The article is written by Aditya Sharma. The article aims to analyse the judgement in the case of the State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat & Ors (2005) with respect to the facts, issues raised, and arguments of the parties, followed by the holding and critical analysis of the case.

Introduction

The Supreme Court, in its landmark ruling in the case of State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat (2005), once again highlighted the co-existence of Directive Principles of State Policy (hereinafter referred to as DPSP) and fundamental rights. The Supreme Court, through this judgement, held the Bombay Animal Preservation (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as the 1994 Act/ impugned Act) constitutionally valid. The Act imposed a complete ban on the slaughter of bulls and bullocks, regardless of their age, by amending the parent law, the Bombay Animal Preservation Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the 1954 Act). The constitutionality of the 1994 Act was challenged on the grounds that it violated the fundamental rights of the respondents. These rights included the freedom of religion guaranteed under Article 25 and the right to practice any profession or carry on any business under Article 19(1)(g). The State of Gujarat argued in favour of the legislation by citing Articles 48, 48A, and 51A(g). The State further claimed that the ban was a reasonable restriction and addressed moral and public health issues, as well as the need to stop cruelty to animals. The following article examines the reasoning given by the Apex Court with respect to resolving the conflict between DPSP and Fundamental Rights. 

Details of State of Gujarat vs. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat & Ors (2005)

Name of the case: State of Gujarat vs Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat & Ors

Equivalent Citation: 2005 SCC 8 534

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Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench:  R.C. Lahoti, B.N. Agrawal, Arun Kumar, G.P. Mathur, A.K. Mathur, C.K. Thakker, P.K. Balasubramanyan

Appellant: State of Gujrat

Respondent: Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat

Date of Judgement: 26 October 2005

Important provisions: 

  • Article 48

Article 48 of the Constitution is a part of DPSP. These Directive Principles serve as guiding principles that the legislature ought to follow. Article 48 provides that the State should legislate in order to promote and develop animal husbandry in India, particularly in line with the scientific developments. This Article also directs the legislature to make laws utilising innovative scientific techniques in order to organise agriculture and animal husbandry. This provision also provides that measures should be taken to maintain livestock breeds.

Furthermore, the Article also focuses on the protection of cows from slaughter. This is also a well-known aspect of this Article. This aspect directs the legislature to make laws with respect to the protection of cows, calves, and other milch (milk-giving) and draught cattle (domestic animals that help humans). The foundation of this Article can be associated with the religious and cultural importance of cows in society.

However, it is to be noted that this Article does not explicitly prohibit cow slaughter for two reasons. First, this Article is a part of DPSP, and it is not enforceable in any court of law. Second, it is upon the legislature to make laws with respect to it. Further, it can be observed that there are slaughterhouses that are exempted by getting a proper licence for slaughtering cattle. 

The objective of Article 48 is twofold. First, the Article aims to improve the condition of livestock in India by protecting them from cruelty. Second, it aims to encourage agricultural processes to be more productive and efficient by focusing on scientific approaches.

  • Article 51A(g)

This Article holds moral and social significance; however, is not legally enforceable. Article 51A(g) of the Indian Constitution is a fundamental duty enshrined in Part IVA and provides that the State should take measures to protect and improve the natural environment and conditions of living creatures. 

This Article plays a key role in environmental protection and animal welfare in India. Courts in India have played an important role with respect to interpreting this seemingly simple provision. One such case was Animal Welfare Board of India v. A. Nagaraja (2014), where the Apex Court held, “animal welfare is intrinsically linked to environmental protection.” In this case, the practice of Jallikattu, a bull-taming ritual, was challenged on the grounds that it causes cruelty to animals. The court, citing Article 51A(g) and Article 21, held that the practice was unconstitutional. Further, it also recognised the State’s responsibility and the citizen’s duty to protect animals. This case established Article 51A(g) as a powerful tool in favour of animal rights. The Court emphasised that “compassion for living creatures” includes “ensuring their well-being and freedom from cruelty.”

  • Article 19(1)g

Article 19(1)(g) is based on the cornerstone of economic freedom. This Article provides every individual to have the right to practice business, trade, or occupation of their choice freely and contribute to the economy. However, as is the case with other rights, this right is not absolute. The State can impose reasonable restrictions by making laws which are in the interests of the general public as provided under Article 19(6). Further, the State is also empowered to make laws with respect to prescribing minimum professional or technical qualification for carrying on a business.

Moreover, restrictions can also be imposed on the grounds of protecting economic stability and national security. The Supreme Court, in landmark cases such as Excel Wear v. Union of India (1978), has further clarified the limits of this right. The court emphasised that the government should maintain a balance between fundamental rights and the restrictions imposed. In simple terms, the restriction should not be unreasonable. By virtue of Article 19(1)(g), a dynamic economic environment in India is created where necessary regulations coexist with an individual’s rights.

  • Bombay Animal Preservation Act, 1954

The 1954 Act was established with the objective of regulating the slaughter of certain specified animals that played a crucial role in agriculture and milk production. Section 5 of this Act acted as a protective measure by providing that a certificate from a designated authority was necessary before any animal could be slaughtered. To put it simply, it prohibited the indiscriminate killing of essential animals like cows and bulls that were over the age of 16. The Act did not explicitly outline which animals were unfit for slaughter, but the issuing authority was required to consider factors such as age, health, and suitability for breeding or agricultural purposes before granting a certificate.

  • Bombay Animal Preservation (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1994

The 1954 Act originally applied to the State of Bombay. However, in 1961, the Gujarat government adopted the 1954 Act vide the Bombay Animal Preservation (Gujarat Extension and Amendment) Act, 1961. This Act made certain changes, like specifying the animals that cannot be slaughtered and procedures for obtaining necessary licences. Later, in 1994, an amendment was brought in by the Gujrat government. As per Section 2 of the said Amendment Act, the age limit of 16 years was completely done away with, implying that now there is a complete ban on the slaughter of cows, bullocks, and other specified cattle. 

Facts and background of State of Gujarat vs. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat & Ors (2005)

The present case is a result of the Gujrat government’s legislation with respect to the slaughter of certain specified animals. Specifically, the 1994 Act was challenged due to the amendment made by the Gujarat government. Before moving forward, it is pertinent to mention the legislative history of this Act. This Act was originally passed in 1948 by the Bombay government and was applicable in the state of Bombay. This Act highlighted the crucial role that cattle play in agricultural operations. The objective of the Act was to protect certain specified animals by prohibiting the slaughter of these animals. The legislation was later replaced with the Bombay Animal Preservation Act, 1954, incorporating certain new clauses and clarifications into the original version.

Criminal litigation

Further, when Gujarat became a state in 1960, the Bombay Animal Preservation (Gujarat Extension and Amendment) Act was passed in 1961 with the objective of formulating a uniform law for cattle throughout the newly formed state. In essence, this Act merely extended the provisions of the 1954 Act to the newly formed state of Gujarat. However, the main issue arose in 1994 with the enactment of the Bombay Animal Preservation (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1994, which amended the 1961 Act. Previously, the Act allowed the slaughter of specified animals that were over the age of 16. This provision was aimed at striking a balance between preserving agricultural usefulness and allowing cattle commerce by allowing the slaughter of certain kinds of animals. However, the 1994 Amendment, in Section 2, removed the age restriction and made it illegal to slaughter bulls and bullocks of any age. Due to this amendment, the respondents in the present case (predominantly belonging to the Muslim community) approached the High Court of Gujrat for holding the amendment ultra vires to the Constitution on the grounds that it was violative of their fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(g) and Article 25. The respondents contended that a broader interpretation should be given to Article 25(1), which protects not only the core principles of a religion but also customary or traditional practices. They further contended that the complete ban on cow slaughter violated their right to freely practice their religion and that sacrificing cows during religious festivals, like Bakrid, while not mandatory, is a well established tradition within their religion which ought to be protected under Article 25. 

However, the High Court held that the 1994 Act was a valid exercise of legislative powers and that the Act was constitutional. Aggrieved by this, the respondents then approached the Supreme Court. A division bench of the Supreme Court overturned the High Court’s decision and held the Act to be ultra vires. However, later, a constitutional bench of 7 judges was called upon to decide on the matter.

Issues raised 

  • Whether the 1994 Amendment to the Bombay Animal Preservation (Gujarat Extension) Act, 1961, by the Gujarat government, is ultra vires to the Constitution?
  • Whether the restrictions imposed by the 1994 Act were consistent with the directive principles and fundamental rights.
  • Whether the restrictions imposed by the government were reasonable restrictions and if there was a real connection between them and the object sought to be achieved by the Act.
  • Whether the ban imposed by the 1994 Act on slaughter was in the interest of the country’s economy.
  • Whether the restrictions imposed by the 1994 Act were in the interest of the general public despite causing inconvenience or dislocation to respondents.

Arguments of the parties

Appellants

The state of Gujrat contended that the High Court had erred in making its decision with respect to declaring the 1994 Act ultra vires to the Constitution. They further contended that the amendment was a legitimate exercise of its legislative powers, as conferred under Article 246 (Entry 15, List II) and was in furtherance of the provisions contained in the DPSPs.

The government further claimed that the 1994 amendment was necessary to inculcate the State’s policy towards implementing the principles laid down in Articles 47, Article 48, and Article 39 of the Constitution. They claimed that the enactment of the Act was in accordance with the constitutional spirit, that the State should make laws for preventing animal cruelty. Further, they also claimed that DPSPs being non-enforceable in the courts, the respondents have no ground for challenging the Constitutionality of the said Act. Also, there is no denying of the fact that State had the legislative competence to make law in this respect. 

The government also contended that the ban imposed by the impugned Act on the slaughter of cow progeny was not only intra vires to the Constitution but also a step towards the country’s economic growth and the well-being of society. The appellant also placed evidence to show that the cow and its progeny play a crucial role in the agricultural and rural economy of India. They further claimed that the impugned Act’s objective was to preserve and promote cattle wealth, which was essential for the sustainable development of the agricultural sector.

Furthermore, the government contended that the High Court had erred in its conclusion that the restrictions imposed on fundamental rights by the Amendment Act were unreasonable. The appellant further claimed that the restrictions imposed by the impugned Act were on the grounds of public policy, despite causing inconvenience or dislocation to certain groups of people.

Respondents

The respondents claimed that the 1994 Act unreasonably restricted their fundamental rights, specifically their freedom to trade and practice any profession of their choice. They claimed that the ban imposed on the slaughter of certain types of cattle had a real and immediate impact on those involved in the trade and butchering of cattle. This has resulted in a notable reduction in their means of livelihood and economic activities. The respondents further claimed that the Act’s limitations were unreasonable and disproportionate and were not in accordance with Article 19(2). They claimed the ban had negatively impacted their fundamental right to Article 19(1)(g).

Moreover, the respondents contended that the objectives of the Act, i.e., protecting cattle and advancement in agriculture, were not reasonably associated with the limitations imposed by the impugned Act. They also claimed that the absolute ban on slaughter does not serve any public policy issue and was not in consonance with respect to its preamble. They also questioned if a complete ban on slaughter was really necessary to achieve the intended outcome.

The respondents argued for the impugned Act’s constitutionality on the grounds that the government did not adequately balance the fundamental rights of people with the DPSP. They claimed that the complete ban on slaughter was an arbitrary action of the government and violated the principles of reasonableness and fairness as enshrined in our Constitution. This was contended as the government did not provide any justification and failed to give regard to individuals whose lives depended on butchering. They also argued that a more comprehensive strategy that takes into account the rights and interests of all parties concerned could have been adopted but the government failed to do so.

Judgement in State of Gujarat vs. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat & Ors (2005)

Concerning the first issue, i.e., the constitutionality of the 1994 Act, the 7-judge bench of the Supreme Court held that the 1994 Amendment was constitutional. The court overturned its previous decision and affirmed the High Court’s decision, holding that the Act was intra vires to the Constitution.

With respect to the second issue, the Court held that the restrictions imposed by the 1994 Act were in consonance with the DPSPs as well as the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution. The Court further emphasised the importance of balancing individual rights with broader societal interests, particularly in matters that concern environmental protection and the economic development of the country.

With respect to the third issue, the Court held that there was a reasonable nexus between the restrictions imposed by the Act and the objectives that were sought to be achieved by the Act. The Court further acknowledged that there is a necessity for preserving cattle and promoting agricultural advancements. Hence, the court concluded that the restrictions were justified in light of the objectives mentioned in the preamble of the Act.

Coming to the fourth issue, i.e., with respect to the imposition of a ban on the slaughter of cow progeny and the national economy, the Court held that the ban imposed on the slaughter of cow progeny was in the interest of the nation’s economy. The court further recognised the crucial role that cattle play in Indian agriculture. The Court affirmed the importance of safeguarding cows and their progeny for the sustainable development of the agricultural sector.

With respect to the last issue, the Court held that the restrictions imposed by the impugned Act were in the interest of the general public, despite causing inconvenience or dislocation to respondents. The Court held that the broader societal benefits of preserving cattle and maintaining ecological balance outweigh the individual inconveniences faced by certain groups of people, like the butchers in this case.

Rationale behind the judgement

The clash between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy

In 1945, the Sapru Committee, under the chairmanship of Tej Bahadur Sapru, submitted its recommendations on constitutional principles. One of its recommendations was that fundamental rights should be divided into two types: justiciable and non-justiciable. It is due to this committee’s report only that today, we have two types of rights under our Constitution. 

These two rights are none other than Fundamental Rights in Part III and the Directive Principles of State Policy in Part IV. In many instances, a question was raised with respect to the enforceability of DPSP. However, this proposition was settled in the case of Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors v. Union of India & Ors (1981). In this case, it was held that Directive Principles are not enforceable before any court of law. These Directive Principles serve as guiding principles for the government to formulate laws. However, in many instances, these both rights, i.e., non-justiciable rights provided under DPSP and Fundamental rights provided under Part III, may collide, and therefore, their harmonious coexistence is necessary.  

The Supreme Court in Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) v. Union Of India & Ors. (1981) held that the DPSP were included in the Constitution to ensure their consideration by law-making authorities for the welfare of society. Therefore, Article 37, which states that Directive Principles of State Policy are unenforceable in a court of law, was included in the Constitution. This provision was included despite the fact that these directives are fundamental to the nation’s improved governance. However, since these principles serve as a guiding light for governance, they are placed at par with fundamental rights.

The Supreme Court in State of Madras v. Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan (1951), for the first time, considered the issue of balancing Fundamental Rights and the DPSP. It was held that the Fundamental Rights are superior to the DPSP, and DPSPs should be considered a subset of Fundamental Rights. However, it is also the reality that the state’s power to legislate is unaffected by disregard for Directive Principles. However, this debate was subsequently considered in many cases and was finally settled in the case of Ashok Kumar Thakur v. UOI (2008), where it was held that both rights i.e. rights mentioned in FR and in DPSPs should coexist, and no distinction should be made between them.

Moving further, it would be unreasonable to say that all DPSP should be followed at the cost of Fundamental Rights. In Kesavananda Bharati and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Anr. (1973), the Supreme Court of India addressed a similar situation and held that the legislature has a responsibility to maintain a balance between these rights since it is best equipped to understand the needs and demands of the country. Later, the Supreme Court in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India (2016), observed that the judiciary will only intervene if a legislation is clearly in violation of Fundamental Rights provided under Part III or if it falls outside the jurisdiction of the legislature.

In I.C. Golak Nath and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Anr. (1967), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that there should be no clash between DPSPs and fundamental rights and a harmonious approach should be adopted. The court further held that the legislature and the judiciary should maintain the delicate balance between DPSPs and fundamental rights for achieving a holistic growth of society. 

It is said that Article 48, a Directive Principle, and Article 19(1)(g), a fundamental right, are in conflict with one another. However, with the numerous holdings of the Apex Court and the presence of Article 37, it can be implied that no one can approach the court of law and pray to the court for enforcement of DPSP. This is also one of the reasons that courts are not empowered to issue a writ of mandamus to the Parliament, asking it to legislate on a matter.

The Court, based on the above reasoning and after considering the arguments of the parties, held that there was no clash of DPSP and fundamental rights. The Court held that the Act was intra vires to the Constitution and the State was empowered to legislate upon it. The court further observed that the Act was consistent with both DPSP as well as fundamental rights.

Role of Articles 48A and 51A

At this point, it is relevant to consider the case of Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, (1959). This can be considered a predecessor to the present case. Mohd. Quareshi’s case was decided at a time when India’s socio-economic situation was greatly different from the present. Articles 48A and 51A were not enforced at that time. Due to this, the courts had to face challenges in upholding the complete ban against the slaughter of she-buffaloes, bulls, or bullocks in case they were not healthy enough to produce milk, breed, or serve as draft animals. Due to a lack of provisions and considerations at that time, the court had to rule that the ban was contrary to public policy and was unreasonable. However, it is important to note that the present case is different in the context that provisions of Articles 48A and 51A were not part of the Constitution at the time of Quareshi’s case. These provisions were later added in 1976 with the Forty-Second Amendment Act, 1976. 

Articles 48 and 51A(g) are required to be examined alongside here. Article 51A(g) is a fundamental duty “to protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wild life, and to have compassion for living creatures“. Article 48 can be classified into two parts, one being “The State shall endeavour to organise agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines…” and the second being “…and shall, in particular, take steps for preserving and improving the breeds, and prohibiting the slaughter of cows and calves and other milch and draught cattle.” The present case specifically pertains to the second part. In AIIMS Students’ Union v. AIIMS and Ors. (2001), a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court held that, even though not enforceable in the courts, fundamental duties hold significant weight in interpreting the Constitution in its true context. Similarly, in T.N. Godavarman Thirumalpad v. Union of India and Ors. (2002), the Hon’ble Supreme Court interpreted these two Articles together in order to address an issue pertaining to the environment. The court held that “the State and the citizens are under a fundamental obligation to protect and improve the environment, including forests, lakes, rivers, wildlife, and to have compassion for living creatures.“

Hence, it can be said that even though these Articles are not enforceable in the courts, they play a crucial role in the interpretation of the Constitution. 

Interpreting “Milch” and “draught cattle” under Article 48

In the eyes of the law, every living creature has a right to be protected from harm, irrespective of their age and usefulness to humans. These creatures also include cows and calves. They are also entitled to legal protection, irrespective of whether they are capable of producing milk or not. In the present case, the court interpreted the term “calves and other milch and draught cattle“. It was interpreted in order to mean that this protection is applicable to the entire species, not just a specific age group, as was contended by the respondents. Meaning thereby that the term “calves and other milch and draught cattle” was given a liberal interpretation so as to include all concerned animals under its ambit. This interpretation is in consonance with Article 51A(g), which casts a duty upon the government and citizens to show compassion towards all living beings.

Interpreting the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Parent Act

In order to determine the true intention of the State Legislature, the court analysed the Preamble of the Act and the relevant provisions. The court was required to do so due to the issue pertaining to the interpretation of the Statement of Objects and Reasons for determining. It is an interesting point to note that the High Court had not considered this issue while giving its decision, and neither did it consider the preamble or statement of reasons of the 1954 Act (parent Act). It was held in the case of State of West Bengal v. Union of India (1964) that the Statement of Objects and Reasons should be considered in order to determine the background and prior circumstances that led to the enactment of a Statute. In this aspect, it was also held in Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, (1959), “it is accepted, and the courts must presume that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds.”

Hence, it can be said that the courts have the final say in determining whether a law is constitutional or not. It is an irrelevant consideration. Even if the legislature recognises the public interest by passing laws, it must be the courts that have the final say. The court would begin by determining whether the restrictions imposed are reasonable, especially in cases where the facts in the Preamble and the Statement of Objects and Reasons are reasonable and are in support of the creation of the statute for achieving a desired objective. It is evident that the purpose of legislation or an ordinance, for that matter, that makes a significant policy decision has to be determined by the legislature alone, and it cannot be challenged on this sole ground. The statute can only be challenged if the objects and the provisions of the Act are not in consonance (that is, the Act is a colourable legislation).

Interpreting reasonable restriction for Article 19(1)(g)

Article 19 has been interpreted time and again; however, our concern for the purpose of the present case is only with respect to the interpretation of the term “restriction”. In various cases, the Supreme Court was called upon to interpret the term “restriction” under Article 19. The interpretation of “restriction” was one of the main issues, and it was important to interpret it correctly. There are three established interpretations with respect to the term “restriction” that are related to the issue at hand:

In the case of Madhya Bharat Cotton Association Ltd. v. Union of India (1954), where many dealers were prohibited from participating in their regular business, it was held that the limitation was reasonable given the circumstances, and a complete ban was acceptable.

However, in this case, i.e., of a certain breed of cow, there is a complete ban on their slaughter. Butchers and slaughterhouses are allowed to slaughter livestock or cattle other than those specified in the Act. Hence, it does not amount to a complete prohibition. Further, if a complete ban meets the criteria of being reasonable in the best interests of the public, which is met in this case, it will be considered reasonable to impose it. Hence, the ban on the slaughter of cows is only a restriction rather than a prohibition, as it does not completely prohibit the butchers or other concerned groups from carrying on their business, rather, it is merely a restriction.

Bans and public interest

Cows play a very important role in India’s cultural and religious heritage. Cows are even considered sacred in Hinduism, which is a majorly practised religion in India. However, the complete ban on the slaughter of bulls and bullocks in the country has been a contentious issue. On the one hand, it is argued that the ban is unreasonable and not in the public interest, but on the other hand, it is also argued that the slaughter of such animals helps by contributing to the Indian economy.

However, to arrive at a decision, the court examined the record-keeping data and held that the public rather benefited from the ban. It is worth noting that cows and their progeny play a crucial role in India’s economy. For example, cow dung can be used as a natural fertiliser. It can also be used to create biogas, which helps reduce fossil fuel consumption and saving the environment. Cows, bullocks and other such animals act as binding forces and help preserve the equilibrium between agricultural and economic sectors.

India is primarily an agriculture-based country, and animals like cows are important for various purposes, not limited to milch and draught. While cows hold religious and cultural importance, it is to be noted that the slaughter of cows is not an essential religious practice in Islam. The Supreme Court in State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Ashutosh Lahiri (1995) has held that Muslims who kill animals for religious purposes on Bakrīd are not limited to slaughtering cows as the only exclusive means of performing the said practice. That is to say that for one of the religious rituals that Muslims perform on Bakrīd, the slaughter of cows is neither necessary nor obligatory. Hence, the ban is not encroaching upon the essential religious practices of Islam.

Considering these factors, it can be said that the ban is in the wider public interest of society. Finally, it is worth admiring that the Supreme Court has deemed the Bombay Animal Preservation (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1994, constitutional, and this is a positive step towards the issue of cow slaughter in India.

Important cases relied on

State of Madras v. Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan (1951)

In this case, it was held that the DPSPs are inferior to fundamental rights. It was observed that the DPSP serves as a subset of fundamental rights. However, this observation has changed over a period of time, and the current view is that the DPSP and the fundamental rights are complimentary to each other, and both are on par with each other. 

Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)

This case is a landmark in Indian judicial history and is also considered a milestone in the evolution of constitutional law in India. This case serves as a turning point in the interpretation of the Constitution. One of the aspects that was considered in this case, which is relevant in the current context, was that a balance should be maintained between the DPSP and the Fundamental Rights. For this purpose, a pragmatic and dynamic approach should be adopted by the courts in India. 

This case also upheld that the DPSP plays a crucial role in the governance of a country and serves as a guiding principle for the state to legislate upon. The court, in the same case, also held that Fundamental rights are not absolute and are subject to reasonable restrictions. It was also held that while interpreting a Fundamental Right and a DPSP, courts should inculcate a harmonious approach so as to give effect to both provisions. 

State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas (1976)

The N.M. Thomas case reiterated the importance of DPSP in the Indian Constitution, based upon the principles established in the Kesavananda Bharati case. In this case, it was held that the State has a duty to implement these directive principles so as to ensure socio-economic freedom for all citizens. It was further observed that the role of these directive principles in shaping legislative and policy decisions that promote the welfare of society is integral in nature. In other words, the case highlights that these principles should be formulated by the legislature to ensure the welfare of society. 

Conclusion 

In conclusion, it can be said that the above analysis highlights the significant role played by the Supreme Court in maintaining a balance between fundamental rights and Directive Principles of State Policy within the framework of the Indian constitution. By applying the principle of harmonious construction, the court harmonised the constitutional provisions. Further, the judgment plays a significant role in highlighting the judiciary’s steady commitment towards safeguarding individual rights on the one hand and broader societal interests as enshrined in DPSPs, on the other hand. This delicate balance between protecting Fundamental Rights and promoting socio-economic justice reflects a subtle approach that seeks to create a just and equitable society.

Moreover, the case highlights the judiciary’s duty to ensure constitutional harmony, legal certainty, and the preservation of core constitutional values. By balancing public interest and individual rights, the court plays a crucial role in protecting the democratic principles and social objectives enshrined in the Constitution of India. Lastly, this case analysis stresses upon the judiciary’s role as a guardian of the values embodied in the Constitution entrusted with protecting the rights of individuals while also advancing the welfare of society at large.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

What is considered an Essential Religious Practice?

Essential Religious Practices (ERP) is a constitutional law doctrine which is used to ascertain whether a particular practice of religion is an essential practice for being a follower of that religion. The customs or rituals which are so inherently necessary for the religion that without following them, a person cannot be associated with that particular religion are only considered as ERP. For example, wearing a turban in certain sects of Sikhism is an essential religious practice, but putting a tilak on the forehead is not an ERP for the majority of followers of Hinduism. 

The application of this doctrine can be seen in various landmark judgments like Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiyar of Shri Shirur Mutt (1954), State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali (1951), Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) and many more. 

What is the principle of harmonious interpretation?

This is a principle of statutory interpretation. The doctrine of harmonious construction means that when there arises a conflict between different statutes or between the provisions of the same statute, in such circumstances, courts try to interpret them in a way that makes them work together smoothly instead of declaring other statutes void. The main aim of this doctrine is to give effect to all the provisions while maintaining the overall coherence and purpose of the law. 

What was the simplified timeline of the discussed legislation?

1948: The Bombay Animal Preservation Act was first time passed in the State of Bombay.

1954: The Bombay Animal Preservation Act was amended in order to make certain changes in the provisions of the original Act by the Bombay government.

1960: On May 1, 1960, the state of Gujarat was formed when it was separated from the state of Bombay. The separation was based on linguistic grounds. 

1961: Gujrat government adopted the Bombay Act with the enactment of the Bombay Animal Preservation (Gujarat Extension and Amendment) Act, 1961.

1994: A major amendment was brought in by the Gujrat government in order to do away with the age restriction for slaughtering of specified animals with the enactment of the Bombay Animal Preservation (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1994.

References

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