companies like the Lawman Brothers and the American International Group led to a cash crunch among businesses. This cheap money and mortgage troubles in the U.S. caused a chain reaction, and a general mistrust in the markets converted a financial crisis originating primarily in the U.S. into a global economic crisis.
Implications of the global financial crisis
It has had devastating consequences for economies and societies around the globe.
Recessions and depressions
Financial crises, in general, can trigger a sharp decline in economic activity, leading to a recession or even depression. The crisis of 2007–8 did the same.
Job losses
Businesses, in general, are forced to lay off workers or close down altogether, leading to widespread unemployment. Data shows that the global crisis of 2007-08 resulted in an estimated 9 million job losses in America alone. Unemployment peaked at 10 percent in late 2009. Even employment patterns changed; for instance, temporary jobs plummeted by 30% during 2007-09.
Poverty and inequality
Crises often hit the poor and vulnerable the hardest, increasing inequalities, as was the case in 2007-08, wherein there was an overall decrease in economic activity globally.
Social and political unrest
Economic hardship can lead to social unrest and political instability due to a shift in power in some countries. General loss of trust of the public in the financial system and the government as a whole leads to more chaos and a call for greater regulations and oversight.
Trigger policy changes
Governments can be forced to adopt new policies in response to a financial crisis, such as austerity measures or financial reforms. In the case of America in 2008-09, the Federal Reserve took extra steps to support the economy and the financial markets in addition to implementing monetary policy. The Fed also designed special-purpose instruments for lending to various sectors of the market, creating a new standard for regular and emergency lending activities.
Regulations
As most of the crises take place because of excessive risk taking and irrational human behaviour, it is pertinent to make space for regulations in the financial systems. One of the first regulatory reactions was the formation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which created agencies like the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and the Consumer Financial Protection Board (CFPB) to serve as watchdogs on Wall Street. Dodd-Frank requires banks with assets over $50 billion to undergo stress tests and reduce speculative bets that could devastate balance sheets and hurt customers. In the United Kingdom, the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act of 2013 required large banks to separate their retail and commercial banking from investment banking by 2019. In Europe, the Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) started to attract a higher level of supervision. The regulatory response to 2008 may be open to criticism, but it did, in the end, help to avert a permanent or a long-term meltdown of the global financial system.
Responses by various countries
The tremors of the financial crises were felt around the world, but each country was impacted differently. For example, the U.S., Europe and Japan were hit the hardest. At the same time, China, India, and Brazil, which had become increasingly integrated into the financial system by then, went through a rough phase of economic slowdown. Therefore, different countries responded differently.
Response by India
In India, the global slowdown cast a shadow over the economy, prompting the government to take decisive steps to counter its negative fallout. Recognising the need to stimulate demand and create employment opportunities, the government unveiled a series of targeted fiscal stimulus packages. These packages included tax relief measures aimed at boosting consumer spending and encouraging businesses to invest. Additionally, increased expenditure was allocated to public projects, fostering the creation of essential infrastructure and generating employment for millions of Indians.
To complement the fiscal measures, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) implemented a range of monetary easing and liquidity-enhancing measures. These actions were designed to facilitate the flow of funds from the financial system to the productive sectors of the economy, ensuring that businesses had access to the capital needed to sustain operations, expand, and create jobs. One of the key measures undertaken by the RBI was the reduction of interest rates, making it more affordable for businesses and individuals to borrow and invest.
Recognising the importance of foreign investments in stimulating economic growth, the government eased restrictions on foreign investments, hoping to attract more capital into the market. These measures aimed to create a conducive environment for international investors, offering them greater access to Indian markets and opportunities for collaboration with domestic businesses. By attracting foreign capital, the government aimed to boost economic activity, create jobs, and enhance the country’s overall competitiveness.
These multi-pronged efforts by the government and the RBI helped mitigate the impact of the global slowdown on the Indian economy. By providing fiscal stimulus, easing monetary policies, and attracting foreign investments, India was able to navigate the challenging economic landscape and lay the foundation for sustained growth in the years to come. It also brought several economic reforms, policies, and packages to attract investments and revive the Indian economy. From all accounts, except for the agricultural sector initially, economic recovery seemed to be well underway. Economic growth stood at 8.6 percent during the fiscal year 2010-11, making India the fastest-growing major economy after China.
Response by Japan
In Japan, the government’s main focus was on increased investment and a gradual shift in the model of highly export-dependent economic growth. The crisis led to a sharp decline in their exports of automobiles and electronics; hence, a majorly manufacturing-driven economy had to stabilise its domestic demand and initialise structural changes. Japan’s government made an unprecedented stimulus effort with three stimulus packages, which, among other measures, contained a number of measures to curtail unemployment and emphasise creating a low-carbon society. In order to handle the negative consequences of having an ageing population, the government also brought in reforms in the field of social security through insurance and pension schemes.
Response by China
In China, the economy was registering double-digit growth prior to the outbreak of the financial crisis. Its strong dependence on foreign trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) made the country vulnerable to external shocks. With the onset of the financial crisis, the demand for goods and services from China’s major trading partners, especially the U.S. and the European Union, plunged, and the Chinese foreign trade growth collapsed, slowing down its economic growth. The Chinese government took immediate action by announcing a fiscal stimulus program of 4 trillion CNY in November 2008. The main focus of this package was on social welfare and investment in the restructuring of industrial enterprises and infrastructure. A lot of labour-intensive projects were undertaken to create new jobs, for example, the construction of affordable housing and airports. A major chunk of expenditure was spent on providing health insurance in rural areas so that the general public could spend more on consumption instead of saving for health care in the future. In addition to the fiscal stimulus package, the government also applied some monetary policy instruments, like lower interest rates for loans and savings. It ensured that no credit crunch occurred, and the banks provided easy access to loans for both companies and private households. These measures helped in improving China’s economic situation. By the end of May 2009, signs of recovery were visible as China’s exports stabilised.
Response by Brazil
In the 2000s, economic development was directly proportional to liberalisation and deregulation. Brazil, on the contrary, was characterised by a highly interventionist government levying heavy financial regulation up until the 2007-08 world financial crisis. This, however, worked in the favour of the Brazilian government, as these regulations helped the economy in dealing with the consequences of the 2007-08 financial meltdown. The most crucial factor in Brazil’s response to the financial crisis was the country’s international reserves. In 2005, the Brazilian government cleared its debt with the IMF. This helped the nation in increasing its international reserves. Hence, in 2007-08, when Brazil faced a sudden seizure in foreign funds and a drop in its exports, the government was able to use these international reserves to offset part of its liquidity constraints. Brazil had accumulated US$ 210 billion in international reserves before the crisis and, as the situation improved and foreign capital returned to the economy, all temporary foreign exchange operations were quickly reversed in the second half of 2009. The second crucial factor for Brazil’s successful response to 2007-08 was its high reserve requirements on banks. In their financial system, the governments were financed at lower interest rates than the market rates. Direct credit to agriculture and housing was also at lower interest rates than market rates. As a result, the Brazilian Central Bank had a huge pool of liquidity at its disposal to alleviate the banks’ liquidity constraint and improve the financial system.
A look at the above reforms and regulations clearly indicates that each country tried its level best to bring back its economy on the path to recovery. As a result, globally, the capital reserves of banks have increased so that they become more secure. Legislation requiring banks to apply more of their own resources and those of their owners in case of insolvency has eased the taxpayer’s burden in case of future crises. Greater coordination of supervision through the Single Supervisory Mechanism and common resolution mechanisms have made the systems more robust internationally. Financial Policy Committees tasked with identifying, monitoring, and mitigating risks to financial stability became a common phenomenon. Low interest rates, even negative in some countries and relatively low inflation have created a highly unusual financial and economic environment that has privileged borrowers over savers.
Can we predict the next financial crisis
Financial crises are a recurring feature of the global economy. While we can learn from our past mistakes and take steps to mitigate the risks. Can we predict when or where the next crisis will occur? Can we identify the bubble? Michel Girardin, in his explanation, has emphasised two major criteria to look out for when we want to identify or spot a bubble. According to him, excessive debt, be it in the government sector, the corporate sector, or the household sector, there will always be too much debt. We need to ask ourselves the question: is the debt sustainable? Can we afford the debt? Can we pay for it? This will be a better indicator than worrying about excessive debt. Another factor to identify the bubble, according to him, is global inflation. Governments and financial institutions around the world include the consumer goods basket as an indicator of inflation, but according to him, financial assets should be included in this basket rather than consumer goods. When the debt cost is 6% or more of GDP, this is a better indicator of global inflation. When the global inflation measure in terms of financial assets increases by 4%, soon after, we get a financial crisis. He talks about “The Dragon King Theory,” which can help in predicting crises to a great extent when studied and understood in detail.
The Dragon King theory
According to Michel Girardin, the theory of complex systems provides us with hope and valuable insights into the behaviour of complex systems. Girardin emphasises that while complex systems may exhibit inherent unpredictability, they also contain pockets of predictability. This understanding challenges the traditional view that complex systems are inherently chaotic and uncontrollable.
The theory suggests that by studying and analysing complex systems, we can develop advanced diagnostics tools to identify potential crises and vulnerabilities. These tools can help us better understand the dynamics of complex systems and predict their behaviour with greater accuracy.
Girardin’s theory encourages us to take responsibility for our actions and decisions, recognising that we can influence the outcomes of complex systems. By understanding the pockets of predictability within complex systems, we can make informed choices and take proactive measures to mitigate the impact of crises.
The Great Recession and the Global Financial Crisis serve as powerful examples of how crises can have devastating consequences when we fail to anticipate and prepare for them. Girardin’s theory offers a framework for learning from these past events and developing strategies to prevent similar crises from occurring in the future.
By embracing the theory of complex systems, we can cultivate a mindset of resilience and preparedness. We can recognise that crises are not inevitable but rather potential outcomes that can be influenced by our actions. As a result, we can work together to build more robust and sustainable systems that are better equipped to withstand and overcome crises.
Conclusion
The crisis, worse since the great depression, has highlighted some key lessons for the world. Market discipline and supervision should complement each other; greater market transparency is crucial; countries need to contain their fiscal deficits so as to meet debt service obligations; strong financial regulations; improved risk management practices; crisis prevention mechanisms; and a need for enhanced global economic coordination between borders. Angela Merkel, Chancellor, Germany, has rightly put it, “We need financial markets in the modern world but not untamed ones, in which profit and greed are the only things that count. We need a market with rules.”
Nishimita Tah has written this article which provides a critical analysis of the landmark judgement of the case named Abdul Hafiz Beg And Anr. vs Sahebbi And Ors.(1974). The article exhaustively covers the concept of marz-ul-maut which is examined in the form of court ruling. However, the ruling in the present case revolves around determining the conditions of Marz-ul-Maut and the legal validity of the transactions during the imminent death. The author has taken the initiative to clear the concept of marz-ul-maut by analysing the case in her own words in a precise manner.
Table of Contents
Introduction
The rules and principles guiding every aspect of life and property for Muslims apply both while they are alive and after they pass away. Muslims have the freedom to make a will under the Muslim personal law. The transfer of Property during a deathbed illness or Marz-ul-Maut falls between a living transaction and a testamentary disposition. In general, marz-ul-maut is a deathbed illness and not a gift made in that situation. When a person is seriously ill and fears that they die, any gift they make during this time is considered a gift during marz-ul-maut.
A Muslim individual is always permitted to make gifts (Hiba). The concept of deathbed gifts are considered under the Muslim personal laws, but it differs from the circumstances and facts of each case. The derivation of marz-ul-maut is based upon the nature from both, “Hiba” i.e. law of gifts, and the law of wills. This type of gift becomes valid upon the death of the giver due to terminal illness. The main condition of this genre of gift is that the gift should be made in contemplation of his death, which is stated under the scope of Section 191 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925.
In general, it is presumed that the muslims are ready with will (wasiyat) before their death or the estate of the person would succeed through the process of intestate succession in accordance with Shariah. The term Shariah refers to the regulations of the religion that governs the lives of Muslim individuals. In cases, when an Islamic person dies without a will, prior to his death, and in its expectancy, he can make a gift known as ‘marz-ul-maut’. In the case of Nazar Husain vs. Rafeeq Husain (1911), it was held that the gift of marrz-ul-maut can only be initiated till 1/3rd extent of the property without the consent of the heirs, the rest of the estate will proceed according to the intestate succession under the scope of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act,1937.
Details of the case
Name of the case:Abdul Hafiz Beg And Anr. vs Sahebbi And Ors. (1974)
Parties in the case: Abdul Hafiz Beg And Anr. (Plaintiff) and Sahebbi And Ors. (Defendant)
Citation: AIR1975 BOM 165
Date of Judgement: 25th July, 1974
Court: Bombay High Court
Case type: A.P.A.D No. 10 of 1965
Bench: Masodkar,J.
Background of the case
The case of Abdul Hafiz Beg And Anr vs Sahebbi And Ors (1974) deals with the doctrine of Marz-ul-Maut under the ambit of Islamic law. It means a gift to be valid as a Marz-ul-Maut gift when it is made or gifted during the death illness. The dispute in the present case revolves around the ownership and possession of property that has been transferred by Abdul Kadar during his deathbed illness. Under the ambit of Islamic law, transactional activities conducted during the period of Marz-ul-Maut were subject to specific restrictions for protecting the rights of heirs. However, this case is related to determine whether a gift made by an ailing muslim man named Abdul Kadar fell under the scope of the doctrine of Marz-ul-Maut. The case revolves around the deteriorating health and eventual death of a man named Abdul Kadar.
Facts of Abdul Hafiz Beg vs. Sahebbi (1975)
Abdul Kadar fell seriously ill and never recovered from his sickness. Throughout the sickness, Abdul Kadar was incapable of taking care of himself, which led to his demise.
At the extreme of his health deterioration, he remained in a state of extreme weakness and mental distress where he reached the point, Abdul Kadar was unable to communicate and express his feelings.
When his daughters visited him during his final days, he could only express himself through gestures and tears, which highlighted his extreme helplessness and suffering.
Abdul Kadar had been suffering from a serious illness prior to 1st February and his sickness persisted until his demise on 4th February.
The circumstances strongly made him make a gift approximately 24 hours before his death. Abdul Kadar was overwhelmed by an immediate sense of imminent death.
Issues raised in the case
Whether the transactions made by the deceased during his marz-ul-maut were valid?
Was the gift made due to the pressure of an imminent sense of death?
Arguments of the parties
The doctrine of “marz-ul-maut” in the context of gift transactions in the Indian and Pakistani legal context has been discussed in the judgement of the case. The doctrine deals with gifts made by a person who is severely ill, which leads to death. The applicability of the doctrine in the Indian context can be proven and considered when the donor is apprehensive about death and makes the disposition, as a gift, while in that condition.
Plaintiff
The plaintiff contended that the deceased was suffering from a fatal disease at the time of executing the gift transactions which constituted marz-ul-maut.
It was also contended that gift transactions made during marz-ul-maut were treated as testamentary disposition and subjected to limitations of will under the scope of Islamic law which allowed only 1/3rd of the possession to be disposed of without the consent of heirs.
It was also contended that the gift transaction was not valid.
Defendant
The defendant argued that the deceased was not suffering from a fatal illness at the time of the transactions.
The defendant contended that the transactions were valid, and it was executed with actual knowledge and consent of the deceased. There was no such act committed like undue influence and coercion.
Concepts involved in the case
Doctrine of marz-ul-maut
The term is derived from Arabic, where “marz” translates to sickness and “maut” means death. Marz-ul-maut involves specific conditions for validity, including a clear declaration of the gift, acceptance by the recipient, and the actual or constructive transfer of possession.
The doctrine of marz-ul-maut, also known as deathbed gifts, is rooted in Sharia law and pertains specifically to the Muslim community under Indian Islamic law. This doctrine governs the disposal of a Muslim’s possessions when they are on their deathbed, a condition referred to as “marz-ul-maut”. Gifts made during this period are treated as a form of testamentary succession. According to Islamic law, if a person is gravely ill and fearful of impending death , any gifts they make during the time are classified under marz-ul-maut.
In the case of Commissioner of Gift Tax vs. Abdul Karim Mohd.(1991), it was upheld by a bench of the Supreme Court that marz-ul-maut does not come under the purview of gifts and is not subjected to gift tax. The three essentials of valid gift under Muslim Law are:
declaration of gift by the donor
express or implied acceptance of the gift by the donee
the delivery of possession of the gift by the donor to the donee.
As per Sharia law, the restrictions imposed on the death-bed gifts are:
There can be no disqualification of an heir.
The net value of the property that can be disposed of must not be greater than 1/3rd of the total value of assets.
“The Principles of Mohammedan Law” by Mulla, the author explains that it is an illness that causes a person to experience a fear of death, which ultimately leads to demise.
In the book “Principles of Muhammadan Jurisprudence” by Abdur Rahim, he discussed the foundational efforts to identify the juristic principles underlying the scope of Mohammedan legal precepts. It particularly focuses on the concept of death-illness. Rahim took the references of Heiya and Kifava describing marz-ul-maut as an illness that generally incites a fear of death and in particular cases it actually ends with death.
Essential conditions for marz-ul-maut
Gifts made by someone on their deathbed face limitations. This difficulty arises for oral gifts which requires clear evidence. Marz-ul-maut is similar to a gift and must follow the same rules as a regular gift (Hiba). These essential conditions include:
The donor clearly and unmistakably states their intention to give a gift.
The declaration, whether oral or written
Acceptance of the gift by the donee either explicitly or implicitly.
Actual or constructive delivery of the possession of the subject matter.
The malady must have caused the death of the person making the gift.
There must be subjective apprehension of death in the mind of the person suffering from that illness and,
The presence of some external indicia such as inability to attend daily routine matters.
In the case of Cain vs. Moon (1896), the Judicial Committee emphasised that the decisive factor in determining the validity of the gift is whether the deed of gift was executed by the donor under the apprehension of death.
In the case of Bhoona Bi vs. Gujar Bi (1972), the Madras High Court held that all evidence and circumstances must be considered, and a decision on a gift made during marz-ul-maut (deathbed illness) cannot be made if it was not mentioned in the original complaint. In the judgement reported in the case of Commissioner of Gift Tax, Ernakulam vs. Abdul Karim Mohd.(1991), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the same principles related to marz-ul-maut and based on the evidence in particular case, held that the gift was indeed a marz-ul-maut.
Apprehension of death
The subjective nature of the apprehension is highlighted in the case of Hassarat Bibi vs. Golam Jaffar (1898), where the definition of death illness has been specified:
The donor should be suffering from a sickness that ultimately causes their death.
The sickness should induce fear of death in the person, making them believe they are going to die.
The illness should render the person unable to attend to their day to day tasks.
A person with long standing sickness suddenly takes a serious turn into fear of death.
Relevant judgements referred to in the case
Fatima Bibee vs. Ahammad Baksh (1904)
In the case of Fatima Bibee vs Ahammad Baksh (1904), the Calcutta High Court considered the doctrine of marz-ul-maut and identified three essential conditions: illness, expectation of fatal issue, and certain physical capacities which indicate the severity of illness. These conditions state about a long-affected illness which has caused immediate apprehension to death. It was also considered that even if a person is suffering from a severe illness, if they were still of sound mind, their disposition would not be taken as invalid.
In this case, the question was raised on the validity of disposition under the law of Marz-ul-maut. The above-mentioned observation of the Calcutta High Court has been affirmed by the Privy Council. It appears that there was no doubt subject to the evidence of the doctor.
The observation was also made that the gift was made under the anxiety of death by the deceased, it is invalid under the ambit of the doctrine of marz-ul-maut.
Sarabhai vs. Rabiabai (1905)
In the case of Sarabhai vs Rabiabai (1905), the court had laid down three conditions which satisfies as to the requirements of Marz-ul-maut :
Proximate danger of death so that there is a prevalence of death.
Degree of anxiety of death in the mind of a sick person.
Some external indicia such as an inability to perform one’s ordinary avocations.
Safia Begum vs Abdul Razak (1944)
In the case of Safia Begum vs Abdul Razak (1944), it was observed by referring to the two privy council decisions that were taken as settled that the test of marz-ul-maut is the proof of the apprehension of death in the mind of the donor. However, the fear of death derived from his own consciousness as the fear was caused in the mind of others. The other symptoms like physical incapacities are only the indications of marz-ul-maut. It was taken into account that the person claiming to be a donor for someone with a terminal illness must provide proof of their illness.
Shamshad Ali Shah vs Syed Hassan Shah (1964)
The judgement of the case was laid down by the Pakistan Supreme Court where the learned judges summarised the law of the gifts and the doctrine of Marz-ul-maut.
The fact of the case starts with:
A woman of 65 suffering from pneumonia, succumbed after the execution of a deed of gift after a period of two hours.
The gift made by such a woman was held to be affected by the scope of Marz-ul-maut.
Following questions were raised, on the law of Marz-ul-maut, which was decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan.
Was the donor suffering, at the time of the gift, from a disease which was the immediate cause of his death?
Was the disease of such a nature or character as to induce, in the person suffering, the belief of death?
Was the illness such as to incapacitate him from the pursuit of his ordinary avocations? A situation which might create in the mind of the sufferer an apprehension of death?
Had the illness continued for such a length of time as to remove the anxiety of immediate death or to accustom the sufferer to illness?
In Shamshad Ali Shah vs Syed(1964), the court emphasised that the transactions made during marz-ul-maut would be scrutinised for validity, particularly, if it appeared that the transactions could harm the legal heirs. In the present case, it was observed that Husan Bano was suffering from disease that caused serious apprehension of death and she died shortly after making a gift, the gift could be treated under the doctrine of Marz-ul-maut.
Judgement of the Bombay High Court
The Bombay High Court examined the concept of marz-ul-maut and its inference under the ambit of Islamic Law. The definition of the marz-ul-maut refers to the condition of illness that leads to death. It is characterised by three elements:
The illness must be severe and lead to death.
The patient must have a consciousness of impending death.
The illness must actually result in death.
The court also decided about the validity of transactions. It was stated that the transactions made during marz-ul-maut were subjected to restrictions which are imposed for the protection of the rights of heirs. The disposition of the property made during this period must not exceed one-third of the net estate, unless the heirs give the consent to the disposition. The court dismissed the appeal and held that the gift in question is within the scope of marz-ul maut.
The transactions were held to be valid. The deceased was in marz-ul-maut at the time of the execution. The plaintiff’s claims were dismissed and the transactions stood as lawful and binding in the eyes of the law. The court also held that there will be no specific orders related to cost.
Rationale behind the judgement
The rationale behind the judgement was rooted in principles of justice and equity inherited in the doctrine of marz-ul-maut. The court aimed to protect the interests of the heirs and to ensure that transactions made during a period of the severe illness are genuine and not influenced by the person’s vulnerable state. There is a process of scrutinising such gift transactions by further evidence so as to prevent any exploitation or undue influence on the person during their final days.
Conclusion
In the case of Abdul Hafiz Beg vs. Sahebbi (1975), the court provided a clear understanding of Marz-ul-maut which means the condition where the person is aware of the danger of death due to severe illness. The case provides significant insights into the application of the doctrine of Marz-ul-maut under the ambit of Muslim law. The court highlighted several critical aspects of the ruling which underscored the importance of the burden of proof in the cases involving the doctrine of marz-ul-maut. The plaintiff in the present case should have provided concrete evidence to establish the condition of the deceased and its impact on his mental health.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
Is Marz-ul-maut different from Hiba?
Marz-ul-Maut refers to the final illness of a person who is near to the end of their life. In legal terms, gifts in death bed illness are scrutinised closely to ensure they are not given the gift under the pressure or coercion. Whereas, hiba is generally a voluntary gift or made during a person’s lifetime. It is not limited to the final illness but can occur at any time.
What is the difference between donatio mortis causa and marz-ul-maut?
Donatio mortis causa is rooted from Roman and common law, while marz-ul-maut is rooted in Islamic law. Donatio mortis causa is the gift which is conditional on the donor’s death, while marz-ul-maut is the gift which is valid if the donor dies from the illness but is subject to inheritance laws. Donatio mortis causa can be revoked if the donor recovers, whereas marz-ul-maut gifts are typically not revocable once the donor dies, but their validity depends on compliance with Islamic law. Donatio mortis causa does not have any specific limitations, while marz-ul-maut limits the gift to one-third of the estate unless the heirs consent.
This article is written by Harshit Kumar. This is a detailed analysis of the case of the Union of India vs. Maddala Thathiah (1966). The case focuses on the principles of contract law related to the tender and the acceptance of a standing offer and how such a contract is discharged after acceptance. This discussion underscores the significance of clarity in the contractual terms and the obligations it puts on the parties once the offer of tender is accepted. We will see how the Supreme Court deals with the issue of the enforceability of the cancellation clause in the contract and what directions it gives.
Table of Contents
Introduction
Under contract law, for the formation of a legally binding contract the principles of offer and acceptance form the foundation. An offer is a statement of intent for entering a contract on some specific conditions which is made on a common understanding and with an intent that it will be a binding contract upon acceptance. On the other hand, an acceptance is an unqualified affirmation of approval given to the conditions specified during the offer. Effective and clear communication of the offer and acceptance is required between the parties (offeror and offeree). A contract is formed when an offer is accepted, subject to the fulfillment of all the specified conditions.
Tender is one part of this principle, it is an invitation to offer made to do or to abstain from doing an act, and this binds the party who is making the offer to perform its obligations for the party to whom the offer is made. When a tender of goods is accepted, it becomes a standing offer and a contract can only be formed when an offer is made on the basis of the tender. Both the parties to the contract have the right to revoke the tender, a tenderer has the right to revoke it same as the party who can refuse to place any order. However, if the tenderer has promised not to revoke the tender for consideration, or if any provision restricts him from doing so, he cannot revoke the tender, which means that the tender is irrevocable.
The case of Union of India vs. Maddala Thathiah (1966)is a significant ruling in contract law concerning the principle of tender and acceptance. This case shows the importance of clarity in the terms of the contract and the necessity of fulfilling the obligations of the parties that are enshrined in the contract. The decision impacts how one understands the procedure of tender and the enforceability of the cancellation clause in the agreement.
Facts of the case
Tenders were invited by the Dominion of India, who were the owners of Madras and Southern Mahratta Railways, to supply jaggery in the railway’s grain shop. A tender was submitted by the respondent to supply 14,000 imperial maunds of cane jaggery during February and March 1948. The tender form had a note in para 2 that mentioned the quantity required and the dates of delivery. The note was,
“This administration reserves the right to cancel the contract at any stage during the tenure of the contract without calling up the outstandings on the unexpired portion of the contract.”
The offer of the respondent was accepted by the Deputy General Manager of the railways through a letter dated 29/01/1948. The respondent was asked to remit a security deposit of Rs. 7900 and it was said that the official order would be placed with the respondent after the receipt of the remittance. Later, in a letter dated 16/02/1948, the Deputy General Manager reaffirmed that the tender would be accepted if the respondent agreed to the terms and conditions given in the reverse of the letter. The term of delivery was mentioned in the following way:
Delivery of 3500 maunds on 01/03/1948.
Delivery of 3500 maunds on 22/03/1948.
Delivery of 3500 maunds on 05/04/1948.
Delivery of 3500 maunds on 21/04/1948.
The note had the cancellation clause as well. Later via a letter dated 28/02/1948, the dates of delivery were slightly changed.
The Deputy General Manager by his letter dated 08/03/1948 informed the respondent about the cancellation of the order of jaggery outstanding against the order dated 16/02/1948, and the contract was cancelled.
The respondent filed a suit against the Union of India, praying for the recovery of the damage that was caused due to the breach of the contract. The case was dismissed by the trial court saying that the railway administration had held the right to cancel the contract at any stage without giving any reason and without making itself liable to pay any damages. This was taken as an appeal to the High Court, where it was ruled that the clause that reserved the right of cancellation of the contract to the appellant was void and since the trial court had not resolved the issue of damages, it remanded the suit for disposal after deciding on the issue.
The Union of India (appellant) took an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, against the decree of the High Court after obtaining the special leave.
Issues involved
Whether the railway administration have the right to cancel the contract without the liability of damages?
Whether the contract was for a definite quantity of 14,000 maunds of jaggery or only for such quantity as the railway administration required?
Whether the clause reserving the right to cancel the contract to the railway administration was valid or not?
Whether the railway administration could rescind the contract arbitrarily or only for good and reasonable grounds?
Contentions by the parties
Arguments by the appellant
Following arguments were given by the appellant:
The railway administration was not required to buy the complete 14000 mounds of jaggery, it should be interpreted as allowing the railway administration to purchase only the required amount of the jaggery up to a maximum of 14000 maunds. This means that they had no obligation to purchase the total mentioned quantity of jaggery.
The terms of the contract did not create any binding obligation to supply the complete amount because the administration had restricted the cancellation rights to itself, that it can cancel the contract at any stage and that will not make the administration liable to pay any damages for the remaining quantity.
The respondent explicitly agreed to every clause of the contract including the cancellation clause, that gave the power to the administration to cancel the contract at any stage without attracting any penalty.
The clause was a legitimate clause and enforceable, it was not repugnant to the contract.
Arguments by the respondent
Following arguments were given by the respondent:
The contract was for the supply of a definite amount of jaggery, 14000 maunds. This order was to be delivered in four installments on the specified dates given by the letter dated 16/02/1948 which were slightly changed by a letter dated 28/02/1948.
The contract was binding once the order was placed. It amounted to a binding contract that required the respondent to supply the jaggery and the administration to accept the order. The cancellation order did not apply to the supplies covered under the formal order.
The respondent agreed to every clause of the contract including the quantity and the delivery schedule. Therefore, by placing the formal order the administration was bound to accept it in accordance with the order terms.
The clause was not a legitimate clause and was repugnant to the contract.
Legal concepts involved in Union of India vs. Maddala Thathiah (1966)
Formation and interpretation of contract
The formation of a contract under Indian law is governed by the Indian Contract Act 1872. The essential elements that form a lawful contract are offer, acceptance, consideration, intention to create a legal relation, lawful consent, and capacity of the party to contract.
Section 2(a) defines an ‘offer’, it provides an offer or a proposal is an act of a person which shows the willingness of that person to do or to abstain from doing something with an intention to obtain assent.
Section 7 deals with the acceptance of an offer. It provides that the acceptance must be absolute and qualified. It also provides that the acceptance must be expressed in a usual and reasonable manner until and unless there is any specified manner that is provided in which it should be expressed.
Section 2(d) defines a ‘consideration’ as something in return for a promise which also must be lawful.
Section 25 provides that any agreement without consideration is void except in certain cases:
It is valid if it is written and registered under any law applicable and it is based on natural affection and love between close relatives.
It is valid if there is a promise involved to compensate someone who has already voluntarily done something for the promisor or fulfilled a legal obligation.
It is valid if there is a written and signed promise to pay, partially or whole, a debt that the creditor could have enforced but for the law for the limitation of suits.
Section 14 defines ‘free consent’, it provides that consent is said to be free when it is free from coercion, undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation, and mistakes.
Section 11 describes the capacity of the party to contract, it provides that any person who is of the age of majority as per the law, to which he is subject, and is of sound mind is competent to make a contract.
There is no Section under Indian Contract Act 1872 that explicitly defines intention to create a contract but that is determined through the interpretation of the agreement. If there is a lawful offer and lawful acceptance and both are clearly conveyed to each party that reflects the intention of both parties to create a contract.
In this case, the railway administration invited tenders for the supply of 14000 maunds of jaggery, the respondent submitted a tender offer to supply the required amount of jaggery on the specified dates, also agreeing to all the terms of the contract, this formed an offer. The Deputy General Manager through his letter asked the respondent to submit the security fees. After the submission of the security fees the respondent was given specific dates on which he had to supply the jaggery to the administration, at this stage the contract was a binding contract.
Interpretation of the contract depends on the intention of the parties to make a legal relationship along with the language of the contract and the purpose of the contract.
In this case, the Court interpreted the binding nature of the contract formed. The intention of the parties was clear from the tender submitted by the responder and the acceptance done through the letter dated 16/02/1948 which specified the date of delivery of the jaggery in installments, which was slightly changed by the letter dated 28/02/1948. This still didn’t form a binding contract until an order was placed for the delivery of the jaggery. As soon as the order was placed a binding contract was formed between the parties.
Discharge of contract
Discharge of the contract means the contract is coming to an end. There are several ways through which a contract is ended or terminated.
When both parties fulfill their contractual obligations as per the terms and conditions of the contract.
When both the parties agree to terminate the contract mutually.
If any unforeseen circumstances make it impossible to fulfil the contractual obligations, the contract can be discharged due to frustration.
If any of the parties breaches any term of a contract or fails to fulfill any contractual obligation. Then that party becomes liable to pay damages.
If any condition given by the law discharges the contract. Examples: the death of any party, the expiration of the time limit, incapacity of the party.
Under the Indian Contract Act 1872, Section 62 discusses the discharge of contract, this explains that a contract can be discharged by a mutual agreement between the parties, this may include either substituting a new contract for an existing one or by making some alterations in the existing contract.
In this case, the railway administration, through a letter dated 08/03/1948 cancelled the order outstanding against the order dated 16/02/1948. Which they believed had terminated the contract. The Court examined the validity of the cancellation clause that restricted the right of cancelling the contract in the hands of the administration. The Court interpreted that the cancellation could be invoked only till the order was not placed, but because the order was already placed by the administration, for the delivery of the jaggery, that made a binding contract between the parties and in this case, the cancellation could not be invoked arbitrarily.
Cancellation clause of a contract
Any cancellation clause in a contract is applicable under certain conditions
If there is a breach of contract.
If there is a misrepresentation of any material fact that influenced the other party to enter into the contract
By mutual agreement between the parties.
Because of any unforeseeable circumstances which make it impossible to fulfil any contractual obligation.
If any party terminates the contract for convenience with a notice period or paying compensation.
Section 65 of the Indian Contract Act 1872 provides that if any contract gets cancelled because it becomes void because of some reason then the party who gained any advantage under that contract must return that to the other party or make restitution.
Section 75 explains that if any party to the contract rescinds or cancels the contract because of the breach of the contract, then the party who breached the contract is liable to pay compensation.
In this case, the language of the cancellation clause restricted the cancellation rights to the hands of the administration. The Court interpreted that this cancellation clause was for a broader event, like acceptance of the tender, but not for the binding contract that was formed after placing a formal order. The administration placed a formal order with the respondent and made a formal binding contract between both parties. Therefore, the railway administration was under an obligation to accept the jaggery.
Damages for breach of a contract
Breach of contract occurs when any of the parties to the contract is not able perform any contractual duty and the innocent party suffers any loss, commonly any financial loss. The damages are paid in three forms:
If an innocent party suffers a financial loss then the breaching party is required to pay the innocent party to recover that financial loss, these are compensatory damages.
If an innocent party does not suffer any financial loss then the breaching party pays a nominal damage which is symbolic, the right of the innocent party to legal relief is affirmed.
If the contract itself had a clause specifying the amount to be paid to the innocent party by the breaching party, these are the liquidated damages.
Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act 1872 provides for the general rules to calculate the damages caused by the breach of the contract terms. It provides that the party suffering because of the breach of the contract is liable to get compensation for the losses that occurred naturally because of the breach or as per the contract terms. It allows compensation for both direct and consequential damages.
Section 74 explains that if the contract specifies a penalty sum to be paid in case of breach of the contract then the aggrieved party can claim the sum, but if the court feels that the stipulated amount is deemed a penalty and not a genuine pre-estimate of loss, then it can reduce it to a reasonable amount. It further provides that the aggrieved party can claim the damages irrespective of whether the loss is lesser or greater than the liquidated damages specified in the contract terms.
In this case, the Court observed that since a formal order was already placed by the railway administration it formed a legally binding contract between the respondent and the administration. Therefore, the cancellation of the contract by the administration, arbitrarily, resulted in the breach of the contract and hence, it was liable to pay the damages.
Judgement in Union of India vs. Maddala Thathiah (1966)
The Apex court ruled in favour of the respondent by explaining that, the restriction of the cancellation right in the hands of the railway administration was not valid and the cancellation of the contract by the administration arbitrarily was void. Thus, the administration was liable to pay the damages to the respondent to recover the loss he suffered due to cancellation.
The Court explained that the tender offer made by the respondent was an offer to supply 14000 maunds of jaggery, the railway administration through its letter dated 16/02/1948 accepted the tender offer by specifying the amount of the jaggery to be delivered in four installments and the date of delivery of the four installments, this was enough to understand that a formal order was already placed by the administration and that made a legally binding contract. Therefore, the administration was bound to accept the complete quantity of 14000 maunds for the respondent. So, the order was not for the amount that was required but for the complete quality of 140000 maunds.
To support its decision the Court referred to the case of Chatturbhuj Vithaldas vs. Moreshwar Parashram (1954), in this case, the arrangement was to supply two brands of bidis to the Government by Vithaldas. The contract that was formed was not through a single signed paper but through a series of letters between the parties. The main issue was whether these series of letters formed a legally binding contract. The Supreme Court observed that the series of letters were not making any binding contract, even if the parties had expressed intention to do business, until and unless a formal order was placed. The letters merely set forth the terms of potential transactions. The Court concluded that a tender is an offer but it is an invitation to do business, a binding contract is formed when the tender is accepted and a formal order is placed.
The reservation of the cancellation rights in the hands of the administration was not valid because the contract was a legally binding contract as soon as the order was placed. Therefore, the administration did not have the right to cancel the contract arbitrarily without paying any damages to the respondent.
The railway authority did not have any right to rescind the contract arbitrarily once the formal order for jaggery was placed.
Analysis of the judgement
The Apex Court focused on the major principles of the contract law:
Nature of the tender: The Court observed that the tender that was submitted by the respondent was for the delivery of 14000 maunds of jaggery. The tender form included the required quantity and dates of delivery. In addition to that the form also included a clause that reserved the cancellation rights in the hands of the administration at any stage during its tenure without calling up outstanding obligations on the unexpired portion of the contract.
Standing offer: The Court observed that there was no standing order in this case. The respondent’s tender was an offer for the supply of 14000 mauds of jaggery, which was accepted by the administration by a letter dated 29/01/1948. However, this did not make any binding contract because a formal order was not placed through that letter but the respondent was asked to remit a security deposit of Rs. 7900, and only after that a formal order would be placed. Later by the letter dated 16/02/1948 a formal order was placed with the specified quantity required to be delivered on the specified date, and this made a binding contract.
Acceptance of tender: It was observed that the administration accepted the tender offer through a letter dated 29/01/1948. However, there was still a condition required to be fulfilled to get the offer accepted completely through a formal order which was the remittance of a security deposit of Rs. 7900 by the respondent.
Communication of acceptance: The Court observed that the acceptance of the tender offer was conveyed by the administration through a letter dated 29/01/2024 which included the acceptance and the condition of the remittance of the security deposit. Later through the letter dated 16/02/2024 a formal order was placed with a specified quantity of jaggery to be delivered on specified dates.
Formation of a binding contract: The Court observed that a binding contract was formed between the administration and the respondent as soon as the administration accepted the tender offer and placed a formal order for the delivery of the jaggery.
Discharge of the contract: The Court observed that after the binding contract was formed between the parties, no such condition occurred that could have caused the discharge of the contract by the administration, that too arbitrarily.
Restriction of cancellation rights: The Court observed that the restriction of cancellation rights in the hands of the administration was not valid and it had no arbitrary right to cancel the contract at any stage after a formal order was placed which formed a legally binding contract.
Distinction between the application of the cancellation clause on the agreement and the contract: The Court differentiated between the application of the cancellation clause on the agreement which was the acceptance of the tender, but this was not applicable to a legally binding contract formed after a formal order was placed.
Cases that referred to the principles set in this case: The case of Union of India vs. Maddala Thathiah (1966) was referred to in the case of Cummins Diesel Sales Service (India) Ltd. vs. The Director General of Supplies and Disposals (1980). The Delhi High Court, while referring to the principle set in the Maddala case about the nature of the tender observed that the calling for a tender and its acceptance without specifying anything further will not make a legal contract. It was further observed that as soon as a specific order is issued under an accepted tender, then it becomes an enforceable contract.
Another case that referred to the case of Union of India vs. Maddala Thathiah (1966) was the State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Coromandel Paints and Chemicals Ltd. (1994). The Andhra Pradesh High Court referred to the nature of the tender explained in this case. It was observed that if the terms of the agreement specify that any good is to be supplied against the raiders placed in the future, it constitutes a standing order and not a binding contract. Unless a specific order is placed that specifies a definite quantity, there is no binding contract. Without a formal order, it remains a standing offer.
Conclusion
The case of Union of India vs. Maddala Thathiah (1966) provides clarity on the enforceability of the contracts in the context of public procurement. The case sets an important precedence for the understanding and application of the cancellation clause in a legally binding contract. It is a crucial case to understand the invitation of a tender and how an offer is made through it. This case is also important for understanding the difference between the tender offer and the binding contract. The Court dismissed the appeal observing that the cancellation clause was applicable only at the tender acceptance stage not after a formal order was placed, so allowing this arbitrary cancellation was against the fundamental principles of contract formation.
The Court has also distinguished between an agreement to contract and an enforceable contract, explaining that the first letter of acceptance dated 29/01/1948 was an agreement to contract and the later letter dated 16/02/1948 created a binding contract by placing a formal order. Lastly, the Court affirmed the right of the respondent to get compensation of the damages faced and the administration cannot escape this by relying on the cancellation clause. The ruling upholds the integrity of contracts in public sector activities and protects the rights of the suppliers.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
Who are the offeror and offeree?
An offeror is a person or the party who makes an offer or a proposal to another party. An offeror through an offer shows the willingness to start a legally binding contract on certain terms and conditions.
An offeree is the person or the party who accepts the offer or the proposal made by the offeror. Acceptance of the offer and agreeing to certain terms and conditions makes a legally binding contract between the offeror and the offeree.
What is a standing offer?
A standing offer is a type of offer that is made by the offeror to the offeree to enter into a contract on certain terms over a period of time. A standing offer, unlike a one-time offer which expires once accepted or rejected, remains open for acceptance for a certain period of time until it is revoked by the offeror or terminated because of the occurrence of certain circumstances that were specified in the offer. This is also known as an open offer or a continuing offer.
What is consideration?
Consideration is something of value exchanged between the parties to the contract. It can be in any form money, services, or any product. Consideration ensures that the parties are legally bound to each other to perform their contractual obligations.
What is the doctrine of frustration? What are liquidated damages?
If any unforeseeable circumstances occur which does not allow the parties to the contract to perform their contractual obligations then the doctrine of frustration discharges the parties from their legal obligations. This is explained under Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act 1872, it explains that a contract becomes void if it is impossible for the parties to fulfill their contractual obligations.
What are liquidated damages?
These are the pre-decided contractual damages that the parties to the contract agree to pay in case of any breach during the time they are entering into a contract. The amount goes to the aggrieved party by the party that breaches the contractual terms. These damages are specified within the contract.
What are direct damages and consequential damages?
Direct damages are general damages that are immediate and primary losses caused directly by the breach of contract. For example, if a supplier fails to supply the required goods as agreed and the other party has to buy them from another supplier at a higher rate, then the extra cost in the purchase of those goods is the direct damages that the supplier is required to pay to the other party.
Consequential damages are special damages or indirect damages that occur because of the breach of the contract but not the immediate result. For example, if any supplier fails to supply any goods on time and the other party loses another contract with a third party. This is indirect damage caused because of the breach done by the supplier. Then in this case the other party can claim the loss suffered.