Shruti Goel wrote this article, and further updated by Mohd Atif Zakir. This article briefly overviews the fundamental right — “right to equality”. It gives a detailed explanation of Articles 14 to 18 of the Constitution of India and discusses the prominent cases decided regarding the right to equality.
Introduction
Equal treatment by the State and the authorities has always been a question of law in any democratic country. India is one of the countries where residents have faced discrimination in respect of their caste, religion, colour, and place of birth before independence. When India became an independent nation, the forefathers of the Constitution stressed the concept of civil liberties in the form of equality so that such discrimination could be avoided to uplift the backward classes of this nation.
The Constitution’s makers drafted the fundamental rights to protect the civil liberties and freedom of everyone in this country. Some of the fundamental rights are guaranteed only to the citizens of this country, and a few have been granted to both citizens and non-citizens. The right to equality has been guaranteed to everyone in this country, whether he has citizenship of India or not.
Part III of the Indian Constitution guarantees certain fundamental rights to all the citizens of India, irrespective of their caste, race, birthplace, religion and gender. Such rights are called fundamental and enforceable before India’s highest court. These are deemed an essential part of the Constitution as they protect the rights and liberties of the citizens of this country against any misuse or intrusion by the government with the power delegated to it in a democracy. These rights try to achieve the goals set out in the Preamble: justice, equality, liberty, fraternity, and dignity.
As we have understood, the introduction concerns the concept of equality that the State must maintain. Let’s examine the meaning of equality comprehensively.
To know more about the Right to Equality Article 16, 17, and 18 under the Indian Constitution in brief, please refer to the video below:
Meaning of right to equality
“As long as poverty, injustice and gross inequality persist in the world, none of us can truly rest” – Nelson Mandela.
Democracy can only thrive when individuals are treated equally and without discrimination. Thus, the framers of the Constitution felt that incorporating such a provision would remove the hurdles of existing social and economic inequalities and enable the country’s diverse communities to enjoy the rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution.
It was believed that removing inequalities based on religion, social norms, and long-aged traditional practices that have been followed in various regions of India, such as untouchability, casteism, race discrimination, etc., was essential. It is also considered one of the fundamental human rights under various world constitutions, international treaties, and conventions.
The drafting personnel of the Constitution of India especially stated that it is necessary to develop a nation where all citizens can enjoy equality, which should not be denied under any circumstances. That is why every citizen in this country was granted equality.
The right to equality means the absence of legal discrimination only on the grounds of caste, race, religion, sex, and place of birth and ensures equal rights for all citizens. It means every citizen of this country would not have to face discrimination for having the social and economic status they belong to. Equality must be maintained by ignoring all the grounds mentioned in the nation’s Constitution.
It is also considered a fundamental of the Indian Constitution, which guarantees it to every citizen of India by the architects of the Supreme Law. The sole purpose of this right was to ensure that no person should remain deprived of the social opportunities and various privileges given to other people because of belonging to a particular caste, race, religion, colour, or place of birth.
The right to equality has both positive and negative characteristics. Every person should be given equal treatment without facing any sort of discrimination. However, it is also required that only individuals who fall under similar circumstances be treated equally, and the unequal should be treated unequally.
Under the Indian Constitution, the right to equality is primarily found under the provisions that are stated below:
| Branches of right to equality |
Constitutional Provisions |
Historical contexts |
| Equality before law. |
Article 14 |
This concept of equality is borrowed from English law, U.K. It talks about providing equal treatment to everyone before the law. |
| Prohibition of discrimination on the ground of religion, caste, race, sex and place of birth. |
Article 15 |
This was derived from the U.S. Constitution and was added to stop discrimination based on the grounds mentioned under Article 15. |
| Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment. |
Article 16 |
This concept was also adopted from the U.S.A. and the U.K. It was enshrined to maintain equality among citizens against any discrimination by the State while employing them. |
| Abolition of untouchability. |
Article 17 |
This principle evolved in India’s social and historical context. It prohibits untouchability. Everything accessible to the general public shall not be restricted to any particular class of people. |
| Abolition of titles. |
Article 18 |
The U.S.A. and the French Revolution influenced the prohibition of titles. This article aims to prevent every citizen from using titles as prefixes or suffixes along with their names. It is stated to ensure social equality in a democratic nation. |
Under the right to equality, Article 14 provides a general applicability of the said right, and Article 15, Article 16, Article 17, and Article 18 depict a specific application of it, which means there are particular grounds on which they are applicable. By the overview stated above, the meaning of the right to equality is clear now. Further, let’s move on to find the significance of the right to equality.
Significance of the right to equality
The right to equality is a fundamental right granted to every citizen of this nation. Its purpose is to ensure fair and equal treatment for all people. Further, it explicitly prevents unfair or discriminatory acts against citizens on several grounds mentioned under the land’s supreme law. The right to equality was drafted to maintain equality when the state provides employment and opportunities to the people.
This significant fundamental right has been asserted to extract unfair treatment, exploitation and discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, caste, gender, place of birth or any of them. This fundamental right is given to ensure the representation of deprived sections of the society which have been excluded and faced untouchable treatment by others.
Before Independence, there was a lack of equal treatment and fairness among people in India, and such unequal treatment has been practised for ages. Considering discriminatory practices, the farmers of the Constitution drafted the right to equality as a fundamental right to ensure fair and equal treatment for all without prejudice or discrimination. Now, let’s find out what Article 14 of the Indian Constitution states about equality before the law.
Article 14: Equality before the law
“The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.”
Article 14 resolves to achieve “equality of status” among all the people in India. This pertains to the state’s duty to ensure that every person enjoys the right to equality without any discrimination. Equality before the law is a negative concept, while equal protection of laws is a positive concept. Both safeguard citizens against any state discrimination.
It aims to establish the “Rule of law” in India. The term Rule of law has an extensive interpretation, as many prominent scholars give. A.V. Dicey is one of them who wrote a well-articulated book, “Law of Constitution”. Dicey defined the Rule of Law as a superior branch of law. Dicey stated that the rule of law is the fundamental concept that applies entirely to every person, whether he is a Prime Minister, an ordinary man or a general staff member who works to manage government affairs. The law shall be applicable equally in both circumstances, and any specific treatment to anyone would go against the rule of law.
Equal treatment and protection shall be guaranteed to both citizens and non-citizens. Regardless of nationality, all residents shall have the right to equality and equal protection under the law.
Before understanding the provisions of Article 14, we need to understand what the Constitution means by the term “Person” itself with respect to its applicability. We will discuss the persons availing themselves of the right to equality in India.
Person as under Article 14 of the Constitution
In India, fundamental rights are available to all people, including citizens and non-citizens. Let’s understand the meaning of ‘person’ under Article 14 of the Constitution.
Single person as a class under Article 14
The right to equality is firmly available to even a single person when it is a matter of protecting him against discrimination.. The principle of single-person laws was laid down in the case of Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri vs. Union of India and Others (1950). In this case, the Government of India passed an ordinance that later successively became the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1950. Because of mismanagement and neglecting conduct by the company, a mill was shut down. The company’s action led to the scarcity of essential commodities in the country, apart from unemployment and unrest.
The petitioner contended that the Act violated Article 14 because a single company was subjected to disabilities.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and held that a law could be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual if, because of some exceptional circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual can be treated as a class by himself.
We have understood how a single person can be treated as a class while protecting his fundamental rights against the State. Now, we have a term, juristic person, to discuss. We are moving on to elaborate on it further.
Juristic person as person under Article 14
Under Article 14, equality applies to all persons, natural and juristic. A natural person is a living personality with an existence and capacity to think and holds a significant personality. A juristic or legal person is defined as an artificial incorporation of personalities that acts as a person who enjoys such rights as a natural person, and it is considered the same in the eyes of the law.
In Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee vs. Som Nath Dass and Others (2000), the Apec Court determined that a Juristic person is an entity that exists as a person under the law. This person includes Artificial persons that are not born naturally but created by humans.
Therefore, the right to equality provisions shall also apply to Artificial and Juridical persons, and the State is obliged to maintain the right to equality for such persons.
The state cannot create any classification in the absence of any differences. However, the state previously did this, but the Judiciary invoked it.
Under Article 14, two significant concepts regarding the right to equality describe the equal in a distinctive context. Let’s discuss these under the upcoming headings.
Equality before the law
Equality before the law has been derived from English common law. Dr. Dennings talks about the equal parameters that need to be created among equals and further states that like should be treated alike. The right to sue other parties and to be sued by others will always be the same, irrespective of any social and economic status.
This phrase implies the absence of any special privileges to any person. No person is entitled to get any special treatment in any form by the law. Everyone is equally guaranteed the same rights and imposed with the same obligations.
In other words, it implies no discrimination before the law on inappropriate grounds like rank, office, etc. This simplifies that there will be no special treatment of any office bearer or person holding any specific position.
It means that every individual is subject to the jurisdiction of ordinary courts, irrespective of their rank or position. The case trial will take place in the ordinary court, where every common man goes to get justice. There shall be no Special Courts for those holding any significant position. After equality of laws, one more critical principle is equal protection of laws. Let’s understand it now.
Equal protection of the laws
The meaning of the term “equal protection of the law” directly relates to a positive concept, unlike the term “equality before the law.” It simply says that all individuals who belong to similar points of situations shall be treated alike and also be given similar rights. On the other hand, individuals who are not alike can be treated differently concerning their rights and liabilities. For example, people from the backwards and scheduled classes are entitled to distinctive protection of the laws.
The principle of equal protection of laws is taken from the 14th Amendment of the US Constitution. It indicates that individuals need to be treated equally without discrimination. Additionally, there should not be any unfair partiality among those on an equal scale. Hence, those who are equal and those who are unequal should not be considered in the same class.
In the case of Srinivasa Theatre and Ors. Etc. Etc. vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and Ors. Etc. Etc. 1992), the court ruled that the concepts of equality before law and equal protection of law differ, although they may have some similarities. The court emphasised that the term “law” in the first expression (equality before law) is used in a general meaning. Still, it has a specific interpretation in the second term (equal protection of law).
Further, it was stated that equality before the law comes under a dynamic concept with various aspects. The central facet of it implies that there is no space for any privileged treatment to any person, and no person is considered above the law. The other aspect states that the State is duty bound to build a society equal in terms of social status as it has been denoted by the Preamble and Part IV of the constitution. A tabular distinction is defined below to know the different aspects of equality before the law and equal protection of the law.
Distinction between equality before law and equal protection of law
| Basis of Differences |
Equality before law |
Equal protection of law |
| Historical |
This principle is taken from English law, which talks about equality before the law, meaning that no one shall be treated above the law. |
This concept is adopted from the Constitution of the United States of America. |
| Implementation, Impact and Particular Context. |
It is a negative concept because it does not give special treatment to anyone who works as a favour. |
Unlike equality before the law, it is a positive concept because it provides equal treatment for those who come under similar circumstances and unequal treatment for those who are not equal. |
| Definition |
It states that the law equally applies to everyone, irrespective of their social and economic status. |
It says that the State can treat the weaker and deprived sections differently from others by providing reservations. |
| Philosophical |
Equal treatment of laws to all the sections of society, that is, all individuals shall be adjudicated by ordinary courts irrespective of any special courts. |
The same protection and applicability of laws shall be given to those who are alike and similar. |
| Legal applicability |
The State must ensure equality among people before treating the law. |
The state has a responsibility to protect the rights of the individuals. |
Exceptions to the right to equality
There are several exceptions to the right to equality that are given under the Constitution of India, which are discussed below:
- In Article 361, the President and Governor are both given certain immunities against civil and criminal matters. During their tenure, the president and governor are not accountable and answerable for anything they do in exercising their powers as per the granted capacity.
- Article 361(A) of the Constitution provides immunity regarding civil or criminal proceedings in any court to the persons who publish any report about Parliament or State’s Legislative proceedings in any significantly authentic manner.
- Article 105 of the Constitution states that members of Parliament have also been granted some privileges regarding speech and expression in Parliamentary proceedings. This immunity safeguards them from any court proceeding.
- Article 194 grants the same privileges to the members of the State Legislative Assembly as is provided to members of Parliament to protect them against any civil or criminal liability.
- Immunity for diplomats: Foreign diplomats and sovereigns are also entitled to immunity from civil and criminal proceedings in India as per Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961 (VCDR). Further, the individuals who hold any diplomatic position at the United Nations Organization (UNO) are also the exceptions for any kind of criminal and civil proceedings within the region of India.
- Article 31C was added by the 25th Amendment of the Constitution in 1971. This article also contains exceptions regarding equality before the law. This implies that if the State enacts laws to implement certain Directive Principles of State Policies (DPSP) enshrined under Part IV, it will not be challenged because it is inconsistent with Article 14 of the Constitution. It also states that the provisions of such laws enacted by the State shall not be enforced unless it has received the assent of the President.
- Reasonable Classification under Article 14 can also be an exception to the right to equality. However, it does not permit all kinds of legislative classification made by the State; instead, it only permits classification based on some reasonable grounds. It implies that the State cannot divide people in class. However, it is allowed in exceptional circumstances where the classification object is reasonable.
In the case of Javed & Ors vs. State of Haryana & Ors (2003), the Apex Court emphasised that Article 14 of the Constitution prohibits class discrimination, allowing for reasonable classification. Further, the court laid down two conditions for checking reasonable classification, which must be followed. These conditions are stated below:
- The reasonable classification must come under the ambit of “intelligible differentia” which means the cause of distinguishing certain people from others should be the same.
- The “intelligible differentia” must have any rationale to achieve the object sought in the legislative enactment or act. That means there should be a connection between the object and the classification made for seeking that object to get achieved.
Therefore, the State can make a reasonable classification to legislate a law favouring public interest. After finding the exceptions to the right to equality, let’s delve into the relevancy of the concepts rule of law, supremacy of law, equality before and predominance of legal spirit about the right to equality.
Rule of law
The principle behind Article 14, “equality before the law,” is mainly based on the Rule of law. It states that all individuals, governments, and other institutions should obey and be governed by law and not by any arbitrary action by an individual or group of individuals.
Regardless of a person’s rank or position, he should follow the ordinary jurisdiction and courts, and no special court proceeding will commence. The Constitution further states that the government’s decisions should be adopted while considering the legal and moral principles drafted in it.
In the case of India, the Indian Constitution is the supreme law of the land. The theory given by Dicey has three central pillars, which are defined below:
Supremacy of law
One of Dicey’s first pillars states that there should be no arbitrary power and that no one should be punished except for breaching any law at that time. The person proved to be guilty by the appropriate authorities of the country before an ordinary court punishes him according to the procedure established by law. That means no one should be held liable without following the prescribed legal procedure within the written procedure of law.
Under such circumstances, the law should be considered supreme if a conflict develops between an ordinary person and a ranked officer. Ultimately, a well-codified substantive procedure needs to be followed when dealing with any kind of discrepancies.
Equality before law
All individuals, irrespective of their rank or position (poor or rich, official or non-official, etc.), should be subjected to the ordinary law of the land, which ordinary courts administer. It seeks to ensure that the law is administered and enforced just and fairly. It is also embedded in the Preamble and Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It implies that ‘law gives equal justice to all’.
Predominance of legal spirit
Dicey believed an enforcing authority should enforce the above two principles effectively. According to him, such enforcing authority should be vested in courts. Now, let’s explore the principles of the right to equality.
Underlying principle behind the right to equality
The underlying principle is not “same treatment to all,” but equal treatment for similar people and distinctive treatment for unequal people because not all humans are identical in every aspect.
Reasonable classifications between people are needed to remove inequalities so that State policies can be formulated to benefit them. The state must reduce inequalities by implementing specific socio-economic policies in favour of those who, according to the State, need such benefits for their upliftment.
However, it should be noted that all people should be treated equally, and no classification should be based on any individual’s social status or physical appearance. To secure the objectives set out in Article 14, it is essential to ensure that equal people should be treated equally and unequal people should be treated differently. A reasonable classification is necessary to complete the aspects of these essentials. Now, moving on to discuss the elements of reasonable classification and further there is a test for making such classification that is also stated ahead.
Reasonable classification
For effective law implementation, legislation must group individuals according to their equal and unequal aspects. Such classification is necessary because not every law applies universally to all persons, the reason being the differences in social, cultural, and economic conditions.
The varying needs of different individuals require different approaches to the law. For public welfare, property, persons, and occupations require appropriate legislation to ensure that other needs are dealt with differently. The general treatment of unequal conditions might lead to inequalities in society. Thus, such special classification by the legislature on reasonable grounds becomes necessary to reduce societal disparities.
There are many instances of such special laws applying only to a particular class or classes of people, like the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (which applies particularly to the police) and the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (which applies to the minimum wage system of certain employments). Thus, Article 14 permits reasonable classification but prohibits class legislation.
Test of valid classification
The classification must be just and reasonable and about the need and purpose of the law in respect of which classification is made. An arbitrary or unreasonable classification will not be justified.
The object of classification should be lawful. In the case of Dr. Subramanian Swamy vs. Director, CBI & Anr (2014). It was observed that ”if the object itself is discriminatory, then the explanation that classification is reasonable having a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved is immaterial.”
When certain classes of individuals are excluded from the ambit of a particular law, there must be a reasonable basis for such exclusion. For example, if the government does not include a specific class while making policies and laws, the exclusion must be just and supported with specified reasons.
In the doctrine of reasonable classification, a test was formulated to ensure that the classification is valid and not arbitrary or against the right to equality. The following two conditions should be fulfilled for a valid classification:
- Intelligible differentia means a difference that is apparent and capable of being understood. Classification distinguishing persons or things that are grouped from others left out of the group should be based on intelligent reason. Such classification must be based on a just objective to be achieved.
- The differentia must be rationally related to the statute’s object. In other words, it is the relationship between classification and the desired result.
After the reasonable classifications, we move on to understand the applicability of Article 14, which explains the application of this article and some of the principles laid down by the judiciary through several decided cases.
Application of Article 14
Certain vital principles have been laid down in some landmark judgments further to explain the concept of Article 14 and legislative classification. Some of these are mentioned below:
Classification without a difference
This highlighted principle was laid down in the case of Minor P. Rajendran vs. State of Madras & Ors (1968). There was a provision relating to district-wise seat distribution in the State Medical colleges according to the proportion of the district’s population to the state’s total population.
The court struck down the provision and held that any admission scheme should be devised to select the best available talent for admission as it is discriminatory to choose a less talented candidate against a talented candidate just on a population basis. The district-wise seat distribution didn’t meet the objective sought to be achieved.
Special courts and procedural inequalities
It was laid down in the case of Maganlal Chhagganlal (P) Ltd vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay & Ors. (1974). The validity of specific provisions of the amended Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 and the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955, was questioned as certain powers were conferred by the said Acts to the authorities to proceed with special eviction proceedings against the unauthorised occupants of the governmental and corporation premises.
Further, the Supreme Court held that when the statute authorises the executive to make a classification, some guidelines should be provided by such statute, whether in the form of a preamble, objectives or other analogous provisions. When the Act provides sufficient guidance, it is an adequate indication for authorities to proceed under the special procedure according to the purpose of the Act and not according to the method of the ordinary civil court. Thus, the Act cannot be struck down only because it provides for special procedures.
Again, in this case, the Apex Court determined the need for reasonable classification in the context of Article 14, which prohibits unreasonable classification. Further, the court differentiated between the statute, which drives classification, and the other one, which empowers the executive to make and execute such guidelines.
In the first scenario, the statute will be null and void if it is unqualified to meet the reasonable classification criteria. On the other hand, if the executive is authorised under any statute to make any classification but cannot meet such classification as mentioned under such statute, only the action would be invalid, not the entire statute.
Procedural fairness
This principle was discussed at length for the first time in Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India (1978). Maneka Gandhi was issued a passport under the Passport Act of 1967. The regional passport officer, New Delhi issued a letter addressed to Maneka Gandhi, in which she was asked to surrender her passport under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act in the public interest within seven days from receiving the letter.
After that, Mrs. Gandhi wrote a letter to the Regional Passport Officer, New Delhi, in which she sought a return copy highlighting the reasons for such an order. However, the Ministry of External Affairs refused to produce any such reason in the general public’s interest.
Subsequently, a writ petition was filed before the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, stating that it infringes the right to equality before the law and equal protection in the ambit of equal treatment by the State. Further, the Apex Court held that Article 14 requires the observance of principles of natural justice and the requirement of reasoned decisions.
The court also emphasised that every citizen has a right to fair and equal treatment by the State. The state can not act arbitrarily because arbitrary actions are enemies of the right to equality. Therefore, the State has to provide the grounds for an action against any citizen of this country.
Administrative discretion
When classification is left to the executive in a statute, specific guidelines or policies should be provided for exercising such discretion. If no guidelines are given, an Act will be held violative of Article 14, and the court will strike it down. The legislation doesn’t need to lay down such guidance; it can be inferred from its preamble, objectives, and other analogous provisions.
Basis of classification
Classification can be based on geographical or territorial grounds, historical considerations, the nature and position of a person, the nature of the business, reference of time, the object of the law, etc., provided that the classification has a nexus with the object of the legislation. The case Law regarding this is P. Rajendran vs. State of Madras (1968), in which it was emphasised that classification and allocation of seats to the students based on district zone is discriminatory and against the principle of Article 14 of the Constitution.
The State has no such objectives regarding providing reservations in educational institutions. Furthermore, the distribution of seats based on the district population is also discriminatory and is not within the state’s ambit. Lastly, the court denied upholding such discriminatory seat allocations to students willing to admit in medical performance.
Widening the scope of equality
According to the judgement of E.V. Chinnaiah vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors (2004), the validity of the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Castes (Rationalisation of Reservations) Act, 2000, was challenged. The Act aimed to sub-categorise the scheduled castes to provide reservations. The appellant contended that the impugned Act is ultra vires and against the fundamentals of the Constitution.
The Apex Court emphasised that reasonable State action is required to meet the demands of Article 14. The State must make policies and laws that try to diminish inequalities and make equal opportunities available to those who are equal and different for those who are unequal.
Hence, the court found that the impugned act is ultra vires and declared it unconstitutional. This Act did not aim to provide any provision for the reservation but to redistribute the existing provision enacted for the reservation.
In August 2024, this judgment was overruled in the State of Punjab vs. Davinder Singh (2024). While deciding the matter, the Apex Court emphasised that reservation must be granted to the citizen after following the basis of some significant data which examines the social and educational aspects for figuring out the backwardness of people. The court reiterated that Article 14 talks about the guarantee of equal protection before the law and prohibits discriminating based on caste because it violates the principle laid down under the ambit of the right to equality.
However, the court further held that the subclassification of the creamy layer from Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe must ensure that those genuinely in need can benefit from such a provision.
In the case of E.P. Royappa vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr (1973), the Apex Court gave the modern approach to the right to equality. The court stated that the right to equality under Article 14 provides a guarantee against arbitrary actions of the State.
Further, the court included that the right to equality is against the arbitrary treatment of the State and added that Article 14( right to equality) and arbitrariness are enemies of each other. Therefore, it is essential to protect the laws and regulations from the arbitrary actions of the State.
The judiciary has set examples in India by delivering many prominent judgments regarding the right to equality. We will discuss these landmark decisions now.
Landmark judgments about Article 14
State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkarhabib Mohamed & Ors. (1952)
This landmark case pertains to the constitutionality of the West Bengal Special Court Act, 1950, which was challenged on the ground of arbitrary powers granted to the State Government to form a special provision under Section 5 for speedy trial in certain offences. The petitioner contended that there is no objective to classify the distinguished offences stated in the Act.
The Apex Court further declared this classification arbitrary, giving the government certain arbitrary powers to classify offences that lack justified reasonability. The Act also did not have any specific guidelines to determine the classification. This case became one of the significant cases determining the concept laid down in Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia vs. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar & Ors. (1958)
This famous case provided us with the well-known doctrine of classification, which the Apex Court derived for the first time in this judgment. The constitutionality of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, was challenged before the Apex Court by filing a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The government made differential classification by enforcing this Act.
The court argued that this Act empowers the government to interfere in the affairs of Individuals and companies under the purview of public importance, which goes beyond the government’s domain. It was argued that it violates the principles of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Further, the Apex Court demonstrated its reasoning over equality before the law by upholding this act’s validity and laying down the principles for reasonable classification.
The first principle provides that the State can make a subjective reasonable classification (otherwise prohibited under Article 14) to uplift any backward class if the classification is done regarding rationally desired goals. The second one concerns making classification based on intelligible differentia, which means the object sought to be achieved by the legislation shall not differ from the classification made. Therefore, reasonable discrimination is not prohibited.
Vishaka & Ors vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors (1997)
In this landmark case, the issue of gender equality regarding working women was pointed out before the Apex Court. Suppose women become victims of sexual harassment due to their gender at the workplace. In that case, it shall violate their fundamental right, the ” right to equality” and the “right to live with dignity” guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Indian Consitution, respectively. The Apex Court further stated that there is no specific legislation which is in force now for dealing with cases of sexual harassment. Still, such issues must be considered under the fundamental rights just to enforce them.
Further, the Apex Court asked the government to pass legislation safeguarding women in the workplace. The court determined that sexual harassment in the workplace amounts to an infringement of the fundamental rights protected under Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), and 21 of the Constitution.
The court further emphasised sexual harassment as unwelcome: “Sexually determined behaviour includes any inappropriate physical, verbal, or nonverbal behaviour of a sexual nature, as well as offers and demands for sexual favours, obscene comments, and the presentation of pornography.” In addition, the Apex Court also determined that inappropriate laws with other legal deficiencies helped increment such severe acts.
It was further emphasised by the court that “the right to work with dignity and getting a safeguard from being sexually harassed are essentially required human and fundamental rights that are universally considered under the ambit of gender equality.” Hence, the court found out that it must look into the utmost matter and has an obligation too, which is directed by Article 32 to ensure that every citizen’s fundamental rights are protected in every possible way.
After that, the court stated that it is altogether discriminatory when a woman has a strange fear if she goes against her employer to file a complaint for attacking her modesty. She would probably lose her job security due to the objections raised against sexual harassment.
The Apex Court established the “Vishaka Guidelines” to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace and protect women’s right to equality in the workplace, which is directly related to Article 14 of the Constitution. The rules laid down by the Apex Court later became the base for the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013.
Indian Young Lawyers Association vs. State of Kerala (2018)
This landmark case, also known as the Sabarimala temple case, significantly impacted the protection of the right to equality enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution. The central issue in this case was whether not allowing women into a temple to worship is discriminatory or a violation of the right to equality guaranteed under Articles 14, 15, and 17 of the Constitution.
In addition, Justice D.Y. Chandrachud said that denying the external freedom for offering worship to women in this democratic country highlighted that women are considered highly subordinate to men in our society where we all live together. Additionally, Justice Chandrachud also expressed the concern that the discriminatory practice is firmly based on the biological characteristics of a person, even if it has no religious connection seeking women not to maintain the “vrutham”, causes excessive discrimination with gender equality in a democratic country like India.
In his observation, Justice Mishra opined that any regulations that violate Articles 14 and 15 and cause harm to the dignity and integrity of women shall be repealed and disposed of. Ahead, it was also stated that women have been part of “classes and sections” and that reform demanded an act of law. He also invalidated Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965. He declared that only allowing men to offer worship is not an essential religious ritual or practice, and no sacred scripture testifies.
The Apex Court observed all the contentions and struck down the ancient practice of prohibiting women, during their menstrual cycle, from entering the premises of the Sabarimala temple. Lastly, the court observed that these restrictions are against the spirit of equality enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.
National Legal Service Authority vs. Union of India (2014)
In this case, the National Legal Service Authority (NALSA) pointed out a need for the rights of those who remained deprived of gender recognition (as male or female). Throughout this case, it was argued that these people receive inhuman treatment in society. They do not have any recognition by the State or laws that can provide them with fundamental human rights for living a dignified life.
After determining all the contentions and facts that were presented before the court, the court made a clear distinction between biological sex and psychological sex as well by stating that the former is what we get since birth, while the latter is what we identify ourselves to be, and both might be uniquely different. The court also added that psychological assumption has a dominant effect over biological ones. Further, the court stated that “transgender is an umbrella term used for persons whose gender identity, gender expression or behaviour are incompatible to their biological sex.“
The Apex Court considered the interpretation of the right to equality under Article 14 gender-neutral. The court accepted them as persons of the third gender and emphasised that they should be granted all the rights conferred on males and females.
Navtej Singh Johar vs. Union of India Ministry of Law And Justice (2018)
This case discussed the legality of consensual intercourse between same sex persons. It was an offence codified under Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (decriminalised under the BNS, 2023). The validity of this specific Section was challenged on the ground of violating the concept of equal treatment as defined under Article 14 of the Constitution.
This issue was raised for the first time in the case of Naz Foundation vs. Govt. In NCT of Delhi and Others (2009), the constitutionality of Section 377 of the IPC was challenged before the High Court of Delhi. The High Court struck down this Section because it violated the right to personal liberty and to live with dignity and privacy. It was observed to have also violated the provision of equal protection ensured by Article 14 of the Constitution.
The decision was challenged before the Apex Court later. The Apex Court overruled the judgement in the Suresh Kumar Koushal & Anr vs. Naz Foundation & Ors (2013) by the High Court of Delhi. It reinstated Section 377 by stating that the Parliament can declare a section unconstitutional.
Another petition was filed in the case of Navtej Singh Johar vs. Union of India (2018) to challenge the constitutional validity of Section 377 of IPC on the apprehension of consensual sex happening between two adults of the same sex in a private space. The Apex Court, after observing and analysing the previous judgements, struck down Section 377 of the IPC, stating it as unconstitutional to the extent of criminalising consensual sex between adults.
Further, the court relied upon the earlier decided case NALSA vs. Union of India (2014) and Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd) vs. Union of India (2018) to restate that gender identity and sexual orientation are natural to the personality of a person. Suppose the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender would be denied their right to privacy and right to choose a sexual partner. In that case, it will violate a person’s dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution. Justice Indu Malhotra stated that sexuality acknowledged that homosexuality is a variation of sexuality.
Further, it was opined that denying the fundamental rights to transgenders would amount to a violation of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. The state must ensure that the human rights of the community of LGBT community are protected without having the majoritarian consent of the government. Hence, the judiciary must ensure sacred constitutional morality over social ethics.
Shayara Bano vs. Union of India and Ors. (2017)
This case is prominently known as the ‘triple talaq’ case. Triple talaq is a kind of instantaneous talaq pronounced by a husband to his wife, and here, the wife’s consent is immaterial. When a husband pronounces this triple talaq to his wife loudly, the marriage is dissolved.
The petitioner Shayara Bano challenged this practice of triple talaq before the Apex Court, arguing that it violates the right to equality guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution.
Ms. Bano argued that such acts are against a person’s right to equality, equal treatment, and dignity. She also contended that these actions have not provided any safeguard under the right to freedom of religion, which is provided under Articles 25 to 28 of the Constitution. So, this freedom has contradictory effects towards other subjective interpretations like morality, public health, and other reasonable grounds.
In this judgement, it was held that triple talaq (talaq-e-biddat) has arbitrary characteristics, it is against the principles of the Constitution and has contradictory concepts on the principles of human rights and freedoms. However, CJI Khehar and Justice Nazeer disagreed with it. They stated that triple talaq is a form of divorce protected under the right to religion, and the Parliament is obliged to enact laws to govern such practices.
A few years later, Parliament successfully passed legislation named the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019, which criminalised triple talaq (talaq-e-biddat) and made it a punishable offence that would be conferred with three years in imprisonment. However, the Jamiat Ulama-I-Hind, Samastha Kerala Jamiatul Ulema, and many Muslim councils challenged this newly enforced Act before the Apex Court. The further hearing is still not scheduled to be commenced by the court.
Harsh Mander & Anr. vs. Union of India & Ors. (2018)
In the present case, various Sections of the Bombay Prevention of Begging Act 1959 were challenged before the Supreme Court on the grounds of violation of the right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution. The Act, enforced by the State Government, criminalises begging within the State of Maharashtra and was also extended to the National Capital Territory of Delhi in 1960. It was contended that the right to shelter and basic needs is guaranteed under the Constitution.
The court widely stated that people who do not have shelter to reside in and no access to basic amenities to make their daily livelihood convenient are forced to beg across the streets of the city. Criminalising begging will deprive them of their fundamental rights, including the right to life and dignity and even the right to equality among other sections of society.
Further, the court emphasised that the state must protect the rights of such individuals by providing them necessities such as shelter and food to safeguard their right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. The court struck down the provisions that criminalise several forms of begging within the State territory. The Apex Court further argued that it violates the fundamental rights secured under Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution.
Subsequently, the court said that begging can not be declared a criminal activity because most poor people have to meet their basic needs by begging outside on the roads. Criminalising begging wouldn’t deprive such people of their basic needs.
Joseph Shine vs. Union of India (2018)
In this case, the constitutionality of Section 497 of the IPC (decriminalised under the BNS) with Section 198(2) of CrPC (not provided under BNSS), which talks about adultery and recognised it as an offence, was challenged before the Apex Court by filing a writ petition under Article 32 on the ground of the violation of Articles 14, 15 and 21. It was not the first time that adultery was challenged before the Apex Court. Many other cases have been filed earlier to challenge adultery.
It was challenged for the first time in Yusuf Abdul Aziz vs. State of Bombay Andhusseinbhoy Laljee (1954), where the court upheld the validity of Sections 497 and 198(2) of CrPC, which criminalised adultery.
After that, the case of Smt. Sowmithri Vishnu vs. Union of India & Anr. (1985) was filed, where the same provisions were challenged on the grounds of discrimination. The court again upheld the constitutionality of the offence of adultery by stating that it is a safeguard to protect the sanctity of the relation of marriage between husband and wife.
In V. Revathi vs. Union of India & Ors (1988), one more time, the Apex Court upheld the validity of Sections 497 and 198(2) of CrPC. The court emphasised that Section 497 protects both husband and wife from filing complaints against each other. It punishes the other person who tries to diminish the sacred relation of marriage by committing such an adulterous act. Thus, it is not discrimination against her but reverse discrimination in her favour.
In the present case of Joseph Shine, it was contended that only a husband has a right to file a case under Section 497 of the IPC. On the other hand, a wife does not have the same remedy. This partiality indicates a violation of a fundamental right: the right to equality and equal protection, which is specifically mentioned under Article 14. This right is gender neutral.
Now, it is absurd to see that if a husband can prosecute her wife for adultery, then why is a wife not entitled to claim the same thing against her husband? The court stated that the wife cannot be the husband’s property. Instead, a wife also has the right to equality and to live with dignity, just like a husband. The court put adultery out of the scope of Article 15(3), which empowered the State to legislate special laws in favour of women. Instead, the court stated that it violates Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution.
Thereafter, the court decriminalised adultery and declared section 497 as unconstitutional. After this judgement, adultery is no more a criminal offence but still a civil wrong. A civil wrong is committed against an individual’s personal life, while a criminal act is committed against society. Now, Adultery is not a penalised offence but is merely a ground for divorce.
We have covered Article 14 regarding the right to equality for every individual against the grounds mentioned under supreme law. Now, we have another aspect of equality under Article 15. Let’s delve into it now.
Article 15: Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth
This Article deals with the prohibition of discrimination based on religion, caste, race, sex or place of birth. The explanation of each clause is discussed below:
Article 15(1) of the Constitution
This provision generally explains that the State should treat everyone equally, without discrimination based on religion, caste, sex, colour, or place of birth.
The protection under Article 15(1) is available against the State only. Any citizen can be protected under this provision when he is subjected to discrimination about any rights, liabilities or privileges conferred to it by the Constitution. Now, let’s look at some prominent cases concerning Article 15.
In the well-known case of Nain Sukh Das And Another vs. The State of U.P. and Others (1953), three residents of Etah explicitly claimed that they were exclusively denied the right to exercise their right to vote and to contest the election to the Municipal Board. It was claimed that it was a violation of Articles 14 and 15(1) of the Constitution. They also claimed that the elected representatives had been elected by the election held on communal lines based on separate electoral votes, which is against the provisions of Article 15(1).
Further, the petitioner sought to prevent the elected representatives from attending official meetings and acting as elected members. The court held that such laws, allowing the election to take place as separate voters for people belonging to distinct religions, are against the principle of Article 15(1) of the Constitution.
The court also emphasised that the right which petitioners have claimed, asking the municipal board to stop the elected member (who is not rightly elected) from attending any board proceedings, does not come under the ambit of Article 32. The court further stated that even if such a right exists, it is not a fundamental right as written in Part III of the Constitution. Hence, no petition can be filed under Article 32.
Additionally, the Apex Court stated that the impartial infringement of Article 15(1) and Article 14 is discriminatory and unacceptable. However, the petitioner did not ask for any relief in his favour against the infringement of these stated rights by filing the petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, even though he had the opportunity to do so. Thus, the court finally held that they were not entitled to receive any relief under Article 32 of the Constitution, and further, the petition was dismissed.
Afterwards, in the decided judgement of D.P. Joshi vs. The State of Madhya Bharat and Another (1955), a medical student raised a petition against the excessive fee demanded by the non-residents of the State who wanted to take admission in a medical college aided by the state of Madhya Bharat that takes care of that medical institution. It was further argued that such discriminatory treatment by the state exclusively violates the principle of Article 15(1) and Article 14.
After listening to the arguments presented by the petitioner, the Apex Court determined the interpretation of the term place of birth and place of residence in a distinctive manner. The court made a precise classification between both the terms, having different meanings and said that place of birth and place of residence are not equivalent in consideration. Ahead of this, the court also emphasised that the States are entitled to make distinctions for persons on the grounds of place of residence. The court further held that the residents of the State are reasonably allowed to get the exemption from paying any higher fee.
Although non-residents of the States are essentially required to pay an additional fee to be admitted to a medical college, the presented petition was dismissed by expressing that no infringement of the petitioner’s fundamental rights was made.
In the case of Dr. Pradeep Jain Etc. vs. Union of India and Ors. Etc (1984), the Apex Court determined that reservation in PG medical courses shall not be given based on domicile records and residency status of staying for several years in a State. If the state wants to give preferential treatment to its domicile students, it can do so, but the limit of 50% should not be exceeded in any circumstances.
The court also stated that the classification is done by the State based on place of birth but not based on residence. The same reasoning was laid down by previous judgements where the court specifically interpreted the 50% limitation in the admission process. In Article 15, Clause 1 gives an overview of discrimination on several grounds. Afterwards, clause 2 of the same Article is a provision which gives an idea about the discrimination when it comes to accessing the public places in this nation. Let’s discuss this highlighted provision in detail.
Article 15(2) of the Constitution
This clause of the abovementioned Article discusses the discriminatory practices and restrictions when accessing this country’s public places. It further states that no citizen of this country shall be forced to bear any discrimination and refused access to the places and public spots on the grounds of their religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them that are listed below:
- Article 15(2)(a) explains that every citizen shall have access to shops, public restaurants, hotels, and places of public entertainment that are wholly or partially maintained and funded by the State. Thus, there shall not be any kind of discrimination against any citizen who wants to access the places established by the State specifically for public use.
- Article 15(2)(b) simply states that the State must ensure that no discriminatory treatment is being given to any citizen while using wells, water tanks, bathing ghats, roads, and places of public resorts that are maintained wholly or partly by State funds or dedicated for the use of the general public.
The word ‘shop’ is stated in a general sense, and it includes every place where goods are sold or services are rendered. Further, It is to be noted that Article 15(2)(b) of the Constitution states that a cause of action arises only when such facilities are maintained wholly or partly by State funds or dedicated to the use of the general public.
This stated guarantee is rewarded to every citizen when such discrimination occurs only on the grounds mentioned above. The enacted law will get its valid consideration if the discrimination is not done on the mentioned grounds under the stated clause of the discussed article.
In the famous decided case of Indian Young Lawyers Associations vs. State of Kerala (2018), the issue prominently revolved around the restricted entry imposed for women during the age of menstruation (between 10-50 years) into the very famous Sabarimala Temple. The significant contentions were presented, which highlighted the violation of Article 15(2), which states that no citizen shall be forced to bear any discrimination solely based on their religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth of the citizen. The primary argument was thoroughly based on the exclusive discrimination that has been done on the factor of sexual identity. If women are not allowed to enter the temple, it violates the principle highlighted under Article 15(2).
After all the contentions and claims, the Apex Court heard the serious matter. It emphasised that making such restriction on entry for women because of their menstrual cycle is not a considered customary and religious practice that needs to be followed. It does not have any evidential reasons to consider it one of the essential practices that have been followed for ages.
The court found this restriction against the constitutional principle of the right to equality enshrined under Article 15. Further, the court declared any restricted norms for women to enter the temple premises unconstitutional. Therefore, after this judgement, women of every age shall be allowed to enter the Sabarimala Temple without discrimination.
We must know about the discrimination that should not be done against any citizen while treating them equally. Some exceptions are also given under Article 15. Let’s find them.
Article 15(3) of the Constitution
This clause is an exception to clauses 1 and 2, which briefly states that the State has the power to enact such provisions that benefit the welfare of women and children in this country. No particular restrictions specified in this article stop the State from enforcing such provisions for the betterment of women and children.
Parliament is entitled by the supreme law to make special provisions. Therefore, this Article is an exception to the general principle laid down against discrimination. In the case of V. Revathi vs. Union of India (1988), the Apex Court emphasised that the term “for” used under clause 3 empowered the State to make special provisions in favour of women and children to uplift their status in society.
Regarding this Article, the firm intention of the Constitution’s architects was mainly to protect the interests of children and women because these sections were considered comparatively weaker compared to other sections of society, and there was an adequate need behind drafting such provisions for their upliftment in society.
In Rajesh Kumar Gupta and Ors vs. State of U.P. and Ors (2005), a writ petition was filed to challenge the reservation quota and appointment procedure that took place for appointing primary school teachers based on BTC (Basic Teacher Certificate) in the state of Uttar Pradesh. Before the concerned High Court, it was contended that the 50% reservation provided to women to appoint them as primary school teachers was against the constitutional principles.
Afterwards, it was firmly argued that this impugned quota is arbitrary. By providing 50% reservation for women to fill the vacant seats of school teachers, it went beyond the principle under Article 15(1) of the Indian Constitution.
The Apex Court further emphasised that the State is empowered under Article 15(3) to legislate special provisions for uplifting women and children. However, this is allowed despite the restriction mentioned under Article 15(1). Hence, it is an exception to Article 15(1), and these special allowances are given to the State to uplift the weaker sections of society to ensure fair treatment.
In its ruling, the court observed that the reservation is given in exceptional circumstances about the betterment of women among other sections of society, which is mainly provided under Article 15(3) of the Constitution. In its findings, the court also stated that this 50% cap should not be customised in any circumstances.
After providing these findings, the court conclusively upheld the reservation given to women up to 50%. Hence, the petition was dismissed because the parties misconceived their remedy under Articles 15 and 32 of the Constitution.
After clause 3, there is another exception to clauses 1 and 2 that empowers the State to make provisions to favour any socially and educationally backward class. We are going to discuss it hereunder.
Article 15(4) of the Constitution
This clause is the second exception to clauses 1 and 2 of Article 15, which states that nothing in Article 15 or Article 29 (2) shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.
The above-highlighted clause was enacted by the First Constitutional Amendment Act, 1951, in the consequences of the judgment of the Apex Court in the State of Madras vs. Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan (1951). In this case, the Apex Court presented a few considerations preventing the State from making any special provision for socially and educationally backward classes. The court also emphasised the lack of legislative provision to enact laws favouring such backward classes.
Thus, after this judgment, the State enacted an Amendment as a new clause. Subsequently, Clause 4 was added, which benefits this country’s socially and educationally backward citizens by improving their representation.
For the application of this provision following two issues should be taken into consideration first:
Determination of backward classes
The definition of “backward classes” is not in the Indian Constitution. However, Article 340 empowers the President to constitute a commission to investigate the matters and conditions of socially and economically backward classes.
It has been held again by the Supreme Court in the case of A. Periakaruppan Chettiar vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors (1971) which the court held that caste cannot be the only criterion in the determination of the class. Caste can be considered one factor determining a class for knowing the social and economic backwardness but not as a dominant factor.
Poverty cannot be the primary factor in determining social and economic backwardness. However, all other factors should also be considered when selecting such a class.
Quantum of reservation of such classes
In the case of M. R. Balaji and Others vs. State of Mysore (1962), it was held that the 68% reservation provided by the impugned order of the State for socially and economically backward classes was inconsistent with Article 15(4) because this Article only enables the State to make special provisions, not the exclusive provisions in the context of reservation.
Further, it was contended that it is against the national interest if competent and talented students are excluded from admission to higher education only because of the reservations provided by the State. The court emphasised that exceeding the legitimate limit over reservation goes against the principle of Article 15(4), which only allows providing reasonable reservations that cannot exceed 50%.
Hence, the Apex Court held the impugned order unconstitutional and violated fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution.
The Apex Court, in the case of A. Periakaruppan Chettiar vs. State of Tamil Nadu (1971), held that any classification of socially and educationally backward classes solely based on caste violates Article 15(4). The court also held that reserving such backward classes is to reform their societal conditions.
In the State of Kerala & Anr vs. N. M. Thomas & Ors (1975), an exemption was given to Scheduled Tribes from passing a departmental test for several years for their promotion in services. However, in a particular year, the reservation was fixed to 68% for scheduled Tribes.
After that, the court upheld the exception, stating that Article 15(4) is not an exception to Article 15(1). Instead, Article 15(4) directs the State to enforce societal equality. Therefore, the State could make adequate reservations for the upliftment of its citizens.
In Indra Sawhney Etc. Etc. vs. Union of India and Ors, Etc. Etc. 1993), it was held that total reservation should not exceed the cap of 50% except for extraordinary circumstances. Moreover, such a quota will not include those socially and economically backward classes selected on merit and will be adjusted towards the open category. This case also pertains to Article 14, as discussed above.
The stated limit only applies to reservations, not concessions, exemptions, or relaxation. Now, we will move on to one more exception, which signifies the need to advance our deprived section of society, which we will discuss in the next subhead.
Article 15(5) of the Constitution
This clause is the third exception to clauses (1) and (2) of Article 15, which mainly says that nothing in Article 15(5) or Article 19(1)(g) shall prevent the State from enacting any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens, the Scheduled Castes, or the Scheduled Tribes.
Special provisions were set about their admission to educational institutions, including private educational institutions that can be aided or unaided by the State. However, the unaided minority educational institutions referred to in Article 30 (1) shall be excluded from the ambit of this clause.
It was added by the Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act, 2005, which says that special provisions can be made after this amendment only in a lawful manner and not by executive action. The Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admission) Act, 2006, was introduced after this Amendment, which grants 15% reservation to the Scheduled Class, 7.5% to the Scheduled Tribe, and 27 % to the Other Backward Class in the educational institutions run by the Central Government.
The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, was enforced to empower the 93rd Amendment Act, which became a reason to add Clause 5 under Article 15. This Act bound all educational institutions to reserve 25% of seats for children from weaker and deprived sections to give them school admission. However, this provision shall not be implemented in private, unaided minority schools.
This Amendment was added in the consequence of the case of P.A. Inamdar & Ors vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors (2005). In this case, the Apex Court stated that the different states are not entitled to enforce the reservation policies on the private unaided colleges of minority and non-minority, including professional colleges.
The validity of the 93rd Amendment Act was challenged in Ashok Kumar Thakur vs. Union of India and Ors (2008). A petition was filed challenging the validity of the Act and of the Amendment, stating that such a provision is violative of Article 15(4). However, the court held that such a provision and Act do not invalidate Article 15(4) of the Constitution.
Further, the court held it is done to demonstrate exceptional reasons to favour the socially and educationally backward classes so that these classes can also uplift their conditions. Therefore, the court upheld the validity of the stated Act and emphasised that the Act is constitutionally valid. The court recommended that a review of the reservation should take place after a period of every 10 years.
With these expressed exceptions, clause 6 was enacted later to give the state power to make provisions in favour of economically weaker sections. Further, an explanation is given about clause 6 of Article 15.
Article 15(6) of the Constitution
This clause explains that nothing in this Article or Article 19(1)(g) or Article 29(2) shall prevent the State from enacting any special provisions for the advancement of any economically weaker sections of citizens other than the classes specified in clause (4) and (5) in so far as such special provisions relate to their admission to educational institutions including aided or unaided private institutions other than the minority educational institutions referred in Article 30(1).
Such special reservation provisions would be in addition to the existing reservations, and it shall not exceed the limit of 10% of the aggregate seats in each category. The broad meaning of the term “economically weaker sections” shall be notified by the State from time to time based on family income and other indicators of economic disadvantage.
This stated clause is the new exception added to the original Article 15 that explains the special provisions for the upliftment of society’s Economically Weaker Section (EWS). The 103rd Constitutional Amendment Act, 2019, enacted this new clause. Post-enactment, the constitutionality of this Act was also challenged before the Apex Court on the grounds of violating the reservation clause, which claims that reservation can not be granted only based on economic condition.
In the renowned judgment of Janhit Abhiyan vs. Union of India (2022), the Apex Court’s five-judge bench heard the matter and further held that the 103rd Constitutional Act does not violate any provisions relating to the fundamental principles of the Constitution.
Justice Maheshwari, Justice Trivedi, and Justice Pardiwala wrote the judgment with the majority opinion. Conversely, Justice Bhat determined a dissenting opinion on his and Chief Justice U.U. Lalit’s behalf. We now understand the different approaches to maintaining the right to equality concerning citizens and noncitizens. There is another concept concerning equality in employment that we will discuss now.
Article 16: Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment
This Article states that the States must maintain equality in employment and appointment to State-run offices in this country. While providing jobs and appointments, the State can not discriminate merely on the grounds of race, sex, caste, colour, religion, descent, place of birth and residence or any of them to any office under the ambit of the State. The State is strictly prohibited from making any discriminatory provision for its citizens.
This Article empowers Parliament to make laws to describe a class or classes of employment and appointments to any office under the union government or any other authority.
The State is firmly allowed to make any provision for providing reservations in appointments to the government services for the backward class of citizens. Such courses can be determined by the State, which is not represented and receiving the benefits in services provided by the state.
When the State demonstrated that any class of citizens is deprived of benefits and the services provided by the State, the State can make laws for providing reservations in promotions of services after determining the consequential seniority of the employees who come under the Schedule Castes and the Schedule Tribes.
The State can consider the vacant seats as a separate class that needs to be filled within one year according to the provisions of Clauses 4 and 4(A), to be filled in any succeeding years. Such vacant seats will not be clubbed with the other new vacancies of that year to determine the limit of 50% in reservation on the total number of vacancies of a particular year.
Further, it states an exception clarifying that this article will not interfere with the operation of any law that requires an office to handle the affairs of any religious or denominational institution or that any member of the institution’s governing body must be a follower of a specific religion or denomination.
It allows the State to set provisions for providing reservation in admission to central government-aided educational institutions and private educational institutions (except for minority institutions) and appointment to government services or to any government post in favour of the economically weaker sections (EWS) of citizens, except the classes mentioned under Article 16(4) of the Constitution.
This stated reservation was granted due to the existing reservation, and it shall not exceed 10%. This clause was added after the Constitution (One Hundred and Third Amendment) Act, 2019.
Article 16(1) of the Constitution
Article 16(1) discusses equality in providing opportunities by the state while giving employment and appointment to any services and offices maintained by the state to all the citizens of this country. This clause obliges the state to ensure that every citizen is treated equally when providing opportunities for employment and appointment in any official authority within the state.
However, no equality provision guarantees equality between separate and independent classes of services. The state can lay down the specific conditions and standards for a particular post. However, the state must ensure that no arbitrary procedure is used and that the grounds for any specific selection are reasonable.
This clause regarding the appointment guarantee also provides the basis for terminating or removing a person from his services.
Article 16 is an aspect of the right to equality enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution. This provision allows the state to make a reasonable classification for providing employment and appointment opportunities for the benefit of backward classes so that these classes can also acquire the upliftment that the other classes already have.
Moreover, the next clause of this article discusses the prohibition on the State regarding appointment. Let’s delve into the grounds mentioned to protect citizens against discrimination by the State.
Article 16(2) of the Constitution
This clause of Article 16 prohibits discrimination in respect of any appointment under the State on various grounds that are listed below:
- Religion of a person.
- Race of a person
- The caste of a person
- Sex of a person
- Descent of a person
- Place of birth of a person
- Residence of a person
One essential point is that it is available only against public employment. On the other hand, private bodies can employ on grounds prohibited by this provision.
Through B. Venkataramana vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr (1951), the government released a notification stating the new rules and regulations regarding appointment policies in state services that would be implemented solely based on caste identity, such as Hindus, Muslims, and Christians. As a result of this notification, a writ petition was filed under Article 32 before the Supreme Court of this nation.
The petitioner made a contention in his petition, which states that this government order was made in contradiction with Article 16, which especially guarantees that no discrimination based on caste can be made by the State while making appointments to the services offered by the State. In addition, after observing the contention, it was held that the communal government order was against the fundamental right enshrined under Article 16 of the Constitution. Hence, the Apex Court held the stated government order as unconstitutional.
Clause 2 provides the grounds that the State cannot discriminate against its citizens, while clause 3 gives an overview of the State’s power to give preferential treatment. Let’s get an overview of clause 3.
Article 16(3) of the Constitution
This clause provides that Parliament is empowered to make such laws giving preferential treatment in employment to the residents of a state, union territory or any local or other authorities within that particular state or territorial region.
This stated clause simplifies the process of considering people officially residing in a certain state or union territory first when providing employment. It aims to promote the state’s local employment policies.
For example, the Parliament introduced the Public Employment (Requirement as to Residence) Act, 1957. This Act requires essential conditions, such as living in a state to attain public employment (several states, including Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Manipur, and Tripura). However, these provisions are not in operation in these states, excluding Andhra Pradesh and Telangana.
The state also has the power to ensure the representation of backward classes in public appointments. This concept and the respective case laws are discussed further under clause 4 of this article.
Article 16(4) of the Constitution
This clause states that reservations in appointments for any backward classes can be provided to those the state thinks are not adequately represented within the state services compared to other courses. However, Parliament can only exercise this power to enact provisions for reservation in promotion or posts for the deprived classes.
Article 16(4) extends Article 16(1) and (2) because it empowers the State to make provisions for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of backward classes.
The Constitution does not provide a definition for the backward class, and it depends on the State to determine whether a particular class is backward or not by compiling data on living standards and educational aspects. Before considering a class as backward, the State has a duty to set some reasonable criteria. Moreover, if the determination is based on irrelevant considerations, then it can be challenged before the court.
The Apex Court, in the case of M.R. Balaji vs. State of Mysore (1962), held that the backwardness of any particular community cannot be determined based on caste only. Certain factors, such as poverty and place of living, can also be considered to determine the backwardness of a particular class. If the State adopts such uncertain measures to assess backwardness, it will also go against the principle of Article 15(1) and Article 16(2).
In the case of T. Devadasan vs. Union of India & Anr. (In 1963, the court struck down the carry-forward rule, favouring the vacancies of backward classes. The Apex court, when providing a reference to the judgment of Mthe .R. Balaji case, stated that the reserved vacancies in one year will rise by more than 65%, which is beyond the 50% reservation limit. In addition, the court said this rise occurred due to the carry-forward rule, which is unconstitutional as per the ambit of Article 14. The court held that the 50% reservation rule only applies to the backward class mentioned under Article 14. This rule would not apply to any exceptional circumstances to relieve the retroactive class.
Indra Sawhney vs. Union of India and Ors. (1993)
One of the landmark cases of the Indian judiciary is also known as the Mandal Commission case. This prominent judgment significantly determined the scope of reservation in promotion to socially and economically backward people in the ambit of Article 16(4). The Apex Court further opined that the 27% reservation quota recommended by the Mandal Commission for the other backward classes was valid.
This provision simply functions as a promoter, and people of backward classes are not entitled to ask for special treatment. The Constitution does not define the term “backward class” anywhere; thus, citizens can challenge its meaning before the court. In this case, the definition of backward class and the power to establish classes for the objectives of this clause constituted some of the issues raised.
Further, the court emphasised that the reservation under Article 16(4) was to be implemented in initial appointments. It cannot be extended to promotions. The Apex Court also asked the government to amend Article 16 to uplift the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe by providing them with specific reservations in promotions.
The court also stated that reservations under Article 16(4) should not exceed 50% as combined classes. Further, the court justified that this reservation concept would benefit the deprived classes and uplift them to achieve social justice.
It was recognised that social and educational measures should be considered in addition to economic facets when determining backwardness. Further, the court proposed constituting the National Commission for Backward Classes to recognise and classify these groups and emphasised the requirement of frequent updates to ensure that the reservation is provided to eligible persons.
The court also stated that the “creamy layer” of other backward classes should be excluded from reservation benefits because the reservation was drafted for the underprivileged and backward, as well as for those who have experienced discrimination in society and have been deprived of advancement. The Apex Court, in this judgment, finally held that reservation should be applicable only in appointments, not in promotions.
Creamy layer and sub-classification of backward classes
The term “Creamy layer” refers to the people from a specific backward class who have advanced socially, educationally and economically by taking the benefits of reservation provided under the Constitution. Such creamy layers are not entitled to bring the benefits of reservation because they have achieved the ultimate goal of being advanced compared to other classes.
Thus, the creamy layer is the sub-classification of people belonging to a specific backward class that does not require reservations to be provided. Till now, the sub-classification of the creamy layer was only applicable to the Other Backward Class (OBC).
In the recent judgement of the State of Punjab vs. Davinder Singh (2024), the Apex Court dealt with the issue of excluding the creamy layer from providing reservations to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The seven-judge bench, with a majority of 6:1, emphasised that the creamy layer principle should also apply to the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe.
Further, the court stated that the purpose of reservation was to uplift these backward classes in terms of education, societal status, and economic condition so that people belonging to these backward classes could raise themselves in order to attain equality. Now, the people who are advanced and succeed in their advancement do not need any reservation benefits.
The court also differentiated between a man who got a sweeping job through reservation and the one who acquired higher education and reached some designated post. The upcoming generations of sweepers still need reservations, but it is unnecessary to provide reservations to the ones who have become educationally and economically advanced.
Based on the stated reasoning and issues, the Apex Court allowed the sub-classification of the creamy layer in Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe. Further, the Court instructed the Parliament to make such policies and criteria for the sub-classification.
The Apex Court also overruled the judgement of E.V. Chinnaiah vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (2004), which stated that the sub-classification of Schedules Class and Scheduled Tribe is not permissible as it violates the constitutional principles. The court clarified that it was necessary to reconsider the judgement in that case by the current scenario.
Article 16(4) provides provisions with respect to appointment in public employment, but later, reservation in appointment was also given by amending Article 16. A new clause was added, which is stated in the name of clause 4(A). Let’s explore what amendments have been made.
Article 16(4A) of the Constitution
Before the enactment of this provision, reservation was awarded in appointment only but not in promotion. But after adding clause (4A), the Parliament was empowered to provide reservation in promotion for the class of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes. This clause was added after enforcing the Constitution (77th Amendment) Act, 1995.
This Act was enacted due to Indra Sawhney vs. Union of India and Ors. (1993), commonly known as the Mandal Commission case, to make the judgement applicable to Scheduled Castes and Tribes.
It provides reservations regarding promotions in favour of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. It is considered an enabling provision that does not provide a fundamental right, and the state should also try to strike a balance between Article 14 and Article 16(1).
This clause was amended by the 85th Amendment Act, 2002, of the Constitution of India. The phrase “in situations of promotion to any class” was replaced with “in matters of promotion, with consequential seniority, to any class”. Consequential seniority simply means that a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe candidate would be prioritised in promotion to the next post over the general category candidate already senior to the SC candidate.
In matters of promotion, the general category candidate would not regain his seniority. Thus, the concept of consequential seniority was introduced to benefit the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe so that they could advance in opportunities and careers.
After clause 4(A), one more subclause was added to favour Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in providing reservations. Now, let’s go through it.
Article 16(4B) of the Constitution
The Eighty-First Constitutional Amendment Act, 2000, added this clause to this Article. It was introduced to uplift the authority of the State to make special recruitment provisions that provide reservations to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. This clause empowers the State to consider the vacant reserved seats that need to be filled in one year; however, they remain vacant in that year as a separate class of unfilled seats that can be filled in the succeeding year or years.
This process of forwarding the vacant seats reserved for the SEBC category to the next succeeding year or years is called the “Carry Forward rule.” This rule aimed to fill vacant seats that could not be filled due to the unavailability of requisite candidates from socially and educationally backward classes.
This clause introduced an exception to the 50% limit on reservation provision to fill the backlog of vacancies. This simply means that the state can expand the reservation scope by 50% just to fill the vacancies in appointments. This clause aimed to use its power in exceptional circumstances.
M. Nagaraj & Others vs. Union of India & Others (2006)
In this well-known case decided by the Indian judiciary, the impugned validity of Articles 16(4A) and 16(4B), which provides reservation for consequential seniority, was challenged on the grounds that they violate the basic structure of the supreme law, like the right to equality that is guaranteed under Article 14. It was also contended that these provisions under Article 16 were added while the Parliament of India used arbitrary power.
However, there was a scenario where the court upheld the validity of Article 16(4A) and Article 16(4B) and protected these provisions under the Parliament’s amending authority. In regard to providing reservations in promotion, the court also added that it is necessary for the State to compile quantifiable data to determine the backwardness and representation of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in India.
In the conclusive part, the court held that the State must ensure that the objectives behind these reservation policies are achieving their respective goals. The state must also note that the rights of other candidates who belong to unreserved categories should not be infringed.
We have understood several aspects of equality in matters of public employment, appointments, and promotions. We also have provisions regarding appointments to posts in religious institutions.
Article 16(5) of the Constitution
This provision provides that the appointments related to posts in religious institutions may be restricted to persons of that particular religion and will not be considered a violation of Article 16(1). Such conditions can be implemented for a person to be appointed in religious institutions that must belong to the religion in which he wants to be appointed.
Article 16(6) of the Constitution
This stated clause was presented to add after the 103rd Constitutional Amendment Act, 2019, that was passed by the Parliament in 2019. It made such an entitlement where the State will have the power to make several provisions for providing reservations in appointments to the government posts for those who belong to the society’s economically weaker sections (EWS). However, such reservations are not subject to the limit of 50% and are in addition to the existing reservation system.
The enactment act was later challenged in Janhit Abhiyan vs. Union of India (2022) on the grounds that it violated the fundamental principles of the Indian Constitution. However, the constitutionality was upheld by a majority decision of 3:2, stating that the amendment was done in accordance with the Constitution.
In an additional context, Justice Maheshwari stated that reservation should be given with respect to the betterment of social and educational backwardness instead of just being provided on the basis of affirmative actions and measures.
It was also ruled that the 10% cap on existing reservations for economically weaker sections, in addition to the 50% limit established in the Indra Sawhney judgement, is constitutionally valid. The judges also stated that the 50% limit for providing is not inelastic but can be exceeded in some exceptional scenarios.
We studied that Articles 14, 15, and 16 provide an overview of our rights concerning equality against any social discrimination based on biological identity, physical appearance, geographical origin, or a particular class. We have Article 17, which states that such discrimination deprives a specific class of people of access to public places as it is available to the general public.
Article 17: Abolition of Untouchability
This Article states “Untouchability” is abolished, and its practice in any form is forbidden. Making enforcement of any disability arising out of “Untouchability” shall be an offence that would be punishable per the enacted law.’
The word “Untouchability” expressly refers to the social limitations imposed on certain classes due to being born in a specific caste. Therefore, it doesn’t cover things like a few people being excluded from religious services or subjected to a social boycott.
Under Article 35 of the Constitution, Parliament can make laws prohibiting such acts of untouchability.
Exercising the powers and duties conferred in Article 17 and Article 35, Parliament occasionally made legislation, which is discussed below.
The Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955, which was later renamed the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955, in 1976, banned untouchability and laid down punishment for denying religious, occupational, and educational rights to others. It was implemented for India as a whole. After the implementation of this Act by Article 17, untouchability is strictly prohibited in India.
In 1965, the Indian government formed a committee, led by Shri L. Elayaperumal, to address untouchability and the economic and educational development of Scheduled Castes, ensure the applicability of the Acts, address issues related to untouchability, and recommend what amendments to the present Act are necessary.
After that, the established committee was tasked with preparing a report that included some essential changes, such as renaming the Act the Protection of Civil Rights Act. Civil rights are demonstrated as the rights given to a person due to the abolition of untouchability under Article 17.
Under Indian laws, no one can use any titles after or before his name. This is prohibited to maintain social equality among all people. The Article next in the queue is about the abolition of titles in India. Let’s go through it.
Article 18: Abolition of Titles
This enshrined Article says that no one in India can receive or use any prefix before his name as a title except the permitted criteria set under Part III of the Constitution of India. The Article talks explicitly about the abolition of titles. Some of the essential demonstrations are provided below:
As per the prohibition set out under Article 18, no title, not being a military or academic distinction, shall be conferred by the State. Also, no citizen of India shall accept any title from any foreign state.
No person who is not a citizen of India shall, while he holds any office of profit or trust under the State, accept without the consent of the President any title from any foreign State. No person holding any office of profit or trust under the State shall, without the permission of the President, accept any present, emolument, or office of any kind from or under any foreign State.’
In Balaji Raghavan S.P. Anand vs. Union of India (1995), the Constitutional validity of four awards introduced by the Government of India, namely Bharat Ratna, Padma Vibhushan, Padma Bhushan, and Padma Shri, was challenged before the court.
The Supreme Court upheld the Constitutional validity of these awards, stating that they are granted for exceptional services and don’t violate the provisions of Article 18 as they do not come under the ambit of titles. Further, it was held that they could not be added as a prefix or suffix to the names of the awardees.
In the judgement of Indira Jaising vs. Supreme Court of India, Through Secretary General and Ors. (2017), the prefix term before their name used by Supreme Court advocates as ‘senior advocate’ was challenged on the ground of being violative towards the principle of abolition of title under Article 18 of the Constitution. It was contended that such designations are against the prohibition of title.
However, the Apex Court upheld such a designation by stating that it is not used as a title but represents the nobility of the legal profession. Hence, it was declared that it does not go against the prohibition of using titles.
At this stage, we have covered all the primary aspects of the fundamental rights—the right to equality. It is quite clear that the right to equality is a wider term that has a comprehensive explanation regarding protecting the citizens or non-citizens of this country. The state is essentially required to provide equality to all individuals in order to achieve the principles enshrined under the preamble of the Constitution.
Now, moving on to the conclusive part of this articulation concerning equality.
Conclusion
The pivotal right to equality is a fundamental feature of the Indian Constitution. It plays a vital role in achieving social and economic justice in our society, where the upliftment of certain classes is considered necessary for our country to flourish. It emphasises the fundamental unity of individuals by providing equal opportunities and treatment to all. All other privileges and liberties follow from the right to equality. It gives every individual in the country all the elements essential for developing his personality.
In a democratic country like India, civil liberties are essential to be protected by the state in order to find harmonious aspects in our society. India was ruled by colonial laws and regulations, and only the upper class of people used to benefit from the reformation policies. People belonging to the lower class of the poorer background were discriminated against, and they did not have any liberties.
Additionally, if strong enforcement of basic human and fundamental rights, including the right to equality, is done, then only a nation can reach the peak of social and educational development.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
Who can enjoy equality under Articles 14 to 18 in India?
The constitutional guarantee under Article 14 guarantees the right to equality to all persons within the territory of India. However, as per Articles 15 to 16, it is conferred to all citizens irrespective of any geographical differences. The right to equality, stated under Articles 17 to 18, is guaranteed to everyone, irrespective of nationality.
Why do we need fundamental rights?
All the fundamental rights enshrined under Part III of the Constitution of India provide civil liberties to lead to a balanced and harmonious living standard. There is essential freedom in the form of equality required, which the citizens or residents can enjoy in a particular country to be developed. The right to equality is one of the rights conferred to every person which the State can’t deny. If all people are not considered equal, how can a society become liberal and advanced? That is why we need to be treated equally.
What body is considered the protector of fundamental rights?
The Supreme Court and the High Court in every State are empowered to protect the fundamental rights of every person. If the state infringes on a person’s fundamental rights, a person can file a writ petition in the High Court under Article 226 and the Supreme Court under Article 32. Thus, these rights are enforceable when they are violated.
Whether the fundamental rights under Articles 14 to 18 be suspended?
Fundamental rights are not absolute rights. Because they can be suspended on the grounds of a National Emergency in India, Article 359 of the Constitution states that all the fundamental rights conferred by Part III shall remain suspended while a state is in an emergency. Although the Apex Court upheld the enforcement of Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution even in the emergency period, the state cannot deny it.
Why is the right to equality guaranteed to even non-citizens of India?
The sole purpose of granting equality and equal protection to non-citizens was to ensure fair treatment and maintain the significance of justice in the nation. Many principles have been considered in granting the right to equality to non-citizens, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, legal consistency in the judicial system, and International commitments towards other countries to apply equal laws to every person.
References
- M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, Wadhwa and Company, Nagpur, Fifth Edition 2008.
- M. Bakshi, The Constitution of India, Universal Law Publishing Co., 2014.
- Dr J.N. Pandey, Constitutional Law of India, Central Law Agency, Allahabad, 37th edition, 2001.
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