This article is written by Shiwangi Singh, a law student at Banasthali University. It talks in detail about the various aspects of Section 167 CrPC, essential amendments to these sections, and important case laws regarding the same. It mainly deals with the power of police to detain an accused by following legal procedures laid down in CrPC, 1973.
This article has been published by Sneha Mahawar.
Table of Contents
Section 167 is a key part of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which states if an investigation into an offence is not completed within 24 hours and the accused is in custody, the concerned police officers shall forward the accused to the nearest Judicial Magistrate. This section entitles the magistrate to either send the accused to police custody or judicial custody while an investigation is going on. It also states that if within the stipulated time of his custody, no such substantial evidence is obtained against him in the investigation, then he can be released on default bail. The provisions of this section protect his fundamental right to personal liberty.
Section 167 is functional when an investigation has been started but has not been completed within 24 hours. It lays down a framework starting from arresting an accused and then conducting an investigation that includes interrogation, collection of evidence, prevention of evidence tampering, etc. Arrest, remand, and bail are components related to the investigation.
Section 57 of the criminal procedure says that if a person is arrested without a warrant and kept in a police officer’s custody, then he can be detained only for a reasonable period of time, which means it shall not exceed twenty-four hours. The police officials have to complete their investigation within the next 24 hours. Section 167 lays down the procedure to increase the jurisdiction of Section 57. If the investigation against a person requires more time and is not completed within twenty-four hours, then the officials have to get permission from the magistrate by stating reasonable grounds for why the accused needs to be kept for a longer time to complete the investigation. In such circumstances, the police has to approach the nearest magistrate, whether they have jurisdiction or not.
Section 167 CrPC
Chapter XII of the Criminal Procedure Code contains Section 167, which talks about the information to the police and their powers to investigate. This chapter states the legal rights of the police to carry on an investigation before a legal proceeding is launched against the accused. Whenever a person is detained under Section 167 on reasonable grounds, the courts, either under Section 482 or Section 401 of the code, cannot interfere in the matter.
Section 167 is used when the fundamental right of the accused is violated by not presenting him before a magistrate within 24 hours of his detention, as provided by Article 22(2). This Article, which is complementary to Section 57 of the CrPC, states that every person who is arrested or detained in custody shall be presented before the nearest magistrate within twenty-four hours, excluding the time which was covered in the journey from the place of arrest to the court of the magistrate, and no person shall be detained for more than twenty-four hours without the permission of the magistrate himself.
Provisions of Section 167 CrPC
It states the various provisions for different kinds of situations that arise in an investigation and also discusses the powers of the magistrate and police officials.
Procedure when the investigation is not completed within twenty-four hours
Section 167(1) – When a person is arrested and detained without a warrant, kept in police custody, and it is believed by the police officials or the investigation agency that the interrogation will not get completed within the period of twenty-four hours as fixed by Section 57, and there are appropriate reasonable grounds to believe that the evidence against the accused is reliable and well-founded, then the officer-in-charge of the police station or the police officer under whom the investigation is going on, who is not below the rank of Sub-Inspector, shall immediately without any delay, put this demand in front of the judicial magistrate for extending the period by submitting a copy of the entries that he maintains in his diary related to the case, and shall present the accused in front of the magistrate at the same time.
Section 167(2) – The magistrate to whom the accused person is forwarded under this section, whether he has the jurisdiction or not, shall try the case from time to time, and authorise the detention of the accused in such police custody as he thinks would fit, for not more than a period of fifteen days. If the magistrate has no jurisdiction for the trial of the case and considers that further detention is irrelevant, he may order the trial of the accused to be forwarded to a magistrate of higher rank who is authorised to hold the trial of the case under this section.
Powers of the magistrate under Section 167 CrPC
Section 167(2)(a) – The magistrate has the power to order the detention of the accused person, but not in police custody if he is convinced that there are suitable and reasonable grounds to detain the accused, but in any situation, the magistrate cannot order detention for a period exceeding:
- Ninety days, if the accused is charged with a punishable offence that is death, life imprisonment or imprisonment for a term that is not less than ten years.
- Sixty days, if the investigation is related to any other offence. After the completion of the time period of 60 days or 90 days, the accused shall be released on bail if he is able to furnish sureties. This period is calculated from the day he was detained and not from the date of arrest.
- If the investigation is not completed within 90 or 60 days, then he has to be released on bail under the provisions of section 167(2).
Limitations on the powers of magistrate under Section 167 CrPC
Section 167(2)(b) – No magistrate is given the power to detain the accused in police custody under this Section unless the accused is produced before him in person for the first time and is also subsequently produced every time he remains in police custody.
The High Court does not empower the magistrates of the second class to pass an order for the detention of the accused in the custody of the police.
Duties of the officer-in-charge and the executive magistrate
Section 2A – If in any circumstances, the judicial magistrate is not present to take up the matter, then the official in charge of the case shall refer the case to the nearest executive magistrate on whom the powers of a judicial magistrate or metropolitan magistrate have been conferred. He shall be provided with a copy of the entry in the diary and the reasons for the detention, for which he may allow the detention for not more than seven days. At the expiry of the prescribed period, the accused shall be released on bail except if any order of further detention is being made against the accused by a magistrate who is authorised to pass such an extension to his period of detention.
- Section 167(3) – The magistrate shall record the reasons given by the police as to why the accused is being detained and kept in the custody of the police.
- Section 167(4) – If an order is made by any magistrate other than the Chief Judicial Magistrate, then he must be sent a copy of the order, with the reasons for making it.
- Section 167(5) – In the matter of a summons case, if the investigation has not been concluded within six months from the date on which the accused was arrested, the magistrate shall order to stop any further investigation related to that case, unless the police officer carrying out the investigation presents relevant and special reasons for continuing the investigation beyond the period of six months in the interests of justice.
- Section 167(6) – If the Magistrate declares an order to stop the further investigation, then an order can be passed against it after making an application to the Session Judge by providing relevant grounds of why it is necessary to carry out further investigation. Under sub-section (5) the judge has the authority to vacate the previous order.
- In case of a woman under 18 years of age, the magistrate shall authorise her detention in the custody of a remand home or recognized social institution.
- If a person is transferred from police to judicial custody, then the number of days the accused spent in police custody would be deducted from the total days of remand in judicial custody.
Various state amendments to Section 167 CrPC
Andaman and Nicobar and Lakshadweep Islands
- For the Union Territories and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Lakshadweep Islands, some additions were made to sub-section (1) of Section 167, which provides that if a judicial magistrate is not present on such an island, then an Executive Magistrate functioning on the island can be referred.
- After sub-section (1), it was mentioned in the form of (1-A), which stated that the copy of entries in the diary of the police official shall be interpreted as references for the Executive Magistrate.
- In sub-section (3), a provision was made which said if an Executive Magistrate is not present, then only a Sub-divisional Magistrate or a District Magistrate is empowered by the State Government to pass an order of detention into the custody of the police.
- In sub-section (4), a provision was made that if any order is passed by the Executive Magistrate then the Magistrate making the order shall send a copy of the order, stating the reasons for making it, to the Executive Magistrate to whom he or she is immediately subordinate.
- In sub-section (2), clause (b), it was added that the judicial custody of the accused could be extended and he or she would have to appear in front of the judge either in person or through the medium of electronic video linkage.
- In Explanation II, under clause (c ), “an accused person was produced” was substituted with “an accused person was produced in person or, as the case may be, through the medium of electronic linkage”.
Union Territory of Chandigarh
- It said that in Section 167, words like ‘Executive Magistrate’ will be read as a substitute for the words ‘Judicial Magistrate’ or ‘Magistrate’ and the words ‘District Magistrate’ will be substituted for the words ‘Chief Judicial Magistrate’
- In sub-section (2), after clause (b), a new clause (bb) was added which stated that no magistrate can authorise the detention of an accused who is not produced in front of him by the custody police, either in person or through the medium of electronic video linkage, and should be represented by a pleader in court.
- In Explanation II, the words “was produced” were added and changed to “was produced from the police custody”
- After Explanation II, a new Explanation III was added which stated that if any question arises whether an accused person is produced by other than the custody of police, either in person or through the medium of electronic video linkage before the magistrate, the production of the accused person can be proved by his or his legal representative’s signature on the order of detention.
- Explanation II was substituted with “the production of the accused person can be proved by his signature on the order authorising his detention or by video recording of the proceedings, as the case maybe”.
- It made changes to the sub-section (2) clause (b), where it was substituted with – “no magistrate shall authorise detention under this section in the custody of the police, unless the accused is produced before him in person every time the accused is in police custody” and “in judicial custody unless the accused is produced before him either in person or through the medium of electronic video linkage”.
- In sub-section (6), the phrase “and the accused has been discharged” was added after the words “any order stopping further investigation into an offence has been made.”
- In Section 167, sub-section (2), the words ‘ninety days’ were substituted with ‘one hundred eighty days’ and the words ‘sixty days’ were substituted with ‘one hundred twenty days’.
- In sub-section (2), for clause (b), it is substituted that no magistrate shall pass the order of detention of an accused person under this section if the accused is in police custody and has not been physically produced before him. If the accused is detained other than in the custody of the police, then unless the accused is produced either in person or through media or electronic video linkage, the magistrate is not authorised to detain the accused.
- The word ‘fifteen days’ was substituted with ‘thirty days’ in sub-section (2) of Section 167.
- Section 167 A, was inserted which said “For the avoidance of any doubt, it is declared that the provisions of Section 167 shall apply to any person arrested by, under any order or direction of, a magistrate, whether executive or judicial.”
Concept of custody under Section 167 CrPC
Generally, the term ‘custody’ under Section 167 is understood as ‘police custody’ or ‘judicial custody’. In police custody, the officials have a greater extent of access to the accused as he is in the exclusive custody of the police officer. The prime focus of the police department is to conduct interrogations within the prescribed period of custody in order to extract the truth in any given case. Whereas in judicial custody, the accused is kept in jail, where the police officials or the investigating agencies cannot have the same hold on the accused to ask him or interrogate him in their own preferred way. Whenever the officials have to meet the accused for investigation, they have to get permission from the court and follow the guidelines and conditions laid down by the court.
Widening the ambit of custody under Section 167 CrPC
The Supreme Court has opened the gates of custody to a wider angle by introducing the terms ‘house arrest’ and ‘transit remand’ in the very high-profile case of Gautam Navlakha v. National Investigation Agency (2021). The Supreme Court has stated that house arrest can be ordered by the lower courts in appropriate cases instead of judicial or police custody. It signifies the expansion of the concept of custody under Section 167. It would pave the way for arguments to be made that an accused should be detained under house arrest rather than be subjected to traditional imprisonment in certain cases.
Background of the case
On 28-08-2018, a famous human rights activist, Gautam Navlakha was arrested from his Delhi residence as an FIR was filed in Pune. The FIR was registered against him on the charge of terrorist activity under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967.
After the arrest, he was taken to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate in Delhi to get a ‘transit remand’. The CMM directed that he should be presented before a Magistrate in Pune before 30-08-2018. Meanwhile, Navlakha had also filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court, which heard the case on the same day and directed to cancel the order for transit remand and ordered that Navlakha should be placed under ‘house arrest’ at his Delhi residence.
This house arrest made him in contact with no one other than the ordinary residents of the house and his lawyers. He was not allowed to leave the house, and two guards were put at his residence to have him under house arrest. After 34 days of house arrest, the Delhi High Court put the house arrest to an end. After this Navlakha filed a writ petition before the Bombay High Court to put an end to the FIR registered in Pune and also requested to grant anticipatory bail. Both of the requests were rejected by the Bombay High Court, and afterward, the court ordered that Navlakha should surrender to the investigating authorities, which he did and spent 11 days with the National Investigation Agency in New Delhi. He was transferred to Mumbai and was kept in judicial custody for a period of 48 days.
Later on, Navlakha filed an application for default bail under Section 167 of the CrPC, where it was argued that the 34 days that he had spent under house arrest should be counted towards the period required for default bail, which resulted in a total of 93 days in his case, including the 11 days and 48 days of police and judicial custody respectively, but the lower courts rejected this application for default bail which made Navlakha to appeal again and this time to the Apex Court.
Supreme Court interpretation on transit remand
- The Supreme Court analysed whether transit remand was a form of custody under Section 167 and whether it would be included in the time period required for default bail. The NIA stated that a transit remand was not a remand for detention under Section 167 but was merely an order to take the accused before a magistrate who had the jurisdiction to pass orders in that particular case.
- The Court stated that an order for transit remand would fall under the ambit of Section 167 because the accused is put under police custody for a continuous period of time that is beyond the period of 24 hours. It said if we don’t consider transit remand under Section 167, then it would imply that the detention is beyond 24 hours, a violation of Section 57 of the CrPC.
- The Supreme Court also mentioned the nature of transit remand and said that it is not a form of judicial custody because the accused is put under a form of custody that is composed of only police officials. It is the police officials who present him before the magistrate who has the jurisdiction to try the case. Therefore, it was decided to consider that the transit remand is police custody.
Supreme Court interpretation of house arrest
- The Supreme Court considered house arrest as a form of custody under Section 167 of the CrPC. The Supreme Court talked about the current problem of overcrowding of prisons in India and stated this as its motivation behind this decision.
- The legal reasoning given by the Court was that since house arrest deprives the accused of his freedom of movement and liberty, it could be considered custody under Section 167. The Court stated that if house arrest is ordered under Section 167 then those days would be included in the days of custody to calculate the total time period for granting the default bail.
- The Court also analysed whether house arrest would be considered as police custody or judicial custody, but could not categorise it in either of the places. It believes in adopting a case-by-case approach. However, in this case, after taking into consideration the ingredients of house arrest and the limitation imposed on the police in accessing the accused, it stated it as judicial custody. Despite deciding the above, the Supreme Court held that Navlakha’s house arrest for a period of 34 days would not be considered as custody under Section 167 CrPC. The reasoning given in the judgment was unclear and contradictory. The court stated that the High Court has not ordered the house arrest ‘purporting’ to be under Section 167. The Supreme Court considered that in this scenario, the house arrest would not be treated as custody under Section 167, therefore the days of his house arrest shall not be counted as the days of custody for Navlakha’s application for default bail.
- The judgment also tells us about the difference between the orders which appear to be passed (purportedly) under Section 167 and the orders which are not a key factor in determining whether a period of house arrest will be considered ‘custody’ under Section 167 so that the days could be counted as the time period spent in custody when an application for default bail is filed by the accused.
- The judgment goes through various case laws and hypothetical examples to explain that even if a judgment is made in an illegal manner, without following the law and order, but if it is ‘purported’ to be passed under Section 167, resulting in the detention of the accused, then this period of time will be counted in days of custody, which would further help in getting a default bail from the court.
- The Court has not clearly explained what distinguishes an order that ‘purports’ to be passed under Section 167 from one that does not. Therefore, this judgment is subject to many issues, lacks guidance, and also has many contradictions in the reasoning of the Supreme Court.
- The decision when ‘purported’ to be passed under Section 167 implies either that –
- The court will always have to clearly mention that they are ordering to detain an accused under Section 167 so that it can be counted in the days of custody.
- Whenever a judgment is appealed in higher courts, they would need to examine the intention behind the orders of the lower courts first then they would confirm whether the judges “purported” the orders of detention to be under Section 167.
The Supreme Court has, however, shown contradictory behaviour by not counting the 34-day period of Navlakha’s detention in order to grant him his default bail, even though it itself talked about the fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except by the procedure established by law. This clearly shows the contradictory nature of the decision. Here, the Supreme Court did mention that the period of house arrest could not be considered as custody under Section 167 but failed to explain how the High Court could legally pass an order of this detention if it was not ordered under Section 167. Navlakha’s merely stating that the lower court did not ‘purport’ to make an order under Section 167 appeared to be a weak argument for not considering a fundamental right and discounting a period of actual detention and deprivation of liberty in that house arrest.
In matters where house arrest is preferred over traditional jail custody, the judgment said that in appropriate cases, it would be in the court’s discretion to order house arrest under Section 167. However, the Supreme Court didn’t discuss the guidelines related to it in detail on when this discretion could be used. It mentioned some criteria like age, health conditions, the prior judgments passed for an offence of the accused, the nature of the crime, the need for other forms of custody, and whether it would be possible for the police officials to enforce house arrest, which would be relevant to order for house arrest of an accused.
This case was also unclear about who was entitled to enforce the house custody. Here it was the two guards of the Delhi police, but it didn’t say who would always be authorised to carry out this activity whether it would be the police or the jail authorities. So, that it could be clear on whether it was judicial custody or police custody.
House arrest has its own benefits in terms of the ease it can provide to the accused, like they would prevent undue disruption in their lives, as they will be able to continue their employment, but they will have to abide by the conditions mentioned by the court. This form of custody is likely to be seen in cases regarding to white collar crimes, which are non-violent in nature or in cases where the accused has committed an offence for the first time and has always had a good clean image in society. In such cases, house arrest should be practiced and encouraged.
Narada Scam judgement
Recently, the Calcutta High Court on 19-05-2021 also ordered the house arrest of four Trinamool Congress leaders, but it didn’t clearly mention that this order was made under Section 167 CrPC. It stated that it is judicial custody but they did not mention that they are passing this order under Section 167 CrPC, which created confusion. The judgment simply stated that judicial custody was being offered by referring to the judgments given by the Supreme Court in the Gautam Navlakha case and also because of the age and health concerns of the accused, as three of the four accused were admitted to the hospital. In this case, the accused were getting medical facilities.
Interpretations from different case laws:
- In Manoj v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1999), the Court held that when a person held in detention who was neither an alien enemy nor was arrested under the preventive detention law, was not produced by the police officer to the nearest judicial magistrate within 24 hours of his arrest, then his further detention would not be considered legally valid and would be held to be vitiated. The Court further said that an excuse of not producing the accused before the magistrate on the grounds that he was already in jail in some other State in connection with another case will not be considered a valid reason.
- In State of Tamil Nadu v. V. Krishnaswami Naidu and Anr. (1979) it was held that a special judge under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952, can exercise the same power as a magistrate mentioned in Section 167 of the CrPC, and can order the detention of an accused who is in the custody of the police.
- In Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan (1994), this case dealt with whether a magistrate had jurisdiction over an accused who was arrested by the Enforcement Directorate under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, and was presented before him for judicial remand under section 167(2) CrPC. In this case, the Supreme Court overruled the decision of a five-judge Bench of the Delhi High Court and stated that the sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 167 CrPC are squarely applicable with regard to the production and detention of a person arrested under Section 35 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 and Section 104 of the Customs Act, 1962 and that the Magistrate has the jurisdiction to authorise the detention of a person arrested under these Acts.
- In Central Bureau of Investigation Delhi v. Anupam J Kulkarni 8 May 1992, it was held that the period of 90 or 60 days shall be calculated from the date of detention as directed by the Magistrate and not from the date of arrest by the police. After the expiry of 15 days of detention, the accused shall be sent to judicial custody from the police custody.
- Dr. Bipin Shanti Lal Panchal v. State of Gujarat (1996), was a case under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, where the Supreme held that if the accused fails to exercise his right to be released on bail for the failure of the prosecution to file a charge-sheet within the time allowed by law, then he could not contend that he had an indefeasible right to exercise it at any time even after the filing of the charge-sheet. Had he exercised the right and got himself time, released before the filing of the charge sheet, he could not be rearrested after the charge sheet is submitted to the Magistrate.
- In Abdul Wahid v. the State of Maharashtra (1991), the right accrued to the accused to get a default bail on failure to submit the charge sheet within the prescribed time is not an absolute right. It gives the only absolute right to be granted bail if the charge sheet is not submitted within the prescribed time, but in spite of the bail, the detention continues to be authorised. So, he can use this right under the provision of sub-section(2) only before the charge sheet is filed against him.
- In T Jagdeeshwar and Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2002), the Court said that under Section 167, a remand order is a judicial order. In order to extend a remand order, the investing officer should mention the proper reasons and the consequences for extending the remand order. If the request is not made by the police or jail authorities, or in the absence of sufficient grounds, the remand should not be extended, and the magistrate must inform the accused that he can be released on bail.
- Shri Joyant Borbora v. State of Assam (1992), was regarding the custody into which an accused would be put as the magistrate thinks fit. The Court mentioned that whenever army members come to the aid of civil authorities for the maintenance of law and order, then they have absolutely no right or power of investigation or interrogation. The accused could not be put into army custody on the prayer of the investigating officer. The court said it would be considered highly improper, illegal, and ultra vires of the constitution.
- In Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (2013), Section 167(2)(a)(ii) was revised and the Court held that default bail shall be granted to the accused irrespective of the fact that the court took it into cognizance. In this case, though the police report was submitted within the prescribed period, no cognizance was taken as there was no sanction to prosecute. The Magistrate went on granting remand till it was questioned by Special Leave Petitions after failing to get bail from the High Court under section 167(2). The Supreme Court clarified that once the police report is filed within the stipulated time, the question of the grant of default bail does not arise. Whether cognizance is taken or not, that is immaterial as far as section 167 is concerned.
- In Vipul Shah Prasad Agarwal v. State of Gujarat and Anr. (2012), an FIR was recorded, further investigation was conducted, and a charge sheet was submitted within the prescribed period of time. However, the investigation conducted was not accepted by the Supreme Court and the Court ordered a fresh investigation by the CBI. The CBI recorded a fresh FIR. The petitioner claimed bail on the ground of default in submitting the charge sheet due to the rejection of the first investigation. Then the Supreme Court held that merely because a fresh investigation has been ordered by the CBI, it does not mean that the charge sheet which was submitted earlier gets abandoned.
- In Aslam Babalal Desai v. the State of Maharashtra, (1992) the Supreme Court said that once the accused is released on bail under section 167(2), he cannot be taken back into custody merely on the filing of a charge sheet which reveals the commission of a non-bailable crime unless there are strong reasons why bail cannot be cancelled on mere production of a charge sheet.
- In Khatri and Others v. State of Bihar and Others (1980), the magistrate or the Sessions Judge before whom the accused appeared informed the judges that he could not afford legal aid due to his weak financial status, and was struggling with poverty, after which he was entitled to obtain free legal service at the cost of the state. The Supreme Court had given necessary guidelines to magistrates, session judges, and state governments regarding the same.
- In Subrtapatra and Ors. v. Director of Panchayat and Ors. (1994), whenever there is more than one accused and if they are not arrested on the same day, then the computation of the stipulated time of investigation should be made from the date of arrest or surrender of the first accused.
Section 167 of the CrPC lays down the procedure of detaining a person if he is accused of committing any sort of crime and when the investigation is not completed within 24 hours by the police or the investigating agency. It also protects the accused from unlawful detention by not granting the extension of the detention if the court finds no substantial evidence regarding it. The maximum number of days an accused can be detained in police custody is 15 days, but it could be further extended in the form of judicial custody for a maximum of 90 days in case of an offence that is punishable with death, life imprisonment, or imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years. This section also secures the right of the accused to get an indefeasible bail if no evidence or charge-sheet is put in front of the court by the police involved in its investigation. The provision of default bail secures the fundamental right of the accused for its protection of life and liberty, according to Article 21 of the Constitution.
The two different forms of custody also affect the interrogation process. While in one, the investigating agency has greater access to the accused, in another one it makes them follow rules and orders of the court before meeting the accused for investigation.
This section obeys Article 21 of the Constitution which states the protection of life, personal liberty, and rights of the accused person. It restrains the direct and prolonged access of the police that they have over the accused because arrest directly curtails personal liberty of an individual, it strikes at his freedom.
The Supreme Court has also mentioned about transit remand and house arrest and has thoroughly explained both the terms in Gautam Navlakha’s case. This case did broaden the meaning and scope of the term ‘custody’. It stated that the detention period of house arrest will only be counted in calculating the days of detention if it “purports” to be passed under Section 167 CrPC, which eventually quashed the appeal of default bail for Gautam Navlakha. The Supreme Court mentioned that the lower court did not order it under Section 167, therefore it would not be considered.
Frequently Asked Questions
Are officers other than police authorised to arrest an accused under Section 167(2) of the CrPC?
Yes, the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that for invoking section 167(1) of CrPC, it is not necessary that the arrest should have been made only by a police officer, and it is not necessary to have the records of entries in a case diary. The magistrate can take into judicial custody a person who is produced before him if –
- The arresting officer is legally allowed or authorised to make the arrest.
- The offence for which the person is arrested should be well-founded.
Therefore, there are many other officers other than police who are authorised to detain a person under this section, like officers of the Enforcement Directorate under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, Customs Act, or Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act. They are competent enough to seek judicial remand of an arrested person.
What is the purpose of Section 167 of the CrPC?
The purpose of section 167 is to protect the accused from dishonest or immoral police custody.
What is the difference between police custody and judicial custody?
|Police Custody||Judicial Custody|
|The accused is kept under the police who is in charge of the investigation. The police has the physical custody of the accused.||The Magistrate has control over the custody.|
|It could be maximum for 15 days on the orders of a Magistrate.||It can be either for 60 or 90 days based on the severity of the offence committed.|
|The accused is kept in a prison located in the police station where the case was lodged.||The accused is kept in central jail.|
- Ratanlal and Dhirajlal: Code of Criminal Procedure 23rd Edition
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