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Brijendra Singh vs. State of M.P. and Anr. (2008)   

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This article is written by Soumya Lenka. The article concerns itself with the background, pertinent facts, arguments on both sides, and the court’s reasoning while delivering the verdict. The article deals with the legality of the adoption of Brijendra Singh with regard to Section 8 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. Further, the case deals with his right as a legally adopted son to hold a piece of agricultural land in consonance with Section 10 of the M.P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960.

Introduction

The case concerns itself with the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, in particular.  After a strict analysis of the provisions of Hindu law, it becomes evident that there is a great deal of difference between a female Hindu who is divorced and someone who is leading a life like a divorced woman. The latter, though living in a pathetic and deserted state, cannot be considered a divorced woman in the eyes of the law, and the former, whose marriage is absolutely dissolved, is only considered a divorcee under the said framework of the Hindu Marital Jurisprudence postulated under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The case was a civil appeal (filed under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908) in 2001 and was disposed of by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the year 2008. The case serves as a precedent for the validity of adoption by a married woman (with regard to Section 8(c) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956) who resides out of the marital union, like that of a divorced woman after being deserted by her husband. The judgement delves into the rights of the adopted child in relation to a land dispute concerning the M.P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960. The precedent tries to answer the plausible correlation between a legal adoption and a legally executed will and whether the validity or legality of adoption has any bearing on the legality of a will executed by a woman in favour of the adopted child.

Details of the case 

  • Case name: Brijendra Singh vs. State of M.P. and Anr.
  • Petitioner: Brijendra Singh 
  • Respondents: State of M.P. and Anr.
  • Case type: Civil Appeal (Second Appeal under Section 100 of CPC, 1908)
  • Court: Supreme Court of India
  • Bench: Hon’ble Justices Dr. Arijit Pasayat and P. Sathasivam
  • Date of judgement: 11.01.2008
  • Citation: AIR 2008 SC 1056 

Facts of the case 

The backdrop of the case was set in 1948. Sometime in 1948, Mishri Bai was married to a man named Padam Singh in a village named Kolinja, situated in the state of Madhya Pradesh. The woman was crippled, as she didn’t have legs. Her marriage was a forced one, as in her village, a virgin girl could not live unmarried after she had attained a certain age. Unfortunately, after her marriage, her husband Padam Singh left her, and after that, she returned to her parents home and lived with them. 

Seeing her plight, her parents bequeathed a huge piece of agricultural land, measuring about 32 acres, in her name for her expenses and maintenance after their demise. In 1970, as per the records, Mishri Bai adopted a son named Brijendra Singh. In 1974, Padam Singh died. In a major turn of events, unfortunately, an issue arose with regard to her land holdings and her adoption of Mr. Brajedra Singh, who is the petitioner in the impugned case. The Sub Divisional Officer, Vidisha, served a notice on Mishri Bai under Section 10 of the M.P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960. It was alleged that Mishri Bai’s holding of the land bequeathed to her by her parents exceeded the prescribed limit as per the impugned Act. 

Replying to the allegation in the notice, Mishri Bai filed a reply contending that Brajendra Singh was her legally adopted son, and as both of them constituted a joint family, they were entitled to hold a land of 54 acres, and hence she was legally entitled to hold the said agricultural holding of 32 acres under Section 10 of the M.P. Ceiling on the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960. On 28th  December, 1981, the subdivisional officer issued a notice to her reply, disbelieving her contention that Brijendra Singh was her legally adopted son on the ground that there was no mention of the adoptive father’s name in the registers of educational institutions. Hence, there was no joint family as per law, and consequently, her contention that she has the right to hold an agricultural holding of 54 acres as a joint family didn’t have any sanction of law. The notice clearly stated that she had violated the provisions of the MP Ceiling on the Agricultural Holdings  Act, 1960, and had to vacate the extra land. 

Aggrieved by such notice, on 10th January, 1982, Mishri Bai approached the trial court by initiating a civil suit. In the civil suit, she made a declaration that Brijendra Singh was her adopted son. On 19th  July, 1989, she executed a registered will in the name of her adopted son, Brijendra Singh, bequeathing all her property in his name. She took her last breath in 1989. On 3rd  September, 1993, the trial court in which the declaration suit was filed gave a decree in favour of Mishri Bai and held Brijendra Singh as her legally adopted son.

The judgement of the trial court was challenged by the state. The first appellate court confirmed the decision of the learned trial court and held Brijendra Singh to be her adopted son. The Appellate Court was in firm view that Mishri Bai adopted Brijendra as her son, and in the will, she executed all her property in his name. The state, aggrieved by this decision, challenged the same in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, contending that the adoption lacked legal sanctity as it was undertaken without the consent of Mishri Bai’s husband, despite her marriage subsisting when the adoption took place. The High Court, allowing the appeal of the State, held that a female Hindu nevertheless adopted a child, but at the same time, she should comply with the conditions mentioned in Section 8(c) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, in order to make such adoption valid in the eyes of law. The Court held that there is a great sort of difference between a divorced woman and a woman who is living as a divorced woman despite the subsistence of her marriage. 

The High Court held that the trial court and the first appellate court erred in holding that Mishri Bai was a divorced woman and that her marriage was subsisting when she adopted Mr. Brijendra Singh. Hence, the High Court held that the adoption by Mishri Bai was invalid. It was held that, as Mishri Bai and Padam Singh were living separately after the marriage, the marriage still subsisted when she adopted Brijendra. It is clearly postulated that a Hindu married woman cannot adopt as per Section 8(c) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, and hence such adoption has no legal sanctity in the eyes of law. The Court hence dismissed the declaration suit of Mishri Bai and held that Brijendra Singh was not the legally adopted son of Mishri Bai and that the bequeathment of the property to Brijendra has no legal standing and is absolutely null and void. Aggrieved by this, Brijendra Singh, the adopted son of Mishri Bai, filed a civil appeal in the Supreme Court of India challenging the High Court’s verdict.

Issues raised

  1. Is Mr. Brijendra Singh (the petitioner)  the legally adopted son of Smt. Mishri Bai?
  2. Is the bequeathment of the said property by Mishri Bai to the petitioner valid?

Arguments of the parties

Petitioners 

The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants submitted that the Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh erred in holding that Mishri Bai’s marriage subsisted while she adopted the petitioner, Mr. Brijendra Singh. It was argued that, as far as the records are concerned, there was no consummation of marriage whatsoever after the marriage between Mishri Bai and Padam Singh, as the parties were living separately for a long period of time. Hence, it was submitted that an inference that the marriage ceased to legally exist between Mishri Bai and Padam Singh based on these circumstances was well conceived by the trial court and the first appellate court. The counsels argued that the learned High Court erred in considering such a marriage as a legally valid one as the marriage lacked any legal sanctity. Putting heavy reliance on the Apex Court’s verdict in the landmark case of Jolly Das (Smt.) Alias Moulick vs. Tapan Ranjan Das (1994), it was submitted that the marriage between the parties constituted a sham marriage on the face of it. Since anything that stems from an arbitrary action is in itself arbitrary, the same applies for the impugned case. Hence, it was submitted that the decision of the High Court that Mr. Brijendra Singh is not the legally adopted son of Mishri Bai stands on the prior consideration of the court that the marriage of her with Padam Singh subsisted when the adoption took place. Hence, such an observation stands on a misguided consideration and hence should be set aside by the Apex Court.

Further, it was submitted that the learned trial court and the first appellate court strictly assessed the material, facts, and circumstances of the case and rightly observed that Mishri Bai was living like a divorced woman. Hence, she should be considered a divorced woman in the eyes of the law and society at large. It was held that she would not strictly be guided by the provisions of Section 8 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, which provides that a married woman cannot adopt a child. To put it concisely, Mishri Bai was to be considered a divorced woman in the eyes of the law and was rightly entitled to adopt Mr. Brajendra Singh. The petitioner further submitted that the trial court and the first appellate court were right in holding Mr. Brijendra Singh as the legally adopted child of Mishri Bai and that they form a joint family and are legally entitled to the possession of the disputed land.

Respondent

The learned counsels appearing on behalf of the respondents concurred with the view of the learned High Court of Madhya Pradesh. It was submitted that the learned second appellate court has not erred in overturning the decision of the trial court, and hence the decision must be upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It was argued that the learned trial court and the first appellate court’s have not exercised judicial soundness by considering Mishri Bai as a divorced woman. It is quite evident that when she adopted Mr. Brijendra Singh as her son, she had a subsisting marriage, and going by the law as stipulated under Section 8 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, she is not entitled to adopt a child. Hence, the said adoption lacks any legal sanctity.

Coming to the dispute land, the respondents (appearing on behalf of the state) held that the contention of the appellants that Mr. Brijendra Singh and Mishri Bai are a joint family is not a legally sound contention. It was further submitted that there is no basis on which they are in any way entitled to hold the dispute land. Such a claim is flawed. It was submitted that, as the adoption itself is prima facie invalid, Mr. Brijendra is in no way the legal son of Mishri Bai. There exists no joint family, and subsequently, Mishri Bai and Brijendra Singh do not have the right to hold disputed land. Hence, the state of Madhya Pradesh has the authority to issue proper directions to do away with the extra land as per the M.P. Ceilings Act.

Laws involved in Brijendra Singh vs. State of M.P. and Anr. (2008)

Section 6 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956

Section 6 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, postulates the requisites for an adoption to be legally valid. It provides that for an adoption to have legal sanction, the following conditions are to be met:

  • Clause (i) provides that the person so adopting should have the capacity and the right to take part in adoption.
  • Clause (ii) provides that the person who is giving in adoption should also have the right and the capacity to give such a child or person who is being adopted. 
  • Clause (iii) provides that the child or person being adopted should be legally capable of being taken in adoption.

Section 8 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956

Section 8 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, concerns itself with the right of a female Hindu to adopt a child. It has been postulated in the impugned provision that a female Hindu is entitled to adopt under three conditions.

  • Clause (a) provides that if she is of sound mind, she can adopt. 
  • Clause (b) provides that if she is not a minor under the Indian Majority Act, 1875, she can take a child in adoption. 
  • Clause (c) postulates that she can take a child in adoption if she is not married, or if married, her marriage must have been dissolved (position before the 2010 amendment). 
  • Clause (c) further postulates that she can adopt if her husband is dead, has completely renounced the material world and has become an ascetic, has  ceased to be a person within the Hindu dharmic fold or whose husband has been declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be of unsound mind.

Section 10 of the M.P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960

The provision provides for the collection of information. Clause 1 of the provision provides that if any person holding land in excess of the ceiling area fails to submit the return under Section 9 of the Act, the competent authority can take action. It provides that the competent authority may, by notice, require such person to furnish the return within the time specified in the notice. Further, on his failure to do so, the competent authority is empowered to obtain the necessary information in such a manner as may be prescribed.

Relevant judgements referred to in the case

Jolly Das (Smt.) Alias Moulick vs. Tapan Ranjan Das (1994)

In the impugned case, the petitioners have relied on this landmark precedent to justify that the marriage of Mishri Bai was a ‘Sham Marriage’. The judgement talks about what constitutes a sham marriage. The precedent concerns itself with a marriage where a 19 year old woman was married to a man who was more than forty years old. In the said case, the court held that as the consent of the girl who was the respondent was obtained by means of fraudulent methods, the marriage is to be declared void under Section 25(iii) of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. Based on this, in the impugned case, the petitioners pleaded that a similar issue exists, as Mishri Bai never intended to marry and was forced to marry a person who left her soon after marriage as she was a crippled lady, and that the same constitutes a sham marriage.

V.T.S. Chandrasekhara Mudaliar vs. Kulandaivelu Mudaliar (1962)

This precedent has been relied upon by the court while giving its verdict on the issue of whether Brijendra Sinbgh is the legally adopted son of Mishri Bai or not. The impugned precedent revolves around the object and purpose of adoption in Hindu society. The judgement postulates that in Hindu society, adoption is primarily based on spiritual reasons. Hereditary benefit is always a secondary objective. Based on this, the court held that the legal sanctity of adoption has to be accessed or judged primarily on the basis of spiritual reasons rather than other secondary purposes.

Hem Singh vs. Harnam Singh (1954) 

The impugned case was also relied upon by the bench to find the true purpose of the adoption. Here also, the court found that the precedent is quite clear and unambiguous over the fact that in cases of adoption in Hindu society, the primary issue to judge its validity is to assess the spiritual reasons behind it rather than any other reason.

Amarendra Man Singh Bhramarbar vs. Sanatan Singh (1933)

This pertinent case of Privy Council was also relied upon and put emphasis upon by the bench while delivering the judgement in the impugned case of Brijendra Singh. In this case, it was held that within the Hindu Dharmic fold, the primary purpose of adopting a son is attached to the spiritual practice of doing the necessary rites that one heir is obliged to do after the death of his parents. Hence, the court, relying on this first ever judgement of the privy council on the validity of adoption among Hindus, held that to determine the legality of the adoption of Mishri Bai, one major factor is to determine whether Mishri Bai adopted Brijendra Singh because her husband deserted her soon after marriage and she didn’t have any heir to perform her last rites or if there is any other reason for the said adoption. 

Kishori Lal vs. Chaltibai (1958)

In this case, it was held that sometimes adoption is carried on for nefarious motives, depriving the original heirs and close relatives of their share of the property because of some family dispute or personal tensions between members. Based on this judgement, the Hon’ble Bench of the Court held that to ascertain the legality of Brijendra Singh’s adoption, it is pertinent to delve deeper into the motive behind such adoption.

Judgement of the case

The two judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court held unanimously that a Hindu married woman cannot adopt a child on a combined reading of the provisions of Section 5, Section 6, Section 7, Section 8 read with Section 11 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, and hence Mr. Brajendra Singh is not the legally adopted son of Mishri Bai. Coming to the disputed land, the court held that the state should do away with the extra land as per the M.P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960. Further, the Court held that the will has nothing to do with whether Mr. Brijendra is the legally adopted son of Mishri Bai or not. It was held that the will is valid and Mr. Brijendra is entitled to the property of Mishri Bai, excluding the extra land. It was further directed that the extra land would be disposed of as per the directions of the state.

Rationale behind this judgement

The verdict was unanimous and cleared pertinent concepts with regard to a married woman’s right to adopt, the validity of a will in consonance with an invalid adoption, and also shed light on the concept of sham marriage.

Whether a married woman can adopt a child under Hindu law

The Court unanimously held that the High Court of Madhya Pradesh has not erred in holding that Brijendra Singh is not the legally adopted son of Mishri Bai. After a strict analysis of Sections 5, 6, 7, and, most importantly, 8(c) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, the court was of the opinion that the language of the statute is quite clear and no ambiguous construction whatsoever cannot be made that a married woman who is living like a divorced woman has the right to adopt a child. The court was of the view that a married woman cannot adopt while under the subsistence of marriage and that any adoption made by her during such subsistence is legally void and has no legal sanctity. 

Whether Mishri Bai and Padam Singh’s marriage was a sham marriage

The bench refuted the contentions of the petitioners that the marriage between Mishri Bai and her husband, Padam Singh, is a sham marriage. It held that the case of Jolly Das (Smt.) Alias Moulick vs. Tapan Ranjan Das (1994), relied upon by the petitioners, is based on a different factum, and the same does not have any application in the present case. The court held that despite the desertion of Mishri Bai by her husband Padam Singh, there was no dissolution of marriage whatsoever when she adopted Brijendra Singh. Hence, it was held by the Hon’ble Court that she was not entitled to adopt Brijendra Singh, being a married woman, and the adoption thus lacks legal sanctity.

Do Mishri Bai and Brajendra Singh form a joint family

The Court, refuting the contention of the petitioners, held that Mishri Bai and Brajendra Singh do not form a joint family as Brajendra Singh is not a legally adopted son of Mishri Bai. Hence, the contention that they are entitled to hold a maximum of 54 acres of agricultural holding is devoid of any merit. 

Does the validity of adoption have anything to do with the validity of the will

Adjudicating on the question of the validity of the will, the court held that the legality or validity of the testamentary disposition has nothing to do with the validity of adoption. It held that the bequeathment of property that Mishri Bai has made in the name of Brijendra Singh is valid in the eyes of the law. Hence, he is rightfully entitled to enjoy the bequeathed property.

Is Brijendra Singh entitled to the extra piece of land 

Adjudicating on the question of the state’s right to the extra land, the court held that Brijendra Singh is not entitled to enjoy the extra agricultural holding beyond what is stipulated under the M.P. Agricultural Holdings Ceiling Act, 1960, and hence the state has the complete discretion to issue any direction that it thinks fit to dispose of the extra agricultural holding.

Obiter Dicta

Further, the court, in a sympathetic tone, held that though Brijendra Singh is not the legally adopted son of Mishri Bai, he has been the only support of the crippled lady, i.e., Mishri Bai, and hence the court permitted the appellant to be in possession of land for a period of six months, by which time the government may take any appropriate decision in the matter.

Analysis of the case

The verdict serves as a precedent for the adoptive rights of a married woman and settles the law that a married woman is not entitled to adopt a child under any circumstances, and the child so adopted doesn’t have any legal standing to be called her heir. The landmark decision clears up the ambiguity between who a divorced woman actually is in the eyes of Hindu law. It settles the law that a woman whose marriage is subsisting but is still living as a divorcee is not a divorced woman. Further, the case clears the law with regard to the validity of testamentary dispositions. The Court unanimously held that the validity of a will has nothing to do with the legal validity of one’s adoption, and in fact, any person can dispose of his or her property in a will to any person, not necessarily a relative of his or hers.

Conclusion 

The Court, in its verdict, made it clear that a married woman has no right to adopt under any circumstances. One key takeaway from this verdict is that the provisions of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, are a bit orthodox and should change, which will pave the way for a married woman to adopt a child prior to her husband’s consent. This will certainly further the constitutional principle and, in a larger sense, the promise for gender parity and justice. The landmark verdict asserts that in Indian democratic polity, the rule of law is supreme and also instills a sense of faith in the Indian judiciary, which has time and again protected the doctrine of the rule of law. The obiter dicta also makes it evident that the Indian Judiciary and the Indian Polity are not sympathetic, consider issues beyond the comprehension of legality and constitutionality, and treat such issues according to the guiding principles of justice, equity and good conscience.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

Which Act is involved in the case of Brajendra Singh vs. State of M.P.?

The case revolves around the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. The case concerns itself with the adoptive rights of a woman and settles the law that a married woman is not entitled to adopt under Section 8(c) of the HAMA, 1956, as long as her marriage subsists.

Which section of the M.P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960 (in short, the Ceiling Act) prescribed limits for agricultural holdings?

Section 10 of the M.P. Ceiling Act prescribes the maximum agricultural holding that a person can hold in the State of Madhya Pradesh.

What kind of suit did Mishri Bai file in the trial court for declaring Brijendra Singh as her adopted son?

Mishri Bai filed a declaration suit in the learned trial court to declare Brijendra Singh as her legally adopted son. A suit for declaration relief is filed invoking Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, by a person who wants the court to ascertain or declare such a right.

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Strategies for building a remote work culture in startups

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video conferencing

This article has been written by Naghma Rahman pursuing a Startup Generalist & Virtual Assistant Training Program from Skill Arbitrage.

This article has been edited and published by Shashwat Kaushik.

Introduction

“Remote work is the embodiment of the belief that great work is not confined to a location but cultivated in an environment of inspiration and choice.”

If the COVID-19 pandemic locked the whole world down, it opened new opportunities for those who did not need their workstation to be tethered to a cubicle for them to be productive, resourceful or efficient. Their output was location agnostic, and they in fact discovered a superpower associated with this flexibility—that they were not ready to trade with anything in the world. There is no denying the fact that remote work is the structure for the future corporations that are here to stay. In this article, we explore the strategies that are effective in building a strong work culture in start-ups.

Understanding remote work culture

Today, if a company wants to reap the benefits of a diverse talent pool, it is embracing remote work—that helps them be at the top of their game by being able to attract talent from across the globe. Here are some features of a remote work culture:

  • Attract global talent: This might be one of the main reasons why most startups are going remote. By obviating the need to come to work, startups can now attract talent from around the world. Today, some organisations are fully remote and are super successful.
  • Cost consideration: Remote work is highly cost-effective as there is no capital cost involved while running a business, in the form of electricity, rent, bills, etc.
  • Improved productivity: The inherent flexibility offered by the remote work culture leads to improved employee productivity through increased autonomy.
  • Reduced absenteeism: The employees need not be absent for reasons that hardly occupy 10 % of their days. They can attend to personal chores without sacrificing their professional commitments, as they have all the flexibility to rearrange their priorities.
  • Remote employees help to widen your perspective: Having employees from across the globe brings a fresh perspective on the region and ethnicity they belong to, making the team truly inclusive in terms of demography as well as intellect.
  • Advances in technology: A few years ago, remote work was unheard of. Many corporations were on the fence, about to implement remote work for the innumerable advantages it had to offer but unable to do so for lack of the requisite technological environment. Today, technological advancements have made those companies switch to remote work.

Driven by these factors, a strong remote work culture is critical for start-ups today. It not only drives productivity and efficiency and directly affects the topline and bottom line but it also attracts top talent from across the globe.

Foundational elements of remote work culture

When you want to build a strong remote work culture, the thrust has to come from the leadership. It should be made a part of the company’s core values and vision, making it an integral part of the work environment. The Leadership team has to lead by example and set benchmarks that the rest of the team can emulate. Of course, the right tools and technology that are essential for communication and collaboration must also be in place, to ensure team cohesion.

Building trust and accountability

  • Trust: A strong remote work culture is based on the foundation of trust. The team is responsible enough to understand what the deliverables are and capable enough to deliver results without the need for micromanagement.
  • Transparency in Communication: Communication is key when it comes to remote work. There needs to be regular, and transparent communication among teams to ensure all stakeholders are aligned and updated.
  • KPIs: When the key performance indicators are results-based rather than the number of hours clocked in, only then will the team members have a sense of ownership for the task allotted.

 Fostering team collaboration and engagement

  • Team building: This assumes even greater significance in the context of remote work. To create a strong team in a remote work environment, there has to be a conscious effort to make the team feel connected and engaged despite being physically distanced from each other. This can be achieved by having team-building exercises, virtual meet-ups, and informal sessions, to get the teams to know each other.
  • Rewards and recognition: Felicitating the performers and changemakers in review meetings reiterates the fact that remote work is also a serious business and establishes the effectiveness of KPIs. Regular feedback and recognition ensure the team’s performance never goes off track and the team members feel a sense of engagement.

Promoting work-life balance

Remote work promotes work-life balance, as it shifts the focus to the outcomes rather than the time invested. This provides much-needed flexibility to the employees, as they feel more in charge of their lives—without having to worry about being unavailable for family when at work and vice versa. Their professional and personal lives need not feed on each other, for one to grow. Both can coexist peacefully and in perfect harmony, leading to an increase in. employee satisfaction. Further, commute-related anxiety and the unavailability due to rigid work hours can be obviated, further leading to a sense of autonomy that directly impacts employee productivity. Reduced absenteeism is another advantage, as employees no longer need to take a PTO to attend to minor commitments at home.

However, the startups as well as the employees must have strategies to set clear boundaries, demarcating personal and professional lives, to let the idea of work-life balance succeed.

Continuous improvement and adaptation

To have a strong remote work culture, it is critical to have an environment where feedback is valued. Start-ups can foster such an environment by encouraging their employees to share their feedback, experiences or insights through various channels. Actively seeking feedback puts continuous improvement at the forefront and the employees feel valued and cared for.

This not only boosts operational efficiency but also leads to high employee engagement, further contributing to their being open to continuous learning and adaptability to keep pace with technological advancements. A work culture that embraces growth through continuous learning and upskilling is what sets organisations apart from the crowd. Further, an adaptable team knows how to bounce back from challenges or less than favourable outcomes, and quickly turn around the situation—something that is extremely critical for a start-up to stay ahead in the competition.

The way forward

Remote work, as we see it today, was unheard of a few years ago. It was offered to employees only as an option to accommodate some exigencies—on a case-to-case basis. It was detested by the leadership team of organisations due to the absence of accountability and accurate performance metrics. Not anymore. The technology has advanced so much that many companies have gone fully remote—20% post COVID compared to 2.3% pre-COVID.  Communication and collaborative technologies like Zoom, Slack, and Google Meet have made teleconferencing easier than ever, making teams embrace this change wholeheartedly. The rise of sophisticated project management software has led to clearly defined performance metrics, making accountability and monitoring easier than ever before, resulting in leadership buying in this change.

Conclusion

The rise of remote work has made a globally diverse talent pool available for startups, but they need to be ready to pay for premium talent if they want to leverage this opportunity. The cost saved from needing an office space may be channelled into paying adequately to attract the best talent.

The future looks promising for remote work as more and more companies continue to adopt it with the rapid technological advancements as well as the change in the nature of the job itself. As technology continues to grow, and now with the introduction of the omnipresent ‘Artificial Intelligence’, there will be a drastic change in how we will be working, making more space for remote adoption driven by task automation and increased productivity.  According to a study by World Economic forum, remote digital jobs will grow by 25% and rise to reach 90 million by 2030.

To wrap up, here are some strategies that can help a startup build a strong remote work culture:

  1. Build trust and accountability
  2. Establish transparency in communication
  3. Set clear deliverables and have performance metrics
  4. Fostering Team Collaboration and Engagement
  5. Establish and encourage a positive company culture
  6. Encourage work-life balance
  7. Create an environment of continuous learning and adaptability

These strategies can help startups have a robust team that is deeply engaged, and motivated and works cohesively because of being remote, instead of ‘despite;’ being remote. Whether or not companies accept this change, remote work is not just a passing trend but is here to stay. Planning for it and strategizing for it is not only a prudent business decision, but also the only way forward to build a strong remote work culture, that will establish the organisation as one that values change, and attracts the topmost talent.

“If a company doesn’t go remote, they’ll steal your most talented people” – Chris Herd Founder & CEO @FirstbaseHQ

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Khazan Singh and Ors. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.

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This article is authored by Shreya Jad. The article is a detailed case analysis of the Supreme Court’s judgement in Khazan Singh and Ors. vs. State of U.P. (1974) which discusses the scope and ambit of the State Government’s power to make laws on inter-state routes under Chapter IV-A of the Motors Vehicles Act, 1939. The decision is a landmark in the extra-territorial applicability of a State Government’s laws if sufficient territorial nexus is established.

Introduction

The founding father of the Constitution of India added a unique feature to the Indian governance system by making it “quasi-federal” in nature. This means that while the governance structure carries elements of a federal government, it has a strong unitary core which does not make a true federation. Unlike a true federation of States, such as the United States of America, where the states voluntarily elect to unite and form a nation of their own free will, they can also secede from the Union at any time. The states in India are not granted any such authority, and their powers are perpetually subordinated to those of the Union Government. 

In order to regulate the distribution of legislative powers between the Union and State Governments, as well as to define the extent of the powers of the State Government vis-a-vis the other states, it is necessary to establish effective laws that are tailored to the unique composition of our nation. These laws are enshrined in Part XI of the Constitution of India which exclusively deals with centre-state relations and defines the extent of the State Government’s powers vis-a-vis the other states. In addition to the Constitutional provisions for the distribution of powers between the centre and state, the Indian judiciary has issued binding rulings that have established legal doctrines through precedent governing centre-state relations. One of these doctrines developed by the Indian judiciary is the doctrine of territorial nexus.

The doctrine of territorial nexus emerges from Article 245 of the Constitution which defines the nature and extent of the powers of the Union Legislature as well as the State Legislature. As per the article, the Union Legislature has the power to make laws with respect to the whole or part of any territory of India, the State Legislature has the power to make laws for the whole or any part of the state. However, the article also legitimises the laws made by the Union Legislature even if they are operative beyond the territorial limits of India. The doctrine of territorial nexus provides such leave to the extension of the State Government’s powers beyond its territorial limits by stating that even a state law of extra-territorial operation shall be valid if a direct and sufficient nexus has been established between the subject matter of the legislation and the law being imposed. 

Furthermore, it must be proved that the link between the subject matter and the laws enforced by the state is actual rather than illusory and that the liability sought to be imposed by the state is directly related to that nexus. The Supreme Court has, in several decisions, reiterated this doctrine and used it to validate several laws that were applicable in other states despite the limitation of territorial jurisdiction. 

Details of the case

Name of the case: Ch. Khazan Singh and Ors. vs. State of U.P and Ors.

Citation: AIR 1974 SC 669, (1974)1 SCC 295

Nature of case: Civil Appeals Nos. 1737 to 1745 of 1972.

Bench: Justice A.N. Ray (then Chief Justice), Justice H.R. Khanna, Justice K.K. Mathew, Justice A. Alagiriswami and Justice P.N. Bhagwati (judgement authored by Justice H.R. Khanna). 

Background of the case 

The Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Khazan Singh vs. State of U.P (1974). (“Khazan Singh”) is an important addition to the plethora of judgements examining the territorial nexus of the state’s executive and legislative powers with respect to inter-state subjects. Briefly, the State Government of Uttar Pradesh had passed a notification in 1963 under Section 68-C and Section 68-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as MV-Act, 1939), authorising only State Transport Undertakings (“STU”) to ply their vehicles on inter-state routes between Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. By way of the same notification, the permits of private transport companies running their buses on these inter-state routes in both Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh were revoked. Subsequently, some of the private bus owners objected to this and filed writ petitions before the High Courts of Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan respectively, which were set aside, hence the private bus owners filed a civil appeal before the Supreme Court, challenging the validity of the aforementioned notifications on the grounds that the Government of Uttar Pradesh did not have the authority to pass a law revoking the licence of private bus owners in Rajasthan. 

However, this contention was set aside by the Supreme Court, primarily on the basis that Section 68D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, allowed the State Government to publish such a notification revoking the licence of private bus owners only with the prior approval of the Central Government, which had already been obtained by the Government of Uttar Pradesh before the notifications were published in the U.P. Gazette. Therefore, the Government of Uttar Pradesh did not act beyond the scope and ambit of its legislative and executive powers. The facts of the case and the resulting judgement by the Supreme Court are described more fully in the following paragraphs. 

Facts of Khazan Singh and Ors. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. (AIR 1974 SC 669)

  • In 1960, the Government of Uttar Pradesh decided upon a reciprocal arrangement between Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan, wherein the following inter-state routes would be nationalised for the operation of the STUs on the following routes. However, the Supreme Court took into consideration only 4 of these routes for the purposes of its judgement (the Bharatpur-Mathura route was excluded from the purview of the Supreme Court’s judgement):

1. Bharatpur-Agra

2. Bharatpur-Mathura

3. Alwar-Mathura

4. Mathura-Kama Kosi via Goverdhan;

5. Agra-Dholpur

The Government of Rajasthan consented to this arrangement.

  • On 4th December 1961, the Government of Uttar Pradesh published a scheme in its Official Gazette (scheme), under Section 68C of the MV-Act, 1939 which allowed only STUs to provide road transport on the aforesaid inter-state routes. 
  • This effectively barred all the private transport operators from plying their vehicles on these inter-state routes. Further, the scheme stated that the permits granted to private operators (which included the appellants) for running their buses on these routes shall be cancelled, subject to any objections submitted against the Scheme as per Section 68D of the MV-Act, 1939.
  • The Government of Uttar Pradesh invited objections against the Scheme, however, no objections were submitted and thereafter the Scheme was approved under Section 68D(2) of the MV-Act, 1939 by the Joint Judicial Secretary to the Government of Uttar Pradesh.
  • Further, the Central Government also granted its approval to the scheme vide its letter dated 20th February, 1963. This approval was a necessary prerequisite for the scheme to become effective as per the proviso to Section 68D(3) of the MV-Act, 1939.
  • The Scheme was published in the Official Gazette on 20th February 1963 granting exclusivity to STUs to ply on the inter-state routes and prohibiting private operators from running their buses on the same routes by cancelling their permits. 
  • A subsequent notification was published on 9th April 1963 through which the permits allotted to various private transport operators (including the appellants) granted by the Regional Transport Authority, Jaipur and countersigned by the Regional Transport Authority (Agra) were cancelled under Section 68F (2) of the MV-Act, 1939.
  • The notifications dated 9th April 1963 and 4th December 1961 (notifications) were challenged by the appellants along with several other petitioners challenged the validity of the Scheme through writ petitions filed under Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution of India before the High Court of Allahabad as well as the High Court of Rajasthan, however for the purposes of the civil appeals before the Supreme Court, only the proceedings initiated before the High Court of Rajasthan were considered and therefore the decisions of the High Court of Rajasthan on the aforesaid writ petitions shall be examined herein. 

Decision of the High Court of Rajasthan

The appellants filed a writ petition under Article 226 in the High Court of Rajasthan seeking that the impugned notifications (as mentioned above) be quashed on the grounds that the Government of Uttar Pradesh acted in excess of its legislative and executive power by cancelling the licences of private bus operators in Rajasthan. The petition was heard by a Single Judge of the High Court and it was held that “a State cannot by unilateral action provide transport services for a territory outside the limits of its own territory”. 

The Single Judge further observed that the government of one state (in this case Government of Uttar Pradesh) cannot use its executive power to cancel the transport permits of private operators in another state (in this case Rajasthan). Additionally, the bus operators in Rajasthan had never been notified of this scheme as these Notifications had only been published in the Gazette of Uttar Pradesh. Accordingly, these Notifications were quashed by the Single Judge and the writ petitions filed by the appellants were allowed. 

Subsequently, the order of the Single Judge was appealed against and the matter was heard by a division bench of the High Court of Rajasthan. In its order where it overturned the decision of the Single Judge, the division bench held that “when an undertaking proposes a scheme and the same is approved by the State Government, the undertaking and the State Government really perform the functions of the Central Government under clause (2) of Article. 258 of the Constitution.” With respect to the cancellation of permits of private bus operators in Rajasthan vide the impugned notifications, the division bench relied upon the notification dated 9th April 1963 which was countersigned by the Regional Transport Authorities based in Jaipur as well as Agra. The division bench further observed that when the Scheme was finalised the transport authorities of Uttar Pradesh cancelled the permits of private bus operators in the state which were countersigned by the transport authorities of Rajasthan and vice-versa. Therefore, the cancellation of permits was a concurrent and valid exercise. 

The division bench also set aside the argument that the private bus operators in Rajasthan were unaware of the implementation of such a scheme since notices informing people about the scheme were put up on the notice boards of transport authorities of Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan. Accordingly, the appeals against the decision of the Single judge were allowed and the decision in the writ petition was overturned. 

Aggrieved by the decision of the division bench, the appellants filed the civil appeals under discussion before the Supreme Court, questioning the correctness of the view taken by the division bench in its judgement.

Issues raised

  1. Whether the power of the State Government to make laws can only operate within the territory of its own state or not?
  2. Whether the scheme implemented by the State Government of Uttar Pradesh is unconstitutional by virtue of the state implementing a law beyond its territorial limits or not?
  3. Whether in approving the Scheme, the State Government acted in excess of its executive power which cannot operate in areas beyond the territorial limits of the state or not?

Laws discussed in the case

Constitution of India

Article 13 and Article 245 of the Constitution

Article 13 of the Constitution of India nullifies any law (whether enacted before the Constitution came into force or enacted after the Constitution came into force) that abrogates or takes away any of the rights provided to the citizens in Part III of the Constitution i.e. Fundamental Rights. It also specifies which legislative instruments shall be deemed as “law” which include ordinances, rules, regulations, notifications, customs or usage having the force of law. 

The power to make and enact laws has been vested in the Union and State Legislatures, as per Article 245 of the Constitution of India. More specifically, the said article defines the territorial limits where the laws made by each body shall extend. The Parliament has the authority to make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India (implied authority that it can make laws for a state or union territory as well), whereas the State Legislature can make laws for its respective state only. 

It is an established position that the legislature’s power to make laws is co-extensive with its power to repeal laws, therefore, both the Union and State Legislature derive their power to repeal laws also from Article 245. The Union or State Legislature generally repeals a law by way of a repealing act or ordinance, or, in the alternative, by way of superseding legislation that effectively repeals an existing law by replacing it.

In the case of Khazan Singh, the appellant had stated in its arguments that the State Government in approving a scheme in respect of an interstate route has effectively made a law and since the State Government is only confined to making laws which are applicable to its own territorial jurisdiction, the Scheme under discussion in the case is ipso facto unconstitutional. However, the Supreme Court rejected this contention, stating that while the Scheme would fall under the ambit of “law” as per Article 13(3), the embargo put in place by Article 245 would not be applicable to the State Government. Since the State Government derives its authority to approve a scheme for inter-state routes from Parliamentary legislation (MV-Act, 1939), it is well within its rights to approve a scheme for inter-state routes without acting in excess of its territorial limits. 

Article 258 of the Constitution

Article 258 of the Constitution essentially deals with the delegation of powers from the Union to the State. The article states that the President of India, with the prior consent of the State Government can entrust to the State Government or any of its officers the legislative powers and executive functions performed by the Union Legislature, as it deems necessary and expedient. 

Article 258(2) authorises Parliament to enact a law that confers powers and imposes duties upon the state or its officers and authorities, despite the fact that such authority pertains to a matter over which the State Legislature lacks the authority to enact laws. Therefore, it refers to a scenario in which the Union Government grants powers and responsibilities to the State Government to enact laws over subject matters which would normally fall outside the scope of the State Government’s authority. 

While quashing the decision of the Learned Single Judge of the High Court of Rajasthan, the Division Bench also relied upon Article 258(2) and stated: “When an undertaking proposes a scheme and the same is approved by the State Government, the undertaking and the State Government really perform the functions of the Central Government under clause (2) of article 258 of the Constitution…” 

Furthermore, while the appeal against this decision was being heard before the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court observed that the approval of the Scheme by the Government of Uttar Pradesh under Section 68D(3) did not signify encroachment in the sphere of executive function of the Government of Rajasthan. The approval was given in order to create a state monopoly in inter-state transport in accordance with the MV-Act, 1939 a Central Act. Further, since the actions of both the State Governments were in concurrence with each other it can hardly be said that there was any encroachment of executive powers of the State Government of Rajasthan. Therefore, the Supreme Court did not find the need to examine if the approval of the Scheme granted by the Government of Uttar Pradesh would be valid as per Article 258(2) of the Constitution.

Article 298 of the Constitution

Article 298 defines the executive powers of the Union and State Legislatures which respectively allow them to carry on any trade or business, hold and acquire property and also enter into contracts independently. In areas of trade/business/commerce where the Union is not permitted to establish laws, due to such areas being part of List II of the Seventh Schedule the Union’s executive power shall be subject to the laws of the State Government. Conversely, the executive power of a State Government over trade/business/commerce in areas where the Union has a right to legislate, as per List I and List III of the Seventh Schedule, shall be subject to the prevailing Union Legislation.

One of the arguments made by the appellants in this case was that the State Government, in approving the Scheme under Section 68D(3) of the MV-Act,1939 exercised its executive powers beyond the territorial limits of the state. However, while examining the nature and extent of the executive power granted to the State and Union Governments, the Court relied on Article 298 and held that such executive power exercised by the State Government under Article 298 can extend beyond the territorial limit of the state. The sole limitation on the executive power of the State Government is laid down in clause (b) of the proviso to Article 298 which stipulates that the executive power of a State Government is subject to the legislation passed by Parliament if it pertains to a trade or business that the State Government is unable to legislate over. 

Under Entry 21 in List III of the Seventh Schedule, the Parliament has the right to make laws for commercial and industrial monopolies, and Entry 35 of List III of the Seventh Schedule, relates to making laws regulating mechanically propelled vehicles including the principles on which taxes on such vehicles are to be levied. While examining the creation of a state monopoly in transport services as per Chapter IVA of the MV-Act, 1939 in H.C. Narayanappa and others vs. State of Mysore and others (1960), the Supreme Court held that the extent of the Union Government’s authority with respect to commercial or industrial monopolies for states as per Entry 21 of List III, consists of the creation of commercial or industrial monopolies in states as well as controlling these monopolies. 

As already held by the Supreme Court in the judgement of H.C. Narayanappa, Chapter IV-A of the MV-Act, 1939 was correctly enforced by the Parliament to achieve the objective of creating a state monopoly on mechanically propelled vehicles (transportation) as laid down in Entry 35 and Entry 21 of List III in the Seventh Schedule. In the context of Khazan Singh, the action taken by the Government of Uttar Pradesh in approving the Scheme was in accordance with the provisions of Chapter- IVA of the MV-Act, 1939 and creating a monopoly in the favour of STUs on the interstate routes under discussion. Thus, it cannot be said that the Government of Uttar Pradesh was acting in excess of its executive power or encroaching upon the executive functions of the Government of Rajasthan.

Motors Vehicles Act, 1939

Chapter IVA was inserted in the MV-Act by the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1956 The said chapter enacted Sections 68A to 68I of the MV-Act, 1939 which dealt with provisions related to STUs. 

Section 68B of Motor Vehicles Act

Section 68B of the MV-Act, 1939 is an overriding clause which states that the provisions of Chapter IVA and the rules and orders made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in Chapter IV of this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law.

Section 68C of Motor Vehicles Act

Section 68C of the MV-Act, 1939 enables an STU, as defined in Section 68A of the Act, to prepare a scheme for the nationalisation of transport services, with the particulars mentioned in the section, if the STU believes that it is in the public interest to do so. The STU can decide that the overall road transport services in a particular state or a part of the route thereof be run and operated by an STU. In creating such a monopoly, the STU has the right to partially or completely exclude private bus operators from such transport services. In order to make this effective, the STU shall formulate a scheme consisting of the particulars of the nature of the services rendered, the area/route which shall be covered and any other details, which shall be subsequently published in the Official Gazette and/or any other manner which the State Government deems fit. 

Section 68D of Motor Vehicles Act

Section 68D of the MV-Act,1939 allows individuals who are impacted by the scheme to submit objections to the State Government within thirty days of the proposed scheme’s publication in the Official Gazette. Subsequently, as per sub-section(2) of Section 68D, of the MV-Act, 1939, the State Government is required to evaluate the objections after providing the person objecting to the scheme or his representatives and the representatives of the STU with an opportunity to be heard. The State Government is granted the authority to either sanction or modify the scheme. The scheme is subsequently published in the Official Gazette by the State Government after it has been approved or modified, and then it is considered definitive. The scheme that has been approved will then be implemented for the designated location or route, as per sub-section (3) of Section 68D. However, the proviso to Section 68D(3) states that a scheme pertaining to an inter-state route shall not be considered an approved scheme unless it has been published in the Official Gazette with the prior sanction of the Central Government.

Judgement in Khazan Singh and Ors. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. (AIR 1974 SC 669)

The Supreme Court took into account the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan and the arguments put forth by the appellants and dismissed the civil appeals filed on the following grounds:

Authority of State Government to make laws on inter-state routes

In response to the arguments put forth by the appellant that a State Government cannot approve the Scheme under Section 68D of the MV-Act, 1939 since it cannot make laws beyond its own territory, the Supreme Court held that this argument is contrary to the proviso to Section 68-D(3) which clearly states that a scheme for an inter-state route shall only be deemed official after obtaining the approval of the Central Government. Thus, the Proviso expressly gives the State Government authority to approve schemes for inter-state routes as per the provisions of Chapter IV-A of the MV-Act, 1939 provided it has taken the prior approval of such a scheme from the Central Government. In the present case, the State Government of Uttar Pradesh had obtained the approval of the Central Government for the Scheme vide the letter dated 19th February 1963. The Supreme Court went on to define an inter-state route as one in which one terminus falls in one State and the other in another State. Therefore, in light of the proviso to Section 68-D(3) of the MV-Act, 1939 the contention that the Government of Uttar Pradesh lacked the competence to approve the Scheme was set aside. 

Power of State Government to approve schemes for the entire inter-state route

The appellants had further contended that a State Government had the authority to approve of a scheme only relating to the portion of the inter-state route falling within its own territory and not for the entire inter-state route, part of which would fall within the jurisdiction of another State Government. This argument was set aside by the Supreme Court on the ground that if the Act imposed such an embargo on the State Government, there would have been no requirement for prior approval of the scheme from the Central Government. However, for approving a scheme for the nationalisation of an inter-state route outside the territorial limits of its state prior approval of the Central Government is required, because the scheme envisages nationalisation of transport service not only for the part of the inter-state route within the territorial limits of the State Government but also for the remaining part of the route which is outside the said territorial limits. Because of the same, the appellant’s contention of the State Government’s authority to make laws only with respect to the part of the route falling within Uttar Pradesh was not found tenable.

Limitation on the power of State Government to make laws outside its territorial limits

While objecting to the implementation of the Scheme as approved by the Government of Uttar Pradesh, the appellants had argued that the State Government’s approval of the Scheme amounts to enacting a “law” under Article 13, and since as per Article 245, the State Government can only enact laws within its territory, the Scheme was unconstitutional. In response to this, the Supreme Court held that while the Scheme would be construed as “law” under Article 13, the limitation on the power of the State Legislature under Article 245 shall not apply. The restriction on the power of the State Legislature to make laws outside its territorial limits cannot be invoked to restrict the power conferred upon the State Government by a Central Act to approve the scheme for an inter-state route. 

Further, the appellants had also contended that in approving the Scheme the State Government acted in excess of its executive power. In response to this, the Supreme Court stated that the State Government in approving a scheme with respect to an inter-state route exercises its statutory power vested in it by the Union Government under Section 68-D(3) of the MV-Act, 1939. The said authority extends to the creation and management of a monopoly in trade and commerce by a State Government, without any territorial limitations on its power. The State Government derives its executive power from Article 298 of the Constitution, which does not restrict the State Government’s executive power of creating and managing a monopoly to its territorial limits. Therefore, the Government of Uttar Pradesh acted in concurrence with the Government of Rajasthan to approve the Scheme to create a monopoly in favour of STUs and in doing so, the Government of Uttar Pradesh did not act in excess of its executive powers.

Rationale behind this judgement

The Supreme Court in its decision upheld the validity of the scheme approved by the Government of Uttar Pradesh with respect to inter-state routes, under Section 68C and Section 68D of the MV-Act, 1939 primarily based on a three-pronged reasoning:

  1. The scheme had been granted the prior approval of the Central Government and thus its applicability extended to the portion of the inter-state route in the State of Rajasthan as well. Given the prior approval of the Central Government to the Scheme the embargo on the territorial applicability of the State Government’s powers would not apply here;
  2. The Government of Uttar Pradesh, while revoking the permits of private bus operators and implementing the Scheme acted in concurrence with the Government of Rajasthan, therefore there was no question of there being an encroachment of the executive power of the State Government of Rajasthan;
  3. In order to create a monopoly in trade/commerce in a particular state, the executive power of the State Government can also extend beyond the territory of its own state. This was supported by Article 298 which allows both Union and State Governments to carry out trade and commerce in the exercise of their executive powers. By virtue of this article, the State Government not only has the power to control a monopoly but also create one with the force of a Central Act and in doing so, the State Government is not acting in excess of its executive powers.

Relevant judgements referred in the case

H.C. Narayanappa and others vs. State of Mysore and others (1960)

The Supreme Court relied on its decision on this case to elucidate on “commercial and industrial monopolies”, and more particularly on the creation of State monopolies in the transport service to support its decision in Khazan Singh. While dealing with the issue of the Union Government creating monopolies for the State Government, the Supreme Court had observed in H.C. Narayanappa and others vs. the State of Mysore and others. that “the amplitude of powers under the entry in the concurrent list expressly dealing with commercial and industrial monopolies cannot be presumed to be restricted by the generality of the expression trade and commerce in the State list“. The Supreme Court had further observed in this case that if they were to accept that the exclusive right of creating monopolies in trade and commerce rests only with a particular State Government then the Union Legislature would be incapable of making any laws for the creation of monopolies for any commercial/trading venture despite having the express authority to do so by Article 298 and the fundamental freedom to carry out any business granted under Article 19(6) of the Constitution. 

The appellants had also relied on the following judgements to support their arguments which were individually distinguished by the Supreme Court based on the fact that the question of law involved in each of these judgements was materially different.

Emperor vs. Sibnath Banerji (1945)

In this case, an appeal was filed before the High Court of Bombay against orders issued by the Federal Court in a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of nine individuals arrested under a preventive detention order issued under Rule 26 of the Defence of India Rules, 1939, directing the release of the nine detainees. Rule 26 of the Defence of India Act of 1939 authorised the Central or Provincial Governments to issue a preventative detention order against an individual who they considered was endangering public safety or interest. This rule was later declared ultra vires by the Federal Court because it exceeded the Central Government’s rule-making authority under the Defence of India Act, 1939. As a result, the Governor-General issued an Ordinance broadening the Central Government’s rule-making authority to include the terms of Rule 26 as well as making the Ordinance retrospectively applicable by prohibiting any challenge to preventive detention orders issued prior to the passage of this Ordinance on the grounds that the Central Government acted beyond its authority in issuing those orders. The Federal Court, which heard the writ of habeas corpus, ruled that Rule 26 exceeded the rule-making authority granted by the legislature to the Central Government and thus is unlawful. The Federal Court had supported its decision by relying on Section 49(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935 stating that the section limited the Provincial Legislature’s authority to make laws, and making laws on the defence of India did not fall within those powers.

The High Court of Bombay set aside such a narrow reading of the section and relied on Section 124(4) of the Government of India Act, 1935 which provides that where an Act of the Federal Government confers powers and imposes duties upon a Province or officers and authorities thereof in relation to a matter with respect to which a Provincial Legislature has no power to make laws, the Federation is to pay to the Province for additional costs incurred by the Provincial Administration’s while carrying out the functions delegated by the Federal Government. The High Court interpreted Section 49(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935 as establishing an extendable limit to the powers of the Provincial Legislature rather than a maximum limit, and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 124 as providing a means for such extension. 

Since the material question involved here is with respect to the delegation of executive power from Central Government to State Government, and not the applicability of one state’s authority to legislate over other State’s matters, the decision was not relied upon.

In Re the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension) vs. The Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950 (1951)

In this case, the Supreme Court extensively dealt with the issue of determining the extent to which the legislature can delegate its legislative power and the distinction between delegated legislation and conditional legislation. The Supreme Court further observed that the legislature is typically required to fulfil its primary legislative function directly, rather than through others. However, it has the ability to delegate, and this power is essential for the full and effective exercise of its legislative authority. Furthermore, the legislature is prohibited from relinquishing its legislative responsibilities and assuming the role of a parallel legislature.

Again, the material question of law here is with respect to the delegation of power from the Central Government to the State Government through delegated legislation and conditional legislation and not the applicability of one state’s authority to legislate over other state’s matters. Thus this judgement was also not relied upon.

Gullapalli Nageswara Rao and others vs. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and another (1959)

This case dealt with a writ petition filed before the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of the petitioners’ fundamental right to carry on the business of motor transport in Krishna District in Andhra Pradesh, and for prohibiting the respondents from taking over the routes on which the petitioners have been plying their stage carriages.

The petitioners were private bus operators plying their buses in the Krishna District, however subsequent to the insertion of Chapter IV-A of the MV-Act, 1939 a scheme nationalising the bus transport services in the State was passed and approved by the Government of Andhra Pradesh and published in the official gazette. The petitioners fearing the implications of the scheme on their business approached the Supreme Court challenging the provisions of Chapter IV-A of the MV-Act, 1939 as violative of the fundamental rights granted under the Constitution. The petitioners argued that Chapter IV-A of the Act, in substance and effect, authorises the State to acquire the transport undertakings of citizens without providing compensation for the same, therefore it is violative of Article 31, as Article 31 specifies that no law shall be made for the transfer of ownership or right to possession of any property to the State or to a Corporation without fixing the amount of compensation or specifying the principles on which compensation is to be determined and given. They also contended that Chapter IV-A of the Act is a colourable legislation that enables such a transfer of ownership without providing compensation for the property transferred, under the guise of cancellation of a permit.

In its decision, the Supreme Court determined that the Constitution permits the state to enact a law that imposes reasonable limitations on the right of a citizen to engage in business, establish a monopoly, or empower the State to conduct business at the expense of a citizen. According to the MV-Act of 1939, the Regional Transport Authority is authorised to revoke the current permit and issue a new permit to the STU if a scheme has been published that allows the STU to provide transport services in a specific area, route, or portion of the same to the exclusion of any individual who has been conducting business in that area. The process of the transport authority cancelling the permit of an individual conducting transport business on a route and transferring it to another individual does not constitute a transfer of business, nor does it even involve the transfer of the permit from one individual to another. The Regional Transport Authority is entrusted with the regulatory jurisdiction to cancel a permit in favour of one entity and issue a new permit to another. Consequently, Chapter IV-A was not held to be a colourable legislation that was enacted to infringe upon the fundamental rights that the Supreme Court had granted under the Constitution.

While the decision, in this case, dealt with similar provisions of Chapter IV-A of the MV-Act,1939 it only challenged the vires of Chapter IV-A and did not contemplate the authority of State Government to legislature on subjects related to another State Government’s functions, hence it was not relied upon the Supreme Court in Khazan Singh

Analysis of the case

The Supreme Court’s judgement in Khazan Singh is relevant since it brought forth one of the few known exceptions to the doctrine of territorial nexus. This doctrine restricts the applicability of a government’s laws to its territorial limits and while this position is widely practised in the Indian federal system, there are few exceptions to this doctrine. 

In its decision in Khazan Singh, the Supreme Court relied on the language and intent of various Sections of Chapter IVA of the MV-Act, 1939 to decipher that the said chapter fully envisioned the extension of a State Government’s power to nationalise an inter-state route. Unlike other areas where the powers of the State and Union continue to be exercised in different spheres, here the Union Government intends to give the State Government authority to extend the ambit of its executive powers beyond the scope of its territory as long as it holds the assent of the Central Government itself. 

Another important aspect brought to light by this judgement was the creation of a monopoly in favour of state-owned undertakings in various areas of trade and commerce. This monopoly-creation is another aspect where the Union Government does not limit the State Government’s powers (with the exception of subjects mentioned in List I and List III of the Seventh Schedule) rather it allows it to extend the same beyond its territorial jurisdiction as long as the procedure laid down in Chapter IV-A of the MV-Act, 1939 is being followed. 

In both aspects- the applicability of a state-enacted law beyond its territorial limits, and the creation of a monopoly in favour of STUs within and beyond its own State, the Supreme Court sought to legitimise it on the basis of the approval accorded by the Union Legislature to the Scheme which carved out an exception to the doctrine of severability. 

Conclusion 

The doctrine of territorial nexus is imposed by Article 245 of the Constitution which delineates the applicability of the Union and State Government’s power and also allows the Union Government to make legislation which has extraterritorial applicability. While this is generally not applicable to State Governments, the laws formed by the State Government can also have extraterritorial applicability, as long as there is sufficient nexus between the law and subject matter. 

In the case of Khazan Singh, the Scheme approved by the Government of Uttar Pradesh had a direct relation to the objective of nationalisation of the inter-state routes as envisaged by Chapter IVA of the MV-Act, 1939. Thus the territorial nexus was established in the matter and also supported by the approval of the Scheme by the Central Government. Additionally, the Supreme Court also relied on Article 298 to establish an exception to the general restriction on extraterritorial applicability of State Government’s laws, since the article itself does not impose a territorial limit on activities of trade and commerce carried out by the State Government. 

Therefore, the decision in Khazan Singh is a significant precedent highlighting the applicability of the doctrine of territorial nexus in different scenarios. 

References

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Uttam vs. Saubhag Singh & Ors. (2016)

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The article is written by Jyotika Saroha. The present article provides a detailed overview of the judgement of Uttam vs. Saubhag Singh & Ors pronounced by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 2016. It elucidates the factual background, issues, contentions by the parties, judgement and analysis of the case. It basically focuses on the concept of the Mitakshara coparcenary system in Hindu joint families. 

Introduction 

A Hindu joint family or an undivided family wherein the affairs of the family or the business of the family is owned and controlled by the members of said family in a joint manner. ‘Karta’ is referred to as the representative of the Hindu joint family. The said arrangement of the Joint Hindu Family is governed by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. This legislation particularly discusses the transfer and ownership of the property inherited by individuals in the Hindu joint family. Coparcenary property implies the property that has been divided amongst the coparceners after the ancestral property has been divided. The present case of Uttam vs. Saubhag Singh & Ors. (2016) has gone through a long discussion in respect of the Mitakshara law, wherein a Hindu acquires the right to property by birth, especially focusing on testamentary and intestate succession. The present case describes the rights of a grandson in the property of his grandfather after his death. The case was primarily filed in the lower court, then went to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh and finally came before the Supreme Court in the form of a civil appeal.

Details of the case

Name of the case: Uttam vs. Saubhag Singh & Ors. 

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 2360 of 2016

Equivalent Citation: AIR 2016 SC 1169

Laws Discussed: Hindu Succession Act, 1956

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: Hon’ble Justice R.F. Nariman and Justice Kurian Joseph

Author of the judgement: Justice R.F. Nariman

Parties to the case

Appellant/Plaintiff: Uttam 

Respondents: Saubhag Singh & Ors.

Judgement date: 2 March, 2016

Factual background of the case

In the present case, a suit for partition was filed by the plaintiff, namely Suit No. 5A of 1999, in the court of the Second Civil Judge, Class II Devas, Madhya Pradesh, on December 28, 1988, against the four defendants. In the present case, defendant No. 3 is the plaintiff’s father, whereas defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 4 are his uncles, his father’s brothers. Jagannath Singh, the grandfather of the plaintiff, died in 1973 while leaving behind his wife, Mainabai and their four children, including the father of the plaintiff. The plaintiff in the suit for partition claimed that 1/8th of the share in the suit property should be given to him. He claimed that the suit property is an ancestral property, and being a coparcener, by virtue of his birth, he had a right to the said property in accordance with the Mitakshara law. On the other side, the four defendants jointly filed a statement and claimed that the suit property is not ancestral and that there has been a partition in which the plaintiff’s father got separated. 

Proceedings of the case

Suit for partition was filed before the trial court by the plaintiff.

The suit for partition was filed by the plaintiff in the court of the Second Civil Judge, Class II Devas, Madhya Pradesh. The Second Civil Judge, in its order dated December 20, 2000, held that the property was ancestral property as defendant no. 1, namely, Mangilal, the uncle of the plaintiff, himself admitted this fact. Further, there was no evidence found with regard to the said partition as claimed by the four defendants. 

First appeal filed before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh by the defendants

The first appeal was filed by the four defendants against the order of the trial court. The first appellate court pronounced its judgement on January 12, 2005. It was held that the observation given by the trial court with regard to the ancestral property was correct.  On similar grounds, it was stated that the suit property was ancestral, and there is no evidence found with respect to the partition that took place between the four defendants. However, if the right of partition is to be looked into, the court observed that after the death of Jagannath Singh and his widow, namely, Mainabai, the share of the property had to be distributed as per the provisions of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The court stated that if Jagannath Singh, the grandfather of the appellant, had died intestate, in that situation, the property had to be divided in accordance with intestate succession rather than survivorship succession. In the present scenario, the plaintiff’s father is alive, and being a Class I heir, the plaintiff is disentitled to sue for the right of partition. Therefore, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff and allowed the first appeal.

Second appeal before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh

Being aggrieved with the decision given in the first appeal, the plaintiff filed a second appeal before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. In the second appeal, the decision was pronounced against the plaintiff, and it was stated that the first appellate court rightly dismissed the suit for partition filed by the appellant/plaintiff. In the second appeal, the High Court, by referring to Sections 4, 6 and 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, held that the grandson has no right by birth when his father is alive and during the lifetime of his father, he cannot claim partition in the property. The appellant in the present case, whose grandfather, Jagannath Singh, died in 1973, is disentitled to claim partition of the property during the period when his father, Mohan Singh, was alive and is a Class-I heir. 

Civil appeal before the Supreme Court

Aggrieved by the decision of the lower court and High Court of Madhya Pradesh, the appellant approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court by way of filing a civil appeal for the purpose of claiming partition in the property of the suit.

Issues raised before the Supreme Court

Following issues were raised before the Hon’ble Supreme Court:

  1. Whether the suit property continued to keep its character as a joint Hindu property?
  2. Whether the appellant has right upon the suit property as a coparcener?
  3. Whether the appellant has the right to file a suit for partition when his father, Mohan Singh, who is a Class-I heir, is alive?

Arguments of the parties

The arguments on behalf of the appellant were presented by the learned senior advocate Shri Sushil Kumar Jain, whereas the arguments on behalf of the respondents were presented by learned counsel Shri Niraj Sharma. The following contentions were made on behalf of the appellant and respondents:

Appellant/Plaintiff

  1. The first contention on behalf of the appellant was that the present situation is to be governed as per the proviso of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, as Mainabai, the widow of Jagannath Singh, was alive in 1973 at the time of her husband’s death. Jagannath Singh, who died intestate, would have his interest in the property devolved or transferred to the Class I heirs through intestate succession and not by way of survivorship succession, as per Section 8 of the said Act.
  2. The second contention made by the appellant’s advocate was that it is the interest of the deceased in the coparcenary property that would be transferred by intestacy, and it would not otherwise affect the joint family property. 
  3. The third contention was made with regard to the appellant’s ‘right to sue for partition’. It was stated that the right for partition in the joint family property shall continue to prevail even after the death of his grandfather, and being a coparcener, he has the right to sue for partition, and it cannot be taken away.
  4. It was further argued by the appellant that the suit shall not be barred as Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, would only be applicable at the time of the death of Jagannath Singh, the appellant’s grandfather and not after his death. 
  5. The appellant is entitled to partition as a living coparcener of the joint family property before any other death occurred in the joint family property.
  6. Lastly, it was stated that the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, only overrides Hindu law and Sections 6 and 8 of the said Act have to be read in a harmonious way. The status given to joint family property under Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, can’t be taken away due to the mere applicability of Section 8 upon the death of Jagganath Singh, the grandfather of the appellant.

Respondent

  1. The respondents claimed that once Section 8 is applied by reason of the Proviso to Section 6 being applied, the joint family property ceases to be a joint family property. 
  2. It was argued that now, for the property to succeed, an application shall be made either under Section 30 or Section 8. Section 30 shall apply wherein a will has been made, and Section 8 shall apply wherein a member of joint family property dies without making a will, i.e., intestate.
  3. In order to support the above contentions, the learned counsel for respondents relied upon the cases of Commissioner Wealth Tax, Kanpur & Others vs. Chander Sen and others (1986), and Bhanwar Singh vs. Puran (2008), wherein it was held that the joint family property ceased to be joint family property once Section 8 is applied to the facts of the case.  It was further stated that when joint family property no longer exists, there shall be no right of partition in a property as a coparcener. 

Laws/ concepts involved in Uttam vs. Saubhag Singh & Ors. (2016)

Hindu Succession Act, 1956

Section 4 of Hindu Succession Act

This section deals with the overriding effect of the Act, wherein the following things that were present prior to the commencement of the Act shall discontinue to have effect on any matter for which provision is made in this Act: 

  • Any text,
  • Rule of Interpretation of Hindu Law, and
  • Any custom or usage.

It further provided that any other law that was in force prior to the commencement of the Act shall not be applicable to Hindus if it is not in consonance with the provisions of this Act.

Section 6 of Hindu Succession Act

This section deals with the devolution or transfer of interest in the coparcenary property.

Section 6(1) of Hindu Succession Act

Section 6(1) provides for the provision with regard to a daughter of a coparcener who is a member of a joint Hindu family and is dealt under the Mitakshara law from the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. 

  • She shall become a coparcener by birth, similar to that of a son.
  • She shall have similar rights and liabilities in the coparcenary property as that of a son.

And, where any reference has been made with regard to the Hindu Mitakshara coparcener, it shall be deemed to include a reference to the daughter of a coparcener. 

The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 6 provides that this provision shall not affect or invalidate any disposition or alienation, which includes partition or testamentary disposition, that happened before December 20, 2004. Prior to the amendment of 2005, coparcenary property used to be devolved by methods of survivorship rather than by succession. Earlier, the daughters were not included in the coparcenary property, but after the amendment made in 2005, daughters are also considered to be coparceners by birth and have the same rights and liabilities in the property as a son.

Section 6(3) of Hindu Succession Act

Section 6(3) deals with the provision with respect to the interest of a Hindu in a joint family property dealt with by the Mitakshara law. If the person dies prior to the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, then his interest in the coparcenary property shall be devolved by the testamentary or intestate succession rather than by survivorship. The coparcenary property shall be divided in a manner as if partition had taken place earlier.

Also, the daughter shall be allotted a similar share as allotted to a son. The share of a predeceased daughter or son shall be allotted to the surviving child of the pre-deceased daughter or son as if they had been alive at the time of partition. In the case of the share of a predeceased child of the pre-deceased daughter or son, such shall be allotted to the child of such predeceased child of a predeceased daughter or son.

Section 6(4) of Hindu Succession Act

Section 6(4) bars the jurisdiction of the court from recognising any right to proceed against the following persons, namely, the son, grandson or great-grandson, for the purposes of recovering a debt due from his father, grandfather or great-grandfather, on the ground that a sincere obligation under Hindu law exists. 

However, there is an exception laid down in the proviso to this subsection (4) of Section 6. It provides that if any such debt is due prior to the commencement of the amendment, then in that case, the right of the creditor shall not be affected. In the said situation, the creditor can proceed against the son, grandson or great-grandson for the recovery of the debt due to him.

Section 6(5) of Hindu Succession Act

Section 6(5) simply states that this section shall not apply to the partition that took place prior to December 20, 2004.

Section 8 of Hindu Succession Act

Section 8 deals with the general rule of succession in the case of males. It states that a Hindu male who dies without making a will or intestate shall devolve or transfer the joint family property in accordance with these provisions:

  • Upon the Class I heirs specified in the schedule,
  • In the absence of heirs in Class I, then upon the relatives specified in Class II of the schedule.
  • In case of absence of heirs in the two above-stated classes, then upon the agnates of the deceased,
  • Lastly, in case of absence of the agnates, then upon the cognates of the deceased.

However, in cases where no cognates also survive the deceased, then in such cases escheat applies. Under Hindu law, Section 29 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, provides the principle of escheat. Section 29 deals with the failure of heirs, it provides that if a person has died intestate without leaving any qualified heir to take care of his property, in that case the property shall be devolved on the government in the same manner as it had been devolved to an heir with the same rights and liabilities. 

Section 19 of Hindu Succession Act

Section 19 deals with the mode of succession for two or more heirs. It states that if two or more heirs succeed together in the property of an intestate, then they shall take the property in accordance with per capita and not as per stripes and as common tenants, not as joint tenants.

Section 30 of Hindu Succession Act

This section specifically deals with testamentary succession and states that any Hindu, by way of will or other testamentary disposition of property, may dispose of any property that is capable of being disposed of by him in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 or in accordance with any other law in force and applicable to Hindus.

Precedents involved in Uttam vs. Saubhag Singh & Ors. (2016)

Commissioner Wealth Tax, Kanpur & Others vs. Chander Sen and others (1986)

In this case, Rangi Lal, the father of the respondent, had immovable property and a family business. After Rangi Lal died, he left behind his son Chander Sen and his two grandsons. At the time of his death, the total amount of Rs. 1,85,043 was in his books of account. During the wealth tax assessment in the year 1966–67, the respondent Chander Sen, with his two sons, constituted a joint family and filed the tax return of his total wealth by also including the family property, which was devolved upon him through survivorship, including the assets of the business. However, the sum of Rs. 1,85,013 was not included in the said return by the assessee. In the next assessment year, the sum of Rs. 1,82,742 was also not included. 

The respondent, before the income tax officer, claimed that the amounts claimed were in his individual capacity and were excluded from the family property. The income tax officer disallowed all contentions raised by the respondent-assessee. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeals filed by the revenue officers, and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax allowed the contentions of the respondent-assessee that the capital of Chander Sen is in his individual capacity. The High Court of Allahabad also affirmed the order pronounced by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The issue regarding whether the income or assets of a son inherited by him from his father by devolution when separated by partition could be assessed as the income of a Hindu undivided family or as the individual income of the son went to the Supreme Court by way of a Special Leave Petition. The Court agreed with the decision given by the High Court of Allahabad by stating that, as per Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the legal position is that when a son is being devolved with the property by intestate succession, it is to be assessed as individual property and not as the property of a Hindu undivided family. 

Bhanwar Singh vs. Puran (2008)

In this case, a person, namely Bhima, died in 1972, leaving behind his property with his son Sant Ram and three daughters. The appellant in the present case, namely Bhanwar Singh, son of Sant Ram, filed a suit for partition to set aside the alienations between the children of Bhima. The trial court gave its decision in favour of the appellant but the First Appellate Court overturned the same. The Supreme Court relied upon the judgement given in Commissioner Wealth Tax, Kanpur & Others vs. Chander Sen and others (1986) and held that as per Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the property would discontinue being joint family property once the son inherits it after getting it by way of intestate succession. 

Yudhishter vs. Ashok Kumar (1986)

In this case, the landlord-respondent filed a petition before the Rent Tribunal in order to evict the appellant on the grounds of bona fide personal requirements. However, the Rent Tribunal dismissed his petition on the said grounds. He approached the Rent Appellate Tribunal, wherein it was stated that the house in which the respondent is living with his family belongs to his grandfather. Therefore, he is not the owner of the house but a licensee. Additional evidence was also presented by the respondent, which was allowed by the appellate authority. 

Later, the appellant filed a revision petition before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana under Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, which was dismissed by the High Court. Lastly, the appellant approached the Supreme Court by way of a special leave petition under Article 136 of the Indian Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision given by the High Court by stating that the respondent fulfilled all requirements in order to maintain an action on eviction. The Court also referred to the question regarding a son’s right to his father’s property after his birth. It was observed that when the father gets the property by way of inheritance from his father, then his son should have a share in it, irrespective of whether the property is separated by partition or is joint family property.

Gurupad Khandappa Magdum vs. Hirabai Khandappa Magdum & Ors. (1978)

In this case, Khandappa Sangappa Magdum died on June 27, 1960, leaving behind his wife, Hirabai, two sons, Gurupad and Shivapad, and his three daughters. The wife of the deceased, by way of filing a civil complaint, asked for a 7/24 share of the joint family property. If the shares were asked for during the lifetime of the deceased, then Hirabai would be getting 1/4th of the said joint family property. The trial court stated that as the suit property was a joint family property, no partition took place. The issue arose in regard to Sections 6 and 8 as to what part of property would be given to the wife of the deceased, namely Hirabai. The trial court rejected the claim asked by the defendant and limited the share to 1/24th. The wife of the deceased, the defendant, preferred an appeal to the High Court of Bombay wherein the share was increased to 7/24th after placing reliance on Rangubai Lalji vs. Laxman Lalji as there was no earlier partition and the property belonged to a joint family. Now, being aggrieved by the decision of the High Court of Bombay, a special leave petition has been preferred before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court upheld the judgement of the High Court of Bombay and stated that the decision of the High Court is well founded and correct. 

Judgement given by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court, in its judgement, dismissed the civil appeal filed by the appellant and held that the ancestral property was devolved by succession after the death of Jagannath Singh as per Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. After the death of Jagannath Singh in 1973, the ancestral property ceased to be a joint family property, and Mainabai, the wife of the deceased (Jagannath) and the coparceners (defendants herein), were the tenants in that property as common tenants and not as joint tenants. The appellant, being born in 1977, said that the ancestral property ceased to be a joint family property; therefore, the Apex Court stated that the suit filed by the appellant holds no value and is not maintainable. 

Rationale behind this judgement

The Supreme Court primarily focused upon the preamble of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which states, “An Act to amend and codify the law relating to intestate succession among Hindus.” The judgements of Gurupad Khandappa Magdum vs. Hirabhai Khandappa Magdum (1978) and Shyama Devi & Ors. vs. Manju Shukla & Anr. (1994) were referred by the Supreme Court, wherein it was observed that in the cases which are covered by the proviso of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, it is important to carry out a fictional partition before the death of the deceased for the purpose of determining the share or part of the deceased in the joint family property. 

The Court further relied upon its earlier decisions pronounced in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Kanpur and Ors. vs. Chander Sen (1986), Yudhishter vs. Ashok Kumar (1987) and Bhanwar Singh vs. Puran (2008), where the court took a conjoint reading of sections 4, 6, 8 and 19, and it was stated that when the succession takes place as per these provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the whole joint family discontinues to be a joint family and the heirs of such deceased person shall become tenants in common and not jointly. The Supreme Court, while dismissing the appeal filed by the plaintiff in the case of Uttam vs. Saubhag Singh (2016), stated that Jagannath Singh, the grandfather of the plaintiff, died in 1973, and after his death, the joint family property discontinued to be a joint family property and was divided between his sons as an individual property. 

Analysis of Uttam vs. Saubhag Singh & Ors. (2016)

The case of Uttam vs. Saubhag Singh is of utmost importance as it has paved the way for further judicial decisions regarding the inheritance of joint family property under Hindu law. This case has given a unique perspective with respect to the position of a son on his father’s property and his rights on his grandfather’s property. The major focus of this judgement is upon the construction of Sections 6, 8 and 19 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The Supreme Court, by relying upon its earlier decisions, reiterated that on applying Section 8, if the succession is taking place in accordance with the said provision, then the joint family property ceases to be a joint family property, and after it ceases to be a joint family property, the persons who are holding that property shall be common tenants rather than joint tenants. Therefore, it could be stated that this case is an important instance in which the position of heirs in the joint family property under Hindu law is made clear by the Apex Court in the case of an intestate death. 

Criticism

It can be inferred that, from the above mentioned cases, not much reliance has been placed on the Supreme Court in this regard. If we look into Chander Sen’s judgement, the subject matter was not the same, and it was opined that after the father’s death, the son acquires the property given to him in inheritance in his individual capacity. The same issue came up before the Supreme Court in the case of Yudhister vs. Ashok Kumar (1986) with regard to the self-acquired property and not the ancestral property. In Gurupad’s judgement, it was held that there was no prior partition and Sections 8 and 6 Proviso would apply to this case. It was relied to mean that upon the notional partition, the joint family property will be converted into individual properties, however, on the other side, Mulla, on Hindu law, by observing this case, stated that by the separation of joint family property into individual properties, the Supreme Court does not mean the total disruption of the joint family and it would not result in the cessation of coparcenary. In the case of Uttam vs. Saubhag Singh (2016), the Court has carried out a legal fiction of notional partition for carrying out the distribution of the share of the deceased and not to end the coparcenary. 

Conclusion 

In a nutshell, it can be inferred from various verdicts of the Supreme Court on the same issue that after the application of Section 8 or Proviso of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, by reason of the death of a Hindu male, the property would be devolved by way of intestate succession rather than by way of succession, which consequently led to the cessation of joint family property. Also, it has been reiterated by the court in its various decisions. For instance, in Chander Sen’s case, in the case of the death of a Hindu male that is dealt with by Mitakshara law, the self-acquired property of the deceased would devolve to the Class-I legal heirs as their individual properties in their individual capacities.  If the deceased had any ancestral property, then there would be a notional partition, and the share would be determined just before the deceased’s death. 

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

What is intestate succession?

Intestate succession is a situation wherein a person dies without making a will or testament. After his death, the assets owned by the deceased are divided according to the inheritance laws.

What is the concept of the Mitakshara system under Hindu law?

Mitakshara law was based on the concept of ownership by birth and implies that the son can claim the right to property when his father is alive. It basically deals with the laws of inheritance, which include the birthright of sons in their ancestral property. Except for Bengal and Assam, the Mitakshara law applies to the whole of India.

References


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Illegitimate children under Muslim Law

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This article was written by Saanvi Singla and has been updated by Kruti Brahmbhatt. It exhaustively discusses the concept of illegitimate children under Muslim law. It provides an in-depth explanation of the meaning, acknowledgement, parentage, and rights of illegitimate children under Muslim law. Further, it also covers various case laws and opinions of scholars on different aspects affecting illegitimate children, such as right to pray, marriage, maintenance, etc.

Introduction

In India, there is a negative mindset regarding an illegitimate child. These children are subject to a great extent of economic and social issues, such as social stigma, lack of financial support, non-acceptance by parents/families, etc. Apart from the social factors, there also exist several legal aspects which come into play due to illegitimacy. It impacts the rights and entitlements, which the child could receive in the future. Some religions completely restrict the rights of such a child, while others provide limited rights, such as financial support. However, under different personal laws, there are certain rights given to such a child. Each follows its own customs and theories in order to acknowledge such children. When it comes to Muslim law, which is uncodified, most of the provisions are derived from customs and prevalent usages. Further, Muslim law includes various schools of thought, such as shias, sunnis, etc. The status and the rights of an illegitimate child also vary, depending on the school of thought. 

Meaning of illegitimate child 

The word “legitimacy” is derived from the Latin word “legitimus”, which means lawful. This means that the term “legitimate child” refers to a situation wherein the parents of the child are lawfully married to each other. Contrary to this, an illegitimate child is one whose parents were not married to each other at the time of his/her birth. 

An illegitimate child is identified on the basis of the marital status of its mother. In cases where a child is born outside of a marriage, and the mother then marries later on, that child is said to be legitimised by marriage. However, it varies under each personal law. 

Illegitimate child under Muslim Law 

Under Muslim law, a child born out of zina (premarital or extramarital relationship), cannot be legitimised. Historically, such a child is also termed as a “bastard”, which is a derogatory term that signifies shame, stigma and inferiority. In Muslim law, a child is legitimate only if he/she is begotten by a man and his wife or a man and his respective slave. Any other offspring is known as zina, and hence is not legitimate. The term “wife” essentially implies marriage, but marriage may also be entered into without any ceremony. Therefore, the presence of marriage in any particular case, may be an open question.

The legitimacy of children shall be based on the relationship between the child’s parents. A child shall be entitled to receive rights if found to be legitimate. Illegitimacy is determined on the basis of certain conditions, which are as follows: 

  • The first condition for the establishment of illegitimacy is zina. Under Islam, zina refers to illicit sexual relations, either between two unmarried parties or, adultery with both parties being married, provided there are four witnesses to the act. In such a case, the parties shall be subject to the hadd punishment (severe punishment prescribed in the Quran). Wherein an unmarried woman becomes pregnant without any witnesses, then in such a case, only the woman shall be punished. Children resulting from such sexual relationships shall be considered illegitimate. 
  • The second condition is when within a legitimate union, due to certain situations, the child can be considered as illegitimate. Four such situations that confirm a child as illegitimate are: 
  1. Imprecation: Also termed as li’an, impercation is defined as an oath that leads to divorce. The husband may deny paternity of a child to his wife, accusing her of adultery, without any proof (four witnesses). In the process of li’an, the husband undertakes that the wife has committed adultery, against which, she may take an oath denying the same. In such a situation, the husband might accuse his wife of adultery even if she is not pregnant, or might disown the conception of the child. Despite the legal relationship between the husband and wife, since the husband disowns the child, such a child shall be considered illegitimate. 
  2. Gestation period: The time during which a woman is pregnant is known as the gestation period. A child is considered legitimate, when it is born at least six months after marriage. The Shafi, Maliki and Hanbali schools of thought, consider a child born at least six months after the marriage, as a legitimate child, provided the couple has been residing together since the marriage. 

In cases where a woman has observed the period of iddah after divorce, a child is considered legitimate if the period between the divorce and conception is more than two years for Shafis, more than four years for Hanbalis and more than five years for Malikis. 

Hence, if the child is born prior to the completion of the prescribed period, he/she would be declared illegitimate, resulting from adultery. 

  1. Inability to beget: When a husband is unable to become a father due to physical conditions (such as eunuch), it is known as inability to beget. The Shafis hold that a child born to such a man’s wife, shall be considered as illegitimate. The Malikis believe that medical opinion is required in such cases. If the medical experts are of the opinion that the husband is not capable of impregnating a woman, the child should be considered as illegitimate. 
  2. Refusal of paternity: As per the Hanafis, when a child is born to a female slave, and the master denies paternity, such a child shall be considered as illegitimate. However, since the woman was a slave, the child born shall also be a slave to the master. 
  • The third condition is where the child is born out of a marriage which is unlawful. This includes marriages between close relatives, marriages with a person who worships idols, marriages with a person who already has multiple husbands and marriage with a husband who already has four wives. Any child born out of these prohibited marriages, is considered to be illegitimate. 

Parentage and belonging of an illegitimate child 

Parentage is exclusively established with the real father and mother of a child, and only if they beget the child in lawful matrimony. Muslim jurists link a child born from adultery and li’an, to the mother’s family. Although the man accepts the adultery and the fact that he is the father of the child, legally, the child shall be associated with the mother. In case the man accepts the child, but the mother is a slave, along with being illegitimate, the child shall also be considered as a slave. 

In Hanafi law, parentage is established in every case, by the mother, but in Shiite law, parentage is established only if the child is begotten in lawful wedlock, which means that an illegitimate child will not belong to either of the parents. However, they are also of the view that an illegitimate child, for some purposes, such as for feeding and nourishment, belongs to the mother. 

When a man ignores any other affecting factors and accepts the child without disclosing adultery, such a child is considered to belong to him and is freed from slavery. On the other hand, if a man terms the marriage to be invalid, he would not be considered the father of the child. The reason behind this concept of following the mother’s lineage, is that usually, the father would refrain from confessing adultery, in the fear of the hadd penalty. The mother may confess that a certain man is the father of the illegitimate child, but it does not hold good unless there exist four witnesses to the act. 

The Privy Council in Sadik Hussain Khan vs. Hashim Ali Khan and Ors. (1916), stated that if a person acknowledges someone as his/her legitimate child, then even if that child was initially considered illegitimate, this statement of acknowledgement serves as evidence of legitimacy in absence of other evidence. However, it is pertinent that in such a situation, the child’s legitimacy must be possible. 

Again in Habibar Rehman Chowdhury vs. Altaf Ali Chowdhury (1918), the court held that there is no process recognized under Muslim law, by which a status of legitimacy may be conferred on an illegitimate child.

Acknowledgement as a legitimate child 

Under Muslim law, a child who has been declared as illegitimate, cannot be later conferred with the status of legitimate. However, a child can be acknowledged as legitimate, under certain situations, which are the following: 

  • The paternity of the child is not established beyond doubt 
  • It is not proven that the child is born out of zina 
  • The marriage between the acknowledger and the mother is not impossible.

These conditions are laid under the doctrine of acknowledgement. This is not revocable and it provides the right of inheritance to the child. In the case of Muhamman Allahdad Khan vs. Muhammad Ismail Khan (1886), the court held that when no direct evidence of marriage can be presented, no legitimacy can be established. Hence, in order to prove paternity beyond doubt, the marriage has to be proven as valid. 

Rights of an illegitimate child under Muslim Law 

Inheritance of an illegitimate child 

Under classical Muslim law, as well as in some of the modern Islamic jurisdictions, an illegitimate child has no right to inherit property from the father. The mother of an illegitimate child may find herself subject to harsh punishments as a result of zina. Thus, the status of legitimacy in Islamic law, has a huge impact on the lives of children and their parents, especially mothers. One such aspect is that it becomes difficult for an illegitimate child to claim property from his/her parents.

No school of thought under Muslim law holds that an illegitimate child has any right of inheritance in the ownership of his/her putative father. Under Hanafi law, the mother and her illegitimate children have mutual rights to inherit property. The illegitimate child inherits not only the property of his/her mother, but also the property of all other relations established through the mother. 

Thus, for instance, when a Hanafi female dies, leaving behind her husband and an illegitimate son of her sister, the husband is entitled to one-half of the total property and the remaining would go to the sister’s son.

A reciprocal right of inheritance exists between an illegitimate child and his/her maternal relations. These relations are residuary heirs. The other inheritors include his/her spouse and descendants, with the exception of the father and his relations. Thus, if an illegitimate person leaves behind a mother, a daughter, and a father, then the daughter would receive one-half and the mother would receive one-sixth of the inheritance. The remainder would revert to the concerned person. The father would be excluded. Similarly, an illegitimate brother and an illegitimate uncle are not entitled to inherit. However, a twin brother would inherit as his uterine brother (The twin brother is regarded as the son of only the mother and not that of the father. Hence, the term “uterine brother”).

Under Shia law, an illegitimate child does not inherit from the mother. Here, illegitimacy acts as a factor for complete exclusion, and such a child is not allowed to inherit from either of the parents.

Maintenance of an illegitimate child 

Tyabgi says “Mohammadan law appears to impose no burden upon the natural father of the child”. Muslim law, it seems, does not confer any kind of obligation of maintenance of illegitimate children, on either parent, though the Hanafis recognize the obligation of nurturing a child till the age of seven. The Shias do not even recognize this obligation.

Under Muslim law, the father is not bound to maintain his illegitimate child. However, it is to be noted that Section 144 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (earlier, Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973) requires the father to pay for the maintenance of the child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. The father would be held liable to pay a certain amount even if the mother refuses to give up the illegitimate child to him.

In the case of an illegitimate child, since the mother is responsible for the child’s parentage and upbringing, her family is also obliged to maintain and care for the child. A divorced woman (divorce due to li’an) cannot claim maintenance from her former husband, even if the woman is pregnant. 

Here, there are differences in opinion amongst the different schools. The Malikis believe that when a woman is divorced because of adultery, she does not hold the right to claim maintenance. However, if the woman is at least six months pregnant at the time of divorce, the child shall receive maintenance, because there is a high probability that the child belongs to the concerned man. In such a case, if the husband later accepts the paternity of the child, then he shall be subjected to the hadd punishment. The Shafis believe that the mother is required to maintain and provide support to the child, while the father may disown the child. Interestingly, even if the father who initially disowned the child, accepts him/her later on, it is still the mother who shall be responsible for the child and not the father. The first stance of the father, that the child is not his, is what would be taken into consideration. If the mother requires money for the maintenance of her child, she may borrow it from her former husband, but this shall be considered as a debt. Here, there exists no legal relationship between the child and the father. When the child is disowned by the father, he/she is not liable to provide maintenance to the father. In cases where the mother’s family refuses to provide, it shall be the duty of the State to take up the responsibility of the child. 

Muslim law is largely silent regarding a child born from rape, but it is generally accepted that he/she shall be considered as an illegitimate child. The punishment for a rapist is clearly prescribed under Muslim law, but provisions regarding the child’s maintenance and care are not clearly laid out. If the man is proven guilty of committing rape, then he shall be liable to pay a dower to the woman for maintaining the child. 

Custody and guardianship of illegitimate children under Muslim law

Custody and guardianship under Muslim law are termed as “hizanat” and “wilayat” respectively. Custody means having physical possession of and taking complete care of a minor child. Under Muslim law, it is generally the mother who is entitled to the custody of a minor child, because of the fact that she is the best person to take care of the child. On the other hand, guardianship has four dimensions to it- wila-e-muhabbat (the right of love and devotion), wila-e-imamat (authority in spiritual guidance), wila-e-ziamat (authority in socio and political guidance) and wila-e-tasarruf (authority of the universal nature). It is divided into these to ensure that the child receives overall physical, spiritual and mental development. 

The schools of both the Sunnis and the Shias, recognized the father as the guardian, and the mother, under all Muslim schools of law, is not recognized as a guardian, natural or otherwise, even after the demise of the father. The father’s right of guardianship exists even when the mother, or any other female, is entitled to the custody of the minor. The father holds the absolute right to control the education and religion of minor children. So long as the father is alive, he is the exclusive and supreme guardian of his minor children.

In Muslim Law, an illegitimate child is considered as a child of nobody. Therefore, the father’s right of guardianship extends only to his minor legitimate children. He is not entitled to the guardianship or the custody of his illegitimate minor children. The mother is also not a natural guardian of her illegitimate minor children, but she is entitled to their custody.

Bloodwit (diyah) for an illegitimate child 

Under Muslim law, diyah is the compensation paid to a victim or his family, against any harm or injury caused to him or her. Herein, if an illegitimate child commits any offence or crime that involves payment of compensation, then in such a situation, the mother or her family, whoever is responsible for the child, must pay the diyah

Slavery and manumission (release from slavery) of an illegitimate child

A child born from a female slave, is considered illegitimate. Interestingly, the owner of a slave woman can free such illegitimate children. Muslim scholars such as Abd Allah, Hasan al-Basri, Ibn Juray etc, were of the opinion that illegitimate children and their mother must be free from slavery. According to them, this act might bring them closer to Allah. Hanafis believed that an innocent child must not be treated as a slave merely because of the parents’ actions. 

However, scholars such as Abu Hurayrah, Mujahid and a few others, did not allow buying, selling or freeing of illegitimate children from slavery. They considered entering into a holy war, a better option than freeing illegitimate slaves. 

Marriage of an illegitimate child 

Under the classical view, there is a difference of opinions with respect to the question of whether a father can marry his illegitimate daughter. The Shafi’is and a few scholars of Malikis, believe that a father may marry his illegitimate daughter, because there is no legal relationship between them, as per Islam. Since there is no legal relationship, the prohibitions laid down in the Quran are not applicable here. 

The Hanafis and Hanbalis state that a man might not legally be the father of the daughter, but she is still the biological daughter. They strictly prohibit a man from marrying his illegitimate daughter. Further, the Hanbalis also hold that a man who marries his illegitimate daughter, must be severely punished. Later on, the Malikis also declared the marriage between a father and an illegitimate daughter to be unlawful. They strictly prohibited the man from marrying a child of zina

Prayer by an illegitimate child

In the early days, the classical view agreed with the opinion that an illegitimate child could offer prayers if the child is a good person by character. Later on, the Maliks, Shafis and Hanafis, declared the offering of prayer by illegitimate children, as inappropriate. According to them, if an illegitimate child offers prayers, it would be a topic of gossip and disrespect. Additionally, they believed that illegitimate children generally lack religious knowledge. 

The Hanbalis held a different opinion here. They believed that an illegitimate child could lead prayers if he/she is aware of the religious practices. They opined that a person’s ability to offer prayers must not be subject to the person’s birth circumstances. They reflected on the concept that individuals are not responsible for the actions of their parents. 

Relevant case laws 

Gohar Begam vs. Suggi Alias Nazma Begam (1959) 

In this case, the petitioner, Gohar Begam, was an unmarried Sunni Muslim woman. She had filed a habeas corpus petition under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, for the custody of her illegitimate child (female). She claimed that the child was born out of wedlock and under the Mohammedan law, the mother holds custody of the illegitimate child. Herein, the respondents took the child and refused to return her. They argued that the petitioner had an alternative remedy under the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 and hence, the petition would not be maintainable under Section 491. 

The Supreme Court held that the petition was maintainable under Section 491 of the CrPC, 1898 since the remedy under the Guardian and Wards Act, does not impose a bar on the application under the said provision. Section 491 is applicable in this case, because the child was illegally detained. Further, the Supreme Court analysed the principles of Mohammedan law, which provides the custody of an illegitimate female child to the mother. Therefore, the Supreme Court ordered to grant custody of the child to the mother. 

Sukha vs. Ninni (1965) 

In this case, an application was filed by Ninni, under Section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 for custody of Jamila, her illegitimate child with Sukha. The Sub-divisional Magistrate ordered Sukha to pay maintenance for the child. The decided pay was Rs. 10 per month, which was later reduced to Rs. 6 per month, by entering into an agreement with Ninni. However, Sukha dishonoured the agreement, against which Ninni filed a suit for the recovery of maintenance. Sukha claimed that under Muslim law, the father has no liability to maintain an illegitimate child. He also stated that the agreement was void and hence, cannot be enforced. 

The Rajasthan High Court in this case, observed that Muslim law does not impose any obligation on the father to maintain an illegitimate child. However, the agreement between Sukha and Ninni was valid and enforceable. The court also observed that the parties had entered into an agreement to maintain the child’s welfare. 

Syed Habibur Rehman Chowdhury vs. Syed Altaf Ali Chowdhury (1921) 

In this case, the plaintiff claimed to be the legitimate son of Nawab Syed Abdus Sobhan Chowdhury of Bogra, who died intestate in 1915. The plaintiff, Habibur Rahman Chowdhury, claimed that Nawab Sobhan had accepted him as a child. He also presented a declaration of legitimacy, which said that his mother was married to the Nawab. The defendants in this case were the Nawab’s grandson and two nephews. Here, the question was regarding the validity of the marriage between his mother and the Nawab. The plaintiff however, failed to prove the validity of the marriage. Further, with regards to the acknowledgement of a legitimate son, the court stated that mere acknowledgement of a child does not prove him to be legitimate. What is important is that the parents of the child are lawfully married. 

The Bombay High Court further explained the difference between legitimacy and legitimation. It said that results from certain facts, such as a valid marriage, legitimation, etc. provide a status (legitimacy) that did not exist before. However, under Muslim law, there is no concept of acknowledgement of a child without legitimation. The court dismissed the suit, stating that there was no valid marriage between the child’s parents. It was held that without the validity of marriage, the acknowledgement by the Nawab, did not confer legitimacy on Habibar Rahman. 

Mohammed Allahdad Khan and Anr. vs. Mohammad Ismail Khan and Ors.(1886) 

In this case, Mohammed Allahdad Khan claimed to be a legitimate child of Ghulam Ghaus Khan. However, the defendant rejected the said claim. Herein, the acceptance of the claim shall allow Mohammed Khan to inherit the property of the father. The question raised was whether the acknowledgement of Mohammad Khan as a son was enough to establish legitimacy. The court examined that under Muslim law, acknowledgement by a man that someone is his child, might establish legitimacy, despite a lack of evidence of marriage between the parents. 

The Allahabad High Court held that Ghulam Ghaus Khan’s acknowledgement of Allahdad Khan as his child was valid and could establish his legitimacy. Hence, the plaintiff shall be entitled to inherit property.  

Comparative analysis of rights of illegitimate children

Section 116 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, provides for the legitimacy of a child, which states that any person who is born during the continuance of a valid marriage between his mother and any man, or within 280 days of the dissolution of marriage, the mother being unmarried, shall be a conclusive proof that he is the son of that man. However, the child would not be considered legitimate if the parties to the marriage had no access to each other at any time when he could have been begotten. 

There are only a few minor differences between the provision given under Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, (hereinafter referred to as BSA)  and the Muslim law. Under Muslim law, a child should be born after six months of the marriage, however, under BSA, a child born soon after the solemnisation of marriage would be a legitimate child. In the case where the child is born after the dissolution of marriage, under BSA, the child must be born within 280 days and the mother should be unmarried whereas, under Muslim law, the period of time varies as per different schools of thought. 

Other personal laws, apart from Muslim law, also recognise the rights of illegitimate children. These include Hindu law, Christian law, etc. The rights of illegitimate children are widely recognised under Hindu law. Section 16(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, prescribes the rights of illegitimate children. They have a right to inherit property from their parents, but they cannot inherit property from other relatives. Hence, an illegitimate child cannot inherit ancestral property. Further, under the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, unlike Muslim law, illegitimate children are given a right to maintenance from their parents. It aligns with the idea that despite the child being legitimate or illegitimate, it is the duty of a Hindu to maintain and take care of the child. Finally, Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, provides that the mother of an illegitimate child, shall be considered as the natural guardian of the child. In case of absence of the mother, the father shall be considered as the natural guardian. 

Under Christian law, the Indian Succession Act, 1925 does not accept illegitimate children for inheritance of property. No obligation is placed on the parents to maintain their illegitimate child under Christian law. Only legitimate children are entitled to receive maintenance and support from their parents. 

Conclusion

In today’s era, when the world strives towards freedom, equality and equity, having restrictions on the rights of a person, due to the parent’s actions, requires reforms and review. Under Muslim law, the treatment and rights of illegitimate children, is a complex issue, each having different opinions and mindsets. It might be difficult for an individual to accept and face the social stigma, financial insecurities etc, associated with being an illegitimate child. There is a lack of legal protection for such children.

It is left to the imagination what the plight of illegitimate daughters has been over the years, as they also suffer because of being of an exploited gender. These traditional, classical and modern views must be wisely interpreted, to protect the human rights and dignity of every person. Efforts must be made to align these laws with the current societal and human rights norms. 

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) 

What is the meaning of walad zina

Walad zina is a term used in Islamic laws, to describe a person born out of wedlock or relationships which are unlawful. The literal meaning of walad zina is, child of adultery or illegitimate child. 

Can an illegitimate child testify? 

There have been various opinions with respect to an illegitimate child’s right to testify. Various scholars, such as Abd al-Aziz and Malik, initially rejected the testimony given by illegitimate children. Many scholars believed that when the nature of the offence is zina, the testimony must be rejected, while some believed that the circumstances of a person’s birth had nothing to do with the testimony. Later on, such testimonies started gaining acceptance. 

What are the maintenance provisions for illegitimate children, under Indian criminal laws? 

Section 144 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 states that maintenance must be provided to legitimate or illegitimate minor children, or even a major child in case he/she is unable to maintain themselves due to some physical challenges. This provision ensures the right of illegitimate children to receive maintenance from their parents. (Earlier, this provision was found under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.) 

References 

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Data protection in online sustainable development and global goals platforms

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This article has been written by Abhishek M S pursuing a Remote freelancing and profile building program from Skill Arbitrage.

This article has been edited and published by Shashwat Kaushik.

Introduction 

In this article, the focus is on “Data protection in online sustainable development and Global Goals Platforms.” The topic will be broken down for a concise understanding. In the current era of the internet, accessibility to various necessities such as food, groceries, household items, electronics gadgets, medicines, taxi services, and house rentals has become streamlined through smartphone applications with internet connectivity. However, the convenience of these services comes at the cost of compromising user privacy. Organisations behind these applications routinely collect extensive personal data, including bank account information, spending habits, credentials, health status, screen time, web search history, and intellectual property. This data collection serves to enhance their business decisions and is often sold to third parties at considerable costs for research purposes. The potential misuse of such data poses significant risks, including manipulation of public opinion or electoral outcomes, should it fall into malicious hands. Thus, ensuring robust data protection measures is critical to safeguarding individual privacy and preventing potential misuse of personal information.

What is data protection

Data protection refers to the practices and measures taken to safeguard data from unauthorised access, corruption, or loss throughout its lifecycle. Key aspects of data protection include:

  1. Confidentiality: Ensuring that data is accessible only to authorised individuals, entities, or systems.
  2. Integrity: Maintaining the accuracy and completeness of data throughout its storage and processing.
  3. Availability: Ensuring that data is available and accessible to authorised users when needed.
  4. Security: Implementing measures such as encryption, access controls, and firewalls to protect data from breaches, cyberattacks, or accidental loss.
  5. Compliance: Adhering to legal and regulatory requirements concerning the collection, storage, and processing of data, including privacy laws like GDPR or CCPA.

Effective data protection practices are essential to maintaining trust, privacy, and security in an increasingly digital and interconnected world.

What are online sustainable development platforms 

Online Sustainable Development Platforms serve as virtual gateways, empowering individuals, organizations, and communities to actively contribute to the realization of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These platforms, often accessible through apps or websites, are designed to facilitate collaboration, knowledge sharing, and action towards achieving these ambitious goals.

At their core, these platforms aim to educate people about the SDGs, raising awareness and understanding of the interconnected challenges and opportunities they address. They provide comprehensive information, resources, and case studies to help users grasp the significance and urgency of each goal, from reducing poverty and hunger to combating climate change and promoting sustainable consumption and production.

Beyond education, these platforms encourage action by offering tools and resources that enable users to take practical steps towards achieving the SDGs. They may feature interactive challenges, quizzes, or virtual campaigns that engage users in meaningful activities, such as reducing their carbon footprint or supporting local social initiatives. By gamifying sustainability, these platforms make learning and action enjoyable and rewarding.

One of the key strengths of online sustainable development platforms lies in their ability to bring together diverse groups of stakeholders from governments, businesses, civil society organizations, and academia. They foster collaboration and networking opportunities, enabling users to connect with like-minded individuals and organizations, share best practices, and form partnerships to drive collective impact.

Progress tracking is another essential feature of these platforms. They leverage data visualization tools and interactive dashboards to monitor and evaluate progress towards achieving the SDGs at local, regional, and global levels. This data-driven approach helps users understand the current state of affairs, identify areas for improvement, and adjust strategies accordingly.

What are the global goals

The Global Goals, also known as the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), are a set of 17 objectives that serve as a roadmap for making the world a more sustainable and equitable place by the year 2030. Adopted by all United Nations member states in 2015, these goals encompass a comprehensive range of critical issues that affect the well-being of people and the planet.

Each of the 17 Global Goals addresses a specific area of concern, from eradicating poverty and hunger (Goal 1) to ensuring access to quality education (Goal 4) and promoting gender equality (Goal 5). The goals recognize that these issues are interconnected and that progress in one area can positively impact others. For example, providing quality education can empower individuals to break the cycle of poverty, while achieving gender equality can contribute to economic growth and social stability.

The Global Goals also emphasize the importance of protecting the environment and combating climate change. Goal 13 calls for urgent action to address climate change and its impacts, while Goal 15 aims to protect and restore terrestrial and marine ecosystems. These goals acknowledge that the health of our planet is inextricably linked to human well-being, and that we must take steps to safeguard the environment for future generations.

Achieving the Global Goals requires the commitment and collaboration of governments, businesses, civil society organizations, and individuals worldwide. The United Nations has established a framework for monitoring and reviewing progress towards the goals, and regular reports are published to track advancements and identify challenges.

The Global Goals represent a bold vision for a better future. They provide a framework for addressing the world’s most pressing challenges and creating a more just and sustainable society for all. By working together, we can make the Global Goals a reality and build a better world for everyone.

Each goal comes with specific targets and ways to measure progress. The SDGs are all about tackling the root causes of problems like poverty and inequality while encouraging economic growth that’s fair, environmentally friendly, and socially responsible. They stress the need for partnerships between governments, businesses, communities, and individuals to work together and make these goals a reality.

In essence, the Global Goals are a shared promise among countries to create a better world for everyone, now and in the future. They provide a roadmap for global cooperation and action to solve big challenges and build a brighter future for all people and the planet.

Importance of data protection in online sustainable development goals

Data protection is important for advancing sustainable development Goals [SDGs] through online digital platforms. It assures privacy, security and ethical handling of private data, nurtures trust among users and aids digital economies.

By protecting data, platforms hand out transparent and accountable digital institutions that agree with SDG 16 (Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions).

Importance of data protection in online platforms

Privacy and trust – Exercising efficient data protection protects one’s privacy rights and builds trust between users. When users trust that their private data is protected, they will be more active on digital platforms, encouraging sustainable digital participation and economic development.

Compliance and innovation – Compliance with data protection rules like GDPR, CCPA, UK GDPR, etc. promises legal compliance and ethical data handling. This mitigates risk combined with data breaches and promotes innovation by generating a protected environment for exploring data-driven solutions.

Ethical considerations – Past legal requirements and ethical data handling require transparency in data collection, getting informed approval from users and promoting accountability in data use and sharing.

Importance of data protection in sustainable development platforms 

In the domain of sustainable development platforms, where digital solutions are vital in addressing global challenges like global warming, poverty, and social equivalence, data protection appears as a critical cornerstone. Here is why it matters:

Critical for users

Data protection is vital to users of sustainable development platforms because it protects one’s personal data and privacy. These platforms often collect sensitive data to modify solutions, monitor progress, and facilitate collaboration. By promoting strong data protection measures, users are assured that their information is secure from unauthorised access and misuse. This fosters trust and encourages active participation, which is crucial for the success and sustainability of initiatives.

Risks of data misuse or breaches

The possible risks linked to data misuse or data breaches in sustainable development contexts are remarkable. Breaches can consist of identity theft, financial loss, sensitive information, and reputational damage. Moreover, in the domain of sustainable development, where projects often involve vulnerable communities or sensitive environmental data, breaches can have far-reaching outcomes. They may reduce reliability on the platform, expose ongoing projects to risk, and hamper progress towards sustainable goals. Reducing these risks through robust data protection practices is imperative to maintain integrity and credibility.

Alignment with ethical considerations

Data protection aligns with deep-rooted ethical considerations in sustainable development. Maintaining individuals’ privacy rights and establishing transparent and responsible data handling demonstrate a commitment to justice and responsibility. Ethical data management not only obeys regulatory requirements but also upholds principles of social justice and community empowerment. By prioritising data protection, sustainable development platforms contribute to a reliable and inclusive environment where stakeholders can collaborate effectively towards shared sustainability goals.

Regulatory frameworks and their impact on sustainable development platforms

In the rapidly evolving digital environment, regulatory structures governing data protection play a pivotal role in shaping the operations and sustainability of platforms dedicated to advancing global development goals. Two outstanding examples of such regulatory structures are the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in Europe and the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) in the United States of America.

The GDPR, implemented in 2018, represents a landmark piece of legislation that aims to protect the personal data of individuals within the European Union (EU). It applies to all companies that process personal data of EU residents, regardless of their location. The GDPR grants individuals a range of rights, including the right to access their personal data, the right to rectify inaccurate data, the right to erasure (also known as the “right to be forgotten”), and the right to data portability. It also imposes strict obligations on organizations to ensure that personal data is processed in a transparent, secure, and lawful manner.

The CCPA, enacted in 2018, is California’s comprehensive privacy law that grants California residents several rights regarding their personal information, including the right to know what personal information is being collected, the right to opt out of the sale of their personal information, the right to access their personal information, and the right to delete their personal information. The CCPA also imposes obligations on businesses to implement and maintain reasonable security measures to protect personal information.

Both the GDPR and the CCPA have had a significant impact on the operations of platforms dedicated to advancing global development goals. For example, many platforms have had to adapt their data collection and processing practices to comply with these regulations. Platforms have also had to invest in new technologies and processes to ensure that they can effectively protect the personal data of their users.

The GDPR and the CCPA are just two examples of the many regulatory structures that are being developed around the world to protect data privacy. As the digital environment continues to evolve, it is likely that we will see even more regulatory activity in this area. Platforms dedicated to advancing global development goals will need to stay abreast of these developments and ensure that they are in compliance with the relevant regulations.

The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), a comprehensive legislation enacted by the European Union in 2018, stands as a beacon of transparency, accountability, and respect for individuals’ rights in the digital age. It serves as a pivotal framework designed to harmonise data protection laws across the European Union, setting forth stringent requirements for organisations that collect, store, and process personal data.

The GDPR extends its reach far beyond the borders of the EU, impacting sustainable development platforms operating within the region or handling data of EU natives. Compliance with the GDPR is not merely a legal obligation but an indispensable element for fostering user trust and avoiding potentially substantial fines.

At its core, the GDPR emphasises several fundamental principles that align seamlessly with the ethical tenets of sustainable development. These principles include:

  1. Transparency: Organisations are required to provide clear and concise information to individuals about how their personal data will be used, shared, and protected.
  2. Consent management: Individuals must provide explicit and informed consent before their personal data can be processed. This consent must be freely given, specific, informed, and unambiguous.
  3. Data minimisation: Organisations are prohibited from collecting and storing excessive amounts of personal data. They must only collect data that is necessary for specific, legitimate purposes.

These principles are essential for promoting responsible data practices and ensuring that individuals retain control over their personal information. By adhering to the GDPR, sustainable development platforms can demonstrate their commitment to ethical and transparent data management, building trust among users and stakeholders alike.

Moreover, the GDPR encourages sustainable development platforms to adopt robust data security measures to safeguard personal data from unauthorised access, use, or disclosure. This aligns with the broader goal of sustainable development, which emphasises the importance of protecting the environment and ensuring the well-being of future generations. By prioritising data security, sustainable development platforms can contribute to a more secure and resilient digital ecosystem.

In summary, the GDPR serves as a crucial framework for sustainable development platforms operating within the EU or handling data of EU natives. Its focus on transparency, consent management, data minimization, and data security ensures that individuals’ rights are protected, while also promoting responsible data practices and fostering trust among users. By embracing the principles of the GDPR, sustainable development platforms can contribute to a more ethical, equitable, and sustainable digital future.

Similarly, the CCPA sets strict rules for businesses operating in California concerning the collection of data and the sale of personal information. It grants California residents rights over their data, including the right to access, delete, and opt-out of the sale of their personal information. For sustainable development platforms serving Californian users, respecting CCPA not only enhances legal compliance but also nurtures transparency and accountability in data handling practices.

Impact on operations of sustainable development platforms

These regulatory structures profoundly impact the operations of sustainable development platforms in many ways:

  1. Compliance costs and resources: Ensuring compliance with CCPA or GDPR requires significant investment in resources, such as implementing robust data protection measures, conducting regular audits, and appointing Data Protection Officers (DPO). This allocation of resources may divert funds initially earmarked for development initiatives.
  2. Enhanced data protection standards: Despite the initial challenges, compliance with these regulations boosts data protection standards. Platforms are compelled to adopt privacy by design principles, prioritise user approval, and approve measures to prevent data breaches. This, in turn, improves user trust and builds relationships with stakeholders.

Best practices for data protection in sustainable development platforms

Implementing best practices is crucial for ensuring robust data protection in sustainable development platforms:

  1. Privacy by design: Incorporating data protection considerations into the design phase of platforms. This includes minimising data collection, anonymizing data where possible, and implementing strong encryption measures.
  2. User consent and transparency: Obtaining explicit consent from users before collecting their data and providing clear explanations regarding data processing practices. Transparency builds trust and encourages active user engagement.
  3. Data minimisation: Collecting only the necessary data for achieving specific purposes and avoiding unnecessary retention of personal information.
  4. Regular audits and compliance checks: Conducting regular audits to assess compliance with regulatory requirements and internal data protection policies. This helps identify vulnerabilities and ensures timely mitigation of risks.

Examples of successful implementations

One noteworthy example of successful implementation is seen in digital health platforms that abide by GDPR standards while facilitating secure data exchange for medical research. These platforms ensure strict confidentiality of patient data, enable controlled access for researchers, and maintain compliance with regulatory requirements to safeguard sensitive health information.

Case studies or examples

Many digital online platforms are taking significant strides in incorporating robust data protection measures, recognizing the crucial need to safeguard sensitive information in the digital realm. One prominent example is the Global Forest Watch (GFW) platform, which exemplifies the productive integration of data protection measures while fulfilling its ecological mission.

GFW leverages a combination of satellite data and crowdsourcing to monitor deforestation on a global scale. This platform plays a vital role in tracking forest loss, habitat destruction, and other threats to biodiversity. However, it also faces the challenge of handling vast amounts of sensitive data, including the location of endangered species and vulnerable ecosystems.

To address these concerns, GFW has implemented stringent data security protocols. It employs encryption techniques to anonymize sensitive information, ensuring that the identities of individuals and organizations involved in conservation efforts are protected. Access to this data is strictly controlled, with only authorized users granted permission to view or modify it.

Another case study is seen in the health sector with platforms like OpenMRS, which supports electronic medical records in resource-limited settings. OpenMRS prioritises data encryption and user consent mechanisms to protect patient information while enabling healthcare providers to deliver efficient and secure services.

Lessons learned and outcomes

These platforms highlight the importance of proactive data protection strategies. Lessons learned include the need for robust encryption, transparent data handling practices, and continuous user education on privacy rights. Successful outcomes include enhanced trust among stakeholders, improved data accuracy for decision-making, and strengthened regulatory compliance.

Future trends and considerations

Looking forward, upcoming trends in data protection technology, such as blockchain for secure data storage and artificial intelligence privacy tools, are set to revolutionise sustainable development platforms. Regulatory developments, such as evolving GDPR standards and region-specific data protection laws, will impact platform operations globally.

Challenges may arise from balancing data-driven innovation with strict privacy requirements, especially in cross-border data transfers. However, these challenges also present opportunities for developing standardised frameworks and international collaborations to harmonise data protection practices.

Global goals initiatives

In 2015, the United Nations took a significant step towards safeguarding personal data and fostering sustainable development by introducing the “UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)”. These goals represent a comprehensive framework aimed at creating a fairer and more equitable world for present and future generations.

The SDGs encompass a wide range of interconnected targets, each addressing critical global challenges. Among them is the goal of eliminating unfair use of personal data. This goal recognizes the importance of protecting individuals’ privacy and ensuring that their data is used in a responsible and transparent manner.

To achieve this goal, the SDGs call for the implementation of robust data protection laws and regulations. These laws should provide individuals with control over their personal data, including the right to access, rectify, and delete it. Additionally, they should hold organizations accountable for any misuse or mishandling of personal data.

The SDGs also emphasize the importance of raising awareness about data privacy and empowering individuals to make informed choices about how their data is used. This includes educating people about the potential risks and benefits of sharing personal data online, as well as providing them with practical tools and resources to protect their privacy.

By aiming to achieve these goals by 2030, the United Nations has set forth an ambitious plan for a more sustainable and just world. The elimination of unfair use of personal data is an essential part of this plan, as it ensures that individuals are treated with respect and dignity in the digital age.

The implementation of the SDGs requires collaboration and commitment from governments, businesses, civil society organizations, and individuals. By working together, we can create a world where personal data is used for the benefit of all, and where everyone has the opportunity to thrive in a digital society.

The European Union and European Economic Area (EEA) took a significant step in 2018 by adopting the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). This regulation replaced the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, setting a new standard for data protection and privacy rights. The GDPR’s impact extended beyond the EU’s borders, serving as a model for numerous countries around the world.

The United Kingdom, after leaving the European Union, enacted its own data protection law known as the UK GDPR. This law closely aligns with the principles and provisions of the EU’s GDPR, ensuring continued compliance with data protection standards. Similarly, California, in the United States, passed the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) in June 2018, which shares many similarities with the GDPR, providing consumers with more control over their personal data.

In India, the Data Protection Bill (DPB) was initially introduced in 2019, but it faced delays and revisions. In 2023, after careful consideration and reexamination by both parties of the Parliament House, the DPB was finally passed and is anticipated to come into force in July 2024.

The DPB aims to protect the privacy and personal data of Indian citizens, ensuring that organisations collect, store, and process data in a fair and transparent manner. It includes provisions for data subjects’ rights, such as the right to access, rectify, and erase their personal data, as well as the right to object to its processing.

The DPB also establishes a Data Protection Authority to oversee the implementation and enforcement of the law. This authority will have the power to investigate complaints, conduct audits, and impose penalties for violations. The DPB’s enactment is expected to have a significant impact on businesses operating in India, as they will need to comply with the new data protection requirements.

Overall, the GDPR and similar data protection regulations have become influential models for countries worldwide, driving efforts to strengthen data privacy protections and empower individuals with more control over their personal information.

Conclusion

In conclusion, data protection is crucial for online sustainable development and global goals platforms to ensure privacy, security, and ethical handling of personal data. As digital platforms continue to expand and innovate, maintaining robust data protection measures is essential to foster trust among users and uphold ethical standards. Balancing data-driven innovation with stringent privacy regulations remains a challenge but also presents opportunities for advancing responsible data practices globally.

Recommendations

To enhance data protection practices on online sustainable development platforms:

  1. For policymakers: Continuously update and harmonise data protection regulations to address evolving digital landscapes and global challenges.
  2. For platform developers: Implement privacy by design principles, conduct regular audits, and prioritise transparency and user consent in data handling practices.
  3. For users: Stay informed about data protection rights, exercise caution in sharing personal information, and support platforms that prioritise privacy and ethical data practices.

By collectively advancing these recommendations, stakeholders can contribute to building a secure and inclusive digital environment that supports sustainable development goals effectively and responsibly.

References

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Radhakanta Deb & Anr vs. Commissioner Of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa (1981)

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This article is written by Meenakshi Kalra. It aims to provide a detailed analysis of the judgement of Radhakanta Deb & Anr vs. Commissioner Of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa (1981). The article highlights and elaborates on the differences between a private endowment and a public endowment. This judgement plays a vital role, as it clarifies the scope of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowment Act, 1939, and sheds light on what falls under the definition of the public endowment. This analysis deals with the arguments made by the parties, observations, and reasoning of the court, including the legal precedents and provisions referred.

Table of Contents

Introduction

Religious endowments have played a crucial role in the Hindu society for a very long time. They have served as a means for preserving religious, cultural, and social heritage. In ancient times, temples and other religious institutions not only served as places of worship but were also important places for the promotion of education and art. Temples have always been regarded as pious and sacred spaces, where deities reside and are worshipped by society. The proper management and regulation of these temples is vital, as this has an impact on the religious practices and beliefs of millions of people.

The laws relating to religious endowments have gone through several changes over time. During the period of British colonial administration, laws and regulations were introduced to supervise the endowments and oversee their management. After independence, states enacted their own state laws for the regulation of religious endowments, one such example being, the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowment Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the OHRE Act). 

The OHRE Act of 1939 was repealed and then reenacted as Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951 which saw several amendments and additions. The aim of the OHRE Act was to check and manage the Hindu religious endowments that existed in Orissa at that time.

The judgement in the present case of Radhakanta Deb & Anr vs. Commissioner Of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa (1981), addressed the nature of the endowment where the temple for deity Radhakanta Deb was built by the Pani family and determined whether it was a public endowment or private endowment under the OHRE Act.

Determining the difference between public and private endowment is important, as it helps in clarifying the degree of state intervention that is allowed under the OHRE Act as all Hindu public religious institutions and endowments in Orissa are covered under its scope. Radhakanta Deb & Anr vs. Commissioner Of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa (1981) highlighted the significance of maintaining such distinction and ensured that the autonomy of private endowments was retained by the founders of such endowment. 

Background of the case

This case revolves around the scope and applicability of the OHRE Act and was brought before the Supreme Court, by the Pani family for reconsideration of the nature of their endowment and temple, as they were dissatisfied with the decision of the High Court of Orissa.

The OHRE Act was legislation which was enacted by the British colonial government to regulate and manage Hindu temples and endowments in the state of Orissa. It was enacted at a time when there was increasing concern about the mismanagement of religious endowments that existed in India. Many temples and religious institutions had gathered significant wealth and property over the centuries, but there were recurrent assertions about the misuse and corruption of this wealth and property. The Act was introduced to oversee the financial management, property administration, and the use of benefits, such as money, derived from these endowments. It aimed to address these issues by establishing a legal framework for the supervision and regulation of these endowments and by ensuring that these establishments were used for their intended religious and charitable purposes. This Act also attempted to lay down the procedure for the appointment of trustees or managers of religious institutions and also listed their duties and responsibilities with respect to such institutions. 

The ORHE Act, 1939 had several loopholes and ambiguities that made it difficult to effectively control and supervise Hindu religious institutions and their endowments. Hence, this Act was repealed and reenacted in 1951.

The OHRE Act, 1951 aimed to provide clearer guidelines and more detailed provisions for the management and administration of these institutions. It established stricter provisions to ensure transparency and prevent mismanagement or misuse of temple assets. Further, the socio-political landscape and the character of religious endowments have evolved since 1939. The ORHE Act, 1951 sought to reflect these changes which took place after independence and provide a legal framework that was better suited to the present context.

The case of Radhakanta Deb & Anr vs. Commissioner Of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa (1981) continues to have an impact on how religious endowments are classified and managed, influencing the balance between religious autonomy and state regulation in the country.

Details of the case

Title of the case

Radhakanta Deb & Anr vs. Commissioner Of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa 

Parties

Petitioner

Radhakanta Deb & Anr.

Respondents

Commissioner Of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa

Type of case

Civil appeal

Court

Supreme Court of India

Bench

Justice Syed Murtaza Fazalali, Justice A. Varadarajan, Justice Amarendra Nath Sen

Author of the judgement

Hon’ble Justice Syed Murtaza Fazalali

Provisions and statutes involved

  • Section 62(2) of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1939
  • Article 133 of the Constitution of India, 1950

Date of judgement

13th February, 1981

Equivalent citation

1981 AIR 798

Facts of Radhakanta Deb & Anr vs. Commissioner Of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa (1981)

  1. A suit was filed by the appellants, under Section 62(2) of the OHRE Act, to quash an order dated 4th August 1950 which was passed by the respondent, the Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa.
  2. The above order stated that the appellant’s temple for their deity, Radhakanta Deb, was designated as a public temple and a trust. The endowment was also said to be of a public nature. Hence, the temple fell within the ambit of the OHRE Act and would be subject to its provisions.
  3. The Subordinate Court was of the view that the deity in the temple was a Pani family deity and the endowment was private in nature. Hence, the same could not be said to be covered within the ambit of the OHRE Act. The judge set aside the order passed by the Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa for the management of the endowment.
  4. The respondent then approached the High Court of Orissa regarding the decision of the Subordinate Court. The High Court reversed the judgement of the Subordinate Court and it was held by the Division Bench, that the temple and deity fell within the scope of the OHRE Act. This meant that the respondent was empowered to pass any orders regarding the management of the said endowment. 
  5. The present appeal in the Supreme Court arose out of the judgement and decree delivered by the Orissa High Court on 31st July, 1969 with respect to the appeal from the original decree no. 78/58. The appeal was brought by way of a certificate that was granted to the appellants under Article 133 of the Constitution of India, against the judgement and decree delivered by the Division Bench of the Orissa High Court.

Issues raised

  1. Whether the temple made by the appellants would fall under the scope of the OHRE Act, as a public endowment or not?

Laws/concepts involved in this case

Private and public endowment

A public endowment is set up for the benefit of the general public. Whereas, a private endowment is set up for a specific group of people or an individual. Further, if the management and control of the endowment is retained by members of a family or specific individuals, then it is a private endowment, but if the public has a say in the same, then it would be regarded as a public endowment. 

If a temple is built in such an endowment, it must be ascertained whether the deity placed in such a temple is a family deity or otherwise. If the public is given a right to worship the deity and the deity is not merely a family deity, then it could be regarded as a public endowment. However, if the deity is merely a family deity, then it could be indicative of a private endowment. 

Article 133 of the Constitution of India, 1950

Under this Article, a High Court’s judgement, decree, or order can be appealed to the Supreme Court of India, if in a civil case, the High Court states under Article 134A (certificate for the appeal to the Supreme Court), that the case involves an important question of law that needs to be adjudicated and if the High Court is of the opinion that the question of law needs to be decided by the Supreme Court.

Notwithstanding anything in Article 132 (appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court in appeals from High Courts in certain cases), if the conditions stated above are met by the aggrieved party, then they can appeal to the Supreme Court by stating that the High Court wrongly interpreted an important question of law related to the Constitution.

Further, an appeal cannot be made to the Supreme Court, if the judgement, order, or decree was passed by a single judge bench of the High Court unless the Parliament makes a provision stating otherwise

Arguments of the parties before the High Court of Orissa   

Appellants

According to the appellants (respondents in the matter before the High Court), the endowment was a private one, as the deity Radhakantha Deb, was a family deity of the Pani family. The petitioners had constructed a temple on their property for practising seba-puja of the deity, but later when they felt that they were unable to carry on with the practice of seba-puja, they sold the endowed property for 1000 rupees and termed it as samarpan-patra.

The appellants argued that there had never been any effort from their side to vest any right or interest to the public for worshipping of the deity or for their endowments and hence, had maintained the private nature of the endowment. The documents, Ex. A (document executed on 18th February 1895 which created the present endowment) and Ex.1 (settlement deed executed on 7th November 1932) clearly indicate that the endowments are of a private nature and were created to honour the family deity and that the clauses contained in the documents, gave no right or interest to the public.

They highlighted that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses 1 to 5, collected by the court, showed that Radhakanta Deb was the ishta-devata (family deity) of the Pani family, which was private to the family and its members, and the public had no right to worship or manage the temple and endowment.

The appellants further claimed that the features of the temple, as pointed out by the respondent, do not imply a public nature, and maintained that the endowment, along with the temple and deity, were of a private nature.

Further, merely conferring power on people outside the family, does not mean that a right or interest has been created in favour of the public. To support this argument, the petitioners highlighted the treatise Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trust by B.K Mukharjee, in which it was stated that if the Shebait who is the guardian of a deity’s property, is the one who has indulged in some wrongdoing or has improperly sold the property and cannot or will not take legal action, then any other person interested in the family temple property, can sue. The deity itself is considered a legal person and can also file a lawsuit through a representative.

The appellants stated that the recital submitted by them, in no way suggested that the nature of the endowment was public and it cannot be said that the right to ownership or right to worship over the same, was given under Ex. A or Ex.1. The endowment was therefore only created for the benefit of the family.

Respondent

The respondent (appellant in the matter before the High Court) contended that the endowment was of a public nature and the deity was not private to the Pani family, implying that the decision of the Subordinate Court was incorrect. There were several portions in the two documents, Ex. A and Ex. 1, which clarified that the nature of the right in the endowment, was public. 

The defence witness 1, who was a descendant of the Pani family, had stated that the public had the right to worship in the temple, thereby making it a public institution and not a private one. The respondent further contended that the prosecution witnesses were never required to seek any permission from anyone before entering the temple and worshipping the deity. Further, prosecution witness 1 had never visited the temple and had no first hand knowledge of how the matters of the deity were being managed. Hence, his testimony of Radhakanta Deb being set up as a private deity of the Pani family was not reliable.

The respondent’s claim regarding the endowment being public was also supported by several features of the temple, such as the height and size of the temple, the observance of festivals, the practice of bhogs and nities, etc. All these features can be seen in temples of public nature. The appellant’s temple also possessed such features that were consistent with that of a public temple and not a private one.

According to the respondent, if any person of the public had the power to sue the Shebait or Marfatdar, as stated by the appellants, then it cannot be said that the nature of the endowment was private. If it was private, the members of the public, apart from the family members, would not be given any such power. By doing so, the Pani family members had given up their rights and put them in the hands of the public, as can also be inferred from the recital submitted by the appellants.

Judgement by the High Court of Orissa

The judgement was delivered by Hon’ble Justice A. Misra. The Court was of the opinion that the endowment and dedication made by the Pani family was of public nature and not of private nature. The deity installed by the family was also not a family deity; rather the temple along with the deity were both of public nature.

The Hon’ble Court set aside the order of the Trial Court and delivered the judgement in favour of the respondent. The Court felt that the characteristics of the temple and the endowment were identical to those of a public endowment and temple. On perusal of the two documents submitted by the appellants, the Court further stated that the dedication was made in favour of the public and not of the Pani family.  

Arguments of the parties before the Supreme Court of India   

Appellants

The majority of the arguments made by the appellants in the High Court of Orissa were reiterated in the Supreme Court. They were represented by Mr. P.K. Chatterjee. It was argued that the contention that their endowment was a public one and not a private one, was incorrect. They further stated that the documents and evidence submitted to prove that the endowment had nothing to do with the public, were also misinterpreted by the High Court. It was the appellants’ claim that the temple of the family deity was private in nature and not meant for public worship.

According to them, the OHRE Act did not apply to their private temple, as it only covers public endowments. Since the deity was the family deity of the Pani family, it meant that the endowment was of a private nature. The family had complete autonomy over the management of the temple and the endowment. Thus, it could not be said that the endowment was of a public nature. 

Respondent

The respondent contended that the judgement delivered by the High Court was correct and the nature of the endowment and temple was public. The arguments made by the respondent in the High Court were reiterated during the proceedings of the Supreme Court.

To summarise, the respondent contended that the endowment, including the temple, was of a public nature and this could be seen clearly by analysing the contents of Ex. 1 and Ex. A. According to the respondent, the temple’s structure, distance from the family residence and celebration of festivals and other characteristics clearly suggested that the temple was of a public nature. Further, other factors, such as practising of seva puja and the presence of others at the temple, also strengthen the public nature of the temple.

According to the defence witness 1, the public had the right to worship in the temple which suggested that the endowment was of a public nature. Further prosecution witness 1 stated that he never had to seek permission from anyone before entering the temple to worship the deity.

The respondent argued that many features of the temple were consistent with that of a public temple. Members of the public were also given the power to sue the Shebait and Marfatdar, which showed that the public had certain rights and interests in the temple.

All these factors and arguments, when considered together, can be used to determine the fact that the endowment was of a public nature. Hence, it would be covered under the scope of the OHRE Act, since the temple was public, did not bar community participation, provided open access to the temple for worshipping, etc.

Judgement by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court of India held that the endowment and the temple of the Pani family did not fall within the ambit of the OHRE Act, as the nature of the endowment and the temple were of a private nature.

This judgement was determined by using both the oral and the documentary evidence. The documentary evidence- Ex. A and Ex. 1, played an important role in helping the Supreme Court reach the said decision. The court upheld the decision of the Trial Court, which had originally stated that the nature of the endowment was private and not public and set aside the judgement of the High Court. According to the Supreme Court, the High Court had overlooked some important facts and had underappreciated the evidence produced.

The court stated that trivial factors were not to be considered while determining the nature of an endowment. Rather, it used multiple tests and paid attention to several factors to ascertain the nature of the endowment.

The court reiterated that the temple was installed to worship the family deity of the Pani family and was intended for the benefit of the Pani family and their descendants alone. The court did not find any evidence that suggested that there was involvement of members of the public when it came to the maintenance or collecting funds for the temple. Further, the members of the public did not have any right to worship which was given to them by the Pani family. The Pani family also made consistent efforts to ensure that the management and control of the endowment and the temple remained with the members of the family or members appointed by the family. All these factors considered together, made it crystal clear that the nature of the endowment and the temple was private and not public.

Rationale behind the judgement

While reaching the conclusion that the endowment and the temple of the Pani family were of a private nature, the court examined two historical documents- Ex. A and Ex. 1, which stated that the temple was created for the family deity and also laid down instructions for the management of the endowment and the temple. It stated that the endowment and the temple were meant to remain within the control of the family or their appointed Tatwabadharak and Shebait. The document further stated that both in the present and in the future, all decisions made by the Tatwabadharak were to be made in accordance with this document. 

Further, provisions were made under the document, to show that the management and control of the temple were retained by the family. The Tatwabadharak could be removed if any actions contrary to what had been laid down were performed by him. The control over the property would be retained by the family, for present and future generations. 

According to the High Court of Orissa, the interpretation of clause 15 of Ex. A suggested that the temple and endowment were of a public nature, as under this clause, any member of the Vaishnav sect or any Hindu resident of the village could exercise certain powers if certain contingencies arose. However, the Supreme Court was of the view that this clause could only be enforced if the Pani family became extinct. Only if no such suitable person was found, would a member of the Vaishnav sect or a reputed Hindu from the village perform the deity’s duties. This provision alone cannot make the nature of the endowment public, as it selected a specific person from a specific community, which indicated that the founders of the endowment strived to maintain the private nature of the endowment, even if the Pani family ceased to exist. If they intended for it to be a public endowment, the clause would be expressed in a different manner, wherein the public, a brotherhood, or the Government, could take over the management. Instead, the provision was structured in a way that the nature of the endowment remained private.

Special provisions were also made against the sale or mortgage of the temple properties, which ensured that the endowment remained private and under family control. The temple and its properties were dedicated to the family deity and were to be managed by family-appointed trustees.

The court stated that the difference between a private and public endowment can be determined by evaluating whether the endowment is under the management and control of specific people or under the public and unknown people. Another factor the court considered to determine the nature of the temple was whether the right to worship was given to the public and if the benefits arising out of the property were meant for the family members or the general public. 

The court referred to multiple legal precedents to determine the difference between a private and public endowment. The court finally reached its conclusion by stating that the deity was a family deity and was intended for only people and members connected to the Pani family. This was done so that the private character of the endowment could be protected. Further, no contributions were taken from the public to support the temple or the deity. Instead, private resources and funds were used. Nothing contained in the documentary evidence indicated that the public had the right to worship in the temple. Prosecution witnesses 1 to 6, in their testimony, stated that permission had to be taken before worshipping the deity. Hence, it cannot be said that there was a right to worship given to the public. The court also clarified that the practice of offering bhogs in temples cannot be used as an argument in favour of the temple being of a public nature, as bhogs are also offered in private temples.

Relevant judgements referred to in the case

Deoki Nandan vs. Murlidhar (1956)

In the case of Deoki Nandan vs. Murlidhar (1956), the Supreme Court stated that while determining the nature of the endowment, there are various factors that need to be considered, such as whether the temple is located in a private house or a public building. Moreover, if the idol of the deity is placed on a pedestal, permanently, then it is in line with the characteristics of a public endowment, rather than that of a private endowment. Further, if an archaka has been appointed to perform puja in the temple, it is suggestive of the public nature of the endowment.

Mahant Ram Saroop Dasji vs. S.P. Sahi (1959) 

In the case of Mahant Ram Saroop Dasji vs. S.P. Sahi (1959), the issue before the court was whether the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950 applied to both private and public trusts. The court stated that it is important to determine the difference between the two before adjudicating on the same. According to the court, the benefit arising out of public trust is in favour of unknown and unspecified persons, which could suggest that it is meant for the general public at large. Whereas, a private trust means that only specific individuals would be entitled to the benefits arising out of the trust.

Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale vs. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi (1960)

In the case of Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale vs. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi (1960), the Supreme Court of India stated that the characteristics of the temple, such as the size of the temple, the way the temple was constructed, the right to worship given to the public, funds collected from rulers, etc., were all suggestive of a public nature of the temple and not a private nature. 

Bihar State Board Religious Trust, Patna vs. Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das (1971)

In Bihar State Board Religious Trust, Patna vs. Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das (1971), the court, upon analysing various factors related to the character of the temple, such as the festival celebrations, giving shelter and food to sadhus in the temple, right of the public to worship in the temple without any limitations, permanent pedestals installed for the idols of the deity, the temple being separate from the residential property of the Mahant, the Mahants belonging to the Vaishnav Bairagi sect who were lifelong celibates, was of the opinion that the character of the temple was public and not private and hence, it would fall within the ambit of Bihar State Religious Trust Board.

Dhaneshwarbuwa Guru Purshottambuwa Owner of Shri Vithal Rukhamai Sansthan vs. Charity Commissioner, State of Bombay (1976)

The court in the case of Dhaneshwarbuwa Guru Purshottambuwa Owner of Shri Vithal Rukhamai Sansthan vs. Charity Commissioner, State of Bombay (1976), reiterated all the factors mentioned in the above cases and emphasised on whether the public possessed the right to worship. If such a right has been given to the public, it would most certainly establish the public nature of the endowment.  The mere fact that there was no hindrance in visiting and worshipping in the temple does not mean that the temple was of a public nature. There has to be an existence of the right to worship given to the public before it can be said that the nature of the endowment is public.

Gurpur Guni Venkataraya Narashima Prabhu vs. B.G. Achia (1977)

In the case of Gurpur Guni Venkataraya Narashima Prabhu vs. B.G. Achia (1977), the court stated that just because there was no hindrance or permission required for worshipping in the temple, it does not imply that a right to worship was given to the public. Various other factors must be considered before the nature of the temple can be inferred.

Analysis of Radhakanta Deb & Anr vs. Commissioner Of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa (1981)

The case of Radhakanta Deb & Anr vs. Commissioner Of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa (1981) established that a comprehensive approach must be taken to determine the nature of an endowment, such as analysing the intention of the founders, management, and control of the property, public involvement in decisions or funding, etc. Trivial factors should not be considered while determining the nature of the endowment. Rather, important evidence and various other factors must be taken into account.

This judgement provided a clear distinction between private and public endowments which will serve as a precedent for future cases. This ruling also clarified that the OHRE Act does not apply to private endowments and upheld the right of the Pani family to manage and control their endowment in the manner of their choice. 

By doing so, the court reduced ambiguity and helped in the consistent application of legal principles relating to the nature of endowments, across similar disputes. This is an important case when it comes to safeguarding private endowments from forceful governmental interference, as it allows a private endowment to operate according to the rules and practices established by the founders.

However, the downside of this judgement could be that it relies heavily on historical documents, such as Ex. A and Ex. 1, to determine the nature of the endowment. This approach used by the court fails to appreciate the current practices and changes in society. A dynamic approach would have been more helpful, as it would help prevent any misinterpretation in future cases.

The Radhakanta Deb & Anr vs. Commissioner Of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa (1981) case not only raises questions about the tests used to distinguish private and public endowments but also helps in determining the degree of state control over religious institutions. It highlights the fact that public endowments are subject to greater state control and supervision. Whereas, private endowments are typically family-run and intended for the use and benefit of the family members or a specified group of individuals. However, this criteria for distinction is not without its own challenges. Navigating the legal landscape and ensuring compliance with regulatory requirements, while preserving the religious and cultural significance of the religious endowments is a tough job. This is because the tension between the autonomy of religious institutions and the need for state oversight to prevent mismanagement and corruption is still a prevalent issue.

Conclusion 

The definition of “religious endowments” has undergone several changes with time. The judgement delivered by the Supreme Court in the case of Radhakanta Deb vs. Commissioner Of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa (1981) marks a pivotal moment in the interpretation of religious endowments under the OHRE Act.

The Supreme Court attempted to clarify the distinction that exists between a private and public endowment. In its decision, the court emphasised the need to consider numerous factors that exist when it comes to determining the nature of an endowment and to use an exhaustive approach, rather than only focusing on limited factors and petty details.

This case continues to be relevant in today’s time, due to the ongoing debates around the regulation of religious endowments in India, considering the recent decisions of the Supreme Court with respect to the management of the Sabarimala Temple and the Ram Janmabhoomi-Babri Masjid dispute. The foundation established by this case is important when it comes to understanding and addressing similar issues in contemporary times.

It serves as a guiding light for future cases, as it ensures that the interests of the founders of a private endowment and their autonomy are safeguarded against State interference. Further, this case also helps to protect the diversity of religious practices that exist in India, as it ensures that all communities are able to retain the management and control of their private endowments and exercise their customs and beliefs.  

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

What is an endowment?

In the most simple terms, an endowment refers to a dedication of any kind of property (movable or immovable), which is made for a specific purpose. This purpose can either be religious or charitable, or for education, health, or any other purpose for the benefit of the public.

What are the essentials of a valid endowment?

For an endowment to be valid, the following essentials need to be fulfilled:

  1. The dedication of the property must be made in definite terms and permanently. The purpose of the dedication should be charitable and the donor must not take any benefits arising out of such property.
  2. The purpose for which the dedication has been made must be clear.
  3. The property that has been dedicated must be unambiguous, as any doubt regarding the property might lead to questions regarding the validity of the endowment.
  4. The founder of the endowment must be competent to do so, that is, he/she must be of sound mind, must have attained the age of majority, and must not be legally disqualified.
  5. The endowment must be in consonance with the provisions of law and should only be made for legitimate purposes.

What are the different types of endowments?

Endowments can be divided into religious endowments and charitable endowments. Religious endowments, also known as debutter property, can further be classified into private endowments and public endowments.

When a property is dedicated to religious purposes, it is known as a religious endowment. The management of such property is handled by Shebaits and Mahants. Public endowments are those wherein the dedication of the property which consists of a temple, is made for the benefit of the general public. It is important that before declaring the endowment as public, the intention of the founder and the degree of right to worship given to the public are analysed.

Private endowments, on the other hand, are set up for the worship of a family deity. The public has no say or interest in the endowment and thus, the benefit arising out of such endowment is only for specific individuals or members of the family.

Charitable endowments include all endowments except Maths (usually monastic institutions) and debutter property. These endowments are primarily established for the purpose of carrying out charitable activities and for the benefit of those in need. Several institutions fall within the scope of a charitable endowment, such as Dharamshala, shelter homes for the elderly, establishments providing free food and water, etc.

Who are Shebaits and Mahants?

Shebait refers to an individual who is responsible for the maintenance and management of the deity. The Shebait is obligated to serve the deity and look after the idol and the properties, as prescribed by the customs and usages.

Mahant is the head of the Math and is given the role of managing the property of the Math. Mahant is regarded as the spiritual head of the Math and is required to perform religious activities and worship the idol. He can also be described as a trustee of properties in the Math.

Can a public temple be converted into a private one, or vice versa?

A public temple cannot be converted into a private temple. Whereas, it is possible to convert a private temple into a public temple. This is possible because sometimes private temples might become reputable enough to attract a large number of worshippers, which can lead them to become public in nature. This was also held in the case of Goswami Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji vs. Rannchhoddas Kalidas (1970).

What are religious endowments under Muslim law?

Under the Muslim law, a religious endowment is known as a Wakf. It is an endowment of a permanent nature, which is set up for religious, educational, or charitable purposes. Similar to a Hindu religious endowment, a Wakf can be set up to provide benefits to the general public or to specific people. Wakfs are governed by the Wakf Act, 1995. It contains provisions for establishing Wakf Boards at both state and central levels, to supervise the administration of Wakfs in the country.

There are 2 types of Wakfs- Wakf alal aulad and Wakf lil allah. Wakf alal aulad is set up for the specific benefit of the family members or descendants of the wakf founder. After the family line perishes, this wakf is then used for the benefit of society. Wakf lil allah, on the other hand, is solely created for religious or charitable purposes, to help the general public or some specific sections of society.

References

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Kakumanu Peda Subbayya and Anr. vs. Kakumanu Akkamma and Anr. (1958)

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This article is written by Gargi Lad. The article provides a detailed analysis of the landmark judgement of Kakamanu Peda Subbayya and Anr. vs. Kakamanu Akkamma and Anr. (1958). It also further elaborates on the facts of the case, issues and arguments by both the parties. Subsequently, it delves into the history of the Hindu Undivided Family and the concept of a minor coparcener and his position and the right to seek partition. The article also talks about the rationale behind the judgement and the aftermath of the case by looking into cases which used this landmark judgement as a reference. 

Introduction

Family law is a subjective approach to law and can be misinterpreted to levels unknown. Generally a person relies on written laws or tends to be very sentimental when there is a property dispute between relatives or if any issue relating to family law has to be solved. Here is where the misinterpretation of a law or case begins. 

The present case is about a minor’s right to ask for partition in his ancestral property, regardless of being a minor. It delves into the aspects of who can file a suit for partition of such ancestral property on behalf of the minor, and whether the interest of the minor is an essential part that is taken into consideration by the court when decreeing a suit for partition of ancestral property. This case is a case of clear misinterpretation by the lower courts, they had different opinions and certain facts were misunderstood and misinterpreted by them which led to varied judgements which were challenged every time. The courts only looked into surface-level issues and neglected the factual parts and rights of the minors.

Details of the case

Name of the case: Kakumanu Peda Subbayya and Anr. vs. Kakumanu Akkamma and Anr.

Citation: AIR 1958 SC 1042

Case type: Appeal

Date of Judgement: 04/09/1958

Constitutional Bench: Justice P. B Gajendragadkar, Justice A.K Sarkar

Court: Supreme Court of India

Background of the case 

The minor, aged 2.5 years and his mother lived with his father in a property. The father was married prior to this and has two sons from the previous marriage. The father and the two sons from an earlier marriage were attempting to sell the joint family property in which the minor son also had some share. After selling off the joint family property they intended to buy a separate property that would belong to them individually, hence the aim was to deprive the minor of his share in the joint family property.

Seeing this, the maternal grandfather of the minor stepped in and filed a suit in the interest of the minor, which was allowed by the court. Meanwhile, the minor passed away, and the mother was then recognised as the minor’s legal representative by the court.

Facts of the case

A suit was filed in the interest of the minor, who seeked partition of the coparcenary property. The minor had died during the pendency of the matter. Initially, the suit was decreed but the subordinate judge for certain issues had remanded the case. On the basis of the evidence presented, the district munsif had held that buying the items with separate funds was not proved and hence they belonged to the joint family and the family had no debts. But he was also of the opinion that this according to him has not furnished any cause of action for the partition and hence he had dismissed the suit. 

Further, unsatisfied with the decision they filed for an appeal challenging the decision. The lower court was of the opinion that there was no cause of action based on the findings of this case for a partition of the property and subsequently they dismissed the suit. After this, an appeal was also filed before the subordinate judge of Bapatla who upheld the decision of the district munsif that there was no cause of action in the present case and the appeal was dismissed.

Further, another appeal was filed before the High Court of Madras where it was held that the claim made by the defendants that item 2 and 11 were separate properties of the defendants and not a part of the joint family, was false. Ultimately it was held that such an action had an impact on the interest of the minor and the suit for partition of the said property is valid and beneficial to the minor. On the basis of these findings, the court granted a preliminary decree of partition.

In this case, a final appeal was filed by the maternal grandfather on behalf of the minor Kakumanu Ramanna. This appeal had arisen out of all the unsatisfactory decisions given by the lower courts regarding the suit for partition for joint family property. The defendants in the present case were his father, sons of the father and his deceased first wife.

Issues raised

  • Whether the suit was instituted for the benefit of the minor? 
  • Whether the minor was an undivided member of the family and a coparcener in the property?
  • Whether filing of a suit by the next friend can affect a partition of the Joint Family Property?
  • Whether the suit abates upon the death of a minor coparcener or can the legal representatives of the minor continue the suit on his behalf?

Arguments of the parties

Appellants

There were three grounds that were presented in front of the judge, to show why a need for partition arose and why the minor should have the right to seek partition. 

The first ground was that the mother of the plaintiff was not treated properly and proper care of her and her children was not taken by the father. The District Munsif and the Subordinate Judge who heard this case prior to Supreme Court, were of the opinion that the above-mentioned fact that the mother was not taken care of, was not established and hence no further arguments were to be made on this in the Supreme Court. 

As for the second ground, it was argued that the family property was sold without giving any reason or intimidation or information to her, on the 9th of May, 1939 to a third party called Akkul Venkatasubba Reddi for the value of Rs. 2300. The sale of the property was done to cause trouble, harass, and hurt the emotions of the plaintiff. 

In the third argument, the plaintiff contested that certain items were purchased with joint family funds from a common pool of resources but the sale deed was only done in the name of the sons of the father and the deceased first wife, and not in the name of all members who made up the Hindu Undivided Family. The plaintiff argued that this was done with malicious intention with an aim to diminish the value of assets that the plaintiff owned and reduce the availability of funds to the plaintiff. The plaintiff also pointed out that the family was well off, had no debts and was in very good circumstances financially.

Respondents

The respondents disagreed with the allegations put forth by the appellants. They refuted that the items mentioned by the plaintiff were not purchased from the common resources of the joint family, but instead were bought from a separate fund that was maintained by the sons of the father and the deceased first wife. Hence the respondents claimed that the joint family had no right on those certain items, nor did they have any right to claim the money. 

In reply to the allegation that the family was well off and had no existing debts, the respondent said that the family collectively had an outstanding debt of approximately around Rs. 2600, that was to be paid off. 

Laws/concepts involved in Kakumanu Peda Subbayya and Anr. vs. Kakumanu Akkamma and Anr. (1958)

Section 3(f) of Hindu Succession Act,1956

This provision talks about the definition of an heir and aids in understanding who is an heir for devolution of coparcenary property. The provision defines an heir as any person, regardless of gender, having the right to succeed to a joint family property. The right comes from being a coparcener or relative of the deceased who died intestate.

Section 3(g) of Hindu Succession Act,1956

As per this provision, a person is said to die intestate if that person has not made any will or testament of his property. An individual can make a testament only of his personal property. A coparcenary property becomes an individual property only when there is partition of that property, after which it is treated just like an individual or personal property. The property then devolves by the rules of succession, if there is no testamentary disposition of the said property.

Section 6 of Hindu Succession Act,1956

Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 specifically deals with the devolution of interest in a Joint Family property governed by Mitakshara law. 

Definition of partition as per Section 6 is that the word “partition” involves both, a partition that has taken place due to the decree of a court or effected by law, and also by a deed of partition that was duly registered under the Registrations Act, 1908.

Section 6(3) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956

This provision clearly mentions that in a situation when a Hindu dies his interest in the property will be further devolved by intestate or testamentary succession. This Section also focuses on who all have the right to the property in case such partition takes place.

The laws that have been laid down under this Act state that daughters and sons are alloted equal shares. This was done after the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, as daughters are also considered to be coparceners. This provision further states that the surviving child of a predeceased son or a pre-deceased daughter will be allocated shares of such pre-deceased son or pre-deceased daughter. The same rules also apply to a child of a predeceased child of a predeceased son and child of a predeceased child of a predeceased daughter.

Explanation for Section 6(3): It is also to be noted that irrespective of whether a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener was entitled to claim partition of the family property or not, the interest of such coparcener will be deemed to be in the share of the joint family property in such a manner, that partition took place immediately before the death of the hindu coparcener.

Provisions of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act will not apply to any partition that took place before 20th December, 2004.

Partition

It is the division of joint family property in equal or priorly decided shares. The property is distributed among the coparceners who make up the joint family, it’s followed to provide each member a share of their ancestor’s property as a memory. Partition is a way through which a Hindu joint family comes to an end, only when the joint status of a joint family ends, it can be said that partition has taken place. Partition of joint family property can take place in two ways – either by severance of the joint status of a family or by division of property by metes and bounds or by both of them. 

Essentials of effecting a valid partition 

  • First is the intention to separate from the joint family, this intention shall be clear from the side of the coparcener.
  • Secondly, the intention to separate must be declared. The decision to separate shall be clear and unambiguous.
  • Third, the same shall be communicated to the Karta, the head of the family. Communicating the same to any coparcener would not count as communication, it’s immaterial to let every coparcener know but it’s necessary to inform the Karta. It’s the Kartas duty to inform all other coparceners, not the coparcener seeking partition.

Modes of effecting partition

A coparcener inherits a property when he is born, he can then ask for the property to be partitioned and get his exact share by metes and bounds. The right to ask for partition comes along with the right to property. He may ask for partition :

  • Partition by individual coparceners through unilateral declaration- when one coparcener decides he no longer wishes to be a part of the joint family, he may intimidate the Karta regarding the same. 
  • Partition by agreement- the coparcener who wishes to seek partition may ask for the consent of all other coparceners, though consent is immaterial for seeking partition, if a certain number of coparceners agree there can be a partition by way of agreement. 
  • Partition by conduct- if the coparcener leaves the house and continues to live a separate life, he ceases to be a part of the joint family. If prior to leaving he informs that he wishes to seek partition and his behaviour continues, it may be assumed that there has been intimidation given to the Karta regarding his wish to seek partition.
  • Partition by suits- Once a partition suit is instituted in the court, it is deemed to be a de facto partition.
  • Partition by notice- the coparcener who wishes to seek partition may give notice to the Karta that he wishes to seek partition. Once the notice is communicated to the Karta, the partition is communicated and effected.
  • Partition by will- if any coparcener, in his will writes down his wish to have a partition and communicates this will to every coparcener including the Karta. It is assumed that partition has taken place and was well communicated.

In the case of Ratnam Chettiar vs. SM Kuppuswami Chettiar (1975), the principle that was laid down was that if the minor coparcener, at any time feels that at that time the partition that took place was unjust or unfair then, after attaining the age they have the right to reopen the partition. This case was also referred to by the Supreme Court in the case of Sukhrani vs. Harishankar (1979).

Types of partition

Partitions can be divided into 2 types, de jure and de facto.

De facto partition

A partition is said to be de facto when the partition is in fact and not in real life. There is no legal recognition of this kind of partition. It takes place immediately when a coparcener communicates effectively to the Karta, the head of the coparcenary that he/she wishes to effect a partition. De facto partition starts on that very day that the communication is completed. It is recognised, however, that even after the de facto partition has begun, Karta cannot sell the entire joint family property as it no longer exists as a joint property. This is regardless of the communication made to other coparceners regarding the wish of one coparcener asking for partition.

De jure partition

A partition is said to be de Jure when the partition is in real life. There is legal recognition given to this kind of partition. It is said that the property is partitioned and it’s a de jure partition when the property is distributed in value to each and every coparcener, and partition has taken place by metes and bounds. De jure is when the partition actually takes place and the valuation of the property is done and every member gets his/her share.

Partition as a minor coparcener

Partition is a concept through which there is a division of a property into two or more parts. As per the Hindu law, a partition takes place when each coparcener gets an individual share in the property and the Hindu Joint Family Property is distributed amongst all coparceners. Every coparcener has a right to share in the property by birth. It is important to note that no partition can take place if there is only one coparcener. Partition of a personal property of an individual also can not take place. Once a partition takes place the status of a joint family is taken away, and the stature of a Hindu Undivided Family ceases to exist.

Role of court in partition of property

With regards to partition of property under the Hindu Law, the courts have a major role to play. They have to ensure that the partition that is taking place is done in a fair manner. The Mitakshara school of law governs the partition of property and according to this school of law a property can only be divided only after the consent of all members of the family. The courts can also intervene in a case, if required and can order partition.

Before dividing the property it is important that the courts analyse and determine the rights of all the parties that are involved in such partition. It is also important to determine the nature of the property that is to be divided.

Other factors including age and health of the people involved are also considered by the courts before arriving at a conclusion. Further courts also look as to what is the financial condition of each person and what contributions have been made for maintenance of such property. It is the responsibility of the courts to make sure that a minor child has not been denied his rights in the property and also that wishes of a deceased person are taken into consideration. After all these factors are taken into consideration, the courts arrive at a conclusion and such a decision or order that is given by the courts is further binding on all members of the family.

Relevant judgements referred to in Kakumanu Peda Subbayya and Anr. vs. Kakumanu Akkamma and Anr. (1958)

Before a few years it was considered that partition could take place only after all the coparceners had agreed to the same or if a decree was passed for partition. However in the case of Girja Bai vs. Sadashiv Dhundiraj (1916) the court had held that every coparcener of a joint family has the right to ask for partition at any point of time and it is not to be considered whether other coparceners have agreed to the same or not. The division of a coparcener can take place when he expresses his intention to separate unambiguously. It was considered that the institution of a suit by a coparcener is a way in which the courts can interpret his intention to separate. The question further arose whether such a rule could only be applied to a major coparcener or it also apply in a case where the suit has been instituted not by a minor but through his next friend. This question was answered in a series of judgements.

In the case of Chelimi Chetty vs. Subbamma (1917) the court dealt with the issue as to whether a suit that has been instituted on behalf of the minor plaintiff can still be continued on the death of the minor or not. The court was of the opinion that rules that are followed for the institution of a suit for partition of a joint property is not applicable to a suit which has been instituted on behalf of the minor and for the same reason, the legal representatives cannot continue the suit on behalf of the minor child. In case an adult asks for partition the court is bound to give the decree. However in the case of a minor child, the courts have been given the power to decide as to whether a decision takes place or not. 

The above case of Chelimi Chetty vs. Subbamma (1917) was also cited in the case of Lalta Prasad vs. Sri Mahadeoji (1920) where the court held that any action that has been brought through a next friend should not lead to any kind of separation as courts have been vested with the power to decide in a case of minor. 

After referring to these cases, the court also said that the power that has been given by the law to the courts to decide a suit for partition for a minor is just to check whether the person instituting the suit on behalf of the minor is acting in their best interest or not. The court in such cases is not acting as a super-guardian of the minor but as a supervisor to look upon if the next friend of the minor is acting in the best interest of the minor or not.

Further reference was also made to the case of Gharib -Ul-Lah vs. Khalak Singh (1903) that in case of a joint family only the Karta that is the head of the family has the right to represent a minor member in any transaction or case that is related to them. However, if the family in a particular case do not have a joint status that right to representation by the Karta cannot be questioned and any other person can also represent the minor provided that the said person is acting in the best interest of the minor.

Judgement of the case

The court when answering regarding whether the minor was an undivided member of the family and a coparcener in the property, determined that yes, the minor was a coparcener as he attains this right from birth, the right cannot be created nor destroyed and hence, he also has the right to ask for partition as a valid coparcener.

The court determined that the suit that was instituted was done in the best interest of the minor and directed the minor to not continue jointly with the defendants and ask for a partition as the defendants had denied the plaintiff right over Item 2 and Item 11 and had also stated that since the family property had debts it was not in the best interest of the child to live with that family.

The court must be convinced that the apparent next friend of the minor who is filing the suit of partition, on behalf of the minor, is acting in the best interest of the minor. If the next friend is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt to the court that the suit was instituted keeping in mind the best interest of the minor, the suit may be allowed.

The Supreme Court observed that the suit doesn’t abate upon the death of the minor coparcener, and if it was in the interest of the minor the suit shall be continued by his legal representatives. A division takes place when the coparcener expresses his intention to separate and filing a suit for partition is a clear indication of the coparcener’s intention to separate unequivocally. The date the suit for partition was filed, a de facto partition took place and hence the minor died a separate member as partition was already communicated to all members. 

Ultimately the Supreme Court had dismissed the appeal.

Rationale behind this judgement

According to the principles that have been laid down in Mitakshara law, a coparcener has the right to be maintained under any property that is under the status of the joint family. Also, from the date of birth, the coparcener has a right to share in joint family property. The coparcener also has the right to ask for a separate possession of his share in the property and can also ask for partition. The question arises as to whether a youngster who is acting via their next friend also enjoys the same applicability of the law that has been laid down or not. 

The court also cited the case of Girja Bai vs. Sadashiv Dhundiraj (1916) where the court had held that every coparcener has an equal right to be divided at his will and in such a case the consent of other coparceners does not matter and holds no value.

With respect to the rights that they enjoy of joint possession there is no difference between a minor and a major coparcener as per the Hindu law. Even the minor coparceners rights when there is a partition is equal to those of a major coparcener seeking partition.

When such a situation arises, it is on the courts to decide as to whether such a decision was taken in the best interest of the child or whether such decision would deny the said child of his rights. If the court performs a partition of the property then the date of institution of suit will be the effective date of severance of status of a minor coparcener. If in such a case the minor dies before the claim was settled that the legal representatives of the minor have the right to continue the case.

Significance of the case

The case of Kakamanu Pedasubayya vs. Kakumanu Akkama became a landmark judgement with regards to partition in favour of a minor coparcener. The courts had relied on this judgement for a lot of cases as discussed below :-

P.M. Ramaswamy Chettiar vs. Raja Kuppa Cheeti (1961)

Roya Kuppa Chetti and Krishnaswami Chetti who is his grandson were members of a Joint Hindu family. Krishnaswami Chetti is living under the care and protection of his mother and he was a minor child. Even though both of them were living in the same house it was said that Roya Kuppa’s did not treat his grandson properly and for the same reasons the mother of the minor child had sent a notice in which she had expressed her intention to separate from the family. The mother wanted a partition of the property. Roya Kuppa did not respond to the notice that was sent and instead had sold the property to the plaintiff of this case. The main issue in this case was that Roya Kuppa was not competent to sell the entire property in dispute. 

The Madras High Court in the above case referred to the landmark case of Peda Subbayya, to determine the role and power of courts in a situation where the minor has been deprived of his right to his ancestral property. The court held that, the power of the courts to decide whether to approve the suit filed by the guardian is firstly to protect the rights of the minor coparcener and secondly to analyse if the minor has been deprived of his right and to provide justice to the minor by restituting him in his original position. The position and role of the court here is supervisory in nature, to overlook if justice is being served and not to institute the suit on the behalf of the minor.

Lakkireddi Chinna Venkata Reddi vs. Lakkireddi Lakshmama (1963) 

A widow and a son had filed a suit for partition of joint family property. The son was a minor child and the mother in the present case was acting as his next friend. They had claimed a share in the joint family property but the minor died when the suit was pending and the mother was acting as a legal representative of the minor. The Supreme Court in the above case, made reference to the landmark judgement of Peda Subbayya to determine whether a suit that is instituted on behalf of the minor for his right, abates upon his death or not. On the basis of the Peda Subbayya case, the court decided that the suit does not abate on the death of the minor coparcener, as it was instituted for the right of the minor and will continue even after the death of the minor. The suit continues to be in place and to be heard.However, it is necessary for the guardian or near friend of the minor to prove that the suit was instituted for the benefit of the minor, and he was deprived of his right. 

Chinnamma and Anr. vs. Gopal and Anr. (1995)

The suit for partition was filed by a mother and the minor son, where the mother was acting as his next friend and they had claimed partition as well as recovery of maintenance. The only issue in this case was whether the minor child is entitled to partition of the property or not. The courts were of the opinion that because the father of the minor child who is the natural guardian is alive a partition cannot be forced between the two.  In this case, the Madras High Court had made reference to the case of Kakumanu Pedasubhayaya and Anr. vs. Kakumanu Akkamma and Anr. where it was laid down that a suit can be instituted for the benefit of the minor. Ultimately the court in the case of Chinnamma vs. Gopal, held that the lower court’s decision that a suit filed by a minor for partition of the joint family property is not maintainable, hence the decision of the lower court was quashed. The court then gave a clear judgement that any suit filed by the minor for the partition of the joint family, is his right, and he cannot be deprived of his right to ask for partition.

S. Jasdeep Singh vs. S. Kehar Singh (2004)

In the present case  the plaintiff had prayed for declaring that the oral partition and the entire proceedings with respect to the house property were null and void and also requested the court to declare that both the plaintiff and the defendants were entitled to 1/6th share of the property. On the other hand the defendants argued that the suit was not maintainable as the plaintiff did not have any locus standi to file the suit. The Delhi High Court in the above case had cited the case of Kakumanu Pedasubhayya vs. Kakumanu Akkama to answer the question as to whether a minor has the right to seek partition during the lifetime of his father or not. This court had quoted paragraph 9 of the judgement of Kakumanu Pedasubhayya vs. Kakumanu Akkama where it was held that the rights of a minor coparcener and a major coparcener are very similar and the minor coparcener should be maintained out of the family property. 

Ms.Ilaria Kapur vs. Rakesh Kapur (2012)

In the present case the defendant contended that her property cannot be termed as a property of the Hindu Undivided Family because she is a woman and she is not a coparcener in the Hindu Undivided Family of her husband and son. She argued that the properties that she was holding were protected by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937 and hence the suit should be barred.In this case, it was argued that the plaintiff cannot seek partition before the death of the father. The Supreme Court referred to the case of Kakumanu Pedasubhayya vs. Kakumanu Akkamma where it was held that the right of a coparcener to share in a joint family property and also to ask for partition arises from the birth of the coparcener and the Hindu law makes no difference between a minor and a major coparcener.

Conclusion

There were few principles that were settled in this case. The first question that arose was whether the right of partition can also be claimed by a minor coparcener. The court had mentioned that all coparceners are independent of each other and during partition the rights of a minor coparcener are similar to that of the major coparcener. The court for the above mentioned reasons also held that if a suit has been filed on behalf of the minor directing the court to grant a decree for a suit for partition, then such suit is valid and maintainable, but the court has to satisfied that the suit in question has been instituted for the benefit of the minor itself. The court also expressed its opinion on whether the suit for partition abates on death of the minor coparcener. The court had cited different cases where it was held that the legal representatives of the minor have the power to continue the suit on behalf of the minor. The Lower courts had also misinterpreted the real cause of action as the transaction that took place in this case was before the birth of the minor and did not furnish any cause of action. Hence with regards to this issue the court held that the high court could interfere with the findings of the lower courts in a second appeal. 

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

Can a minor be a coparcener in coparcenary property?

A coparcener is a member of a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) who is related by blood/ adoption to the common male ancestor who initiated the Hindu Joint Family. A coparcener can be a son/ a daughter (introduced by the 2005 Amendment) and he/she attains the right to be a coparcener and receive share in the coparcener property by birth. Hence, the right to be a coparcener is not limited by age, a minor can also be a coparcener.

Can a minor ask for partition in coparcenary property?

Every coparcener has a certain set of rights which are related to the ancestral property, amongst these some are the right to ask for partition. Hence, a minor also has the same set of rights ever since he gets the right to become a coparcener.

What is the difference between coparcenary and Hindu Joint Family?

A Hindu Joint Family, is a cluster of members that are living in a common household bound by one common male ancestor. The people who make the HUF are related to each other by blood/ adoption or marriage. The huf has a head known as the Karta who is the decision maker of the house.

A Coparcenary on the other hand, is a system within the HUF. It used to consist of only male members, but after the 2005 Amendment, even daughters are a part of the coparcenary. It consists of the Karta, the male members of the HUF and the daughter/s of the Karta.

Is consent of all coparceners necessary for effecting a partition?

The consent of all members of the HUF or all the coparceners is not mandatory for effecting a valid partition. If the communication of seeking partition is done by valid means, to the Karta, then it doesn’t need the consent of other members or the Karta.

References


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Is kissing illegal in India

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This article is written by Nipasha Mahanta. It is further updated by Upasana Sarkar. It gives a detailed understanding of the concept of public display of affection (PDA) in India and relevant applicable laws. It also states whether kissing is illegal in India or not.

Introduction

Movies are reflective of what the contemporaneous society approves of and what it does not. A few decades back, shots of the protagonists getting cosy would be followed by random clips of birds brushing their beaks against each other or two roses in a slight tilt towards each other, all symbolic of what might have happened. It is a demonstration of something which has happened but cannot be publicly shown. This automatically brings to the corollary that the act in itself is not wrong, but bringing it under the spotlight or painting it in its true colour stimulates raised eyebrows and gaping mouths and might cause Mom/Dad to tap the channel change button on the remote during family television hours. The Economic Times proposes two parameters for Indians to judge whether an act is probable to cause the above-mentioned reactions of shock and disgust; “If one can do something in front of one’s parents, then one can do it in public. This a tricky rule of negotiation for most Indian kids, given that they have never seen their parents even as much holding hands. Again, context matters, meaning that a goodbye kiss at the airport is okay, but smooching in a restaurant isn’t.”

Two years prior, an over-eager Richard Gere had the mob demonstration perusing him when he swooped down and caught performing artist Shilpa Shetty and planted a few kisses on her. The two, incidentally, were on an occasion to enlighten lorry drivers regarding safe sex. News TV hyperventilated, serving up titillation and snitching in equivalent measure on the serial-kissing Hollywood on-screen character. A few dissenters smouldered models of Gere; others yelled mottos requesting the demise of the hapless Shetty. It took the Supreme Court to suspend a capture warrant against Gere and vulgarity charges against Shetty. Much prior, in the mid-1990s, the general population were shocked after Nelson Mandela kissed the on-screen character Shabana Azmi when he came. What’s more, when India’s generally generous tabloids sprinkled grainy cell telephone photos of a Bollywood couple – they were dating around then – supposedly kissing a few years prior, the star diva fussed and seethed and started lawful procedures against the paper.

The Indian Legal System has been scrutinising the different kinds of obscene acts from ancient times. This led to the insertion of Section 294 (now Section 292 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which clarifies the criminal nature of obscenity. Though it deals with the nature of obscenity, it does not shed light on the content of obscenity. It does not state the acts or actions that will amount to public display of affection (PDA) in India. The Indian Penal Code neither states the activities that will be considered obscene nor defines the term ‘PDA’ anywhere in the Code. Therefore, the Code has granted this discretion to the courts to determine which acts or actions will be considered obscene and will lead to public display of affection. It will solely depend on the community standards that are driven by collective conscience. The judges of the courts will interpret whether a particular act performed in a public place by individuals would be considered an obscene act or not and attract Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Section 294 lays down provisions that deal with obscenity. This Section was inserted in the Indian Penal Code to strike a balance between individuals’ right to freedom of expression and community standards for maintaining public morality and decency. Section 294 lays down the provision stating that if any person-

  • performs any obscene act in any public place, or
  • sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place,

That can cause annoyance to others, those persons performing such obscene activities will be punished with imprisonment of maximum three months imprisonment, or with a fine, or with both.

Moral policing and public display of affection

The fundamental problem with effective policing is that in a society and custom characterised by high standards of dress, a small number of religious and political groups tend to divide the general population and target the interests of minority groups in an effort to gather support and gain attention and other benefits. Nor is it said that in no time, the idea of good policing is transforming into a racket, whereby the cops badger the nearby and legitimately ignorant residents, by abusing their power.

Moreover, what is hazardous is not that the endeavours are made to uphold Indian ethical quality and Indian society and conventional and moral qualities. However, the issue is in choosing who is the best judge to choose which act is foul or not or which act can be irritating or not. As to ethical quality, the Supreme Court has observed that thoughts of profound social quality are characteristically subjective, and criminal law can’t be utilized as an intent to unduly meddle with the area of individual independence. Democracy is a great deal all the more about simply spreading the thought of majoritarianism. India, a pluralist country, has been fruitful in showing the world the lesson of resistance by offering sanctuary to the mistreated and displaced people of all religions and countries. Regardless, the biased, moderate, and, above all, entrepreneurial individuals who specialise in good policing prefer to impose their own definition of ethical excellence on others. Over time, majority rule governance is put at risk since it hinders progress and other attributes. 

This concept, whether directly or indirectly, has deceived the thought process of the nation’s moral policing. In a fast-paced metropolis like Mumbai, police officers who act as mannequins for the coordinators of the ethical policing movement believe it is inappropriate, regardless of whether an individual, married or not, is publicly holding hands with a woman.

People with different thoughts object to the idea of men and woman travelling together at night, in today’s MNC’s culture. In July 2013, a couple at a beach, had to face arrest by the police merely because the whimsical moral police suspected “immoral activity” between them merely because the woman was not wearing any accessories to demonstrate that she was married. The Khap Panchayat in Haryana, and U.P. are one of the worst forms that moral policing has the potential to take. The extent of interference is so high in such form of moral policing that woman are not permitted to keep cell phones with them, or they cannot wear jeans in the public places, and government are merely mute spectators to such an apparent act of violation of rule of law. Similarly, in the metropolitan city of Kolkata, a girl was prevented from entering a theatre as she was dressed in a skirt.  In early 1990s, a women’s separatist organization called Dukhtaran-e-Millat in Jammu and Kashmir began forcing local women to cover their faces and threatening them with acid attacks. During that period, they also attacked cinemas, video parlours, beauty parlours and wine shops. Recently in the garb of moral policing, VHP has threatened people against celebrating the Valentines’ day, a foreign festival and has warned the people that whoever would try to embrace the western tradition by celebrating Valentines’ day, would be compelled to enter into the marital bond. Thus, it is demonstrated that moral policing can take hazardous forms, if it is not combated.

The line in the middle of innovation and debasement of ethics and society isn’t too thin, yet the narrow-minded and politically roused and childish. Good policing pioneers think that it is advantageous to totally smear this line, and consequently characterise culture and profound quality according to their impulses. The issue does not stay bound to the unusual methodology of good police to depict advancement. What is exceptionally troubling is that these individuals have no respects to the due procedure of law, and they attempt to rebuff individuals all alone through whatever methods accessible or plausible, then be it through savagery, lynching, or whatever else. If moral policing is allowed to continue, then the rule of law would take a backseat and “Might is Right” rule would prevail. Some people could find the act of kissing within the protest to be vulgar, but it is submitted that vulgarity and obscenity are two very different things; former is an aggravated form of obscenity. What is ‘obscene’ is certainly ‘indecent’ but what is ‘indecent’ is not necessarily ‘obscene’. Indecent refers to something not being in conformity with prevailing standards of propriety, modesty or quality of being decent or what is shocking, disgusting or revolting. We are not here confronted with a combination of words ‘obscene or indecent’ so as to permit a plea that the words are intended to convey a single idea. Indecency is not the same thing as ‘obscenity’ and it has a broader connotation.  It is easier to illustrate than define, and I illustrate thus for a male bather to enter the water nude in the presence of ladies would be indecent, but it would not necessarily be obscene. But if he directed the attention of a lady to a certain part of his body, his conduct would certainly be obscene. They might perhaps be roughly expressed thus in ascending scale – positive, immodest; comparative-indecent; superlative- obscene. These, however, are not rigid categories. The same conduct, which in certain circumstances may merit only the milder description, may in other circumstances deserve a harder one. Indecent is a milder term than ‘obscene’, as it satisfies the purposes of this case, if the prints in question are indecent, I shall apply that test.”

On the off chance that the contention are that there is a probability that a portion of the individuals would have felt deprivation of profound quality or would have felt irritated at the typical kissing done by the offended party, then the advice presents that Sexual therapists let us know of persons who are pure to the point that they have their susceptibilities stunned by seeing a lady’s shoe showed in a shop window; others have their humility insulted by listening to wedded individuals discuss turning in; some have their unobtrusiveness attacked on seeing in the store windows a sham wearing a girdle; some are stunned by seeing clothing, or listening to it discussed generally as “unmentionable”; still others can’t tolerate the notice of “legs,” and even talk about the “appendages” of a piano. Indecency is, in this way, just a quality or commitment of the review mind. It is absolutely in light of this non-target character of restriction that promoters of flexibility of declaration in writing view the concealment of vulgarity with extraordinary trepidation. In this way, the standard ought to be of a sensible individual.

Morality is subjective

Social morality is subjective in nature, and so it cannot be used unnecessarily by the Criminal Code to limit individuals’ right to privacy. Morality and criminality are not synonymous. The courts, while passing a judgement, should be sensitive enough to understand the changing moral viewpoints and notions of the people of the State. It must also take into consideration the effect of Section 294 on modern society’s norms and evolving definitions of obscenity. The test for determining whether public order would be disrupted by certain issues or acts is done by the Judiciary of the country.

In the case of Prabhakaran V. V. vs. State of Kerala (2022), the petitioner had filed a complaint against the accused under Section 294(b) alleging that the accused has used abusive and obscene words towards him. The accused submitted a petition in the Kerala High Court requesting to quash all the proceedings including Section 294(b) issued against him. The High Court of Kerala observed that unless the words used by the accused caused any sexually impure or filthy thoughts in the mind of the heaters, it would not amount to the commission of an offence under Section 294. Therefore, the Kerala High Court accepted the petition of the accused and quashed all subsequent actions and proceedings.

Morality differs from one person to another

The law of the State does not punish any individual for expressing unwelcomed views or opinions. However, a compromise between social interests and the right to free speech is necessary. It is the duty of the Indian Judiciary to protect the right to freedom of speech and expression, which means that it cannot be curtailed unless the circumstances that result from granting it are urgent and harm the interests of the community. The Court is permitted to do so only when the threat that is expected is not improbable, detached, or unrealistic. The Courts, in various judgements, have repeatedly stated the importance of acknowledging a balance of rights between the complainants and the accused so that the right and valid countervailing interests refrain from terminating each other. 

In the case of Prafulla Kumar Jaiswal vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh (2023), two complaints were registered in writing to the police station located in Bihta village, Madhya Pradesh by two newspaper Journalists against the accused who had abused them in response to instigation by one other person. According to the complainants, he also threatened to damage their camera and was attempting to manhandle them. They filed complaints under Section 294 and Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. It was pending in the District Court before the Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC). The accused submitted a petition to the Madhya Pradesh High Court to quash the First Information Report (FIR). Justice Dinesh Kumar Paliwal stated that the prosecution has not clarified what obscene words were told by the accused to the complainants. So the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that in the absence of allegations of annoyance and clarity in obscene words, as stated by the complainants, Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code cannot be applicable. The Madhya Pradesh High Court observed that the necessary ingredients for an offence under Sections 294 and Section 506 of the IPC could not be derived from the contents of written complaints on the basis of which an FIR was registered nearly a month later, or from recordings of the witness statements under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. So this case will not attract Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

In the case of N.S. Madhanagopal and Another vs. K. Lalitha (2022), the tenant filed a case against the landowner under Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code for using abusive words when work of laying PVC pipes was being carried out. The complainant filed a suit stating that the accused had used offensive language against him. The Supreme Court of India observed that abusive or defamatory words cannot always be considered obscene in nature. Therefore, the accused cannot be punished under Section 294(b) of the Indian Penal Code.

Did Indians kiss in the past 

Among disciples of Hindutva, a moderate belief system that likens Indian character with Hindu qualities, kissing openly is hostile to Hindu—and hence, as one progressive previous clergyman said on various events well before the present dissents began, open kissing is just not Indian. Vedic Sanskrit texts, dating back to 1500 BC, apparently contain the first mention of a kiss in writing. (A caveat from a researcher: “This does not mean that nobody kissed before then, and it doesn’t mean that Indians were first to kiss.”) India’s famous epic poem and one of the world’s oldest literary works, The Mahabharata, composed sometime between 3000 BC and 1500 BC, mentions kissing. The Radhika Santwanam, a collection of erotic poetry from a courtesan in a court in southern India from the mid-18th century, describes a kiss in fairly graphic detail: Move on her lips/The tip of your tongue/Do not scare her/By biting hard. In Kama Sutra, the definitive epic of amour, the scholar Vatsayana devotes a chapter to the art of kissing. He painstakingly details some 30 types of kisses – straight, bent, turned, press, nominal and throbbing are some among them. Ironically enough, Atish Patel of The Wall Street Journal has pointed out that anthropological evidence suggests India may have been the real birthplace of the potentially misnamed French kiss.

Laws relating to public display of affection in India

This is not a settled dimension of obscenity laws in India. Most of the charges against such act are brought under Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Section 294 of the IPC states:

Criminal litigation

Whoever, to the annoyance of others,
(a) does any obscene act in any public place, or
(b) sings,  recites or utters any obscene songs, ballad or word, in or near any  public place, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine, or with both.

It holds a great amount of veracity when, in Zafar Ahmad Khan vs The State (1962), the Allahabad High Court stated that it is an essential requisite that the obscene act or song must cause annoyance. Annoyance refers to a mental condition, and hence, it has often to be inferred from proved facts. When the accused addressed openly two respectable girls who were strangers to him, in amorous words suggestive of illicit sex relations with them and asked them to go along with him on his rickshaw, he was held to have committed an obscene act. Indecent exposure of one person or sexual intercourse in a public place will be punished under this section. The prosecution must prove

  • that the accused did some act; or that the accused sang, recited or  uttered any obscene song, ballad or words;
  • that this was done in or  near a public place;
  • that it was of an obscene nature;
  • that it caused annoyance to others. 

An FIR merely alleging the utterance of obscene words without mentioning the objectionable words is liable to be quashed, being vague.

In case of a conviction under this Section of the Indian Penal Code, a person shall also be liable for an offence involving a breach of the peace within the meaning of Section 106, Criminal  Procedure Code, 1973. Annoyance should be directed towards the party who is being assaulted. The inclusion of the public clause is not to ensure that everyone present in a public space agrees to the sexual encounter but to protect the modesty of the victim, who is more likely to be harmed if in public. Courts in India have a relatively large use of discretion permitted, so the court is expected to be wise.

However, the three words of this provision that sow the seeds of extreme arbitrariness are ‘annoyance’, ‘obscenity’, and ‘others’. The utter lack of definition of these words and the vagueness looming overhead provide scope for the policemen to harass and collect unaccounted fines, all of which accrue to their own interests.

Elements of Section 294

The important elements of Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, are as follows- 

  • One of the important elements of this offence is the performance of obscene acts in a public place.
  • The expression “obscene act” is nowhere clearly defined in the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Its meaning is just taken in a general sense as an act that is sexually explicit or offensive in nature, which is not in accordance with the prevailing standards of decency.
  • Obscene acts also include verbal forms of obscenity including obscene songs, ballads, or words.
  • Another important element is causing annoyance to others. It means that if an act is performed by any person in such a manner so as to cause annoyance to others, it amounts to obscenity. The act performed needs to ensure that it is an obscene act and that the law will not infringe on the right or individual freedom of expression more than necessary.

A person can only be punished under this Section of the Indian Penal Code when all of the above grounds are fulfilled. In the absence of any of the grounds, the conduct or action will not qualify as ‘obscene’.

Obscenity

The meaning of the expression ‘obscenity’ is not properly defined in law. The Dictionary meaning of the term ‘obscene’ is “offensive or disgusting by accepted moral and decency standards.” It is not defined in the Indian Penal Code, 1860. It merely means “lewd, impure, indecent and calculated to shock the moral sense of man by a disregard of chastity or modesty”. Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code was inserted to prohibit any act that can cause annoyance to the public at a large scale. In this situation, the meaning of the word “others” is not restricted to the individual who is the intended victim of the accused’s obscene behavior. Even if opinions differ from one person to another about the definition of the term ‘obscenity’, it is widely known, therefore it is not truly ambiguous.

In the case of Om Prakash vs. State of M.P (1989), the High Court of Madhya Pradesh stated that mere platitudinous utterances signifying the enraged state of a person’s mind would not be sufficient enough to consider such an act as ‘obscene’ and, therefore, Section 294 of Indian Penal Code will not be applicable in such cases.

By introducing the ‘community standards’ test, the court has paved the way for cases like the Bobby Art International, Etc vs. Om Pal Singh Hoon & Ors. (1996), wherein the scenes depicting nudity were contended to be obscene. The court opined that the scenes under contention cannot be viewed in isolation. The court said that these scenes which depicted gross nudity must be in the context of the entire film and with the background in which they were depicted. The movie Phoolan Devi depicts the social menace of torture and violence against a helpless female child, which transformed her into a dreaded dacoit. The object of the scenes was not to titillate the cinemagoer’s lust but to arouse in him the sympathy for the victim and disgust for the perpetrators. The court states that nakedness does not always arouse baser instincts. This case clearly shows a shift in the position of the court on the subject of ‘obscenity’. The court is now under an obligation to view the publication as a whole and not to just view the scenes depicting nudity in isolation. The dominant test, therefore, is whether the publication or work offends the standard set out by contemporary society for determining what is ‘obscene’ and what isn’t. The test, therefore, is whether an ordinary rational and reasonable man would be offended by the work and whether the context in which the obscene scenes are depicted is one of a useful social message or one of arousal of sexual feelings, and this must apply to cases of both Section 292 and Section 294. It is further accepted by the court, in cases like A & B vs. State Thr. N.C.T. Of Delhi & Anr. (2009), has accepted kissing and hugging in public to be simply a symbol of love and compassion and, therefore incidental and not obscene and protected by the Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression as guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India.

In the case of Zahir Hussain vs. State Reps (2021), the High Court of Madras held that the definition of ‘obscenity’ is not given in the Indian Penal Code, 1860. In this case, the complainant stated that the accused had used filthy language and threatened to end his life if he insisted on his portion of the partnership firm. So the complainant filed the case under Section 506 and Section 294(b) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. So the Court while interpreting the term ‘obscenity’ stated that while Section 294(b) of the IPC allows for prosecution under Section 294(1) of the IPC, the definition of “obscenity” under Section 292(1) of the Indian Penal Code does not apply to the offence of using obscene words by the accused in this particular case. Therefore, in order to be punished, the alleged words must be lewd, target a sensual interest, or refer to depraved or corrupt individuals.

Community standards are driven by collective conscience

The prevalent collective consciousness of society establishes standards for morality and immorality. When a court determines whether an act falls in the category of PDA or not, it takes into consideration the majority views of the society, which includes the norms and values of society. With the changing times, these views are also changing and the courts are passing orders in accordance with the changing thoughts and mindset of the people of our country. 

The case of Ranjit D. Udeshi vs. State of Maharashtra (1964) was inspired by the ‘Hicklin Test of Obscenity’ that was imported from British case law. In the British case of Regina vs. Hicklin (1868), Chief Justice Cockburn, while determining the ‘test of obscenity’ stated that “whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influence, and into whose hands a publication of this sort might fall. Further commenting that the criminal character of the publication is not affected by an ulterior object which was benign.” In the present case, the petition was filed against Ranjit D. Udeshi, a bookstore owner who was charged with possessing and selling obscene material in the form of a book called Lady Chatterley’s Lover, by DH Lawrence. The book contained contents dealing with detailed sexual intimacies. So it became necessary to determine whether or not the charge filed under Section 292 would be applicable, along with the standard for obscenity under Section 294. The Supreme Court of India observed that the ‘test for obscenity’ will be based on contemporary community standards that are driven by collective conscience. The Apex Court also held that artistic, scientific, or literary merit could be considered as a valid ground for defence against charges of obscenity.

In case of Chandrakant Kalyandas Kakodar vs. State Of Maharashtra And Ors. (1969), the Supreme Court again had occasion to deal with the concept of obscenity. While the Court seemed to follow the Udeshi case, in effect, the Court in Kakodkar expanded the freedom of writers by going beyond the Udeshi doctrine. The court stated that, in addition to considering the fill in general when determining whether the parts being referred to are truly profane or not, those parts must also be considered independently and without any other input, free from the connection established by the work itself. In doing so, the court set out a greatly thorough test that permitted each work of writing, which included even a smidgen of “vulgar” material, to be banned. On the other hand, in Kakodkar, the Supreme Court took an alternate position and made it the obligation of the court to take general perspective of the work under inquiry and not simply consider parts of the fill in as was set down in Udeshi which supported a more restricted perspective. However, the court, through Udeshi and Kakodkar did establish a test for obscenity which was also known as the Hicklin Test. 

The Hicklin Test was laid down by the Queen’s Bench in Regina vs. Hicklin (1868). The test of obscenity is whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall. The Hicklin Test allowed for a publication to be judged for obscenity based on analysis of isolated passages of the publication rather than the publication as a whole. Works can be judged by their apparent influence on most susceptible readers, such as children or weak-minded adults. The Kakodkar case, although retained the Hicklin Test, made it mandatory for the court to take into account the entirety of the publication and not just isolated out-of context passages and thereby changed the position of law on what can be considered obscene. 

The recent case of Aveek Sarkar vs. State of West Bengal (2014), has further altered the position of the court in determining whether a publication is obsolete or not. The Supreme Court has held that a photograph of Boris Becker and his fiancee, in the nude, is not “obscene” within the meaning of Section 292 of the Indian Penal Code. The Supreme Court has based its judgement on the overall publication and not just isolated aspects. In doing so, the Court has done away with the Hicklin Test and introduced the “Community Standards” test borrowed from the Roth v. United States (1957) judgement.

 In contrast to the Hicklin Test, which was focused on individual or isolated aspects of an entire work that could be deemed obscene, as well as its impact on “vulnerable” sections of society, the contemporary community standards test seems to be saying that if (on applying community standards), a particular work “has a tendency to arouse feeling or reveal an overt sexual desire“. Therefore, the Supreme Court, through the Aveek Sarkar case, has to a certain degree clarified that for a publication to be obscene, it must be viewed in its entirety and attention must be paid to the entire publication under contention, not just the isolated passages which contain material which is ‘obscene’. However, the Supreme Court has not referred to any judgments which over-rule this test though cases like Memoirs v. Massachusetts (1966) and Miller v. California (1973) have superseded the Roth Test. Further, the Supreme Court has also not taken the Roth test in its entirety. The Roth test as enunciated in the Roth v. United State (1957) case was envisaged to be a three-pronged test, Community standards constituted the first prong, but under the second prong, the material had to be “patently offensive”, and under the third prong, “of no redeeming social value”. However, the second and third tests under the Roth Test have not been referred to by the Supreme Court which has considered the Community Standards test to be the dominant test for obscenity. 

In the case of Amardeep Singh Chudha vs. State of Maharashtra, (2016), it was held that if any obscene activities are taking place in a private flat which is owned by a private person, it cannot be considered as a public place as it is bought for private use only.

In the recent case where Shilpa Shetty was discharged from the allegations filed against her under Section 294 on January 25, 2022, for kissing Hollywood actor Richard Gere during an AIDS awareness event in Delhi around fifteen years prior. The Hollywood star was seen kissing Ms. Shetty’s cheek on camera footage. It was only recently that the accusations were dropped as “groundless,” with the court ruling that she was the victim of an unwelcome approach. The Radical Hindu organisations were against such an act that took place in a public place as they viewed the kiss as an insult to Indian values. So they protested against the kiss.

Annoyance to others to be interpreted in reference to the general public 

The important question that needs to be considered and addressed from a broader perspective is whether the viewpoint of the people witnessing an incident will alone be taken into consideration or whether the viewpoints of others in the general public who are not present at that moment need to be considered. For this reason, it is not stated in Section 294 IPC that it should be to the annoyance of those who are present at the place of occurrence of that kind of activity. This is because the phrase “to the annoyance of others”, which is mentioned in Section 294 of the IPC means that the action in question annoyed those who were not present on the activity’s premises or precincts. Since annoyance is frequently linked to mental illnesses, it becomes challenging to establish its veracity through conclusive proof. It must be concluded based on the facts and evidence of a case. This was held in the case of Ameer Basha vs. State of A.P. (2010). In the case of Lila Dhar vs. State of Haryana (2011), it was observed that the presence of at least one person is necessary at the time of the commission of PDA in a public place to prove that the accused is guilty of causing annoyance by any obscene activities.

The prerequisite proof of annoyance is required

When an obscene act is committed in some place, the mere fact that it has occurred does not conclude the matter. While going through the provisions of Section 294, one would be able to understand the intention of this Section, which is to prohibit the commission of obscene activities in a public place that can cause annoyance to the public at large. So it is very important to cause annoyance to others in order to attract this Section. If the public present in a particular place is not annoyed by certain acts or activities, it means no offence has been committed. The people present there must consent to the fact that certain activities which have taken place have annoyed him or her. If such a complaint has not been registered, then only action can be taken against the offenders.

Ways to protect oneself from being charged under Section 294 

Kissing in public is usually charged under Section 294 of IPC, which lays down three ingredients to be satisfied for an act to be punished. 

In the event that any of these are not fulfilled, one can’t be held subject under this procurement. Further, there are Supreme Court judgments that may be relied upon to demonstrate that kissing out in the open is not an offence. The subjectivity of the expression “obscene” is a central point. Consequently, it relies upon the way of the demonstration charged whether one can be held subject and one can’t pronounce kissing out in the open an offence by all appearances. Additionally, vulgarity is characterised by society. In the vast majority of India, open presentation of sexual fondness makes individuals uneasy and is viewed as corrupt; subsequently, it is viewed as revolting.

Glance at various cities of India for public display of affection

The three main important metropolitan cities of India, that is, Kolkata, Delhi, and Chennai have implemented Section 294 for preventing PDA in public places-

  • In Kolkata, if two persons are seen to be indulging in an act that involves sexual connotation, then they can be sued for committing an offence under Section 292 or Section 293 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The provisions of Section 294 lay down the punishment for committing obscene activities or using obscene words in public. 
  • In Delhi, if two persons get intimate in a public place, then they can be either charged with a fine for doing so or a complaint can be filed under the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
  • In Chennai, the people are much more conservative than other metropolitan cities. The couples living in Chennai did not have much freedom like that of other States. The couples feared even holding hands in public. In recent years, there has been certain liberalization. Therefore, the couples, like the previous years, do not fear holding hands in public. But they certainly avoid getting involved in an intimate act in public places. 
  • In Mumbai, if two persons get involved in an obscene act in public, charges can be filed against them under the Indian Penal Code or Section 110 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951. Mumbai is the only State that introduced a specific Section under Bombay Police Act, 1951 for preventing PDA.

Steps taken to prevent kissing incident in Delhi metro

With the changing times and modernisation, every day we hear new incidents happening in and around us. The Delhi Metro network which connects lots of cities with one another became a hotspot for public displays of affection. A video of a young couple kissing suddenly went viral on social media in May 2023. The video showed that a woman was lying on a man’s lap, while they were kissing. All the people travelling in that compartment reported to the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC) that incident as “objectionable behaviour”. The Corporation promised to look into the matter and to monitor such instances so that henceforth such kind of incidents do not occur. As the video went viral on online platforms, it was highly criticised by many. Fierce debates took place about moral policing and public obscenity in the country. It was stated by the public and media that the metro is not a place for public displays of affection of any kind. So no sexual acts taking place in a train coach can be appreciated. These kinds of obscene acts are punishable under Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

As these kinds of incidents were happening so often, the Delhi police with the help of Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC) and Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) officials, decided to dispatch teams of constables and head constables dressed in civilian attire, who would monitor such incidents occurring in Delhi Metro. They took the initiative to deploy over 100 personnel in civilian clothes within the train compartments to keep a check on the occurrence of obscene activities inside the Delhi Metro. This effort was taken by the Delhi police to prosecute offenders on the spot and take further legal action against them. At least two Delhi Metro officials and two CISF personnel were decided to be deployed along with the police personnel, who will assist them in maintaining surveillance. It was also decided to deploy female constables in plain clothes, who will keep an eye on the women’s compartments and prevent the occurrence of such instances. Uniformed police personnel were also decided to be deployed in the train coach for safety and security measures. This initiative was taken by the Delhi police at the request of DMRC. They were worried about the rising number of public obscenity incidents. So they requested the Delhi police to strengthen patrolling both at stations and inside the Metro compartments. The DMRC also made squads of three to four personnel. Their job would be to instantly prosecute offenders on the spot, who would perform any kind of obscene activity.

If any person is caught performing any such obscene act, A fine of  Rs 200 would be imposed upon him under Section 59 of the Delhi Metro Railway (Operation and Maintenance) Act, 2002. If any obscene act is considered to be more serious, then those persons performing such acts will be charged under sections of the Indian Penal Code. To keep a check on the occurrence of obscene activities like kissing in Delhi Metros, CCTV cameras were decided to be installed within the Metro compartments, which will closely monitor individuals and if any person gets involved in any kind of inappropriate behaviour or acts, it will be promptly notified to the Delhi police. If a commission of any obscene activities is considered more serious, then the DMRC might file a complaint against those individuals committing such obscene acts to the Delhi police under Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code. In such situations, the police officials can arrest them and produce them in the Court. Since it is a non-compoundable offence, no compromise can take place between the complainant and the accused. Though, the accused can apply for bail, as it is a bailable offence.

Bengaluru couple kissing incident in metro train

In 2024, another video in Bengaluru went viral where it was seen that a boy and a girl were hugging each other. The person who recorded the video claimed that they were also kissing. While uploading the video on social media, the person tagged the official account of Bangalore Metro Rail Corporation Limited and Bengaluru City Police, asking them to take action against such incidents. When this post was shared on the online platform, a mixed opinion of the people was seen. While some were against such acts of public kissing and hugging, others stated that the person recording and sharing the video must be penalised as it has hampered the couples’ right to privacy. They were of the opinion that it was illegal to take videos and photos of people without their consent and is punishable under Section 354C of the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, a mixed opinion was seen in this PDA incident and there is no public consensus about it. Public display of affection is considered offensive to some people, whereas it is normal to others who accept that with changing times people need to accept changes without getting annoyed. To understand the concept of PDA and obscenity, the definitions of these expressions must be inserted in the Indian Penal Code by the Legislature.

Important judicial pronouncements

Ranjit D. Udeshi vs. State Of Maharashtra (1964)

In the Ranjit D. Udeshi vs. State Of Maharashtra (1964), the Supreme Court said that the word obscenity is really not vague because it is a word that is well understood even if persons differ in their attitudes to what obscenity is and what is not. The court, however, did lay down some qualifying factors which may aid in determining whether an act is obscene or not:

  •  That which depraves and corrupts those whose minds are open to such immoral influences.
  •  That which suggests thoughts of a most impure and libidinous character.
  • That which is hard-core pornography.
  • That which has a substantial tendency to corrupt by arousing lustful desires.
  • That which tends to arouse sexually impure thoughts.
  • That which passes the permissive limits judged from our community standards.

Ramdutt Singh And Anr. vs. Gram Kutchery Of Naudiha (1957)

In the case of Ramdutt Singh And Anr. vs. Gram Kutchery Of Naudiha (1957), the respondent of this case stated that he was threatened by the petitioner that his land would be plowed up and his house’s passage would be completely blocked by a thorn hedge when a domestic dispute arose between them. The case was filed in Patna High Court by the petitioner, who was held accused by the Gram Panchayat Court. The respondent further contended that the petitioners uprooted the pegs and threw them away without a thought. While this case was taken to the Gram Panchayat, witnesses of both sides were examined by them and it was observed by the Panchayat Court that the petitioner was guilty under Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. It was stated by the Panchayat after hearing both that the uprooting had resulted in the demolition of the ridge and the merging of the respondent’s land with the petitioner’s land, as well as the additional repercussions of blocking the respondent’s route by raising a thorn hedge is an act where the accused was found to be guilty under Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code. The Patna High Court observed that merely annoying a person does not constitute an obscene act unless any obscene activities are done or any obscene song is sung or recited or any obscene words have been uttered relative to mischief. They might have given displeasure to the respondents but it does not mean that the petitioner would be held guilty under Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

State of Maharashtra vs. Joyce Zee (1973)

In the case of the State of Maharashtra vs. Joyce Zee (1973), the Bombay High Court observed that it is doubtful whether places like Hotel Blue Nile could be considered to be such public places within the meaning of Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code as it requires admission fee to be paid to attend cabaret shows. Similar circumstances also took place in this case. It was also stated by the Court that if an adult person is willing to pay the admission fee to attend such shows, he or she always runs the risk of getting annoyed by obscene activities that will take place around that person. In this case, Section 294 cannot be applicable as it is used only for punishing those persons who indulge in obscene acts in any public place, which annoys the other general public. This Section states that punishing people indulging in obscene activities needs to be in a public place, which is to be used by the public at large. Those places that require admission fees and where the public is not allowed to enter without payment, that is, have no right to enter, cannot be said to be a public place. In such circumstances, Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code cannot be invoked to punish any people who are involved in any sexual or obscene activities.

Shreya Singhal vs. Union of India (2015)

In the case of Shreya Singhal vs. Union of India (2015), it was held that determining whether a particular act will be considered obscene or not, and will disturb the current life of the community or just an individual leaving the tranquillity of the rest of society undisturbed depends on the collective consciousness of society.

Narendra H. Khurana vs. Commr. of Police (2003)

In the case of Narendra H. Khurana vs. Commr. of Police (2003), the High Court of Bombay observed that the performance of cabaret dances, which includes indecent and obscene acts, would not invoke Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code as it will not create annoyance to others who will not watch it.

Indian Hotel & Restaurants Assn. vs. State of Maharashtra, (2006)

In the case of Indian Hotel & Restaurants Assn. vs. State of Maharashtra (2006), it was held that mere performance of an act cannot be considered as an obscene act or sufficient enough to prove that it will cause annoyance to others. Then, it will be like saying an intimate dance performance in Hindi movies will also affect the public who are watching those movies. Therefore, the dance sequence and the dancers, who are skimpily dressed, cannot be considered as obscene acts disturbing the public order. Sufficient evidence must be provided to the court to establish that a particular act is creating annoyance to others.

Dhanisha vs. Rakhi N. Raj (2012)

In the case of Dhanisha vs. Rakhi N. Raj (2012), the High Court of Kerala observed that when an obscene word or words are spoken by any person, it is a matter of fact to determine whether or not those words have the potential to corrupt the mind of the people present at that time and whether their minds are to be affected by such immoral influences. This can be determined by taking into account the meaning of those words that are spoken by a person. The Court also stated that the tone and tenor of those words, along with their meaning must be taken into consideration. Also, whether the person hearing those words is likely to experience mental shock upon hearing them or not, and whether those words are actually intended and used in an obscene sense in that area or locality, are all factual basis that must be looked into before deciding a case, and not just based on the evidence that may be presented.

Dr. K.K. Ramachandran vs. Sub Inspector of Police (2022)

In the case of Dr. K.K. Ramachandran vs. Sub Inspector of Police (2022), the petitioner filed a case against a doctor, who was the respondent of this case. According to the petitioner, her child was taken to a hospital as he developed bleeding from his penis. During the time of his examination, the child started to urinate. This made the respondent angry and started to use some abusive words against the petitioner which outraged her modesty. Not only that, he had also shown some obscene signs with his fingers, while using those obscene languages. The Kerala High Court stated that to invoke Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code, it is important to establish that the accused has sung, recited, or uttered any obscene song or used any word in or near any public place, which has caused annoyance to others. The Court observed that in this case, the incident took place in the consulting room at the hospital. So it cannot be considered to be a public place. So Section 294 IPC cannot be used to punish the respondent in this case. The Court also held that Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code cannot be invoked in this case as the words uttered required to arouse sexually impure thoughts in the mind of the hearer. But in this case, it failed to satisfy the basic requirements of that Section. Therefore, neither Section 294(b) nor Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, can be invoked to punish the accused. 

Lalit Nandlal Bais vs. State of Maharashtra (2023)

In the case of Lalit Nandlal Bais vs. State of Maharashtra (2023), the Police Sub-inspector of the police station of Nagpur District of Bombay received secret information. It was about an obscene dance performance taking place at a Banquet Hall in Tiger Paradise Resort and Water Park, Tirkhura. The informer informed the police officials that the people watching those women perform that obscene dance, who were scantily dressed, were showering dummy currency notes on them. The police officials on the basis of this information raided the said Banquet Hall and found three bottles of foreign liquor. The petition was filed in the Bombay High Court under Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code, along with various other sections of the Police Act, 1861. The Court observed that no allegations against the accused have been submitted stating that they have indulged in any obscene activities or any FIR has been registered. There was only one allegation against the accused that states the accused were dressed in short skirts and were dancing in a provocative manner. The Court stated that their way of dancing or making gestures to the police officials cannot be regarded as obscene acts that have caused annoyance to others. But the Court was of the opinion that while dressing up one should be mindful of the general norms and values of society which is prevalent in Indian Society. It also opined that women wearing swimming costumes or similar attire are common and acceptable in this present era. The Court concluded by stating that the women in films and cinemas also dress in such a manner that it passes through censorship, and there it is not creating any annoyance to the audience. No complaints or FIRs have been lodged in the application based on which the accused can be held guilty of any offence. Therefore, the Court held that Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code would not be applicable in this situation, taking into account the progressive view and thoughts in this matter with the changing times.

Monu Kumar vs. State of U.P. (2024)

In the case of Monu Kumar vs. State of U.P. (2024), the police arrested the applicant for making obscene remarks towards women in a public place. The police registered an FIR under Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, against the applicant, though there was no independent witness of this arrest. So the applicant filed a petition in the Allahabad High Court. It was contended that neither there is any independent witness to that incident nor recordings of the statements of any woman with their names. According to the applicant, the police officials did not follow the protocols while arresting him and violated the provisions of Section 100 and Section 165 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, at the time of his arrest and investigation process. He also stated that the investigation had taken place solely on the statements of the police personnel. He, an undergraduate student, also contended that he was returning from his aunt’s house when he was wrongfully arrested. The Allahabad High Court scrutinised all the lapses and hasty processes of the investigation done by the police personnel while investigating and preparing the charge sheet The Court observed that the police officials had failed to investigate properly and examine the independent witness, which, in turn, decreased the credibility of the case. The Court also took into consideration the applicant’s future and was of the opinion that an undergraduate student whose career and future prospects are at stake, cannot be jeopardized by these false allegations. It also held that there must be enough proof of annoyance caused to the general public by obscene words or acts to attract Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, the Court concluded by quashing the summoning order, the chargesheet presented by the police personnel, and the proceedings against the applicant, highlighting the importance and requirement of a fair, just, and unbiased investigation in this matter.

Conclusion

The definition of ‘obscenity’ is not precisely mentioned anywhere in the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The definition of ‘obscenity’ is unclear and vague. Therefore, most people take advantage of this Section to harass couples who do not even indulge in PDA. It can be a sister and a brother standing close in a crowded metro or a father and a daughter. So standing close to each other must not be treated as an obscene act unless they are kissing or performing any other sexual activities. If a case is filed in court in such cases, it is the duty of the judges to understand the situation and pass a judgement that will prevent the public from creating an unreasonable fuss. It is also the duty of the legislature to insert the term ‘obscenity’ in the Indian Penal Code and define the term so that no individuals are unnecessarily harassed by the people in public places. It is the judges of the courts who interpret its meaning from time to time with the changing thoughts of the people of society. They are entrusted with the responsibility to find out which actions or words would be considered obscene with the changing times. Few words or activities that may have been considered obscene in the past, might not be regarded as obscene in this recent era as the mentality and the thought processes of the people are evolving with time. Therefore, it is of vital importance to create a balance between the right to free speech and expression and the decency and morals of society, which is entrusted to the Indian Judiciary.

We can see that people at times get furious when they see a boy and a girl kissing or hugging in public places and this creates a lot of fuss. These people start beating the boy for standing close to a girl but do not raise their voice when they see a woman being eve-teased by others, or for a woman who is sexually harassed in public places. In those situations, we can not find them showing their sense of morality. Public display of affection is considered unacceptable in India today in many places. Hugging or kissing in public places in India is taboo. Though India is adopting western style and culture, citizens of India are still not able to accept PDAs in public places. Whenever they find people hugging or kissing in public places, they get agitated. Couples must also understand that PDAs in public places to an extent are alright, but they must not cross a line as many children with their parents who are around them become uncomfortable. So punishing the offender for committing obscene activities in public places becomes very important.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

What is the meaning of a PDA?

The public display of affection (PDA) means any intimate act committed by a couple done in a public place, which includes holding hands, hugging, kissing, cuddling, and other sorts of physical intimacy.

Whether the offence committed under Section 294 is bailable?

Bailable offence are those where the accused is granted bail in their entirety, which is purely a matter of right. In case a person gets arrested by a police officer, he will be granted bail for any offences of obscenity, as it is not a very serious offence. Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code is a bailable offence.

Whether the offence committed under Section 294 is cognizable?

Cognizable offences are those where a police officer can arrest an offender without a warrant in accordance with the law. Any offence filed under Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, is considered a cognizable offence.

Reference


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Difference between seat and venue of arbitration

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This article is written by Sahil Kumar Purvey and Siddhant Singh and further updated by Sana Virani. In this article, the authors explain the difference between ‘seat’ and ‘venue’ of arbitration. This article aims to elucidate the concept of seat and venue in arbitration and highlights its fundamental differences and it’s legal implications. 

Introduction

We live in a time when globalisation is at its peak which initiates a wide number of contracts between entities belonging to different nations. Many disputes occur due to ambiguity or non-performance of the contract which requires interference from a third party. Earlier, a court trial was a preferred dispute resolution mechanism, however, its prolonged procedure creates unnecessary delays. International Commercial Arbitration is a less formal and easier and faster way to solve disputes. Arbitration proceedings are preferred as an alternative to litigation because of its simple execution and accessibility. 

Arbitration gives the power to parties to decide various factors like the law applicable to the arbitration agreement and the performance of that agreement as well as the law governing the procedure of arbitration. Arbitration takes place when parties face a dispute that arises out of a commercial transaction and wish to amicably resolve it privately by submitting required evidence to the arbitrator. The arbitrator is responsible for listening to both parties and making a decision based on the evidence and applicability of the law. 

However, Arbitration due to the involvement of entities from different parts of the country raise the issue of jurisdiction of the court to deal with the arbitration disputes, which involves the concept of “seat” and “venue”. The seat of arbitration also known as the legal jurisdiction is necessary to determine because it would affect several major legal issues such as the arbitrability of the subject matter, the legal validity of the arbitration agreement, procedural guarantees, judicial review of the award and supervisory jurisdiction of the court, etc., whereas the venue of arbitration is where the arbitration proceedings take place is flexible, and only signifies the physical place for the conduct of said arbitration proceedings.

This article provides a detailed analysis of the two important topics falling under arbitration, i.e., seat and venue. The article first attempts to explain the aforementioned two terms, thereafter, the difference between the two terms has been dealt with in detail along with relevant case laws, for a better explanation of the topic. 

Difference between seat and venue of arbitration

The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) does not directly define the terms ‘seat’ and ‘venue’.

Although the aforesaid terms have not been expressly defined in the Act, an attempt has been made to explain the concepts in Section 20 of the Act. It highlights that parties are free to choose the place of arbitration and the role of an arbitral tribunal in case the parties fail to determine the place in the arbitration agreement/ clause. Section 20 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is an important provision inspired by Article 20 of UNCITRAL Model Law which gives contractual freedom to parties to decide the place for arbitration. It plays the role of providing the ground for the arbitration process and majorly impacts the procedure as well as the result of arbitration. If the parties fail to decide the place of arbitration then it shall be decided by the arbitral tribunal taking into consideration the circumstances of the case and the convenience of the parties involved. The section highlights the importance of the place of arbitration and gives the parties the privilege to decide on the place of arbitration. However, the Act uses the word “Place” of Arbitration, instead of ‘seat’ and ‘venue’ which creates ambiguity on the location of the arbitration, the law governing the arbitration proceedings, the language in which the arbitration is effected, and the recognition and enforcement of the award.

Let’s first understand the concept of seat and venue with the help of relevant case laws followed by a detailed explanation of the role played by ‘seat’ and ‘venue’ to understand its importance in the procedure of arbitration. 

Seat 

The seat of an arbitration refers to the court which has exclusive jurisdiction over the transaction. Seat in the context of International Commercial Arbitration is one of the most crucial aspects that determines the course of arbitration proceedings. If in an arbitration agreement, a certain place is selected as the seat, then the courts of that place will have jurisdiction over that matter, if any dispute arises related to the agreement. Seat creates a legal base for arbitration because it determines how the arbitration will be conducted, what procedural rules will apply, and also governs the way the decision of arbitrators will be enforced. However, the role of the seat in arbitration is to decide the legal framework of the complete arbitration proceedings and it cannot be determined as the geographical location of arbitration proceedings. Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Aluminium Co vs. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Service, Inc (2012) pertaining to foreign seated International Commercial Arbitration held that “When parties have chosen a seat of arbitration, or if the arbitral tribunal has determined a seat, such a determination automatically confers jurisdiction on the courts at such seat of arbitration for the purposes of interim orders and challenges to an award”. Through this case, the Supreme Court observed that Part I of the Act is concerned with the seat of arbitration in India. 

Venue

Venue refers to the geographical location where the parties will conduct the physical proceedings. Since arbitration is a mechanism to settle disputes outside the court, the place to conduct the proceedings is also crucial to decide by the parties. The venue in the arbitration should specify the city or country where both parties along with the arbitrator will meet to conduct the proceedings. Many arbitrations have the same place for the jurisdiction of the court as well as the physical place where the parties will meet to solve the dispute. However, the problem arises when the seat and venue are different. The confusion on seat and venue in India has been clarified through conflicting judgements by various high courts which have been concluded by the Apex Court. In Imax Corporation vs. E-City Entertainment (India) Pvt. Ltd. (2017) where one party was Indian and parties contracted to install theatre systems in India, the Supreme Court held that “If the venue of arbitration is not clearly mentioned then any party which is involved in arbitration can apply for jurisdiction to decide in the Indian Court. This might increase the multiplicity of legal proceedings.”

The use of “place” under Section 20 sparked debate if it referred to a seat or venue which was later settled under Bharat Aluminium Co. vs. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. (2012) (explained in detail under Supreme Court on “seat vs. venue” of this Article) clarified that “place” refers to the “seat” and in Section 20(3) of the Act “place” refers to the “venue”. 

Illustration 

Let’s understand the difference between seat and venue through a hypothetical illustration. 

Assume Company A and Company B, have a dispute about a contract they made. Instead of going to court, they agree to resolve their disputes through arbitration. 

Venue: Venue refers to a place or physical location where the arbitration proceedings happen. Both parties chose London, England, as the location for their arbitration proceedings because it’s more convenient for them to travel to London than anywhere else for the arbitration proceedings. 

Seat: The seat of arbitration refers to the main laws applicable to the arbitration process. Even though the arbitration hearings will physically take place in London, the seat of arbitration can be in a different place. In this case, the seat of arbitration is specified to be in Zurich, Switzerland. This means that Swiss arbitration law will govern the arbitration process, including issues such as the procedural rules, ensuring awards are followed, and handling any problems that arise during arbitration.

Summary: Venue refers to a place or physical location where the arbitration proceedings are conducted  (London). The legal jurisdiction is the laws of a certain place that govern the arbitration process (Zurich). Just like this illustration, both aspects should be specified in the arbitration agreement or parties can select an arbitration institution to navigate through it. 

Table of differences

AspectSeatVenue
DefinitionThe seat is known as the jurisdiction which governs the applicable law of the arbitration proceedings.The venue is known as the geographical location of the arbitration proceedings.
Legal implicationIt implies the procedural law that regulates the arbitration process.It has no certain legal implication and is solely based on the convenience of the parties.  
Jurisdiction controlThe courts at the seat of the arbitration proceedings have jurisdiction over certain aspects. Venue has no concern or jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings and has more concern over access, and facilities. 
ChangeabilitySeat is not easily changeable and requires a strong reason as well as mutual consent of partiesVenue may be changed easily based on the convenience and flexibility of parties. 
Legal challengesLegal challenges regarding arbitration proceedings shall be filed at the courts of the seat decided. Challenges regarding venues can be discussed amongst the parties. 

Insights from The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 

The Arbitration Act, 1996 along with many other flaws lacks clarity on the meaning of seat and venue. The Act doesn’t define the meaning of these terms but only uses the term ‘place of arbitration’. Section 2(2) of the Act states that Part I shall apply if the place of arbitration is in India. It doesn’t clarify that, whether “place” means to be a mere “venue” of arbitration or it also includes a “seat” which confers jurisdiction to the court.  Even Section 20 of the Act, which provides how to determine the place of arbitration, is ambiguous and fails to distinguish between “seat” and “venue”. However, the Act comprehensively covers various aspects of domestic as well as international arbitration to make it fair and efficient. 

Conflicting views by the High Court

Due to the underlying inconsistency and ambiguity in the Act, there have been several issues raised concerning ‘seat vs venue’ which has also sparked debate between judges. Conflicting opinions by high courts arose when the arbitration contract or clause specified a certain place as the seat for the legal place arbitration, however, at the same time, it also granted jurisdiction to a different court which created ambiguity about the governing law and other aspects of the arbitration. 

First view 

The first view that various courts opined is that the juridical seat is the same as the place (venue) of the arbitration. Delhi High Court in NJ Construction vs. Ayursundra Health Care (P) Ltd (2018) and Madras High Court in Ayyappa Enterprises vs. Sugam Vanijya Holdings (2021)  held that there is no distinction between seat and venue. The above-mentioned courts encountered similar cases and the judges stated that the exclusive jurisdiction clause is applicable to other proceedings and irrelevant to arbitration and they further held that the parties intended the place of arbitration to be their juridical seat. To conclude the cases, the shashoua test was often applied to determine the location of the arbitration proceedings. According to this test, when there is no mention of a seat in the arbitration clause, the venue automatically becomes the jurisdiction of the arbitration.  In short, this view disregarded the exclusive jurisdiction mentioned in the agreements directing the arbitration. 

Second view

The contrary viewpoint observes that an exclusive jurisdiction clause indicates that seat and venue are different. Gujarat High Court in Instakart Services vs Megastone Logiparks Ltd (2023), Delhi High Court in Kush Raj Bhatia vs. DLF Power and Services Ltd (2022), Calcutta High Court in Commercial Division Bowlopedia Restaurants India Ltd in vs. Devyani International Ltd (2021), and Rajasthan High Court in Aseem Watts vs. Union of India (2023) concluded with the second view. They highlighted that place is considered the venue whereas exclusive jurisdiction is about power given to the court of a certain place which makes both distinguished. The Courts in their respective case held that the venue is the location chosen for the arbitration sittings which brings convenience to parties whereas the seat is the intention of parties that gives exclusive jurisdiction. 

In Meenakshi Nehra Bhat vs. Wave Megacity Centre (2022), the parties designated Delhi as the location but also mentioned that any dispute arising shall be referred to the exclusive jurisdiction of a different court. The High Court of Delhi held that the selection of a certain venue would not automatically make it the seat of arbitration. 

Supreme Court on “seat vs. venue”

To answer this vexed question of law time and again, the judiciary has given various interpretations in different judgements. On 5th March 2020, the Supreme Court in Mankastu Impex Private Limited vs. Airvisual Limited revived the conundrum of “seat vs. venue” under the Arbitration Act, 1996 and tried to settle the issue in the line of UOI vs. Hardy Exploration (2016).

Prior to Hardy Exploration case

After the enactment of the Act, the first landmark attempt by the judiciary to settle down the quandary was in the case of Bhatia International vs. Bulk Trading SA (2002) (herein referred to as (Bhatia International”). In this case, the Supreme Court while interpreting Section 2(2) of the Act, rather than differentiating between “seat” and “venue”, held that any international commercial arbitration that involves an Indian party irrespective of whether it proceeded in any country would confer jurisdiction on Indian Courts to entertain applications under Part I of the 1996 Act. This view was without any reasoning and is considered a judicial fiasco. 

However, the Apex Court in the case of Bharat Aluminium Co. vs. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. (2012), (herein referred to as “BALCO”) overruled the interpretation of Section 2(2) as laid down in the case of Bhatia International vs. Bulk Trading SA (2002) and held that Part I of the Act would only apply if “seat” of arbitration is in India, and reading of Section 2(2) along with Section 20 established that the Act has no extraterritorial jurisdiction. 

The Court restored the distinction between “seat” and “venue” and stated that the term “place” used in Sections 20(1) and (2) connotes “seat” and Section 20(3) talks about “venue”. Sections 20(1) and (2) deal with the right of the parties to select the place of arbitration and in the absence of any such selection in the agreement, authorise the tribunal to determine the same, whereas Section 20(3) allows the tribunal to meet at any place for convenience in procedural matters. 

Before BALCO the other prevailing approach to determine the supervisory jurisdiction of the court for arbitration was to decide as per section 2(1)(e) of the Act, which recognizes that the court at the place of cause of action would have jurisdiction, but BALCO adopted a seat centric approach instead of the place of cause of action approach and extended the supervisory jurisdiction of the arbitration exclusively onto the court, which is considered as the seat of arbitration.

In 2014, the 246th Report of Law Commission addressed that the use of the word “place” in the Act is a misnomer and suggested replacing the word “place” with the words “seat” and “venue” in section 2(2) and section 20 of the Act on the line of explanation given in BALCO, but this suggestion was never materialised. 

The Supreme Court reiterated the same principle in Enercon (India) Ltd. vs. Enercon GmbH (2014). In this case, the court noted that if the “seat” of arbitration is not clear, the “closest and most intimate connection test” would be applied. This test necessitates taking into consideration several factors like place of performance, contractual conditions in the contract, governing and curial laws of arbitration, the intention of the parties, and the legal system which has the most intimate connection with the arbitral proceedings while determining the “seat”. 

In Roger Shahshoua vs. Mukesh Sharma (2017), the Supreme Court upheld the judgement of the English case and recognized “the significant contrary indicia” test to differentiate between “venue” and “seat” and held that unless there is the contrary intention of party “seat” of arbitration would be determined by “venue” and “something else” prescribed in the agreement, which would vary with the facts of the case. However, BALCO has also implicitly concluded that a “venue of the arbitration” is the “seat of arbitration”, in the absence of any significant contrary intention in the agreement.

Before the judgement of Hardy, the law to determine “the juridical seat” was “the significant contrary indicia” test, but the judgement of Hardy led the other way around to determine the “seat of arbitration”. 

UOI vs. Hardy Exploration

Facts of the case- Hardy Exploration and the government of India signed a contract and agreed to solve the dispute through arbitration. The arbitration clause specified Kuala Lumpur as the “venue” of arbitration, whereas the UNCITRAL Model Law of International Commercial Arbitration of 1985 would govern arbitration proceedings. 

The arbitration was conducted and the award was signed in Kuala Lumpur in favor of Hardy Exploration, which was challenged before the Delhi High Court under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The high court held that the  seat of Arbitration is Kuala Lumpur and Indian courts don’t have any jurisdiction to hear the matter. The matter was further challenged before the Supreme Court and heard by a three-judge bench.

Issue- Whether the “juridical seat” of the arbitration is the same as the “venue” of arbitration if the venue is given but the seat is not specifically mentioned in the arbitration agreement. 

Held- The Court contradicted the judgement of Roger Shashoua, BALCO, and held that the “seat” of the arbitration and “venue” of the arbitration are distinct from each other and if the arbitration agreement only mentioned the “venue” of arbitration, the same can be considered as the “seat” of arbitration only if arbitration agreement has explicitly mentioned it or other factors of the arbitration agreement indicate that. The Apex Court held that the arbitration agreement should be read holistically to deduce the ‘seat’ of arbitration. 

In the present case, the Supreme Court read the Arbitration agreement holistically and considered the Model Law as a factor in deducing the seat of arbitration. As per the Model Law if there is no mention about the place of arbitration, then the same can be determined by the arbitral tribunal. The Apex court noted that the award was signed and declared in Kuala Lumpur, but the place of arbitration was not expressly determined by the arbitral tribunal. So, the ‘seat’ of arbitration is not Kuala Lumpur and the award rendered isn’t a “foreign award”, which entitles the Indian court to entertain the application under Section 34 of the Act.

Post Hardy Exploration

In the case of Brahmani River Pellets vs. Kamachi Industries (2019), the matter involved domestic arbitration, but the court in case obliterated the difference between “seat” and “venue” and held that, in the absence of specification of “seat” of arbitration in the arbitration agreement, the “venue” of the arbitration would be same as “seat” of the arbitration without any other concomitant factors. The court neither mentioned any reason for its judgement nor applied nor set any test or standard which could determine that “venue” would be considered as “seat”. 

This blanket formula could have far-reaching effects on the arbitration because the venue of the arbitration could be flexible and could take place at different locations but the same can’t be applied to the seat of the arbitration. 

Another landmark judgement in this series of judicial interpretations is BGS SGS Soma vs. NHPC (2019). Many regarded this judgement to be the defining moment in the never-ending debate of “seat vs. venue”, as it tried to clarify and describe the stand of the Apex Court on the issue. In this particular judgement, the Apex Court restored the reasoning of Roger Shashoua and the BALCO case and held that choosing the “venue” of the arbitration is akin to choosing the “seat” of the arbitration. And, the absence of any contrary indication about any difference in the context of “seat” and “venue” shall be a strong sign to regard both venue and seat as indistinguishable and not require any explicit mention of the same as held in Hardy. This judgement was hailed by many as significant. 

Nonetheless, the judgement being contrary to Hardy has added fuel to the already undying debate on “seat vs. venue”. Also, the Court held that the law laid down in Hardy shouldn’t be considered a good law as being contrary to the judgement of a five-judge bench in BALCO and Roger Shashoua. 

However, the Mankatsu Impex Private Limited vs. Airvisual Limited (2020) judgement of the Apex Court has again brought the issue of “seat vs. venue” into the limelight. Let’s discuss the case in detail. 

Mankastu Impex Private Limited vs. Airvisual Limited (2020)

Facts of the case- The Petitioner (Mankastu Impex Private Limited) and the Respondent (Airvisual Limited) entered into an MoU for the exclusive distribution right to be awarded to the Petitioner for the Respondent’s air quality monitor products for five years. Subsequently, the respondent company was acquired by an entity named IQAir AG, which refused to honour the pre-existing MoU as entered between the Petitioner and the Respondent and the dispute arose between the parties as the Petitioner claimed the exclusive right of the sale of the Air Visual’s product for five years as per the terms as mentioned in the MoU. 

The dispute resolution clause (Clause 17.1 of the MoU) between the parties specified that the agreement between the parties would be governed by Indian laws, and the courts of New Delhi would have jurisdiction. Clause 17.2 of the MoU specified that if any dispute arose out of or relating to the agreement, it was to be resolved by arbitration that was to be administered in Hong Kong and mentioned Hong Kong as the place of arbitration. 

The clause further specified that parties have the right to seek preliminary injunctive reliefs from the courts having jurisdiction. After the dispute arose, the Petitioner approached the Delhi High Court to file a petition under Section 9 of the Act seeking interim relief and the Petitioner obtained the same and subsequently approached the Apex Court under Section 11(6) of the Act for the appointment of a sole arbitrator. 

Issue- Whether the Indian Courts have the jurisdiction to entertain the petition filed under Section 11(6) of the Act? 

Held- The Court began its analysis by highlighting the importance of determining the difference between the “seat” and “venue” of any arbitration proceedings, as the seat tends to help in deciding the curial law, which thereafter has implications on remedies available through judicial review of the proceedings. 

It was observed by the court that the mere expression “place of arbitration” can’t be regarded as the focal point on the questions related to the seat and venue of the arbitration proceedings, instead, the court upheld the fact that the same should be determined by the conduct and the agreement between the parties. 

So, while arriving at this conclusion the Court was of the view that Clause 17.1 shows that it will be the substantive law of India that will be governing the substantive contracts. But, after analysing Clause 17.2, the Court was of the view that the seat of the said arbitration proceedings is to be Hong Kong. The court, while considering the principle of territoriality as held in the five-judge bench decision in BALCO, dismissed the petition made under section 11(6). The judgement of the Mankatsu case laid down the same law as in Hardy.

The BALCO judgement made it clear that the supervisory jurisdiction of the court would be “seat-centric” and not at the place of Cause of action. The Court in the BALCO gave exclusive supervisory jurisdiction to the “seat of arbitration”. However, the Delhi High Court in Antrix Corporation Ltd vs. Devas Multimedia Pvt Ltd, held that the court at the seat and the court of the cause of action have concurrent jurisdiction over arbitration applications. 

The Delhi High Court view has been overruled in BGS Soma and specified the strict stand regarding exclusive supervisory jurisdiction to court at the seat. The view of the judiciary to determine the seat of arbitration has been continuously changing since BALCO. The BGS Soma was considered as the end of the conundrum but the Mankatsu again revived the conundrum. 

However, it can’t be said that the BGS Soma case stands overruled, as there was nothing in the judgement to declare the same as bad law. Further, both the judgements being of the same coordinate bench can’t overrule the other. Also, it can’t be said that the Mankatsu judgement is in complete contradiction to the BALCO judgement as while negating other laws of the BALCO judgement, Mankatsu upheld the Principle of territoriality as held in BALCO.

 However, in light of the above observations, it can be said that the Mankatsu judgement is a missed opportunity for the Apex Court to clear this conundrum by referring the matter to the larger bench. 

So, now it would be interesting to see what will be the future course of action of the High Courts as presently due to the ‘negligence’ of the Apex Court there are umpteen contradictory cases in front of the parties to the arbitration, which thereby hampers the growth of India, to become the global hub of arbitration.

Recent Case laws on seat vs. venue

The discussion on seat vs. venue has been longstanding and full of complexities which makes it crucial to understand the recent judgements by courts to understand the complexity of this topic through the lens of judges and their interpretation of the same. 

Following are the recent case laws on seat vs. venue:

In the case of BGS SGS Soma JV vs. NHPC Limited (2020), the Supreme Court pointed out that if an agreement mentions a specific location “venue” without specifying any other place as the “seat” and there’s no conflicting sign in the agreement or the behaviour of parties and the mentioned venues should be considered as Juridical seat of the arbitral proceeding. The Court observed that subsection (3) of Section 20 of the Arbitration Act refers to the “venue” while the term “Place” mentioned in subsections 1 and 2 refers to the jurisdictional seat. 

The Supreme Court of India in Sumitomo Heavy Industries Ltd. vs. ONGC Ltd. and Others (1997) noted that in a situation where the parties in the agreement are unable to make the decision to the seat of the arbitration, the arbitration agreement would be subject to the same law as the contract even if the arbitration agreement holds a different legal status from the contractual agreement.

In the Bhatia International case, as per fact both parties entered into a contract containing an arbitration clause specifying that arbitration would be conducted according to the rules of the ICC i.e., International Chamber Of Commerce. An argument arose between the parties when the respondent referred the arbitration proceedings at ICC which led to the decisions made by the High Court and Lower Court being challenged at the Supreme Court. The Court decided that International Commercial Arbitration consists of the involvement of an Indian party and proceeding to take place anywhere globally, Indian courts would have the jurisdiction to exercise their power under Part 1 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

In Reliance Industries Ltd. and And. vs. Union of India, (2023), where both parties being Indian, referred to International Commercial Arbitration in which the Supreme Court of India observed that if parties to the agreement have selected London as the place of arbitration and concluded that the agreement shall be governed by the law of London which made it clear that part 1 of the Act would not apply.

In Harmony Innovation Shipping Ltd. vs. Gupta Coal India Ltd. and Anr, (2015) – The Supreme Court based on its previous decision on the principle of implied exclusion which means an agreement may exclude the jurisdiction of other courts if more than one court has jurisdiction, but jurisdiction can only be granted to the court that originally held it. It was laid down in the case of Bhatia International and as per this principle, if the case of international commercial arbitration is happening outside of India then the provisions of Part 1 will apply until the parties are excluded by agreement it might be implied or expressed.

In Eitzen Bulk A/S & others vs. Ashapura Minechem Ltd. and Anr, (2016).– The arbitration was referred to be resolved in London as per English law. The Supreme Court held that choosing a certain location outside India as the venue of the arbitration clearly expresses that the parties wish to exclude themselves from being governed by Indian arbitration law.

Aniket SA Investments LLC vs. Janapriya Engineers Syndicate (P) Ltd (2021)– The parties chose mumbai as the seat for the arbitration but when the dispute arose on the execution of the real estate project which was situated in Hyderabad, the respondent raised an issue on the same. The Bombay High Court held that a choice of seat is in itself an expression of party autonomy and carries with it the effect of conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the courts of the seat.

Indus Mobile Distribution Private Ltd. vs. Datawind Innovations Pvt. Ltd, (2017)– According to the facts of the case when the parties entered into an agreement to conduct a business, mentioned the clause of arbitration where the disputes would be solved through the Arbitration Act at Mumbai in the English language. However, the Court referred to the BALCO case and observed that the Bombay Court would not have jurisdiction to deal with the matter as no cause of action had occurred there and also neither CPC (Section 16-20) had been attracted. 

In the case of Vasudev Garg vs Embassy Commercial project, (2023), there was an underlying ambiguity about jurisdiction as Mumbai and New Delhi both were mentioned. The Delhi High Court held that the venue clause as well as an exclusive jurisdiction clause included in the agreement is subject to the venue clause. It limits exclusive jurisdiction courts in resolving disputes which are not covered by the arbitration /venue clause.

In Orissa Metaliks Pvt. Ltd. vs. SBW Electro Mechanics Import Export Corporation, (2023) the Plaintiff pointed out that the agreement contained ambiguity about the seat and venue to which the High Court of Calcutta ruled that if an agreement between parties has clearly not mentioned any venue for arbitration, it would be the same as the seat of arbitration.

In Damodar Valley Corporation vs. BLA Projects Pvt Ltd, (2023), the question arose whether the High Court of Calcutta had the jurisdiction to set aside the award to which Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya held there was no evidence or reason to remove the arbitration from its current location i.e. the High Court of Calcutta.

In the case of BBR (India) Private Limited vs S.P Singla Constructions Private Limited, (2022) the Supreme Court noted that once the arbitrator determined  ‘the seat’ subsection (2) of Section 20 of the Act, the arbitrator cannot alter ‘the seat’ of the arbitration until the parties to the agreement mutually agree and specifically state that ‘seat of arbitration’  should be relocated to another place. The court made certain observations which are as follows:

1. Changing the venue does not result in changing the ‘seat of arbitration’.

2. Place of jurisdiction or ‘the seat’ must be definite and fixed, not vague or changeable.

While the courts overseeing the arbitration proceedings have a relevant role to play in supervisory jurisdiction, it’s not the final deciding factor when the venue is not designated as the main place of arbitration.

A Bench consisting of Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman and Hrishikesh gave an important decision in the case of M/s Inox Renewables Ltd vs. Jayesh Electricals Ltd, (2021). The bench followed the previous precedent  BGS SGS Soma JV vs NHPC Ltd, which held that the arbitration venue will be the judicial seat of arbitration unless there is an absence of contrary intention of the parties. 

Overview of International Commercial Arbitration 

International Commercial Arbitration (ICA) refers to arbitration arising out of disputes between parties that are residents or bodies incorporated in a country other than India. In such cases, the probability of disputes increases when parties emerge from different countries, making the seat vs venue dispute a topic of discussion. When parties select the seat, it administers the governing law and other formalities over the arbitration proceedings. The decision to conduct the proceedings of the arbitration is different from the seat decided by the parties and is not dependent on each other. Not only Indian judges, but courts worldwide in various cases have reiterated that seat denotes jurisdiction and is distinguished from venue. In Atlas Power vs. National Transmission And Despatch Co (2018) the agreement signed by the parties was governed by the laws of Pakistan but arbitration was to be conducted in London which caused disagreement amongst the parties. Thus, it was held that the agreement in which the seat in question was clearly London which permits the claimant the right to restrict the defendant from challenging the arbitral award anywhere other than its jurisdiction. 

International Arbitration conventions signed by India 

International Conventions can be regarded as the backbone of the legal framework particularly in the scenario of arbitration to ensure consistency across various jurisdictions. The following are the conventions signed by India that outline comprehensive guidelines to resolve disputes in the scenario of International Arbitration: 

The New York Convention of 1958 

The New York Convention of 1958 aims to ensure the enforcement of foreign arbitration awards worldwide. The New York Convention comprises 16 articles. The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”) plays a crucial role in recognizing and enforcing international arbitration. The New York Convention applies to recognizing and enforcing foreign arbitral awards; it also includes court referrals to arbitration. This Convention applies to recognizing and enforcing arbitral awards made in the territory of a state different from where their recognition and enforcement are sought, arising from disputes between persons, whether physical or legal and sought in a state other than where they were made.

The UNCITRAL Model Law Rules

The UNICTRAL Model Law is created to assist States in updating and modernising their laws concerning mediation procedures. It provides uniform rules for the mediation process, aiming to promote the utilisation of mediation while enhancing predictability and certainty in its application.

The Model Law provides consistent regulations regarding the enforcement of settlement agreements and outlines the party’s right to invoke a settlement agreement in a procedure. It includes an exhaustive list of grounds that a party can invoke in a procedure governed by the Model Law.

The Geneva Protocol of 1923

The Geneva Protocol of 1923 aims to ensure that agreements to settle disputes through arbitration are recognized and enforced between countries. It covers the recognition of arbitration agreements, the arbitration procedure, and the enforcement of arbitral awards, as well as denunciation and territorial exclusions.

ICSID Convention

The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) provides an independent platform for mediating and arbitrating such conflicts. ICSID provides the institutional facility and procedural provisions for impartial conciliation commissions and arbitral tribunals formed for each specific case. ICSID facilitates foreign investment by providing a multilaterally-agreed system for dispute settlement.

Authors analysis

The main reason why parties select arbitration instead of any other dispute resolution mechanism is that it brings efficiency as well the dispute remains confidential. Sometimes when the implications of seat vs venue seem to be confusing, it may also prolong the problems of the parties. 

To bring clarity to the arbitration proceedings and avoid confusion, here are certain steps which are recommended: 

  1. Define terms clearly

An arbitration agreement is not only a prerequisite but also sets the foundation of the arbitration proceedings. They should be clear, precise, and unambiguous to avoid disputes later on. The confusion can be avoided altogether if the seat and venue are defined in the agreement in simple, clear language. It is also advisable to document all the discussions and decisions to avoid ambiguity. 

  1. Consider practical factors

Seat plays an important role in arbitration proceedings and affects many factors. It’s always a safe option to outline the practical factors like jurisdictional requirements,  convenience, language, and cultural differences before choosing a seat as well as a venue for the arbitration. 

  1. Consult legal expert 

Every arbitration is unique and to cater to the specific needs, it is important to tailor the arbitration to the agreement as per the circumstances and requirements of the parties. An arbitration agreement may impact the legal rights of the parties involved which makes it crucial to address all potential issues which can be solved by consulting a legal expert.

 Amendment to the Act

The confusion on seat vs venue is because of the use of the word “place” in the Act. If the word “place” in sections 2(2), 20(1), 20(2), 28, 31(4) is replaced with “seat” and in section 20(3) with the venue, it’ll be easier to interpret for the people opting for arbitration. 

Conclusion

Arbitration offers the freedom to parties of dispute in determining: the procedure of appointment of Arbitrator; number of Arbitrators; place of Arbitration; etc. With minimal judicial intervention, arbitration stands out as the most feasible option for seeking swift recourse in disputes arising out of commercial transactions. The discussion on seat and venue has been a topic of considerable importance because seat and venue play a crucial role in how the arbitration proceedings will be held. The Supreme Court of India has put a full stop to the debate and confusion on seat vs venue through various judgements. The physical location does not hinder in any way the jurisdiction known as the seat decided by parties to settle the dispute. The parties should carefully select the seat and venue because one provides the legal framework whereas the other decides the physical location respectively. 

References

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