This article is written by Arjun Pal from Jindal Global Law School. He write about Euthanasia law in India and various other countries and whether India should legalize euthanasia – allowing patients to commit die when they are in a vegetative state instead of keeping them alive artificially. Over to Arjun.

The legalization of euthanasia or “mercy killing” to end suffering painlessly, has been one of the topics of heated discussions in many countries around the word especially in India. Many terminally-ill patients do not have a possibility to recover, but the strict and stringent laws do not allow doctors to help them in ending their lives. In this paper, I will argue why euthanasia should be legalized in India.

Not much light had been shed on the concept of Euthanasia in India until the famous Aruna Shanbhaug Judgement in 2011. In 1973, Aruna Shanbhaug, a nurse working at the KEM Hospital in Bombay was brutally raped, which rendered her in a vegetative state. This judgement sparked a rage of debates across the country, on the topic of legalization of euthanasia. However, even after remaining in a vegetative state for thirty seven years, Aruna’s lawyer was not able to convince the Indian government to take any firm action for legalizing euthanasia.

It was only in 2010 when the Supreme Court of India responded to the plea for euthanasia filed by Aruna’s friend journalist Pinki Virani, by setting up a medical panel to examine her. In 2011, the Supreme Court finally passed a judgment that clarified that” Passive Euthanasia” was not illegal. It was a momentous step forward but one that ironically kept Aruna outside its pale because her erstwhile colleagues, the nurses in KEM Hospital who cared for her, refused to let go. And so Aruna lives on — unable to see, talk, move or emote, and fed through a tube in her nose.

Euthanasia is divided into two categories, namely passive and active euthanasia. Passive Euthanasia is the gradual withdrawal of life support or the withholding of common treatments such as antibiotics, necessary for the continuation of life. In Aruna Shanbhaug’s case, the doctors at the KEM hospital would gradually have to stop force-feeding her through the tube (because that is the only thing that is keeping her alive, as the doctors had already stopped administering her other essential medicines many years ago). The concept of Passive Euthanasia is more preferred in general because there is no administration of lethal injections or any other harmful substances in order to help the patient terminate his/her life. The patient is allowed to die in a peaceful manner, but over a certain period of time. This view is however opposed by those who believe that active euthanasia (e.g. administering a lethal injection to kill) is a better choice, since it helps to relieve the patient of his/her pain and misery within a very short period of time.

The right to life and the right to die with dignity must be granted to every citizen, irrespective of their caste, creed, religion, sex etc. This must also be kept in mind when debating against the legalization of euthanasia in India. Every individual is born with the right to his/her body. Individuals can make important decisions about their bodies. For example, when they are young, they can decide to participate in dangerous sporting activities or women can choose to have an abortion. Similarly, an individual must also have the freedom to let go of their bodies when they feel that their pain has become unbearable.[1] A person’s right to die with dignity holds the same importance as the person’s right to live. In case of a terminally ill patient or a patient suffering immense pain from an incurable disease, that person must be given the choice to continue to live or to end his/her life via euthanasia, be it “Active” or “Passive”.

Pro-Euthanasia or the “Right-to-die” activists not only in India, but across the world claim that the elderly and those with disabilities fear becoming a financial burden on their loved ones and would rather choose death. They state that next to pain and suffering this is the second most important reason people want to die by euthanasia. Most of the underprivileged patients, who are diagnosed with terminal or both incurable and painful diseases are very often abandoned by their families since they simply cannot bear the hospital/medical costs of keeping their relative (the patient) alive through artificial means. Also it is argued that the same facilities should be used for the benefit of other patients who have a better chance of recovery and to whom the said facilities would be of greater value. Thus, the argument runs, when one has to choose between a patient beyond recovery and one who may be saved, the latter should be preferred as the former will die in any case.[2]

The problem of prolonged pain and suffering is one of the main reasons that urge a terminally or incurably ill patient to ask for euthanasia. In India, there are thousands of patients who are living below the poverty line. These patients can barely afford bare means of living, let alone huge medical/hospital bills to keep themselves alive artificially and so they keep on suffering and bearing pain right till the time of their death. For example in Aruna Shanbhaug’s case, after her being raped and rendered into a vegetative state, her family members abandoned her. A permanently vegetative state does not permit patients to know of, least of all enjoy, favourite foods, music, people. It also doesn’t allow for them to smile in response to an external influence. Aruna has become a permanent resident of the KEM Hospital in Bombay for the last forty-one years, being cared only by the hospital’s other nurses and staff. Aruna has mush tipped into a nasal-feed pipe going directly into the stomach to keep her alive. A permanently vegetative state does not permit patients like her to know off, least of all enjoy, favourite foods, music, people. It also doesn’t allow for them to smile in response to an external influence. Aruna has mush tipped into a nasal-feed pipe going directly into the stomach to keep her alive.[3] And all this will continue right till her death, since the Indian Government has not yet legalized euthanasia. This is the case for all patients in India who are waiting for years in order to be finally granted the right to die with dignity.

Many people in India and abroad, who are against euthanasia, argue that the concept of euthanasia can be counter-reacted by the introduction of “Palliative Care” while treating the patients who are demanding euthanasia. The key to effective palliative care is to provide a safe way for the individual to address their physical and psychological distress, that is to say their total suffering. Dealing with total suffering involves a broad range of concerns, starting with treating physical symptoms such as pain, nausea and breathlessness. The palliative care teams have become very skilful in prescribing drugs for physical symptoms, and have been instrumental in showing how drugs such as morphine can be used safely while maintaining a patient’s full faculties and function. However, when a patient exhibits a physiological symptom, there are often psychological, social or spiritual symptoms as well. The interdisciplinary team, which often includes a registered nurse, a licensed mental health professional, a licensed social worker or a counsellor and spiritual support such as a chaplain, can play a role in helping the patient and family cope globally with these symptoms, rather than depending on the medical/pharmacological interventions alone. Usually, a palliative care patient’s concerns are pain, fears about the future, loss of independence, worries about their family and feeling like a burden. While some patients will want to discuss psychological or spiritual concerns and some will not, it is fundamentally important to assess each individual and their partners’ and families’ need for this type of support.[4] However, due to the maximum number of patients in India being below the poverty line, these patients are unable to afford good hospital care and are also unable to bear the enormous medical bills. Consequently, euthanasia is sought after as a better option to alleviate the pain of such patients in India.

In general, apart from India, other countries around the world, attempt to draw a line between passive euthanasia (generally associated with allowing a person to die) and active euthanasia (generally associated with killing a person). While laws commonly permit passive euthanasia, active euthanasia is generally prohibited. Here, I have made references to countries where euthanasia has been legalized.

In 2002, the Netherlands passed a law legalizing euthanasia including physician assisted suicide .This law codifies the twenty-year-old convention of not prosecuting doctors who have committed euthanasia in very specific cases, under very specific circumstances. The Ministry of Public Health, Wellbeing and Sports claims that this practice “allows a person to end their life in dignity after having received every available type of palliative care.” The United Nations has reviewed and commented on the Netherlands euthanasia law. In September 2004 the Groningen Protocol was developed, which sets out criteria to be met for carrying out child euthanasia without the physician being prosecuted

In Belgium, the Belgian parliament legalised euthanasia on 28 May 2002. In December 2013, the Belgian Senate voted in favour of extending its euthanasia law to terminally-ill children. Conditions imposed on children seeking euthanasia are “the patient must be conscious of their decision and understand the meaning of euthanasia”, “the request must have been approved by the child’s parents and medical team”, “their illness must be terminal and they must be in great pain, with no available treatment to alleviate their distress”.[5]

In England, following a series of decisions of the House of Lords it is now settled that a person has the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment as part of his rights of autonomy and self-determination. The House of Lords has also permitted non-voluntary euthanasia in case of patients in a persistent vegetative state. Moreover, in a recent decision in 2011, a British High Court has granted a woman paralysed from the neck, the right to die by having her life support system switched off.

Switzerland has legislatively permitted assisted suicide (euthanasia) since 1942. For example, lethal drugs may be prescribed as long as the recipient takes an active role in the drug administration.[6] The legality of assisted suicide is a result of article 115 of the Swiss Criminal Code, in effect since 1942. When an assisted suicide is declared, a police inquiry may be started. Since no crime has been committed in the absence of a selfish motive, these are mostly open and shut cases. Prosecution can occur if doubts are raised about the patient’s competence to make an autonomous choice, or about the motivation of anyone involved in assisting the suicide. Article 115 was interpreted as legal permission to set up organizations administering life-ending medicine only in the 1980s, 40 years after its coming into effect.

After analysing the current situation in India and after comparing the legality of euthanasia in India with that in other countries of the world, I feel that India needs to legalize euthanasia, both active and passive, without further delay. After many years of heated debate, India has still not been able to make progress on this topic, even though it managed to legalize passive euthanasia in 2011. This denies ill-fated people like Aruna Shanbaug the right to die painlessly and with dignity. There are many patients in our country, who cannot afford to remain alive on life support because of poor financial conditions (especially patients living below the poverty line). These patients too have a right to die painlessly and with dignity but are not allowed to do so by the laws of our country.

In spite of repeated public demand for legalizing euthanasia, the Government of India has not made any good effort to try and legalize euthanasia. People in favour of euthanasia have tried to draw the Government’s attention to the fact that other countries of the world have legalized euthanasia (without it being misused), but to no avail. The Government is still against the complete legalization of euthanasia. The Government is formed and run by the human representatives of the people. Hence, I believe that during times like these, these people must appeal to their inner humanity (if they really have any left) and then decide whether or not to legalize euthanasia. Even the preamble to the constitution of our country says that our government is of the people, by the people and for the people. Thus, I believe that ultimately the government must give in to our demands for legalization of euthanasia without further delay and let these deserving patients die painlessly and with dignity.

[1] David Swanton – Appendix 1. The right to die with dignity – euthanasia

[2] Should Euthanasia be Legalised in India? by Shreyans Kasliwal (2003) PL WebJour 16

[3] “The unbearable agony of being Aruna Shanbaug: A great injustice” by Pinki Virani

[4] Strang P, Strang S, Hultborn R, Arnér S (March 2004). “Existential pain—an entity, a provocation, or a challenge?” J Pain Symptom Manage 27 (3): 241–50.

[5] “Belgian Senate votes to extend euthanasia to children”. BBC News. 13 December 2013.

[6] Hurst SA, Mauron A (February 2003). “Assisted suicide and euthanasia in Switzerland: allowing a role for non-physicians”. BMJ 326 (7383): 271–3.

This article is written by Arjun Pal of Jindal Global Law School on the issue of ordinance making power of the executive in India and recent debate related to that.

In 1947, after a tremendously long struggle for independence, India, our motherland, finally realized her dream of achieving independence from her British masters. Over two years after the fact, when the recently printed Republic gave itself its Constitution, it included Articles 123 and 213, giving a recharged rent of life to the very Ordinance-production control that had been seriously censured years before just like an underhanded weapon in the hands of colonial rulers for the suppression of the locals. Furthermore, today, the septuagenarian nation that we are, that prides itself on its dedication to democracy and the rule of law, we find that executive Ordinances have turned into the favoured method for presenting legislative enactments; that progressive governments from each shade of political opinion have made liberal utilisation of this instrument; even the most standard and commonplace statutes are regularly being introduced by issuing Ordinances, after which the law-making body is given a fait accompli; that undoubtedly, Ordinances issued on the guidance of the Ministers, instead of Bills presented and discussed in Parliament or State Assemblies, has become normal. Despite this, I believe that the power of the Executive to promulgate ordinances should be amended, so that the Executive’s actions can be kept in check by the legislature and the judiciary. In this essay, I have made a note of the various instances from where the need to amend the power of the Executive arises (certain cases which justify the need for amending the Executive’s power of promulgating ordinances).

In undivided India (now Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, in alphabetical order) the Governor General was empowered under section 72 of the Government of India Act, 1915 and later section 42 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to issue Ordinances as an emergency measure on those subjects which fell within the legislative powers of the fledgling colonial Legislature. Such power was to be exercised only when the Federal Legislature was not in session, and could remain in force for not more than six months, though extendable in certain situations for another six months. However, the main issue was with the Governor-General’s power to issue Ordinances under section 42, which transformed under our 1950 Constitution into Article 123 at the Federal or National level, and Article 213 at the level of States, or territories. Tragically, despite being strictly against the practice of this semi authoritative power by Britain’s Governor-General, the founders of our Nation joyfully exchanged sides once they were established in power, and between 15th August, 1947 and the encircling of our Constitution on 26th January 1950, Parliament was bypassed no less than ninety-nine times by issuing Ordinances under the extremely same section 42 of the 1935 Act. Maybe as a consequence of this liberal utilization of enactment by the official, the Constituent Assembly, when it wrangled about the requirement for Ordinance-production powers, ignored every one of the naysayers, and demanded that such arrangements were much required and were in any occasion supported in by supervening control by Parliament and the State Legislatures. Also, the deathblow was conveyed by Dr. B. A. Ambedkar, who asked why anyone would question the thought processes of future governments or lawmakers, and demanded that such powers would be utilized just as a part of impossible crises.
Going simply by the dialect of Article 123[1] (mainly the same for current use as that of Article 213, which applies to the States), maybe Ambedkar’s certainty was legitimized. Similarly as with section 42 of the 1935 Act, on which it is based, Article 123 must be conjured when the Houses of Parliament are not in session, and it requires the President to be fulfilled that conditions exist which render it vital for him to make prompt move to enact a law which can’t anticipate the re-gathering of Parliament. Such law made by Presidential pronouncement must be laid before both Houses of Parliament promptly upon their reassembly, and should cease to work six weeks after reassembly, unless not approved by resolutions go by both Houses before that date. The Article makes it clear that while an Ordinance will have an indistinguishable compel and impact from an Act of Parliament, on the off chance that it makes any arrangement which Parliament is not skilled to order, then such arrangement might be void. However, this soon came to be misused by the successive administrators, who started using this power of issuing Ordinances as an easy and readymade solution in order to avoid legislative burdens.

In a report published by the Lok Sabha, the House of the People or Lower House of Parliament, in November 2015[1], it was revealed that in the 64 years from 26th January 1950 till 31st December 2014, the President of India promulgated 679 Ordinances, more than 10 per year on an average. However since averages can be  misleading, and tending to conceal facts that as many as 34 Presidential Ordinances were issued in 1993, 32 in 1996, and 31 in 1997. Here, crucial questions arise as to how urgent were the issues/situations that the  President faced  such that he could not await the reassembly of Parliament 679 times in 64 years, or that 34 laws needed to be urgently enacted without awaiting the reassembly of Parliament in 1993? Both of these questions haven’t been answered quite clearly. Time and again the Supreme Court has sought to restore the sanctity of legislative process by cautioning against misuse of Ordinances, but each time it has ended up in homilies and advice, which unfortunately are not seen as binding by the next Bench that deals with this issue.

The Lok Sabha Report of November 2015 highlights the anguish of several Speakers of the House in the first three decades of the Republic, who strongly criticized the bypassing of Parliament in this manner, but expressed their inability to do anything about it due to Parliamentary convention. However, the Supreme Court of India, which was not bound by any constraints of convention, remained a silent spectator to this pernicious practice. Instead of interpreting the Constitutional provisions on the anvil of a free nation governed by the rule of law, the Supreme Court was persuaded to accept judgements handed down by the Privy Council in the cases of Bhagat Singh v. King Emperor[2], Raja Bahadur Kamakhya Narain Singh v. Commissioner of Income Tax, AIR 1943 PC 153; 70 IA 180, and Lakshmidhar Misra v. Rangalal, AIR 1950, where the Governor General’s satisfaction on the need for an Ordinance was held to be beyond judicial scrutiny. This was partially rectified in the case of A.K. Roy v. Union of India[3], the Supreme Court noted that clause (4) of Articles 123/213, which had been inserted by the Constitution (Thirty-Eighth) Amendment Act, 1975, had been deleted by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, thus strongly suggesting that Parliament itself identified the requirement of judicial review of the President’s satisfaction. But even though the Constitution Bench in A.K. Roy (supra), held that it could be contested that the Forty-fourth Amendment left no doubt that judicial review is not excluded in respect of the President’s satisfaction, yet, the Court left that question undecided. Later on, in the case of S.R. Bommai v. Union of India,[4], a 9-judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that judicial review is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution, and consequently found that the satisfaction of the President prior to issuing a proclamation to suspend the State Legislature under Article 356, was open for discussion before the higher courts, and this logic was expanded in the case of Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India[5]. In Indra Sawhney v. Union of India [6] the Supreme Court held that judicial review could, in a fit case, extend even to examining the underlying rationale and motivation for passing an Act of Legislature, and especially for questioning the existence of a state of affairs which the Legislative enactment declares to be in existence.

Another territory in which our Supreme Court has been inside and out excessively liberal in its elucidation of Ordinances is in allowing the Executive to proclaim Ordinances with unlimited retrospectivity. While it is alright for the elected legislature to make a law which works reflectively in specific conditions, it seems ludicrous to peruse such a power into the restricted legislative function bestowed upon the Executive for meeting new emergencies until the following session of the legislature. Considering that an Ordinance must be declared when the legislature is not in session, and stops existing six weeks after the session recommences, it is ridiculous to permit the Executive to make a law that extends into the past, with the end goal that it spans numerous periods when the legislature was in session, and consequently when, the Executive had no energy to make an Ordinance. However, by translating (wrongly, in my view) the words “same force and effect as an Act” on the premise of a roundabout and imperfect reasoning, the Supreme Court has held that an Ordinance can be retrospective in the same way as an Act of Parliament or a State Legislature. Perhaps the only aspect on which the Supreme Court held the executive within the bounds that the framers of the Constitution intended, is in the matter of re-promulgation of Ordinances.

The lesson which Constitutional draftsmen might draw from the Indian experience is to avoid conferring legislative powers upon the executive, and, if such powers are unavoidable, to make any such enactment strictly time-bound and transitory. Keeping the above instances in mind, I conclude by holding the opinion that the Executive’s power to promulgate ordinances must indeed be amended in order to keep the Executive from misusing this power

[1]http://164.100.47.192/loksabha/writereaddata/Updates/EventLSS_635907162497207518_presidential_address_english.pdf

[2] AIR 1931 PC 111; 58 IA 169

[3] (1982) 1 SCC 271

[4] (1994) 3 SCC 1

[5] (2006) 2 SCC 1

[6] (2000) 1 SCC 168

This article is written by Arjun Pal from Jindal Global University. His main interests are commercial laws comprising of Company, Property and Arbitration law related subjects.

To begin with a quote from Scruttons Ltd. v Midland Silicones Ltd. [1962] AC 446 by Lord Reid:

“I find it impossible to deny the existence of the general rule that a stranger to a contract cannot in a question with either of the contracting parties take advantage of provisions of the contract, even where it is clear from the contract that some provision in it was intended to benefit him. That rule appears to have been crystallised a century ago in Tweddle v Atkinson [1861] EWHC QB J57; (1861) 121 ER 762 and finally established in this House in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v Selfridge and Co Ltd [1915] AC 847.”

The credit for development of the doctrine of Privity of Contract is credited to the common law courts, yet now it is used in numerous nations like India, England, Canada, Australia and New Zealand with certain statutory and legal exceptions. This doctrine guarantees that an outsider to a contract can neither sue nor be sued by the parties to the contract. Notwithstanding, in course of time, it was understood that the doctrine is so inflexible it couldn’t possibly adapt to the social requests, for a contract influences the parties to it as well as society everywhere too. Therefore, certain impediments (or exemptions) were advanced and perceived to the doctrine/tenet by both the judiciary and legislature.

In spite of the fact that the doctrine of Privity of Contracts has no solid base for its standing however there are a few avocations which still backing its survival[1]:

Firstly, as a contract is based on a mutual agreement, it would not be fair to force commitments on any party who might not have given his consent to be bound. Furthermore, empowering third parties to enforce contracts would influence or limit the rights of contracting parties to differ or end the contract. Next, a third party might not have provided the consideration, and consequently should not have the capacity to authorize the agreement. What’s more, finally, the promisor is liable to face two activities, from the promisor and the third party.

As we are aware there is no separate/independent enactment of the principle of Privity of Contract in India however luckily, unlike England, the law of Contract in India is classified. It is to be, notwithstanding, noticed that the Indian Contract Act 1872 does not expressly contain a solitary procurement/provision connected with the doctrine of Privity of Contract. Hence, the position of the tenet may be pictured in the light of different procurements/provisions of the Contract Act. Those provisions are: Sections 2(a), 2(b), 2(c), 2(e), 2(h), 73, 74, and 75 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

It can, accordingly, be induced from the above procurements of the Contract Act that the promisor is liable to the promise and the promisee is answerable to the promisor. It recommends that only the parties to any specific contract are the proper persons who can authorize/compel the contractual rights and shoulder the contractual commitments. Further, it is evident from section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 that the party who endures by breach of a contract is entitled to be awarded damages from the other party to the contract. In perspective of section 74 of the Act, it can be said that if an amount is named in the contract as the sum to be paid if there should arise a breach of a contract, the party claiming the breach of contract is qualified for get a reasonable compensation not surpassing the sum so named, or may be, the penalty/fine stipulated for.

In India there has been an incredible difference of opinion in the courts in the matter of how far a third party to a contract can uphold/enforce it. There are numerous chosen old cases which proclaim that a contract can’t be implemented by an individual who is not a party to it and that the doctrine/ tenet in Tweddle v. Atkinson, which is as much pertinent in India as it is in England[2]. The Privy Council extended the principle to India in its choice in Jamna Das v. Ram Autar Pande. According to the opinion of RANKIN CJ, this is by all accounts the impact of the Contract Act itself in the case of Krishna Lal v. Promila Bala. The principle in Tweddle v. Atkinson was maintained by the Supreme Court of India in M.C. Chacko v. State Bank of Travencore[3]. For this situation, SHAH AG CJ supported the proclamation of RANKIN CJ in Krishna Lal Sahu v. Promila Bala Dasi in the wake of alluding to the perception of Lord Haldane in Dunlop v. Selfridge.

Be that as it may, an unbending adherence to the precept of Privity is sure to bring about hardship. The current situation with significant Indian law is not sure and is still developing. Special cases which have been perceived by our legal and assembly don’t cover all instances of hardship and subsequently increase the confusion of layman.

This is where the controversial question arises regarding, “Should the Doctrine of Privity be annulled in Toto or be liable to certain stipulation?”

As per 13th Law Commission Report, 1958, the better course would be to embrace a general exception to cover all instances of contract presenting advantages upon 3rd parties and shed the specific occasions where the standard of Privity must not be valid[4].

I am in consonance with the suggestion of Law Revision Committee that a different and separate section must be adopted as section 37 A, which is like The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act, 1999. It must read as follows:

Section 37 A – Benefits conferred on third parties:

1. Where a contract expressly confers a benefit directly on a third party, then, unless the contract otherwise provides, which shall be enforceable by the third party in his own name, subject to any defences that would have been valid between the contracting parties.

2. Where a contract expressly conferring a benefit directly upon a third party has been adopted, expressly or impliedly, by a third party, the parties to the contract cannot substitute a new contract for it or rescind or alter it so as to affect the rights of the third party.

There are similarly four conceivable reform choices:

(a) Judicial Development of circumvention of the Privity doctrine/tenet.

(b) Legislative exceptions to the Privity doctrine to be made in particular cases.

(c) Adopting a general authoritative procurement/provision that no third party is prevented from enforcing a contract made for his advantage on the grounds of absence of Privity.

(d) Reform by method of comprehensive legislative plans/schemes.

Every choice has its own particular advantages and disadvantages. We have realised that choices (a) and (b) have the upside of being adaptable and can address the needs of particular circumstances. Their foremost deficiency is that they both don’t manage the Privity doctrine inside a detailed, efficient and lucid plan. Choice (c) may be easy to execute, yet it is not attainable since it leaves an excess of crucial questions unanswered and that would make extensive instability in its operation. Alternative (d) which discusses a complete change of the Privity convention would give sureness, clarity and intelligible assemblage of law, which is not accessible under alternate choices and subsequently quite suited to the issue. This methodology/approach is additionally adopted by Australia, England, New Zealand and Singapore.

After researching, I am drawn to the conclusion that the thought behind the very idea of Doctrine of Privity of agreement is itself dubious and not suited to the current context. Likewise, I imagine that essentially abrogating the principle of Privity or to disregard it would not settle the emergency and rather represent a significant test to the legal framework. In this way, there is an urgent need to reclassify it.

Despite the fact that it has been in presence in numerous common law systems on the planet for a very long, so challenging and transforming it in its aggregate wouldn’t be defended. What is needed is to alter the procurements/provisions by making:

(1) A separate section according to proposal of the 13th Indian Law Commission Report which may be useful to decrease the hardships made by this convention, or

(2) Enacting a completely new legislation offering rights to an outsider (or third party) to the contract in certain qualified circumstances which may be a different option for it.

Hence, according to my opinion, the importance of the Doctrine of Privity can be improved and this doctrine must not be abolished in Toto. Yes, undoubtedly, the Doctrine of Privity may not be that important in the present circumstances, yet I think that if this doctrine is properly evolved and undergoes necessary changes, then this doctrine will someday become relevant in the very near future.

[1] Pollock & Mulla, supra n.4, p.112.

[2] Avtar Singh Pg. 111

[3] Avtar Singh Pg. 114

[4] 13th Law Commission Report(Contract Act,1872), 1958 , available at http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/1-

50/Report13.pdf, (Last visited on May 5, 2015).