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Bulli Bai App case : an analysis

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This article is written by Rachel Sethia, it covers the dark side of technology, the facts of the case, FIR against the accused of the case, arguments of the parties involved in the case, the order of the court and a critical analysis of the case.

Introduction

With the era of digitalisation and expansive digital field lies an alarming field, one where vulnerabilities are exploited and harm is perpetuated. The case of Niraj Dashrath Bishnoi vs. The State of Maharashtra (2022) also known as the Bulli Bai App case serves as a reminder of the dangers that accompany unregulated digital spaces. We delve into the crime of the Bulli Bai App case from its inception to its demise to uncover the complexities of this digital phenomenon and its profound societal implications. This case emerged as an alarming scenario regarding privacy concerns. Cyber violence which has witnessed this in this case has targeted the minority religious group of women which express the power of assertion. The ineffectiveness on the part of the police force can also be a cause of the problem. Like in the matter of Sulli deals, after the registration of FIR, there was nearly no development for almost six months. These kinds of situations hamper the dignity of women. 

The incident came into the picture in January 2022 when the FIR was lodged by the victims in Delhi and Mumbai and the police started the investigation, All the six accused were arrested and a chargesheet was filed in the court in March 2022, with that, the case finally reached to the Additional Sessions Court in both Delhi and Mumbai after a long proceeding and arguments in July 2022. Firstly, the Delhi Court granted bail to three accused and following that the other three accused were granted bail by the Mumbai Court.

This article talks about how technology is being misused to spread extremist ideas and increase gender based violence. Further, it deals with the horrors implanted against Muslim women which has given rise to radicalization and issues regarding the same. This article showcases how the cons of technology have suppressed the pros of technology and have made us question the safety of women even in a virtual world. In addition to this, the article mentions the approach of the courts of India in dealing with such incidents. 

Dark side of technology

This case is a significant example of how technology can be used to spread extremist ideas and to promote harmful actions, especially gender based violence. Radicalization is the process by which individuals adopt extreme beliefs and ideologies often leading to violent or disruptive actions. This element is present in the concerned case. 

Bulli Bai App was an online platform where users could engage in anonymously that normalised and perpetuated misogyny, harassment as well as intimidation against women as an echo chamber. This virtual space worked best for those with similar extremist convictions thereby making participants more misogynistic through further radicalisation. Consequently, through exploiting the possibilities of anonymity and global reach that technology provides, this application created conditions for acceptable but harmful behaviours blurring the lines between online and offline radicalization. 

The impact of this radicalization went beyond individual victims, promoting gender based violence as well as discrimination within society. This case also enlightens the world on the concept of internet terrorism within the nation. Misogynistic content distribution and promotion of gender based violence against females manifest internet terrorism Hence, it is apparent that this case highlights the urgent requirement to address digital platforms’ role in facilitating radicalization towards a more inclusive respectful internet environment.  portrays the loopholes of the legal framework and inadequacies of the technological safeguard in relation to the offence of cyber bullying. 

Facts of the Bulli Bai App case

On 1st January 2022, the Muslim women of our nation were battling with themselves and the world outside to address the threats, trauma and dignity that had been targeted once. The Bulli Bai app operated on an open-source platform called GitHub. It is the world’s largest repository used by developers, start-ups and huge technology firms to build an app. Bulli Bai App is the Islamophobic slur used by the rightists to troll Muslim women. 

Bulli Bai App is built on stolen photos of women for fake online auctions, with an ulterior motive to intimidate and degrade women who voiced their opinions publicly, especially those women who raise their voices for women’s rights and social justice. Journalists and activists like Rana Ayyub, Hiba Beg and Fatima Khan were among many who were targeted. 

Despite having a small user base initially, the app gained widespread attention and spotlight after photos and tweets related to it were shared on Twitter which resulted in public outrage and demands for action against the perpetrators. 

Shweta Singh was arrested from Uttarakhand, an 18 year old girl who was the first accused in this case. She was the one operating the Twitter handles and posting the tweets and pictures. After her, a 21 year old boy Vishal Jha was also arrested from Bangalore after 10 hours of interrogation. The third accused in this case was arrested on 5th January 2022, nabber from Pauhri Gharwal in Uttarakhand, named  Mayank Rawl, a 21 year old son of serving army personnel posted in Jammu was also arrested by a 3 member team of the Mumbai Cyber Police.

On 7th January 2022, the mastermind behind the crime, named Neeraj Bishnoi who was operating the app and the Twitter account was arrested by the IFSO unit of the Delhi Police Station Force.  Another arrest was made in Odisha. All the five accused were taken to Mumbai and were remanded by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate in Mumbai. 

During the interrogation of Neeraj Bishnoi, it was found by the police that Neeraj was disharmony with the Muslim community and had an intentional target towards the Muslim women who had an opinion and were working for their rights. 

FIR against the Bulli Bai App case

It was mentioned in the FIR that the informant came to know that this app is a community driven by a Sikh Group and was created to select Muslim women as maids due to Islamophobic sentiments and all this was mentioned in the bio of one handle whereas another handle had a picture of the informant with a caption that she can serve as an escort maid. 

Charges against the accused 

It can be seen from the facts of the case that the accused had intentions to stir religious discord and potentially incite communal violence. However, the more disturbing aspect of the case is that the youth of our nation is involved in it and instead of channelling their skill, and energy towards productivity and development of the nation, they have indulged in such criminal activity. Another disturbing factor in the case is that the accused targeted women, increasing the already existing issue of women’s safety in our country. 

The charges against the accused of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 are as follows:

  1. Section 153A: promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence etc and doing acts prejudicial to maintaining harmony: This section aims at punishing those who spread enmity through spoken or written words, visual representation with an intention of causing hatred, disharmony or disturb the public tranquillity on the basis of religion, communities or castes. Aid in the organising of certain movements, drills that encourage as well as train the participants of such movements to use criminal force and violence upon people belonging to other racial and religious groups and communities.     In the case of Bilal Ahmed Kaloo vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1997) the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it is important to clearly check whether the alleged enmity is caused between two different groups. Therefore, mere mentioning of a religious community while inciting the religious sentiments of one community cannot constitute an offence under Section 153A.          
  2. Section 295A: This Section broadens the scope of Section 153A, these two sections go hand in hand and interact with each other and the offences listed under this section are interlinked. Section 295A states that those who insult or attempt to insult any religious sentiments of any particular group by way of gestures or words are liable to be punished. The key difference between these two sections is that Section 295A criminalises those who offend or insult the religion or religious groups, while on the other hand  Section 153A criminalises creating enmity between two different groups and not just within a single group as under Section 295A.                                                    
  3. Section 153B: imputation, assertions prejudicial to national integration: It addresses the offences under mining national integration by promoting disharmony between different religions, racial, linguistic, or regional groups as well as castes or communities. Making, publishing or circulation of assertions, rumours or reports likely to provoke feelings of hatred, ill-willing or enmity amongst the religious groups is prohibited under this section. Imprisonment up to three years, a fine or both are punishments prescribed under this section. To constitute an offence under this section it should be done with the intention of fostering disharmony between groups. Intention to incite discord is an important element under this section, mere expression of criticism or opinion does not make an offence under this section. 
  4. Section 354: Assault of criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty: It is a crucial section in addressing and determining the act of violence and harassment against women, emphasising the importance of respecting their dignity and rights. This section punishes any individual who assaults or uses criminal force against a woman intending to outrage her modesty with imprisonment which may extend to two years or with a fine or both. In the case of the State of Maharashtra vs. Rovena Aadnya Amit Bhosle (2021) it was established by the Hon’ble metropolitan magistrate court that women can also be held liable for outraging the modesty of other women. The accused, a woman herself, assaulted her neighbour by tearing her nightdress in the passage of a building, outraging modesty and assaulting her in front of many others. Hence, the accused was convicted and sentenced to one year of rigorous imprisonment for outraging the modesty of another woman.  
  5. Section 354D: This section mentions stalking which includes both online and physical intimidation of women. It also outlaws electronic monitoring without consent. In the case of Zeenat Shaikh vs. State of Maharashtra (2021), it was held by the Bombay High Court that cyber stalking which involves checking her use of electronic communication without her consent falls under Section 354D. The court observed that actions like these can cause harassment and mental trauma to the victim.  
  6. Section 509: gesture, words or acts intended to outrage the modesty of a woman This section plays a vital role in deterring verbal and gestural harassment against women and upholding their right to dignity and respect. Any individual having the intention to outrage the modesty of a woman, utters any word or sound or makes a gesture shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term up to three years, a fine or with both. The gender of the perpetrator is not an element under this section. 
  7. Section 500: This section is punishment for defamation therefore, to constitute the offence of criminal defamation, the accused’s words, signs or imputation must either be meant to injure the reputation of a person or the accused must have reasonable knowledge that his or her behaviour may do so. Simple imprisonment for up to two years or a fine or both is the punishment for this section.  
  8. Section 67 Information Technology Act, 2000:  It is a section for punishment for the publication or transmission of obscene material, which will include sexually explicit content and depiction of children engaged in such acts in electronic form. People convicted under this section can be punished with imprisonment up to 7 years and a fine which can be extended to 10 lakh rupees. In the case of Maqbool Fida Hussain vs. Raj Kumar Pandey (2008), the Hon’ble Delhi High Court had applied the principle of ‘generalia specialibus non derogant’ and held that when the crime committed has some nexus with electronic medium, provisions of the Information Technology  Act will apply, similar provisions will not apply.

Arguments by both parties

Criminal litigation

Arguments by the Applicant/ Accused

  1. The accused submitted that the contents of the FIR do not constitute any offence against him and the offence is politically motivated and there is no direct evidence to link the accused to the creation or publication of objectionable material mentioned in the FIR and the chargesheet.
  2. The accused further submitted that the prosecution has already preserved the evidence which was in electronic form and cannot be tampered with. 
  3. He also submitted that a forensic examination of both his phone and laptop is done, therefore his detention is no longer required. 
  4. It was submitted by the applicant that he is 20 years old and due to this case he was also suspended by his college where he was studying Btech. 
  5. He also submitted that he does not have any previous criminal antecedents and is ready to abide by the conditions of bail. 

Arguments on behalf of the Prosecution

  1. The prosecution highly opposed the bail application and submitted that prima facie the involvement of the accused/ applicant is seen in the case as he has prepared the Bulli Bai application. 
  2. It was further submitted that the accused by preparing such an application has promoted enmity amongst different groups and this act of the accused is prejudicial to maintaining harmony and also to national integration. 
  3. In addition to that it was mentioned that all the accused in the case are in contact with each other through platforms like Instagram and Twitter. 
  4. The prosecution contended that the offence is serious in nature and that if the accused is granted bail there might be the possibility of creating a serious issue regarding law and order. The accused is a resident of Assam and there is every possibility of his absconding after getting bail. 

Order of Session Court 

After hearing the detailed arguments on behalf of both the parties, the Additional Session Judge granted bail to the three accused namely Aumkareshwar Thakur, Neeraj Bishnoi and Neeraj Singh upon execution of a personal bond of 50,000 and one or two sureties of a similar amount. The Bail conditions included that they must visit Cyber Police Station every month and they cannot leave the country without prior permission of the court. Earlier the court also granted bail to the three other accused namely Shweta Singh, Mayank Rawat and Vishal Jha who were involved in the case. Aumkareshwar Thakur was accused of providing the source code for the application. Neeraj Bishnoi was the creator of the application whereas Neeraj Singh allegedly circulated pictures. 

Rationale

The court held that the investigation is complete and the chargesheet has been filed, the offence is based on electronic evidence which is in the custody of the investigating agency the accused has been behind bars for 5 months and it is pertinent to note that the other accused in the said case has been granted bail by the Patiala House Court Delhi. The required evidence is collected by the Investigation Agency, hence the continuous custody of the accused is no longer required. 

It was also mentioned by the Hon’ble Judge that the accused is a youngster and has already been suspended by his college therefore, further detention will hamper his educational career. Passing the order of bail the court held that it did not find any fruitful purpose that would be served by the incarceration of the accused. 

Critical analysis of the Bulli Bai App case

Misuse of technology led to the creation of the Bulli Bai app which helped in creating and spreading offensive content aimed at women, therefore, besides encouraging gender based violence, it also fostered fear and harassment in digital spaces. This misuse of technology demonstrates the urgent need for more informed consideration of ethical as well as technological aspects of digital platforms, especially legal frameworks that can combat online harassment effectively. It is important to note that the normalisation of harassment and objectification of women in digital spaces reflects deep-seated beliefs and attitudes that perpetuate gender based violence.

By simply amplifying these harmful stories, the application only went ahead in promoting existing power imbalances affecting women more negatively hence demonstrating how technology is linked to gender equality and social justice. 

Solving these problems demands a combination of legal language as well as collective activities geared towards challenging societal norms about women while advocating for equality. 

In short, the Bulli Bai app incident exemplifies how current legal systems and regulatory frameworks fall short of tackling online harassment and cyberbullying through existing law punishes an individual for stalking, but the implementation is difficult due to the jurisdiction and digital platform’s anonymity. This raises a fundamental question as to whether or not technology companies should intervene to stop the abuse of their services and the need for partnership between governments, civil society and tech stakeholders to find a lasting solution. Thus, a wake-up call to everyone is to prioritise the safety and future of humanity in digital platforms and to make a more inclusive and better online environment. 

Similarity between Sulli Deals and Bulli Bai case

The two cases of Sulli Deals and Bulli Bai App are two similar offences with the prevalent online harassment and mistreatment against the Islamic women of the nation. Both the offences were widespread on social media making targeted assaults where women were auctioned and were subjected to degrading and objectifying content. 

The emergence of apps like Sulli Deals and Bulli Bai stemmed from open source like Github. Bulli and Sulli are the Islamophobic slurs used by the rightists to troll Muslim women. Sulli Deals and Bulli Bai are apps built on stolen photos of women for fake online auctions with an ulterior motive to intimidate and degrade women who voiced their opinions for women’s rights and social justice.  

The case of Sulli deals happened in the year 2021 whereas the case of Bulli Bai happened in 2022. The Delhi Police was not able to catch the accused in the case of Sulli deals but a significant advancement took place when the Mumbai Police was successful in arresting all the accused in the Bulli Bai App case.  

Secularism : a myth or reality

Secularism is understood as a principle of separating the state from religious matters. It is a complex and debatable notion which is often taken as a guiding principle as well as a utopian vision of working of multi-faith nations but when incidents like Bulli Bai happen the bigger question which arises is whether Secularism is a myth or reality, particularly with regard to gender-based hate speech and violence against women through online communities. Bulli Bai’s case is considered a failure against the secular state for independent app bullying and hatred against women but on the other hand, it is pertinent to note that secularism itself is not only the reason behind such incidents it is other factors as well secularism provides the idea of equality it does not guarantees eradication of discrimination from the society. Secularism is the ideal scenario while incidents like the Bulli Bai app case is the effect of this idea for those who are not able to accept and understand the ideal scenario. 

Conclusion 

The appearance of platforms like Bulli Bai and Sulli Deals, which promote the objectification and exploitation of Muslim Women, underscores the pressing need for comprehensive measures to tackle cyber bullying, harassment and online abuse. While Law enforcement agencies are taking steps to address such crimes, the social ramification extends beyond reported incidents. 

Education plays a pivotal role in this aspect special attention shall be given to knowledge about cyber safety and fostering digital literacy in young individuals of the nation. Institutions like schools, colleges and universities shall make awareness campaigns to educate students and individuals about offences like cyberbullying and can teach them the necessary safeguards for protecting them from such offences happening online. If the underlying causes of cyberbullying are addressed and a supported environment is promoted, it can be a big step towards building a secular society in the true sense and a society which respects and celebrates all the diverse cultures and religions of the nation and no one shall be discriminated on the basis of their race, religion or beliefs and everyone can live with dignity and respect.

Fernand de Varennes, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights of minorities, highlighted the unique vulnerability faced by outspoken minority women. In his tweet, he emphasised that the international community is closely monitoring trends like #bullibai and its predecessor, #sullideals, which seeks to degrade and intimidate minority Muslim women in India, warning against the normalisation of such behaviour. He tweeted, “They involve harassment and hate speech targeting minority women who speak out and need immediate and effective condemnation and action. As an independent expert for the United Nations, it is clear to me that what is at stake are our fundamental principles of equal dignity for all. Indian women, especially those from minority communities who continue to speak out for their rights and hence are targeted, are particularly vulnerable because of their identities. They should be unequivocally supported and any violence against them, online or offline, taken action against by concerned authorities immediately,”. 

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

What is Sulli Deal?

Sulli Deals was an app where Muslim women were degraded and objectified through their stolen pictures and were subjected to a fake auction online. 

Who made the Bulli Bai App?

A 21 year old boy named Neeraj Bishnoi from Assam made the app. 

What led to the creation of the Bullibai app?

The app was created to hamper the dignity of opinionated Muslim women who were vocal about the rights and equality of women.

What is Github?

Github is an open source platform. It is the world’s largest repository used by developers, start-ups and huge technology firms to build an app. The users of Github can manage code repositories with tools specially present for developers, tools like host, review, manage code and many more.  

How did the Bullibai app affect its users?

Users targeted by the Bullibai app experienced significant emotional trauma, reputational damage and in some cases even physical threats. The app created a culture of fear and intimidation amongst its user base. 

What type of content was shared on the Bullibai app?

The app shared a range of harmful content, including defamatory posts, derogatory remarks and personal attacks targeting women. 

References 


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All about lawful consideration

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This article has been written by Vidushi Kachroo. This article aims to provide the necessary information about the consideration of a contract. It elaborates on the meaning of the term consideration given under the legal provisions and its essential ingredients. The article also focuses on unlawful consideration and its effects on the contract. Moreover, the article also includes various case laws and illustrations, as well as an explanation of some concepts in brief related to consideration.

Introduction

It is often seen that whenever we agree to do an act or restrain ourselves from doing an act, we do not do it for free. There is always some sort of value or benefit attached to it for which we give our consent. The act that we do in return for the benefit is what we call ‘consideration’ within the context of a contract. It is governed by the provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The term contract is defined under Section 2(h) of the Act as ‘an agreement enforceable by law is a contract’.

But the question arises what exactly is an agreement? As per Section 2(e) of the Act, ‘every promise and every set of promises, forming consideration for each other, is an agreement’

Hence, a contract is an agreement made for some consideration that is enforceable by law. As we go through this definition, we come across the most essential element of a valid and legal contract, i.e., consideration. An agreement made without consideration is not a contract, and this has been stated under Section 25 of the Act with some exceptions. Therefore, the presence of consideration in an agreement is crucial to determining its enforceability as a contract. 

Let’s discuss the concept of consideration in detail below. 

What is consideration

The concept of consideration is based on the principle of quid pro quo, a Latin term meaning ‘to take something in return’. Basically, consideration is something of a certain value in return for which a party to the contract agrees to do or abstain (restrain oneself) from doing something. For easy understanding, consideration can also be referred to as the price of the contract. 

Consideration may be anything that has some value in the eyes of the law. It can be a right, interest, money, asset, etc. But it is important to note that qualitative aspects or feelings like love, respect, etc., do not come under the ambit of a valid consideration in law. Also, it is not important that a consideration must always have a monetary value attached to it; rather, it just has to be something that has an actual value in any form in the eyes of the law. This was established in the case of Chappell and Co. Ltd. v. Nestle Co. Ltd. (1960). In this case, Nestle Co. Ltd. had started an advertisement stating that for every 3 wrappers of their 6 penny chocolate bars, they would be selling the music records at a discounted price. This was challenged by the Appellant on the ground that the consideration given by the Respondent was not adequate. The Court, in this case, held its decision in favour of the Respondent by stating that the presence of consideration is important for the agreement to be valid, and the adequacy of the consideration need not be important; however, it must be of some value in the eyes of law. Although the wrappers may seem useless in general, they do possess certain value.

Section 2(d) of the Act gives the definition of consideration as:

‘When, at the desire of the promisor, the promisee or any other person has done or abstained from doing, or does or abstains from doing, or promises to do or to abstain from doing, something, such act or abstinence or promise is called a consideration for the promise’. 

Now, if we try to break this definition into parts, it becomes easier for us to understand it. So the essentials to be remembered here are:

  • There must be two parties present in every contract, i.e., a promisor and a promisee.
  • The desire or wish of the promisor.
  • An act or abstinence by the promisee or any other person. 

In this regard, the meaning of the word abstinence means to restrain someone or oneself from doing a specific act or thing. Now that we have a basic understanding of the term consideration, let us move on to the essential elements for making the consideration valid and enforceable.

Essentials for a valid consideration 

There are some essential elements that must be present in the consideration so as to make it valid and legally enforceable. It is very important to have a valid consideration because if there is no valid consideration, the contract is void. This means that a valid consideration makes a contract valid and enforceable before the law. It is necessary so as to give protection to the rights and interests of both parties to the contract. Since a contract without a valid consideration is not enforceable in court, the rights and interests of any of the parties to the contract do not have any legal protection.

The essentials for a valid consideration are as follows:

An act or abstinence 

For a consideration to be valid, there must be an act or an abstinence. Here, an act is something to which the promisee is not bound or obligated by law to do; rather, he does it at the desire of the promisor. On the other hand, abstinence or to abstain means to refrain from doing something to which the promisee is legally entitled, but he agrees to refrain from doing it at the desire of the promisor. Such an act or abstinence can be in the past, present, or even in the future. All these terms are included in the definition of consideration itself. The words ‘has done or abstained from doing’, ‘does or abstains from doing’, and ‘promises to do or abstain from doing’ indicate the past, present, and future forms of consideration, respectively. Hence, for a valid consideration, there must be an act of abstinence, and it must be legal. 

Past, present or future consideration

Our legislature is very clear about the time frame of a valid consideration. It approves all three forms of consideration, i.e., past, present, and future considerations. A consideration is valid irrespective of the fact that it was, is to be, or will be furnished. 

The English law does not recognise the concept of past consideration. It only accepts present and future considerations as valid and enforceable. But Indian law has acknowledged this concept and included it in the very definition of consideration to avoid any loopholes. Hence, the consideration may be in past, present, or future form. 

Past consideration is an act or abstinence that has already been done. For example, X, while repairing his car on the road, gets injured badly, and Z, a passerby, rushes in to help X and takes him to the medical clinic for treatment. After the treatment, X promises to pay Z an amount of ₹ 3000. The act done by Z in the past is a valid consideration.

Present consideration is something that is fulfilled simultaneously as the promise is made. This type of consideration is also called an executed consideration. For example., A sells his mobile phone to B and receives the payment at that moment only. This is known as present consideration.

Future consideration, as its name suggests, is something that is promised to be fulfilled in the future. It is also called an executory consideration as it is yet to be performed. For example, X promises to deliver 10 bags of cement to Z next week, and Z promises to pay the amount of the cement bags when they are delivered.  This is called future consideration. 

The concept of future consideration can be understood from the case of Kedarnath v. Gorie Mahomed (1887). The Respondent had made a promise to the Appellant that he would pay the amount incurred in the construction of the town hall in Howrah. On the basis of this promise, the Appellant started the work and completed the construction. When he asked for the payment as promised by the Respondent, the latter refused to pay the amount. This was initially challenged in the Howrah Court of Small Causes, and the decision was given in favour of the Respondent, but when this case went before the Madras High Court, the Hon’ble Court held the decision in favour of the Appellant on the ground that when a promise is made, the promisor cannot revoke it once the promise has begun. Hence, the Madras High Court held that the promise was enforceable as the work was done at the desire of the promisor, in anticipation of receiving the payment after the completion of the work and that the promisor was liable to pay the amount as he had promised. 

Consideration by promisee or any other person

Examining the definition under Section 2(d) more closely reveals the inclusion of the words ‘the promisee or any other person’. This implies that consideration for the contract can be fulfilled not only by the promisee but also by any other person. This is sometimes called the doctrine of constructive consideration. The implication of this doctrine is very simple, that it is not essential for the consideration to be fulfilled by the promisee alone. The consideration may be fulfilled by any other person who is a stranger to that consideration. However, this doctrine is not followed in English law. English law follows the doctrine of privity of contract.

Privity of contract

This doctrine lays down that only the parties to the contract have the right to sue and be sued in order to enforce the terms of that contract. It ensures that a contract remains a private agreement between the parties, and no third person can take advantage of such a contract in which he has not entered. This was established in the landmark case of Tweddle v. Atkinson (1861). In this case, it was held that no person who is a stranger to the consideration could take advantage of a contract, even if the contract were made for his benefit. On the basis of this general rule, it was held that the Plaintiff had no right to sue under the contract.

However, the perspective of Indian law is different from that of English law here. The Indian law stresses on the presence of consideration for a contract to be enforceable, and not on the fact of who furnished it. This was held in the case of Chinnaya v. Ramayya (1882). In this case, a lady gifted some property to her daughter through a registered gift deed with the condition that the daughter, in return, has to pay an amount of ₹653 to her sister annually. The daughter agreed to the condition of paying the said amount every year to her mother’s sister (the Plaintiff). However, after the death of her mother, the daughter (the Defendant) refused to pay the amount to the Plaintiff, to whom she had made a promise to pay the said amount. The Plaintiff sued the Defendant in order to recover the promised amount. The Madras High Court held that the Defendant is liable to pay the amount to the Plaintiff because, though the Defendant was not a party to the contract, the agreement was furnished by the Defendant’s mother on behalf of the Plaintiff, and it was given under Section 2(d) of the Act that the consideration may be furnished by the promisee or any other person. 

Stranger to consideration vs. stranger to contract

As we discussed the concept of stranger to consideration above, it is essential to note that this concept is different from the concept of stranger to contract. A stranger to a contract is a person who is not a party to the contract and cannot initiate a lawsuit for it. However according to Indian law, a person has the right to initiate a lawsuit if the consideration is furnished on behalf of him or for his benefit by the promisee, even if he is a stranger to the contract. 

We can understand this by the definition of consideration under Section 2(d), as the words ‘promisee or any other person’ indicate that a promise gets initiated only at the desire of the promisor, but however, it can be fulfilled by either the promisee himself or by any other person who is a stranger to consideration. It is important to note that under certain circumstances, a stranger to a contract is also entitled to initiate a lawsuit, such as in cases of marriage settlement, family settlement, assignment of contract, etc. 

In the case of Premalatha v. Mysore Minerals Ltd. (1992), the Karnataka High Court held that the Petitioner had the right to seek relief from the insurance corporation on behalf of her deceased husband on the ground that even though the contract was between the company, where her deceased husband was an employee, and the insurance corporation, the benefit of the contract was for the employees of the company itself. Hence, the employees and their heirs had the right to claim that benefit.

Consideration at the desire of promisor 

Another key ingredient of a valid consideration that we can draw from the definition of consideration given under Section 2(d) of the Act is that it must be fulfilled only at the desire of the promisor. If the act or abstinence is done at the will of any other party, the consideration will be considered void. This is because it is specifically mentioned in Section 2(d) through the words ‘at the desire of the promisor’ that the promisee, or any other person for that matter, must furnish the consideration at the desire of the promisor. However, the benefit of the consideration may be enjoyed by a third person if the promisor consents to it. 

In the case of Durga Prasad v. Baldeo and Ors. (1881), the Plaintiff was approached by the District Authority of Etawah for the construction market in the local area. The Plaintiff accepted the proposal and constructed a two-grain market. He also built buildings for shops and bought land for them. The Defendants leased the shops and worked as commission specialists. It was decided that the Defendants would pay a commission of a certain sum to the Plaintiff regularly, and the Plaintiff approached the municipal corporation to make the agreement legally binding by having it registered. However, the Defendants refused to give their consent to register their agreement, and hence, the Plaintiff initiated legal proceedings against the Defendants in order to safeguard his right to a regular commission. The Allahabad High Court held its decision in favour of the Defendants on the ground that it is the basic essential element of consideration given under Section 2(d) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, that the consideration must be moved by the promisee or any person at the desire of the promisor. The Court held that the market was constructed at the desire of the District Authority of Etawah and not at the desire of the Defendants. Hence, there was no established relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendants as the promisor and promisee. 

Consideration must be legal

A consideration must be legal, i.e., it must not be something that is illegal or void in the eyes of the law. If a consideration is not legal, it will automatically have no value or enforceability in a court of law. The meaning of a valid or lawful consideration is discussed further in the article.

What is lawful consideration

A lawful consideration is one that is enforceable in a court of law. Section 10 of the Act clearly states that all agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent of parties competent to contract, for a lawful consideration, and with a lawful object, and are not hereby expressly declared to be void’.

As per this Section, it is understandable that every agreement is a contract if:

  • It is made with the free consent of all parties.
  • The parties are competent to enter into an agreement as prescribed by the law.
  • It is made for lawful consideration and with a lawful object.
  • Is not expressly declared void. 

As per Section 23 and Section 24 of the Act, any agreement with an unlawful consideration shall be void. The Act does not directly state the essentials of a lawful consideration. Instead, Section 23 provides the factors that make a consideration unlawful. So, a consideration is said to be lawful if it does not have any of the elements given under Section 23, which makes it unlawful.

In the case of Ram Sarup Bhagat v. Bansi Mandar (1915), the Defendant sought a loan of ₹13 lakhs from the Plaintiff and promised to return the principal amount with the interest accrued in the month of Baisakh in the coming year. However, it was decided that until the amount was repaid, Defendant would work in the fields of Plaintiff, which included the work of planting seeds, ploughing the field, threshing crops, etc. It was also decided that if the Defendant remained absent even for a single day, he would have to pay the entire principal sum along with an increased 4% to 6% interest rate on that same day. Defendant worked for Plaintiff for two years continuously, and one day, after being absent from work, he was asked to pay the sum as decided. The Defendant refused to pay his liability in return, for which the Plaintiff filed a case against him for breach of contract. The court held that the agreement was not enforceable and was void. It was in contradiction with Section 23 of the Act, as the Defendant was made to work without any pay for two years in return for the loan sought by him. Hence, the Court held that there was no difference between his work and slavery. Also, the Plaintiff expected the repayment of the entire loan with huge additional interest, which the Defendant could not bear as he was poor. The Calcutta High Court held that the contract was opposed to public policy and hence, not enforceable.                 

However, in the case of Gherulal Parakh v. Mahadeodas Maiya and Ors. (1959), the partnership agreement was entered into and focused on engaging in wagering transactions. The Supreme Court held that the partnership was not void as per Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, despite the wagering contract being void under Section 30 of the Act. The Court held that the partnership agreement was not against public policy, emphasising that public policy was a branch of common law led by precedents and that the scope of the word ‘immoral’ should be restricted to recognised court principles.

When is a consideration unlawful

Section 23 of the Act states what considerations or objects are considered unlawful in the eyes of the law. As per this section:

The consideration or object of an agreement is lawful unless-

  • It is forbidden by law;
  • Is of such nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law; or is fraudulent;
  • Involves or implies injury to the person or property of another;
  • The court regards it as immoral or opposed to public policy.

In each of these cases, the consideration or object of an agreement is said to be unlawful. Every agreement of which the object or consideration is unlawful is void. Let us understand the aforementioned points in detail. 

Forbidden by law

If a consideration refers to the performance of an act that is forbidden by law, such consideration shall be said to be void in the eyes of the law. An act is said to be forbidden by law when any law restricts a person from doing a certain act and imposes a punishment or fine on every such person who performs any such forbidden act. It is important to note that all agreements with illegal consideration are void, but all void agreements may not always be illegal.  

Defeats the provision of law

Criminal litigation

A consideration is also said to be unlawful if it defeats the provisions of the law. This means that if the consideration is any act that, although not prohibited by the law directly, it seems that the performance of such an act would defeat or contradict the objectives of the law, it is not possible to avoid such contradiction, such a consideration shall be void. Hence, an agreement made with the intention of defying the objective of any provision of any law shall be void. 

In the case of Ram Sewak v. Ram Charan (1982), both the parties had agreed to carry on their business in partnership, which was lawful. However, the parties decided to conceal some parts of their business activities and not show some transactions in the books of accounts in order to evade payment of income tax. The Allahabad High Court held that the agreement was not enforceable as it aimed at defeating the provisions of tax laws. 

Fraudulent purposes

Section 23 provides that any consideration made purposefully for fraudulent purposes shall be void. Hence, any agreement made in order to defraud any person shall be void in the eyes of the law. This is explained very effectively in illustration (g) of Section 23 and it says: ‘A, being an agent for a landed proprietor, agrees for money, without the knowledge of his principal, to obtain for B a lease of land belonging to his principal. The agreement between A and B is void, as it implies fraud by concealment by A on his principal’. 

Injurious to a person or property of others

Any consideration or object that may inflict an injury to any person or to the property of others shall be void. No agreement should inflict injury to any person or to the property of any person through its performance. In the case of Ram Sarup Bhagat v. Bansi Mandar (1915), the Calcutta High Court struck down the agreement as it led to the Defendant being subjected to human labour without any pay, and hence, it became indistinguishable from slavery, which led to injury to a person.

Immoral

According to the Black’s Law Dictionary, immoral means ‘contrary to good morals; inconsistent with the rules and principles of morality that regard men as living in a community and which are necessary for the public welfare, order, and decency’.

Section 23 states that an agreement that is against the moral principles followed by society in general and that is considered immoral in the eyes of the law shall be void. 

Illustration to Section 23(j) explains a type of agreement which falls under the scope of the immoral act: ‘A, who is B’s mukhtar, promises to exercise his influence, as such, with B in favour of C, and C promises to pay 1,000 rupees to A. The agreement is void because it is immoral’. In the case of Pranballav Saha and Anr. v. Sm. Tulsi Bala Dassi and Anr. (1958), the Calcutta High Court held that a contract transferring property for the purpose of running a brothel or for prostitution is immoral and void. However, if the contract is made to a prostitute for residential purposes only and not for running a brothel or carrying out her profession, then the contract will be enforceable.

Opposed to public policy

The term ‘opposed to public policy’ included in Section 23 has a wide scope. This term has not been defined anywhere and is left as an open-ended question for the courts to interpret from time to time, as it keeps changing. In a general sense, it means any act which opposes the pre-established interests and morals of the public at large. Although this term has not been defined, there are certain titles which are commonly accepted by the courts as the grounds of public policy. The major heads of public policy are as follows:

Trading with an enemy or foreign entity when the law does not approve it

Enemy entity means any person who is a citizen of the country having war-like situations with India. Any kind of agreement with such an entity is void, as such an agreement is against the interests of the country. They may confer some benefits which pose a threat to the security and integrity of the nation.

Agreements made for hampering the prosecution

Agreements made for suppressing criminal charges are void. The criminal must be punished for the offence committed by him when the same is proved in court. If an agreement is made to protect the offender from getting punished, such an agreement is considered to be in conflict with public policy. In the case of Pakalapati Veerayya v. Devulapalli Sobhanadri (1936), a person entered into an agreement in which he agreed to take back the charges framed against the accused under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. As per the law, this offence may be compounded only with the prior permission of the court, and since the permission was not taken from the court for compounding, the Madras High Court held the agreement made was void.

Agreements in the nature of champerty and maintenance

Champerty and maintenance are two different terms, the latter being the genus and the former just a species. Maintenance means when the litigation is motivated by a person who is not a party and has no interest in the suit against a third person. Champerty, on the other hand, refers to the situation where the litigation is motivated by a person who is not a party himself against a third person, with the intention of sharing the gains from the suit or litigation.

All agreements made for the sale of public offices and titles

Any agreement made for selling or transferring the seats of public offices is unlawful, as such agreements hamper the rights of the deserving candidates who are actually qualified for being appointed to any of the public offices. Titles are given for achieving excellence in any field, and the transfer of the same for any monetary benefit is void. In the case of Sushil Kumar Yadunath Jha v. Union of India and Ors. (1986), a public officer agreed to transfer his post to a public office in exchange for ₹5000. The Supreme Court of India held the agreement void.

Agreements made in restraint of parental rights

As per Indian laws, the father is considered to be the natural guardian of a child, and after him, the mother (except in the case of Muslim law). An agreement made for the sale or transfer of parental and guardianship rights is void. In the case of Annie Besant v. G. Narayaniah (1913), the father had agreed to transfer the guardianship of his two minor sons to Mrs. Annie. Later, he filed a case to seek back the custody of his sons, and the Madras High Court denied him the same on the ground that if the adoption made according to the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, is valid, then the custody cannot be sought back.

Agreements made for marriage brokerage

Any agreement made to pay a third party for negotiating, procuring, or bringing about a marriage is void. In the case of Gopi Tihadi v. Gokhei Panda and Anr. (1953), the Orissa High Court held that any contract made for marriage brokerage is illegal and void as it opposes public policy.

All agreements that interfere with the course of justice

Interference with the delivery of justice is not allowed, and any agreement made with such an intention is void. For example, A is guilty of committing theft, and B is the prime witness. A promises B that he will pay him ₹10,000 if B gives a false statement before the court during the proceeding. Such an agreement is void.

Agreements in restraint of personal liberty

The right of personal liberty is a fundamental right of every person provided by the Constitution of India, and any agreement made to restraining the personal liberty of a person is void. In the case of Sitaram Deokaran v. Baldeo Jairam (1957), an agreement was made in which the Defendant signed a naukrinama in which he agreed to serve the Petitioner at a salary of ₹2 per month for a period of 112 and a half months in exchange of a loan for ₹225. After serving the Petitioner for a period of approximately 2 years, the Defendant withdrew from his services and started serving somewhere else as a watchman for presumably more advantageous terms. It was argued by the Petitioner that the Defendant was instigated to withdraw from his services as per the contract. However, the Court stated that there was no evidence to prove the same and that the Defendant may have withdrawn from the services because of the meagre salary. The agreement was declared void by the Court as it restrained the Defendant from serving anywhere else, and the salary given to him was meagre. The Court held that the terms of the contract were unconscionable.

Effect of unlawful consideration

The effect of an unlawful consideration is that the agreement becomes void in the eyes of the law. Section 24 of the Act states that agreements are void if considerations and objects are unlawful, even in parts. The Section states that ‘if any part of a single consideration for one or more objects, or any one or any part of any one of several considerations for a single object, is unlawful, the agreement is void’. The meaning of this Section is that in an agreement, if any part of the consideration for one object or for more than one object is unlawful or illegal, then the agreement is void. It also states that where multiple considerations for a single object are involved, even if any one of those considerations or any part of a single consideration is unlawful, then the whole agreement becomes void. 

For example, if A and B make an agreement that A will give B 100 gm of gold and, in return, B will give him 500 gm of heroin, such an agreement shall be void because the consideration given by B is unlawful. Under Section 27 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act), the consumption of drugs like heroin is an offence which has a rigorous imprisonment of 1 year or a fine of 20,000 or both. The production, manufacture, possession, sale, purchase, transport, import interstate, export interstate or use of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances is also an offence punishable with imprisonment and a fine depending upon the quantity of any such drug under Section 21 of the NDPS Act. Hence, any agreement with an unlawful consideration shall be void in the eyes of law.

Difference between lawful consideration and lawful object 

The terms lawful consideration and lawful object are usually considered the same. However, there is a difference between the two terms, and these are, in reality, not synonyms. The object of an agreement essentially means the intention or purpose of the agreement in which the parties enter, whereas the consideration of an agreement means something of value in the eyes of the law. A consideration can be an act or abstinence done in the past, present, or future, moved by the promisee or any other person at the desire of the promisor. Hence, it can be understood that the object is the purpose of the agreement, and the consideration is its value. Both the object and the consideration must be lawful because, many times, it happens that the consideration in an agreement is lawful, but the object is unlawful, or vice versa. In any such case where any of them is unlawful, the agreement becomes void. For example, A agrees to invest in the company of B and becomes the creditor. B, who is insolvent, agrees to return the principal amount with interest in instalments of ₹10,000 every month to A, with the intention of defrauding the creditor. The consideration for the agreement, namely ₹10,000, is legal, but the object, namely defrauding the creditor, is illegal because it violates insolvency law. 

Exceptions to consideration

The Indian Contract Act, 1872, specifically upholds the rule of ‘no consideration, no contract’, implying that no contract or agreement can be made without consideration. Any such agreement made without consideration shall stand void. However, the Act also states certain exceptions to this rule. Section 25 of the Act lays down the situations under which the presence of a consideration is not required for an agreement to be enforceable. The Section talks about the following three exceptions:

  • Natural love and affection: Any agreement made without consideration in writing and registered under the law for the registration of documents between near relatives on the basis of natural love and affection is enforceable and valid. The term ‘near relatives’ is not defined anywhere in the Act; however, it has been explained by the courts in various cases. In various cases, it has been held that near relatives include relations by blood as well as marriage. They do not include remote relations. In the case of Vijaya Ramraj v. Dr. Sir Vijaya Ananda (1950), the Allahabad High Court held that when the promise is registered and based on natural love and affection, it has to be carried out even if the promisor dies before the fulfilment of the promise.
  • Past voluntary service: If a promise is made by the promisor to compensate a person wholly or partly for any service that was performed voluntarily by that person for the promisor. It may be something that the promisor was legally compellable to do. The service must be done for the promisor only and without his knowledge. 
  • Time-barred debt: The promise made in writing and signed by the person who is to be charged or his authorised agent for the payment of time-barred debt is also enforceable and valid. The repayment may be made wholly or partially. The period in which a suit can be filed is saved and commences from the day the borrower acknowledges his debt. 

Conclusion 

Now that we have discussed the concept of lawful consideration, one thing is absolutely clear that where there is no consideration or an unlawful consideration, the agreement is void. For an agreement to be enforceable in a court of law, it is necessary to have a lawful consideration as well as a lawful object present in that agreement. The consideration and object become unlawful if they fall under any of the categories given under Section 23 of the Act, i.e., they must not be illegal, fraudulent, opposed to public policy, forbidden by law, defeat the provisions of law, immoral, or inflict any injury to any person or to the property of any person. If the consideration is unlawful, the agreement becomes void, and even if any one part of the consideration or any part or more than one part of any of the several considerations is unlawful, then the agreement is also void and hence cannot be enforced in a court of law.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

What is the importance of consideration in a contract?

Consideration is an essential element of a contract, and without consideration, no contract can come into force.

What is past consideration?

As per the Indian Contract Act, 1872, when the promisor receives consideration before fulfilling his/her promise, such a consideration is called past consideration.

What is a lawful object?

The object of an agreement means the intention or purpose of that agreement. Hence, a lawful object means the purpose of the agreement that is in conformity with the law and is not something which is strictly prohibited by law, i.e., it is not unlawful or illegal. 

What happens when the agreement is made with unlawful consideration?

Any agreement made with unlawful consideration becomes void as per Section 24 of the Act and, hence, is not enforceable in a court of law. 

References 


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Section 27 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

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This article is written by Advocate Devshree Dangi. It talks about the scope of Section 27 where the Arbitral Tribunal seeks assistance of the Court in taking evidence. This article focuses on the coordination of both the Arbitral Tribunal and the Court under Section 27 with regard to the execution of orders made by the Arbitral Tribunal by the Court. Further, various judicial pronouncements pertaining to Section 27 have also been explained in detail to understand the practical applicability of the provision.

Table of Contents

Introduction

The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) was enacted to regulate domestic arbitration and conciliation matters. This Act sets laws to regulate the overall functioning of dealing with matters concerning arbitration and conciliation in the Arbitral Tribunals. These tribunals have their own procedure to deal with such matters. It is applicable on both domestic and international arbitration Awards, both of these are enforceable under the Act. The Judicial Courts have the power to support and supervise the arbitration proceedings but are limited to an extent which is also specifically mentioned under Section 5 (“extent of judicial intervention”) of the said Act. Section 27 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is among one of such provisions in the Act that allows the involvement of the Judicial Courts in the arbitration proceedings. It details the provisions related to making an application to the Court for seeking its assistance in taking the evidence pertaining to the concerned matter of arbitration proceedings. This article analyses the pivotal role of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, of 1996 in smoothly regulating the arbitral proceedings and emphasising the provisions for the extent of judicial intervention with a specific focus on Section 27 of the Act.     

Section 27 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 : an overview

Section 27 of the Act, as the title of the provision suggests provides a legal framework and thus establishes a mechanism whereby the arbitral tribunal or a party to the dispute (with the approval of the arbitral tribunal) may seek legal assistance for the purpose of obtaining evidence. As stated above, this provision stands as one of the few sections within the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 that permits judicial intervention or assistance in arbitration proceedings governed by the Act. 

Let’s have a detailed analysis of Section 27 of the Act.

Provision of taking assistance from the Court

Section 27(1) of the Act comes up with the provision for the arbitral tribunals to seek the assistance of the Court in taking evidence on its own or through a party to dispute after the approval of the arbitral tribunal. It is pertinent to note that the use of the words “May” and “Execute” in the provision under the Section is a significant factor in deciding the extent of the power of the Courts in relation to deciding the application under Section 27 of the Act. In the case of Sime Darby Engg. SDN. BHD. v. Engineers India Ltd. (2009), the issue revolved around the sole arbitrator’s authority to seek the assistance of an expert in arbitral proceedings. The Apex Court in the aforesaid case observed that Section 27 clearly provides that an Arbitral Tribunal has the discretion to seek the assistance and support of the experts when necessary. Whenever it seems essential to the sole arbitrator, they have the right to engage an expert for assistance and therefore, the Court affirmed the same. 

Manner and particulars of the application

Section 27(2) of the Act lays down the provision for what should mandatorily be included in the application made under  Section 27(1). The application shall include the following:

1.  Name and address (Parties to dispute and the arbitrators).

2.  General nature of the claim and the relief being sought.

3.  The evidence which is to be obtained,

  1. Particulars of the person to be heard as witness or expert witness (Specifically the name and address) and the statement specifying the testimony required.
  2. In case of any document to be produced, the description specifying the requirement or in case of a property to be inspected, the description for the same shall be provided in the application.  

The Supreme Court in the case of Delta Distilleries Limited v. United Spirits Ltd. & Anr., (2014) highlighted that the terms ‘any person’ used under Section 27(2)(c) of the Act is inclusive of not only the witnesses but also extends to the parties involved in the dispute before the Arbitral Tribunal.

Competency of the Court and the execution of the request for assistance    

Section 27(3) of the Act specifies the provision for the execution of the request made under Section 27(1) and also the competency of the Court to take the application for assistance.

  • Competency of Court: This Subsection highlights the provisions for the competency of the Court to take the application for its execution. Here the term ‘competency’ refers to the jurisdiction of the Court and its authority. The Court shall be competent in terms of jurisdiction to involve or support the Arbitral Tribunal for its assistance in taking evidence for the arbitral proceedings.
  • Execution of request: The Court, if competent, then after receiving the application may execute the request and may order that the evidence shall be directly provided to the Arbitral Tribunal.  
  • Rules on taking evidence: For the execution of the request made by the Arbitral Tribunal or any person authorised by the Arbitral Tribunal for the Court’s assistance in taking the evidence, the Court shall follow the procedure of taking evidence according to the provisions laid down under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Simply, the Court has to follow the same procedure it follows in case of any suit tried before it.

The Bombay High Court in the case of Dilip s/o. Bhavanji Shah versus Errol Moraes (2022) interpreted Section 27 of the Act. The simple reading of Section 27 of the Act is when the Arbitral Tribunal or any person approved by it approaches the Court to seek its assistance in taking evidence then the Court must ensure that all the necessary conditions mentioned under the Section are fulfilled. Once the Court is satisfied with the same, it is obligated to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 27 of the Act. The provision clarifies that the Court doesn’t have adjudicatory powers in such a process. The role of the Court is limited to facilitating the assistance to the Tribunal on its request under Section 27. The Court cannot make substantive decisions but rather ensure that the procedure is carried out smoothly and in line with the regulations on request of the Tribunal. 

Provision for the issuance of processes to the witnesses

Section 27(4) of the Act outlines the procedure to be followed by the Court when making an order under Section 27(3). According to this provision, the Court is obligated to follow a process as to summoning witnesses in civil suits for executing a request. This simply means that the Court will follow the standard procedure it follows when summoning witnesses to appear before it in cases being tried.  It ensures the involvement of the Court in arbitral proceedings remains consistent with its procedure to maintain clarity and coherence in the application of the law.  

Default and the contravention of any order made by the Court under this Section

Section 27(5) of the Act laid down the provision for the penalties, punishments or disadvantages in case of any default and the contravention of an order made by the Court under Section 27 of the Act in the following cases:

  • When any individual does not attend the proceedings when required by the Arbitral Tribunal or makes any other default during the processes under this Section, or
  • refuse to produce the evidence required by the Arbitral Tribunal, or 
  • is guilty of contempt of the Arbitral tribunal when the proceedings are taking place.
  • If any person is found guilty of any of the abovementioned defaults and contraventions, then he shall be subject to the punishment or the penalty as given by the Court in case of any suit tried before it. In simple words, the consequences of any default or contravention will be the same as the consequences of such acts in case of suits tried before the Courts. 

The Supreme Court in the case of Alka Chandewar v. Shamshul Ishrar Khan (2017) regarding the interpretation of Section 27(5) of the Act, declared the interpretation by the Bombay High Court to be incorrect. The Bombay High Court had previously construed this provision to mean that the Arbitral Tribunal has no authority to refer the matters of contempt of its orders to the Court of law. The Supreme Court held that the provisions of Section 27(5) don’t preclude the Arbitral Tribunal from referring the matters of violation of contempt of its order including the interim orders to the Court. 

Interpretation of the expression “processes” under the Section

Section 27(6) of the Act gives an explanation of the use of the expression “Processes”. This expression refers to the summons and commissions for the examination of witnesses and summons to produce the required documents.

Scope of Section 27 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 

This Section ensures the effectiveness of the orders of the Arbitral Tribunal by involving the Court in taking evidence. When the Arbitral Tribunal finds it necessary to seek the assistance of the Court it can make it through this Section. The provision highlights the responsibility of the Arbitral Tribunal while making such applications. It specifies the necessary particulars that should be considered while presenting such an application under Section 27 before the Court. The provision puts an obligation on Courts to decide their competency or the ability to accept such requests. Here the term competency refers to the jurisdiction of such Court where the application is made for taking the assistance. It highlights that the procedure of the Court for making orders under this Section is similar to that of the normal suits. The penalties for contraventions by any person under this Section attract similar consequences as of the normal suits before the Court.

Who can file an application under Section 27 of the Act

According to Section 27(1) of the Act, the Arbitral Tribunal can apply to seek judicial assistance from the Court for the purpose of taking evidence. Further, any party to the dispute can also file an application under Section 27 to the Court, provided it is first approved by the Arbitration Tribunal. 

It is pertinent to note that the statutory mandate of Section 27(1) requires the Arbitration Tribunal’s prior approval to seek the court’s assistance, and for that, it is significant that the party provides adequate and legitimate justification. Upon being satisfied with the merits of such assistance, the Arbitral Tribunal may grant its approval to the party’s request. Subsequent to receiving the Tribunal’s sanction, the party is entitled to proceed with an application under Section 27. 

In the case of Psa Nitrogen Limited vs Company Secretary Gail (India) Lyd (2022) the Delhi High Court dismissed the petition filed under Section 27 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by the petitioner in the aforesaid case, for the reason that it was not filed by taking approval from the Arbitral Tribunal. The Court held that the Petitioner’s action doesn’t align with the provisions of Section 27 hence, this led to the dismissal of the Petition.  

Further, in case the Tribunal is making an application under Section 27, it should determine sufficient grounds for seeking the assistance of the Court. However, the Tribunal doesn’t need to explain in detail the reasons for taking assistance to the Court. In case the Tribunal is making an application under Section 27, it should determine sufficient grounds for seeking the assistance of the Court. However, the Tribunal doesn’t need to explain in detail the reasons for taking assistance to the Court.

Arbitral Tribunal’s responsibility to determine sufficient grounds

In the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Ashok Kumar Garg (2007), an appeal was made before the Delhi High Court against an order passed by the Additional District Court Judge who rejected the application made by the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 27 on the grounds that it didn’t have the sufficient reasons that necessitated the assistance of the Court. The Delhi High Court in this case stated that before approving the request for making an application under Section 27 the Arbitral Tribunal should determine the sufficient reasons. The High Court in the aforesaid case observed that “detailed reasons may not be specified by the tribunal, but at least application of mind must be available from the order passed by the tribunals”.

Responsibility of the party to dispute when seeking approval of the Arbitral Tribunal for making an application under Section 27 of the Act

In a petition filed before the High Court of Judicature for Orissa in the case of National Aluminium Company Ltd. v. Indo Power Projects Ltd. (2019) against an order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal where an application was filed before the Arbitral Tribunal for seeking its approval for taking the Court’s assistance. However, the same was rejected on the ground that the applicant had furnished a list of five witnesses and only two of those were examined by the applicant. The other party to the dispute contended that there were no sufficient grounds provided by the other party (the applicant) as to how the examinations of those two witnesses are required for the adjudication of the case. The High Court of Judicature for Orissa held that the applicant had clearly mentioned the reasons for taking the approval of the Arbitral Tribunal for making an application to the Court for seeking its assistance. Further, the Court highlighted that if any party seeking the assistance has submitted the list of witnesses it doesn’t prevent the Arbitral Tribunal from approving that party to make an application for seeking the court’s assistance. However, the party seeking approval of the Arbitral Tribunal shall provide satisfactory reasons for the same. The Arbitral Tribunal has the discretion to allow such a party when sufficient and convincing grounds are presented, even when any prior list of witnesses has been submitted.  

When the witness is residing outside the jurisdiction of the Court

There may occur a situation when the witness to be produced resides outside the jurisdiction of the Court. There are certain judicial pronouncements which clarify the scope of Section 27 in such cases. In the case of Reliance Polycrete Ltd. v. National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation of India (2008), the Delhi High Court analysed the entire situation and, considering the relevant provisions held that the Courts are deprived of the authority to issue process (summons and commissions) to the foreign witness. The Delhi High Court further pointed out that there may occur logistical difficulties as to how the attendance of such foreign witnesses will be obtained. In simple words, this judgement highlighted the practical challenges in such a situation. But with a contrary approach the Bombay High Court in the case of Stemcor (S.E.A.) Pte Limited and Anr. vs. Mideast Integrated Steels Limited (2018), while adjudicating an application under Section 27 where a foreign witness residing in Singapore refused to visit India, then in response to this the Bombay High Court after considering the evidence of the key witness to be material and crucial has appointed an arbitrator as the Commissioner of Court. The Bombay High Court directed a team of lawyers to go to Singapore to collect and record the evidence of the witness. The Bombay High Court highlighted the importance of recording the evidence in person to be more authentic than collecting them through video conferencing. This judgement not only provided the solution to the challenges in the concerned case but also directed the Courts to adopt such measures to tackle the practical challenges in such circumstances.

Conditions for granting assistance in taking evidence  

The Court under Section 27 has the power to assist the Arbitral Tribunal in taking evidence. However, there are certain conditions for the Court to provide assistance in such cases, which are mentioned as under:

Competency of the court 

The Court while considering the application shall determine its ability to accept the request for its assistance required by the Arbitral Tribunal. Here the competency of the Court means that the Court must have jurisdiction to accept such application. There may be situations where the application made under Section 27 is for taking the assistance of the Court for issuing processes to the foreign witnesses, in such cases the Court has the power to find alternate solutions considering the significance of the requirement. But this power is also limited to only the execution of the request of the Tribunal.

Assistance by the Court must be in accordance with the rule

arbitration

Firstly, the Court shall determine whether or not the request made under Section 27 of the Act by the Arbitral Tribunal or any aggrieved party approved by the Tribunal is in accordance with the rules of the Court. This simply means that the Court shall have the rules to execute such a request. If the request made by the Tribunal restricts the Courts to commit such action as required by the Tribunal or if the Courts do not have the rules to execute the same then the Court can reject the request. The Court shall follow the same procedure for assisting the Tribunal in taking evidence as it follows for taking evidence in suits tried before it. The overall impression of this condition is to ensure that every order made under this Section has the same effect as it has in the normal cases before the Court.  

Effect and enforceability

The order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 27 allows a person to seek the assistance of the Court in compelling the production of any documents as evidence or the appearance of any person before the Tribunal holds validity and is completely enforceable. If any person fails to adhere to such an order would be subject to penalties and legal consequences for non-compliance with a Court order. The consequences are similar to the consequences faced for non-compliance when the Court issues processes to witnesses or any person to produce any document or to appear before the Court as per the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure,1908 and Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

Role of the Court in evidentiary processes and witness examination in arbitral proceedings     

The Arbitration and Conciliation Act enumerates the provisions for the functioning of arbitration and conciliation matters in the Arbitral Tribunals. The provisions cover the appointment of the arbitrators in the Arbitral Tribunal, arbitration agreement, making of awards, terminating the proceedings, recourse against arbitral awards etc. However, it does not provide any procedure for issuing summons to the witnesses or the examination of witnesses when required. Many times the parties to dispute do not cooperate with the Tribunal’s proceedings, especially when any document is required as evidence or any witness is required to appear before the Tribunal and they do not cooperate. This makes the Arbitral Tribunal to seek the Court’s assistance for taking evidence or the examination of witnesses and the issuance of processes to the witnesses. It ensures fairness in the smooth functioning of the proceedings in the Arbitral Tribunal. However, the role of the Court is limited to assisting the Arbitral Tribunal in taking evidence, issuing processes to witnesses and for the examination of the witnesses through an order under Section 27 of the Act. The rest of the responsibilities regarding the same lies with the Arbitral Tribunal. The Arbitral Tribunals are responsible for the execution of such orders made by the Court.       

Limitation of Court’s jurisdiction  

Section 5 of the Act highlights the provision for limited interference of the Courts. The scope of Section 27(1) where the Arbitral Tribunal can request a Court to assist it in taking evidence is limited to the extent that the Court can only accept or reject the application. Further, to decide the admissibility, relevancy, materiality and weight of any evidence is the part of the Arbitral Tribunal. The Court has no power to determine the same. So, the responsibility of the Court is just to ensure that it should be in accordance with its Rules on taking evidence. Also, the Court doesn’t have adjudicating powers under any order made by the Arbitral Tribunal. No such order is appealable in the Courts. Thus, the Courts are not an appellate forum for any order made by the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 27. However, with respect to the relevance of any evidence sought and the legality of the directions of the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 27 to produce it can exclusively be challenged only during the stage when the arbitral award is challenged under Section 34 of the Act. This Section serves as an avenue available to a party of dispute in the proceedings of the Arbitral Tribunal for ventilating its grievances against the award including interim orders issued by the Arbitral Tribunal during the proceedings. 

Power of Court in relation to taking assistance

The power of a Court under Section 27 is limited as the main role of the Court is just to assist the Arbitral Tribunal in taking evidence. After accepting the request by the Arbitral Tribunals the Court can make orders for issuance of processes to the witnesses, examination of the witnesses and for the appearance of any witness before the Tribunal during the proceedings. The main powers of the Court to make orders for;

  • Issuance of processes to the witnesses to appear before the Arbitral Tribunal,
  • Summons and commissions for the examination of witnesses and,
  • Summons to produce the required documents.

The Court follows the same procedure for issuing of summons under this Section which is laid down under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The power is limited to assist the Arbitral Tribunals but the responsibility of execution of all the orders made under Section 27 lies with the Court.

Limitation on judicial intervention under this Section

The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 sets out the provisions for putting limitations on judicial interference of the Court in arbitral proceedings. Section 5 of the Act put an obligation on the Courts not to intervene in any matter before the Arbitral Tribunals except when required to an extent specified under the Act.

Interconnection of Section 5 and Section 27 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

Section 27 says that the Arbitral Tribunal or any aggrieved person approved by the Tribunal can make an application for the assistance of the Court in taking evidence. Now, Section 5 of the Act decides the extent to which the Court can be involved in the proceedings. The role of the Court under Section 27 is executory and not adjudicatory. This simply means that the Court can only execute the request of the Arbitral Tribunal and assist it in taking evidence. The Court follows its rules for the execution of such requests and ensures that such requests are in accordance with its rules. Again, the concept of accepting the request of the Arbitral Tribunals in such a case shall not be based on the Court’s decision to determine the admissibility, relevancy, materiality and weight of any evidence which is to be sought. It is all on the part of the Arbitral Tribunal. The Court can only accept or reject the request made by the Arbitral Tribunal on the basis of its competency and rules. The Court’s powers under Section 27 are limited to the execution of the request made by the Arbitral Tribunal and nothing more than that. The Court, by no means, can interfere in the proceedings of the Arbitral Tribunal except for the execution of the request. The Court can only issue processes to the witnesses following its own rules as specified under Section 27(3). This is what a limitation is with regard to the provisions of Section 27 in connection with Section 5 of the Act. 

Case laws on Section 27 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

Ennore Port Ltd. vs. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd (2006)

Facts of the case

In this case, the applicant invoked the arbitration to pursue the recovery of a substantial sum of INR 12,93,92,982 from the respondent. The dispute came out from the contract between the parties involving the quarrying and transportation of rocks essential for constructing breakwaters at Ennore from Karaikal to the Ennore port. The dispute revolved around the discrepancies in payments made to the respondent by the applicant which exceeded the stipulated terms of the contract. This dispute led to the initiation of a criminal investigation with an FIR and also the involvement of CBI with regard to the investigation. During the arbitral proceedings, the applicant requested the Arbitral Tribunal to direct the Respondent to produce a copy of the documents that the CBI had filed before the Criminal Court. However, the respondent failed to do so and filed a statement for its inability to produce such documents. This led the applicant to seek approval from the Arbitral Tribunal for taking assistance of the Court under Section 27. The Tribunal allowed the applicant to file the application before the Madras High Court. 

Issue 

  • Whether or not the Court has discretion under Section 27 to make an order for the production of any document as evidence?
  • Whether or not the documents related to criminal proceedings can be produced on requirement of the Arbitral Tribunal?
  • Whether or not the failure on the part of the respondent to adhere to the order of the Tribunal’s direction warrants Court intervention under Section 27?
  • Whether or not the documents required by the Tribunal are essential for the requested documents are essential for proving the case of fraudulent acts committed by the respondent. 

Judgment 

The Madras High Court dismissed the petition filed by the applicant under Section 27 of the Act which required the Court to direct the Superintendent of Police, CBI to produce the Charge sheet and the other documents. The Court Highlighted that it does not have the power to pass an order automatically when an application is filed under Section 27. The Arbitral Tribunal didn’t pass any order directing the Superintendent of Police, CBI to produce the required document. With regard to the application filed by the applicant for seeking the assistance of the Court, the Court highlighted the distinction between the cases before the Arbitral Tribunal and the cases before the CBI Court. Additionally, the Court questioned the evidentiary value of the documents to be produced before the Arbitral Tribunal and stated that it could jeopardise the interests of the respondent in this case before the Criminal Court. Further, the Madras High Court referred a judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Virender vs The State Of Nct Of Delhi (2009) which held that the statements made before the Police officer during the investigation cannot be used for any other purpose unless it attracts the provisions of Section 27 which is about the discovery of a fact occurred out of the information obtained from a person who is accused of any offence while they are in police custody to be submitted as evidence before the Court and Section 32(1) which is about the admissibility of the statements made by the deceased, unavailable or person incapable of giving evidence in Court, of the Indian Evidence Act,1872. Thus, the Court dismissed the petition saying that it was not satisfied with the applicant’s case to exercise its discretion under Section 27 of the said Act. 

Delta Distilleries Limited vs. United Spirits Limited (2013)

Facts

This case involves an appeal through Special Leave against the order of the Single Judge of the Bombay High Court. Respondent no. 1 filed an arbitration petition before the Court to seek assistance under Section 27 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. The Arbitral Tribunal had permitted the Respondent to file such an application. Subsequently, the Court accepted the said application by the Respondent and directed the Petitioner to produce the documents as evidence. The appeal before the Supreme Court challenged the order of the Bombay High Court. The appeal questioned the scope of Section 27 with regard to the circumstances that necessitate the application under Section 27 for seeking the assistance of the Court.

Issue 

The issues raised in the present case are as follows:

  • What is the Scope of Section 27 with respect to making an application before the Court for seeking assistance in taking evidence?
  • In what circumstances can the Arbitral Tribunal apply to the Court for seeking its assistance in taking evidence?

Judgment

The Supreme Court, in this case, rejected the objection against an order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal allowing the Respondent to apply to the Court for taking its assistance under Section 27 of the Act. The Supreme Court emphasised that an Arbitral Tribunal is mandated to make an award based on the merits of claims. If the Tribunal finds it necessary to consider any evidence for making an award, it has the inherent power to procure such evidence.

The Supreme Court didn’t delve into the powers specifically given to the Court under Section 27 and focused on affirming the authority of the Tribunal to invoke the provisions of Section 27 for evidence collection.

The Supreme Court didn’t interfere with the order of the Bombay High Court directing Respondent no. 1 to produce documents. This judgement of the Supreme Court underscores the authority of the Arbitral Tribunal to invoke the provisions of Section 27 for taking the evidence while highlighting the significance of the discretionary approach of the Court when responding to such applications. It emphasised a nuanced consideration of the application under Section 27 rather than an automatic or uniform response to it by the Courts.  

Silor Associates vs. Bharat Heavy Electrical Limited, (2014) 

Facts of the case

In the present case, the Petitioner and the Respondent were engaged in arbitral proceedings where a dispute occurred out of a Service Provider Agreement, in which the Petitioner was the claimant of its services charges from the Respondent. The Petitioner requested the Arbitral Tribunal to direct the Respondent to produce the two specific documents as evidence. The Arbitral Tribunal found the documents to be relevant and crucial for the case and held that the disclosure of these documents is necessary for the case and is, prima facie, relevant. However, the Arbitral Tribunal asserted that it lacked the authority to compel document production and hence it sought the assistance of the Court under Section 27 of the Act. Thus, it allowed the Petitioner to make an application to the High Court of Delhi to seek assistance. The Delhi High Court on receiving the Application came up with a question for learned counsel for the Petitioner as to how the petition is maintainable in the Court. The order of the Arbitral Tribunal is about its findings of the relevancy of the documents required to be produced and no witness is required to be summoned. The Tribunal has not passed any order directing the respondent to produce any document as evidence.

Issue 

The issues raised in the present case are as follows:

  • Whether or not the Arbitral Tribunal has the authority to make an order for the production of documents by a party to dispute or any witness in the absence of an agreed procedure between the parties.
  • Whether or not the Court should provide the assistance under Section 27 based on the order of the Arbitral Tribunal?
  • Whether or not the reasoning provided by the Arbitral Tribunal for rejecting the provisions of Uncitral Model Law was appropriate?

Judgement

The High Court of Delhi has held in this case that the Arbitral Tribunal is empowered to direct any party to dispute to produce any document when required by the Arbitral Tribunal during the proceedings. And if any party denies or fails to do so then the Arbitral Tribunal may choose to invoke the provisions of Section 27 in taking assistance of the Court. The Court based on the order made by the Arbitral Tribunal is empowered to execute the request of its assistance under Section 27. With regard to the rejection of the provisions of the Uncitral Model Law the Delhi High Court further by taking reference to the verdicts of the Supreme Court has stated that the Uncitral Model Law reinforces the powers of the Arbitral Tribunal with regard to its own procedure for directing the parties to produce documents.  Also, the grounds for rejections by the Arbitral Tribunal were found erroneous by the Court, which made it clear that the procedure for regulatory powers for the procedure is a statutory right of the Tribunal. 

Montana Developers Pvt. Ltd vs. Aditya Developers (2016)

Facts of the case

In this case, arbitral proceedings were initiated by Montana Developers Private Limited in the year 2013 against Aditya Developers and Others presided over by the former Chief Justice of India who acted as a sole arbitrator in these proceedings. The arbitrator, once done with the completion of the production of evidence and examination of witnesses from the Petitioner’s side, proceeded further with the review of the evidence and witnesses presented by the Respondents. At this stage, the Petitioners filed an application before the Arbitral Tribunal for further production of documents and the examination of some additional witnesses. This request by the Petitioner was opposed by the Respondent. However, the application was allowed by the Arbitrator. Subsequently, the Petitioner approached the Court and applied under Section 27 for its assistance which was again opposed by the Respondent.

Issues

  • Whether or not the Court has adjudicatory powers with regard to any order made by the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 27 of the Act.
  • Whether or not the Court has the power to question the validity of any order made by the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 27 of the Act?

Judgment

The Bombay High Court in this case has clarified that Section 27 of the Act serves to facilitate the assistance of the Court to the Arbitral Tribunal for the requirements of its proceedings with regard to the production of documents as evidence or examination of any witness. The Court highlighted that Section 19 of the Act clarifies that the Arbitral Tribunals are absolved from being bound by the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and the Indian Evidence Act,1872. The Court pointed out that the Arbitral Tribunals lacked the authority to issue processes to the witnesses to appear before the Tribunal during the proceedings or to compel any document production. If it appears necessary to the Tribunal for the production of specific witnesses or any document to be produced, it can permit the concerned party to seek the assistance of the Court under Section 27.

The Court made it clear that unlike in a civil suit, the Respondent need not be heard by the Court in cases of arbitration. The Court asserted that once the Arbitral Tribunal determined that the production of certain documents is warranted then the Respondent has no right to object it before the Court. The BHC further highlighted that the Courts are barred from intervening in the proceedings of the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 5 of the Act. Thus, the Court cannot challenge an order of the Arbitral Tribunal granting permission to seek Court’s assistance under Section 27. The powers of the Court under Section 27 are non-adjudicatory and the challenge to such order can only be made at the stage of final award under Section 34 of the said Act.

Steel Authority of India vs. Uniper Global Commodities  (2023) 

Facts of the Case

The case has come up with a situation where the Petitioner and the Respondent were engaged in a Charter Party agreement based on the carriage of the Petitioner’s cargo from the ports of the United States to the ports of Haldia and Vizag in India. The dispute occurred when the Petitioner found them in a situation of demurrage claims concerning the vessel ‘MV Peace Gem’. So, the Respondent brought into effect the arbitration. During the arbitral proceedings, the Petitioner filed an application before the Arbitral Tribunal to seek its approval to approach the Court for its assistance in taking the evidence of a third-party witness. The Arbitral Tribunal allowed the application by the Petitioner without taking note of the relevancy and materiality of the evidence. The Arbitral Tribunal accepted the application of the Petitioner with a view that every party to the dispute has the right to present their case and the Tribunal should not get into the relevancy and materiality of the evidence sought by the parties to dispute.

Issue

  • Whether the Arbitral Tribunals should determine the relevancy or materiality of any evidence sought by any party to dispute when applying for the approval of the Arbitral Tribunal for seeking assistance of the Court in taking evidence?
  • Whether or not the Courts have the power to scrutinise such matters and to what extent can interfere in such matters?

Judgment

The Delhi High Court in this case dismissed the Petition under Section 27 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 on the ground that the Arbitral Tribunal shall consider the significance of the evidence while accepting an application under Section 27 by the parties to seek assistance of the Court. The order of the Arbitral Tribunal was based on the misconception of law that the Arbitral Tribunal is not under the obligation of considering the relevance and materiality of the evidence which are to be sought. However, the Court didn’t intervene in the proceedings of the Arbitral Tribunal and directed it to consider the relevance and materiality of the evidence sought by the parties while accepting the application under Section 27. The overall impression of this case is that the Court cannot interfere in the proceedings of the Arbitral Tribunal but can direct it when it makes an order under a misconception of law.  

Right to appeal 

Section 37 of the Act enumerates provisions for the orders of the Arbitral Tribunal that are appealable before the Court of law. It clearly indicates that no order under Section 27 is appealable. The Gujarat High Court in the case of Aepl Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs Tehran Jonoob Technical And Construction Company (2023) highlighted that the Court doesn’t have jurisdiction to review or appeal the procedural decisions during arbitration proceedings. The Court verified the very nature of the Court’s role under Section 27 of the Act to not act as an appellate body over the procedural decisions of the Arbitral Tribunal. The Courts are limited to facilitating the arbitration process with their assistance when required by the Tribunal under Section 27 of the Act. 

However, if any party to the dispute before the Arbitral Tribunal, if not satisfied with the final Award, it can appeal before the Court. Section 5 of the Act limits the interference of the Court in Arbitration Proceedings. Any order including the orders made under Section 27 cannot be appealed before the Court of Law. 

Critical analysis of Section 27 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

The legal provisions enumerated under Section 27 provide a well-structured legal framework for the smooth functioning of the proceedings before the Arbitral Tribunal in the context of admissibility of evidence, appearance of any witness or the examination of any witness. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 lacks in providing any legal procedure of the Arbitral Tribunal in such cases. It requires the Arbitral Tribunal to seek the assistance of the Court in taking evidence so that every order made by the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 27 could be enforceable by law. However, this coordination of the Court and the Arbitral Tribunal gives rise to controversies with regard to the limitation of judicial intervention in arbitral proceedings.

The Arbitration and Conciliation Act provides the provisions and the extent to which the Court can interfere in the arbitration proceedings. Section 5 of the Act limits the judicial intervention in all the provisions where the Court can get involved in the arbitral proceedings.  It emphasises that the role of the Court is limited to performing the actions as given under the provisions of the Act. It ensures the Court’s intervention remains aligned with the objectives of the provisions of the Act and prevents any undue interference in the arbitration procedure..In the context of Section 27 where the Arbitration Tribunal can seek the assistance of the Court in taking evidence, the role of the Court is to execute the request of the  Tribunal. Here the word “Execute” simply indicates the executory powers of the Court under Section 27. This simply means that the Courts are empowered only for the execution of the request made by the Arbitral Tribunal or any aggrieved party approved by the Tribunal. The Court cannot further adjudicate in the same matters. The main responsibility of the Court is to make sure that every request it receives under Section 27 shall be in accordance with its rules in taking evidence.

When deciding an application under Section 27 which requires the Court to assist the Arbitral Tribunal in issuing processes to foreign witnesses and the Court doesn’t have the authority to do so, then the Court can find an alternative solution considering the weight of the evidence which is to be obtained. Basically, the Court, while determining its ability to consider the request of the Arbitral Tribunal in such cases should also determine the demand of the circumstances of the requirement. If the request is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court or not in accordance with its rules, the Court should determine whether or not the situation can be handled with an alternate solution. For instance, the Court can appoint a team and direct them to go to the place from where the evidence has to be collected.

Section 27 of the Act ensures the legality of the orders of Arbitral Tribunals in cases when it requires any documents to be produced by any party to dispute as evidence and also the examination of witnesses or the appearance of the witnesses before it. But lacking any provision under the Act that provides the procedure of the same makes the situation difficult. So, the involvement of the Courts in such cases supports the Arbitral Tribunal to a great extent and stands out as a legal base for the smooth functioning of the proceedings of the Arbitral Tribunal. 

Conclusion

Section 27 of the Act underscores the limited but significant role of the Courts in assisting or supporting the Arbitral Tribunal. The role of the Court under this Section is strictly executory.

The involvement of the Court in arbitral proceedings under Section 27 is limited to the extent that it can assist or support the Arbitral Tribunals in taking evidence in accordance with its rules. The Court can only execute the request by the Arbitral Tribunal but cannot adjudicate against any order made by the Arbitral Tribunal under this Section. The Court lacks the authority to pass any judgement or interfere in the proceedings of the Arbitral Tribunal. The provisions led down under the Act to limit judicial intervention are just to ensure the autonomy and integrity of the arbitral procedure. It maintains the independence of the Arbitral Tribunal in the arbitral proceedings. It further ensures the balance between judicial support and the self-legislation of the Arbitral Tribunal.  Section 27 of the Act is all about the coordination of the Court and the Arbitral Tribunal to strengthen the legality of every order made by the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 27 which limits the Courts to provide the legal support only and not to adjudicate against it.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

What are the requirements of the aggrieved party to apply for the Court’s Assistance?

  • The aggrieved party who wants to apply for the assistance of the Court shall first obtain the approval of the Arbitral Tribunal. 
  • The aggrieved party shall have sufficient reasons to apply for the assistance of the Court. 
  • For the approval of the Arbitral Tribunal, the Aggrieved party shall furnish the list of the witnesses before the Tribunal and also sufficient reasons to believe that the assistance of the Court is necessary. 
  • The Tribunal, after examining the details provided by the aggrieved party if satisfied, can approve the request of the aggrieved party and allow it to make an application to the Court for its assistance.

Can foreign witnesses be summoned under Section 27?

No, foreign witnesses can’t be summoned under Section 27 as the Courts do not have rules for issuing summons to foreign witnesses. However, the Court, while determining its ability to execute such requests made by the Arbitral Tribunal for issuing processes to the foreign witnesses, also considers the significance of such evidence in arbitral proceedings, and in such circumstances, the Court can make order in accordance with its rules as a possible solution to execute such a request. For instance, the Bombay High Court in a case considering the weight of the evidence appointed an arbitrator as the commissioner of the Court and a team of lawyers and sent them to the place of the foreign witness to record the evidence.

Do the Courts have adjudicatory powers for any order made by the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 27?

The Courts do not have adjudicatory powers against any order made by the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 27. The Courts do not have any power to determine the admissibility, relevancy, materiality and weight of any evidence or any witness which is to be produced or to have appeared before the Arbitral Tribunal. The role of the Courts is limited to the execution of the request made by the Arbitral Tribunal. All required by a Court after receiving the application under Section 27 is to ensure that it should be in accordance with the rules of the Court in taking evidence and the Court is competent to execute such request. 

What is the interpretation of the term “Competency” under Section 27?

The term “Competency” under Section 27 refers to the Court’s ability to execute the request made by the Arbitral Tribunal or any aggrieved party approved by the tribunal. When a Court receives an application under Section 27, it should determine its ability in terms of jurisdiction and the relevancy of the request with its rules on taking evidence. Also, the Court if found itself deprived of any action which is necessary to execute such a request of the Tribunal then it can find any possible way to tackle the challenges but it should be in accordance with its rules. 

Is any order made under Section 27 appealable? 

No, the Courts are not an appellate forum for any order made under Section 27 by the Arbitral Tribunal. Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act makes it clear which orders are appealable in the Courts under this Act. Section 27 doesn’t fall under the orders mentioned under Section 37 of the Act which are appealable.

References 


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Virtual courts and access to justice : an overview

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This article has been written by Nikita Mukati pursuing a Diploma in Advanced Contract Drafting, Negotiation and Dispute Resolution from LawSikho.

This article has been edited  and published by Shashwat Kaushik.

Introduction

Covid-19 lockdown was a very tough time for the whole world. All sectors and all classes were greatly affected, and so was the judiciary. Where access to courts was not possible. The judiciary is one of the pillars of government and the working of courts are very essential for the proper functioning of government. With a view to the proper functioning of courts and the timely delivery of justice, the Hon’ble Supreme Court exercised its plenary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Indian Constitution and directed courts to opt for e-courts and virtual courts for the delivery of justice to all. This direction resulted in a blessing for the entire judicial system, which has now taken an entirely different form. Access to justice is now made easier, Our judiciary is now adopting new technologies to ensure that all persons can get justice without unnecessary delay or expenditure. Recently, the Honourable Chief Justice of India, DY Chandrachud, directed all the high courts to allow lawyers to access virtual hearings throughout the court proceedings. Access must not be limited to their cases only, this will help many lawyers and interns learn a lot and gain experience while not visiting courts physically.

What is a virtual court

Virtual courts are a concept brought about by the Indian judicial system for the trial and adjudication of petty offences currently under the e-courts project. Virtual court eliminates the presence of litigants and advocates in court to save time and money. It has wider jurisdiction than the physical courts and practices its jurisdiction throughout the state. Currently, only cases related to petty offences for which summonses can be issued under Section 206 of the CrPC and cases of traffic challans under the Motor Vehicles Act of 1988t are being adjudicated through these courts. In these courts, there is no need for judges to be present in the court building, Virtual court enables judges to adjudicate cases 24*7. Currently, there are 25 courts in 20 states and union territories. Virtual courts also provide the facility of filing a complaint online without filing it physically, which is also cost-effective and environmentally friendly. It also enables one to pay court fees and fines online. These courts have reduced the burden of the judiciary a lot. More measures are being taken every now and then by our Ministry of Law and Justice and the judicial system to bring the latest technological developments to the judiciary.

Transition into virtual courts

As part of the eGovernance Plan, virtual courts were implemented through the concept of E-courts which is based on the National Policy and Action Plan for Implementation of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in the Indian Judiciary-2005. It was implemented in three phases, The first phase(2011-2015) enabled VC in 347 jails and 493 courts and computerised 14,249 district and subordinate courts. The second phase(2015-2023) enabled VC in 1272 jails and 3240 courts and computerised 18,735 district and subordinate courts. It also connected 99.4% of courts through WAN. Live streaming started in the Supreme Court and High Courts. It also started a judgement search and a portal for providing copies of judgements and orders free of charge. Phase Three (2023) digitised all court records. It implemented AI-based “smart courts” for automatic translation and transcribing. It also expanded the scope of virtual courts.

As access to justice was not possible in the tough times of the pandemic, the Supreme Court took suo moto cognizance in Re: Cognizance For Extension Of Limitation for the difficulties faced by people across the country to file their suit/appeal/applications within limitation, and excluded the limitation time from the period from 15.03.2020 till 14.03.2021. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also directed a virtual hearing of all important matters during the pandemic. The first virtual court started at Tis Hazari Court in Delhi on July 26, 2019, followed by Punjab and Haryana High Courts.

Need for virtual courts

The main principle behind the need for virtual courts is the pandemic, which changed the system from a physical court that was time-consuming to a virtual and time-saving. There are many more principles behind the need for virtual courts, such as the need for speedy trial, which is then guaranteed under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution through Hussainara Khatoon and Ors. vs. The State of Bihar (1978). In this case, the Court laid down several principles that are essential for ensuring speedy trials.

  1. Timely disposal of cases: The Court held that the state has a constitutional obligation to ensure that cases are disposed of within a reasonable time.
  2. Speedy investigation: The Court also held that the investigation of cases should be conducted in a speedy and efficient manner.
  3. Adequate judicial infrastructure: The Court emphasised the need for adequate judicial infrastructure, such as sufficient number of courts and judges, to ensure speedy trials.
  4. Virtual courts: The Court recognised the potential of virtual courts in expediting the trial process. Virtual courts allow for remote hearings and proceedings, reducing the need for physical presence of the parties and witnesses in court.
  5. Simplified procedures: The Court also called for simplified procedures and the use of technology to streamline the trial process.

The Hussainara Khatoon judgement has had a significant impact on the Indian criminal justice system. It has led to a number of reforms aimed at ensuring speedy trials. For example, the government has established fast-track courts to deal with cases expeditiously.

The use of virtual courts has also been explored in recent years, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic. Virtual courts have the potential to make the trial process more efficient and accessible, especially for cases involving witnesses or defendants who are located in remote areas.

The right to a speedy trial is an important safeguard against arbitrary detention and prolonged pretrial detention. It is also essential for ensuring the fairness of the trial process.

The Hussainara Khatoon judgement has played a crucial role in upholding the right to a speedy trial in India. It has set forth a clear framework for ensuring that cases are disposed of within a reasonable time. Another principle is the principle of open court, which is provided under Section 327 of the CrPC, Section 153B of CPC and many other acts and is also widely discussed by the constitutional bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar Ors vs. State of Maharashtra Anr. (1966). Virtual courts provide open court hearings where all parties and witnesses can attend the court hearing at the same time from the place of their convenience without spending a lot of money and time. Currently, only cases of petty offences where summons can be issued under Section 206 of the CrPC and other traffic challan cases under the Motor Vehicle Act of 1988 are tried by virtual courts. Another principle behind this is the disposition of pending cases. Currently, over 3.76 crore cases have been handled by 25 virtual courts and approximately 455.12 crore fines have been realised till 30/09/2023 in more than 43 lakh cases. These figures demonstrate the significant impact that virtual courts have had in addressing pending cases and generating revenue for the government.

The success of virtual courts in India has prompted discussions about their potential for expansion. Some experts believe that virtual courts could be used for a wider range of cases, including civil disputes and even criminal trials. However, concerns have also been raised regarding the potential implications for the right to a fair trial, particularly in cases involving complex legal issues or the need for witness testimony.

As the Indian judicial system continues to adapt to the changing landscape, the role of virtual courts is likely to evolve. It is imperative that a balanced approach is taken, ensuring that the benefits of virtual courts are harnessed while safeguarding the fundamental principles of justice and the rights of all parties involved.

Advantages of virtual courts

  • Virtual courts have proven to be the best decision made in the pandemic, which has given many benefits to parties, advocates, judges and the government.
  • Virtual courts make easy access to justice for all, as these courts are cost-effective which saves the cost of travel and other expenses for parties. These courts saved huge expenses on establishing court buildings, infrastructure, security, staff and maintaining court records.
  • These courts work 24*7, which reduces the burden of pending cases in the judiciary and provides faster delivery of justice to all.
  • Footfall in courtrooms is reduced, and there is no need for parties to be present physically in the courtroom. Filing the complaint online and paying court fees through an online portal made parties file their pleadings in limitation, as they don’t have to travel to court again and again for petty matters.
  • Testimony of witnesses, including children, women, and victims, is now less traumatic, which ultimately provides effective delivery of justice.
  • Certain tribunals and certain appeals don’t require the attendance of parties physically; thus, virtual courts make it easy for courts to adjudicate matters easily, even if they require the presence of parties.
  • Faster delivery of justice has reduced the burden of pending cases and also reduced the burden of maintaining court records.
  • The judicial system has now become more transparent as the status of cases is updated online and live streaming of cases is accessible from any place.
  • Virtual courts also enable real-time case adjudication and data sharing with other courts, which saves time for courts to adjudicate matters easily and effectively.

Challenges of virtual courts

As we have seen, these courts have made a significant change in the system, but there are certain difficulties and challenges faced by these courts that are to be addressed.

  • Virtual courts need good internet speed, and proper broadband connectivity, many district courts lack good broadband connectivity. It hinders a fair trial if the interruption is caused by a lack of proper connectivity.
  • It is also noticed in various cases that many technical interruptions cause poor connectivity, echoes and other disruptions. Which disturbs the entire adjudication procedure.
  • There is a lack of training for judges and advocates to understand the software used for virtual courts.
  • Implementing virtual courts and e-courts is a big challenge for the government, because it requires a lot of monetary funding and highly advanced software to protect the data of courts from hacking and cyber-attacks.
  • Maintaining data security and privacy of citizens is also an issue that must be primarily protected while implementing virtual courts while maintaining the balance between the right to privacy and the right to information at the same time.
  • Maintaining e-records of cases is also a challenge, as the staff of all courts is not well versed in new technologies. There is a great need for training and teaching the court staff all about e-courts and virtual court technology.

Virtual courts vs. physical courts

Virtual courts, also known as online courts or e-courts, are legal proceedings conducted remotely through the internet or other electronic means, rather than in a physical courtroom. Physical courts are traditional courtrooms where legal proceedings take place in person, with the judge, lawyers, witnesses, and defendants present in the same room.

There are several key differences between virtual courts and physical courts.

Location: Virtual courts do not require a physical presence in a specific location. Participants can access the proceedings from anywhere with an internet connection, eliminating the need for travel and reducing the costs associated with transportation and accommodation.

Technology: Virtual courts rely heavily on technology to facilitate communication and collaboration between participants. Video conferencing platforms allow for real-time interactions, while secure online portals provide access to case documents and other relevant information.

Accessibility: Virtual courts can enhance accessibility to justice for individuals who may face challenges attending physical court hearings. This includes people with disabilities, those located in remote areas, or those with limited mobility.

Efficiency: Virtual courts have the potential to streamline the legal process and improve efficiency. Automated systems can expedite tasks such as scheduling, filing, and sharing documents, reducing the time required for certain legal procedures.

Transparency: Virtual courts can increase transparency and public access to legal proceedings. Recordings of hearings and other proceedings can be made available online, allowing the public to observe and understand the legal system better.

Security: Virtual courts incorporate security measures to protect sensitive information and ensure the integrity of proceedings. Encryption and other security protocols help safeguard data and prevent unauthorised access.

However, virtual courts also have certain limitations.

Technical issues: Virtual courts rely on reliable internet connectivity and technical infrastructure. Participants may experience difficulties accessing proceedings if they have poor internet connections or lack the necessary equipment.

Lack of personal interaction: Virtual courts lack the personal interaction and nonverbal cues that are present in physical courtrooms. This can make it challenging for judges to assess witness credibility and evaluate evidence effectively.

Potential for bias: The use of algorithms and artificial intelligence in virtual courts raises concerns about potential bias and discrimination. Ensuring fairness and equal treatment of all participants is crucial in virtual court proceedings.

Digital divide: The digital divide, where certain populations have limited access to technology and the internet, can create barriers to participation in virtual courts. Efforts must be made to address this issue and ensure inclusivity.

Overall, virtual courts offer several advantages over physical courts in terms of convenience, accessibility, and efficiency. However, addressing the challenges associated with technology, security, and inclusivity is essential to ensuring the effectiveness and fairness of virtual court proceedings.

Procedure of proceedings in virtual courtrooms

In India, virtual courts have been implemented to provide remote access to judicial proceedings, particularly during challenging circumstances like the COVID-19 pandemic.

  1. Case filing and registration:
    • Parties can file cases electronically through designated e-filing platforms or portals provided by the court.
    • Once the case is registered, a unique case number is assigned, and relevant documents are uploaded.
  2. Scheduling of hearings:
    • Virtual hearings are scheduled in advance, considering the availability of judges, parties, and witnesses.
    • Notices are sent to all parties involved, containing the date, time, and specific instructions for joining the virtual hearing.
  3. Technology setup:
    • Parties are expected to have access to a computer or mobile device with a stable internet connection.
    • Video conferencing platforms or dedicated virtual court software are used to facilitate the hearing.
    • Parties may be required to test their devices and ensure proper audio-visual capabilities.
  4. Virtual courtroom environment:
    • Virtual courtrooms replicate the traditional courtroom setting as much as possible.
    • Judges preside over the proceedings from their chambers or dedicated virtual courtrooms.
    • Parties can see and hear each other, and the proceedings are recorded for future reference.
  5. Authentication and identification of parties:
    • Parties are required to provide valid identification documents for authentication purposes.
    • Video feeds are used to visually identify and verify the presence of parties and witnesses.
  6. Presentation of arguments:
    • Lawyers and parties can present their arguments, examine witnesses, and submit evidence through the virtual conferencing platform.
    • Cross-examination of witnesses may be conducted remotely, with due consideration for the rights of all parties involved.
  7. Judicial deliberations and decisions:
    • Judges deliberate on the case based on the evidence presented and legal principles.
    • Judgements or orders are pronounced during the virtual hearing or may be reserved for a later date.
    • Copies of the judgements are made available electronically to all parties.
  8. Post-gearing processes:
    • Virtual courts provide mechanisms for parties to file post-hearing submissions or appeals electronically.
    • Further proceedings, such as appeals, may also be conducted virtually if necessary.
  9. Public access:
    • In some cases, virtual court proceedings may be open to the public for observation.
    • Access to live streams or recordings of hearings may be provided through designated platforms or websites.
  10. Security and data protection:
  • Virtual courts employ robust security measures to protect sensitive information and maintain the integrity of proceedings.
  • Data encryption, access controls, and authentication mechanisms are implemented to prevent unauthorised access or tampering.

Overall, virtual courts in India aim to provide a convenient, efficient, and secure platform for conducting judicial proceedings remotely, ensuring access to justice while prioritising the safety and well-being of all parties.

Conclusion

Thus, to conclude, we must accept that, in this tough time, our judiciary did not give up but got up to an entirely new system for the effective and speedy delivery of justice. Virtual courts are very useful for reducing the burdens of courts and are beneficial to all, including judges, advocates, parties, and new interns. These courts will also encourage our new generation to pursue law and give their valuable intelligence to the judicial system of the country.

These courts, if they overcome the challenges of data breaches and internet connectivity, will prove to be of great advantage to the country. Proper training for all the staff of courts and judges will add up to the entire virtual court system. Conducting various seminars for the implementation of virtual courts will also help. However, virtual courts cannot be a complete substitute for physical courts.

References

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Mergers and acquisitions in India and its impact on shareholders wealth and operational efficiencies

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This article has been written by Kanishk Bansal pursuing a Diploma in M&A, Institutional Finance and Investment Laws (PE and VC transactions) course from LawSikho.

This article has been edited and published by Shashwat Kaushik.

Introduction

In recent times/years, corporate restructuring through mergers and acquisitions has become a very common practice in the corporate world. Government agencies in India were the first to propose corporate restructuring through mergers and acquisitions.
Mergers and acquisitions is a common corporate strategy that involves consolidation of two or more companies to form into a single entity. The main goal of this practice is to achieve financial synergies, diversification, increased market share, etc.

Mergers and acquisitions have a great impact on operational efficiencies and shareholders wealth. In this article, we will discuss these impacts through real-life M&A transactions. First, let us discuss the concept of M&A in brief.

Merger

A merger is the consolidation of two or more companies/ business entities to form a single entity. Usually, a merger takes place between two companies of the same size to form one single, strong entity. In mergers. The assets, liabilities, operational units, etc all combine and work in a single unit. This could be understood through an equation:

A (merging entity) +B (merging entity) = AB (merged entity)

Acquisition

Acquisition is a corporate practice where one bigger or stronger entity, acquires or buys a smaller or emerging entity in order to cut or defeat the competition. In acquisition, the target company completely loses all of its existence and gets absorbed into the acquiring company. Unlike merger, acquisition transactions are not that friendly. This could be understood through an equation:

A (Acquiring Company) + B (Target Company) = A (After Acquisition)

Impact of mergers and acquisitions on shareholder wealth and operational efficiency:

A fundamental aspect of this corporate strategy involves attaining financial synergy, which essentially refers to the generation or enhancement of value. This value creation is achieved in the form of increased efficiency in business operations and shareholder wealth.

Ways by which shareholder’s wealth and operational efficiencies are impacted

There are certain ways by which shareholder’s wealth and operational efficiencies are impacted. These are:

Market efficiencies

The market efficiency reflects the stock prices. All the information available in the market that is related to the merger or acquisition of a company affects the stock prices directly. If the market believes that a merger of companies would be good for the company, then the stock prices might go up, but if the market believes that it won’t be a good decision, then the stock prices might go down. Likewise, in an acquisition, if the company is acquired at higher bids, then there are chances that the stock price might go up, whereas if the company is acquired at a lower bid (than the company’s actual value), then the stock price of that acquired company might go down.

High volatility

When companies are merged or acquired, there is high uncertainty in the market related to those companies. This uncertainty is due to less certainty about the functioning, efficiency of the newly merged company, and because of this uncertainty, investors don’t want to invest in the stocks of the newly merged company. This is what is known as high volatility. Due to this, the prices of stocks can fluctuate to a great extent.

Mergers and acquisitions in India and their effect on shareholder wealth and operational efficiencies

Tata Steel’s acquisition of Corus Steel

Tata Steel is one of the most profitable steel producing companies in India. During 2005-2006, Tata Steel had a revenue of 5 billion USD. Being one of the most profitable steel producing businesses in India, Tata Steel was on a mission to expand its business and operations globally.

In 2005, Corus Steel was the second largest producer of steel in Europe and the largest producer of steel in the United Kingdom. In 2005, Corus Steel had a revenue of 9.2 billion pounds.

On September 2, 2006, Tata Steel began the process of acquiring Corus Steel, which ended on July 2, 2007. The whole transaction was valued at 12 billion USD. Though the deal seemed to be very promising in the beginning, there was something due to which the deal proved to be a failure, due to which there was an impact on the wealth of shareholders and the operational efficiencies of the entities.

After the acquisition, the value that was achieved was way less than the value that was expected to be achieved after the acquisition. By the end of two years, there had been a decline in the profitability of Corus steel. The share price was reduced to 20%, which created a sense of fear in shareholders and hence affected shareholder wealth after the acquisition.

Cultural issues were also one of the reasons behind this failed acquisition. Tata Steel and Corus Steel were a cross border acquisition deal where one country was Indian and the other was based in the United Kingdom. The management of the company has seemed complicated due to cultural differences between the two countries, due to which operational efficiency was affected after the acquisition.

Tata Motors acquisition of Jaguar and Land Rover

Tata Motors is one of the largest automobile companies in India. During the year 2008, Tata Motors was the second largest bus producer in the world and had a revenue of USD 8.8 billion.

The launch of Tata Nano and the acquisition of Jaguar Land Rover were significant events that impacted companies’ operations and reputations among people around the world.

In 1989, Ford acquired two British based brands called Jaguar and Land Rover. In 2007, Ford reported the largest annual loss in its history. The company reported a loss of 12.8 billion USD. Due to this reason and the weak economy, Ford announced the launch of the Jaguar Land Rover.

On March 26, 2008, Tata Motors entered into the process of acquiring Jaguar Land Rover for 2.3 billion USD and on June 2, 2008, Tata Motors completed its acquisition of Jaguar Land Rover. Jaguar Land Rover was acquired on a cash free and debt free basis.

After the acquisition, shareholders’ wealth and the operational efficiency of companies were affected to a great extent.

In 2010, Jaguar Land Rover reported profit for the first time after the acquisition by Tata Motors. JLR’s debt to equity ratio went down to 1.6 times from 4.5 in 2009.

In pre- merger years, the sales revenue of Tata Motors was a million USD (during 2005), which increased to 7.468 USD in 2007. Nowadays, Jaguar Land Rover has expanded its manufacturing in various countries like the UK, India, China, and Brazil, which has reduced the risk of supply chain and currency risks, due to which Jaguar Land Rover’s is leading towards very high profits. During the financial year 2008-2009, JLR had a revenue of 4950 million pounds, which increased to 24339 million pounds in the financial year 2016-2017. Due to these reasons and strategies, shareholder’s wealth was impacted to a great extent. Moreover, during the financial year 2008-2009, the total employees in the entity was 17,529, which increased to 43,781 during the financial year 2016-2017.

Flipkart’s acquisition of Myntra

Flipkart is an Indian based e-commerce start-up, founded by Binny Bansal and Sachin Bansal in 2007, with a total investment of Rs 4 lakh. By achieving small-scale strategies, by March 2011, Flipkart had a gross merchandise value of USD 10 million.

Myntra is an Indian based start-up that was founded by Mukesh Bansal, Ashutosh Lawana and Vineet Saxena in 2007. Between 2007 and 2010, Myntra was dealing with personalised products for its consumers, such as t-shirts etc. By 2012, Myntra was dealing with 350 Indian and International brands.

By 2014, Flipkart had acquired Myntra in an all-stock deal valued at USD 250 million. Acquiring entities operating in the same sector can be very risky and challenging. It can be said that it is too much to put all the eggs in the same basket, i.e., investing totally in the same sector, which can be very risky. But this type of acquisition can be strategic if the target company (the company to be acquired) is a market leader for a specific type of product and by acquiring this type of company in the same market, it will substantially increase the market share of the acquiring company. This is the biggest reason behind the Flipkart acquisition of Myntra. Myntra, by getting acquired by Flipkart, was targeting the possible benefits, which could be easily possible through Flipkart’s logistic network. Therefore, it can be said that it was a win-win situation for both entities, as both were getting the benefits in the same way they wanted through the acquisition.

Like all other acquisitions, this one also had an impact on shareholder wealth as well as operational efficiencies.

After the merger, the number of users increased by 30.7%, the total number of sellers increased by 3.2%, the daily visits increased by 32.6% and team strength increased by 16.6%. Because of this increased number of users, revenue increased to 1.5 billion USD.

As both entities were happy with the deal, the operational efficiency of the entities is always affected in a positive manner if the employees of the target company support the acquisition. Though this deal was structured in a different way for the employees of both companies. It was agreed that Myntra’s management would be retained without any changes. Further, both companies agreed that none of the employee’s designations would be affected due to this acquisition. This deal was made with the intention that it does not hamper the functioning of both companies and helps to preserve the unique working culture of both entities.

Impact of M&A activity on the Indian economy

Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have had a significant impact on the Indian economy, leading to both positive and negative outcomes.

Increased market concentration:

  • M&As have resulted in increased market concentration in specific sectors, such as telecommunications, banking, and manufacturing.
  • This consolidation has led to concerns about reduced competition, which can potentially result in higher prices for consumers and a decline in innovation.
  • Regulatory authorities have taken steps to address these concerns, such as imposing stricter merger control regulations and reviewing proposed deals more closely.

Economic efficiency:

  • Well-executed M&As can enhance economic efficiency by optimising resource allocation and reducing duplication.
  • For example, mergers between companies in the same industry can eliminate overlapping operations and streamline production processes, leading to cost savings and improved productivity.
  • However, the success of M&As in achieving economic efficiency depends on various factors, including proper integration planning and effective management of post-merger challenges.

Job creation and economic growth:

  • M&As can lead to job creation and stimulate economic growth by expanding business operations and creating new opportunities.
  • When companies merge or acquire others, they often invest in new products, markets, and technologies, which can lead to increased employment and economic activity.
  • However, it’s important to note that M&As can also result in job losses, particularly in the short term, as companies restructure their operations to achieve cost savings.

Innovation and technological advancement:

  • M&As can foster innovation and technological advancement by combining the resources and expertise of multiple companies.
  • When companies with complementary strengths and capabilities merge, they can create new products, services, and technologies that would not have been possible individually.
  • For example, mergers between technology companies have led to significant advancements in areas such as artificial intelligence, cloud computing, and e-commerce.

Mergers and acquisitions in India’s various sectors

Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have emerged as a prominent force shaping the business landscape in India across various sectors. These strategic transactions have significantly contributed to the growth, consolidation, and restructuring of industries, impacting the economy, market dynamics, and competitive ecosystem.

Healthcare sector

The healthcare sector in India has witnessed a notable surge in M&A activity. Major hospital chains and pharmaceutical companies have engaged in mergers and acquisitions to expand their reach, enhance operational efficiency, and gain access to new technologies and markets. This consolidation has led to the creation of larger healthcare entities with improved patient care services and access to quality healthcare infrastructure.

Financial services

In the financial services sector, M&A has been used as a means to consolidate the fragmented market and create larger, more diversified financial institutions. Banks, insurance companies, and asset management firms have undertaken mergers and acquisitions to gain scale, reduce competition, and expand their product offerings. This consolidation has resulted in a more robust and stable financial system in India.

Information Technology (IT)

The IT sector in India has been a hotbed for M&A activity, driven by rapid technological advancements and the need for innovation. Leading IT companies have pursued mergers and acquisitions to strengthen their portfolios, gain access to new markets, and acquire specialised skills. This consolidation has facilitated the emergence of global IT giants with enhanced capabilities and a wider customer base.

Manufacturing industry

In the manufacturing sector, M&A has been utilised to achieve economies of scale, optimise operations, and gain access to new technologies. Large conglomerates have acquired smaller companies to expand their product lines, improve efficiency, and enhance their market position. This consolidation has contributed to the growth and competitiveness of the manufacturing industry in India.

Consumer goods

The consumer goods sector has experienced significant M&A activity, driven by rising disposable incomes and changing consumer preferences. Leading consumer goods companies have engaged in mergers and acquisitions to strengthen their brand portfolios, expand their distribution networks, and cater to the evolving demands of consumers. This consolidation has resulted in the emergence of larger, more diversified consumer goods companies with a wider reach.

Factors contributing to M&A activity in India

  1. Economic growth:
    1. India’s robust economic growth has led to a significant increase in the number of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) transactions in recent years.
    2. The country’s GDP has grown at an average rate of 7% in the last decade, creating a favourable environment for companies to invest in M&A activity.
    3. The availability of capital and resources has enabled Indian companies to pursue strategic acquisitions to expand their market share, diversify their portfolios, and gain access to new technologies.
  2. Government policies:
    1. The Indian government has played a crucial role in promoting M&A activity through supportive policies and regulations.
    2. The government has implemented measures such as simplified approval processes, tax incentives, and foreign direct investment (FDI) reforms to create a conducive environment for M&A transactions.
    3. These policies have facilitated cross-border M&A activity and encouraged foreign companies to invest in India.
  3. Globalisation:
    1. India’s increasing integration with the global economy has led to a rise in cross-border M&A transactions.
    2. Indian companies are looking to expand their international presence by acquiring companies in developed markets.
    3. Cross-border M&A transactions have also facilitated the transfer of technology and knowledge from developed countries to India.
  4. Technological advancements:
    1. Rapid technological advancements have necessitated M&A activity as companies seek to acquire new technologies and skills to remain competitive.
    2. The rise of digital technologies, such as artificial intelligence, machine learning, and blockchain, has created a demand for specialised expertise.
    3. M&A transactions have enabled companies to acquire startups and technology companies to gain access to cutting-edge technologies and talent.

Conclusion

Mergers and acquisitions are a strategy in the corporate world to achieve various targets, such as financial synergy and many more. Through the above case studies, it could be understood how this corporate strategy creates a good impact on shareholder wealth and operational efficiencies.

References

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Section 320 IPC punishment

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This article is written by Kaustubh Phalke. The article exhaustively explores the punishment for grievous hurt under IPC. The article starts with a brief introduction of the topic and then the meaning of grievous hurt, simple hurt and the types of injuries that constitute an offence of grievous hurt, followed by their respective punishments.

Table of Contents

Introduction 

It is noticeable that people engaging in quarrels turn into serious brawls and eventually end up inflicting serious injuries to one another which are considered as grievous hurt in law. The idea of grievous hurt has been derived from the French Penal Code

The infliction of injury to someone’s body is known as battery in English law. As per the dictionary, “hurt” refers to causing bodily or mental injuries to someone. Hurt as per the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as IPC)  is very similar to battery in English law.

In the recent case of Durga Prasad vs State of Uttar Pradesh, (2024), the Allahabad High Court stated that the most fundamental formula to ascertain the malicious intention or knowledge of the accused is to check whether he was aware of the consequences of his act or not. Where the accused lacks such awareness then the offence may not fall under Section 302 (punishment for murder)or Section 304(punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder) of IPC. Such cases shall rather be covered under Sections 323(punishment for voluntarily causing hurt), 324(voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means), and 325 (punishment for voluntarily causing grievous hurt) of IPC as per the facts of the case.

Chapter XVI of IPC Section 319-338 covers offences related to hurt and grievous hurt, which is the aggravated form of hurt.

According to IPC, the offence of grievous hurt as mentioned under Section 320 IPC, provides a list of eight different actus reus which shall fall under the category of grievous hurt. In India acts that fall under this list only will be considered grievous hurt, i.e., the list is considered to be exhaustive. However, the act may ensue more than one of the consequences given in Section 320.

Furthermore, it is pertinent to note that the pigeonhole theory states that if the act falls under one of the several pigeon holes it will be considered a tort, similarly if an act falls under one of the eight well-defined hurts then it will be considered grievous hurt. The concerned provision is strictly interpreted to prevent other injuries from falling under this provision.

Meaning of hurt : Section 319 IPC

Hurt as per the IPC is an act of a person that inflicts injury, anguish, or discomfort to someone this may include pain, disarray or even a temporary health issue. Section 319 IPC, defines hurt. Intention and knowledge of the person inflicting injury play a big role in deciding the offence of hurt. It is pertinent to note that Section 321 IPC talks about voluntarily causing hurt to someone in which the person has knowledge and intention to cause hurt to someone, similarly Section 322 IPC talks about voluntarily causing grievous hurt to someone in which the person committing the offence has knowledge and intention to cause grievous hurt to someone.

For example, A hits B on his stomach knowing that hitting him on his stomach will cause him bodily pain. A will be accused of voluntarily causing hurt.

The Section does not cover emotional or mental hurt.

Hurt can be divided into two categories, simple hurt under Section 319 and grievous hurt under Section 320.

Direct physical contact of the person inflicting injury is not necessary to cause hurt, it can be caused without any direct physical contact as well by some method.

Essentials to constitute an offence of hurt

Bodily pain

For the purpose of this section, any injury that causes external pain to someone is not emotional or mental.

Disease

For the purpose of this section, it means losing health or soundness. Any disease that weakens the person or which turns out to spread from one another would constitute simple hurt.

Infirmity

It refers to physical or mental weakness.

Hurting someone else

Hurting one’s own is not covered under the ambit of this section.

Actus reus

It refers to the guilty act.

Mens rea

It refers to the guilty mind to commit any offence.

Mens rea and Actus reus

The actus reus is a consequence of an act, thus in this case the consequence will be one or more than one of the 8 consequences given in Section 320.

Mens Rea is the mental element of a crime which, in this case, the hurt when caused as per Section 322 voluntarily is the mens rea required, voluntarily has been explained in Section 39 of IPC and also under Section 322. It refers to an act done with the intention to cause a specific consequence and knowledge or reason to believe that a specific consequence will occur. 

Both mens rea and actus reus together ensure a crime of voluntarily causing grievous hurt punishable under Section 325.

Meaning of grievous hurt : Section 320 IPC

Grievous hurt refers to inflicting serious injury to someone which leads to pain and suffering.  Grievous hurt may be life-threatening or may not be life-threatening. Grievous hurt are injuries that may cause a threat to the life of someone but not death, neither is the intention of the person inflicting such injuries of causing death. The exact meaning of grievous hurt under the law can be understood as injuries such as breaking of bones, severe burns, disfigurement, loss of an organ, or injury leading to non-function of the organ.

Grievous hurt can also be considered in terms of the impact it has made on the person to carry out his or her daily chore activities and the time period the victim took to recover from the injury. Such injuries are more severe than minor injuries and less severe than major injuries. Grievous hurt under IPC is covered under Section 320 IPC. This provision can be considered as an aggravated form of the injuries covered under Section 319, i.e., the injuries covered under grievous hurt are of a more severe nature than the injuries covered under simple hurt.

The following injuries can be covered under the category of grievous hurt under this provision:

  • Emasculation refers to the removal or damage of testicles.
  • Permanent damage to one of the eyes and loss of sight.
  • Permanent damage to one of the ears and loss of hearing.
  • Damage to any joint or member. Member means a muscle/limb for the purpose of this provision.
  • Damage or impairing of the power of any member or joint.
  • Permanent disfigurement to the head or face.
  • Breaking of bone or dislocation.
  • Breaking of the teeth.
  • When a person is unable to follow his daily chores for more than twenty days due to injury then the injury is considered as grievous hurt.

Categories of injury to constitute grievous hurt

The categories of injury to constitute grievous hurt as per Section 320 can be divided into 8 categories, following are the categories of injury:

Emasculation 

The dictionary meaning of this word is removing the male organ. In common parlance, it can be understood as depriving a male of his male role or identity. This clause is only applicable to males and not females. Emasculation can be done by castration which means cutting the male sexual organ or damaging the testis or damaging spinal cord to level 2nd to 4th lumbar vertebrae. This is responsible for erection and damaging the spinal cord may cause impotence, taking away penetrating power during intercourse. If the male retains the penetrating power then the accused will not be held liable for causing emasculation. Similarly, cutting off a permanently flaccid penis as in the case of lumbosacral injury is not emasculation. Permanent does not mean incurable.

As per the clause first, the injury must have resulted in the loss of masculine power which may or may not have been caused due to the impact on the aforementioned segments. Before holding the accused guilty of grievous hurt, if the victim is already impotent before sustaining such injuries then this fact should be ruled out except in the cases where such injuries are subject to physical verification. The word emasculation makes it difficult to determine the nature of injury. Many times injuries constituting simple hurt are determined as grievous hurt as per the injury report and vice versa.

In the case of Madho Singh(1878), it was held that who has emasculated himself has committed no offence under Section 309 IPC, since the act is not likely to cause death.

Permanent privation of the either eye or ear

The dictionary meaning of “privation” is a permanent or temporary loss of basic things that a person needs for living. This can be done through poking eyes, gouging out eyes or pouring chemicals into it, etc. Usually in medico-legal cases, the injury in the eyes is inflicted through hands or fists. In grievous hurt, only permanent privation of the eye or ear is labelled as grievous injury, temporary privation of the eye or ear will not be considered as grievous hurt. At least one of the eyes or one of the ears must be permanently damaged due to the infliction of injury to make the offender fall within the ambit of Section 320 IPC. For the purpose of this provision, permanent damage does not mean incurable privation. It is sufficient if the quality or attribute of the eye decreases. However, nothing has been mentioned in the provision regarding the extent to which quality or attribute has been decreased. For example, if the vision of the eye was 6/6 and due to infliction of injury the vision goes down till 6/12 then the injury would be considered grievous hurt under this provision. Determining the extent of damage that occurred to the eye is a difficult task for a medical expert since the quality reports of the eyes before the infliction of injury are not available in most cases. 

The injury to the eye can be caused in three groups namely:

  • Simple injury 
  • Grievous injury
  • Injuries to the eye are dangerous to life for all medico-legal purposes.

The element of permanence is the most important factor to be considered in cases of grievous hurt. For example, dislocation of the lens, breaking of zonules, stripping away of the lid or any small part of it are considered to be the elements of permanence. Injuries that leave residual effects after healing are also considered grievous hurt, such as ptosis, entropion, squint, etc. The medical examiner should have sufficient history and must thoroughly examine the victim in order to ascertain an accurate estimation of injuries and prevent any erroneous report. The medical examiner must clearly state in the report if the victim has suffered permanent damage to the eye and must include the intraocular pressure and drawings of the wounds.

Permanent privation of ears

Permanent damage to ears is considered grievous hurt under this provision. Permanent injuries to the ears are caused by a blow on the head or ear or by blows that injure the tympanum or auditory nerves, by pouring any liquid in the ears or by blasts that lead to deafness. As per clause  3 of Section 320 IPC, the extent of loss of ears is necessary to determine the gravity of injury to be considered under grievous hurt or simple hurt. The report is based on the status of the hearing capacity of the victim before the injury.

Privation of any member or joint

For the purpose of this provision, “member” or “joint” refers to an organ, a limb or part of a man capable of performing a distinct function or any part of the body that has a separate morphological and functional identity. A Joint is an articulation where two adjacent bones form a connection. If a joint becomes stiff due to the injury caused it is considered as grievous hurt. As per clause 4 unlike the privation of an eye or ear, permanent privation of any member or join is not necessary to be considered as grievous hurt, temporary privation shall also be considered as grievous hurt.

It is worth noting that eyes and ears are also considered members under section 320 IPC to be construed as members under this provision. Therefore, temporary privation can also be considered grievous hurt. This might seem to be a contradiction, but this temporary privation is considered grievous hurt because of the intense pain caused to the victim due to injury. Clause 5 also includes destruction/ permanent impairment of the power of member/joint.

Permanent disfiguration of the head or face

Under this, only permanent disfiguration of the head or face is considered to be grievous hurt. As per the black’s Law Dictionary, permanent disfiguration refers to the result of injury or accident that impairs beauty, symmetry and appearance. Even if the normal functioning of the organ is not affected but the victim has suffered through deformation then it will be considered grievous hurt under Section 320 IPC. The disfigurement caused must be permanent in nature. Examples of disfiguration, are cutting off any organ on the face, and incision wounds on the face are considered as grievous hurt.

In the case of Ganga Ram vs State of Rajasthan(1983), the High Court of Rajasthan held that when a person causes a cut on the bridge of the nose by some sharp object like a razor will be considered a permanent disfiguration of the face under this clause.

Fracture or dislocation of a bone or teeth

Fracture has not been defined in the IPC. As per the Black’s Law Dictionary, a fracture refers to the complete or incomplete breaking of a bone. Incomplete breaking of bone i.e., a mere crack caused due to the injury is also considered a fracture for the purpose of this provision.

A crack on the skull bone is also considered to be a grievous hurt under Section 320.

In the case of Po Yi Maung v Ma E Tin(1973), the High Court of Rangoon stated that the word ‘fracture’ means “breaking’ though it is not necessary in case of fracture of the skull bone that it be divided into two separate parts because it may consist merely of a crack but if it is a crack it must be a crack which extends from the outer surface of the skull to the inner surface.

Injury which endangers human life, severe bodily pain, and inability to follow normal pursuits

Clause 8 covers three different kinds of hurt:

  • Any hurt that endangers human life

Where the hurt is such that it only endangers human life, it shall be considered grievous hurt whereas if the hurt is such that it would like to cause death it would amount to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

For example – a wound on the neck with a sharp-edged weapon is considered ‘dangerous to life’.

  • Hurt which causes the sufferer severe bodily pain: 

It also includes bodily pain for 20 days and prevention of performance of daily chores for 20 days. it is to include those hurts which even though not covered under the preceding 7 clauses are of such a nature that these are to be differentiated from the offence of simple hurt.

For example: if a woman is suffering from grievous injuries, and remains in hospital only for 17 days, out of which she was in danger for just three days, it will be considered as grievous hurt.

  • Any injury that prevents the victim from following his ordinary pursuits for a period of twenty days

The penal code has taken into account certain acts that are considered grievous injuries even if they do not pose a threat to the life of humans, but would result in a person’s incapacitation for at least 20 days. The phrase “ordinary pursuits” is very vague and includes daily chore activities such as eating, bathing, incapacity to work, etc.

For example, A inflicts blows to B with a sharp-edged object and B for his defence uses his hands which results in fractures and cuts. B was unable to eat on his own for 25 days and was admitted to the hospital. In this case, A has caused grievous injuries to B.

As in the case of Mithu Singh vs State of Punjab(1980), it was held that it must be proved within that period that the victim was unable to follow his ordinary pursuits. However, the hurt cannot be termed as grievous hurt if the injury does not last for 20 days. It is the nature of the injury and the chances of disability that are to be considered to label any hurt as grievous hurt.

All three clauses are independent of each other.

The injury cannot be labelled as grievous hurt unless the medical examiner is of the opinion that the injuries caused were such that they endangered human life. The injuries that are considered to endanger human life have not been defined in IPC. Any injury can be said to endanger life if the injury is sufficient in itself to endanger life. Any injury in order to endanger life should be imminent. If the injury is on some vital part of the body but no vital part has been damaged then it will not be considered grievous hurt under this clause. The weapon of injury, the part of the body where injury has been caused and the manner of causing injuries play a great role in identifying the nature of the injury. The medical examiner clearly states the nature of the injury in the medical certificate.

In the case of Government of Bombay vs Abdul Wahab(1946), the High Court of Bombay stated that there is a very thin line between culpable homicide not amounting to murder and grievous which endangers human life. In culpable homicide not amounting to murder, the injuries are such that they are likely to cause death whereas in the latter one, the injuries must be such that endanger human life.

Mens rea for causing grievous hurt

Mens rea refers to the guilty state of mind of the offender. Voluntarily causing grievous hurt is defined under Section 322 IPC, as an offence wherein a person voluntarily causes hurt to someone, having sufficient knowledge that the injury caused by him will amount to grievous hurt is known as voluntarily causing grievous hurt.

Punishment for grievous hurt : Section 325 IPC

Grievous hurt is considered a serious crime in India due to the bodily pain which is suffered by the victim of the offence. The definition of the offence of grievous hurt is given under Section 320 IPC and the punishment is defined under Section 325 IPC.

It prescribes a punishment of imprisonment which may extend to seven years and the offender shall also be liable for a fine.

The exception to the provision is Section 335 which talks about voluntarily causing grievous hurt on provocation.

Nature of offence under Section 325 IPC

The offence under this provision is a cognisable offence. As per Section 2(c) of the Criminal Procedure Code,1973 cognisable offence refers to the offence under which the police can directly arrest the accused without any warrant by the Magistrate.

As per Section 320(2) of CrPC, the offence is compoundable on the part of the person to whom the hurt is caused by the permission of the court. Compoundable offences are those offences under which the victim party and the accused party can compromise while the case is under trial in court. The trial comes to an end as the accused gets acquitted as per section 320.

The offence is bailable i.e. as per Section 2(a) of CrPC. The offences in which the bail is granted as a matter of right are known as bailable offences.

Punishment for different types of grievous hurt under IPC

Voluntarily causing grievous hurt:

Voluntarily causing grievous hurt is defined under Section 322 IPC, as an offence wherein a person voluntarily causes hurt to someone, knowing that the injury is caused by him will amount to grievous hurt is known as Voluntarily causing grievous hurt.

Essentials

  • The person causing the hurt must have the intention and knowledge to grievously hurt another person.
  • The injuries caused by him must be of grievous nature.

For example, A, intending or knowing himself to be likely permanently to disfigure Z’s face, gives a blow that does not permanently disfigure Z’s face, but causes Z to suffer severe bodily pain for the space of twenty days. A has voluntarily caused grievous hurt.

Punishment

The punishment for voluntarily causing grievous hurt is given under Section 325 IPC, a person voluntarily causing grievous hurt is punished with imprisonment of a maximum of seven years and shall also be liable for a fine. It is triable by any magistrate.

Causing Grievous hurt with dangerous weapons

This is defined under Section 326 IPC which states that whoever causes injury to someone through the following means is considered to be grievous hurt. For the purpose of this provision, the following instruments are means which are categorised as “dangerous weapons”:

  • Any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting.
  • Any instrument that is used as a weapon of offence. 
  • Any element which is explosive in nature, poisonous or corrosive substance.
  • Fires resulting in grievous hurt.
  • Any substance that is deleterious for the human body to inhale, to swallow or to receive into the blood.
  • Grievous hurt caused by means of any animal.

The offence under this provision is of a severe nature hence the punishment is more severe.

Essentials 

  • The hurt caused must be grievous hurt.
  • The hurt caused must be caused by some dangerous weapon and shall fall under the categories mentioned in the provision.
  • The offender shall not fall under the ambit of Section 335 IPC.

For example, A caused eight injuries to B with a sharp-edged knife. There was an incised wound cutting the trachea in the middle with air coming out. As per medical experts, a victim ordinarily dies in such a situation but B survived. Hence, A is guilty of causing offence under this section with a sharp cutting instrument.

Punishment

An offence under this provision is punishable by life imprisonment or imprisonment up to 10 years and shall also be liable to a fine.

Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by use of acid

Section 326A was inserted by Section 5 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013. According to this provision whoever causes damage, deformity, burns, maims, disfigures, or disables any part of the body or administers acid to that person with due intention and knowledge commits the offence under this provision.

The offence of acid attack was made a distinct offence in IPC because of a huge rise in the number of attacks in India. It was a heinous offence that left a deep impact on the victims leaving them to survive with deep misery.

The offence is cognisable in nature, non-bailable and triable by the Court of Session.

As per the author’s own opinion, the punishment should be increased for such crimes and there should be specific arrangements for victim compensation as well.

Essentials 

  • The offender must have caused damage, deformity, burns, maims, disfigures, or disabled any part of the body or administered acid to the victim.
  • He must had the guilty intention and knowledge to commit the crime.
  • The fine must be enough to meet the medical expenses for the treatment of the victim and shall be paid to the victim himself.

For example, Arman was a lab technician who proposed to Beena for marriage. She rejected his proposal. Arman in order to take revenge on Beena, attacked her with acid which caused severe burns to Beena. Arman is guilty of the offence under this provision.

Punishment

The punishment under this provision is imprisonment which shall not be less than 10 years and may extend up to life imprisonment and with fine.

Such a fine must be enough to meet the medical expenses for the treatment of the victim and shall be paid to the victim himself.

Voluntarily throwing or attempting to throw acid

It deals with the offences of voluntarily throwing or attempting to throw acid. 

In the recent case of Suresh Chandra Jana vs the State of West Bengal and Ors (2017), the Supreme Court observed that acid attacks have transformed into gender-based violence. Such offences not only cause immense psychological trauma but also become a hurdle in the victim’s overall development. Although the seriousness of such offences was acknowledged when laws were amended in 2013, yet number of acid-attack cases is on the rise. It must be recognised that merely having stringent laws and enforcement agencies to administer them, may not be sufficient unless deep-rooted gender bias is removed from society. In the instant case, the appellant caused the death of the victim deceased by acid attack due to the burn injuries caused by acid, the motive behind the murder was that she filed an alleging commission of rape on her. The trial court had found the appellant guilty of the offence under Section 302/306 and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the High Court allowed itself to be swayed by the fact that there was 23 days delay in filing FIR but had failed to have taken note of the fact that the helpless woman who was admitted by neighbours in the hospital had moron husband and two little kids at home and none of them were able to go to the police station to lodge an FIR. The Supreme Court held that the death due to an acid attack was corroborated by medical evidence and the motive for the acid attack was to teach a lesson to the deceased victim for lodging FIR against him for committing rape upon her, a few months back, which led to his prosecution under Section 376 IPC. Hence conviction under Section 302 was restored and the accused was sentenced to life imprisonment with a fine of Rs 10000/-.

Essentials 

  • Throwing or attempting to throw acid on any person.
  • Attempting to administer acid to any person.
  • The person throwing acid should have knowledge and intention of throwing or attempting to throw acid.
  • Attempting to use any other means with the intention of. 
  1. Causing permanent damage.
  2. Causing partial damage.
  3. Causing deformity.
  4. Causing burns.
  5. Maiming.
  6. Causing disfigurement or disability or grievous hurt.

For example, A intentionally throws acid on the face of B to permanently damage her face. A will be accused of the offence under this provision.

Punishment 

Any person causing any of the above injuries shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to seven years.

Voluntarily causing grievous hurt to extort property or to constrain an illegal act

Section 329 IPC covers the aforesaid offence. As per the provision, any person voluntarily causing grievous injuries to someone with the purpose of extortion of property, or valuables or compels them to commit an illegal act.

Essentials 

  • The offence must be caused voluntarily i.e. the offender must have the intention and knowledge to commit the offence.
  • The purpose of the offence must be fulfilled as per the provision.
  • To constrain the sufferer or any such person interested in the sufferer to do anything that is illegal or which may facilitate the commission of an offence.

For example, A inflicts blows on B with a thick lathi with the purpose of extorting the jewellery possessed by B. B suffers severe injuries on the head and face which were of grievous nature. A is guilty of the offence under this provision.

Punishment

The offence is punishable with imprisonment of 10 years which may extend to life imprisonment and fine.

Voluntarily causing grievous hurt to extort confession or to compel restoration of property

As per Section 331 IPC, whoever causes grievous injuries to someone with the following purposes:

  • Extorting confession or information relating to an offence or misconduct.
  • Compelling to restore some property or valuable security.
  • Satisfy any claim.
  • Demand or give information that may lead to restoration of any property or valuable security.

The court in the case of Shri D.K. Basu, Ashok K. Johri vs State Of West Bengal, State Of U.P (1996), reprimanded the use of third-degree torture that is causing physical and mental harm to a person in police custody to fish out confession out of him. Using any form of torture for extracting any kind of information would neither be ‘right nor just nor fair’ and, therefore, would be impermissible, being offensive to Article 21.

Essentials 

  • The purpose of the offence must be extortion of confession or information from the sufferer that may lead to the detection of an offence or misconduct or to constrain the sufferer or to restore any property or valuable security etc.
  • The offence must be done voluntarily i.e., he must have intention and knowledge of the consequences.

For example, A, a police officer, gives third-degree torture to Z in order to induce Z to confess that he committed a crime. The third-degree torture given to Z by A caused him injuries on his face and head. A is guilty of the offence under this section.

Punishment

The offender shall be liable for a punishment of imprisonment which may extend to 10 years and shall also be liable to fine.

Voluntarily causing grievous hurt to deter a public servant from his duty

Section 333 IPC covers the offences against public servants. It prevents the person from grievously hurting the public servant from the lawful discharge of his duties.

Essentials 

  • The victim shall be a public servant for discharging his duties.
  • The offence must be done voluntarily i.e., he must have intention and knowledge of the consequences.

For example, A is a wanted criminal. He went on a pilgrim parikrama when he was arrested, he took out his knife and inflicted a blow on the police constable who arrested him. The accused is guilty of the offence under this provision.

Punishment

The punishment under this provision is imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable with a fine.

For example, if A causes severe injuries to B, a public servant for arresting his friend then he will be liable for the punishment under this provision.

Causing grievous hurt by an act endangering the life or personal safety of others

Section 338 IPC, deals with the act of any person who causes grievous injuries to someone by doing any act so rashly or negligently which endangers human life or their personal safety.

The provision is distinctive from Section 304A IPC, since in it the rash and negligent act of the offender results in the death not amounting to culpable homicide. It is worthy to note that in Sections 304A and 338 the rash and negligent acts of a person are being punished. However, the latter provision is invoked where harm other than death is ensued and the former is invoked where death as a consequence is ensued.

Essentials 

  • The act done must be rash and negligent.
  • The act so done must endanger human life or the personal safety of others.

For example, A is a truck driver. While driving on a crowded road, he was driving at a speed of 60 km/hr knowing that the speed limit of the road is 40 km/hr. A rammed the vehicle into B who was standing at the roadside. A is guilty of the offence under this provision.

Punishment

The offence under this provision is punishable by imprisonment which may extend to two years or with a fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or both.

Exception to Section 325 IPC

Voluntarily causing grievous hurt on provocation

This provision serves as an exception to Section 325 IPC, as per Section 335 IPC, If a person causes grievous injuries to someone on the grave and sudden provocation caused by someone else without any intention and knowledge to cause such injuries.

Essentials 

  • The offender must not have the knowledge and intention to cause such an act.
  • The act must be the result of grave and sudden provocation.

Punishment 

The offender shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend up to 4 years or with a fine which may extend to two thousand rupees or both. Interestingly, the proviso to exception 1 of section 300 IPC states the same for the offence of murder

Difference between grievous hurt and hurt

It becomes a crucial task when it comes to determining the act committed as grievous hurt or simple hurt hence it becomes important to distinguish between the two.

Basis Simple hurtGrievous hurt
Provision in IPCThe provision for simple hurt under IPC is Section 319.Grievous hurt is defined under Section 320.
Punishment The punishment for simple hurt is defined under Section 323 IPC which states that the offender under this provision shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to one year or with a fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or both.The punishment for grievous hurt is given under Section 325 IPC, which states that the offender under this provision is to be punished with imprisonment which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to a fine.
Nature of offenceThe offence of hurt is simple in nature and is not a serious offence.The grievous hurt is an aggravated form of the injuries inflicted in the simple hurt.
Impact of InjuriesThe victim does not suffer a threat of life in simple hurt.The injuries inflicted under grievous hurt may result in a threat to the life of the victim.
Classification based on cognizanceThe offence of simple hurt is non-cognisable in nature.The offence of grievous hurt is cognisable in nature

Identification of the injuries is the most difficult task i.e., the injuries which are not grievous hurt as per the medical examiner may fall under the category of grievous hurt as per the IPC, making the report erroneous.

Important case laws

Abdul Ansar vs. State of Kerala (2023)

Facts of the case

In the instant case, appellant 2 was a bus conductor, accused No. 1 was the driver of a stage carriage bus and Accused No. 3 was the cleaner.

The victim and her younger sister were waiting for a bus at the Karithambu bus stop. Younger sister boarded the bus along with two other girls. As per the victim, he tried to board the bus but was pushed by the accused No. 3 who was standing on the footboard of the bus, resulting in the victim coming into the rear wheel of the bus which caused him serious injuries and fracture in his pelvis. The allegation against the appellant was that without waiting for the PW1 to board the bus, he rang the bell as a result of which accused no.1 started the bus.

The driver was acquitted by the Session Court but the appellant was convicted along with accused no. 3 for the offence punishable under Section 308 read with Section 34 of IPC. They were punished with rigorous imprisonment for 4 years with a fine of Rs 5000 each out of which 7500 was to be paid to the victim.

The appellant and accused No. 2 made an appeal before the Kerala High Court. The High Court acquitted accused No. 3. And while confirming the conviction of the appellant under Section 308 of IPC, the sentence was brought down to one year by directing him to pay a fine of Rs.50,000/.

Issues of the case

Whether the accused was rightly convicted under Section 308 IPC?

Judgment

The Supreme Court noted that the appellant didn’t have any intention of causing death or to cause her such grievous injuries. He acted rashly and negligently while performing his duties. At the time of the incident, the bus stop was crowded. A good number of the crowd was waiting for the bus at the bus stop. It was the obligation of the conductor to take care of the passengers. He did not verify whether all the passengers had safely boarded the bus before ringing the bell and hence giving a signal to the driver to start the bus. He could have verified this from the accused number 3 cleaner who was standing near the door of the bus. Hence he acted in a rash and negligent way.

Further, the court was of the opinion that the appellant had knowledge that a large number of students were waiting for the bus at the relevant bus stop. Since he did not verify he is guilty of negligence and recklessness as he failed to perform his duty. It was due to his negligence that human life was endangered. The case falls under section 338 of IPC and not under 308 of IPC as the victim has suffered a fracture of the pelvis which is a grievous hurt by an act endangering the life or personal safety of others.

The appellant was punished with a simple imprisonment for 6 months and a fine of rs. 50000 which was imposed by the High Court. The Court directed the appellant to pay an additional amount of rupees 25000 to the victim.

Laxmi vs. Union of India and Ors. (2015)

Facts of the case

The facts of the case are that Laxmi was working as a salesman in a bookshop. Two acquaintances of Laxmi visited her in the shop and attacked her with acid. Laxmi screamed and the crowd gathered but no one attempted to help her. Later, she was brought to Ram Manohar Lohiya Hospital for treatment. As per the medical experts and reports Laxmi’s 25% face was damaged due to acid blisters. Once she gained consciousness, she identified the accused to be Naeem Khan and Rakhi, her sister-in-law. Naeem Khan was her family friend and he approached Laxmi to marry him which Laxmi rejected.

The session court convicted the accused under Section 307 and 120B IPC.

The victim appealed in the High Court of Delhi which affirmed the charges led by the trial court and additionally ordered the accused to compensate the victim with the amount of 3 Lakh rupees.

Laxmi then filed a public interest litigation to draw the attention of the courts to the miseries faced by the victims of acid attacks. It was observed that majorly the reasons for the acid attacks were rejections for marriages, sexual favours or dowry.

Issues of the case

The Following issues were discussed in the case:

  • Amendments must be made to the criminal laws and acid attacks should be recognized as a distinct crime, the punishment should be increased for the same.
  • Proper regulation on the sale and purchase of acid-like substances.
  • Provisioning of adequate compensation along with rehabilitation for the acid attack victims.

Judgment 

The Supreme Court directed the Home Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India to convene a meeting of the Chief Secretaries/ Secretaries of the state governments concerned and the Administrators of the Union Territories to discuss enactment of effective provisions for the proper regulation of the sale of acid in the states/ union territories.

The Supreme Court issued the following guidelines to regulate the sale and use of acid and other corrosive substances:

  • A register is to be maintained by the seller regarding the sale of the acid containing the details of the customer i.e., name, address etc. The counter sales would be prohibited without this register.
  • The sellers can sell acid only if the person has shown a valid ID card issued by the government of India containing the name and address of the same. The reason is to be specified by the buyer for procuring acid.
  • The stock of acid is to be disclosed to the Sub Divisional Magistrate within 15 days.
  • If not disclosed, the SDM can confiscate the illegal stock and fine up to Rs 50,000
  • No acid is to be sold to a person under 18 years of age.
  • The SDM may fine anyone who breaches any of the guidelines above.

Aftermath of the case

Section 326 A and 326 B were added to Section 326 IPC which particularly addressed the offence of acid attack.

Section 357A was introduced in the Criminal Procedure Code,1973 to address the victim compensation programmes. Section 357B CrPC was introduced to address the issue of reimbursement that will be given to the victim along with the penalties faced by the accused for their offences as per the provisions in IPC.

Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act was added to address the issue of knowledge and purpose that the accused had while committing the crime.

The victims will be entitled to a compensation of at least 3 Lakh rupees which were to be given from the government’s victim compensation scheme.

No hospital could refuse the victim free medical aid, irrespective of the fact that it is a private hospital or a government hospital.

The sale and the purchase of the acid and acid-like substances were restricted. A separate legal service authority was established to help the victims to seek justice.

Ahmed Ali and Ors. vs. State of Tripura (2009)

Facts of the case

The facts of the case are such, that an FIR was lodged under Section 325/326 IPC read with Section 34 IPC against Ahmed Ali, Suraj Ali, Mustafa Miah and Mahmud Ali for committing an offence against Nural Islam. Nural later died and Section 302 IPC was added to the charges.

The trial court convicted Mustafa Miah and Mahmud Ali for committing an offence under Section 304 part ii read with Section 34 IPC and were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years. Ahmed Ali and Suraj Ali were convicted under Section 324 read with Section 34 IPC and were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years.  Ahmed Ali, Suraj Ali and Mustafa Miah presented an appeal before the Supreme Court against the order of the High Court of Gauhati.

Issues of the case

The following issues were dealt with in this case:

  • The maximum sentence permissible for an offence under Section 334, IPC is one month and, therefore, the High Court could not have imposed a sentence of one year so far as the accused Ahmed Ali and Suraj Ali are concerned.
  • Accused Mustafa Miah was of tender age at the time of occurrence and the maximum sentence permissible relatable to Section 335, IPC is four years.
  • Whether the accused were adequately sentenced by the High Court?

Judgment 

The appeal was allowed by the Supreme Court reducing the sentence of Ahmed Ali and Suraj Ali to one month and The sentence of Mustafa Miah was reduced to three months. The amount of fine with default stipulations was unaltered.

Mathai vs. State of Kerala (2005)

Facts of the case

The facts of the case are that Krishna Kutty was walking on a public road near Pulinchode Cruz Junction. The accused inflicted injuries on his head and face with a stone, he was taken to the hospital. An FIR was lodged against the accused. The investigation was completed and the charges were laid before the court. The trial court convicted the accused under Section 326 IPC and the High Court upheld the same.

Issues of the case

After considering the shape and size of the stone, whether the stone used for inflicting injuries can be considered a dangerous weapon.

Judgment 

In the instant case, after considering the size of the stone that was used by the accused to inflict injuries on the victim, it cannot be considered a dangerous weapon. Hence the conviction was altered to Section 325 IPC. No hard and fast rule can be applied for assessing a proper sentence and a long passage of time cannot always be a determinative factor so far as sentence is concerned. It was not in dispute that a major portion of the sentence awarded had been suffered by the appellant. On the peculiar facts of the case, we restrict it to the period already undergone. The appellant was released and the appeal was disposed of.

Grievous hurt under Bhartiya nyay Sanhita, 2023

IPC is the penal law of India which covers offences of different categories covering offences against property, body, public order, etc. The IPC has been amended several times to add new offences, changing the quantum of punishment and amending the existing provisions. Several law commissions have suggested to amend the old IPC on various subjects. The criminal laws were finally changed in 2023 replacing IPC with the Bhartiya Nyay Sanhita 2023, the CrPC of 1973 will be replaced by the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha (Second) Sanhita, 2023 whereas the Indian Evidence Act of 1872 will be replaced by the Bharatiya Sakshya (Second) Bill, 2023.

The provision regarding grievous hurt is made from Section 114-123 under the Bhartiya Nyay Sanhita, 2023. There are no major changes regarding the punishment. Though the offences of hurt and grievous hurt are combined.

Conclusion 

Grievous hurt is an aggravated form of the injuries that are covered under the offence of hurt. These injuries are not limited to the skin and bones but extend to the organs of the body such as the brain and nervous system as well. Grievous hurt being an aggravated form of injury requires special treatment in IPC. The provisions of grievous hurt under IPC cover several kinds of injuries that should be treated as of a grievous nature. It causes severe pain to the victim and may also lose his ability to carry on daily chores. The seriousness of the injury depends on its nature and its impact on the victim. The opinions of the medical practitioners are often inconclusive because of the misidentification of the injury as hurt or grievous hurt, this is where courts play a huge role in interpreting and altering the charges. However, the reports prepared by them must be non-erroneous to prevent any miscarriage of justice.

However, the injuries caused to constitute an offence under grievous hurt are life-threatening in nature so the punishment must be harsher to prevent such offences.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

Is the offence punishable under Section 325 IPC bailable?

Yes, the offence punishable under Section 325 IPC is bailable in nature i.e., the bail is a matter of right for the accused in the cases. It can be compounded by the permission of the court.

The offence under Section 325 is triable by which magistrate?

The offence under this provision is triable by a magistrate of any class.

If a person commits grievous hurt by weapons or dangerous means, is he still punishable under Section 325?

If a person commits grievous hurt by weapons or dangerous means he is punishable under Section 326, not Section 325.

References 


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Tamil Nadu labour laws

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This article is authored by Aaron Thomas. The article looks into the history, origin and character of labour laws. The labour laws applicable in Tamil Nadu have been expanded at length in this article and it demonstrates the effect it has on workers and employers alike. The laws that have been enacted by the Central and State Governments have been mentioned in this article. Through meticulous research and analysis, this article aims to demystify complex legal concepts, making them accessible to a diverse audience.  

It has been published by Rachit Garg.

Table of Contents

Introduction

The state of Tamil Nadu has a rich cultural heritage, a dynamic workforce and a vibrant economy. At the centre of this bonhomie atmosphere is an intricate web of labour laws that govern the rights and obligations of both employers and employees. These labour laws may be those enacted by the state or the centre and enforced by either the centre or the state or they may be jointly enforced by the centre and the state. A cogent understanding of all these laws is crucial for both employees and employers to navigate the labyrinth of duties and obligations that have been explicit in this Act. This article aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the labour laws applicable in the state of Tamil Nadu and it aims to serve as a practical guide for any individual navigating through Tamil Nadu labour laws. This article shall also contain case laws that laid down crucial jurisprudence for every Act mentioned in this Article.

Definition and scope of labour laws

The definition of labour law in general reads as follows:

“The body of rules either deviating from or supplementary to the general rules of law, which regulates the rights and duties of a person accepting the work of a subordinate.”

The aforementioned definition explicates labour laws as the corpus of rules that an employer has to follow while availing of the services of his employee. But what exactly are an employee and an employer? How does one differentiate between an employee and an employer? If an individual is his own master (running his own business), is he an employee or employer? These questions that give an unequivocal definition of what an employer and employee are have to be explicitly set down before we enunciate on the nuances of Tamil Nadu Labour Laws. 

The difference between an employee and employer in labour law, as opposed to an individual working for another in any other field, lies in his state of dependance. The subordination of an employee to his employer is of paramount importance in determining the responsibilities of the employer. The most precise expression of this subordination is the ‘right to direct an employee’. By virtue of this principle, for an employee-employer relationship to exist, the employee must be subject to the working conditions and working hours mandated by the employer for a particular job. This principle can be found in the law of torts as well, wherein the master is exempt from any prosecution arising out of vicarious liability from the actions of an independent contractor because the master does not possess the right to command over the independent contractors. 

This brings us on to the question of whether individuals who are not subordinate to another and are in charge of their own employment and the activities thereof come under the definition of ‘employees’. By the principles of labour law, these individuals are also employees, vis-à-vis their economic dependence on their labour and the subsequent restrictions to the freedom of movement arising therefrom. Examples of these individuals are hairdressers, taxi drivers, etc. So it goes to reason that an individual who enjoys a comfortable level of autonomy with regard to their actions and time would not be classified as an employee; this is the case for presidents, executives, and corporation heads. Although they are still technically employees, they are subordinate to the corporation, which is a legal person. However, the corporation cannot directly supervise or control the executives at any moment. These executives, which include the general directors, executive officers, and statutory representatives of the corporation, assume the role of employer and inherit the rights and duties labour law has established for them.

Labour law does not concern itself with just the relationship between employee and employer; it also deals with many matters concerning worker safety and wellbeing. These laws direct the course of action with regard to the performance or acceptance of the work of a subordinate and the benefits to him. Oftentimes, these benefits are not extended to just the labourer; the legal heirs would also benefit. It has to be noted that, as of late, the statutes in labour law that address societal distress, such as the one mentioned above, often tend to disregard the bond of kinship and grant benefits based on economic criteria. Those who were economically dependent on the labourer but lacked any legal relationship with him would be eligible to receive any benefit mandated by labour laws. The law is peculiar with regard to whom the benefits are extended; children of the labourer above the age of eighteen are excluded as they are considered legally capable of engaging in work. The example above shows the exceptions to the general principles of labour laws and these exceptions can be found throughout these laws.

Character

The entirety of labour law was not formulated from scratch; it is a concoction of a multitude of heterogeneous laws that are imported from all the classical branches and subdivisions of law and are clustered around one social phenomenon: ‘the performance of work by a social worker’. After all these laws are brought together into a singular piece of legislation with the intent of serving the needs of a particular sector of society, they morph the characteristics and subsequent interpretations of the existing rules that were brought together to form such legislation. This morphing is indubitably for the benefit of those who avail themselves of this law, as these laws are moulded to serve the particular purpose for which the legislation is intended. These laws are brought together not by reason of similarity in their legal nature but by the identity of the social situation to which they apply. An example of this phenomenon is the French administrative law. Labour law, by virtue of its concocted genesis, possesses a spontaneous character and a particular spirit. The legislators are well aware of the autonomy of labour laws and have hence created special labour courts for the administration of labour laws.  

History of labour laws 

Origin

Labour law is by no means a new discipline. There have been some duties and obligations on the employer and the employee ever since one man started working for another. Unlike today, labour laws were not always governed by public law. In ancient times, when slaves were the property of their masters, labour laws were private laws as they laid down the statutes surrounding slaves. Parallels cannot be drawn from ancient labour laws to modern labour laws. Unlike modern labour laws, ancient labour laws were not in place to protect an individual in service of another. The cardinal onus of ancient labour laws was to keep in check the tendency of an employer to abuse his power. The laws that were present in ancient Greece and Rome were enacted with the sole intent of protecting the servants from unscrupulous exploitation by their masters. With time, these laws became stronger and more codified. In the middle ages, we find detailed regulations dealing with ‘dependent’ labourers.

A vast majority of the regulations present at the time were not brought into effect by the government, be it provincial or municipal. These regulations were established by the guilds. These guilds bear a great semblance to today’s trade unions. These guilds effectively functioned through cartelization. A number of these guilds would band together and lay down regulations regarding wages, working conditions, etc.; the employers would have no choice but to accept these working conditions if they wanted to hire a labourer. These guilds didn’t restrict themselves to making rules and regulations that just concerned labourers; they also protected the interests of the nation and its people by imposing strict legislation through the government. 

These guilds also protected the interests of businesses in their respective regions. In the Middle Ages, night work was prohibited. There were many practical reasons behind this prohibition but the rationale behind this decision was the control of production, i.e., to prevent other businesses from doubling their production by working the night. These guilds eventually started working to the detriment of the employees by considering only the guild’s interests and ignoring the needs of the labourers. These guilds were made illegal by making cartelization unlawful and thus the paraphernalia for this illegalization ultimately worked to the detriment of the labourers by stripping them of the protection or higher wages that would have been granted to them by these guilds. The labourers, however, found ways to get around these laws and still unionise under different veils and guises. 

Modern history

The unprecedented decimation brought about by the First World War left almost half of Europe in dire need of labourers for reconstruction. This large-scale reconstruction effort put the plight of labourers in the limelight.

In Great Britain, the Whitley Commission recommended that ‘industrial councils’ be established throughout the world. The third Inter-Allied Labour and Socialist Conference, in its February 1918 report advocated for the establishment of an international body for the protection of labour rights. As the end of the war neared, a meeting was organised in Berne in 1919 by the International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU). The meeting was boycotted by the president of the American Federation of Labour (AFL), Samuel Gompers, as the IFTU wanted the delegates of central powers to be treated on par with the others. Gompers considered it a disgrace for the others to be treated on par with the delegates of the Central Powers, and he wanted them to be in a subservient position for causing the war. Unhindered by America’s absence, the Berne meeting transpired as scheduled. The final report demanded an end to wage labour and the establishment of socialism. 

The proposal to establish an international parliament to legislate upon labour laws was set forth by the British. This idea was vehemently opposed by the Americans because of one covenant; the British wanted to make the enforcement of the labour laws enacted by the international parliament mandatory for the member nations, but the Americans resolutely opposed this idea. Despite British protests, they caved into the demands of the Americans and made it so that the laws enacted by this international parliament would only serve as recommendations. 

The final report of the Commission was issued on March 4, 1919, and the final report was adopted by the Peace Conference without amendment on April 11. This report is enshrined in Chapter VIII of the Treaty of Versailles. Thus, the International Labour Organisation was formed through the Treaty of Versailles and Albert Thomas became its first Director General. 

Indian origin and history

The very first labour legislation in India was the Apprentice Act of 1850. This act was enacted to enable children who were brought up in orphanages to find employment when they came of age. The Apprentice Act was followed by the Factories Act of 1881. Upon a glossary oversight of this act, one would unambiguously conclude that this Act was enacted as a welfarist measure but they would be wrong if it was enacted with British interest in mind. 

Although there existed a plethora of major union organisations of workers based on different political ideologies, the first central union trade organisation was the All India Trade Union Congress, which was established in the year 1920. At around this time, workers at Buckingham and Carnatic Mills in Madras went on a strike led by B.P. Wadia. The management of the company brought a civil suit against the protesting workers and the company was awarded an injunction and damages from the labourers for breach of contract. This legal prosecution outraged labourers throughout India and afterwards, there were widespread protests. These protests finally yielded the enactment of the Trade Union Act of 1926. This act gave the labourers immunity against certain criminal and civil offences. The act also included many provisions that facilitated better cooperation between the labourers, their masters, and the government. 

Tamil Nadu history

The history of the Labour Department in Tamil Nadu can be traced as far back as the 1920s. In the genesis of the Labour Department, it predominantly concerned itself with the welfare of unorganised labour. The department has hence evolved to include, within its ambit of functions, the welfare of the organised sector too. The Tamil Nadu government has adopted several liberalisation policies and has become one of the most industrialised states in the country. The government has been vehemently enforcing the Industrial Disputes Act to conciliate and settle industrial disputes to create a congenial atmosphere. The government has also been enforcing a slew of other Acts that were created by them and also the Acts that were created by the Central government.

Presence of labour laws in the Indian Constitution

Labour is an item on the concurrent list and thus, the Union and State governments are empowered to legislate on labour matters and administer them. The majority of important legislation has been enacted and enforced by Parliament. A wide variety of items have been legislated upon; these include but are not limited to, training and safety of workers, employment, bonded labour, women and child labour, adjudication of industrial disputes, compensation in case of accident, gratuity, provision for paying bonuses, etc.

Labour law can broadly be classified as follows:

  1. Labour laws are enacted by the Central Government, where the Central Government has the sole responsibility for enforcement.
  2. Labour laws are enacted by the Central Government and enforced both by Central and State Governments.
  3. Labour laws enacted by the Central Government and enforced by the State Governments.
  4. Labour laws enacted and enforced by various State Governments that apply to the respective States.

Labour laws find their roots in the provisions of the Constitution and the International Conventions and Recommendations. Labour laws derive their strength from the Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy enshrined in Chapter III and Chapter IV of the Constitution. In Chapter III, Articles 16, 19, 23, and 24 deal with the relevance of protecting and safeguarding the interests of labourers as human beings. In Chapter IV, the Articles that deal with the same are 39, 41, 42, 43, 43A, and 54. 

Labour laws in Tamil Nadu

We shall now expand on the Labour Acts that are applicable in Tamil Nadu. The Acts discussed will include those that have been formulated and enforced by the Tamil Nadu government and also the Central Government. Acts that have been enacted by the state in conjunction with the state government will also be deliberated below.

The Trade Union Act, 1926

History 

Trade unionism has seen an eruption in popularity owing to the growth of industrialism and capitalism. Since the majority occupation in India is agriculture, trade unionism has historically been restricted to industrial areas. The process of setting up trade unions in the unorganised sector is going through a period of rapid development now. The earliest recorded trade union in India is the Bombay Millhands Association, founded in 1890. A slew of other trade unions followed and they are listed below in chronological order:

  • The Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants of India and Burma, 1897
  • Printers Union, 1905
  • The Bombay Pastel Union, 1907
  • The Kamgar Hitwardhak Sabha, 1910

It had been mentioned previously that the need for labour rights and unionism was accentuated by the First World War. The plight in India was no different; National Trade Unions began to form after World War I.

The Indian Trade Unions Bill received the assent of the legislature on March 25, 1926. It was brought into force on June 1, 1927, as the ‘Indian Trade Unions Act of 1926’. This name was changed to just ‘Trade Union Act, 1926’ by Section 3 of the Indian Trade Unions (Amendment) Act, 1964.

Objective and scope

The cardinal objective of this act is to explicitly state the necessary mandates for registering a trade union in India and to regularise labour-management relations. This Act applies to the whole of India and it applies to all kinds of unions of workers and associations of employees. The broad application of the Act can be classified as:

  • To lay down the requisites for registering a trade union in India
  • To make clear the obligations and liabilities that have been imposed upon a trade union.
  • To make clear to the judiciary and the executive the rights of a registered trade union.

Definitions

Under Chapter I of the Act, we can see the multitude of definitions that have been laid down for the convenience of comprehension in the latter chapters. Under Section 2(g) of the Act the definition of trade dispute is provided;

A trade dispute may include a dispute between an employer and an employee, between an employee and an employee or between employers and employers. These disputes may be connected to the employment, non-employment, terms of employment or working conditions of the said job. Employers in this instance are any individual that may be engaged in trade or commerce and does not necessarily have to be associated with the employer implicated in the dispute.

Trade Union

A trade union includes any combination that may be permanent or temporary, formed for regulating the relations between workmen and employers, between workmen and workmen, between employers and employers or for imposing restrictions on how business or trade is conducted. This restriction can also be imposed on two or more trade unions with certain exceptions.

Registration

Chapter II of the Act deals with the registration of trade unions. It is not mandatory to register a trade union, but to avail themselves of the civil and criminal protection granted to them, they must be registered.  

  • A trade union can be started by employees or employers; the minimum mandate for either is seven. If more than half of the applicants of the proposed trade union give notice to the Registrar dissociating themselves from the application, the application becomes null. 
  • The application must encompass a copy of the trade union and the following:
  • The names, occupations and addresses of those making the application,
  • The name of the trade union and the proposed place of its headquarters,
  • The names, ages, addresses, titles, and occupations of the three office bearers.
  • If the Union has been in existence one year prior to the date of application for recognition as a trade union under the law, a general statement of assets and liabilities of the trade union shall be submitted along with the application.

The provisions to be contained within the rules of the trade union, which have to be submitted along with the application, are as follows:

  • The name and objective of the union,
  • The entirety of the purposes for which the union shall use its general fund. These purposes should be lawfully applicable under this act. An ambit for an annual audit shall also be laid down.
  • The name of its members includes the ad-hoc members that may be admitted by the Union by virtue of overlap between the labourer’s field of work and the field in which the union carries out its business.
  • The amendment methods and the appointment and removal of the executive board shall also be prescribed.
  • The circumstances under which a member of the union may receive compensation from its part,
  • The manner in which the trade union may be dissolved.

The Registrar may call for any further documents to satisfy the veracity of the trade union or to make sure that this trade union does not resemble any other existing trade union or so nearly resembles such a name as is likely to deceive the public or the members of either trade union. The Registrar, if content that the proposed union has complied with all the requirements of the Act with regard to registration, shall grant a certificate of registration to the trade union.

The Registrar can cancel the certificate if it is found that it was obtained by deceit or if the union itself submits an application for dissolution. The Union has to be given adequate grounds to be heard before they are cancelled, failure of which will deem the cancellation order illegal.

Any person aggrieved by not receiving a certificate of registration by the Registrar or if the Registrar decides to cancel or withdraw the certificate at a later date is eligible to file a complaint, within such a period as prescribed, to the High Court with appropriate jurisdiction or to a court not inferior to the Court of an additional or assistant judge of a principal civil court of original jurisdiction. The appellate authority may dismiss the appeal or pass an order directing the registrar to issue a certificate of registration to the trade union.

The registered headquarters of the office shall be deemed to be the registered office of the trade union. All correspondence from any individual or entity to the trade union shall be sent to the address of the headquarters. A change of address for the headquarters should be addressed to the Registrar within 14 days of such a change.

Legal presence

  • A registered trade union is a body corporate under its registered name. This body will also have perpetual succession and a common body seal with the power to acquire property and to sue and be sued.
  • Certain acts do not apply to the Trade Union Act; these are-
  1. The Societies Registration Act, 1860
  2. The Companies Act, 1956
  3. The Co-Operative Societies Act, 1912

General corpus

Chapter III of the Act deals with the rights and liabilities of registered trade unions. The Act specifies how the general fund of the union should be spent, namely:

  • The payment of salaries of the office bearers,
  • The management of trade disputes on behalf of the trade union and the compensation for members of the trade union for loss arising out of the trade dispute
  • Providing allowances to a member or their dependents for any unfortunate circumstances,
  • Providing for the socio-cultural development of the members or their dependents 
  • To fund the legal obligations of the trade union,
  • The regular publication of a journal which debates issues pertaining to employers or workers,
  • To further the goals of the trade union in improving the working conditions of the workers.
  • Any work that may be notified by the appropriate government.

The Act stipulates that there should be a separate fund for the contributions to or from that fund for the purpose of furthering the political or civic interests of one of its members. The expenditures from this fund are listed below:

  • The payment for a member of the union in an election for any legislative body also extends to the activities before, during, or after the election.
  • The advertisement of the candidate by handing out any literature or activities of the sort
  • The registration fee or the charges for maintaining an individual in an office.

No individual shall be compelled to contribute to the general fund or the political fund. In the event of non-contribution, an individual shall not be exempt from any benefits or privileges of the Union.

Exemptions and prosecution

  • No member of a registered trade union shall be liable to punishment for any act or agreement entered into for the benefit of the Union unless the agreement entered into was an agreement to commit an offence. No civil suit can be brought against the trade union, any office bearer, or any member for any action taken in anticipation of or in furtherance of any objective of the trade union solely on the grounds that such action encourages another individual to breach the employment contract or interfere with another person’s trade, business, or employment. Any legal proceeding cannot be brought against a trade union for a tortious act of a member, provided that the individual acted without the knowledge or prior consent of the executive of the trade union.
  • An agreement between a trade union and its members may not be deemed void or voidable merely because the agreement is a restraint of trade. There are no provisions in these sections that will enable civil courts to prosecute the trade union for restricting a business, by agreement, against selling any goods or transacting business.

Rights of stakeholders

  • The account book of the trade union or the list of members shall be open to inspection by an office bearer or by an employee at such times as have been prescribed by the rules of the Union.
  • Any individual who has attained the age of fifteen can become a member of a trade union. This member shall enjoy all the rights and privileges of the Union and shall also dutifully follow the rules and regulations set down by the Union.

Office bearers

The Act stipulates the qualifications and grounds for dismissal of an office bearer or any executive. The grounds are as follows:

  • If the executive/office bearer is not 18 years of age
  • If he has been convicted by a Court in India and subsequently imprisoned, he cannot hold office unless a period of 5 years has elapsed since the date of exoneration.
  • At least half of the office-bearers of the trade union have to be associated with the industry the trade union engages in.

Change of name & amalgamation

  • For a trade union to change its name, it should receive the consent of not less than two-thirds of the total members.
  • Two or more registered trade unions can become one trade union by amalgamation without affecting either of their general funds. For the amalgamation to happen, a minimum of half of the members of either trade union must vote and among the tabulated votes, not less than 60% should be in favour of the amalgamation. After amalgamation, the rights of creditors to either trade union remain the same.
  • A written notice should be sent to the Registrar in case of a change of name or amalgamation. The letter seeking permission for registration of change in name should be signed by the Secretary and seven members of the trade union and sent to the Registrar of the state in which the headquarters of the trade union is situated. For amalgamation, a written letter containing the signature of the Secretary and seven members of both the trade union’s party to the Amalgamation should be sent to the Registrar of the state where the proposed headquarters of the amalgamated trade union is to be situated. 
  • If the new name proposed by a trade union is similar to that of an existing one, the Registrar would deny registering the change of name. If the Registrar is content that the name is not similar to another trade union, he will register the change of name.

Dissolution

  • The letter for dissolution should be sent to the Registrar within 14 days of any course of action for dissolution. The Registrar, if content that the dissolution has been effected in accordance with the rules that have been set down by the trade union, shall grant permission for dissolution
  • If there is absence of rules in the rulebook of a registered trade union for the division of the general fund after dissolution, the Registrar shall divide the funds amongst the members.

Returns

As mentioned above, the trade union will have a general fund, and some may have a political fund. The steps for regulating these funds are as follows:

  • The audited statement, which includes the income and expenditure for the year ending on 31st December, as well as the assets and liabilities of the trade union that existed on that day, should be sent to the Registrar.
  • If a rule of the trade union has been altered by the office bearers, it should be sent to the Registrar within fifteen days of making the alteration.
  • The Registrar or any officer authorised by him has the right to examine any document at the registered office of the trade union at any time.

Regulations

Chapter IV of the Act deals with regulations. The appropriate government may, at any time, make regulations for enforcing the provisions of this Act. These provisions include making amendments to the manner in which trade unions shall be registered, transfer of registration, the qualifications of the auditor, the inspections and upkeep of the records, etc. These regulations shall be published in the Official Gazette and such publication shall be brought into force as an Act.

Penalties & procedures

Criminal litigation

Chapter V of the Act specifies the penalties and procedures.

  • If a trade union fails to submit its returns to the Registrar by the stipulated date, the office bearers shall be liable to a fine. This fine shall increase if there is continued delay. Any individual who willfully furnishes false entries into the statement shall be liable to a fine.
  • If an individual willfully deceives a person who is seeking to join a trade union by giving false information regarding any trade union,  he shall be liable to a fine.
  • Only if a person files a complaint can a case be filed and tried. No court inferior to that of a District Judge or a Magistrate of the First Class.

Related cases

The Managing Director, Luminous Power Tech Vs. Manoj Kumar and Ors.

Facts and history

In the case, writ petition before the High Court of Shimla has been filed by Luminous Power Technologies through its Managing Director. It has been filed seeking to quash the order passed by the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala. The petitioner company was expanding its units in Hosur Tamil Nadu and for the job they ordered twenty-five men to relocate and start work. Of the twenty-five workers who were ordered to relocate, only thirteen did so immediately, the other twelve did not relocate and as such they were prohibited from entering the premises of the factory at Gagret, Tehsil Amb, District Una. The workers then filed a complaint notice before the Labour Conciliation Officer and the respondents countered that this complaint was only filed because the petitioners did not want to be transferred. The act of the Labour-cum-Conciliation officer in issuing the notice has also been challenged, as he did not issue the notice to the competent authority dealing with the matter.

The respondents highlighted clause two of the appointment letter which stipulated that the Management has the right to transfer any workman to any part of India for the purposes of furthering the objectives of the company. It was argued that this clause legally binds the workman as per the Indian Contract Act, 1973. There was also an allegation that the Union was not registered. After the hearing, the Labour-cum-Industrial court cancelled the transfer order passed by the petitioner company. As for the legality of the Union, the Tribunal was of the opinion that the Union was still in the process of registration and it was not fully registered and their application had also been rejected once. There was also no trace of unfair labour practices on the side of the Company. 

Procedure

  • The petitioner heavily relied on the terms and conditions of the appointment letter served to the workmen. In this letter, it is explicitly stated that the job is transferable and thus transfer from one factory to the other was wholly justified. 
  • The petitioner also relied on the fact that Luminous Powers Technology Workers Union was not a registered trade union under the Trade Union Act and this fact was clearly depicted in the letterhead of Workers Union. Hence the complaint made by Manoj Kumar, President of the Union was untenable.
  • The respondents stated that the requisite documents for the registration of the Union had already been submitted. When the management came to know about the submission of documents for the formation of the Union, it was said that they actively tried to thwart the process of registration.
  • The respondents made certain demands; these included
  1. The transfer be cancelled and the workmen be retained with full wages;
  2. Neutrality be maintained in the registration process;
  3. Continuity in service.
  • The petitioner contended that they did not interfere in any way in the registration process of the new Union.

Issues

  • Whether the demand notice issued by an unregistered trade union is maintainable. 

Judgement

  • The Union, admittedly, had not been registered under the Trade Union Act and as such it cannot be classified as a trade union under the Act. 
  • A case that had a similar subject matter was the State of Bihar v. Kripa Shankar Jaiswal (1960). In this case, it was held that a dispute becomes an industrial dispute even if it is sponsored by a non-registered trade union. This view of the Supreme Court was again reiterated in the case of The Management of Pradip Lamp works v. Workmen of Pradip Lamp Works (1969). 
  • As there exists little to no ambiguity on the matter referred to above, this Court also holds that the Labour-cum-Industrial Tribunal was not wrong in entertaining the notice served to them by the Union. When the efforts for reconciliation failed, the Labour-cum-Conciliation officer was right in submitting the report to the appropriate government. 
  • The Court held that they could not review or reweigh the evidence that has already been subject to extensive review by the Tribunal.  Therefore, the award passed by the Labour-cum-Industrial Tribunal is upheld and the present petition is dismissed.

The Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishment Act, 1947

History

The Tamil Nadu Shops & Establishment Act of 1947, was enacted shortly after India gained independence. The Bill received the assent of the Governor and became an Act in 1948, post-publication in the Fort St.George Gazette on February 10, 1948. The Act was amended in 2018 through the Tamil Nadu Shops & Establishment (Amendment) Act, 2018. The latest amendment to the Act came in 2023. The purpose of this amendment was to ensure a prominent display of the names of shops and establishments on name boards in Tamil. This amendment further encompasses certain changes to the provisions of the Act to be in line with the Model Shops and Establishments (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Bill, 2016, which was approved by the Union Ministry of Labour and Employment.

Scope

This Act covers the entire state of Tamil Nadu and it monitors the functioning of businesses and establishments in the state. It lays down rules and regulations governing the working conditions and upkeep of shops, movie theatres, restaurants, other establishments, etc. This Act also aims to protect the working conditions of employees by safeguarding their wages, working time, working conditions, prevention of child labour, holidays, etc.

The provisions in the 1947 Act mandate that any shop or establishment carrying out its operations in Tamil Nadu must get a Shop and Establishment licence. This provision was amended in 2018, mandating only shops or businesses that employ more than ten people to register and obtain the licence. Parallels can be drawn from this Act to the central-level legislation that exists on the matter, which is the Model Shops and Establishment Act of 2016.

Definitions

Chapter I of the act defines a multitude of terms that are imperative in later chapters. Some of the important definitions have been enunciated below:

  • A ‘child’ is someone who has not completed 14 years of age.
  • A ‘commercial establishment’ need not necessarily be a shop that carries out day-to-day sales; it may also be an institution that undertakes any activity in the interest of profits. Some examples of these are banks, advertising agencies, industrial undertakings, joint stock companies, insurance agencies, etc
  • The definition of an ‘employed person’ differs depending upon the field of labour the person engages in. The definitions are as follows:
  1. In the case of a shop, it shall be a person employed in connection with the principal business of the shop;
  2. If it is a factory, it shall be a person employed as clerical staff;
  3. If it is a commercial establishment, it shall be a person engaged with the business of the establishment;
  4. If it is a restaurant, it shall be a person undertaking the responsibility of preparing or serving the food prepared; 
  5. If it is a theatre, it shall have a person employed to ensure the smooth functioning of the establishment; 
  6. If it is an establishment that does not fall under the categories listed above, a person who is connected to the business can also be listed as an employed individual.
  7. For all of these establishments, the cleaning staff shall also be designated as employees of the establishment. This designation, however, does not extend to the family that may be dependent on the employee.
  • ‘Wages’ are defined under this Act as any remuneration that is capable of being expressed in terms of money and would be receivable if the terms of the contract of employment were fulfilled.
  • No provision contained in this act shall extend to the following individuals/establishments;
  1. A person in a managerial position,
  2. A person who travels a lot for work
  3. Establishments that come under the Central or State Governments or the RBI,
  4. Establishments in oil and mine industries,
  5. Temporary establishments (those not exceeding 15 days).

Shops

Chapter II of the Act deals with the regulations surrounding shops. This chapter includes rules and regulations mandating working hours, the jurisdiction of sales, the wages of employees, etc., of the shops. These facets of the Act have been expanded below.

  • The act lays down the closing time for the shops within the State. This time is fixed by the State Government. This time may vary for different shops and also for different times of the year. No sales are to occur outside of a shop after the closing time.
  • The working hours of employees are restricted to eight hours a day and workers are forbidden from working more than forty hours a week. This period may be extended to ten hours a day which would permit the worker to work fifty hours a week, provided that overtime wages are duly paid. No person working in a shop is allowed to work for more than four hours continuously without being given a break.

Establishments other than shops

Chapter III of the Act wholly deals with establishments that are not shops. This chapter lays down the rules and regulations for establishments other than shops. 

  • Just as for shops, Establishments Other Than Shops too have a stipulated opening and closing time and no Establishments Other Than Shops are to open or close before the times mandated. The opening and closing times are fixed by the government. The government may fix different times for different areas or for different times of the year.
  • Wholly in accordance with the provision for shops, the working time for employees employed in Establishments Other than Shops is barred at eight hours a week and subsequently forty hours a week. This time may be extended, provided that overtime wages are paid. An employee should not work more than four hours a week unless he has an interval of one hour.
  • The employees of Establishments Other Than Shops shall be allowed a whole day’s holiday every week.

Child employment

Chapter IV of the Act lays down rules and regulations regarding child labour and the labour of young persons.

  • Children are prohibited from working in any establishment.
  • Young persons (those between 14 & 18), are only allowed to work between 6 a.m. and 7 p.m. Young persons are also prohibited from working overtime.

Health and safety

Chapter V of the Act lays down the precautionary and preliminary measures to be taken whilst running an establishment.

  • The premises of every establishment should be well-ventilated and should be kept clean at all times using lime washing, painting, colour washing, etc. This regular upkeep should be done according to the prescribed methods and standards.
  • The premises of every establishment should be kept well-lit during working hours. If an inspector, upon inspection, finds the lighting of the establishment lacklustre, he may serve a notice to the establishment advising them to do what is necessary before a certain date.
  • There should be fervent precautions taken for the prevention of a fire breakout and measures should also be present to curb a raging fire.

Holiday with wages

Chapter VI of the Act mentions the provisions for granting paid holidays to an employed person.

  • Any person employed in an establishment after twelve months of continuous service shall be entitled to a paid holiday not exceeding 12 days. This paid holiday shall be granted every year after the completion of twelve consecutive months of employment. This holiday can be granted for absence on the basis of medical grounds or an application moved by the employee under reasonable grounds.
  • If an employee, eligible for the benefit of paid leave is discharged by his employer or he quits on his own volition before availing of the 12 paid leaves, he shall be entitled to the amount for the un-availed holidays under this Act. This benefit also extends to employees who were refused the grant of a holiday or if the employer dismisses the employee when he is sick or suffering from an accident.
  • The pay that the employee receives on paid leave should be equal to the daily average for the days he actually worked.

Wages

Chapter VII is concerned with the payment of wages and it specifies the deductions that can be made from wages.

  • The employer shall be liable for payment of wages to his employee(s). The time interval during which the employee will be paid is to be fixed by the employer. This period shall not exceed one month.
  • The payment of wages should happen on a working day. If employment is terminated by the employer, wages as specified by the Act shall be payable to the employee. 
  • Wages must be paid without any deduction, except for the specific circumstances listed in this Act. 

Fines

  • No fine shall be levied against the employed person unless he has been given adequate opportunity to be heard regarding the matter of his fine.
  • A fine levied at one instance on any employed person should not exceed half of his wage.
  • An employed person under the age of fifteen cannot be fined.
  • A fine cannot be recovered from an individual after the expiration of sixty days from the date on which it was imposed. A fine is considered to be imposed on the day of the act for which the fine was levied.

Deductions for absence from duty

  • Wages can be deducted for the absence of an employed person, from the place of his employment for a period of time where he was required to work. 

Deductions for damage or loss

  • If, by the acts of an employed person, there is monetary damage to the employer, the employer is entitled to deduct wages, provided that the employee is given adequate opportunity to show cause against the deduction. 

Deduction for services rendered

  • If an employed person accepts accommodation, amenity, or any service from the employer during the tenure of employment, deductions can be made to the wage. This deduction shall not exceed the value of the actual amenities provided. Insurance that has been provided by the employer is also a deductible expense.

Dismissal and wages thereof 

An employer shall not dismiss an employed person from service if he has completed six months of service, except for a reasonable cause and the employer should give one month’s notice to the employee or a month’s wage. If the employed person has been found guilty of misconduct, no such notice or wage has to be served or paid, respectively. The employed person has the right to appeal the grounds of dismissal by the employer. The appellate authority has the right to reinstate the employed person and give compensation for the time he spent unemployed. 

Appointment, powers and duties of inspectors

The State Government shall appoint Inspectors to further the objectives of this Act. Every inspector who is appointed by the government shall be considered a public servant. He is empowered by this Act to enter into the premises of any establishment licensed under this Act and examine the records, registers, etc. The onus of enforcement of this Act falls upon the Inspectors.

Penalties for offences

  • An employer that doesn’t pay the employee’s wages can be fined.
  • An individual can be fined if he wilfully obstructs an Inspector from exercising the powers conferred on him by this Act. 
  • The State is empowered to amend the provisions of offences at any time.

Related case laws

P. Sarathy Vs. State Bank of India

Facts and history of the case

In this case, Mr. P. Sarathy ( further referred to as the appellant), was appointed as a Clerk at the State Bank of India (further referred to as the respondent). After a couple of years, the appellant was promoted to the post of Branch Manager, but shortly afterwards he was placed on suspension. Upon enquiry of the reason for his suspension, he was served a chargesheet following which departmental proceedings were issued against him. Ultimately, three years after his suspension, he was removed from service. Aggrieved by this decision, he filed an appeal before the Local Board of the Bank, which is a local authority that governs the activities of a bank in a particular area. This appeal was dismissed and the appellant filed an appeal under Section 41(2) of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act before the Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Madras. The appeal so filed was dismissed by citing the case of Bank of India v. C. K Raman (1988), in which the Madras High Court held that nationalised banks do not come under the ambit of the Act. After the rejection of the appeal, the appellant instituted a suit at the City Civil Court contending that the dismissal of his appeal was illegal and ultra vires and he prayed for him to be reinstated to his job and to be remunerated for the hardships faced by him during this time. This suit was dismissed by the courts after decreeing that the contentions put forth by the appellant would not stand. Hereafter, an appeal was filed before the High Court.

There were two appeals filed before the Hon’ble court. The first one was admitted on 7th March 1995 by the additional judge of the Madras High Court, and he found that the order of dismissal handed out to the appellant by the Labour Commissioner was lamentable. The respondent filed an appeal to the order passed and contended that the suit was instituted at the Civil Court beyond the period of limitation as prescribed under the Limitation Act. The Court refused to go into the merits of the case as it had already been examined by the Commissioner.

Issues 

The only issue that comes up for consideration is whether the suit instituted exceeded the statute of limitations and hence if it is in violation of the Limitation Act. 

Proceedings

  • The common period of limitation within which a suit can be filed is mentioned under Article 58 of the Limitation Act, of 1963. 
  • The appellant contended that the civil proceedings were instituted in a court of due authority and it was contended that if the period in which the proceedings were taking place is excluded, the suit would be well within the limitations. 
  • Learned Counsel for the respondent contended that the ‘civil proceedings’ instituted before the appellate authority provided for by Section 41(2) of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act 1947, is not a court, therefore the time spent in proceedings in that court cannot be excluded. 
  • Section 41 of the Act mandates that no employer shall dispense of the services of an employed person without providing ample cause or without giving one month’s notice or one month’s pay in advance. The general exception to this rule is when a person has been dismissed on a charge of misconduct which has been proven with satisfactory evidence. Such persons that have been dispensed off, have the right to appeal to the appropriate authority within the stipulated time. 
  • Subsection 2 of Section 41 mandates that any employee terminated from employment must approach the prescribed authority within thirty days from the date of termination of service. Citing these Sections, the appellant contended that reparations should be granted to him

Judgement

  • The Court held that the appeal before the Deputy Commissioner of Labour at Madras was within the stipulated period.
  • The Court observed that the Deputy Commissioner of Labour has the jurisdiction to decide upon an order of dismissal, passed by employers. The order so passed is binding on an employee or employer. Therefore it can be said that the Deputy Commissioner of Labour may not be called a ‘civil court’ as defined by the Civil Procedure Code, but is definitely a ‘court’.
  • The Court highlighted that Section 14 of the Limitation Act includes all the courts and not just a ‘civil court’. Any tribunal or authority that has the authority to pass orders that would be legally binding would come under the purview of this Section. 
  • The Court cited the case of Pritam Kaur v. Sher Singh, in which the Court contemplated Section 14 of the Limitation Act. It was held in that case that the term ‘court’ included those of the character of the one mentioned in the case at hand.
  • The Court ultimately decided that the Authority constituted under Section 41(2) was in fact a court as per the meaning given in Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

The Tamil Nadu Labour Welfare Fund Act, 1972

History

The Tamil Nadu Labour Welfare Fund Act Bill was sent to the President by invoking the powers granted to the Governor under Article 175 of the Constitution. The President gave his assent to the Bill on December 2, 1972, and it subsequently became an Act after publication in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette Extraordinary on December 6, 1972.

Scope

This Act encompasses many guidelines and regulations that aim to improve the economic condition of labourers and others within the State. This Act is applicable throughout the State of Tamil Nadu.  This Act provides provisions for the setting up of a Welfare Fund that shall systematically collect money in the prescribed manner from the employees and the government, which shall be used to improve the living conditions of workers and their dependents. This Act also stipulates the guidelines for establishing a board to oversee and regulate the accumulation and distribution of funds. There are also measures to keep in check the power and authority exercised by the Board and any establishment that comes under the purview of the Act.

Definitions

We must comprehensively understand the definitions for better clarity and understanding of the provisions later in the Act. The primary definitions have been discussed below:

  • An employee is a person who has been employed to do any form of labour, skilled or unskilled, technical, clerical, etc., for thirty days. This act excludes from the definition of employee those who hold a managerial position, a person who works in a managerial capacity and draws a salary that exceeds a certain amount or a person who has been employed on an ad-hoc basis or part-time basis.
  • An employer is a person who has absolute control over the operation of an establishment. This person may be known as a manager, superintendent, etc.
  • There are many definitions for an establishment in which an employee and employer work. These are:
  • A factory
  • A motor transport undertaking
  • A charitable establishment
  • A catering Service
  • A plantation
  • Any other establishment may be notified by the Government.

Labour welfare fund

The primary intent of this Act is to create a fund that would work to the benefit of the labourers or any other individual mentioned in the Act. This is done by putting an impetus on the employee to donate to the Labour Welfare Fund and double the amount invested by the employee must be invested by the company that he works for. Employers and employees invest money in this fund, which also includes any donations.

Tamil Nadu welfare Board

This Act also provides for the establishment of the ‘Tamil Nadu Welfare Board’. This body shall be classified as a ‘body corporate’ and shall have perpetual succession and a common seal. 

Constitution

The board shall have a chairman and this must be the Labour Minister of the incumbent government. The other members of the board are as follows:

  • There shall be an adequate number of representatives representing the employees and employers.
  • The Board may also contain some officials or non-officials as prescribed by the government. Or members of the State Legislature.

Term

The term of the non-official members of the Board shall be three years and the members that are also part of the State Legislature shall be unfit for membership when they cease to be members of the Legislature.

Disqualification

Members of the Board may be ineligible for a seat on the board if they fulfil any of the criteria below:

  • If he is a person of unsound mind,
  • If the person has any arrears or any sum due to the Board,
  • If the person is insolvent,
  • If the person has been convicted of any crime by a criminal court in India,.

Removal

Removal of a member of the Board is on two grounds:

  • If he has fulfilled any of the criteria mentioned above,
  • If the person has been absent from three consecutive meetings of the Board without providing to the Board a satisfactory reason.

Suspension of the Board

The presiding board can be suspended and another board can take effect for not more than six months if the government is satisfied that the Board has abused its power or neglected its duties. The Board is given an opportunity during this six-month tenure to show cause as to why it should not be disbanded.  A member of the board can resign from his position, provided that he submits a written application to the Government. 

Unpaid accumulations

A large portion of this Act deals with unpaid accumulations. The claims to unpaid accumulation and the interest on unpaid accumulation have been discussed below. 

  • Any unpaid accumulation that has been paid to the board in a lump sum shall be matched by the employer. The employer is absolved of any liability when he pays the requisite sum to the Board. 
  • If the employer fails to pay the board the amount that he is required to, the Secretary shall serve the employer with a notice requesting payment of the due amount. If the due amount is not paid within 30 days, a fine shall be levied on the principal amount. The interest rate for this fine must be one per cent for the first three months, and for each passing month, the amount shall be one and a half per cent. 

Contribution to the fund

  • Every employee must donate to the fund an amount that he wishes but this amount shall not exceed twenty rupees. The employer, in respect of the employee, shall make a contribution not exceeding forty
  •  rupees. 
  • The employer is empowered under the Act to deduct this amount from the employee’s salary in a manner as may be prescribed by the government.

Utilisation of the fund

  • The Fund shall be maintained by the Board for use at a later date for the benefit of the employees or their dependents within the state. This fund shall also be used to carry out the provisions of this Act or any activity that may be specified by the government at any time. Community necessities, vocational training, and preschool for the children of the employees are just some of the measures that shall be carried out with the economic backing of the fund. 
  • Unpaid accumulations, along with fines, shall be utilised by this board explicitly for the welfare of the employees. The Board is empowered under the Act to borrow funds from any local authority with the prior approval of the Government. If a new fund is created by a decree of the government or otherwise, there is no mandate for amalgamating the old fund with the new one; they both can be used independently.

Dispute and audit

  • Any dispute concerning the utilisation of the funds or the income received by the Board must be referred to the government and the decision of the government is final on the matter. 
  • The accounts of the Board must be audited by a certified auditor and the report must be forwarded annually to the Government. These accounts will be published in the public domain by the government in the prescribed manner.

Inspector

The Government shall, under this Act, appoint inspectors within local limits for the inspection and implementation of the provisions of the Act. The powers of the Inspector under this Act are as follows:

  • To ascertain whether the provisions of the Act are being carried out,
  • To inspect any document in possession of the employee or employer with respect to the sums payable to the Fund;
  • The inspector under this Act is empowered to enter any premises of any of the establishments mentioned in the Act. He may do so with any assistance he deems necessary.
  • The onus to ensure the proper implementation of this Act lies with the Inspector. 

Any person who refuses to produce an audit, register, or document or copies of any such document that is requested by the Inspector shall be punished with imprisonment for a term that may extend to three months. For any repetition of such an offence, the period of imprisonment and the fine shall be increased from five hundred rupees to one thousand rupees. For convicting an individual under the aforementioned provisions, no court inferior to a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the First Class shall try the offence. Suo moto cognizance cannot be taken by a court and if a party decides to lodge a case before a competent court, they shall do so within six months of the commission of the offence. 

Related case laws

United India Insurance Company Limited and Ors. Vs. Secretary, Tamil Nadu Labour Welfare Board

History and facts of the case

In this case, the appellant filed a writ petition to quash the respondent’s demand for payment to the Tamil Nadu Labour Welfare Fund which has been instituted by the Tamil Nadu Labour Welfare Fund Act, 1972. The appellant further seeks to prevent the respondent from making any demand under Section 2 of the said Act. The learned single judge of the Madras High Court that heard the petition considered all the facts and circumstances of the case and subsequently dismissed the writ petitions with costs. The opinion of the learned judge was that Insurance Companies are not establishments of the Central Government and hence they are mandated to contribute under the Act. The appellant has filed a writ petition against such an order. 

Procedure

  • The appellants contended that Government Companies were registered under the Indian Companies Act and were subsidiaries of the General Insurance Corporation of India. The business schemes for such companies have similar authority to a law as the schemes are tabled before the parliament and only come into effect after much deliberation. These companies are wholly under the control of the Central Government, these include insurance companies. Despite unequivocally being a part of the Central Government, the respondent has demanded payment from the year 1972. This dogmatic demand shall not stand as it is tacitly against public policy.
  • Another contention put forth by the appellants was that the Tamil Nadu Act, 1972 was not applicable to the appellant’s company as they were incorporated under the Indian Companies Act. The Tamil Nadu Act solely concerned itself with the welfare and labour within the state of Tamil Nadu and it should not be applied to companies that insure the life of medi-claim, carriers, fire accidents, etc.
  • The learned counsel for the appellants would further denote that, upon a glossary perusal of Section 2(d) of the Tamil Nadu Act, it would become clear that it does not specify whether Government controlled companies or insurance companies would come under the purview of this Act. The counsel also highlighted the settled position of law that a State Act cannot override a Central Act
  • The learned counsel for the respondent contended that the appellant’s companies would fall under the category of establishments encompassed in Section 2(d)(v) of the Tamil Nadu Act, 1972, and hence the companies are bound to make a contribution. In the case of State Electricity Board v. Govindarajulu Manu, the High Court of Madras took the view that, even though the Electricity Board is a governmental body, it would come under the purview of the Tamil Nadu Labour Welfare Fund Act. This would entail an obligation upon them to contribute to the Act unless they have obtained any exemption under Section 40 of the Tamil Nadu Act.

Issues

  • Whether Insurance Companies operating within the State of Tamil Nadu have to contribute to the Tamil Nadu Labour Welfare Fund Act or not.

Judgement

  • The Court relied heavily on the decision of the learned single judge. The Court also upheld the view of the single judge in holding that Insurance Companies are not establishments of the Central Government. 
  • The Court dismissed all the writ petitions accordingly. 

The Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen), 1981

History

This Act received the assent of the President on August 5, 1981. The constitutionality of this Act was questioned before the High Court by way of writ petitions filed by several establishments, and after the conclusion of the hearings, the High Court struck down certain crucial provisions of the Act. The State Government, aggrieved by the decision of the High Court appealed to the Supreme Court. The case, ‘State of Tamil Nadu & Ors Vs. Nellai Cotton Mills Ltd. And Ors, 1990’ served as a landmark case for the constitutionality of the Act, and shall be expanded upon in the latter parts of the Article.

Objective

This Act aims to provide permanent employment status to the workmen of establishments in the state of Tamil Nadu. The conferment of permanent status is subject to a slew of stringent prerequisites, which have been enunciated in the Act. The Act extends to the whole State of Tamil Nadu. Only those establishments that employ more than fifty workmen shall come under the purview of the provisions of the Act.

Definitions

  • ‘Employer’ is the owner of an establishment. Some of these establishments include but are not limited to, a factory, any industrial establishment by the State Government or any other industrial establishment.
  • Any individual employed in an establishment to do any sort of labour comes under the definition of a ‘workman’. Those who are employed in a managerial, supervisory, or administrative capacity do not come under the definition of ‘workman’.

Conferment of permanent status

  • Those workmen that have been in continuous employment in an industrial establishment for not less than four hundred and eighty days within a time period of twenty-four calendar months, shall be made permanent employees of that establishment.
  • Continuous employment is subject to certain breaks; these are as follows:
  • If the workman was on paid leave, which he had earned after working the requisite amount.
  • The temporary absence arising out of any accident and subsequent recovery.
  • In the case of females, maternity leave shall also not hinder ‘continuous employment’, as long as it does not exceed twelve weeks.

Inspectors

  • Appointment of inspectors is done by the government. The appointed inspectors are deemed to be public servants.
  • The onus of carrying out the provisions of this Act rests upon the inspectors. They are empowered to employ the assistance of a subordinate to inspect, at any reasonable time, the premises, register, records, or any evidence that might be related to the Act.  

Offences and penalties

  • A court inferior to that of a metropolitan magistrate or a judicial magistrate of the first class shall not try an offence under this Act.
  • An offence under this Act can only be instituted with prior approval of the prescribed authority.
  • An employer that violates the provisions of this Act shall be punishable with a fine, which shall increase in case of continuing offence.

Related case laws

The Superintending Engineer, Vellore Electricity Distribution Circle, Tamil Nadu Generation and Distribution Corporation Limited Vs. The Inspector of Labour, Authority under the Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act and Ors.

History and facts 

This case is concerned with the writ petition filed before the High Court of Madras by the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board. The respondents in this case are the workmen who filed an application under Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981, praying that they be conferred permanent status. These men had fulfilled the prerequisite of 480 days of service in 24 calendar months. The petitioners stated that the respondents did not have their names in the list of 18,006 contract labourers eligible for permanent status prepared by the Hon’ble Justice Khalid Commission. A probable exclusion for the lack of their names in the list could be because the certificate was only handed out to contract labourers, who had worked under the contractors. There was also no proof with the Board that the respondents worked the 480 days in 24 calendar days as they claimed. There was also the perplexing question of whether the working hours of some of the respondents could be counted at all as they had not been paid directly by the Tamil Nadu Board.

Proceedings

  • The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that for a grant of absorption, the Board is bound by their own service regulations which shall prevail over general laws. The very application of the Conferment of Permanent Status made by the workmen will not stand as there are special enactments in force. 
  • The counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that the service conditions and regulations related to conferring permanent status to the workers have been formulated by the Board by virtue of the powers conferred under Section 79 of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948, and as such the Act through which complaint has been moved is wholly untenable.
  • The conferment of permanent status should be done in strict adherence with the recruitment rules in force. The rules to be applied in this instance are the ones in the Tamil Nadu Act, although these are akin to those enacted in general by the State.
  • In the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and others v.. Umadevi and others (2006), the Supreme Court reiterated that the benefit of regularisation or permanent status cannot be conferred in violation of the recruitment rules in force. The Supreme Court also highlighted the principle of equal opportunity being a constitutional mandate. It was also held that the duration served by an employee cannot be dressed as the sole criteria for conferment of permanent status. 
  • In the Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen Act 1981, permanent status cannot be conferred to those who have fulfilled the mandate of 480 days by working for contractors or any individual other than the recognized board. 
  • The Court vehemently urged the competent authorities to make the appointment process conform to the constitutional scheme of appointments. The court also said that those workers employed on a temporary or casual basis cannot be made permanent simply by fulfilling the criteria of completing 480 days of service.
  • The counsel for the petitioner contended that the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board was not an Industrial Establishment as defined under the Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, this would render the complaint filed by the complainants null and void. 

Issues

  • Whether upon working for a certain period of time, the employee would be entitled to permanency or not.

Judgement

  • The Court held that all appointments made by the ‘State’ should be by providing equal opportunities to all the candidates; any other practice shall be deemed unconstitutional. 
  • No individual can claim permanent workman status as soon as they have served for 480 days. They must also conform to the other mandates that have been laid down by the specific laws in effect. Thus, the order passed by the Inspector of Labour is in violation of the constitutional scheme of appointment as well as in violation of the service regulations issued by the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board. 
  • The court observed that the current trend of Contract Labourers/Temporary employees/Daily wage employees on completion of services or 480 days of service applying for permanent status is a lamentable one.
  • The Court stated that it had repeatedly mandated clarification on the terms and conditions of the appointment rules. This case was such a case that warranted the need for such clarity.
  • The Court wanted to stop the conferment of permanent status to workmen in a lenient way and all individuals should be given an equal opportunity. 
  • The Court had no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the decision of the Inspector of Labour was erroneous and constitutionally invalid. 

Tamil Nadu Factories Act, 1950

Objective and scope

The Tamil Nadu Factories Act, 1950, mirrors the Indian Factories Act, 1948. The central level Act has been adopted, with considerable changes for the state of Tamil Nadu. The purpose of this Act is to regulate almost every aspect related to the labourer and the establishment he works for. The regulatory provisions of the Act are extremely explicit and vast in nature. The Act even specifies the percentage of humidity to be kept in and around the areas of production. This Act also explains the established processes of factories within Tamil Nadu. The Act concerns itself with the working conditions of labourers and the benefit that is to be extended to them and their dependents.

Definitions

Some of the crucial definitions that have been mentioned in the Act for a better understanding of the provisions of the Act have been listed below:

  • ‘Family’ is defined as the natural descendants of the employee of the place wherein the manufacturing process occurs or any dependent of the employee.
  • A ‘Manager’ is someone who has been appointed by the occupier of the factory for the purpose of carrying out or supervising the activities of the factory.
  • ‘District Magistrate’ includes the Additional District Magistrate.

Licence

  • The premises for the establishment of the factory have to be first approved and registered under the rules provided in this Act.
  • The application for registration of the factory shall be submitted to the Chief Inspector, along with the fee payable for the grant of the licence. This fee shall be drawable from any Nationalised bank to the name of the Deputy Chief Inspector of Factories region. 
  • If the Chief Inspector is satisfied with the documents provided for the establishment of the factory, he may grant a licence for the same. If the Chief Inspector deems it necessary to call for more documents to ensure the veracity of the establishment and its activities, he may do so. 
  • The licence shall be renewed from time to time and the application for the same must be submitted to the Deputy Chief Inspector, not less than two months before the expiry of the licence. 
  • If the application is received one month before the date of expiry, a fine of ten per cent of the fee payable shall be levied. If the application is received just before the date of expiration, a fine of twenty per cent of the fee payable shall be levied. If the application is received after the date of renewal, a fine of thirty per cent shall be levied. 
  • If the Deputy Chief Inspector is content with the documents submitted, he shall grant a licence to the factory.
  • There may be a refusal to grant a licence if the application is not accompanied by the requisite documents, the Chief Inspector may also call for additional documents. The licence will be refused if there is an imminent threat to the lives of the factory workers because of gas, dust, etc. An imminent threat could also arise if the building in which the factory is housed is in a structurally unsound condition and the necessary steps have not been taken to address these issues.

Inspecting staff

  • A person can be appointed as an inspector only if he possesses the necessary qualifications mandated in this Act. A medical inspector can only be appointed if he possesses a degree in medicine. 
  • The powers of inspectors are vast. An inspector is authorised to photograph or document the working conditions of the workers of the factory, and he is also authorised to take copies of registers or records or any other documents that he deems necessary to inspect the working conditions of the factory.
  • The inspector must also appear before the court to prosecute or defend his actions while discharging his duty.

Health

  • The premises of the factory have to be kept clean by regular sweeping, mopping, dusting, etc. The cleaning standards vary according to the difference in room size. The rooms are segregated into rooms of less than five hundred cubic feet, less than two thousand five hundred cubic feet and more than two thousand five hundred cubic feet. 
  • If the Chief Inspector is convinced that any part of the factory has not been kept clean to the requisite standards, he may order the seizure of a specific part of the factory or the whole factory.
  • The aspects of ventilation and temperature have been discussed at length in the Act. There are very stringent criteria as to what should be the limits of temperature and air movement. The Act explains the places in which hygrometers must be established to ensure proper humidity in the factory.

Leave

  • Every year, there should be a certain amount of paid leave given to the employee. Paid leaves, when granted, should be recorded in the ‘Leaves with Wages Register’. This register should be kept for a minimum of three years. If the worker doesn’t avail of the paid leaves, it shall be recorded in the register.
  • If an employee is absent from work due to any illness and wants to avail sick leave, he may be required to submit a certificate signed by a registered medical practitioner or by a registered or recognised medical practitioner. 

Employment of young persons and women

  • The Chief Inspector may restrict women or young persons (persons under eighteen years of age), from working in a specific factory as it may be dangerous for their health and safety.
  • A person who has been restricted from working in such a factory shall be provided with alternate work that would not be detrimental to their health and safety.

Related case laws

D. Krishnan and Ors. Vs. Special Officer, Vellore Co-operative Sugar Mill and Ors.

Facts and history 

This case was appealed to the Supreme Court after the decision of the High Court of Judicature at Madras. There were two appellants in this case and both of them were employed under the respondent. The appellants were promoted in their respective works. Appellant No. 2 was the in-charge of the canteen in 1991 whereas appellant no. 1 was given the same duty in 1996. The appellants had presented claims for receiving overtime wages as they had put in the necessary overtime work for specific hours each day. The appellants had made repeated requests to the Labour Welfare Officer and had received verbal promises regarding the same on many occasions. There was also another case pending before the Labour Court (Jayavalu Case) whose facts were similar to the one in this case and as such its decision would apply squarely to this case; and the decision in this case was in favour of the labourer. 

Frustrated that their complaint was falling on deaf ears even after the decision in the Jayavelu case, the appellants filed a petition under the Industrial disputes Act, 1947. The respondents countered the plea by stating that no impetus had been placed on the appellants by the respondents to do any overtime work and they had never done so either. The respondents contended that Jayavalu’s case had no similarity to the case at hand and as such the jurisprudence set down in that case does not apply to this case. 

The decision of the Labour Court on this matter unequivocally held that the workers had in fact worked overtime and were entitled to the payment accordingly. The contention by the respondents that the appellants were managers and not workers was squarely rejected by the Labour Court. The respondents challenged this decision before the High Court. The High Court, in its judgement, dismissed the writ petition and affirmed the award of the Labour Court. The decision of the learned single judge was challenged before a Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court held that the reliance of the Labour Court wholly on documentary evidence alone was untenable. The Division Bench also held that the punch time cards which formed the basis of the petitioner’s case did not constitute sufficient proof. The claim that there was no order on the workmen to work any overtime should also fail. The Division Bench ultimately quashed the judgement of the Labour Court and Single Judge and against this decision an appeal had been filed.

Proceedings

  • Colin Gonsalves, the learned senior counsel for the appellants, submitted that a simple enquiry under Section 33C(2) was fully justified citing  the case of Chief Mining Engineer East India Coal Co. Ltd v. Rameshwar and Ors 1967. The counsel contended that the argument of the workmen actually being managers were wholly untenable as they would not be designated as managers solely if they are given some minor managerial positions. 
  • Dayan Krishnan, the learned Counsel for the respondent, submitted that inorder to submit a claim for overtime wages, the overtime has to be authorised by a competent authority and there was no such authorisation on record, therefore the claim under Section 59 of the Factories Act was not tenable. The counsel also contended that the proceedings were executory in nature.

Issues

  • Whether documentary evidence is necessary to prove this case or not.

Judgement

  • The court held that the nature of proceedings was executionary and in executionary proceedings there were some presuppositions of adjudication which would lead to the determination of a right. There had not been a lot of adjudication in this case and it primarily relied on the documentary evidence of both parties. 
  • According to the Tamil Nadu Factories Rule, 1950, only an employee who was authorised to work overtime can claim overtime wages. The appellants had not disputed the respondents’ claim that there were no overtime slips issued to the appellants.
  • The Court finally came to the conclusion that a sole reliance on documentary evidence was not enough to prove the case. 

Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishments (National, festival and special holidays) Act, 1958

Objective and scope

The Bill received the assent of the Governor on December 4, 1958. It became an Act after publication in the Fort. St. George Gazette Extraordinary on December 10, 1958. The impetus behind the enactment of the Act is the grant of National, festivals or special holidays for the employees employed within an industrial establishment in Tamil Nadu. The Act also provides provisions for the payment of employees when they are on any such leave. 

Definitions

  • ‘Employee’ is any person who has been employed in an industrial establishment to do labour that may be skilled, unskilled, or any other form of labour. 
  • ‘Employer’ is any person who has absolute control over the establishment and its employees.
  • ‘Wages’ are defined as they are in other Acts; they denote any compensation that can be expressed in monetary terms. These wages shall be paid at fixed intervals and after completion of pre-agreed work. 

Grant of national and special holidays

  • For the following days, a whole day of holiday should be granted as per the Act;
  1. 26th January
  2. 1st May
  3. 15th August
  4. 2nd October
  • And there shall be another five days of full days off. This is exclusionary to any date that the government may declare a holiday, having due regard to any emergency or special circumstances prevailing in the State.

Wages

  • An employee should be paid full wages for all of the holidays granted under the Act.
  • If an employee voluntarily or by order works on a holiday, he shall be entitled to twice the wage that he would normally get on a workday.

Inspectors

  • The Government appoints the appropriate persons as inspectors for the supervision and enforcement of the provisions of this Act. These inspectors shall be deemed to be public servants.
  • The Inspector is empowered under this Act to enter the premises of any of the establishments this Act applies to at reasonable hours. 
  • The Inspector is empowered to procure and examine any necessary document, register, etc, that he may deem necessary for furthering the purposes of this Act.
  • If an individual willfully obstructs or fails to provide any document that the Inspector demands in writing, which would be necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of the Act, he shall be punished with a prison term of three months, a fine, or both.

Related case laws

Madura Coats Limited Vs. Inspector of Factories, First Circle, Madurai and Ors.

Facts and history

This case has reached the Supreme Court of India by way of appeal from the Madras High Court. Madura Coats Limited is an industrial establishment as per the definition provided in the Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishments (National and Festival Holidays) Act, 1958 (further referred to as the ‘Act’), and they owned mills in Tamil Nadu. The Payment of Bonus Ordinance Rules of 1975 governed the payment of bonuses. Bonus for the year 1974-75 was due for the workers and the management refused to pay this bonus by stating that payment of bonuses would be against the provision of the Payment of Bonuses Act as amended by the ordinance. The non-payment of wages by the mill management led to a strike. A complaint was lodged against the Commissioner of Labour, Madras. The parties reached a settlement and in this settlement, the workers were to immediately stop the strike and the management should not cut the pay for the days that the workers went on strike. However, when the wages were paid to the workers, the management withheld the wages for the days that the workers went on strike. The inspector of factories addressed a communication to the management stating that they should pay the wages. The management filed a writ petition to the High Court and the High Court refused to interfere and the petition was dismissed. As far as the definitions go, the right of the workmen to receive wages for the national or festival holidays is not absolute as it is subjective to the right of the management under sub-section (2) of Section 5 to call upon them to come to work on such holidays. The employer however has no right in deciding the holidays. Therefore the right of the employee to claim wages for the national and festival holidays is co-extensive with the right of the management to call upon the workers to work on such a holiday. 

Issues 

  • Whether an employer is statutorily bound to pay wages if the workmen are on strike, for any of the national or festival holidays falling within the periods of strike under the Act or not.

Procedure

  • The case was referred to a division bench by Natarajan (learned single judge bench), he referred the case to a divisional bench as he questioned the correctness of the view taken in the Lotus Mills case. 
  • Judge Ramanujam, speaking on behalf of the Division Bench, accepted that the special right conferred on the management was somewhat inconsistent with other sections of the Act. He also stated that the misconception that the Act confers the right not to work on a holiday appears to be unwarranted.

Judgement

  • The Court ordered the respondents to pay the workers their wages for the national or festival holidays falling within the periods of the strike. The previous judgement of the High Court is reversed and the impugned notice issued by the Inspector of Factories is quashed. 

Tamil Nadu Professional Tax Act, 1992

Objective

This Act specifies the amount to be paid as tax by each and every salaried individual within Tamil Nadu. The Act provides definitions for an unambiguous comprehension of the provisions of the Act and many provisions include detailed procedures in case of actions taken in contravention of the Act.

Definitions

  • An ‘employee’ is someone who has been employed under any establishment and receives remuneration from an establishment established under the Central or State government. An employee is also someone who has been employed in any private institution within the State.
  • An ‘employer’ is a person who has employees under him who receive regular pay from the establishment under which they are hired.
  • A ‘half year’ is from the 1st day of April to the 30th of September and from the 1st day of October to the 31st of March of a calendar year. ‘One month’ means a calendar month.

Professional tax

  • Any company, Hindu Undivided family, etc., that does business or trade shall file their tax returns at the beginning of the half year with the concerned municipality. This tax can be paid in monthly instalments if permission for the same is requested by the tax collecting officer and he makes the necessary changes for the same.
  • The tax rate shall be revised and made public by the executive authority once every five years, and these are the rates that should be followed by the general populace while filing taxes.
  • The tax can be paid in many ways, which include cheques and cash.

Penalty

  • A penalty can only be levied after proper notice has been served by the Commissioner and a time period of thirty days has passed since the notice has been received. 
  • A penalty can be levied if the employer fails to pay the half-yearly tax within the stipulated time period. Penalty is levied in the form of fines and these fines can increase as the non-compliance goes on.

The Tamil Nadu Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Rules, 1968

Objective

This Act aims to lay down the rules and regulations related to setting up and working in an establishment that produces beedi and cigars. The primary intent of the Act is to safeguard the lives of the workers engaging in the industries that come under its purview. 

Definitions

Under Chapter I of the Act, definitions are given that would provide more clarity to the provisions later in the Act. The most crucial of them are:

  • ‘Health Officer’ is someone who has been appointed by the Government for a specific area, irrespective of whether that area comes under any specific local authority.
  • ‘Public Health Authority’ is any Health Officer that has Jurisdiction over an area in which the Beedi industrial premises are situated.

Licencing

  • The application seeking permission for the selection of a site to establish an industrial premise shall be accompanied by the following items
  1. The premise to be used to set up the manufacturing establishment and the surrounding premises should be submitted.
  2. The emergency exits, natural lighting, etc. should also be mentioned in the submission.
  3. The receipt showing that the appropriate fee has been paid for the application should also be submitted.
  4. The licence should only be granted after the appropriate authority has made sure that the site has no prior developments or activity going on within twelve months of the date of submission of the application.
  • The application for renewal of the licence must be sent to the appropriate authority not less than one month before the date of renewal of the original licence. Attached to the application, must be the treasury receipt showing the payment of the renewal fee and the original licence. 
  • If an application for renewal of the licence has been submitted after the due date, an additional fee shall be remittable from the party. This fee will vary depending on the time period caused by the delays.
  • If the licence has been lost, stolen, or destroyed, an application shall be submitted for issuing a duplicate licence. The receipt showing payment of the due fee for issuance of a duplicate licence shall also be attached to the application.
  • If the licence has to be amended, an application is attached to the original licence, a statement showing the amendment required and the new plans. Along with the application, the fee receipt should also be submitted.

Health and welfare

Chapter III of the Act outlines the provisions related to health and welfare. 

  • All of the surfaces of the establishment shall be cleaned from time to time to prevent the accumulation of dust. Appropriate measures should be taken to maintain the painted walls, and timely repainting should also take place. Proper records shall be kept of all the activities that have been undertaken in furtherance of cleanliness.
  • There should be sufficient washrooms for male employees. There should be a minimum of one washroom for every one hundred male employees. For female employees, a separate washroom shall be provided. The same criteria apply to urinals. Cleaning of the washrooms should be done periodically and now and then they should be cleaned with appropriate tools for deep cleaning of washrooms. Washing areas are also to be provided to the employees; this too shall be segregated on a gender basis. 
  • First aid must be made available at every establishment under this Act. The exact number of items to be stocked at the First-Aid Centre has been laid down in the Act. The charge of the First-Aid box or cupboard shall be kept with a person who is trained in First-Aid treatment and who shall always be readily available during the working hours of the industrial premises. 
  • Every industrial establishment that employs more than two hundred and fifty employees shall have a canteen and this canteen must not be situated close to a washroom. The premises of the canteen shall be kept clean and build-up of dirt or water must be prevented. The canteen shall have a separate dining hall, kitchen, store, and pantry. The food served must be on a profit, no-loss basis.

Working conditions

Chapter IV of the Act lays down the working conditions of the employees employed in any establishment that comes under the purview of the Act. 

  • The working hours, rest intervals, and holidays shall be published by the employer in a place where they are clearly visible to the employees. A record of the work done by each and every employee must also be kept.
  • Leaves granted to an employee must be recorded in a leave book. This leave book shall be the property of the employee and duplicate records shall be maintained by the employer.

Miscellaneous

  • If the beedi or cigar that a worker uses is not to the requisite standard, it shall be rejected. No more than five per cent of the total number of cigars or beedi an employee manufacturer produces shall be rejected by the employer.
  • Any information that is required by an Inspector while inspecting the premises of the industry shall be furnished by the employer within seven days of the inspector requesting it in writing.

Related case laws

Rajangam, Secretary, District Beedi Workers’ Union and Ors. Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors.

Facts and history

In this case, a writ petition was filed under article 32 of the Constitution by the District Beedi Workers Union before the Supreme Court. In the complaint there were allegations of manipulation of records regarding employees, non payment of appropriate dues for work done, failure to implement the provision of labour laws, etc. Another petition with the same subject matter was clubbed together with this appeal. 

The Supreme Court by an order dated 24th October, 1989 appointed an organisation by the name ‘Society for Community Organisation Trust (SOCCO), for making the necessary investigation into the allegations and to submit a report to the court. Along with the submission of the report there should also be a suggestion scheme for consideration of the Court. There were two other schemes submitted; one by the petitioners and the other by the State of Tamil Nadu. The Court then decreed that only one policy shall be implemented and instructed the parties to sort out their differences by having discussions. After the discussions conclude, the final draft shall be sent to the Labour Ministry of the Government of India.

The Ministry of Labour of the Union Government filed an affidavit that addressed a myriad of concerns. The Ministry wanted to dispose of the issue, for this they provided many suggestions;

  • The Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Rules, 1968 should be strictly adhered to and thus the discrepancies that exist in furnishing the books (as per in this case) should be done away with. The working conditions of the workers should be improved as per the Act.
  • Child labour should be prohibited as per the Act and child labour should be stopped within a period of three years. 
  • The contract labour system is indispensable in this trade and it should be legitimised. 
  • A governmental labour establishment should be located in every local area and it should be competent to answer the requirements on the matter. 
  • The welfare fund instituted for the Beedi Workers should be made operational and funds should be dispersed immediately in case of the death of a worker. 
  • Every employer should be insured for a minimum of Rs. 50,000 and the premium should be paid by the employer and the cost should not be transferred to the worker.

Issues

  • Whether there is a need for an external agency to supervise the implementation of the provisions of the Act or not.

Judgement

  • The Court was of the view that the implementation of the scheme that would be adopted by the Supreme Court would require supervision from an independent external agency.
  • The Court also stipulated a time period of three years for the completion or implementations of the provisions of the scheme. 
  • The Secretary of the Tamil Nadu Board, would mainly be in charge of the field job and shall be paid a sum of Rs. 1,500 per month and an allowance to meet out of pocket expenses as long as he does the work as Secretary of the Board.
  • The case had been disposed of by the Court with the view that the concerned authorities would adopt or implement rules and regulations for the best of the nation.

Tamil Nadu Catering Establishment Rules, 1959

Objectives

This Act aims to explicit the provisions related to the catering establishments that are functioning in Tamil Nadu. Under the ambit of this Act, processes from registration to provisions for washing facilities have been mentioned in detail. The Act applies to the entirety of the state of Tamil Nadu. 

Registration certificate

  • The application for grant of registration to begin operations must be sent to the inspector along with the fee payable for the application. The fee payable varies according to the number of employees in the establishment.
  • The registration certificate shall be granted only after the inspector inspects all the necessary certificates. If the inspector deems it necessary to call for further necessary documents, he is empowered to do so under this Act.
  • If the certificate of registration has to be amended, an application has to be sent to the inspector. This application has to be accompanied by the original certificate, the proposed changes, and the requisite fee for renewing the application. 
  • An application must be sent for renewal of the registration certificate before the expiration date of the existing certificate. The original certificate, along with the amount for registration, must be accompanied by the application. If the application for renewal has been submitted late; fines shall be levied on the submitter. 
  • If the registration certificate has been lost, an application must be moved to the Inspector to whom the certificate was last renewed. The application must also contain the requisite fee for issuing a duplicate certificate.

Holidays and leaves

  • The employer must send to the inspector the list of holidays for which the establishment shall grant holidays to its employees. A copy of this letter must be displayed on the premises of establishments where it will be clearly visible to all the employees. If any employee has any objections to the proposed holidays, he may send a letter to the appropriate jurisdiction. The inspector, after receiving and analysing the objections received by the employees, shall approve the proposed list of holidays.
  • If the majority of the employees or an employer of the establishment wishes to change the specified holidays. They may do so by applying to the Inspector for the same. 
  • Employees are entitled to a certain number of paid leaves with wages. The employers would fix certain time periods in which the employees can avail of these leaves. If the employee does not want to avail of his leave at the time specified by the employee, he may inform the employer regarding the same, and this leave shall be adjusted for an alternative period.

Health and sanitation

  • For an individual to be employed at an establishment that comes under the purview of this Act, he must produce a certificate of physical fitness from a medical practitioner. If he is employed without a physical certificate, he should produce the medical certificate within one month of the date of employment.
  • All the employees of the establishment are subject to a medical examination once a year by a Medical Practitioner, the records of which should be kept by the employer. If it is found that any employee has been affected by a transmittable disease or is a carrier of one, he shall immediately cease working in the establishment. 
  • If an employee has been infected with a transmittable disease and thus becomes a hazard to the other employees in the establishment, he should inform the employer, and the employer in turn shall ascertain if the employee is carrying a hazardous disease. If it is found that the employee is carrying a hazardous disease, he will not be allowed to further work in the establishment.
  • There should be ample living, sleeping, and washing facilities for the employees in every establishment. There should also be a first-aid kit for every establishment and the contents of this first-aid kit shall vary according to the number of workers employed. 

The Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961

Objective

The Motor Transport Workers Act is an Act that has been legislated by the Union Government to explicit mandates concerning the people who work in any Motor Vehicle Department. This Act is enacted to protect the welfare of motor transport workers and to regulate the working conditions of their work. 

Definitions

This Act has provided many crucial definitions, these are:

  • ‘Adolescent’ is a person who has completed fifteen years of age but has completed eighteen.
  • ‘Child’ is someone who has not completed fifteen years of age.
  • ‘Employer’ is someone who has ultimate authority over the functioning of the motor transport undertaking. 

Registration

  • All motor transport undertakings have to be registered under this Act.
  • An application has to be submitted to the prescribed authority and after approval of the application, a certificate of registration shall be granted.

Inspectors

  • The government shall appoint one Chief Inspector for a state and he shall be considered a public servant. 
  • The Chief Inspector or other inspectors are empowered under this Act to stop and inspect any vehicle that they deem necessary and they have the authority to hold the vehicle for as long as may be reasonably necessary. They may examine any document, registration, or licence for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act.
  • The Inspectors are authorised to enter, with assistance, as they deem fit, to inspect any premises that would be using a motor vehicle. They are empowered to seize or take copies of any of the documents that may be necessary for carrying out this Act.

Health and welfare

  • If there are more than one hundred workers employed in a particular area, the Government shall provide one or more canteens for them. The Government shall also constitute a canteen management committee for each canteen.
  • The Government should provide restrooms in those places where workers are required to halt at night. These restrooms must be sufficiently lighted and ventilated and decent cleanliness should also be maintained in these washrooms according to the guidelines set by the Government.
  • The Government is bound by this Act to provide for uniforms that would protect the workers from rain or cold. There should also be facilities to wash these uniforms for a specific cost. 
  • There shall be medical facilities for the workers and these facilities should be placed at a convenient distance so that they are easily accessible.

Working conditions

  • No worker is allowed to work more than eight hours a day or forty eight hours a week; unless prior approval is obtained from the concerned authority. If approval is granted, a worker can work for up to ten hours a day or fifty-five hours a week. The employer is also authorised to make the workers work overtime if any breakdown of machinery in the department occurs or there is any unforeseen traffic jam. 
  • The working time for adolescents varies from that of adults. Adolescents are not allowed to work for more than six hours a day and they are not allowed to work between 10 P.M and 6 A.M.
  • It should be made so that no worker must work for more than five hours continuously without a break of at least half an hour. Once a working day is done, there should be a break of at least nine hours before the next working day starts. 
  • A child shall not be employed in any of the establishments that come under the purview of this Act.
  • If an adolescent wants to be employed, he shall procure a fitness certificate from a certified surgeon. This surgeon shall assess the individual and ascertain if he is fit for the work in the motor transport undertaking. If he is fit for the work at hand, he may join the department by submitting the certificate of fitness. This certificate is valid for a period of twelve months.
  • If an adolescent joins the department without a fitness certificate, the inspector shall serve a notice to the adolescent requesting that he submit the certificate. 

Leaves and wages

  • If a worker works overtime or works on a rest day, he shall be entitled to twice his normal wage. 
  • A worker who has worked for a period of two hundred and forty consecutive days shall be entitled to at least leave of twelve working days with wages. An adolescent who has worked consecutively for two hundred and forty days shall be entitled to at least sixteen working days with wages. 
  • If a worker does not avail of all the leaves granted to him in a calendar year, the restover leave shall be carried over to the next year [Calendar year commences on the first of January].
  • A worker who is availing paid leave shall be paid full wages on the days of absence. The wages should be calculated from the most recent payslip that he received. 

Penalties and procedures

  • If an individual willfully obstructs an Inspector from entering any premises for making any inspection or willfully neglects to provide the Inspector with any help in carrying out the provisions of this Act, shall be punished with a prison sentence that may extend to three months, a fine, or both.
  • If an individual willfully refuses to produce any document or register that the Inspector demands, he shall be punished with a prison sentence that may extend to three months or with a fine or both. 
  • If an individual knowingly furnishes a false certificate, he shall be punished with a prison sentence that may extend to one month, a fine, or both.
  • If an individual is guilty of an offence under this Act that he has committed before, the term of imprisonment shall increase to six months, and the fine shall also double, or he may be punished with both.
  • Courts are not empowered to take suo moto cognizance of any offence committed under this Act. Only if a complaint has been made in writing and has been submitted or if there has been a previous sanction from the Inspector can a case be lodged. Prosecution under this Act can only begin if the complaint has been made three months from the date of the alleged offence.

Related case laws

R. Bharanidaran Vs. The Managing Director, Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation and Ors.

Facts and history

In this case, the writ petition has been filed before the Supreme Court against the order passed by the Principle Labour Court, Vellore; in which the claim of the petitioner to reinstate him into the workforce was rejected. 

The petitioner had acquired his conductor licence and he registered his licence in the District Employment Exchange. The respondent had employed the petitioner and the petitioner worked for a continuous period of 252 days in a 12 month period. The petitioner claimed that since he worked for more than 16 hours for 126 days under the respondent, he was entitled to receive permanent status. The petitioner contended that he and many other temporary employees were removed from service abruptly without any notice and this led to them filing a complaint under the Industrial Disputes Act. They also alleged that the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act were also not being adhered to. 

Procedure

  • The petitioner submitted that he had received a call letter for the post of ‘conductor’. However, even though he attended the interview and possessed all of the necessary qualifications for the post, he was above the age limit for the job. The petitioner raised the grievance that the age limit should not be applicable on temporary positions.
  • Mr. C.S.K Sathish learned counsel for the respondent raised the contention for affirming the judgement of the Labour Court based on the fact that the petitioner was given ample opportunity to be enlisted into the workforce but failed to do so because of his own shortcomings. He failed to secure minimum marks on the test that was held for the post.
  • The counsel for the petitioner relied heavily on the judgement in M. Sekaran v. General Manager (2005), because in the case it was held that preference should be given for employees that have been ousted from service. 
  • The counsel for the petitioner also held that the rejection of the complaint by the Labour Court was erroneous as they claimed that the petitioner had not completed 240 days of continuous employment. This claim was untenable as the petitioner had worked for 252 days in a 12 month period and was paid an average of Rs. 150/- per day.
  • To rebut the argument presented by the petitioner above, the respondents drew the Court’s attention to the case of Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation v. N. John Henri Raj and other (2008), in which it stated that merely because an employee worked overtime it would not be counted as two days even if he worked for double the hours in a single day.
  • The respondents also pointed out that an employee cannot be asked to work overtime beyond a certain amount of hours as it would be contrary to the provisions of the Motor Transport Workers Act. 
  • The petitioners were discontent with the labour court, primarily because it didn’t count sixteen hours of work in one day as work done for two days even though the employee was being paid two times the wages. Working for sixteen hours a day would be in contradiction to almost all the Labour Laws within the state of Tamil Nadu. 

Issues

  • Whether the work done by an employee for more than eight hours a day would constitute a separate working day and should be calculated as such.

Judgement

  • The Supreme Court stated that the worker had worked 16 hours a day and was given rest on the next day, the absence from work was not the fault of the employee but it was done to give the employee some rest. Therein, the single day of work done by the employee would in fact count as two.
  • In this case, for arriving at 240 working hours, the off days have to be taken into account as paid holidays. 
  • The Supreme Court held that Sundays and paid holidays should be taken into account and should be counted as days worked by the employee, and these days shall also be factored in while calculating the days of continuous service. 
  • In this case, the respondents having allowed the employee to work past the allowed working hours cannot refuse granting him permanency on the basis of the contentions taken on in this case.
  • The Court held that the award of the Labour Court was erroneous and was set aside. 

The Inter-State Migrant Workmen (Regulation Of Employment And Conditions Of Service) Act, 1979

Objective

The Act solely concerns itself with the welfare of inter-state migrant workmen. This Act provides provisions for the regulation and working conditions of workers. This Act also enunciates the duties of contractors and Inspectors. 

Definitions

The most crucial definitions that are paramount in understanding the provisions of the Act are as follows.

  • ‘Contractor’ is someone who has agreed to complete a certain work. The term contractor does not include those that merely supply goods or manufactured items to the establishment. 
  • ‘Establishment’ is defined under the Act as any Government office or department, or as any place where trade, business, or manufacture is carried on.
  • An ‘inter-state migrant workman’ is any person who has been recruited in one state to work in an establishment in another state.
  • ‘Principal Employer’ is someone who has complete authority over the establishment and is responsible for the control and functioning of the establishment.
  • ‘Workman’ is any person who has agreed to do certain work, regardless of the nature of the work he shall be known as a workman.

Registration

  • The Government shall appoint such persons with the necessary qualifications as the registering officers. The Government shall also define the limits within which a registering officer shall exercise his powers.
  • An application must be made to the registering officer and within one month of such an application, the registering officer shall approve the application or return the application for further consideration.
  • If the registering officer comes to know that the registration of an establishment was obtained by furnishing fraudulent documents, he has the authority to revoke the registration. This can be done only after approval has been obtained from the appropriate Government official. 
  • No inter-state migrant worker shall be employed unless the principal employer has established the establishment under this Act.

Licensing of work

  • The appropriate government shall, by order, appoint those persons who seem fit to be licensing officers. The government shall also define the limits within which the officer shall exercise his powers.
  • An application for grant of a licence shall contain the location of the work, the nature of the work and the work that the inter-state migrant workmen will do. The licensing officer may investigate to certify the veracity of the documents submitted or claims made in this regard. 
  • If the licensing officer finds that a licence has been obtained by furnishing false documents or if the holder of the licence has failed to act within the boundaries of the licence or this Act, the licence shall be cancelled. The licence shall be revoked only after ample opportunity has been given to the licence holder to show cause for the alleged misconduct.

Duties of contractors

  • The contractors have to submit a form with such particulars as may be prescribed to the specified authority of the State from which the inter-state migrant is from and also to the State in which the worker shall work.
  • The contractor is bound to provide the worker with a passbook that contains a passport size photo of the worker and the name of the worker in Hindi, English, or any other language as per the geographical location. The passbook shall also contain the following items;
  • The location of the workplace,
  • The duration of the employment,
  • The wages provided to the worker,
  • The displacement allowance is payable,
  • The return fare is payable to the worker once his period of deployment is completed.
  • The contractor should also submit a declaration to the appropriate authority after a worker has come back from work in another state. In the declaration, the contractor should state that the worker has been paid full wages for his work in the other state. 

Wages and working conditions

  • The wages that are to be paid to an inter-state migrant worker shall be done so in cash. The wages paid should not be in violation of the Minimum Wages Act of 1948. Those workers who do the same work should be paid the same amount of money.
  • There should be a displacement allowance that should be paid to the worker. This allowance should be fifty per cent of the monthly wages that the worker receives. A journey allowance shall also be provided to the worker. This allowance shall not be less than the fare from the place of residence of the worker to the place of employment. 
  • The contractor should ensure prompt payment of wages, ensure accommodation is provided to workers, ensure no gender discrimination takes place, etc. 
  • The contractor is responsible for the proper payment of wages to the workmen employed by him. The wages should be paid before the stipulated time period and should also be paid in full. 

Inspectors

  • The appropriate government shall be the one appointing the inspectors for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act.
  • The Inspectors are empowered to enter any premise that employs inter-state migrant workers with any assistants to inspect the working conditions, payment of wages, facilities provided to workmen, registers, or records. 
  • The Inspector can search any individual found in an establishment to determine if he is an inter-state migrant worker. The inspector can require a person to give such information as his name, address, etc.

The Plantation Labour Act, 1951

Objective

This Act was enacted to regulate the working conditions and welfare of those labourers who work for the plantations and any associated establishment that comes under the purview of this Act. This Act fervently protects the rights of plantation workers.

Definitions

  • An ‘adolescent’ is someone who is between the ages of fourteen and eighteen.
  • ‘Adult’ is someone who has completed eighteen years of age.
  • ‘Child’ means someone who is under fourteen years of age.
  • ‘Employer’ is someone who has ultimate authority over the plantation.
  • ‘Plantation’ under this Act includes offices, schools, dispensaries, and any other premise used for any purpose connected with such a plantation, but it does not include any factory on the premise of the plantation.

Registration

  • The State governments shall be the ones appointing the registering officers and shall also define the limits within which they discharge their powers.
  • The employer of a plantation shall register the plantation within sixty days of the commencement of the operations. After receiving the application, the registering officer will issue a certificate of registration to the plantation. 
  • If there is any change in the ownership or management of the plantation, such change shall be communicated to the registering officer within thirty days.
  • If a person is aggrieved by the decision of the registering officer, he can submit an appeal to the appellate authority within thirty days of the order of the officer.

Inspectors

  • The State Government shall appoint a Chief Inspector for the state and many aptly qualified persons to be inspectors of the plantations. The Chief Inspector has the authority to specify the local limits within which the inspectors shall exercise their powers. All the inspectors appointed shall be deemed to be government employees.
  • The Inspectors shall make such an inquiry as to ascertain if the provisions of this Act are being implemented. The Inspector is empowered to enter the premises of any plantation, with assistants if necessary, to inspect the functioning of the plantation. Upon inspection, if he finds any irregularity in documentation, he shall order the employer to rectify it. 

Health and welfare

  • Every plantation should have clean, safe drinking water that is easily accessible to all of its workers. 
  • There should be sufficient latrines for males and females employed on the plantation. These latrines should be kept in a clean and sanitary condition.
  • Every plantation should have a medical facility with sufficient first-aid that is easily accessible to all the persons employed there.
  • In a plantation that employs more than one hundred and fifty workers, one or more canteens shall be provided. The appropriate government shall also prescribe the number of employees to work in the canteen and the food to be served in the canteen.
  • There should also be adequate recreational facilities for the workers and their children. Where the children of the workers aged between six and twelve exceed twenty-five in number, there should be proper educational facilities for the children. 

Safety

  • Effective provisions should be made by the employer for safe handling, storage, and transport of chemically hazardous items that might be used in and around the plantation. The plantation will have to comply with rules that may be made by the State Government that restrict women and adolescents from using or handling hazardous chemicals. 
  • Adequate training has to be given to every worker who works in handling, mixing, blending, and using any chemically hazardous chemicals. A worker who is routinely exposed to any chemically hazardous substances shall be subject to routine medical checkups. The results of these checkups should be recorded and maintained by the employer. 

Working hours

  • An adult worker should not be allowed to work in excess of forty-eight hours a week and an adolescent should not work for more than twenty-seven hours a week.
  • In case of overtime, no worker should be allowed to work for more than nine hours a day or more than fifty-five hours a week. The wages for overtime should be double that of normal wages.
  • One day should be given as a rest day in a week to all workers. A worker is allowed to work on a rest day, if he, of his own volition, decides to do so. 
  • A worker should work for more than five hours consecutively in one day; there should be at least half an hour break in between.
  • Children are prohibited from working in a plantation. Only if there is prior permission from the State Government can women work between the hours of 6 A.M and 7 P.M. Adolescents are only allowed to work in a plantation if they are given a fitness certificate from a certified medical practitioner and the adolescent should carry this certificate with him during the time he is employed.

Leaves with wages

  • How many leaves with wages are to be granted to a person is calculated as given below:
  • For an adult, one day for every twenty working days;
  • For an adolescent, one day for every fifteen working days.
  • If a worker does not avail of the leave granted to him in a year, that leave shall be carried over and added to the paid leave of next year. Thirty days of leave is the limit to the number of leaves that can be accumulated.
  • The wage that is to be paid to the worker during the leave period is to be calculated on a time-rate and piece-rate basis. The wage to be paid to the worker should be paid before he avails of the paid leave.
  • Workers are eligible for sick allowance and women are also eligible for maternity allowance.

Penalties and procedures

  • If a person wilfully prevents an Inspector from discharging his duties, he shall be punishable with imprisonment, which may extend to six months with a fine or with both.
  • If a person willfully refuses to produce any document or register that is demanded by the Inspector, he shall be punishable with imprisonment, which may extend to six months, or with a fine or both. 
  • If a person knowingly uses or attempts to use a false certificate of fitness with the intent of securing employment at any plantation that comes under the purview of this Act, he shall be punished with imprisonment that may extend to two months, with a fine, or with both.
  • If a person is guilty of the same crime twice, the prison sentence shall extend to twelve months,  and the fine shall also be increased.

Related case laws

M.C. Mehta Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors.

Facts and history

This case came before the Supreme Court of India through a writ petition. The case deals with the employment of children in industrial establishments and related consequences and circumstances. Our constitution makers knew enough to understand the paramount importance of protecting the rights and interests of children of the country, they realised that children would not be able to contribute their mite to the nation unless they received basic education. This petition was filed by M.C Mehta by invoking Article 32 of the Constitution to protect the children engaging in child labour in the factories of Sivakasi. The workplace conditions of the match manufacturing industry were extremely hazardous for children and as a result many deaths occurred. The Court also gave directions for the constitution of a committee which would consist of three advocates to study the plight of children in these factories and in general within the State of Tamil Nadu. The Court took cognizance of various committee reports that had been proposed by various stakeholders. 

Impact

This being a case that dealt with a prominent societal issue, the impact this had on society has to be also examined. 

The Court noted that Sivakasi was not the only centre employing child labour, across India, in three hundred different industries at least thirteen thousand children were being engaged in child labour. According to the 1971 census, 4.66 per cent of the child population in India consisted of working children. There were also many other reports that highlighted the gravity of the situation. In this case the Supreme Court dealt with not only the issue in the Sivakasi establishments but throughout the whole of India.

Constitutional mandates

  • Article 24 of the Constitution mandates that there should be no child under the age of fourteen working in any hazardous situation.
  • Article 39(f) of the Constitution states that children should be given adequate facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity.
  • Article 41 provides for the right to work, right to education and the right to public assistance. These rights have to be enforced by the State for the benefit of the citizens. 
  • Article 45 is the provision for providing free and compulsory education for children until they reach the age of fourteen. 

Analysing the above mentioned articles, one would unequivocally come to the viewpoint that the best interest of the children is of paramount importance for our nation and it is highlighted in such manner in the Constitution. 

Statutory provisions

  • Section 24 of the Plantation Labour Act, 1951, mandated that no child under the age of twelve shall be allowed to work in any plantation.
  • Section 67 of the Factories Act, 1948, mandated that no child below the age of fourteen shall be allowed to work in any factory.
  • Section 21 of Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961, mandates that no child can be allowed to work in any capacity in any motor transport undertaking. 
  • Section 3 of the Apprentices Act, 1961, mandates that no individual under the age of fourteen shall be qualified for apprenticeship training in any trade.

Issues

  • Should primacy be given to the right to work over the rights of children. What is the optimal method to approach this dilemma?

Judgement

  • The Supreme Court came to the conclusion that there were many reasons for child employment but emphasised that poverty is the leading cause.
  • The Court held that the prima-facie answer to the problem of child labour, which is education; is not the actual solution. Even if education was provided on a large scale the children in poor families would not receive any education. 
  • The Court stated that the least they could do to enforce the rights of children was the strict adherence to the Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986.
  • There is a strong case for primacy to be given to the right to work and what has been provided in Article 47 relating to raising the standard of living of the population. Here the Supreme Court said that primacy should be given to the rights of the children so that the future of our nation is safe. 

The Tamil Nadu Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Rules, 1975

Objective

This Act has the primary intent of protecting the interests of the labourers that have been employed on a contractual basis by their principal employer. The Act also protects the welfare of the contractors by providing guidelines and regulations for the employment and subsequently working conditions of the labourers. The provisions under the ambit of this Act are extremely wide, and the crucial ones have been enunciated below.

State Advisory Board

Composition

  • The State Advisory Board shall consist of a Chairman who is appointed by the Government.
  • There should be an official representing the government on the board.
  • Two people representing the public sector and private sector should be present on the Board. There should also be two people representing the contractors.
  • The Board should also have six representatives of the trade unions.

Term of Office

  • An official member of the Board shall hold office at the pleasure of the Government, the same applies for non-official members.
  • If a member is unable to attend a meeting of the Board, he shall intimate the Government in writing as to the cause of his absence and any decision that is taken in his absence shall be binding upon him too.

Resignation, cessation, disqualification and meetings

  • A member shall send a letter addressed to the Chairman of the Board as to when the member wishes to vacate his seat from the Board.
  • If a member without sufficient cause fails to attend three consecutive meetings of the Board, he shall cease to be a member of the Board.
  • A person shall be disqualified from nomination or as continuing as a member if he is insolvent or of unsound sound or if he has been convicted of an offence.
  • The Chairman decides the seat of the meeting and he also presides over all the meetings of the Board. 
  • The notice for conducting a meeting should be sent to all the members at least fifteen days before the meeting. In case of an emergency meeting, a notice shall be sent at least seven days before the meeting takes place.

Registration

  • The application for registration under this Act should be submitted to the Registering Officer with the appropriate jurisdiction. All applications should be accompanied by the treasury receipt showing payment of fees for registering the establishment.
  • For granting a certificate of registration, the following particulars must be present in the form:
  • The address of the establishment,
  • The name under which the establishment shall be known,
  • The type of trade and business to be carried on at the establishment,
  • The application submitted may be rejected by the registering officer if the application is not complete or if the applicant fails to submit any document that has been requested by the officer.
  • If an amendment to the certificate of registration has to be made, the original certificate along with the intended change and the treasury certificate showing the payment of the appropriate fee should be sent to the registering officer.
  • The licensing officer should make a decision within thirty days as to whether the licence has been accepted or refused. If no order has been passed within the stipulated time period, the licence is deemed to be granted.
  • Every licence that has been granted under this Act is deemed to be valid for a period of two years. For renewal of a licence, an application has to be made three months before the date of expiry.

Health and welfare

  • The contractor shall provide an adequate amount of restrooms for the workers, within seven days of the establishment of hiring them. The restrooms should also be split on a gender basis and proper ventilation should be ensured in all the restrooms. 
  • If there are more than one hundred workers employed, canteens should be provided by the contractor. The canteen should easily be able to accommodate at least thirty per cent of the workers employed at a time, and its premises should be kept clean at all times. 
  • The canteen shall be run on a ‘no-profit, no loss’ basis. The prices of the dishes served should be clearly visible to the workers.
  • A sufficient amount of latrines should also be made available to the workers. There should be separate latrines for male and female workers, these latrines should also be partitioned off for privacy and shall have a proper door and fastenings.
  • Every establishment that comes under the purview of this Act shall have a First Aid Kit and there should be no less than one kit for one hundred and fifty labourers.

Wages and registers

  • The wages shall be fixed by the contractor with the concurrence of the labourer. The wage period should not exceed one month and the wages should be paid within three days of the expiration of this period.
  • The wages to be paid to an employee should be paid directly to him or any person authorised by him. 
  • Every contractor should maintain a register of the wages paid and these records should be certified by the labourer. All the registers that are to be kept under this Act should be kept in Tamil or English.

Related case laws

Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. The Deputy Chief Commissioner of Labour (Central) & Ors

Facts and history

The petitioner was a company incorporated under the Companies Act and has numerous telephone exchanges throughout the state of Tamil Nadu. The primary business it is engaged in is the maintenance and installation of telephone lines and cables. For the purpose of carrying out the business, the company has employed many employees under the company’s name. For carrying out housekeeping, cleaning, etc., the petitioner obtained a Certificate of Registration under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. The contractors have the obligation to pay the contract labourers the amount fixed by the District Collectors, which shall vary from time to time. The work done by the employees of the company and those engaged on a contractual basis are of totally different nature. The work done by the non-employees of the company is unskilled work and this work is not essential for the company. The only ones the petitioner has on the contract labourers is to make sure that they receive their wages in a timely manner. The minimum wages fixed by the District Collectors of respective districts are generally higher than the minimum wages fixed by the Ministry of Labour. The second respondent is not a recognized union and as such it has no locus standi in the case.

Procedure

  • The petitioner alleged that the wages fixed by the District collector under the Tamil Nadu Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Rules, 1975, are legally valid and proper. However the first respondent has unilaterally fixed the wages to be paid to the contract labourers and hence this petition has been filed.
  • The second respondent (the Union), had raised its voice for the workers of BSNL because the workers there were receiving substandard wages. 
  • The petitioner contended that they had no control over fixing the wages for the labourers. 
  • The petitioner relied on the judgement in Allied Industries v. E.S.I. Corporatio (1993), wherein it was held that the order of the authority has to be remitted and set aside and the wages made paid to the appellants has to be redetermined, upon any inferment.
  • It became clear, after examination of much evidence and records, that the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central) is the competent authority to determine the wages rates, holidays, hours of work and other conditions of service of the contract workers. 
  • The petitioner raised the contention that the minimum rates fixed by the District Collector alone would apply and the minimum wage applied by the Government of India would not apply. 
  • The respondent contended that the work done by the contract labourers are of a similar nature to the work done by the employees. The contention that the contractors had no control over the work of the contract labourer and hence no control over the payment of their wages were also repudiated.

Issues

  • Whether contracted labourers should be receiving the same remuneration as regular employees or not.

Judgement

  • In the present case it was held that, after taking into account the fact that the contract workers were engaged in work for less than eight hours a day would make them only eligible for payment on a pro rata basis.
  • The writ petition has been dismissed with no costs implied.

Significance and recent developments

As has been enunciated time and time again in the cases above, the Tamil Nadu Labour laws plays an impertinent role in the development and moreover the maintenance of decorum among the labour fraternity of Tamil Nadu. The Acts concern themselves with almost all the nuances of any aspect of labour, from the setting up of shops to the setting up of trade unions and the closure of these establishments, have all been regulated by the labour laws. This framework is slightly delicate as can be seen in the upset of the framework by the new Union labour codes that have been introduced. 

The new Union Codes

In 2019 and 2020 the Union Government had replaced 29 central labour laws with four labour codes, namely, Code on Wages (2019), Code on Social Security (2020), Industrial Relations Code (2020) and the Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code (2020), these dealt with worker safety, industrial relations, social security and safety of workers. The workers in Tamil Nadu would have a lot to lose if these Codes were implemented because it would destroy certain rights which they had worked extensively for. These labour codes are yet to be implemented as they face some difficulties in implementation in certain states.

There are eighteen boards in Tamil Nadu established under The Tamil Nadu Manual Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Work) Act 1982 and these boards offer several benefits to workers including old age pension, educational assistance for children and maternity assistance. There are also two boards that have just been announced for the salt and gig-workers and these boards provide sector specific benefits. There are also eighteen other boards that have been constituted for the welfare of the labourers, although labour welfare boards are not unique to Tamil Nadu, their multiplicity definitely furthers the interests of the citizens. In the new labour codes there is no clause to ensure regulation upon the working conditions of the workers, there is an absence of any clause that states that welfare boards will be protected. 

There is a rough estimate that ninety three percent of India’s workforce is in the informal sector, the number stands at more than two crore in Tamil Nadu. As per the estimates of the Tamil Nadu Labour Welfare and Skill Development Department, about forty lakh workers are registered with unorganised workers welfare boards. The concerns of the labourers have almost been wholly ignored in the new codes. The framework that has been established by the Tamil Nadu Welfare Department that protects the rights of workers in the unorganised sector is most ideal and it has to be protected by the concerned authorities. 

The 2021 Foxconn protests in Tamil Nadu saw thousands of young contract worker women demanding better wages, working conditions and actual contracts. The new code is in no way reassuring to the contract workers as the Contract Labour Act of 1970 which had been absorbed into the new code provided many safeguards which are absent in the new codes. The new codes vaguely defined that the workers are to receive welfare schemes and did not specify in what way they would receive the amounts under these “welfare schemes”. The framework that has been established  by the Tamil Nadu labour department is definite and it supports the rights of the workers and the calculation of the amounts to be distributed to the workers is also mentioned. The support to the unorganised framework comes despite the neglect from the Central Government. 

While the labour codes are still pending, industrial states have eased labour laws, especially those relating to worker welfare and conditions. Tamil Nadu has extended the working hours from eight to twelve. States like Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh are looking forward to making similar changes like this. However, Tamil Nadu had not eased the working conditions of those labourers working in hazardous conditions and the weekly working hours were still capped at forty eight. This allows establishments to implement the four day work week, this has to be with the consent of the workers. The new code affects major industrial states like Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Haryana and West Bengal and as such they are yet to frame and notify them. Another aspect that could change is the ideology imposed by the government. The Tamil Nadu government had emphasised federalism and social justice for a considerable period of time. Many of the features of the new code like setting threshold for application of social security schemes, retrenchment and closure, specifying safety standards has been delegated to the State Government for deliberation and codification into laws. The government of Tamil Nadu being a fervent follower of federalism should subject themselves to the new labour codes that would undermine the sea of worker safety that has been provided to the workers. It is also imperative that the Tamil Nadu government ensures the continuation of the welfare boards in Tamil Nadu as it is a cardinal tenet of their framework. The Tamil Nadu government was also hostile to the proposal of a floor wage. 

The framework established by the Tamil Nadu Labour Acts is more than capable of dealing with any issue dealing with worker safety, worker welfare, etc., any transgression on the autonomy of this already functioning system would be a travesty. As can be seen in the above passages, the labour Acts have a definite system of appeals and authorities of first hearings and also proper distribution systems for welfare funds and provident funds. All this is harmoniously brought into one concoction and it works extremely well and it gives us the framework we see today.

Conclusion

As is evident from the article above, there are a multitude of labour laws that are in effect in Tamil Nadu at the present moment. These laws may be enacted by the Central Government or State Government and enforced by them independently or jointly. Some of the Central acts in power in Tamil Nadu are also amended to adapt to the socio-economic situation prevailing in Tamil Nadu. It is imperative that these statutes be amended periodically to safeguard the interests of both employees and employers. A congenial relationship between the Acts enacted by the centre and state is extremely important to ensure the smooth functioning of both systems. 

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

Are there multiple labour laws enacted by the Tamil Nadu government?

Yes, there are multiple labour laws enacted by the Tamil Nadu Government for the regulation of establishments and to protect the interest of the labourers that have been employed in those establishments.

Is the Central labour laws working in congruence with the State labour laws?

Yes, although Central labour laws and State labour laws are separate legislations, they work in consonance with each other for the welfare of the workers and employees.

When did the Tamil Nadu Labour Department come into force?

The Tamil Nadu Labour Department has been working since the 1920s and during the initial days, they primarily looked after the welfare of non-industrial labour and subsequently diverged into other sectors of labour. 

How do Tamil Nadu labour laws address broader issues such as child labour, forced labour, and other forms of exploitation in the workforce?

There are provisions in many of the Acts applicable in the state that address child labour. In many of the Acts, the definition of a ‘child’ varies. 

What role does the Labour Department play in upholding and enforcing labour laws across Tamil Nadu?

Even though there are provisions for inspectors or Boards that oversee the implementation and efficacy of the Acts within the state, it is crucial that a labour Department overlooks the entirety of the labour sector in Tamil Nadu; the implementation of the labour Acts is also the responsibility of the State Government. 

References


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Enforcement of arbitral awards

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arbitral

The article has been written by Samiksha Singh. This article discusses the concept of the enforcement of both domestic and foreign awards in India. Before dealing with the process of enforcement, this article firstly gives a brief overview of the law, that is, the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, in order to discuss important concepts that lead up to the making of the award. It then goes on to discuss in detail the questions surrounding the procedure, limitations, and challenges faced in the enforcement of domestic as well as foreign arbitral awards in India.

This article has been published by Shashwat Kaushik.

Table of Contents

Introduction

Arbitration is one of the oldest mechanisms for the settlement of disputes and has long been preferred for its potential to resolve disputes without the need to litigate before traditional courts. Arbitration, like other mechanisms of settlement of disputes such as mediation, conciliation, etc., is a type of alternative dispute resolution method. Arbitration, in some aspects, resembles a trial proceeding before traditional courts. It resembles a trial since both parties present and argue their case like they would in a trial. Further, after hearing both parties, the arbitrator, like a judge, forms an opinion and passes a judgement, which in arbitration is referred to as an award. The enforcement of this arbitral award made by the arbitral tribunal is like a decree of the court. Thus, fundamentally speaking, one can say that since arbitration resembles a trial proceeding in so many ways, it is similar to a judicial process. However, it would also not be an overstatement to say that arbitration betters trial litigation in many respects. While there are many reasons to say so, briefly and primarily, it is because not only do the parties have the autonomy to nominate their own arbitrators, but also the very process is much faster, flexible, more relaxed in procedural aspects, neutral, confidential, and expeditious in terms of disposal of the issues and issuance of awards. It is therefore a top choice for big companies that seek a speedy, and more confidential resolution of their disputes. 

Arbitration is governed and regulated by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter “1996 Act”). The first part, that is, Part I, titled “Arbitration” deals with domestic arbitration. The second part, on the other hand, that is, Part II, titled “Enforcement of Certain Foreign Awards” deals with foreign awards. Part II is further subdivided into two chapters. The first chapter, Chapter I, provides a mechanism to enforce those awards that are made in pursuance of the New York Convention. The second chapter, Chapter II, on the other hand, provides the process of enforcing those awards that are made in pursuance of the Geneva Convention.

Arbitration agreement

Section 2(1)(b) of the 1996 Act defines an “arbitration agreement,” stating that it is an agreement provided under Section 7 of the 1996 Act. Section 7 of the 1996 Act, in effect, provides exhaustively as to what would constitute a valid arbitration agreement. Thus, it is:

  • An agreement by virtue of which parties submit “all” or “certain” disputes to arbitration.
  • Such disputes may be ‘existing’ at the time of making the agreement or may arise in the ‘future’.
  • These disputes should arise between parties in connection with a “defined legal relationship.” This relationship need not necessarily be contractual in nature.
  • The parties can enter into an arbitration agreement either by only incorporating a clause in the contract or by entering into a separate arbitration agreement altogether.
  • The agreement must be in written form. For the purpose of this requirement, an arbitration agreement would be construed to be in written format if it is recorded in any form. It may be a signed document or contained in an exchange of letters, telegrams, etc. between the parties, or it may even be in the statement of claim or defence. Simply put, it should be recorded in a “written” format in any way that shows the existence of an arbitration agreement between the parties. 

Contents of an arbitration agreement

Generally, the following are provided for in an arbitration agreement:

  • Place or seat of arbitration: An arbitration agreement provides the juridical place or seat of arbitration. Seat is important because it is the courts located at the juridical place of arbitration that have the jurisdiction to entertain any application or appeal during the continuance of the arbitration proceedings. As an example, an Indian-seated international commercial arbitration may have its legal seat in New Delhi or any other place within India.
  • Process of appointing arbitrators: Parties have the autonomy to choose their own procedure for the appointment of arbitrators. In this, for example, the parties may opt for a tribunal comprising three arbitrators, wherein each party would have the right to nominate one arbitrator. Further, the process of appointing the third arbitrator may require that the third or presiding arbitrator be appointed with the agreement of the two arbitrators. 
  • Number of arbitrators: Arbitration proceedings are generally carried out by a sole arbitrator or a total of three arbitrators. For domestic arbitrations governed by Part I of the 1996 Act, Section 10 specifies that the parties are at liberty to agree upon the number of arbitrators; however, the total number of such arbitrators constituting the tribunal must be an odd number. 
  • Language of arbitration: Such types of clauses are more prevalent in instances of foreign-seated arbitrations wherein the parties have different nationalities. Hence, there is a need to agree upon a common language that would govern the proceedings. 
  • Type of arbitration: An arbitration could be of multiple types, including institutional, ad hoc, or fast-track arbitration. 
  • Name and Address of the Arbitral Institution: In case the parties agree to opt for institutional arbitration, the agreement may specify the name and address of the institution governing the arbitration. India, too, has its own institutes that conduct and regulate institutional arbitration. For example, the Delhi International Arbitration Centre, the Mumbai Centre for International Arbitration, etc.
  • Procedure regulating the arbitration proceedings: Arbitration is generally very flexible in terms of procedure. If the parties opt for institutional arbitration, the institutional rules govern and regulate the arbitration proceedings. In the event that the parties proceed with ad hoc arbitration, they have the autonomy to agree on the procedure that would govern the proceedings.

Principles to identify an arbitration agreement

While Section 7 of the 1996 Act essentially provides what would constitute an arbitration agreement, there has always been ample dispute between the parties on the question of whether they actually agreed to have their disputes resolved by arbitration or not. The reason for this is that once an intention to proceed with arbitration for the resolution of disputes is made out by an interpretation of the contract, the parties mandatorily have to go for arbitration. They cannot later back out. Thus, it becomes important to understand what agreements would be construed as arbitration agreements. In the case of Jagdish Chander v. Ramesh Chander (2007), the Supreme Court listed certain principles to identify an arbitration agreement. These essentials were:

  • Upon construction of the terms of the agreement, there should be a clear indication that the parties intend to submit their disputes for resolution by a private tribunal. There should further be a clear indication that they also intended to be bound by the decision of the tribunal. A mere possibility to submit to arbitration would not suffice; there should be a clear, definitive indication to submit to arbitration.
  • If the attributes of a valid arbitration agreement are met, that is,
    • It is in writing.
    • The parties agreed and intended to submit their differences for resolution by a private tribunal.
    • That private tribunal has the power to adjudicate the disputes impartially, affording each party equal opportunity to argue and present their case, and
    • Parties are in agreement that they would be bound by the decision of that private tribunal.

If these requisites are met, then it is irrelevant whether the terms “arbitration”, “arbitrator” etc. have or have not been used in the contractual clause dealing with the settlement of disputes. The emphasis is on the substance of the agreement and not the form of such an agreement.

  • In cases where the word “arbitration” is expressly used, it is not essential that the attributes mentioned above also have to be specified for such an arbitration agreement to be valid. Nonetheless, if the clause in the contract for settlement of disputes uses words or expressions that derogate from the attributes of arbitration, then that too would not be a valid arbitration agreement merely because the word “arbitration” has been used. For example, if the clause states that the authority could decide the substance of the dispute without any hearing or without any submissions by the parties, then that would not be a valid arbitration agreement. 
  • Merely using the term “arbitration” would also not make a clause in the contract a valid arbitration agreement. The clause should show the clear, express, and definite intention of the parties that they would only opt to resolve their disputes through arbitration whenever a dispute arises between them. If the arbitration clause instead leaves it up to the parties to once again make a choice whether they want to go for arbitration, it would not be a valid arbitration clause. Further, if the clause gives various options to the parties to resolve their dispute and “arbitration” is only a “possibility”, that again would not be a valid arbitration agreement. 

Arbitral award

The tribunal hears both parties, and after doing so, it applies the law to the case at hand, forms an opinion, and makes a decision. This decision is referred to as an “award.” The term “arbitral award,” however, is not defined anywhere in the 1996 Act. There is only a mere reference to the term “arbitral award” under Section 2(1)(c) of the 1996 Act, which is to say that an arbitral award would also include an interim award. Further, Section 31(6) of the 1996 Act empowers an arbitral tribunal to pass an interim award at any time during the continuance of the proceedings. This interim award can be based on any matter on which the tribunal may pass a final award. 

Categorisation of arbitral awards

Arbitral awards can be categorised as follows:

Domestic award

The term domestic award has not been defined under the 1996 Act. However, Section 2(7) of the 1996 Act provides that any award that is made under Part I of the Act would be considered to be a domestic award. Simply put, any award that is the outcome of an arbitration held in India whose proceedings themselves were carried on in consonance with Part I of the 1996 Act would be construed to mean a domestic award. As already discussed earlier, the scheme of the 1996 Act is such that Part I of the Act only governs and applies to those arbitrations whose juridical seat or place of arbitration is India. It is thus safe to say that Section 2(7) of the 1996 Act is clearly based on the principle of territoriality to classify what constitutes a domestic award. The outcome of Section 2(7) simply is that even in instances of international commercial arbitration, if the arbitration itself takes place in India, that is to say, has its seat in India, then such arbitration would be governed by Part I of the 1996 Act. Further, the outcome of such an arbitration would be termed a “domestic award.” Part I of the 1996 Act, encompassing Sections 2 to 43, lays down the legal framework for governing and regulating domestic arbitrations. 

Foreign award  

Part II of the 1996 Act provides the manner in which the enforcement of foreign awards would be carried out in India. Part II deals with only those arbitrations whose juridical seat is located outside India. This part consists of two chapters. The first chapter, that is, Chapter I, encapsulating Sections 44-52, provides the legal framework for dealing with the enforcement of the New York Convention awards. The second chapter, that is, Chapter II, comprising Sections 53-60, deals with the enforcement of Geneva Convention Awards.

In Chapter I, which deals with the enforcement of New York Convention Awards, the term “foreign award” is defined in Section 44 of the 1996 Act. As per Section 44: 

  • A foreign award is one that is made based on differences between the parties.
  • This difference must emanate from a legal relationship between the parties. However, it is not necessary that such a relationship be contractual in nature. This only means that even if parties are related by virtue of a tortious relationship, that too would fall under the purview of Section 44. 
  • Further, such differences between the parties must be recognised as commercial under Indian law. 
  • Section 44(a) and (b) further provide that the award must result from an agreement that is in writing and the award itself must be made in a territory to which the New York Convention applies, respectively. For the purpose of Section 44(b) of the 1996 Act, “territory” to which such a convention applies would be one that the central government declares by virtue of a notification in the official gazette.

For the purposes of Chapter II, which deals with the enforcement of Geneva Convention Awards, the term “foreign award” is defined under Section 53 of the 1996 Act. Herein, an award would be qualified as a foreign award when:

  • It is based on differences between parties on such matters that are considered commercial under Indian law.
  • The award must be the result of an arbitration agreement to which the Second Schedule of the 1996 Act is applicable (the Convention provided under the Second Schedule is the Geneva Protocol, 1923).
  • Both parties must belong to different jurisdictions. However, those jurisdictions must be declared to be parties to the Geneva Convention of 1927. For the aforesaid Section 53, “jurisdictions” that would be construed to be parties would be ones that the Central Government, by virtue of a notification in the Official Gazette, declares. This Convention has been reproduced under the Third Schedule of the 1996 Act.
  • The arbitral award itself should be made in one of those territories where the convention provided under the Third Schedule is applicable. Here too, it would be the Central Government that would make a declaration through a notification as to which territories the Convention is applicable. The Central Government would make such a declaration only upon its satisfaction that reciprocal promises have been made.

Conditions of a valid award

For an award to be valid, it must meet the following requisites:

  • Be made pursuant to a valid arbitration agreement.
  • The parties were afforded equal opportunity to submit and argue their case. Moreover, they must have had proper notice of the constitution of the tribunal and the appointment of arbitrators.
  • The award itself should not travel beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement. It must deal with the dispute as contemplated by the arbitration agreement.
  • The composition of the arbitral tribunal must be in conformity with the agreement between the parties.
  • The dispute should be arbitrable, and the award should not be against the public policy of the enforcing country.
  • Further, the arbitral tribunal must pass an award that is reasoned unless the parties agree otherwise.

Essential elements of a valid award

As per Section 31 of the 1996 Act, the following elements are necessary for an arbitral award to be construed as valid:

  • Firstly, the arbitral award must be in written form.
  • Secondly, it must be signed by the members of the tribunal. However, it is pertinent to mention that the signatures of all members are not mandatory to make an award valid. In the event that the arbitral tribunal is composed of more than one arbitrator, it is not mandatory that the signatures of all the members be provided. If the majority of the members of the tribunal provide their signature, that shall suffice so long as the arbitrator who has not signed provides the reason behind such an omission. 
  • Thirdly, the award must be a reasoned one. 
  • Fourthly, the award should provide the date of passing the award. As per Section 31 of the 1996 Act, the award should also provide the place at which it was made. For the purposes of this requirement, it would be deemed that the award was made at the seat or place of arbitration determined in line with Section 20 of the 1996 Act.

Thus, by virtue of Section 31 of the 1996 Act, any award that fails to meet the requirements specified under Section 31 may be declared invalid.

Enforcement of domestic awards

The process for enforcement of a domestic award is provided in Section 36 of the 1996 Act. Once the award attains finality in terms of Section 35 of the 1996 Act, the parties may approach the appropriate court for enforcement of the award. 

Finality of an award

Every arbitration proceeding has one ultimate objective, which is to result in an award that is both valid and enforceable. For this reason, the final award must be such that it fully decides all the issues and differences that had arisen between the parties and were in dispute between the parties, which they had ultimately raised for determination in the arbitration proceeding. Section 35 of the 1996 Act confers the status of finality on an arbitral award. It goes on to state that an arbitral award shall be final and binding not just on those who have been parties to the arbitration proceedings but also on every person claiming under the parties. Therefore, this arbitral award that has attained finality and which has decided all the differences raised and in dispute between the parties would be binding on the parties as well as those other persons who seek to claim through the parties.

In fact, a three judge bench of the Apex Court examined the scope of Section 35 in the case of Cheran Properties Limited v. Kasturi and Sons Limited (2018). The observation made with regard to the scope of this section was that Section 35 of the 1996 Act essentially widens the scope of who may be bound by an arbitral award. It does so by binding not only those who have been parties to the arbitration proceeding but also those who derive their authority through the parties to the proceedings. 

Applicability of the principle of res judicata to an award

Section 31 of the 1996 Act provides what would constitute the form and contents of an arbitral award. Any arbitral award, in order to be binding and enforceable against the parties and their privies, must be valid in nature. For any award to be valid, it must:

  • One, decide definitively all the claims submitted by the parties for determination by the tribunal. 
  • Two, it must be in accordance with Section 31 of the 1996 Act.

The scheme of the law is that the rules of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “CPC, 1908”) and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as “IEA, 1872”) would not be applicable to arbitration proceedings in line with Section 19 of the 1996 Act. Yet, the spirit of these laws, in as much as the principles of estoppel and res judicata provided under Section 115 of the IEA, 1872, and Section 11 of the CPC, 1908, respectively, would be applicable.

Enforcement of an arbitral award

After the arbitral tribunal forms an opinion and subsequently passes the award, the award may be challenged in accordance with the grounds provided under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. If a challenge to the award has been made and is unsuccessful, or if the grounds under Section 34 of the 1996 Act have not been made out, the award attains finality in terms of Section 35 of the 1996 Act. Further, as already discussed above, this final award becomes binding on both the parties to the proceedings and their privies who claim through the parties. 

Scheme of enforcement in the Indian Arbitration Act, 1899

The process of enforcement in the now-repealed Indian Arbitration Act, 1899, was provided under Section 15. According to the repealed Section 15 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1899, this award, unless it is set aside or remitted back for reconsideration, would be enforceable like a decree of the Court. There was no requirement to obtain a formal decree after the passing of a final award for it to be enforceable. The final award itself was to be enforced like a decree. 

In this regard, a question arose as to whether the principles of CPC, 1908, would be applied in enforcing awards under the Indian Arbitration Act, 1899, or not. The answer to this question was provided by the Calcutta High Court in the case of Gladstone Wyllie v. Joosub Peer Mahomed (1923). The Hon’ble Court observed that although Section 15 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1899 in itself did not make a mention of the applicability of the CPC, 1908 for the purposes of enforcement of the arbitral award, when the legislature provided that the award on being filed must be enforced in a way where the award was to be deemed as a decree of the Court, then there was an implied intention on the part of the legislature that the CPC, 1908 be applied for the purposes of enforcing the award.

Scheme of enforcement in the Arbitration Act, 1940

The position regarding enforcement in the Arbitration Act, 1940, was different from the earlier Indian Arbitration Act, 1899. Unlike the 1899 Act, where there was no requirement of obtaining a formal decree, under the 1940 Arbitration Act, in order to get an award enforced, the parties had to first, obtain a judgement and then subsequently a decree in line with the award. Section 17 of the repealed 1940 Arbitration Act provided that when the Court did not find any cause to set aside or remit the award, it would then go on to first pronounce a judgement in accordance with the award. After doing so, the court would then proceed to pronounce a decree. Thus, if the parties sought to enforce the award, they could only do so after obtaining a judgement and a subsequent decree from the Court in line with the terms of the award.

Enforcement under the 1996 Act: Position prior to the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015

The position under the unamended Section 36 of the 1996 Act was partially similar to the position under Section 15 of the repealed Indian Arbitration Act, 1899. The similarity between these two statutes was regarding the manner of enforceability of awards under these two statutes. In the 1996 Act as well, the award was once again made enforceable as if it were a decree of the Court. Unlike the requirement under Section 17 of the repealed Arbitration Act, 1940, there was no prerequisite of first obtaining a judgement and subsequently obtaining a decree from the Court in line with the award for seeking enforcement of the award. 

Further, prior to the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, an award could only be enforced when the objections for setting aside the award under Section 34 of the 1996 Act were dismissed. Therefore, previously, in the unamended Section 36, if merely a challenge under Section 34 of the 1996 Act was preferred, there was an automatic stay on the enforcement of such awards.

In fact, the Supreme Court was presented with an opportunity to discuss the discretionary power of the courts in enforcing an award once that award had been challenged by any party under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. Here, in the case of National Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. Pressteel and Fabrications Pvt. Ltd. (2003), the Apex Court observed that once a challenge under Section 34 of the 1996 Act was made, the award could not be executed. In fact, the courts did not possess any discretion to pass any interlocutory order with reference to the award. If at all, the Court may only adjudicate upon the correctness of the claim. The pendency of a challenge under Section 34 of the 1996 Act only meant that the award holder could not even seek a direction from the Court, even if it were only a direction requiring the award debtor to make any deposit to the Court of any part of the award. Going with this logic, it only meant that if a challenge under Section 34 of the 1996 Act lasted several years, then the award would also automatically stand suspended from execution for those many years. This defeated the very objective of arbitration, which was an expeditious resolution of disputes. 

Enforcement under the 1996 Act: Position after the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015

The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, was a significant step taken towards the enforcement of arbitral awards. This Amendment in 2015 substituted the earlier Section 36 of the 1996 Act. Following the implementation of the 2015 amendment, there was no longer an automatic stay or suspension of the award. Unlike the position prior to the 2015 Amendment Act, a mere filing of a challenge under Section 34 of the 1996 Act did not mean that the award would automatically be stayed, thereby making it unenforceable. In order to stay the award, the party was required to file a separate application praying for an order of stay. The Court, after recording the reasons for stay in writing, may grant a stay and impose such conditions as it may deem fit. 

Further, if there was an award for payment of money, the proviso to Section 36(3) laid down that in such cases, the Court would have regard to the provisions of the stay of money decree provided under CPC, 1908. Now, a question may arise whether in cases of payment of money in an arbitral award, are the courts required to mandatorily adhere to the provisions of CPC, 1908, since Section 36(3) of the 1996 Act uses the term “have due regard to”? This question was answered by the Apex Court in Pam Developments Private Limited v. State of West Bengal (2019), wherein the Hon’ble Court interpreted the phrase “have due regard to.” The Supreme Court, while doing so, made a clear distinction between the terms “in accordance with” and “have due regard to.” The Apex Court noted that the very fact that the legislature incorporated the phrase “have due regard to” and not “in accordance with” signified that the legislature only intended that the Court had regard to the provisions of CPC, 1908, as a guiding factor and not as a mandatory requirement. Further, the Court pointed out that the provisions of the CPC, 1908, would apply only in as much as they were not incompatible with the provisions of the main, self-contained statute, that is, the 1996 Act. 

Enforcement under the 1996 Act: Position after the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2021

With the introduction of the 2021 Amendment, titled the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2021, to Section 36 of the 1996 Act, a second proviso was added under Section 36(3). By virtue of this amendment, the Court could impose an unconditional stay on an award if there was an element of fraud or corruption in either the arbitration agreement or, alternatively, in the making of the award. However, before doing so, the Court must “prima facie” be satisfied that the arbitration agreement or the award was tainted with fraud or corruption. 

Creation of statutory fiction for enforcing the domestic award

In simple terms, in arbitration proceedings, there is no decree. There is only an arbitral award. This award was passed by an arbitral tribunal. Here, an important point to remember is that, unlike courts, the arbitral tribunal is a creation of the arbitration agreement. The arbitral tribunal has no existence apart from the arbitration agreement. It is therefore safe to say that the tribunal is the creation of an agreement between the parties to have their differences resolved by arbitration. So, it can also be said that the tribunal’s jurisdiction itself is derived from the arbitration agreement. Thus, while the tribunal is empowered to make an award, it does not possess the power to ensure the enforcement of that award.

For this reason, in order to enforce this award, the 1996 Act creates a statutory fiction whereby the award is deemed to be a decree. This means that an award, though not a decree, is to be treated in a manner like a decree of the Court. Subsequently, it has to be enforced in consonance with the provisions for enforcement under the CPC, 1908. As already mentioned, unlike the Arbitration Act of 1940, which required firstly a judgement and subsequently a decree to be passed in line with the award for it to be enforceable, the 1996 Act does not require courts to go through this process since, by virtue of the statutory fiction, a final award is already enforceable, similar to a decree of the Court. The rationale behind imposing such a statutory fiction is to ensure a mechanism for the enforcement of arbitral awards. This is because, unlike courts, arbitral tribunals do not possess the power to ensure the enforcement or execution of the awards. 

Now, just because Section 36 of the 1996 Act uses the phrase “as if it were a decree of the Court” that does not mean that an arbitral award is similar to a decree in all respects. The Bombay High Court in the case of Dhirendra Bhanu Sanghvi v. ICDS Ltd. (2003) observed that the phrase must be construed only to mean that the arbitral award would also be enforceable, just like a decree. Further, it is as conclusive and binding upon the parties as any ordinary decree.

When does the award become enforceable 

According to Section 36(1) of the 1996 Act, an arbitral award can be enforced only when the time limit for challenging the award under Section 34 of the 1996 Act has passed. This time limit for challenging the award under the grounds mentioned in Section 34 of the 1996 Act has been specified under Section 34(3). As per Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act, the arbitral award may be challenged within 3 months from the date on which the arbitral award is received. Apart from a challenge, the parties are further free to seek any correction in the award, any interpretation of the award, or any part of the award. If the parties opt for either a correction of the award or its interpretation, the limitation for such a request would be 3 months from which such a request for correction has been disposed of by the tribunal. This 3-month period provided under Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act is further extendable by a period of 30 days. However, such an extension would be provided only if the applicant satisfied the court that there existed sufficient cause which prevented the applicant from making an application challenging the arbitral award. 

Thus, subject to whether the Court has stayed the operation of the award or not, an award would be enforceable only after the time limit specified in Section 34 of the 1996 Act for challenging the award has passed, that is, 3 months, further extendable by 30 days on establishing sufficient cause. It is also pertinent to mention that the proviso to Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act provides that, upon showing sufficient cause, the court may further extend the time period for challenging the award by way of an application under Section 34 by 30 days “but not thereafter”. Does that mean that the courts would not condone a delay beyond 30 days? This clarification was made way back in the case of Union of India v. Popular Construction (2001), wherein the Apex Court observed that by incorporating this phrase, the Statute provides for an express exclusion in line with Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. Therefore, as far as the question of condonation of delay is concerned, any application for condonation of delay per Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, would not be applicable.

What is the mechanism for enforcing a settlement award

Not just an arbitral award but also a settlement award would be enforceable in a similar manner as if it were a decree of the court. Merely because the parties are undergoing arbitration, they are not barred from entering into any form of settlement. In fact, Section 30(1) of the 1996 Act rather urges parties to settle their disputes by virtue of mediation, conciliation, or any other alternative method of dispute resolution, even during the pendency of the arbitral proceedings. Section 73 of the 1996 Act lays down the provision for a settlement agreement as a consequence of conciliation between the parties. When Section 73 is read with Section 30 of the 1996 Act, it transpires that a settlement in line with Section 73 would be afforded a similar status to that of an arbitral award per Section 30 of the 1996 Act. This was also the view of the Apex Court in Mysore Cements Ltd. v. Svedala Barmac Ltd. (2003). Thus, as per Section 30(4) of the Act, such settlement agreement would be construed to be an award and shall have the same status as any other arbitral award made consequent to an arbitration proceeding and would be enforceable as if it were a decree of the Court in accordance with Section 36 of the 1996 Act.

Enforceability of ex-parte award

The tribunal is empowered to pass any ex parte award if the parties fail to appear during hearings. Consequently, the tribunal may pass an ex parte award upon consideration of the evidence before it in consonance with Section 25(c) of the 1996 Act. This ex parte award would be a valid award made in line with Section 25(c) of the 1996 Act and would be enforceable under Section 36 of the Act.

Which court can entertain an application for enforcement of an award?

The definition of court for the purposes of Part I of the 1996 Act is provided under Section 2(1)(e) of the 1996 Act. Further, Section 42 of the 1996 Act begins with a non-obstante clause and goes on to provide that, by virtue of an arbitration agreement, if any application is preferred before any court in respect of the arbitration agreement, then it is only that court that would have jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings in general and all subsequent applications in particular. On reading these two sections together, a question might arise as to which court would have the jurisdiction to enforce the award. Would it be the court that supervised the arbitration proceedings, or could any other court also have jurisdiction to enforce the award?

Further, according to Section 2(1)(e) of the 1996 Act, a court would imply any court that has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the arbitration. It is not necessary that there be only one court that has jurisdiction over the subject matter. More than one court could have subject-matter jurisdiction over the arbitration. In that respect, since more than one court has jurisdiction, a further question also arises whether in respect of Section 42 of the 1996 Act, the court in which any application is first made pursuant to the arbitration agreement, whether that court alone would have exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the award? Further, if the award has to be enforced in some other place, let’s say in some other state where the assets of the parties are located, would the award holder have to obtain a transfer decree from the court having exclusive jurisdiction? 

In the case of Daelim Industrial Co. Ltd. v. Numaligarh Refinery Ltd. (2009), it was the observation of the Delhi High Court that, for the purposes of enforcement, the definition provided under Section 2(1)(e) of the 1996 Act would not be applicable. This is because the term “court” used in Section 36 is not to confer any territorial jurisdiction upon a court to enforce the award but only to create a legal fiction by virtue of which an arbitral award is statutorily given the force of a decree to ease its enforcement. Thus, the term “court” in Section 36 has a different significance from “court” in Section 2(1)(e) of the 1996 Act.

This issue was finally settled in the case of Sundaram Finance Limited v. Abdul Samad and Anr. (2018). Here, the Apex Court observed that an award is to be enforced in conformity with the provisions of the CPC, 1908, in a similar manner “as if it were a decree of the Court”. However, the Supreme Court made a distinction here by stating that even though the enforcement is to be carried out as if it were a decree, the award itself cannot be said to be a decree of any court. This is because no court is passing that award. Therefore, the enforcement of the award could thus be initiated anywhere where such a decree can be enforced. The Apex Court further observed that there was no need to obtain any transfer of decree from the Court, which supervised the proceeding and possessed exclusive jurisdiction. This is for the simple reason that just because the Court had exclusive jurisdiction to entertain certain applications and appeals does not mean that the award in itself is a decree of that Court or any Court for that matter. By virtue of statutory fiction, it is only deemed to be enforceable like a decree of a civil court. The Court thereby affirmed the view taken in Daelim Industrial Co. Ltd. v. Numaligarh Refinery Ltd. (2009) and observed that the parties need not obtain a transfer decree from the Court having jurisdiction in terms of Section 2(1)(e) of the 1996 Act. Therefore, the enforcement of such an award may be sought before any court within whose jurisdiction the assets of the award holder lie. 

Registration of domestic awards

Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908, lays down what documents would require compulsory registration. According to Section 17, any award affecting any immovable property would have to compulsorily be registered. Further, if such an arbitral award requiring compulsory registration is not registered, then the arbitral award could not be received as evidence in respect of an immovable property. 

In Satish Kumar & Ors v. Surinder Kumar & Ors (1968), it was observed by the Supreme Court that if there is any award that affects any right in respect of an immovable property, such an award would compulsorily have to be registered. 

Stamp duty on arbitral award

The Indian Stamp Act, 1899, specifically Section 3, lays down what instruments would be chargeable with stamp duty in accordance with Schedule I of the Act. In this Schedule I, Item 12 provides the stamp duty payable for awards. In accordance with Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, any instrument for which stamp has to be paid but has not been paid would not be admissible as evidence. Deriving thereby, if an arbitral award is not duly stamped, then, in accordance with Section 35, the same would not be admissible as evidence. However, the unstamped arbitral award can be validated by the payment of the deficient amount and the penalty.

Enforcement of foreign awards

Part II of the 1996 Act governs and regulates the enforcement procedures for foreign awards in India. This part is further subdivided into two chapters. Chapter I deals with the enforcement of the New York Convention Awards, 1958. It runs from Sections 44-52 of the 1996 Act. Further, Chapter II deals with the enforcement of Geneva Convention Awards. This chapter runs from Sections 53-66 of the 1996 Act.

Enforcement of New York Convention Awards

Part II, Chapter I, of the 1996 Act deals with the mode of enforcement of New York Convention Awards. Under this part, while the courts do have the power to refuse enforcement, they do not possess the power to set aside such an award. This is different from Part I of the 1996 Act, wherein, under Section 34, courts have the power to set aside the award in accordance with Section 34. Thus, in instances of foreign awards, the opposing party has no recourse against that award other than seeking its non enforcement at the time when the award holder seeks to enforce it. 

It is also pertinent to mention at this point that Section 48 of the 1996 Act, which lays down the provision for the conditions for enforcement of foreign awards, uses the term “may” refuse enforcement. This only means that the legislature has left it open to the discretion of the courts to enforce or not enforce an award even when the grounds specified under Section 48 are made out. 

It is also important to mention that while considering an enforcement petition, the court should not reapply its mind in order to second-guess the findings of the tribunal. In Shri Lal Mahal Ltd. v. Progetto Grano Spa (2013), it was observed by the Apex Court that the enforcing court is neither an appellate court nor can it inquire whether the rendering of the award is erroneous. The grounds enumerated under Section 48 of the 1996 Act, therefore, do not allow a review of the merits of the foreign award. 

Conditions for Enforcement of the New York Convention Award

The following are the conditions for the enforcement of the New York Convention Awards:

Incapacity of parties

According to Section 48(1)(a) of the 1996 Act, the enforcing court “may” refuse enforcement if: 

  • The parties to the arbitration agreement under Section 44 of the 1996 Act did not have the capacity to enter into a contract as per the law applicable to them. For example, if the law applicable here would be India, the capacity to enter into a contract would be governed by Section 11 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
  • Further, the arbitration agreement referred to in Section 44 of the 1996 Act is invalid according to the legal framework that regulates the arbitration agreement. As already mentioned, this law which governs the arbitration agreement may be the one which the parties have agreed upon, or in the absence of any such agreement between the parties, it would be the law of the place where the award was made. 

Procedural due process

According to Section 48(2)(b) of the 1996 Act, an award may be refused enforcement if:

  • The party objecting to the enforcement of the award establishes that it was not given adequate notice of the arbitrator’s appointment; or
  • The party objecting to such enforcement was given improper notice of the arbitration proceedings themselves; or
  • Such a party was otherwise unable to adequately present its case. 

For the purpose of the aforementioned section, there is no straightjacket formula to determine what would constitute procedural unfairness. This would depend on the independent circumstances of each case. Due process implies complying with the principles of natural justice, being adjudicated by a fair and impartial tribunal, or equality of treatment. However, it is pertinent to mention that a mere procedural lapse would not mean that the award would not be enforced; the procedural lapse should be such that it has an effect on the overall fairness of the proceedings. 

Jurisdictional defects

According to Section 48(1)(c) of the 1996 Act, a foreign award may be refused enforcement if:

  • The tribunal exceeded its authority in dealing with the issues, and while doing so, it dealt with such differences or disputes that were not submitted by the parties; or
  • The award went beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement.

This subsection also comes with a proviso according to which if the decisions by the arbitral tribunal on terms submitted to arbitration are separable, that is, they, can be separated from those issues which were not submitted to arbitration, then the part which deals with the decisions on matters contemplated by the submission to arbitration may be enforced. Here, the phrase “terms of submission of arbitration” implies the terms of the arbitration agreement itself. The same observation has been made in the case of Olympus Superstructures (P) Ltd. v. Meena Vijay Khetan (1999).

Defects in the composition of the tribunal or arbitral procedure

According to Section 48(1)(d) of the 1996 Act, a foreign award may be refused enforcement if either:

The tribunal’s composition; or the procedure of arbitration was contrary to what was agreed upon by the parties, or in the absence of any such agreement between the parties, it was contrary to the law of the juridical seat of arbitration. 

As far as the first condition is concerned, relating to the tribunal’s composition, it is up to the parties to choose the manner of composition of the tribunal or the total number of arbitrators. Suppose the parties agree that there should be three arbitrators in the tribunal; however, if the arbitrator appointed by only one party continues with the arbitration, then, in case of such a defect, the enforcement of the award passed by the tribunal may be refused. However, in such a scenario, it is also important that the other party refuses to take part in the proceedings at that time itself. In the event that the party now opposing the enforcement then participates in the arbitration proceedings, that party cannot be allowed to take this ground and resist the enforcement, stating that there is a defect in the tribunal’s composition. Participating in the proceedings would be considered a waiver of the subsequent right to object to such a defect in the tribunal’s composition.

Award yet to attain finality or set aside at the seat of arbitration

According to Section 48(1)(e) of the 1996 Act, the award may not be enforced if:

  • It is yet to become binding, or
  • It has been set aside or suspended by an authority competent to do so at the juridical seat of arbitration or as per the law in accordance with which the award was made.

As regards the first part, an award generally becomes binding soon after it has been made subject to any remedies, such as setting aside the award or any appeal before an appellate body.

As regards the second part, if the award is set aside at its seat, it may not be enforced. However, an award may also be suspended by the competent authority. For example, upon a request by a party to set aside the award, the competent authority may remit the award back for the tribunal’s reconsideration in order to give the tribunal an opportunity to eliminate such grounds on which the award is liable to be set aside. During that time, the competent authority may suspend the award. In such a scenario as well, the award may be refused enforcement.

Non-arbitrability of subject matter 

In consonance with Section 48(2)(a) of the 1996 Act, enforcement may be refused if the subject matter of the arbitration is non-arbitrable in India. 

Non-arbitrable disputes in India generally pertain to those matters in which the action is right in rem. In Booz Allen & Hamilton v. SBI Home Finance Limited (2011), the Apex Court made the observation that a dispute over a mortgage over an immovable property is a non-arbitrable dispute. While there is no statutory definition of what constitutes non-arbitrable matters, actions that involve a right in rem are generally considered to not be arbitrable. 

Violation of public policy 

Enforcement may also be refused if, in enforcing such an award, there would be a violation of public policy in India. The elements of “public policy” for the purposes of this section, have been enumerated under Explanation 1 of Section 48(2)(b). These are:

  • First, in the making of the award, if there existed any element of fraud or corruption, or if the same was violative of Section 75 or Section 81 of the 1996 Act,
  • Second, if the award contravenes the fundamental policy of Indian law,
  • Third, if the award conflicts with the basic notions of morality and justice. 

For the purpose of determining whether an award contravenes the fundamental policy of Indian law, Explanation 2 to Section 48(2)(b) provides that there must not be a review of the merits. 

Section 48(3)

As per Section 48(3) of the 1996 Act, the enforcing court may also refuse enforcement of the award if there has been an application for setting aside or suspension of the award in accordance with Section 48(1)(e). The Court may in such a scenario adjourn the question of enforcement of the award. Further, the Court may also order the party against whom the award is sought to be enforced to give adequate security upon an application made by the award holder. 

Enforcement under Section 49 of the 1996 Act

Section 49 of the 1996 Act provides that upon the satisfaction of the Court that the foreign award is enforceable, the foreign award would be construed to be a “decree of that Court”. Here, in Section 49, the term used is “that court.” The use of this terminology in Section 49 is quite different from the terminology used in Section 36 of the 1996 Act for enforcement of domestic awards under Part I. In Section 36, the term used is “as if it were a decree of the Court.” Contrastingly, the term used in Section 49 is “decree of that Court.” A pertinent question here would be why such a deviation was made by the legislature in Section 49 of the 1996 Act. When Section 36 uses the term decree of “the court”, why does Section 49 use the phrase “that court”? Now, in order to understand this distinction in terminology, it is important to understand the rationale behind such a measure. A domestic award is a deemed decree, but it cannot be said to be a decree of a particular court. However, under Section 49 of the 1996 Act, the Court, which decides whether the conditions for enforcement of the award specified under Section 48 of the 1996 Act are met or not, deems the foreign award to be the decree of that Court. This distinction is made because in cases of foreign-seated arbitrations wherein the parties have the autonomy to opt for a neutral seat of arbitration, it is rare to come across circumstances wherein the assets of either party are situated in the territory of the neutral country where the award has been made. So, even though the award is made in a particular country, it would subsequently have to be enforced in another country. Further, the enforcement of the award would have to be carried out according to the legal framework of the country in which the assets are situated. Therefore, it becomes extremely important that the foreign award be internationally recognised and subsequently enforced. Such recognition should not be limited just to the juridical seat of arbitration. Thus, when a party seeks enforcement of such an award in India, Section 49 of the 1996 Act firstly provides recognition to the international award by making it a decree of “that Court.” It is then subsequently enforced in India. 

Recognition of the award

The validity of an award made in a foreign-seated international commercial arbitration could be challenged in accordance with the legal framework of the juridical place of arbitration. If there has been a challenge to the award at the seat and such challenge has been unsuccessful or there has been no challenge at all and the award stands, then such a foreign award attains the status of finality and is enforceable in India as a foreign award. 

Proceeding for enforcement and execution 

There is a common procedure for enforcing and executing the foreign award. Thus, the enforcing court can decide the question of both the enforceability and execution of the award in a common proceeding. A separate proceeding for both would only result in a multiplicity of proceedings.

What is the limitation for the execution of foreign awards?

This issue regarding what would be the limitation period for the execution of foreign awards has been expressly clarified in the case of Government of India v. Vedanta Limited (2020). Before this issue was resolved by the Apex Court, various contrasting views were held by different high courts. The contrast in opinion was with regard to what would be the appropriate provision of the limitation Act that would apply to calculate limitations for the execution of foreign awards. The question was whether Article 136 of the Limitation Act or Article 137 would be applicable? In Government of India v. Vedanta Limited (2020), this issue was dealt with in detail and clarified by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Hon’ble Court clarified that the enforcement of foreign awards would fall under the residuary provision of Article 137 of the Limitation Act. Thus, the limitation for the execution of foreign awards would be three years from the time when such a right to seek execution accrues. 

Process of enforcement of the Geneva Convention Awards

Part II, Chapter II, of the 1996 Act deals with the enforcement of awards made in pursuance of the Geneva Convention. This chapter, titled “Geneva Convention Awards,” runs from Sections 53-60. This chapter, in effect, replaces the now repealed Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937. India is a signatory to both the Geneva Protocol, 1923 and the Geneva Convention, 1927. In order to put these conventions into effect in the Indian scenario, the earlier Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937, was enacted. Chapter II, Part II, of the 1996 Act is thus a replacement for the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937. While the Geneva Convention is not as prevalent as it used to be when it was enacted, it is relevant since it represents prior attempts to address the concerns and problems faced in the enforcement of foreign awards. 

Conditions for Enforcement of Geneva Convention Awards

In order to enforce a foreign award under Part II of Chapter II of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 57(1) lays down five conditions. These are:

Arbitration agreement should be valid 

Section 57(1)(a) of the 1996 Act provides that the foreign award would be liable to be enforced only if such award is made in accordance with a valid arbitration agreement. The test of the validity of the arbitration agreement would be in accordance with the law applicable to the agreement. In the event that the arbitration agreement is invalid, then the award too would not be enforceable.

Subject matter should be arbitrable 

Section 57(1)(b) of the 1996 Act provides that the subject matter of the award must be arbitrable as per Indian law. If the same is not arbitrable in accordance with Indian law, then the foreign award would not be enforceable.

Constitution of the tribunal and due process

Section 57(1)(c) of the 1996 Act provides that the award must be made by such an arbitral tribunal as was provided in the submission to arbitration by the parties. Further, the constitution of the tribunal should be in a manner as agreed by the parties. In doing so, it should also conform to such laws as are  applicable to the arbitration procedure. 

Award must be final 

Section 57(1)(d) of the 1996 Act states that the award sought to be enforced must have attained the status of finality in the country in which it was made. By finality, the provision means that the award should not be open to any form of opposition or appeal. For example, a foreign award would be considered to have attained finality if the time period for challenging the award by virtue of a proceeding had expired long before. Such an award would be considered to have attained finality and would be enforceable. 

Enforcement should not be against public policy

According to Section 57(1)(e) of the 1996 Act, if the enforcement of the foreign award is against the public policy of India, then the award would be denied enforcement in India. Further, Explanation 1 to Section 57(1)(e) clarifies what would be construed to mean public policy for the purpose of this provision. Public policy, for the purposes of Explanation 1, constitutes the following: 

  • In the making of the award, either any element of fraud or corruption was present, or the award violated Section 75 or Section 81 of the 1996 Act; or
  • The award contravenes the fundamental policy of Indian law.
  • The award conflicts with the basic notions of morality and justice.

For the purpose of determining whether an award contravenes the fundamental policy of Indian law, Explanation 2 to Section 57(1)(e) provides that there must not be a review on the merits. 

Conditions for non-enforcement under Section 57(2)

Section 57(2) of the 1996 Act provides three other grounds for refusal of enforcement of the foreign award. These are:

  • In accordance with Section 57(2) subclause (a), an award that has been set aside at its juridical seat or place of arbitration may be refused enforcement.
  • Section 57(2) subclause (b) lays down two other conditions for enforcement based on improper representation. According to this Section, if the party against whom the award is to be used could not adequately present its case either on account of untimely notice of the proceedings or because of some legal incapacity, then such an award may be refused to be enforced.
  • Section 57(2) subclause (c) provides that if the tribunal failed to deal with all the differences between the parties as per the agreement or the tribunal gave its decision on such aspects that go beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement, then the enforcement may be refused. However, in instances where the award does not deal with all the differences between the parties, a proviso to this subsection provides that the Court may either postpone the enforcement or grant the enforcement. If the Court chooses to grant the enforcement, then it may further subject the enforcement to such a guarantee as the Court decides. 

Additional grounds under Section 57(3)

Section 57(3) of the 1996 Act provides one additional condition for enforcing the award. As discussed above, under the 1996 Act, Sections 57(1)(a) and (c) and Section 57(2)(b) and (c) lay down certain conditions for enforcing the award. If the party seeks non-enforcement of the award under Section 57(3), then that party has to successfully establish that, in accordance with the law regulating the procedure of arbitration, there is some other ground except the ones already provided under Sections 57(1)(a) and (c) and Section 57(2)(b) and (c) that would entitle the opposing party to challenge the award. If the opposing party successfully proves the presence of further ground, then the court may do either of the two things:

  • Refuse enforcement, or
  • Adjourn Enforcement

If, however, the Court decides to adjourn enforcement, then it may provide a reasonable time for the opposing party to challenge the award and have it set aside by the tribunal competent to do so.

Section 58: Enforcement of the Geneva Convention Awards 

Section 58 of the 1996 Act provides that upon satisfaction of the Court that the award is enforceable under Chapter II of Part II, such award would be deemed to be a decree of the Court.

Conclusion

While a lot has been done to make India a hub for arbitration, there is much to be done to overcome the ambiguity that persists in making the process of enforcement a smoother affair. As a much needed relief, the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) of 2015 revoked the provision of an automatic stay on domestic arbitral awards. However, a lot of barriers still stand in the way of the swift execution of an award. As far as domestic arbitrations are concerned, the enforcement of arbitral awards is still a very time-consuming affair. 

First and foremost, if a party seeks to challenge an arbitral award according to Section 34 of the 1996 Act, then the time period for enforcement would be three months, further extendable by 30 days. However, this is not the end of the dilemmas a successful party may have to face. The Court’s decision under Section 34 of the 1996 Act can be further appealed under Section 37 of the 1996 Act. After a decision on the appeal under Section 37, the parties have the option to make a further appeal before the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Even if the award holder is able to cross all of these hurdles, the execution itself may take several years. This is because there is no prescribed time limit within which the award must necessarily be enforced. Thus, it runs contrary to the very purpose of arbitration, which is to ensure the expeditious disposal of cases and the resolution of disputes. 

A smoother, faster enforcement of arbitral awards is necessary and required in order to make India a pro-arbitration country. Parties generally engage in litigation just to stall the process of enforcement. However, if a better execution mechanism is not set up, it would be a long way for India to become a hub for arbitration. In this regard, however, a commendable approach was taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Vijay Karia v. Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi (2020), wherein a heavy cost of Rs. 50 lakhs was imposed on the appellants in view of the continuous challenges that were made to the award. 

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

If there has been a challenge to an award as per Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, does that mean that the enforcement of such an award would automatically be stayed?

No, after the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, there is no automatic stay on the execution of the award. This position of automatic stay was applicable only prior to the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015. However, after the 2015 amendment, the fact that the award is facing a challenge under any ground mentioned in Section 34 of the 1996 Act is irrelevant. There is no automatic stay. Further, the Apex Court in the case of Hindustan Construction Company Limited v. Union of India (2019) noted that this provision for no automatic stay applies not just to cases subsequent to the 2015 amendment but also to cases which belong to a period before the 2015 amendment. 

Can there be a foreign-seated international commercial arbitration between two Indian entities?

Yes, two Indian entities have the autonomy to proceed with a foreign-seated international commercial arbitration having the juridical seat or place of arbitration outside India. In the case of PASL Wind Solutions Private Limited v. GE Power Conversion India Private Limited (2021), the Apex Court affirmed this view. Furthermore, in such cases, the process of enforcement of such awards in India would be as per Part II of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, dealing with the enforcement of foreign awards. 

Can there be a challenge to a domestic award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, on the ground that the domestic award is not stamped?

No, a party cannot challenge an award under Section 34 of the 1996 Act on the ground that the award is unstamped. Such clarification was provided in the case of M. Anasuya Devi v. Manik Reddy (2003). The Apex Court in this case made an observation that a domestic award can be challenged only as per the grounds provided under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Further, the Apex Court observed that, though such an issue of non-stamping cannot be dealt with under Section 34, an objection regarding non-registration or non-stamping may be raised during the enforcement stage under Section 36 of the 1996 Act.

Does the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, provide for any stipulated time limit within which the courts are bound to enforce the domestic award?

No, there is no time limit within which the courts are bound to dispose of the enforcement petition, thereby enforcing the award. While Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, lays down that an arbitral tribunal must make an award in 12 months. This period of 12 months as provided under Section 29(A)(1), can be further extended by the parties for a period of 6 months. However, there is no such provision that provides for a time frame within which the courts should enforce and execute the arbitral award. 

Can the parties to an India-seated international commercial arbitration choose a venue outside India?

Yes, they can. A venue is merely a geographical place of convenience where the parties and tribunal meet for the conduct of the hearing. It has no bearing on the juridical seat or place of arbitration. In this case, when the juridical seat is in India, the hearings may be conducted at any place convenient to the tribunal and the parties, which includes a venue outside India. A mere conduct of a hearing outside India would not amount to the ousting of the jurisdiction of the Indian courts under Part I, Sections 2-43 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Supreme Court made a similar observation in the case of Videocon Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (2011).

If a foreign award is passed in a country that is a contracting party not just to the New York Convention but also to the Geneva Convention, then how would such an award be enforced in India?

If a foreign award is made in a country that is a contracting party to both of these conventions, then in that case the award would be enforced in consonance with the procedure for enforcement provided in the New York Convention and not the Geneva Convention. The same is provided under Section 52 of the 1996 Act, according to which those awards to which Chapter I of Part II, that is, the New York Convention applies, and Chapter II, Part II, that is, the Geneva Convention, would not be applicable. This is also in line with Article VII(2) of the New York Convention, which provides for the non-applicability of the Geneva Convention in so far as and to the extent to which the Contracting States are bound by the New York Convention.

Whether a foreign award requires to be registered like a domestic award under the Registration Act, 1908?

No, there is no provision for registration of a foreign award under the 1996 Act. Further, according to Section 48 of the 1996 Act, a non-registered award would not be refused enforcement. Additionally, in the case of Harendra H Mehta v. Mukesh H. Mehta (1999), the Apex Court clarified that a foreign award under the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961, is not required to be registered.

Like a domestic award, is there also a requirement for a foreign award to be stamped?

No, there is no such requirement for a foreign award to be stamped under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. This question has now conclusively been dealt with in the case of M/s. Shriram EPC Ltd. v. Rioglass Solar SA (2018). Herein, the Apex Court observed that the reference to the term award under Schedule I, Item 12 of the Indian Stamp Act, is applicable only to the domestic award dealt with under Part I of the 1996 Act and not to foreign awards. Therefore, the requirement of stamping awards is not applicable to foreign awards and is limited to domestic awards regulated and made under Part I of the 1996 Act.

Can perversity in interpretation be a grounds for objecting to a foreign award?

No, for the simple reason that there was an element of perversity in the interpretation of a clause in the contract, a foreign award cannot be objected to. A similar view was held by the Apex Court in the case of Vijay Karia v. Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi (2020).

References

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Separation of power in India, UK and USA : a comparative study

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This article has been written by Devesh Kumar Yadav pursuing a Diploma in Corporate Litigation course from LawSikho.

This article has been edited and published by Shashwat Kaushik

Introduction

The Indian Constitution is the world’s largest and longest written constitution. It encompasses fundamental rights and fundamental duties in Part III and Part IV, respectively, of the Constitution of India. The concept of separation of powers refers to the checks and balances system of the government, ensuring that the power of any one branch of government is limited. The Constitution provides a mechanism for the separation of powers so that the rights of one organ of the government cannot be handed over to another in terms of power and responsibility. 

The separation of powers deals with the situation that the executive cannot exercise the powers of the legislative and judiciary. The legislature cannot exercise the powers of executive and judiciary and the judiciary cannot exercise the powers of executive and legislative.

Historical background of separation of power

Ancient Greece gave birth to the concept of separation of powers and it became widespread in the Roman Republic as part of the initial Constitution of the Roman Republic.

Aristotle (384-322 BC) introduced it in his book “The Politics” in the 4th century B.C. He has stated that “there are three elements in each constitution in respect of which every serious lawgiver must look for what is advantageous to it. If these are well arranged, the Constitution is bound to be well arranged, and the differences in constitutions are bound to correspond to the difference between each of these elements. Later, the theory of separation of powers was discussed in detail by Baron-de-Montesquieu and John Locke.

Aristotle divided the government into three different parts or branches, and the Roman Republic also observed similar forms of political structure around the same period.

Baron-de-Montesquieu was a French philosopher who observed that the government’s responsibilities must be divided into three categories: legislative, executive and judiciary.

Wade and Phillips introduce three types of categories in the separation of power. The three parts of the separation of powers are given below.

  • One organ of government should not interfere with other organs of the government; it means every part of government should be independent.
  • The same organ cannot be part of more than one organ and there should be separation and distinctions for all three organs of the government.
  • The function of each organ must be separate and should not be exercised with any other one.

Separation of powers in India

Relevant provisions in the Indian constitution 

There are various constitutional provisions in the Constitution of India that describe the concept and theory of separation of powers. Article 50 of the Indian Constitution deals with the separation of the judiciary from the executive. According to Article 50, the state shall take steps to separate the judiciary from the executive in the public service of the states.

Article 53 of the Indian Constitution deals with the executive power of the union. Article 53(1) further states that the president shall have the executive power of the union and shall be exercised by the president himself; it may be either directly or maybe through officers who are subordinate to the president as per the Constitution.

Part XI of the Indian Constitution deals with relations between the union and the states. Article 246 of the Indian Constitution deals with the subject matter of laws made by parliament or state legislatures. Parliament may make laws on any matter for any part of the territory of India. There are three lists in the seventh schedule of the constitution which are the union list, the state list and the concurrent list. These lists enumerate the various subject matters in which laws are made by parliament or the state legislature.

If we jointly read Article 53(1) and Article 79 together and draw a conclusion, then we will find there is no strict separation of powers in India.

Article 154 of Part VI of the Constitution of India deals with the executive power of the state. According to Article 154, the governor of the state exercises his executive power either through himself or through officers subordinate to him, in accordance with the Constitution. Article 168 deals with the constitution of legislatures in states. According to Article 168 of the Constitution of India, for every state, there shall be a legislature, which shall consist of a governor.

Article 123 deals with the power of the president to promulgate ordinances during recess of parliament and the governor of the state enjoys similar power to promulgate ordinances under Article 213.

Article 309 deals with the recruitment and conditions of service of persons serving the union or state. The president and the governor of the state may make rules to regulate the recruitment and service conditions of any person appointed to such services and posts until provisions on that behalf are made by or under an act of the appropriate legislature.

Article 166 deals with the conduct of business activities by the governments of states. It provides that all the executive actions of the state government must be taken in the name of the governor of that state. The Governor shall make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the government of the state.

Article 103 deals with the decision on questions asked to disqualify members. The President exercises his judicial power with regard to the disqualification of members of the House; the decision of the President shall be the final decision under Article 103.

As the President of India enjoys judicial power on the matter of disqualification of members of the houses under Article 103 in the same way the governor of the state enjoys similar power under Article 192(1) on disqualification of members of a house of the legislature of the state, the decision of the Governor shall be final. Similar power is also enjoyed by the Governor of the State under Article 161 to suspend, remit or commute sentences in certain cases.

Provisions under which the legislature in India performs judicial functions

According to Article 61(1), the President can be impeached for violation of the Constitution by either House of Parliament.

According to Article 124 (4), a judge of the Supreme Court shall not be removed from his office accepted by an order of the president passed after an address by each house of parliament supported by a majority of the total membership of that house and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that house present and voting has been presented to the president in the same session for such removal on the grounds of proved misbehaviour or incapacity.

According to Article 124(5), parliament may by law regulate the procedure of investigation and the misbehaviour or incapacity of a judge under clause 4 of Article 124.

The recommendation of the president is necessary under Article 274 on the provision of bills that affect taxation in subject matter in which states are interested, like taxes on agricultural income.

According to Article 3 of the Constitution, the parliament has the power to form a new state by separating the territory from any state or by uniting any territory into a part of any state. The parliament has the power to increase or diminish any area or alter the boundaries or names of any state.

The High Court shall have the power to make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating court practices and proceedings under Article 227(2)(b). The Supreme Court of India appoints its subordinate staff under Article 146 of the Constitution.

The High Court, in the same way, appoints its subordinate staff under Article 229 of the Constitution.

So, there is no strict power of separation in India through various constitutional provisions.

Landmark judgement

There are the following landmark judgements regarding the separation of power in India. These cases are given below.

  • In re Delhi Law Act (1951)
  • Ram Jawaya Kapur vs. State of Punjab (1955)
  • Indira Gandhi vs. Raj Narain, (1975)

If any organ of the government delegates its essential power and function to any other organ of the government, such delegated act shall be unconstitutional and void. The Supreme Court of India shall have the power to declare any laws passed by the legislature as void if such laws violate any of the provisions of the constitution.

The parliament shall have the power to amend the Constitution, subject to the scrutiny of the court. In the case of Keshwanand Bharati vs. State of Kerala (1973), the Supreme Court held that the court can declare any amendment as void if it changes the basic structure of the constitution. The legislature cannot go against the judgement of the court.

The Supreme Court of India held in the case of P. Kannadasan vs. State of Tamilnadu (1996) that in India there is a system of checks and balances while incorporating the doctrine of separation of power.

In Re-Delhi Law Act

The Supreme Court noticed that functions other than executive were not vested in particular bodies. The Constitution of India is a written constitution; therefore, the power and functions of each organ of the government must originate from the Constitution alone. However, there are some exceptional provisions in the constitution, like Articles 123, 213 and 357.

It was observed by Chief Justice Kania, that there is no separate provision for the separation of powers in the Indian Constitution but it is clear that the constitution is created by the legislature, detailed provisions are made for making the laws and there are provisions to pass the laws by the legislature.

The Supreme Court held in the famous case of Gupta vs. Union of India (1982) by Justice Mahajan that the judges are trusted by their decisions in the cases so they cannot delegate their ancillary powers to other organs of the government.

So, it is observed in Gupta vs. Union of India that the separation of powers is not part of the Indian Constitution. There are various provisions provided in the Constitution of India that can be amended and repealed. The powers of one organ cannot be delegated to other organs of the government.

Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur And Ors. vs. The State Of Punjab (1955)

The scope of executive power was discussed in the case of Ram Jawaya Kapoor. The decision of the case was generally influenced by the decision made by the court in the Delhi Laws case. The scheme of the government regarding the printing and publishing of textbooks in the year 1950 was challenged on the ground that the executive could not engage in any trade or business activities without any laws made for the purpose.

The Supreme Court held that the Indian Constitution has not indeed recognised the doctrine of separation of powers in its absolute rigidity but the functions may be differentiated and consecutively. The power of one organ can not be exercised by other organs.

Indira Nehru Gandhi vs. Shri Raj Narain & Anr. (1975)

In this case, the Court held that there are amending provisions in the Constitution under Article 368. The election of the House of People by Mrs. Gandhi was challenged before the Allahabad High Court. The Allahabad High Court gave its decision in June 1975 and set aside the election, and Mrs. Gandhi was found guilty of corrupt practices. It was held by the court that the doctrine of rigid separation of powers, in the American sense, does not apply in India. No organ of the republic can take over the function assigned to any other organ of the republic. The Supreme Court held that adjudication of specific disputes is a judicial function that Parliament, acting under constitutional amending powers, cannot exercise. It was recognised that there is no separation between the executive and legislative wings of the government. The division of powers into the legislature, executive and judiciary is difficult to define in terms of workability.

Separation of powers in the United States of America

The doctrine of separation of powers was understood in the sense in which Montesquieu aimed at; a personal separation of powers exists.

According to the modern exponent of doctrine, there will be no liberty if legislative and executive powers are united into the same person, body or magistrate. There is a need to separate judicial power from executive and legislative power; if it is not separated, then the judge might become violent and oppressive.

Madison said that the accumulation of all three powers—legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands will become tyranny.

Constitutional provisions of the American Constitution

The framers of the Constitution of America meticulously designed a system of government built upon the principle of separation of powers. This fundamental concept divides the governing functions into three distinct authorities: legislative, executive, and judiciary. Each branch possesses unique responsibilities and is designed to operate independently while maintaining checks and balances with the others.

  1. Legislative branch:
    • Comprising the United States Congress (Senate and House of Representatives), the legislative branch holds the power to create laws.
    • Its primary roles include enacting legislation, impeaching government officials, and confirming presidential nominations.
    • It exercises oversight over the executive branch through congressional hearings, investigations, and committee proceedings.
  2. Executive branch:
    • Led by the President, the executive branch is responsible for implementing and enforcing laws passed by the legislative branch.
    • The President appoints cabinet members and other executive officials, manages the federal bureaucracy, and serves as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
    • The executive branch is tasked with conducting foreign policy, negotiating treaties, and executing the budget approved by Congress.
  3. Judicial branch:
    • Comprising the Supreme Court and lower federal courts, the judicial branch interprets the laws and the Constitution.
    • Its primary function is to resolve legal disputes, protect individual rights, and ensure that the actions of the other branches comply with the Constitution.
    • The Supreme Court, in particular, possesses the power of judicial review, allowing it to declare laws and executive actions unconstitutional.

The separation of powers is a crucial element of American democracy. It prevents the concentration of excessive power in any single branch of government, fostering a system of checks and balances that safeguards individual liberties and promotes accountability.

The Supreme Court of America has no power to decide political questions. The Supreme Court of the United States does not interfere with the executive branch of the government. The power of judicial review is not vested in the Supreme Court of America.

The President of the United States is not bound by the advice of a secretary and is free to take any decision. The American Cabinet is collectively responsible for holding its office so long as it enjoys the confidence of the majority. The President is the head of state as well as the executive. The decisions about the appointments and dismissals of other executive officers were taken by the President.

Practicality in the United States

The President, through his veto power, may interfere with the powers of Congress. The American President exercises law making power and interferes with the functioning of the Supreme Court of the United States by exercising his power to appoint judges.

The American Congress interferes with the powers of the President through the vote on budget, approval of appointments by the Senate and rectification of treaties. Congress interferes with the exercise of powers by passing procedural laws, creating special courts and obtaining the approval of judges.

The American judiciary, by exercising the power of judicial review, interferes with the powers of Congress and the President. The Supreme Court of America has made more amendments than Congress itself.

The theory of separation of powers in modern practice is the organic separation of functions and one organ of the government should not usurp or combine functions belonging to another organ.

Landmark judgements in the United States of America

Kilbourn vs. Thompson (1880)

In this case, the Supreme Court of the United States of America observed in 1881 that the power of any of the branches shall be permitted to encroach upon the power confined to the other organs or branches. The legislature can not exercise or encroach upon the power of executive or judicial power. The executive branch cannot exercise or encroach upon the functions of the judiciary and legislative branches. The judicial power can not exercise executive and legislative functions.

Marbury vs. Madison

The Court in this case held that the legislation could be invalidated by courts. The issue of judicial review was settled in terms of exercising the power of judicial review. The case arose from the refusal of then-Secretary of State James Madison to deliver a commission to William Marbury, who had been appointed as a justice of the peace for the District of Columbia by President John Adams. Marbury sought a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court to compel Madison to deliver the commission, but the Court ultimately ruled against him. However, in the process of reaching its decision, the Court asserted its power to review the constitutionality of laws, a power that has since become a cornerstone of the American legal system.

The issue of judicial review has been a subject of debate since the founding of the United States. Some, like Alexander Hamilton, argued that the Constitution itself granted the courts the power of judicial review. Others, like Thomas Jefferson, maintained that such a power was not explicitly granted by the Constitution and that it would give the unelected judiciary too much power over the elected branches of government.

The Marbury v. Madison decision was a significant victory for those who believed in the importance of judicial review. In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice John Marshall argued that the Constitution was the supreme law of the land and that it was the duty of the courts to uphold it. He also asserted that the courts had the power to declare laws unconstitutional, even if those laws had been passed by Congress.

The decision in Marbury v. Madison has had a profound impact on American law and government. It has established the principle that the courts are the ultimate interpreters of the Constitution and that they have the power to strike down laws that they find to be unconstitutional. This power has been used to protect individual rights, to ensure the separation of powers, and to uphold the rule of law.

Satinger vs. Philippine Island (1928)

The Court in this case held that unless it is provided by the American Constitution, the executive, legislative and judiciary can not exercise the functions of each other. This principle is essential to the system of checks and balances that is a fundamental part of the American system of government. It ensures that no one branch of government becomes too powerful and that the rights of the people are protected.

The case arose out of a dispute between the Philippine Islands, which were at the time a territory of the United States, and a group of American citizens who were doing business in the Philippines. The citizens had filed a lawsuit against the Philippine government, but the Philippine Supreme Court dismissed the case, holding that the US Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction over the case.

The American citizens appealed to the US Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case. In its decision, the Court held that the US Supreme Court did have jurisdiction over the case and that the Philippine Supreme Court had erred in dismissing it. The Court also held that the Philippine government was not immune from suit in US courts.

The decision in Satinger vs. Philippine Island is a landmark case in the development of the American system of government. It established the principle of separation of powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government and ensured that no one branch of government became too powerful.

Buckley vs. Valeo (1976)

In this case, the Supreme Court held that a congressional act is unconstitutional because it breaches the doctrine of separation of powers.

Separation of powers in the United Kingdom

The United Kingdom is one of the countries in the world where there is no written constitution. Since there is no written constitution in the United Kingdom”, it is not possible to claim that there is no formal separation of powers in the United Kingdom.

There are three formulations of structural classification of the government powers These three classifications are given below.

  1. The person cannot be a part of more than one of the three organs of the government.
  2. There should not be interference from one organ of the government with the other organs of the government.
  3. No organ of that government cannot exercise the function of the other organs to whom it was assigned.

The separation of powers exists in England and the King is the executive head of England and also an integral part of the legislature.

Recent developments in the United Kingdom regarding the separation of powers

Before 2009, the House of Lords was the highest court in the United Kingdom for over 130 years. The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom was separated from the House of Lords on October 1, 2009.

The absolute monarchy system was replaced by the legislative function being exercised by Parliament and the courts replaced judicial functions. The Judiciary became independent from the control of the executive in England.

Conclusion

We come to the conclusion that India never adopted the doctrine of separation of powers very rigidly, but India has adopted the division of power. All three organs of government should not interfere with the functions of any of the other organs of the government. It must be kept in mind that any one organ of the government should not exercise the functions of all three organs of the government.

The Constitution is the supreme law of the land and the legislative, executive and judiciary should not go beyond the limits of the Constitution.

References

  1. https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.ijlsi.com/wp-content/uploads/Separation-of-Powers-A-Comparative-Study-under-India-UK-and-USA-Constitution.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwiivufsgvSDAxUQTmwGHcULBrcQFnoECBIQAQ&usg=AOvVaw2Qwyl78cNsYO7sNrL_zESE
  2. https://www.lawctopus.com/academike/separation-of-powers-a-comparative-analysis-of-the-doctrine-india-united-states-of-america-and-england/
  3. https://lawbhoomi.com/comparison-of-separation-of-powers-in-india-usa-and-uk/
  4. https://nliulawreview.nliu.ac.in/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/SEPARATION-OF-POWERS-A-COMPARATIVE-STUDY-OF-INDIA-USA-UK-AND-FRANCE-Article-6.pdf
  5. https://www.ijlsi.com/wp-content/uploads/Separation-of-Powers-A-Comparative-Study-under-India-UK-and-USA-Constitution.pdf
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Policyholder vis-a-vis data sharing in India

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This article has been written by Devesh Kumar Yadav pursuing a Diploma in Corporate Litigation course from LawSikho.

This article has been edited and published by Shashwat Kaushik

Introduction

The policyholder’s data sharing by insurance companies and insurance intermediaries was a great concern to the policyholders. There are many Insurance companies as well as Insurance intermediaries engaged in the business of the Insurance sector that collect the data of the policyholders via various sources like form filling, telemarketing, etc. The data of the individuals is protected under the Constitution of India under Article 21. The Government of India has made various laws regarding the protection of the data of individuals. The policyholder’s data is also protected under the right to privacy. Any insurance company may not misuse the policyholders’ data without the consent obtained from the policyholders or information owner.

Key terms of the article

If we are unaware of the key terms in the article title mentioned above, then we need to understand the following terms: policyholder, data sharing, robust, and regime.

The meaning of each word is discussed separately and to understand the meaning of the sentence:

  1. Policyholder: A person who holds certain policies is a policyholder. A policyholder is a person who is the owner of the policy and the policies are issued by the insurance companies or intermediaries to the policyholder.
  2. Policy: A type of plan of action agreed upon or chosen by the government or any company, etc. is a policy. It is a situation or a way in which a person can think about any particular situation in a better way. 
  3. Data sharing: Data sharing is a process by which the same data is made available for use in multiple applications by the same or different organisations or companies.
  4. Robust: Something that is healthy and strong is robust.
  5. Regime: The method or system of government is called a regime.

Indian government steps towards protection of policyholder’s data

The government of India has launched several digital initiatives to transform the society and people of India. The government launched various digital initiatives to make government policies easily available to the citizens of India via electronic mode or digitally accessible.

There are various insurance companies, insurance intermediaries, and government companies that provide various insurance policies to individuals. The insurance companies are collecting personal data from the policyholders that is related to their name, date of birth, address proofs, health conditions, and income-related data. Sometimes, a policyholder’s data is sold to third parties. So, it is necessary that the policyholder’s data not be misused under any conditions and to avoid any kind of fraudulent activity with the policyholders.

One of the key pieces of legislation in this regard is the Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act). This Act provides a comprehensive framework for regulating electronic transactions and information security in India. It includes provisions related to data protection, such as the requirement for companies to obtain consent from individuals before collecting and processing their personal information. The IT Act also empowers the government to appoint a nodal officer for data protection and establishes a grievance redressal mechanism for individuals who believe their data rights have been violated.

In addition to the IT Act, the Indian government has also introduced specific regulations and guidelines to protect the data of policyholders in the insurance sector. For example, the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (IRDAI) has issued guidelines on data protection for insurers. These guidelines require insurers to take appropriate measures to secure policyholders’ data, such as implementing strong encryption mechanisms and conducting regular security audits. IRDAI also mandates insurers to provide policyholders with clear and concise information about how their data will be used and protected.

Key requirements outlined by IRDAI include:

  1. Data security: Insurers are mandated to implement robust security measures to protect policyholders’ data from unauthorised access, use, disclosure, or destruction. This includes implementing strong encryption mechanisms, regularly updating software and security patches, and conducting vulnerability assessments and penetration testing.
  2. Access control: Insurers must establish strict access controls to ensure that only authorised personnel have access to policyholders’ data. Access should be granted on a need-to-know basis, and employees should be trained on data security best practices.
  3. Data retention and disposal: Insurers are required to retain policyholders’ data only for as long as necessary for business purposes or as required by law. They must also implement secure disposal methods to prevent unauthorised access to or misuse of discarded data.
  4. Incident response: Insurers must have a comprehensive incident response plan in place to effectively respond to data breaches or security incidents. This plan should include procedures for detecting, containing, and mitigating data breaches, as well as communicating with affected policyholders.
  5. Regular security audits: Insurers are obligated to conduct regular security audits to assess the effectiveness of their data protection measures. These audits should be performed by independent third parties to ensure objectivity and thoroughness.
  6. Policyholder notification: In the event of a data breach or security incident, insurers must promptly notify affected policyholders. The notification should include information about the incident, the potential impact on policyholders, and the steps being taken to mitigate the situation.

By implementing these guidelines, insurers can enhance the protection of policyholders’ data, build trust, and comply with regulatory requirements.

Furthermore, the Indian government has been actively involved in promoting digital initiatives and creating a robust digital infrastructure. These efforts include the implementation of the Aadhaar system, a unique identification system for Indian residents. Aadhaar has played a crucial role in reducing fraud and ensuring transparency in various sectors, including the insurance industry. By linking Aadhaar with insurance policies, policyholders can easily access their policies and avail of various services online.

The government’s focus on data protection is not limited to policyholders alone. It extends to all citizens of India. The Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019, which is currently under consideration by the Indian Parliament, aims to provide a comprehensive framework for the protection of personal data in India. The bill proposes to establish a Data Protection Authority, which will be responsible for enforcing the provisions of the bill and ensuring compliance by companies and organisations.

Overall, the Indian government’s initiatives and laws related to data protection reflect its commitment to safeguarding the privacy and rights of individuals. These measures are essential in the digital age, where data has become a valuable asset and its misuse can have serious consequences for individuals and society as a whole.

Indian government’s vision towards digitalization and data sharing

The vision of the Indian government is to transform India into a digitalized country. The Government of India also launched a flexible programme called Digital India with a vision to transform India into a digitally empowered society and knowledge economy. The digital India programme was launched on July 1, 2015, by the honourable Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi.

The Indian government launched various digital platforms to empower Indian society into digital India. There are 28 platforms launched by the government of India in higher education, like SWAYAM (Study Waves of Active Learning for Young Aspiring Minds), National Academy Depository (NAD), National Digital Library of India (NDL India), Digilocker, etc.

The Indian government has taken various initiatives towards the protection of the data of the person around the internet-based services provided by the many service providers.

The Indian government has taken several steps towards the connectivity of the people with internet-based services.

The Government of India has launched several digital services, like UPIs (Unified Payment Interfaces) and Digilocker.

Effects of digitalisation in India

As per the report published by the Indian Brand Equity Foundation, the use of digital payment methods through UPIs rose in the number of transactions. In April 2022, the number of UPI transactions as per the data available was 5.58 billions, which made the total number of transactions in the Indian currency of INR 9.83 trillions as per the data. The Government of India launched various digital platforms, like the Digilocker portal. On March 19, 2022, there were 101 million users of Digilocker, as per the data officially available in the records and published in the reports.

IRDA steps towards data protection

The IRDA, which stands for the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India, has supported various digital initiatives. The IRDA issued certain guidelines regarding Insurance and e-commerce on March 9, 2017.

The IRDA promoted the web aggregators. Web aggregators are insurance intermediary websites that provide an interface to insurance prospects for price comparison and information on products of different insurances and other related matters, like MIBL or Mahindra Insurance Brokers Ltd., India Insure Risk Management and Insurance Broking Services Pvt. Ltd., ACME Insurance Broking Services Pvt. Ltd., and Bharat Re-insurance Brokers Pvt. Ltd. The IRDA also establishes a common public service centre platform to market the insurance products of insurers and insurance intermediaries.

Role of IRDA in protection of policyholder’s data

The policyholder information is not defined in the Insurance Act of 1938 or in any rules or regulations framed under the Insurance Act of 1938.

The policyholder’s information includes the information taken by the insurance companies and insurance intermediaries during the course of serving the insurance policy to the policyholders.

The IRDA has made several restrictions on insurance companies and insurance intermediaries sharing the data of policyholders with third parties.

According to Regulation 19(5) of the IRDA Protection of Policyholders Interest Regulation 2017, the IRDA has made that the policyholders data must be kept confidential by the insurance companies and intermediaries, and it can only be disclosed to such authorities if it will be found to be legally necessary to disclose.

Key aspects of Regulation 19(5):

Confidentiality of policyholder data:

  • Insurance companies and intermediaries are obligated to keep policyholders’ data strictly confidential.
  • Personal information, financial details, and health records of policyholders must be protected.
  • Unauthorised access, disclosure, or misuse of policyholder data is prohibited.

Disclosure of data:

Legal obligations:

  • In cases where the law or a court order requires the disclosure of policyholder data, insurers are obligated to comply.

Examples include:

  • Responding to subpoenas or search warrants issued by law enforcement agencies.
  • Providing information in response to regulatory inquiries or investigations.

Insurance-related activities:

Underwriting:

  • Insurers may disclose policyholder data to underwriting companies for the purpose of assessing risks and determining insurability.
  • This includes sharing information such as medical history, claims history, and other relevant details.

Claim processing:

  • Policyholder data may be disclosed to third parties involved in the claim process, such as claims adjusters, repair shops, and medical providers.
  • This is necessary to facilitate the efficient processing and settlement of claims.

Other legitimate activities:

Insurers may disclose policyholder data to other entities for legitimate insurance-related purposes, such as:

  • Conducting actuarial studies and rate-making.
  • Developing new insurance products and services.
  • Complying with internal risk management and audit protocols.

Consent from the policyholder:

  • Insurers can disclose policyholder data when they have obtained explicit consent from the policyholder.
  • Consent must be informed, specific, and voluntary.
  • Policyholders should be clearly informed about the purpose of the disclosure and the parties involved.

Consent can be obtained in various forms, such as:

  • Written consent through a signed form.
  • Electronic consent through an online portal.
  • Verbal consent is recorded during a phone conversation.

It’s important to note that insurers have a responsibility to protect policyholder data from unauthorised access, use, or disclosure. They must implement robust security measures and follow strict data protection protocols to safeguard the privacy of their customers.

Data security measures:

  • Insurance companies and intermediaries must implement robust data security measures to safeguard policyholder data.
  • Encryption, access controls, and regular security audits are required to protect against unauthorised access and breaches.

Policyholder consent:

  • In certain cases, insurance companies may seek consent from policyholders before sharing their data with third parties.
  • Policyholders have the right to grant or withhold consent for the disclosure of their personal information.

Compliance and penalties:

  • Failure to comply with Regulation 19(5) may result in penalties and disciplinary action by the IRDA.
  • Insurance companies and intermediaries found responsible for mishandling policyholder data may face fines, licence suspensions, or other consequences.

This regulation reinforces the importance of protecting policyholders’ privacy and ensures that their sensitive information is handled responsibly by insurance companies and intermediaries. It promotes transparency and accountability in the insurance sector and helps build trust between policyholders and the insurance industry.

Policyholder data protection and IRDA

The Insurance Regulatory Development Authority allows insurance companies and insurance intermediaries to share the data for public purchase only with the consent of the policyholder.

The Insurance Regulatory Development Authority has taken several safety measures towards the confidentiality and security of such information in paragraph 11 of the guidelines on information and cyber security for insurance companies and insurance intermediaries dated April 7, 2017.

Before disclosing the information or sharing the data, companies must obtain consent from the policyholders or information holders.

The insurer must ensure adequate control to prevent third parties from misusing data, whether by way of non-disclosure agreements, e-mail, etc.

The IRDA has made policyholder data sharing very rigid.

The IRDA has issued guidelines regarding cyber security and e-commerce guidelines regarding the sharing of policyholder data with insurers and insurance companies. The Reserve Bank of India allowed banks to disclose the data of their customers, inter alia, when they expressed or employed the consent of the customer.

Types of data collected by insurance companies from policyholders

The insurance companies are collecting the personal information of policyholders via a claim form, which is duly filled out by the policyholders while taking out the insurance policy from the insurance companies. The data of policyholders is also collected via filling out various forms, which insurance companies provide to the policyholder and collect the information from.

Sometimes the data of policyholders may be collected via telemarketing by the companies while asking for several details about the policyholders.

There are certain other marketing modules and strategies to collect the data of the individual via various modes, like providing links to any subscription, etc., on the internet, and the user filling in his personal information on the website.

The company asks for the personal information of the policyholder, like the person’s name, address proofs and date of birth.

The insurance company also collects the details of any other insurance policies registered in the name of the policyholder. They also collect the insurance account number details of any other policies that are registered in the name of the policyholder.

The insurance companies collect the contact details, like mobile numbers and email addresses, of the person or policy holders.

The insurance company also collects the educational qualification details, family details and social and economic status of the policyholders.

The insurance companies are collecting the details of employment and occupation of the policyholders, as well as the annual income of the policyholder.

The insurance companies and insurance intermediaries are collecting the financial information of the policyholder, like their credit card, bank account number, debit card and other payment methods.

The companies collect government approved identity cards like PAN, Aadhar Card details, voter cards, driving licences and any other government approved identity card information of the policyholder.

Additional information about the policyholder, which is collected by the companies

  • The companies collect the medical health and medical history of the policyholder.
  • The company also collects data related to the physical and mental health conditions of the policyholders.
  • The company also collects any existing insurance policy details from the policyholder.
  • The company also collects the family and beneficiary details of the policyholder.
  • The company also collects the general insurance policy details, such as name, address, bank details, and the details of any other person who has an interest in the policy of the policyholder.

Need for protection of policyholder data

In the case of Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (retired) vs. Union of India (2017), the Supreme Court of India issued a landmark judgement while recognising the right to privacy as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The court held that the right to privacy is part of the right to life and personal liberty, which are guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023 focuses on the protection of data sharing.

The Insurance Regulatory Development Authority plays an important role in ensuring the benefits of insurance policies. There are certain rules made by the IRDA that are mandatory for insurers to follow when issuing a certain insurance policy to policyholders, such that the interests of policyholders must be protected. There are various penalties on non compliance of the law for insurance companies and insurance intermediaries if they misuse policyholder’s data.

Conclusion

During the COVID pandemic, the use of digital payment methods increased. Many companies incorporate different types of payment methods. Paytm introduced QR-based payment methods. The Indian government has taken several steps towards boosting the internet connectivity of Indian citizens. The Insurance Regulatory Development Authority issues certain guidelines regarding the protection of policyholder’s data for insurance companies, insurance intermediaries and e-commerce entities. The policyholder’s data may not be misused in any way. The policyholder must also be aware of sharing his personal data with any insurance companies or entities and must ensure that his data is not misused. There are several laws made by the government for the protection of the policyholder’s data. If any of the companies are found to be misusing or selling policyholder data to any of the third parties, this may lead to punishment and penalties as per the provisions prescribed by the laws.

References

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