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Are cyber laws sufficient in India to protect from cybercrimes

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This article was written by Ezhava Riya Biju Diploma in International Business Law, pursuing the Course from LawSikho, and edited by Koushik Chittella.

Introduction 

To understand cyber law, we have to first understand what cyber crime means for which cyber laws are enacted. Cybercrimes refer to any criminal activity that is carried out using digital technology, networked devices, or the internet. These crimes involve unauthorised access to computer systems, data manipulation, theft of sensitive information, online fraud, online abuse, and various other malicious activities. These are some of the crimes prevalent in India and, as a matter of fact, the whole world. 

Kinds of cybercrimes

There are various kinds of cybercrimes; they are:

  1. Hacking: It means unauthorised access to computer systems or networks with the intent to steal, alter, or destroy data. It is the activity of identifying weakness in a computer system or a network to exploit the security to gain access to personal data or business data. An example of computer hacking can be using a password cracking algorithm to gain access to a computer system.
  2. Phishing: Phishing attacks are nothing but the practice of sending fraudulent emails or setting up fraudulent websites to trick individuals into providing sensitive information, such as passwords, login information, credit card numbers, or to install malware on the unsuspected victim’s machine. An example of a phishing attack is fraudulent communications or emails that appear to come from a reputable source.
  3. Malware attacks: Malware, short for malicious software, refers to any intrusive software developed by cyber criminals (hackers) to compromise computer systems, steal data, or demand ransom payments. Examples of malware attacks include viruses, worms, Trojan viruses, spyware, and ransomware. The goal of malware is to cause havoc and steal information for monetary gain or sabotage purposes.
  4. Identity theft: It refers to all types of crimes in which someone wrongfully obtains and uses another person’s information, social security numbers, or personal data in some way that involves impersonating that person, fraud, or deception, and it is mostly done for monetary gain but not limited to it. Commonly seen identity theft is as follows:
  • Financial Identity Theft
  • Medical Identity Theft
  • Criminal Identity Theft
  • Synthetic Identity Theft
  • Child Identity Theft 

These are some of the most commonly seen identity thefts. 

  1. Distributed Denial of Service Attacks (DDoS): It is designed to overwhelm a website or online services offline, and this is accomplished by flooding the victim or target with online traffic, sending many requests, and consuming its capacity, causing it to become slow, unavailable, or completely shut down.
  2. Cyberbullying: Cyberbullying refers to the use of technology to harass, threaten, embarrass, or target another person, such as online threats, mean, rude, or aggressive texts, tweets, posts, and messages, or posting personal information, pictures, or videos of someone else to hurt or embarrass them. These are some examples of cyberbullying. This is also one of the most widely committed cybercrimes and a severe one at that, as it can result in psychological problems such as depression, suicidal thoughts, and other medical problems in the victims. 
  1. Online scams and frauds: This kind of crime refers to various forms of scams and fraudulent activities done online, such as lottery scams, online purchase scams, loan scams, or investment fraud where targets are tricked into paying money or providing personal information, social security numbers, etc. under false pretences.
  2. Data breaches: A data breach is a security violation in which sensitive, protected, and confidential data is copied, transmitted, viewed, stolen, or used by an unauthorised individual without the knowledge of the system’s owner. An example would be an employee using a co-worker’s computer and reading files without the proper authorisation.
  3. Cyber espionage: This type of attack refers to an user illegally gaining access to confidential information, intellectual property (IP), trade secrets, or government data of another nation for political, economic, or military advantage. Cyber espionage attacks can be motivated by monetary gain. The most common targets of espionage include large corporations, government agencies, academic institutions, the military, etc. Gathering intelligence on political opponents and activists is also one of its objectives.
  4. Child exploitation: Child exploitation refers to the use of digital technology and the internet to exploit children for various illegal activities. This can include child pornography, online grooming, live streaming abuse, dark web exploitation, “the distribution of explicit content involving minors, etc.” Child exploitation in cybercrime is a grave and widespread issue that poses significant risks to the safety and wellbeing of children online. Combating it requires a multi-faceted approach involving education, legislation, technology, and international cooperation to protect vulnerable children and ensure their safety in the digital age.
  5. Ransomware attacks: Ransomware attacks are a type of cybercrime where malicious software is used to encrypt a victim’s file. The attackers then demand a ransom from the victim to restore access to the files. These attacks can have severe consequences for individuals, businesses, and even entire nations. Ransomware is typically delivered through phishing emails, malicious attachments, or compromised websites. Once a user’s system is infected, then the ransomware encrypts files and makes them inaccessible. The attackers then demand payment, often in cryptocurrency, in exchange for the decryption keys.
  6. Online hate crimes: Online hate crimes, also known as cyber hate crimes or internet hate crimes, refer to criminal activities committed online that are motivated by hatred, prejudice, or bias towards a particular individual or group based on their race, caste, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender identity, disability, or other characteristics. These crimes can take various forms and are facilitated through digital communication channels, social media platforms, websites, and online forums. This type of crime can lead to misinformation and incitement to violence among people against individuals or communities based on their identity. 

These are some of the cybercrimes prevalent in today’s society. To combat cybercrimes, governments, organisations, and individuals must adopt robust cybersecurity measures, stay updated on the latest threats, and follow best practices for online safety. Law enforcement agencies should also work diligently to investigate and prosecute cybercriminals to ensure a safer online environment. Also, education, legislation, and responsible online platform practices are crucial in preventing cybercrimes and fostering a safer online environment.

Cybercrime laws in India

India has a comprehensive legal framework to address various aspects of cybercrime. The primary legislation governing cyber crimes in India is the Information Technology (IT) Act, 2000, which has been amended over the years to keep pace with technological advancements and emerging cyber threats. Here are some of the key components in cybercrime laws in India:

  1. Information Technology (IT) Act 2000:

The IT Act is the primary law in India that deals with cyber crimes and electronic commerce. It defines various cyber offences such as unauthorised access, hacking, data theft, and spreading malicious code. The Act has been amended to address new challenges, and it provides a legal framework for electronic transactions and digital signatures. Some of the provisions of the Act are:

  • Section 3: This Section of IT Act, 2000 in India pertains to the authentication of electronic records.
  • Section 10-A: Under this Section, the validity of contracts formed electronically, which means contracts formation or acceptance of proposals that are expressed in electronic forms or by means of electronic records, is enforceable by law.
  • Section 35: This Section of the IT Act, 2000, in India deals with the power to make rules by the Central Government, also known as certifying authority to issue electronic signature certificates.
  • Section 43: This Section deals with penalty and compensation for damage to computers, computer systems, etc. If a person tampers with or manipulates any computer, computer systems, or computer network of someone else, he is liable to pay damages by way of compensation to the person affected.
  • Section 67-A: This Section pertains to punishment for publishing or transmitting material containing sexually explicit acts, etc., in electronic form. In other words, whoever publishes or transmits any form of electronic material that contains sexually explicit acts or the like shall be punished with imprisonment for a term that may extend to 5 years and a fine that may extend to 10 lakh rupees.
  1. Amendments to the IT Act (2008) : Amendments were made to the IT Act to address emerging cyber threats and provide legal frameworks for issues such as data protection and privacy. The 2008 Amendment introduced provisions for punishing cyberterrorism and data theft. The 2009 Amendment clarified legal provisions for electronic signatures and electronic records.
  2. The Personal Data Protection Bill (PDPB) : The PDPB, introduced in 2019, aimed to regulate the processing of personal data of individuals by the government. It was designed to enhance data protection and privacy for Indian citizens. This Act received the assent of the President on 11th August 2023.
  3. National Cyber Security Policy (2013): The National Cyber Security Policy outlines the framework for securing cyberspace in India. It focusses on creating a secure cyber ecosystem, and promoting research and development in cybersecurity.
  4. Indian Penal Code (IPC) Amendment: Several sections of the IPC, including Sections 66, 66A, and 66D, were amended to address cybercrimes, online defamation, and cheating through electronic means.

Sufficiency of cyber law in India

As you can see, India has made significant progress in the field of cyber law and cybersecurity. Several laws and regulations have been enacted to address various aspects of cybercrimes, data protection, and digital transactions. Some of the important legislation includes the Information Technology Act 2000 and the DPDPA, 2023, as mentioned above. However, the sufficiency of cyber law in any country is a complex and evolving matter. Some of the points to consider regarding the state of cyber law in India are:

Framework

India has a comprehensive framework to address various crimes, including unauthorised access, hacking, data breaches, cyberbullying, identity theft, sextortion, online fraud, etc. The Information Technology (IT) Act, 2000, along with its amendments, provides the legal basis to prosecute cybercrimes.

Challenges and evolving nature of cybercrimes

Challenges are constantly evolving, and new threats emerge regularly. As such, keeping up with these evolving threats is a challenge for any legal system, and India is no exception. 

  • Enforcement and awareness: Effective enforcement of cyber laws and raising awareness among law enforcement agencies, legal professionals, and the general public are crucial. It is important to have these in place.
  • Data protection and privacy: Introduction of the Personal Data Protection Bill addresses concerns related to data protection and privacy of the people aligning India’s legal framework with international standards. 
  • International cooperation: Cybercrimes often have an international dimension, making cooperation between countries essential. India actively participates in international cooperation in efforts to prevent or combat cybercrimes and enhance cybersecurity, such as international cybersecurity.

Workshop, Indian-EU Cyber Dialogue, India-France Bilateral Cyber Dialogue, etc.

  • Need for regular updates: The rapid advancement of technology requires regular updates and amendments to the existing laws to ensure their relevance and effectiveness in addressing emerging cyber threats.

Conclusion

In conclusion, India has made strides in establishing cyber laws, but there is still progress to be made. The sufficiency of these laws is an ongoing concern due to the evolving nature of cybercrimes. All the above mentioned are needed to prevent cybercrimes from taking place. Also, as the process of passing a new bill or amendments to any laws takes a long time in India, it decreases the efficiency with which the cybersecurity laws are established. So in my opinion, India takes conscious efforts in improving the efficiency of cybersecurity and enacting the cyber laws, but it can also do better.

References

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Smt. Indrakali vs. Ravi Bhan Prasad (2012)

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Cossijurah case

This article is written by Subhangee Biswas. The article discusses the judgement of Smt. Indrakali vs. Ravi Bhan Prasad (2012) in the backdrop of ancestral property and the doctrine of blending in Hindu law. It proceeds to cover the facts of the case that gave rise to the dispute and then leads to the issues formulated by the court along with the submissions made by both parties. The article also discusses in detail the legal concepts involved and the precedents mentioned before concluding with the judgement pronounced by the Madhya Pradesh High Court and an overall analysis of the entire judgement.

Introduction

There are two types of properties that a person possesses, one which is passed down from the male ancestors through inheritance called the ancestral property, and another is the self-acquired property which a person builds during his lifetime. It is also known as personal property. 

In general, ancestral property is inherited by birth and self-acquired property is inherited through transfer. The self-acquired property also becomes an inheritable property under certain circumstances. If a Hindu dies intestate leaving his self-acquired property behind unattended, such self-acquired property would be shared among his legal heirs as per the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Another way in which self-acquired property can be inherited is when self-acquired property is blended with ancestral property, i.e., the person has to independently merge his acquired property with the joint family property so that such personal property becomes a part of the ancestral property. 

This particular case of Smt. Indrakali vs. Ravi Bhan Prasad (2012) is concerned with the self-acquired property belonging to a Hindu female who had received the same from her father by way of a gift. This self-acquired property belonged to the plaintiff’s sister-in-law and it was claimed to have been merged with ancestral property liable to be inherited by the two brothers-in-law. Thereafter, a suit for declaration and possession was filed by them contesting the claim over the property. 

The case revolves around the question of whether a property acquired by a Hindu female, by the way of a gift from her father, could be taken to have formed a part of the ancestral property. The Madhya Pradesh High Court considered the facts and after applying the principles of Hindu law related to property and inheritance, came to the conclusion that such acquired property of the female, being her stridhan, could not be merged with the ancestral property. The Court also analysed the doctrine of blending in this context while also deciding on the extent of the application of the limitation period for the filing of the suit.

Details of the case

  • Case name: Smt. Indrakali vs. Ravi Bhan Prasad
  • Case number: Second appeal number 495 of 1994
  • The statutes involved: The Limitation Act, 1963.
  • Appellant: Indrabhan, represented by his legal representatives after his demise.
  • Respondents: Ravi Bhan Prasad.
  • Court: High Court of Madhya Pradesh.
  • Bench: Justice A. K. Shrivastava.
  • Judgement date: 15th September 2011

Background of the case 

The case of Smt. Indrakali vs. Ravi Bhan Prasad (2012) discusses the concept blending of self-acquired property with the ancestral property. The self-acquired property mentioned in this case was actually the stridhan of a Hindu female. The same contended to have been merged into the ancestral property. 

The case also discusses a few Articles mentioned in Mulla’s Hindu Law (21st edition) and their application in the present case. Mulla’s Hindu Law is a treatise on the concepts of Hindu personal law like marriage, divorce and inheritance. 

Apart from the legal aspects related to joint family property, the case also discusses the law of limitation and its application when the title to the property has been perfected by the opposing party via adverse possession.

Facts of the case 

Background facts

Ravibhan Prasad (the plaintiff in the original suit and respondent no.1 in the present appeal; hereinafter referred to as ‘respondent no.1’) has two brothers, his real brother named Indrabhan (the defendant no.1 in the original suit, hereinafter referred to as the defendant) and another elder brother named Suryabhan. Suryabhan died in 1946. 

The father-in-law of Suryabhan, named Ramsanehi, was the owner of the property. Ramsanehi had transferred the property to his daughter, i.e., the wife of Suryabhan. It also contained certain ancestral properties belonging to the parties. 

After the death of Suryabhan, the defendant Indrabhan, being the immediate elder brother, mutated the suit property in his name. However, both the brothers Indrabhan and Ravibhan had possession of the property. 

Both the suit property and the ancestral property were partitioned between the two remaining brothers in 1964 and they were in the possession of their respective shares since the said partition. According to the claim made by respondent no.1, he received the suit property as his share and had its possession. 

In 1988, the defendant Indrabhan forcibly dispossessed respondent no.1 from the suit property. Then, respondent no.1 assembled a Panchayat. After conciliation, the suit property was given back to respondent no.1. Again, defendant Indrabhan took illegal possession of the suit property by forcing out respondent no.1 from the property.

Filing of the suit for declaration and possession

A suit for declaration and possession of the suit property was filed by respondent no.1 on November 3, 1988. After the suit was filed by respondent no.1, Indrabhan filed a written statement wherein he denied all the allegations made by respondent no.1 and alleged that respondent no.1 was not the owner of the suit property, that the property was transferred to him and that there was no partition. Further, defendant Indrabhan also presented a plea of adverse possession of the suit property and claimed that the suit was time-barred.

Proceedings before the Trial Court

The Learned Trial Court dismissed the suit on merits and the grounds of limitation. It held that the suit was barred by time and that defendant Indrabhan had gained “bhumiswami right” by adverse possession of the suit property.

Appeals following the dismissal by the Trial Court

Respondent no.1 filed a first appeal against the judgement of the Trial Court. The same was allowed and hence the judgement of the Trial Court was reversed.

Then, defendant Indrabhan filed a second appeal in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh against the judgement of reversal.

During the pendency of the second appeal, defendant Indrabhan died and his legal representatives substituted him (hereinafter referred to as ‘the appellants’).

Issues involved in the case

The court admitted the appeal on January 21, 2011, and the following issues arose before the court:

  1. Whether the property inherited by a daughter, in the form of a gift from her father, is classified as ancestral property?
  2. Whether the original suit filed by respondent no.1 was within the limitation period?

Arguments by the parties 

Arguments by the appellant

Contentions regarding issue no. 1

The learned counsel for the appellants reiterated the following contentions presented by respondent no.1:

  1. The property in suit was originally owned by Suryabhan (the eldest brother) and his wife.
  2. Both Suryabhan and his wife died issueless.
  3. The property in suit was inherited by the wife of Suryabhan from her father in the form of a gift.

Based on the same, the learned counsel for the appellants made the following submissions:

  1. Since the suit property was acquired by the wife as a gift from her father, in the absence of any child of their own, the suit property would be transferred to the male members of her husband’s family.
  2. It was also submitted that the suit property could not be considered to be an ancestral property. 
  3. Article 221(3) of Mulla’s Hindu Law (21st edition) was referred to and it was stated that property inherited from collaterals (example: brother, uncle) or from a female (example: mother) falls under the category of the person’s separate property and not ancestral property.
  4. Article 126 of Mulla’s Hindu Law (21st edition) was referred to and it was stated that property gifted to a female by her parents falls under the category of her stridhan and that property cannot be included in the ancestral property.
  5. Article 225 of Mulla’s Hindu Law (21st edition) was referred to and it was submitted that the doctrine of coparcenary could not be applied to a Hindu female acquiring property from her father since the female is not counted as a coparcener.

Concluding the submissions in this regard, the learned counsel claimed that the plea of respondent no.1 that the property of the wife (wife of Suryabhan and daughter of Ramsanehi) could not be put together with the ancestral property of the husband’s family. Thus, the suit property could not be partitioned.

Contentions regarding issue no. 2

The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the original suit filed on November 3, 1988, was ex facie barred by time. The reason provided behind such contention was that respondent no.1 was not in possession of the suit property 12 years prior to the date of the filing of the original suit. As a result, the Appellate Court had made an error in holding that the original suit was filed within limitation. Moreover, the learned counsel added that the Trial Court had observed that the suit was time-barred. 

It was thus prayed that the judgement passed by the learned first appellate court be set aside and the judgement and decree of the Trial Court be restored and upheld.

Arguments by respondent 

Contentions regarding issue no. 1

The learned counsel for the respondent presented the following contentions regarding issue no. 1:

  1. Defendant Indrabhan had admitted in his written statement filed in the original suit and had claimed the same in the present suit that the suit property was a subject matter besides the other immovable properties.
  2. Defendant Indrabhan had admitted in his written statement that the suit property was merged with the ancestral property and then the property was partitioned between respondent no.1 and defendant, i.e., Ravibhan and Indrabhan respectively.
  3. In the partition of the properties, the suit property fell in the share of respondent no.1, Ravibhan.
  4. Defendant Indrabhan shall not be allowed to go back on his own admissions made in his written statement filed in the original suit. 

The learned counsel concluded that since the question of whether the suit property can be included in the category of ancestral property has been settled in the earlier proceedings, the same could not be re-adjudicated.

Contentions regarding issue no. 2

Regarding the issue of limitation, the learned counsel for the respondent had submitted the following:

  1. The learned first appellate court was not erred in holding that the suit was within the limitation period.
  2. As observed by the first appellate court in its judgement, the testimony by the witnesses from the side of respondent no.1 has collectively led to the opinion that respondent no.1 had possession of the suit property from 1964 to 1988. Thus, the suit filed on November 3, 1988, cannot be claimed as time-barred.

The learned counsel for the respondents presented the above-mentioned contentions and prayed that the appeal be dismissed.

Legal concepts involved in Smt. Indrakali vs. Ravi Bhan Prasad (2012) 

Article 221 of Mulla’s Hindu Law (21st edition)

As mentioned earlier, Article 221(3) of Mulla’s Hindu Law discusses the property inherited from collaterals. It states that property inherited from females in a family is termed as the property inherited from collaterals. The exception in this case is when property is inherited from maternal grandfather.

Regarding what property can be called and included under the term “ancestral property”, it has been mentioned that the property which is inherited by a person from their male ascendants, like, father, father’s father, father’s father’s father, and so on, is to be considered under ancestral property. In simple terms, property inherited from the male lineage is called ancestral property.

Property inherited by a person from any other relation constitutes separate property of that person. In this case, the person’s male offspring would not have any interest in the separate property by birth. 

Therefore, property inherited from collaterals, like brother or uncle, and those inherited from a female, like mother or aunt, all constitute separate property.

Article 126 of Mulla’s Hindu Law (21st edition)

This Article mentions will and bequests from familiar relationships. It states that if a property has been gifted to a female offspring by her parents, it would be considered as her stridhan. Since the property is her stridhan and since a Hindu female is also not considered a coparcener in a joint family property, her stridhan cannot be blended into the ancestral property.

Article 225 of Mulla’s Hindu Law (21st edition) and Article 225 (2a)

The judgement mentions Article 225(1) and Article 225(2a) while discussing the blending of personal property with ancestral property is not a possibility. 

Article 225(1) mentions property thrown into common stock. The Article states that a separate or self-acquired property of a coparcener in a joint family may become joint family property through the application of the doctrine of blending if such property has been voluntarily merged into the common property with the intention to renounce all separate claims on such property. 

The most important element to be established is the clear intention to waive the separate rights. Acts of kindness or generosity are not to be interpreted as acceptance of legal obligation. It is not to be concluded from facts like:

  1. The person has allowed the other family members to use such personal property together with him; or,
  2. That some income from the separate property was used to provide for a son; or,
  3. The failure of a member to keep separate accounts of his income.

The fact that the individual has permitted other coparceners to use his self-acquired property does not lead to the presumption that the separate property becomes a part of the joint family property unless the person expressly throws such property into common stock. 

The occurrence of throwing self-acquired property into common stock depends on all the incidents of joint family property. 

Article 225(2a) states that the basis of the doctrine of blending is the existence of coparcenary, coparcenary property and separate property of a coparcener. Moreover, it has been expressly stated that the doctrine of blending cannot be applied to a Hindu female acquiring immovable property from her father since a Hindu female is not considered to be a coparcener under the Mitakshara school of Hindu law. 

The fact that a Hindu female is not a coparcener and that the doctrine of blending does not apply to a Hindu female was also reaffirmed by the Supreme Court, as mentioned later in the present judgement. 

Coparcener and doctrine of coparcenary

Hindu law defines a coparcener as a member of a Hindu Undivided Family having an interest in the joint family property by birth. Such a right is a legal right and the coparceners are joint heirs to the ancestral property. The coparceners have a right to demand partition of the ancestral property.

Before 2005, the daughters of a family were not considered coparceners. They were just members of the family. The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 removed the gender-based provisions and included daughters under the term of coparceners. After the amendment, the daughters were given the same rights and liabilities to the same extent as that of the male members. 

Coparcenary in Hindu law extends to four descending generations in the lineage, i.e., the common ancestor and three generations under him. The fourth generation would only be a coparcener once the highest common ancestor dies. 

The doctrine of coparcenary refers to the co-ownership of ancestral property by the coparceners in a Hindu Undivided Family. The ancestral property is owned jointly and enjoyed by all the members of the family, with the coparceners having the inherent right by birth to demand a partition of their portion.

To learn more about coparcenary under Hindu law, click here.

Ancestral property and self-acquired property

Ancestral property 

Ancestral property, as the name suggests, means all the properties that are inherited through male ancestors of a joint family. It is also known as “coparcenary property”. As per Hindu law, only male members are considered coparceners, which means, only the male members have an interest in the joint family property by birth. The daughters of the family were not given any right to claim a share in the joint family property till 2005. With the enactment of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, daughters were given the same status as sons with regard to having an interest in the joint family property by birth. 

Ancestral property is inherited from the paternal side. The property inherited by a Hindu male from the preceding three generations, i.e., father, father’s father, father’s father’s father is considered to be ancestral property. Similarly, succeeding three generations of a common ancestor, i.e., children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren, are considered to have developed an interest in that property by birth. Ancestral property is limited to the male lineage and such interest comes into existence by birth.

Property inherited from female ancestors, indirect male lineage, i.e., uncles and brothers, does not fall under the scope of ancestral property. 

Self-acquired property

self-acquired property is also known as personal property or separate property. It refers to all those assets that an individual acquires in his lifetime. Such a property may have been acquired by purchase, gift, will, or any other form of transfer. The successors do not acquire any rights to the self-acquired property and the only way self-acquired property is distributed among the legal heirs following rules of succession is when the Hindu dies intestate, i.e., without a Will. However, the owner reserves the right to sell, transfer or mortgage such self-acquired property in the manner they wish to.

Doctrine of blending

The doctrine of blending postulates that when a coparcener blends their separate personal property with the joint Hindu family property willingly, the property becomes a part of the joint family property. The exclusive control and the individual rights that the particular coparcener had over his separate property will stand extinguished and all the coparceners will have a right over the same since the property is now merged with the joint property. Article 225(1) of Mulla’s Hindu Law describes the same phenomenon as “property thrown into common stock” which has been mentioned and discussed above. 

Concept of stridhan

The word ‘stridhan’ has been derived from two words: ‘stri’ meaning woman and ‘dhana’ meaning property in sanskrit. As the term suggests, stridhan means property of a woman over which she has absolute rights. Stridhan does not necessarily have to be land or property, it can be any form of asset, including cash, ornaments, land, i.e., any kind of movable or immovable property. 

In Hindu law, stridhan consists of everything a woman receives during her lifetime. All the movable and immovable property that a woman receives before her marriage, at the time of her marriage, after marriage, during childbirth or after the death of her husband, all constitute stridhan. It is a voluntary gift given to a woman. 

To learn more about stridhan, click here.

Mutation

Mutation is the process of updating the details of the owner of a property in the government records. When a property is sold or transferred, the details relating to that property are changed in the land revenue department. This is known as mutation. Mutation helps the locals as well as authorities to figure out the owner of the property and accordingly fix tax liability and charge the same. 

Whenever there is a change or transfer of ownership by sale or inheritance or even by power of attorney, the change has to be reflected in the revenue records through mutation. 

To learn more about mutation of property, click here.

Adverse possession

Adverse possession is a legal principle that allows someone to gain ownership of land or property belonging to someone else. Adverse possession is also known as “squatter’s rights” or “homesteading”.

In adverse possession, the title is acquired without the previous owner’s permission. According to this doctrine, when a person has the possession of a property, the ownership of which belongs to some other person, for a continuous and uninterrupted period of 12 years, the person having the possession becomes the lawful owner of that property. 

To learn more about it click here.

Bhumiswami rights

Bhumiswami in general means the owner of the land. The ownership may not be absolute considering Section 57 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 states that the state government is the owner of all of the land but apart from the state government, the person termed as bhumiswami is the owner against other persons.

The term bhumiswami has been defined under the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 under Sections 157 and 158.

Before understanding the term “bhumiswami”, we need to understand the term “tenure-holder”. According to Section 2(1)(z), “tenure-holder” means a person who holds land from the state government and is considered to be bhumiswami under the Act of 1959.

Thus, there are two essentials for a person to be a tenure holder, which are as follows:

  1. The person should be holding land from the state government, and not the central government or any private person,
  2. The person should be a bhumiswami under Section 158 of the Act. The classes of persons who are to be considered as bhumiswami are mentioned in Section 158 itself.

Section 157 states that there would be only one category of tenure-holders of land from the state (state of Madhya Pradesh, since the Act is a state Act) and they would be known as “bhumiswami”. Therefore, within the state, only one class of tenure holders were allowed and all the persons holding land under different land revenue tenancy laws operating in different parts of the state were brought under a single Act. 

Section 158 mentions who is included within the term bhumiswami in its sub-section (1).  The following persons are to be termed as bhumiswami:

  1. Persons holding land in the Mahakoshal region in bhumiswami or bhumidhari rights as per Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954.
  2. Persons holding land in the Madhya Bharat region as a Pakka tenant or as a Muafidar, Inamdar or Concessional holder, as defined in the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat, 2007.
  3. Persons holding land in the Bhopal region as an occupant as defined in the Bhopal State Land Revenue Act, 1932.
  4. Persons holding land in the Vindhya Pradesh region as a pachapan paintalis tenant, pattedar tenant, a grove holder or as a holder of a tank as defined in the Vindhya Pradesh Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1953.
  5. Persons holding land in the Vindhya Pradesh region as a gair haqdar tenant and having the entitlement to a patta in respect of that land as per Section 57(4) of the Rewa State Land Revenue and Tenancy Code, 1935. Land which is a grover or tank or land acquired or required for Government or public purposes is excluded from the scope of this clause.
  6. Persons holding land as a tenet in the Vindhya Pradesh region and having the entitlement to a patta in respect of that land as per Sections 151(2) and 151(3) of the Vindhya Pradesh Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1953 but has failed to obtain such patta before the Act of 1959 came into force.
  7. Persons holding land in the Sironj region as a khatedar tenant or as a grove holder as mentioned in the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955.

Sub-section (3) to Section 158 further mentions that the following persons would be considered to be bhumiswami and shall possess all the rights and liabilities conferred and imposed upon a bhumiswami as per the Act of 1959:

  1. Persons holding land in bhumiswami right through lease granted by the State Government or the Collector or the Allotment Officer on or before the commencement of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code (Amendment) Act, 1992 would be considered to be bhumiswami from the date of commencement of the Act.
  2. Persons to whom land is allotted in bhumiswami rights by the state government or the collector or the allotment officer after the commencement of the Act of 1992 would be considered bhumiswami from the date of the allotment.

The condition added to this sub-section is that the person should not transfer the land within 10 years from the date of such lease or allotment by the mentioned authorities. 

Chapter XII of the Act also mentions the rights and liabilities of bhumiswami. It lists the following rights:

  1. Section 164 states that on the death of the bhumiswami, the interest of bhumiswami would pass to the legal heirs by inheritance, survivorship or bequest.
  2. Section 165 mentions the right of the bhumiswami to transfer his land, subject to the conditions mentioned in the subsequent Sub-sections.
  3. Section 167 authorises the bhumiswami to exchange his land, in whole or part, by mutual agreement to consolidate his holdings or to facilitate convenience in cultivation.
  4. Section 168 allows a restrictive right to the bhumiswami to lease his land. 
  5. Section 171 (deleted by the amendment of 2018) states that a bhumiswami holding land for agricultural purposes has the right to make improvements for better cultivation.
  6. Section 173 allows the bhumiswami to relinquish his rights as well.
  7. Section 178-A enables the bhumiswami to divide his agricultural land among his legal heirs during his lifetime.
  8. Section 179 states that the trees standing in the land of the bhumiswami would belong to him.
  9. Section 212 elaborates on the right of bhumiswamis to the possession of holdings.
  10. Section 213 states that the rights of bhumiswamis in their holdings would be transferable by exchange. Such transfer could be made for the purpose of giving effect to any scheme of consolidation.

Time bar under Limitation Act, 1963

Under the law, there are different time limits prescribed for the initiation of different types of legal proceedings. The Limitation Act, 1963 is the legislation that sets out the maximum period within which a lawsuit can be initiated after the happening of a particular event. The Act ensures the filing of disputes in a timely manner and also prevents unnecessary claims.

The limitation period can be explained with reference to the present case. The law states that for filing a suit for possession of immovable property or any related interest based on title, the limitation period mentioned is 12 years from the date when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.

Precedents referred to in the case

Mallesappa Bandeppa Desai vs. Desai Mullappa alias Mallesappa (1961)

In this case, the appellants had claimed for partition against their uncle and granduncle. The uncle was the manager of the ancestral property. The claim of the appellants was that the uncle, being the manager of the family, was depriving them of their legitimate share in the property and also refused to accede to the request for partition. The respondents contended that the ancestor of the family had effected a partition and the property was already divided between the uncle and the father of the appellants, hence, a claim for partition was unreasonable. 

The learned District Judge found that the claim of partition having taken place by the respondent uncle was not proved and held that the appellants were entitled to half of the share of the family property and passed a preliminary decree to that effect. 

The decree was challenged by the respondent’s uncle in an appeal before the Madras High Court. The High Court upheld the decision of the Trial Court except with respect to two particular categories of properties.

The decision of the Madras High Court was again challenged before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, while deciding the case, took up the question of whether the principle of blending applies to property held by a Hindu female as a limited owner. 

The Supreme Court stated that the doctrine of blending states that a coparcener having an interest in the coparcenary property and also owning a separate property of his own may, by his deliberate and intentional conduct, merge his separate property into the coparcenary property. If it is observed that the owner of the separate property deliberately and voluntarily throws such property into the joint stock with the clear intention of giving up his sole claim on the property and with the aim to merge it with the joint family property, then the separate property becomes a part of the joint family property and loses the separate character. The owner of the self-acquired property must have a clear and unequivocal intention to merge his separate property with the joint family property.

Coming to the scenario when the separate property is being owned by a Hindu female, the Supreme Court observed that a Hindu female is not a coparcener and has no interest in the coparcenary property. The property is held by the Hindu female in the capacity of a limited owner and on her death, it devolves on the reversioner (person who gets the rights of the property belonging to a widow, held by her for her life, after her death). The Hindu female can surrender her estate to the reversioner but such a process must follow the already established rules. A Hindu female cannot evade such rules of surrender and allow the husband’s family members to consider her limited estate to be a part of the joint family property. 

The Supreme Court proceeded to hold that the principle of blending cannot be invoked in the case of a limited estate held by a Hindu female. This decision was referred to in the present case to state that the doctrine of coparcenary could not be invoked to a female and that the doctrine of blending would not apply to her stridhan. 

Smt. Pushpa Devi vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi (1977)

In this case, the question was whether a Hindu female, being a member of a Hindu Undivided Family, could blend her separate property with the joint family property. 

The appellant was a member of a Hindu Undivided Family. In her individual capacity, she entered into a partnership with her father-in-law with her minor son being admitted to the benefits of the partnership. The appellant made a declaration that she was the absolute owner of the credit amount in the books of one of the businesses and also declared her unequivocal intention to treat both her capital and share in that business as the joint family property. She also gave up her separate individual interest and ownership over her capital investment, her share in the profit and losses of that business in favour of the joint family and declared that all these assets were to be enjoyed and possessed by the joint family, wholly and exclusively. 

The case is regarding the assessment year of 1963-64. The shares of the appellant from the above-mentioned business were credited to the joint family account as per her declaration. Accordingly, the Hindu Undivided Family paid advance tax and also filed its return regarding the income amount. The appellant did not file a return for that amount. She mentioned the declaration in her return. 

The Income Tax Officer rejected the contention of the appellant. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner also affirmed the order of the Income Tax Officer highlighting that the appellant, though being a member of the Hindu Undivided Family, was not a coparcener and thus she could not change her personal property into joint family property. Another ground cited was that there was no joint family property and thus there was no common stock in which the appellant could throw her separate property. 

On further appeal, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal accepted the appellant’s claim and observed that there was no reason why a Hindu female, being a member of the Hindu Undivided Family, could not blend her separate property with the joint family property by her unequivocal intention. It was further observed that a Hindu female can surrender her interest and the right of a Hindu female to abandon her exclusive interest in favour of the joint family of which she is a member could not be restricted. 

The Supreme Court analysed the doctrine of blending in the light of various cited judgements. The general concept was discussed, thereafter the principle was analysed from the point of view of a Hindu female. It was stated that if a Hindu female, being a member of a Hindu Undivided Family, merges her separate property with the joint family property, she creates new claimants to her property but extinguishes her individual right since a female is not a coparcener and thus has no right to demand a share in the joint family property. She would only be entitled to maintenance out of the joint family property. Her right to demand a share is dependent on the happening of a partition between her husband and sons. In the case of the Mitakshara joint family, the Hindu female’s right to demand partition in the joint family property comes into existence on the death of her husband. The Supreme Court concluded that blending is not suitable in the case of a Hindu female who throws her separate property, an absolute or limited estate in the common stock of joint family property.

The Supreme Court took a similar view as held in the case of Mallesappa Bandeppa Desai vs. Desai Mullappa alias Mallesappa (1961) that a Hindu female is not a coparcener and thus the doctrine of blending is not applicable in her case. 

P. Lakshmi Reddy vs. L. Lakshmi Reddy (1957)

In this case, the property in suit belonged to a person named Venkata Reddy. He died as an infant and his agnatic relation Hanimi Reddy filed a suit for recovery of Venkata Reddy’s properties which were under the possession of third parties. A receiver was appointed who was directed to deliver possession of the properties to the successful plaintiff. Hanimi Reddy obtained the actual possession and continued to have the same till his death. 

The present suit was filed stating that the plaintiff and the second defendant, his brother, both were agnatic relations, of the same degree as Hanimi Reddy, of Venkata Reddy and that all three of them were co-heirs of Venkata Reddy to the same extent and they all succeeded to his properties on his death. It was also alleged that Hanimi Reddy filed the suit and obtained possession of the properties as one of the co-hers having the consent of the plaintiff and the second defendant. All of them enjoyed the properties jointly as tenants-in-common. 

After the death of Hanimi Reddy, his brother’s son (first defendant) took possession of all his properties as his heir. After possessing the same, he denied the title of the plaintiff and the second defendant.

The appeal before the Supreme Court was first filed before the District Court where it was held to be barred by limitation, considering that the suit was initiated on December 2, 1942, instead of October 23, 1941. On the first appeal, the District Judge held that allowing the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the suit of the plaintiff was within the limitation period being filed on October 23, 1941. 

The High Court held that the possession of Hanimi Reddy was not an adverse possession as against the plaintiff. Since the question of limitation or availability of the benefit under Section 14 was not raised, the decision of the District Judge that the suit was initiated on October 23, 1941, was upheld.

It was observed that the date of the initiation of the suit was more than 14 years from the date when succession was allowed regarding the properties of Venkata Reddy but was less than 12 years after Hanimi Reddy obtained possession of the property.

The Supreme Court then discussed the contention of adverse possession on the part of Hanimi Reddy against the plaintiff and second defendant. It was seen that from the family tree provided by Hanimi Reddy, Venkata Reddy and Hanimi Reddy were related through a common ancestor. Hanimi Reddy had shown only two lines for himself and Venkata Reddy. On the other hand, the plaintiff and the second defendant belonged to another line from the same ancestor which was not shown and was ignored by Hanimi Reddy. 

The first defendant, i.e., Hanimi Reddy’s nephew, denied the relationship of the plaintiff and the second defendant in his written statement. He argued that the father of the plaintiff and the second defendant originated from a common ancestor by birth or adoption. The Court considered this reason to be the possibility behind Hanimi Reddy neglecting the plaintiff and the second defendant in his suit. However, in the suit before the Supreme Court, it was accepted that the plaintiff and the second defendant were agnatic relations of Venkata Reddy to the same degree and extent as that of Hanimi Reddy.

The Supreme Court proceeded to adjudge on the issue of adverse possession and stated the classical requirement for adverse possession is that it must be “nec vi, nec clam, nec precario” which means that the possession should be “without force, without secrecy and without permission”. The possession must be continuous, in public and adverse to the original owner. 

In the case of co-heirs, to prove adverse possession against a fellow co-heir, it is not enough to establish that one co-heir is in sole possession and solely enjoys the profits emerging out of the properties. It is important to prove that the non-possessing co-heir was evicted by the possessing co-heir since, in law, possession by one co-heir is considered to be the possession of all co-heirs. This is presumed on the basis of joint title. The possessing co-heir cannot declare his possession to be adverse to the non-possessing co-heirs only by a secret ill-feeling. 

There must be evidence of an open declaration of hostile title along with exclusive possession and enjoyment by one of the co-heirs to the knowledge of the non-possessing evicted co-heirs. Moreover, the burden to prove the eviction is on the person claiming the title by adverse possession. 

Another question determined in this case was regarding the Receiver’s possession and whether the Receiver’s possession could be attached to Hanimi Reddy’s possession given that his possession was adverse to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court noted that a receiver is an officer of the Court and not an agent of any party, his possession is treated as the possession of the successful party of the suit. However, the doctrine of Receiver’s possession cannot be allowed to enable a person initially not in possession to claim the attaching of the receiver’s possession to his adverse possession. If the possession is taken by the receiver from the person who is in adverse possession against the real owner and afterwards, the receiver restores the possession back to him at the conclusion of the proceeding, then it would be a different scenario. 

Again, it was observed that limitation cannot begin against a person unless that person is in a position where he can legally absolve title by action. Considering this principle, the outset of adverse possession in favour of a person suggests that the person is in actual possession of a hostile claim of exclusive title, and the owner has the authority to initiate an action to repulse such claim. The adverse possession of the claimant would not begin unless he obtains the actual possession with the necessary intention of adverse possession. Adverse possession cannot begin without the actual possession that gives rise to the cause of action. 

Judgement in Smt. Indrakali vs. Ravi Bhan Prasad (2012) 

Issue no.1

At first, the court considered the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that defendant Indrabhan, in the original suit, had admitted in his written statement that the suit property was merged with the ancestral property and then partitioned in 1964 which led to the suit property falling in the share of respondent no.1. This contention was rejected because on the inspection of the written statement filed by defendant Indrabhan, it was seen that such a statement was not admitted by him. It was also not pleaded by him that the suit property was the subject matter in the previous litigation. Therefore, as the suit property was not the subject matter in the previous litigation, it could not be accepted that defendant Indrabhan had admitted the falling of the suit property in the share of respondent no.1 after partition as contended. 

The Court then proceeded to decide the contention of the appellant side regarding whether the suit property, i.e., the property belonging to the wife of Suryabhan could be merged with the ancestral property. It was admitted that Suryabhan was the eldest brother. It was also admitted by respondent no.1 that the suit property originally belonged to the father-in-law of Suryabhan who gifted the same to his daughter, i.e., the wife of Suryabhan. Both Suryabhan and his wife died issueless. Since the property was gifted to Suryabhan’s wife by her father, the same becomes her stridhan as per Article 126 of the Mulla’s Hindu Law (21st edition). Considering the same, the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that the property was the stridhan belonging to Suryabhan’s wife. 

If the property is accepted to be the stridhan of Suryabhan’s wife then the property could not be termed as the ancestral property of the parties since ancestral property means the properties which are inherited from the male lineage of the family. The property inherited from the collaterals or the females is not included under the term ancestral property. 

Article 221(3) of Mulla’s Hindu law was referred to and it was held that the property, being gifted to Suryabhan’s wife by her father, was her stridhan. Thus, it could not be termed as an ancestral property and therefore, the property could not be merged with the ancestral property. 

Article 225(1) and (2a) were quoted and the Court observed that a Hindu female is not a coparcener and the doctrine of blending cannot apply to a Hindu female. Thus, in the present case, the suit property could not be merged with the ancestral property and then subsequently partitioned. 

Deciding the first issue, the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that since the suit property was the stridhan of Suryabhan’s wife, it could not be blended with the ancestral property and could not be partitioned between the parties in 1964. It was held that the suit property, i.e., the property belonging to Suryabhan’s wife could not be treated as the ancestral property of the parties since the same was gifted to her by her father and thus it counted as her stridhan.

Issue no.2

The Trial Court had held that the suit by respondent no.1 (plaintiff before the Trial Court) was time-barred since he was not in possession of the suit property for 12 years from the date of filing of the suit and defendant Indrabhan acquired an absolute title by adverse possession by that time. The Trial Court had also observed that defendant Indrabhan was in possession of the suit property since 1958. This observation of the Court was based on the revenue record. 

The first appellate court had held that the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate in the proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on November 3, 1966, and the order passed by the Revisional Court on April 8, 1977, was negated by the testimony made by the witnesses from the side of respondent no.1. The Madhya Pradesh High Court refused to accept this contention, stating that, if testimony of the witness is contrary to a judicial order, the credibility of the testimony can not overrule the judicial order. Similarly, in the present case, the credibility of the testimony of the witnesses from the side of respondent no.1, being contrary to the judicial order, could not be said to have overruled the judicial order, the judicial order being passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and also affirmed by the Revisional Court. 

According to the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, defendant Indrabhan was in possession of the suit property two months before the date of attachment of the property, i.e., November 16, 1973. This observation has been affirmed by the Sessions Judge in revision on April 8, 1977. 

Therefore, the Trial Court as well as the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate as affirmed by the Sessions Judge clarified that defendant Indrabhan was in possession of the suit property.

The Madhya Pradesh High Court stated that if the holding of the Trial Court regarding the possession of the suit property by defendant Indrabhan since 1958 was disregarded, the orders of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and the Revisional Court prove that defendant Indrabhan was in possession of the suit property since September 1973.

If the time of September 1973 was considered to be the onset of the limitation, the suit filed on November 3, 1988, i.e., the original suit was ex facie time-barred. 

On further examination of the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, the High Court noticed that Supurdgidar was expressly directed to hand over the possession of the suit property to defendant Indrabhan. The High Court, in this regard, referred to the settled law that the property in the possession of the Supurdgidar in the proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is considered to be of the person for whom he is possessing such attached property. Following the same law, the High Court considered that the Supurdgidar was possessing the property for defendant Indrabhan. 

Concluding this issue, the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that the original suit dated November 3, 1988, by respondent no.1 (plaintiff in the original suit) was barred by time.

Verdict of the court

The appeal was allowed. The judgement and decree passed by the first appellate court was set aside and the judgement by the learned Trial Court was upheld.

Analysis of the judgement

This judgement mainly focuses on two topics; one is the application of the doctrine of blending on the two different types of properties possessed by a Hindu, and the other is the limitation period applicable when adverse possession is involved.

As the facts unfold, it was seen that the property which was the centre of the dispute was the stridhan belonging to the sister-in-law of the parties. Both the sister-in-law and her husband, i.e., the brother of the parties died issueless. This led to the parties contesting to obtain declaration and possession of the stridhan property. 

The Madhya Pradesh High Court decided upon the issue of whether the doctrine of blending would be applicable to stridhan property. It was held that stridhan, being the personal, self-acquired property of a Hindu female, could not be said to have been merged with the ancestral property of the parties. Emphasis was given on various Articles of Mulla’s Hindu Law and it was reiterated that property inherited from females and collaterals cannot be termed ancestral property and that property inherited from only the male lineages is ancestral property. The doctrine of blending was also discussed which depicted the situation when personal property is voluntarily thrown into the common stock of the joint family property. The High Court then concluded that a female Hindu is not a coparcener and thus doctrine of blending does not apply to merge stridhan into joint family property. 

The Madhya Pradesh High Court discussed the limitation period as the second and final issue. As per the Limitation Act, 1963, the limitation period prescribed concerned to the present case is 12 years. Therefore, the party has to possess the suit property for 12 years from the date of the filing of the suit. But as per the facts, the Court observed that the revenue record supports the fact that the opposite party was in possession of the suit property. It was also observed that when Supurdgidar was holding possession of the property during the pendency of proceedings under the Code of Criminal Procedure, he was directed to deliver the possession of the suit property to the opposite party. This supports the contention that the suit property was, no doubt, in possession of the opposite party and thus the suit becomes time-barred as the filing party was not in possession of the disputed property during the time when he was supposed to hold it in order to file the suit lawfully. 

Conclusion 

The case was an important decision which excluded self-acquired property, in particular, stridhan, out of the scope of the doctrine of blending. The case revolves around Hindu joint family property and coparcenary rights. The High Court concluded that stridhan could not be considered to be ancestral property. The Court also discussed the possibility of blending self-acquired property into joint family property. 

The case also mentioned the limitation period concerned. It was adjudged that the property was indeed not in the possession of the party filing the suit as per the revenue records and thus the suit was time-barred. The Court also mentioned the settled law relating to possession of property by Supurdgidar which further strengthened the statement that the suit property was not in possession of the party filing the suit. 

In essence, the present case cleared the question as to which property constitutes ancestral property and also to what extent and under what circumstances self-acquired property would fall under the category of joint family property. 

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

Can a self-acquired property be transferred through inheritance?

There are two ways in which self-acquired property can be transferred through inheritance. They are:

  1. As per the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, in case the Hindu dies intestate,
  2. Through the doctrine of blending, if the person voluntarily merges the self-acquired property with the ancestral property.

What is the doctrine of blending?

The doctrine mentions the possibility of a coparcener merging his personal self-acquired property with the ancestral property. The consequence of such an action is that the individual claims cease to exist and a right of all the coparceners to the separate property is established. In short, the self-acquired property would be treated as the ancestral property.

Can stridhan be blended into ancestral property?

No. Stridhan cannot be blended into ancestral property for two below-mentioned reasons:

  1. Stridhan is the personal self-acquired property of a Hindu female,
  2. A Hindu female is not a coparcener in the joint family property, hence, cannot merge her personal property with the ancestral property.

References 

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Sampath Kumar vs. Enforcement Officer Madras 

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The following article is authored by Adv. Ishani Samajpati. This article exhaustively deals with the case of Sampath Kumar vs. Enforcement Officer Madras, on 1st August 1997. It discusses the facts of the case, the arguments put forth by both parties, the analysis of relevant laws, precedents and finally, the order passed by the single judge bench of the Madras High Court. This case is primarily concerned with the application of Section 56 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973.

Introduction 

At a critical time, when forex reserves of India were at an all time low, the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “the FERA” or “the Act”) was enacted. The Act came into force on 19th September 1973. The purpose of this Act was to regulate certain kinds of payments, dealings in foreign exchange and securities, and transactions which indirectly affect the foreign exchange and import and export of currency and bullions. The Act also sought to conserve and properly utilise foreign exchange resources for the economic development of India. 

The Act also provided competent authorities (mostly the Enforcement Officer), the power to investigate. Hence, it contains provisions under Section 40, wherein a Gazetted Enforcement Officer has the power to summon any person whose attendance he thinks is necessary, either to give evidence or to produce any document during the course of an investigation or any proceeding under the FERA.

However, what if the person receiving the summons does not attend to give evidence or produce documents? Does it constitute an offence under this Act? Are there any provisions in the FERA under which it is punishable?

The case of Sampath Kumar vs. Enforcement Officer Madras on 1st August 1997 answers these questions. Although it was a single bench order, it has been cited multiple times in various related judgements, indicating its importance. Let’s read on to find out.

Details of the case

Name of the case:  Sampath Kumar vs. Enforcement Officer Madras

Petitioner: Sampath Kumar 

Respondent: Enforcement Officer Madras  

Court: Madras High Court

Nature of case: criminal original petitions

Counsel on behalf of the petitioner: Mr. N. Jothi

Counsel on behalf of the respondent: Mr. V. T. Gopalan

Date of order: 1st August, 1997 

Facts of the case

The facts of the case are as follows:

  • The petitioner was issued summons for an investigation under the FERA, which directed them to comply with the directions mentioned in the summons. It was specifically mentioned in the summons, that non-compliance with the summons constitutes offences under Sections 50 and 56 of the FERA. The summons were issued on 12.02.1996, directing the petitioner to appear on 16.02.1996, which he failed to do so.
  • On 19.02.1996, the Enforcement Officer searched their residences and seized certain documents. Even during the course of the search, the petitioner was absent. Hence, again, summons were issued on 19.02.1996, for the appearance of the petitioner at 3 pm on the same date. Again, the petitioners did not appear and one more summons for their appearance was served under Rule 3(c) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Rules, 1974. The petitioner, in turn, filed writ applications and anticipatory bail applications before the Madras High Court.
  • Multiple summons were issued to the petitioner, but he failed to respond and appear before the respondent. Thereafter, complaints were filed under Section 56 of the FERA, before competent courts, for not abiding by the summons. Finally, the petitioner appeared before the respondent, to give his statement.
  • Various incriminating documents were confiscated under Section 33(2) (power to call for information) of the FERA, from the Income Tax Department. Apart from this, the seizure of foreign exchange also formed part of the material available against the petitioner, while summoning him.
  • The petitioner failed to comply with the directions mentioned in the summons and hence, he defeated the sole purpose and scope of the FERA. He had contravened Section 40(3), read with Section 56(1)(ii) of the FERA.
  • A prosecution case was started against the petitioner, since he failed to comply with the summons, and thereby failed to comply with the directions of the Enforcement Officer.
  • The respondent, the Enforcement Officer of Madras, filed a complaint against the petitioner, under Section 56(1)(ii) of the FERA, for committing an offence under Section 40(3). 
  • Two proceedings, in C.C. No. 60 of 1996 and C.C. No. 61 of 1996, were ongoing against the petitioner, Sampath Kumar, on the files of Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (E.O.-I), Egmore and Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (E.O.-II), Egmore, Madras. The petitioner approached the Madras High Court under Section 482 (inherent powers of High Court) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, to file two criminal original petitions. Hence, the present case.

Issues raised

The main issues involved in this case are as follows:

  • Whether the proceedings pending against the petitioner in the files of Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (E.O.-I), Egmore and Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (E.O.-II), Egmore, Madras are maintainable or not?
  • Whether the remaining criminal cases against the petitioner are maintainable or not?
  • Whether the criminal original petitions filed by the petitioner under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be allowed or not?
  • Whether the violation of Section 40(3) is punishable under Section 56(1)(ii) of the FERA or not?

Laws involved in Sampath Kumar vs. Enforcement Officer Madras

Section 40 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973

Section 40 of the FERA deals with the power to summon persons to give evidence and produce required documents.

Section 40(1) of the Act states that any Gazetted Officer of the Enforcement has the power to summon any person whose attendance he thinks is necessary for giving evidence or for producing any required documents for any investigation or ongoing proceedings under this Act.

Section 40(2) states that a summons will be given for producing a specific document or for producing documents of certain categories, which are in possession or under the control of the person who has been summoned.

According to Section 40(3) of the Act, the person who has been summoned must attend either in person or be represented by any authorised person, as directed by the Enforcement Officer. Additionally, the person summoned shall be bound to state the truth with respect to the subject on which they are examined or give statements or produce required documents. Further, this Section allows an exemption under Section 132 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It states that women who do not appear in public due to their customs and manners, cannot be compelled to publicly appear in court. Hence, their personal appearance in court is exempted.

Section 40(4) states that under the scopes of Sections 193 (punishment for false evidence) and 228 (intentional insult or interruption to public servant sitting in judicial proceedings) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, such investigation or proceedings under this Act, shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding.

Section 56 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973

Section 56 of the FERA, is the only Section in this Act that deals with offences and their prosecution. 

This Section provides punishment for contravention, without prejudicing the award of a penalty by adjudicating officers under this Act. Section 56 also provides a number of exceptions wherein its punishments will not be applicable, such as Section 13 (restrictions on import and export of certain currency and bullion), Section 18(1)(a) (payment for exported goods), Section 18A (prohibition to take or send any goods except with the general or special permission of the Reserve Bank), Section 19(1)(a) (taking or sending any security without the permission of the Reserve Bank), Section 44(2) (punishment for discharging duty in good faith), Sections 57 (the penalty for contravention of an order made by adjudicating officer, Appellate Board and High Court) and Section 58 (vexatious search etc. by Enforcement Officer). Apart from these Sections, if a person contravenes any provisions of this Act, after conviction by a court, he shall be punishable under Section 56.

Section 56(1)(i) provides punishment for an offence which is pecuniary in nature and exceeds rupees one lakh. In such a case, the person shall be punished with imprisonment for a minimum term of six months, which may extend to seven years, and a fine. The court may provide a sentence of less than six months if it thinks fit.

In other cases, Section 56(1)(ii) provides punishment of imprisonment extending up to three years or with a fine or with both fine and imprisonment.

As per Section 56(2), for the second and every subsequent offence under this Act, the person shall be punished with imprisonment for a minimum term of six months, which may extend to seven months, and a fine. The court may provide a sentence of less than six months if it thinks fit.

Under Section 56(3), in addition to the sentence imposed, the court that convicts a person under this Act may pass an order to not carry out a specified business, for a term of not more than three years, if it is found the business may enable the commission of such an offence.

Section 56(4) lays down the reasons which a court cannot use as grounds for providing a sentence of less than six months-

  • The accused has been convicted of an offence under this Act, for the first time.
  • The accused, in any proceedings under this Act (apart from a prosecution), has been ordered to pay a penalty, or if goods concerned with such proceedings have been ordered to be confiscated, or if for the same offence, any other penal action has been initiated against him.
  • The accused was not the primary offender and was merely a carrier of goods or a secondary party.
  • The age of the accused.

Further, Section 56(5) states that the fact that the offence is not detrimental to the general public or any individual is also not a valid ground for a court to provide a sentence of less than six months.

Arguments by the petitioner

The following were the arguments advanced by the petitioner before the Hon’ble Court.

Respondent was not justified in approaching the court of law

The counsel for the petitioner raised the contention, that since the petitioner was pursuing their legal remedies in the competent court of law, the respondent was not justified to lodge a complaint under Section 56(1)(ii) of the FERA, for an offence under Section 40(3) of the same. The counsel further submitted that the petitioner had approached the Supreme Court and filed special leave petitions challenging the issue of the summons under Section 40 of the FERA. Those were still pending before the learned Supreme Court and hence, the respondent was not justified in filing the above complaint. The counsel relied on Garikapati vs. Subbiah Choudhry (1957),  wherein the following principles emerged:

  • The legal pursuit of any remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal, are steps in a series of proceedings. They all are connected by an intrinsic unity and should be regarded as a single legal proceeding.
  • The right to appeal is a substantive right and not a mere procedural matter.
  • The beginning of a suit implies that the right to appeal that existed at that time, remains with the parties until the end of the suit.
  • The right to appeal is a vested right.
  • The vested right of appeal can only be taken away by a subsequent enactment.

The petitioner further submitted that he had invoked constitutional remedies by filing a writ petition, after receiving the first summons. The said writ petition was disposed of and the petitioner filed writ appeals before the Madras High Court. Subsequently, the writ appeals were also dismissed. Then the petitioner approached the Supreme Court. He filed a special leave petition under Article 133 of the Constitution (Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court from High Courts in regard to Civil matters), which was pending before the said Court. Under such circumstances, the respondent was not justified to lodge a complaint for not complying with the provisions of Section 40(3) of FERA. The initiation of the above-mentioned legal proceedings implies that the rights of the petitioner are protected until the proceedings attain finality. 

The petitioners also submitted that the right to appeal is a vested right, which can be exercised on any adverse order, while the right to enter a superior court is a substantive right available to a person. 

Non-compliance under Section 40(3) does not constitute an offence under Section 56(1)(ii) of the FERA

The next contention submitted by the petitioner’s counsel was that non-compliance of Section 40(3), does not constitute an offence under Section 56 of the FERA. Hence, neither the respondents are justified in filing complaints, nor the courts are justified in entertaining them and issuing summons to the petitioner. 

The first submission by the petitioner was that a plain reading of the provision of Section 40(3) states that the person who has been summoned, shall attend and will be bound to state the truth regarding the subject they are examined on and produce the required documents. Nowhere has it been stated that it would lead to prosecution under Section 56(1)(ii) of the FERA. Section 40(3) merely states that the person summoned shall attend to give a statement and produce the documents. It does not mention what the consequences would be if a person does not do so. Section 56(1)(ii) lays down a punishment of imprisonment for three years or a fine or both. On further reading of the Section, it is seen that the offence is measured on the basis of the amount of money involved in the contravention. This Section decides the quantum of punishment, on the basis of the pecuniary involvement and does not mention any punishment for contravening and not complying with Section 40(3) of the FERA. Taking this into consideration, non-compliance under Section 40(3), would not constitute an offence under Section 56

Non-compliance of summons issued by a Gazetted Officer is not an offence

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that in case of a summons issued by a Gazetted Officer of Enforcement, not attending, either in person or by authorised agent, is not an offence under Section 56. This Section of the FERA deals with offences which are pecuniary in nature. On the other hand, there is no mention of monetary value under Section 40(3) of the FERA. Hence, the courts are not justified in taking cognisance and subsequently issuing summons to the petitioner. 

The counsel for the petitioner relied on the judgement passed in the case of Itty vs. Assistant Director (1990), by a single judge bench in the Kerala High Court. The court in this case examined the meaning of the word “contravention”. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, when a person is summoned to appear before a competent authority, it means that the person has been directed to appear before him. Summons should be obeyed, but disobedience of summons is not a contravention. Rather, it is a matter which falls under Section 174 of the Indian Penal Code, which deals with non-attendance in obedience to an order from a public servant. The single judge bench held that it was a legal fallacy to state that non-compliance of summons under Section 40(1) is a contravention of any of the provisions of this Act. Section 56 of the Act mentions punishment with regard to the extent of monetary values. So to attract Section 56, it may not be possible to compute the offence in terms of monetary value. Hence, in such a case, Section 56 is not applicable to an offence under Section 40, because if it is held otherwise, the consequences may be serious and innocent persons will be harassed by vindictive officers.   

Definition of offence 

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that as per Section 3(38) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, “offence” refers to “any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force.” He further submitted a decision by the Allahabad High Court, namely, Raj Narain Singh vs. Atmaram Govind And Anr. (1953), which reiterated the definition of “offence” as given in the General Clauses Act, 1897.

Interpretation of ambiguous words

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that any ambiguity that arises while interpreting the provisions, should be resolved in favour of the person liable to the penalty. To support his contention, he relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Ishar Das vs. State Of Punjab (1972), where it was held that while construing a penal statute if any ambiguity or doubt arises, it should be resolved in favour of the person liable to the penalty, based on Interpretation of Statutes by Maxwell.

Furthermore, in the case of Nasiruddin vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal (1975), the Supreme Court observed that words should be interpreted in their ordinary sense if they are plain and unambiguous. A court cannot refuse to give effect to a statute, merely because its interpretation is unjust. Furthermore, in an Act, if a word can be interpreted in two ways, the courts should adopt the interpretation which is just, reasonable and sensible.

In the case of A.R. Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak & Anr (1988), the Supreme Court observed that while interpreting a Section, the court should read it as it is. It neither has the authority to rewrite a Section as it wants nor can it interpret the Section in any manner which renders it absurd.

FERA is not a self contained Act

The counsel for the petitioner submitted before the Court that the FERA is not a self-contained Act, since it contains no provisions to issue notice, application for granting bail, and mode of recording evidence. He relied on the Andhra Pradesh High Court’s decision in N.S.R. Krishna Prasad vs. Directorate Of Enforcement (1991), where the court decided that while recording statements of a person, the Enforcement Authorities should follow the procedure under Section 164 (recording of confessions and statements) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to show that the Act is not a self-contained Act. 

He also relied on Deepak Mahajan vs. Director of Enforcement And Another (1990) by the Delhi High Court, where it was observed that the Customs Act, 1962 does not lay down a specific procedure for customs or enforcement officers to procure an order from the Magistrate to detain someone they have arrested. While these officers hold the power to investigate crimes that are by a Magistrate, they have limited authority, like that of a police officer in charge of a police station, particularly the power to deny or grant bail. Their powers of arrest and detention are merely to enable inquiry under the Customs Act or the FERA. Along with this, the case of Directorate Of Enforcement vs. Deepak Mahajan (1994) by the Supreme Court of India, was also referred to, to show that the FERA is not a self-contained Act.

Binding effect of precedents

The counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the case was decided by the Court, not at the time of disposal, but at the stage of admission, without issuing notice to the other side. Hence, it is not binding on this Court. To substantiate his contention, he mentioned the decision of the Madras High Court in Abdul Malick vs. The Collector Of Dharmapuri And Ors (1968), where the single judge bench examined the binding force of precedents. In this case, during trial, the Board of Revenue relied on the observations of two judgements which this Court held to have no binding force as precedents because they were not rendered after hearing both sides. The single judge bench further elaborated that a judgement rendered without notice or without hearing a contesting party or in his/her absence, will not be considered as a precedent. In cases where petitions are dismissed at the admission stage, the respondent is absent and quite naturally gets no opportunity to present his/her case. So the observations made, will not be binding on the respondent and the said judgement cannot be considered as a precedent, since it was passed only after hearing one side. The judgement passed would be a judgement per incuriam.

Arguments by the respondent

The respondent filed a counter and denied all the allegations mentioned in the affidavits of the petitioner, except those which the respondent admitted specifically. The arguments made by the respondents were as follows.

When a party can be prevented from availing a legal remedy

The counsel for the respondent submitted before the Court that mere pendency of a matter does not prohibit a party from availing a legal remedy. A party can only be stopped from proceeding with an available legal remedy, if there is an order of stay or any order from the competent court, directing them to stop. He relied on a decision by the Supreme Court, namely, N. Rathinasabapathy vs. K. S. Palaniappa Kandar (1995). In this case, the respondents were given an injunction for three weeks. The appellants stopped the construction work as soon as the injunction order was communicated to them. After the three weeks ended, the appellants received no order of extension of the injunction and hence, they proceeded with the construction. The Supreme Court held that the appellants showed respect to the order by halting the construction as soon as they received the injunction order and proceeding with the construction as soon as the period expired.

FERA is a self-contained Act 

Counsel for the respondent submitted that the FERA is a self-contained Act. It does not need to refer to any other Act for any purpose, such as interpretation or procedural details. Hence, the non-compliance of Section 40(3) by the petitioner, is punishable under Section 56 of the FERA. 

The counsel further submitted that Section 40 of the FERA is an important Section of the Act and if a person does not comply with the provisions of this Section, investigation proceedings stop at an initial stage and the provisions of the Act become void. Keeping the scope and view of the Section in mind, any contravention under Section 40 becomes punishable under Section 56(1)(ii) of the FERA. The counsel relied on the decision in Central Bureau of Investigation vs. State Of Rajasthan and Ors (1996).

Non-compliance of Section 40(3) constitutes an offence under Section 56(1)(ii) of the FERA

Counsel for the respondent submitted that non-compliance with Section 40(3) is an offence under Section 56(1)(ii) and therefore, the respondent was justified in filing the complaints and the Court was justified in entertaining the complaints filed. He pointed out that in the decision of Itty vs. Assistant Director (1990), by the Kerala High Court, which was relied on by the counsel of the petitioner, the court did not consider the provisions of Section 56(1)(ii). 

According to his submissions, although the decision in an unreported case M. P. Jain vs. The Assistant Director in Crl. O.P. No. 312 of 1992 of the Madras High Court, was rendered at the admission stage, the facts fully cover the present case. Section 56(1)(ii) should refer to matters under the provisions of Section 40, as well as other provisions of this Act. If a person contravenes any provisions of this Act, he shall be liable for punishment.

The counsel submitted that rather than the decision of the Kerala High Court referred to by the counsel for the petitioner, the Court should follow the decision of this Court. The counsel also submitted that the decision of the Kerala High Court is not binding upon this Court, but the decision of this Court is binding upon itself.

Order of the court

Final order

Based on the reasonings discussed below, the Hon’ble Court ordered the following:

  • The criminal original petitions would be allowed. 
  • The pending proceedings in C.C. Nos. 60 of 1996 and 61 of 1996 on the file of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (E.O.-I) Egmore and Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (E.O.-II), Egmore, Madras-8, would be quashed.

Rationale behind the order

Whether the proceeding is maintainable

The Court also examined whether the petitioner could use the legal remedies availed by him (writs, writ appeals, special leave petitions etc filed by them), as a ground to support his stand. Furthermore, he had also invoked the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court reasoned that the legal remedies availed by the petitioner, are self-serving factors and they are subject to proof. They should be determined on the basis of evidence at the time of trial. The petitioner cannot use that as the ground to support their stand for non-compliance of summons.

The Court has also accepted the submission of the respondent in this regard. According to the respondent, the courts can exercise their inherent powers only in the rarest of rare cases. The Court may not exercise its inherent powers in this case, since the complaints have been filed before the Economic Offences Court and these involve taking evidence and trial before the said court. 

The Hon’ble Court held that there was no order of stay in the special leave petitions filed in the Supreme Court and those are merely pending. Hence, there is no ground for the first contention of the counsel of the petitioner. The Hon’ble Court rejected the first contention of the petitioner’s counsel.

Analysis of the provisions of Section 40 and Section 56 of the FERA

To analyse the rival contentions put forth by the parties, the Court first examined the provisions of Sections 40 and 56 of the FERA.

The Court analysed that Section 40 of the FERA deals with the power of any Gazetted Officer of Enforcement to summon persons to give evidence and to produce necessary documents. However, the Section does not mention what the consequence would be if a person does not comply with the summons. On the other hand, Section 56 of the Act deals with offences and their prosecutions. Section 56(1)(i) states that without prejudicing a penalty awarded by an adjudicating officer, a person contravening any provisions of this Act, shall be punishable with a term of imprisonment for a minimum of six months to a maximum of seven years, if the offence involves an amount exceeding rupees one lakh. From the provisions of Section 56(1)(i), it becomes clear that this Section mentions offences with reference to a particular monetary value. The Court reasoned that to attract Section 56(1)(ii) of the FERA, it may not be possible to compute the offences committed by the petitioner with respect to monetary value or amount.

The Court then analysed the provisions from the perspective of the respondent’s stance. Section 56(1)(ii) states that in any other case, the accused, on conviction by the Court, shall be punishable with imprisonment up to three years or with a fine or with both imprisonment and fine. The single judge bench reasoned that the phrase “in any other case” should be read in consonance with the provision of Section 56(1)(i) of the FERA. Section 56(1)(i) deals with the prosecution of an offence involving more than rupees one lakh. Hence, the phrase “in any other case” in Section 56(1)(ii) refers to offences wherein the value involved is less than one lakh. Therefore, both the provisions compute offences with respect to monetary value.

Based on the above reasoning, the learned Judge held that the entire Section 56 of the FERA is identified and substantiated, with respect to monetary value or the amount involved in the offence. Hence, the Court rejected the submission of the counsel for the respondent, who submitted that “in any other case” refers to cases which come under the purview of this Act irrespective of the amount of money involved. The Court also rejected the submission of the counsel for the respondent, wherein he stated that offences committed under Section 40(3) of the Act will come under the purview of Section 56(1)(ii) of the FERA.

Whether an offence under Section 40(3) constitutes an offence under Section 56(1)(ii) of the FERA 

It was observed that the non-compliance of summons by the petitioner, is a contravention under the meaning of the Act and the only Section that mentions its punishment is Section 56.

Section 56 of the FERA specifically deals with punishment. Other Sections of the FERA deal with the offences and powers of the enforcement officers. Therefore, for contravention of any provisions of the Act, Section 56 of the FERA should be attracted. 

Non-compliance with the summons sent means the non-compliance of any direction/ order/ rule/ condition under Section 40 of the FERA, but as far as Section 56 is concerned, the non-compliance should not be measured with respect to a pecuniary extent.

While the FERA provides the effect of contravention under the Act in many provisions, the Act does not provide punishments in every Section. Hence, only Section 56 provides punishments under the FERA.

The Court held that the contention of the petitioner, that Section 56 can only be invoked if there is a monetary contravention, is not correct. It was further held by the Court that the petitioner cannot interpret the Section to suit his convenience.

The Court fully agreed with the decision of the Kerala High Court in Itty vs. Assistant Director (1990), where it was held that an offence committed under Section 40 of the Act does not attract Section 56, since Section 56 computes prosecution of offences with respect to monetary value. Accepting the submission by the counsel of the petitioner, the Court held that the unreported judgement of  M. P. Jain vs. The Assistant Director in Crl. O.P. No. 312 of 1992 of the Madras High Court, cited by the counsel for the respondent, has no binding force upon this court since as held by the decision of Abdul Malick vs. The Collector Of Dharmapuri And Ors (1968), this judgement was rendered at the admission stage without issuing notice to the opposite party.

Finally, the Court held that contravening the provisions of Section 40 of the FERA was not an offence which attracts Section 56 of the said Act.

Critical analysis of Sampath Kumar vs. Enforcement Officer Madras 

Sampath Kumar vs. Enforcement Officer of Madras on 1st August, 1997, dealt with the issue of whether a violation of Section 40(3) is an offence under Section 56(1)(ii) of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1973 by considering the nature and characteristics of Section 56. The key observation, which aided in deciding this matter, was that Section 56 of the FERA identifies offences with respect to the monetary value or amount. If an offence cannot be computed into monetary value, the offence will not come under the purview of Section 56. The phrase “in any other case” mentioned in Section 56(1)(ii) should be read in consonance with Section 56(1)(i) of the Act. Hence, the only offences triable under this Section should be financial offences and not any other offences. Hence, contravention of any other Sections will not attract Section 56 if no monetary amount or value is involved.

This case highlighted the importance of complying with summons issued under the FERA. However, the High Court of Madras clarified that non-compliance with Section 40(3), does not constitute an offence under Section 56(1)(ii). The Court’s observations and the order passed in this case, also re-establishes the authority of the Enforcement Officer, while ensuring that the process of investigation is not compromised or obstructed, and hence, encouraging economic development and the regulation of foreign exchange in the country.

Impact of the case

Although a single judge bench order, the case has been cited in numerous decisions, even in the Supreme Court. In the case of Enforcement Directorate And Anr vs. M. Samba Siva Rao & Ors (2000), a division bench of the Supreme Court cited this decision in their judgement to consider the issue of whether any violation or contravention of summons under Section 40 should be punishable under Section 56 of the FERA. In the case of The Enforcement Officer vs. Mohammed Akram (2017), Justice Nageswara Rao of the Supreme Court, cited this case for the same reason.

Conclusion

The case of Sampath Kumar vs. Enforcement Officer Madras on 1st August, 1997 is an important case with respect to a specific question of law under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. It deals with the core question of whether the contravention of summons under Section 40(3) would constitute an offence under Section 56(1)(ii) of the FERA. The decision made in this case has brought great clarity with respect to the basic aspects of this Act, which enables smoother regulation of foreign exchange in India. 

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

What is a special leave petition (SLP)?

A special leave petition refers to a special sect of appeals, which may skip the general hierarchy of courts prescribed. The Supreme Court of India grants a special leave to an aggrieved party, to appeal against any judgement or order of any courts or tribunals in India, except any courts or tribunals related to the military and court martial. Article 136 of the Constitution of India provides the Supreme Court with the discretionary power to grant a special leave petition.

With respect to a judgement of a High Court, a special leave petition against the same should be filed within 90 days from the date of passing of the judgement. In case the High Court has refused to grant a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court, a special leave petition should be filed within 60 days.

To gain a detailed understanding of special leave petitions, click here.

What are vested rights?

Vested rights are unconditional and independent rights. Vested rights cannot be taken away from a person without his/her permission.

For example, the right to appeal is a vested right. It can only be taken away by retrospectively amending a statute, which confers the right to appeal. This was held in the case of Ganesh Singh And Anr. vs. Bishram Singh And Ors. (2003).

What is Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973?

Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 deals with the inherent powers of the High Court. Under this Section, the High Court can give effect to any order, to prevent procedural abuse by the courts, as well as to secure ends of justice.

What is a self-contained Act?

Self-contained Acts are those Acts which are complete in themselves. They do not require the help of the provisions of other Acts for any procedural purpose or for their interpretation.

How is “foreign exchange” defined under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973?

Section 2(h) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 states that foreign exchange means foreign currency. Section 2(h)(i) includes all deposits, credits and balances payable in foreign currency. Furthermore, under this Act, foreign currency also includes drafts, traveller’s cheques, letters of credit and bills of exchange, which have been drawn in Indian currency, but are payable in any foreign currency. Section 2(h)(ii) of the Act also includes any instrument payable between the drawee and the holder, either in Indian currency or any foreign currency or partly with both.

References

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Motor Vehicle Act, 1988

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This article is written by Michael Shriney from the Sathyabama Institute of Science and Technology and has been further updated by Sakshi Kuthari. The article gives an outline of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. It discusses in detail the essential aspects, offences, amendments, claims tribunal and compensation. The changes done by the legislature  in the (Amendment) Act, 2019 are also included. Some provisions have been completely repealed and some have been added or  varied from the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 . It also includes the Supreme Court judgements, information on the Central Motor Vehicle Act of 2019, and Motor Vehicle Rules of 1989 and 2022.

Table of Contents

Introduction 

The Motor Vehicle Act of 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1988) regulates all the essential components of road transport vehicles. It took effect on July 1, 1989, covering various laws relating to traffic laws, vehicle insurance, motor vehicle registration, controlling permits, and penalties. For the purpose of ensuring and enhancing road safety, the Government of India, in consultation with the State Transport Ministers, came up with this Motor Vehicle (Amendment) Bill, 2017 to make amendments to the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. This Bill was introduced by the Minister for Road Transport and Highways, Mr. Nitin Gadkari, on 15 July, 2019. It dealt with the issuance of licences and permits related to motor vehicles, established standards for motor vehicles, and imposed penalties for violations of these provisions. The Bill became law after receiving the President’s assent on 01 September, 2019. 

There is a mandate under Section 3 of the Act of 1988 that all drivers must have a valid driving licence, and no vehicle can be driven unless it is registered under the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. The Preamble of the Act aims to integrate and update motor vehicle legislation, requiring all drivers and conductors to obtain a licence and then drive a vehicle. Section 41(7) of the  Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 2019) provides that a vehicle’s registration certificate is valid for a time period of fifteen years from the date of registration and can be renewed. 

This article gives an outline of the Act of 1988, it’s important amendments, relevant and recent Supreme Court judgements, the New Amendment Act and Rules, important provisions of the Act, penalties under the Motor Vehicle Act and the differences between the Act of 1988 and the  Act of  2019. Let us discuss each aspect of this Act in detail below:

An overview of Motor Vehicle Act, 1988

The Motor Vehicle Act comes within the ambit of the law of torts. The law of torts is based on the Latin maxim ubi jus, ibi-remedium, i.e., where there is a right, there is a remedy. This maxim brings into play the concepts of damage and compensation. At this point, the idea of compensating and giving damages comes into action. The Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, is considered a law of welfare aiming to provide relief to those injured in an accident. While the Motor Vehicle Act of 1939 initially consolidated all motor vehicle legislations, it required frequent amendments to stay updated. With the progression of advancements in road transport technology, the expansion of the road network, and changes in passenger transport patterns, a comprehensive revision of the Act became necessary to address new developments related to motor vehicles and its rules and regulations.

The main objective of the Act of 1988 is to provide relief to innocent road users who often, through no fault of their own, become victims of accidents and struggle to receive the compensation they deserve. Under this Act, beyond the laws relating to licensing and registration, various other aspects of road transport vehicles are also covered. 

Motor insurance is one of the most important mandatory laws. The motor vehicle should at least have third-party insurance in order to register and drive a vehicle on Indian roads. The Act of 2019 introduces stricter penalties for driving a vehicle without a licence, including a fine of Rupees Two Thousand, three months of imprisonment, and community service for first-time offenders, and a fine of Rupees Four Thousand for repeated offenders. 

Objectives of Motor Vehicle Act, 1988

The Act of 1988 was passed for the purpose of solving the most prominent issues mentioned below: 

  • Implementing strict procedures for issuing licences and determining their validity period;
  • Ensuring road safety by regulating the transportation of hazardous and explosive materials and enforcing pollution control measures;
  • Manage the rapid increase in the number of personal and commercial vehicles in the country;
  • Increase the amount of compensation available to the victims of hit-and-run accidents;
  • Remove the time limit for traffic accident victims to file compensation claims.

Offences covered under the Act

The original Motor Vehicle Act covers the following offences:

  • Driving a vehicle without a licence;
  • Vehicle owner allowing a person to drive a motor vehicle not possessing a driving licence; 
  • Failing to carry all necessary documentation required to drive a motor vehicle on Indian roads; 
  • Driving without a permit when required, 
  • Driving without a vehicle fitness certificate;
  • Driving without a registration certificate (R.C.);
  • Minor driving a motor vehicle, 
  • Permitting an unauthorised individual to drive a motor vehicle,
  • Driving a motor vehicle without a helmet, 
  • Driving without fastening the seat belt of the driver seat; 
  • Exceeding the prescribed speed limit and involving in rash driving; 
  • Risky driving; 
  • Driving against the flow of traffic in a one-way lane; and 
  • Other violations that are considered as offences under the Act.

Important Sections of Motor Vehicle Act, 1988

The following are some of the most important provisions of the Act of 1988:

Essential requirement of a driving licence

Section 3 of the Act of 1988 addresses the necessity of carrying a driving licence. It states that-

  • A person cannot drive a vehicle in a public place until and unless they possess a valid and authorised driving licence. Additionally, they are not permitted to operate any transport vehicle, except for a motor-taxi or a motor bike for personal use or rental under any scheme, unless their driving licence specifically authorised them to do so.
  • These requirements apply to an individual who operates a motor vehicle in India unless specified by the Central Government.

Age restrictions related to driving of motor vehicles

Section 4 of the Act of 1988 deals with the age limitations for driving motor vehicles. It states that-

  • No individual below the age of 18 years is allowed to operate a motor vehicle in public. However, any individual who reaches the age of 16 years or older is allowed to drive a motor vehicle with an engine capacity of less than 50cc.
  • No individual under the age of 20 years is allowed to drive a public transportation vehicle.
  • No individual shall be granted a learner’s or permanent driving licence for a specific class of motor vehicle unless they meet the requisite qualifications to drive that class of vehicle.

Responsibility of motor vehicle owners for violations of Sections 3 and 4

Under Section 5 of the Act of 1988, it is provided that no owner or person in charge of a motor vehicle shall allow anyone who does not meet the requirements of sections 3 or 4 to drive the motor vehicle.

Restrictions on holding driving licences

Section 6(1) of the Act of 1988 provides that no individual shall hold a driving licence while a valid licence is in effect, except for a learner’s licence. 

Section 6(2) of the said Act provides that the holder of a driving licence or learner’s licence shall not allow it to be used by anyone else.

Section 6(3) of the said Act provides that nothing in this section shall prevent a licensing authority, as specified in subsection (1) of Section 9 of the said Act, from expanding the classes of vehicles that the driving licence permits the holder to drive.

Restriction on issuing learner’s licence for certain types of vehicles

Section 7(1) of the Act of 1988 provides that no individual shall be granted a learner’s licence to drive a transport vehicle unless they have held a driving licence for a light motor vehicle for at least a period of one year. This subsection shall not apply to e-carts or e-rickshaws.

Section 7(2) of the said Act provides that no individual under the age of eighteen years shall be issued a learner’s licence to drive a motorcycle without gear unless they have written consent from their guardian.

Necessity for registration

Section 39 of the Act of 1988 provides the necessity for motor vehicle registration, stating that no person is allowed to drive a motor vehicle in a public place, and no owner should permit or allow the motor vehicle to be driven shall in a public place by another person, unless it is registered and the vehicle’s registration certificate of registration has not been suspended temporarily or cancelled permanently.

Where registration should be made

Under Section 40 of the Act of 1988, it is provided that, in accordance with the provisions of Sections 42, 43, and 60, it is the duty of every owner of a motor vehicle to register his or her vehicle. It is to be done by any registering authority in the State that has jurisdiction over their residence or place of business where the vehicle is primarily kept.

How registration should be made

Section 41(1) of the Act of 1988 provides that an application for the registration of a motor vehicle should be submitted by or on behalf of the owner. It must be in the prescribed form and include the required documents, details, and information within the timeframe set by the Central Government. 

First proviso of this subsection provides that in cases where a motor vehicle is owned jointly by several people, the application must be submitted by any one co-owner on behalf of all, and that individual will be regarded as the owner for the purposes of the said Act.

The second proviso provides that if there is a new motor vehicle, the registration application must be submitted by the dealer if the vehicle is being registered in the same State where the dealer is located.

Section 41(2) provides that, along with the application of sub-section (1) of Section 41, the prescribed fees must be paid as set by the Central Government.

Certificate of registration: Section 41(3) provides that the registering authority shall issue a certificate of registration in the name of the owner, in a format and containing the details as prescribed by the Central Government.

Section 41(4) provides that in addition to the required details in the certificate of registration, it must also indicate the type of motor vehicle based on its design, construction, and use.

Section 41(5) provides that the registering authority shall record the details of the certificate mentioned in subsection (3) of Section 41. The register is maintained in the format and manner prescribed by the Central Government.

Registration mark: Section 41(6) provides that the registering authority shall assign a distinguishing mark to the vehicle, referred to in the said Act as the registration mark. This mark shall have a set of letters and will be followed by specific letters and numbers allocated to the State by the Central Government through notifications in the Official Gazette. The registration mark must be displayed on the motor vehicle in the format and manner prescribed by the Central Government. The proviso to this subsection provides that for a new motor vehicle, for which registration is applied under the second proviso to subsection (1), the vehicle shall not be delivered to the owner until the registration mark is displayed in the prescribed format and manner.

Validity of certificate of registration: Section 41(7) provides that a certificate of registration issued under subsection (3) of Section 41, whether before or after the commencement of the said Act, for a motor vehicle shall be valid for a period of fifteen years from the date of issue of the registration certificate, subject to the provisions of this Act. The registration certificate may be renewed for such a duration as prescribed by the Central Government.

Renewal of certificate: Section 41(8) provides that an application for the renewal of a certificate of registration, submitted by or on behalf of the vehicle owner, must be made within the prescribed time limit and in the prescribed format, including the required details and information as set by the Central Government.

Section 41(9) of the said Act provides that application of registration certificate must also be accompanied by a fee determined by the Central Government.

Section 41(10) of the said Act provides that, subject to the provisions of Section 56 of the said Act (Certificate of fitness for transport vehicles), the registering authority may renew the certificate of registration upon receiving an application under subsection (8) of Section 41 for a duration as prescribed by the Central Government and shall notify the original registering authority if it is not the original authority. The Central Government has the authority to set different renewal periods for various types of motor vehicles.

Section 41(14) of the said Act provides that an application for a duplicate certificate of registration must be submitted to the last registering authority in the prescribed format, including the necessary details and information, along with the fee prescribed by the Central Government.

Necessity for permits

Section 66 of the Act of 1988 provides for the necessity for permits. It states that- 

  • The owner of a transport vehicle cannot operate it in any public area unless it is authorised and covered by a valid permit.
  • Exceptions include transport vehicles owned by the Central or State Government, local authorities, ambulances, fire brigade vehicles, police vehicles, hearses, and those with a registered loaded weight of not more than 3000 kg.
  • Additionally, it is mandatory for every educational institution to have a bus permit. This permit is granted by the State Governments with various terms and conditions. The buses need to go through the mandatory fitness test because, without it, the bus permit could not be renewed. 

Speed limitation

Section 112 of the Act of 1988 deals with speed limitations for driving a motor vehicle. It states that-

  • No person shall drive or allow a motor vehicle to be driven in any public place at a speed exceeding the maximum or falling below the minimum speed limit set for any motor vehicle under the said Act;
  • No one is allowed to drive at high speed that exceeds the maximum speed limit set for any motor vehicle;
  • The state government or other authorities may impose speed restrictions for public safety or convenience due to the nature of the road, bridge, or other suitable locations. These restrictions are valid for a time period of one month and no longer.

Weight limitations and usage limitations

Section 113 of the Act of 1988 provides for weight limits and restrictions on usages. It states that-

  • The State Government may define the conditions under which permits are issued by State or Regional Transport Authorities. It further provides that overloaded vehicles must be either prohibited or restricted in specific regions or routes;
  • It is mandatory for vehicles to be equipped with pneumatic tyres;
  • No person is allowed to operate a motor vehicle or trailer in any public place under the following conditions:
    • An unladen weight (i.e., not carrying a load) that exceeds the weight specified on the certificate of registration, or 
    • A laden weight (i.e., carries load) that exceeds the gross weight specified on the certificate of registration.
  • If a driver or any individual other than the owner operates a motor vehicle exceeding the specified weight limits, the court may presume that the offence was committed with the knowledge or direction of the vehicle’s owner.

Safety measures for drivers and passengers

Section 128 of the Act of 1988 provides that no driver of a two wheeler motorcycle shall carry more than one additional person. The additional person must be seated on a properly secured seat behind the seat of the driver and should be equipped with appropriate safety measures.

Use of protective headgear

Section 129 of the Act of 1988 deals with the necessity of wearing head protection. It states that every driver must wear a helmet while driving a motor vehicle in a public place. A helmet is designed to protect against injuries in case of an accident and is securely fastened to the wearer’s head using straps or other fastenings provided on the helmet. The provision of this section does not apply to a Sikh individual who is wearing a turban while driving or riding a motorcycle in a public place. Also, the Central Government may establish rules to ensure the safety of children under four years of age who are riding or being carried on a motorcycle.

Obligation to produce a licence and registration certificate

Section 130 of the Act of 1988 imposes an obligation to present a driver’s licence and a registration certificate. It states that-

  • A police officer in uniform may request the driver of a motor vehicle in any public location to present their driving licence;
  • A police officer in uniform or an officer from the motor vehicle department may request the conductor of a motor vehicle in any public place to present their driving licence;
  • The registering authority or any other authorised official of the motor vehicle department may legally require the owner or person in charge of the vehicle to provide insurance for the vehicle and the fitness certificate as per Section 56.
  • If the driver fails to produce these documents within fifteen days of the request,  they must submit attested photocopies in person or by registered post to the officer who made the request.

Responsibility of the driver when an accident causes injury to a person

Section 134(1) of the Act of 1988 provides that when a person is injured or third party property is damaged because of an accident involving a motor vehicle, the driver (owner of the vehicle) or other individual in charge of the vehicle must do the following:

  1. If it is impractical due to mob violence or any other uncontrollable circumstances, the driver must take all reasonable steps to obtain medical attention for the injured person. It includes transporting them to the nearest medical practitioner or hospital. It shall be the duty of every registered medical practitioner or of the attending doctor at the hospital to promptly provide medical aid or treatment without waiting for any procedural formalities;
  2. He/she shall provide any information requested by a police officer, and if the police officer is not present there, report the details of the incident, including any reasons for not taking reasonable steps to secure medical attention as specified in clause (a), to the nearest police station at the earliest, and in any case within twenty-four hours of the incident.
  3. He/she shall provide the following information in writing to the insurer that issued the insurance certificates regarding the accident:
  1. insurance policy number and its validity period;
  2. date, time, and location of the accident;
  3. details of the individuals injured or killed in the accident;
  4. name of the driver and details of their driving licence.

Inspection of vehicle involved in the accident

Section 136 of the Act of 1988 provides that when an accident takes place involving a motor vehicle, any person authorised by the State Government may, upon presentation of their authority if requested, inspect the motor vehicle. For this purpose of inspection, they may enter any premises where the vehicle is located at a reasonable time and may remove the vehicle for examination. However, the owner of the vehicle must be informed of the location to which the vehicle is taken, and the vehicle shall be returned to the owner, driver, or person in charge within twenty-four hours after the necessary formalities have taken place.

Liability for compensation in specific situations based on the principle of no-fault

Section 140 of the Act of 1988 mandated compensation under specific circumstances based on the no-fault principle. Please note that, by the Amendment of 2019, this Section has now been omitted. Under this Section, the following was provided:

  • It grants compensation to the aggrieved person if the vehicle itself, its owner, or the driver of such vehicle causes the death or permanent disability of the aggrieved party. In cases of death or permanent disability resulting from a motor vehicle accident, liability is determined under the ‘no-fault principle’;
  • The amount of compensation to be paid to the aggrieved party under this section was as follows:
    • In case of an accident resulting in the death of an aggrieved person, a fixed amount of compensation of Rs.50,000/- is payable; and 
    • In case an accident resulting in the permanent disability of an aggrieved person, a fixed amount of compensation of Rs. 25,000/- is payable.
  • It was emphasised that compensation under this section is not contingent upon proving fault, negligence, or default by the claimant, heir or representative. The principle of no-fault liability governs these compensations;
  • If the victim remained unaffected by the accident, the owner of the motor vehicle was liable to compensate according to this Act and any other applicable laws at the time the incident took place.

Refund in cases of compensation paid under Section 161 of the Act of 1988

Section 163(1) of the Act of 1988 provides that the payment of compensation for death of, or serious injury to, any person under Section 161 of the said Act is conditioned on the understanding that if any other compensation or amount is awarded or paid for such death or injury, then the portion of the other compensation equal to the amount paid under Section 161 shall be given as a refund back to the insurer.

Section 163(2) provides that before awarding the amount of compensation for an accident causing death or bodily injury due to the use of a motor vehicle, the Claims Tribunal, or the Court, or other relevant authority must verify whether compensation has already been paid under Section 161 or if an application for compensation is pending under that section. The Tribunal, or the Court, or authority shall do the following:

  1. If the amount of compensation has already been paid under Section 161, instruct the person liable to pay the compensation awarded to refund the appropriate amount to the insurer, as required by subsection (1);
  2. If an application for compensation is pending under Section 161, forward the details of the awarded compensation to the insurer. 

Special provisions relating to compensation payments based on structured formula

Section 163A of the Act of 1988 prescribes the laws for granting compensation payments through a structured formula, which states that-

  • The insured owner of the motor vehicle under an authorised insurer has a duty to compensate the legal heirs or the victim in case of death or permanent disability resulting from an accident involving the operation of the motor vehicle.
  • The claimant does not have the burden to prove or argue that the death or permanent disability, for which the claim is being made, was due to any unlawful conduct, negligence, or failure on the part of the vehicle owner, the vehicle itself, or any other person involved.

Application for compensation

Section 166 of the Act of 1988 describes the procedure for payment of compensation. It states that:

  • An application for compensation can be filed to the Motor Accident Claim Tribunal by:
    • An injured person; or
    • The owner of the property damaged or involved in the accident; or
    • The legal representative of the deceased person who died in a road accident; or 
    • An authorised agent representing the injured person; or 
    • The legal representatives of the deceased person who died in the accident.
  • The application for compensation shall be submitted on behalf of all legal representatives of the deceased person.

Claims Tribunals

Section 165(1) of the Act of 1988 provides that a State Government may, through a notification in the Official Gazette, establish one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals for a specified area to adjudicate claims for compensation related to accidents resulting in death or bodily injury to individuals caused by the use of motor vehicles and for damages to third-party property arising from such accidents, or both.

Explanation to this subsection provides that the term “claims for compensation in relation to accidents resulting in death or bodily injury to individuals arising from the use of motor vehicles” includes claims for compensation under Section 164.

Section 165(2) of the Act of 1988 provides that a Claims Tribunal shall have as many members as the State Government deems appropriate to appoint. If the Claims Tribunal consists of two or more members, one of them shall be designated as the Chairman.

Section 165(3) of the Act of 1988 provides qualification for appointment as a member of a Claims Tribunal. No person shall be competent to be a member of the Claims Tribunal unless they:

  1. are or have been a Judge of a High Court, or
  2. are or have been a District Judge, or
  3. are qualified for appointment as a High Court Judge or District Judge.

Section 165(4) of the Act of 1988 provides that if multiple Claims Tribunals are established in a given area, the State Government may, through a general or special order, manage the allocation of business among them.

General provisions for punishment of offences

Section 177 of the Act of 1988 provides that a penalty of Rs.500/- is imposed on any person for the first time for violating the rules, regulations, or notifications under the said Act. For the second or subsequent time, the amount of penalty increases to Rs. 1000 and Rs. 500/-.

Penalties for travelling without a pass and for the conductor’s failure to perform their duties

It is provided under Section 178(1) of the Act of 1988 that any person who travels on a stage carriage without a valid pass or ticket, or who fails or refuses to present or surrender their pass or ticket for inspection upon request, shall be liable to a fine of up to five hundred rupees. The terms ‘pass’ and ‘ticket’ shall have the same meaning as defined under Section 124 of the said Act.

Section 178(2) provides that the conductor of a stage carriage, or the driver acting as a conductor, has the following duties:

(a) supply a ticket to a passenger upon payment of the fare and if he either willfully or negligently:

  1. fails or refuses to accept the fare when offered, or
  2. fails or refuses to provide a ticket, or
  3. issues an invalid ticket, or
  4. issues a ticket of lesser value, or

(b) check any pass or ticket, and either willfully or negligently fail to do so, they shall be subject to a fine of up to five hundred rupees.

Section 178(3) of the said Act provides that if the holder of a permit or the driver of a contract carriage refuses to operate the vehicle or transport passengers in violation of the said Act, or the rules made under it, they shall be subject to:

  1. a fine of up to fifty rupees for two-wheeled or three-wheeled motor vehicles; and
  2. a fine of up to five hundred rupees for all other vehicles.

Disobedience of orders, obstruction and refusal of information

Section 179 of the Act of 1988 addresses disobedience of orders, obstruction, and refusal of information, stating that-

  • In case of absence of any other specified penalty for the offence, any person who intentionally disobeys the directions given by any person or authority under the said Act, or obstructs or hinders any person or authority having the authority to carry out the duties under this Act, shall be liable to pay a fine that may extend up to Rs. 2000
  • In case of absence of any other specified penalty for the offence, any person who, under the said Act, is required to provide information and purposely withholds such information, or provides information that they know to be not true or do not believe to be true, shall be punished with an imprisonment for up to one month, or a fine of Rs. 2000, or both.

Driving vehicles in violation of Section 3 and 4 of the Act of 1988

Section 181 of the Act of 1988 provides for driving a motor vehicle under the requirement for a driving licence and the age restriction related to driving a motor vehicle. It  states that:

  • Any person who drives a motor vehicle without a licence as prescribed under Section 3 of the act; or
  • Any person who drives a motor vehicle while under the age restriction prescribed under Section 4 of the Act;

are subject to imprisonment for a maximum period of three months or a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, or both.

Driving at high speed, etc.

Section 183 of the Act of 1988 describes punishment for driving a motor vehicle at high speed. Sub-section (1) of Section 183 provides that who drives or allows to drive a motor vehicle in violation of the speed limits specified in Section 112 of the said Act (Speed limit) shall face penalties as follows:

  1. In case of light motor vehicles, a fine of not less than one thousand rupees and up to two thousand rupees;
  2. In case of medium goods vehicles, medium passenger vehicles, heavy goods vehicles, or heavy passenger vehicles, a fine of not less than two thousand rupees and up to four thousand rupees; and
  3. For the second or subsequent offence under this subsection, the driver’s licence shall be confiscated in accordance with subsection (4) of Section 206 of the said Act.

Section 183(3) of the said Act provides that no person shall be punished under the preceding subsection based solely on the testimony of one witness claiming that the individual was driving at a speed that was unlawful, unless that opinion is supported by an estimate obtained using a mechanical or electronic device.

Section 183(4) of the said Act provides for the publication of a timetable stating that a journey or part of a journey must be completed within a specific time. In case there is any directive to that effect, it shall be considered prima facie evidence that the person who issued the timetable or direction has committed an offence under subsection (1) if the court finds that completing the journey within that time would not be feasible without violating the speed limits set forth in Section 112 of the said Act.

Dangerous driving

Section 184 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, deals with instances of driving a motor vehicle dangerously. It states that-

  • Any person who drives a motor vehicle at a speed or in a manner dangerous to the public, considering all the circumstances, including the nature, condition, and use of the place where the vehicle is driven, as well as the amount of traffic present at that time; 
  • If such an offence occurs, the person shall be punished for the first time with imprisonment for six months or a fine that shall not be less than one thousand rupees and may extend up to five thousand rupees, or with both. For the second or subsequent time, if the same offence is committed within three years of the previous offence, then with an imprisonment of 2 years, a fine of 10,000 rupees or both.

Driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs

Section 185 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, pertains to drinking and driving or a person who is under influence of drugs. It states that:

  • Any person who drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle:
    • With alcohol concentration exceeding 30 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood as determined by a breathalyser test; or
    • While under the influence of a substance impairing their ability to control the vehicle. 
  • For the first offence, a person found driving inebriated or under the influence of narcotics faces imprisonment for 6 months, a fine of 10,000 rupees or with both. 
  • For subsequent offences committed within three years of the previous offence, the individual is liable to imprisonment for two years, a fine of 15,000 rupees, or both.

Motor Vehicle Act : amendments

On 1st September, 2019, the Motor Vehicle (Amendment) Act, 2019 came into force and completely replaced the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. While the Bill for its enforcement was introduced in the Parliament, it was kept in mind that an important change was made in the Act for enhancing road safety of the drivers as well as the pedestrians. For this  purpose, the traffic penalties were increased, protection was provided for good samaritans, making it an obligation upon the automobile companies to recall defective parts of the vehicle, holding the builders at fault if the quality of road infrastructure is not up to par, and holding the vehicle owners criminally accountable for any violation committed by a juvenile driver, etc.

Salient features of the Motor Vehicle (Amendment) Act, 2019

An amendment to the Act of 1988 was necessary to improve road safety in India. The following are the salient features of the new Motor Vehicle (Amendment) Act, 2019 (w.e.f. 09 August, 2019):

  • The said Act makes it mandatory to have an “Aadhar number” before getting a driving licence or for registering a vehicle in the territory of India;
  • There has been a significant increase in the amount of fine payable by an under-age driver, intoxicated driver, driving without a licence, reckless driving, over speeding, overloading, etc. It was also proposed by the Union that the amount of fines would increase each year by 10% in every financial year, i.e., on April 1 of every year;
  • The owner or guardian of the vehicle cannot be held solely liable for a traffic rule violation committed by a minor unless they fail to prove that the violation occurred without their knowledge or that they took reasonable measures to prevent it;
  • Under the said Act, the Union Government has been given the competence to recall any vehicle that could jeopardise the environment, road users, or other motorists. Once the vehicle is recalled, it is at the discretion of the recalled manufacturer to opt between the two:
  1. To compensate the buyers for the full cost of recalled vehicle; or
  2. To get the recalled vehicle replaced with a new one that has better or more enhanced similar specification than the earlier vehicle;
  • It has become a mandate now for the vehicles to compulsorily pass fitness inspection. This is done so that the quality of the vehicle being used to drive on the open road could be checked and decrease corruption in the transport industry. This directly covers the testing agencies and their requirements for vehicle testing and certification.
  • This Act also covers the benevolent persons who help the victims of road accidents and end up being the victims of harassment. For this purpose, the Act defines ‘samaritan’ as a person who offers help to a victim of a road accident, immediately after the accident takes place. The help offered by the ‘samaritan’ may be medical help or any other form of help as defined in the Act. It must be done in good faith, voluntarily and without any expectation of receiving any amount of compensation. This protects the ‘samaritan’ from any civil or criminal liability if any injury or demise of an accident victim takes place because of sheer negligence.
  • The Central Government has, under the said Act, established a National Road Safety Board. This Board has been established to advise the State Governments and the Federal Governments on all matters pertaining to traffic regulations and road safety. Every State Government shall have officials on Board.
  • This Act has made it incumbent upon the Central Government to create a Motor Vehicle Accident Fund to provide all users of Indian roads with a requirement to carry insurance. It is used for the following purposes, as mentioned below:
  1. Provide treatment to victims of accident in accordance with the golden hour system;
  2. In hit-and-run accidents, compensate the family of the victim of accident;
  3. In hit-and-run accidents, compensate the victim of the accident;
  4. Pay compensation to the individual as per the mandate of the Central Government.
  • Under this Act, for the victims of traffic accidents, the Golden Hour Care Plan has been established with cashless care. The term ‘golden hour’ means the time period of one hour from the moment the accident took place. It is the time duration in which the victim’s chances of survival are maximum if subjected to proper care and immediate medical treatment.
  • The Amendment of 2019 now covers the driver’s assistance and there is no limit on liability insurance amount. There has been a ten-fold increase in insurance compensation amount and the procedure to obtain the amount of insurance compensation claim has been simplified. It is the obligation of the companies to resolve the insurance claim within a period of one month after getting approval from the family of the victim. In the cases of fatal hit-and-run accidents, the minimum compensation for injuries is now Rupees Two Lakhs from Rupees Twenty-five thousand, and for serious injuries caused to the victim, the amount of compensation is now Rupees Fifty Thousand from Rupees Twelve Thousand Five Hundred.
  • A new term, ‘Taxi Aggregators’, is also included in the said Act. They are the intermediaries who make use of a digital platform to book rides, facilitating the connection between drivers and passengers. These intermediaries are provided with licences by their respective State Governments and must comply with the provisions of the Information and Technology Act, 2000.

Key provisions of the Motor Vehicle (Amendment) Act, 2019

The following Sections are the key provisions under the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019:

Settlement by the insurance company and procedure thereof

Section 149(1) of the said Act mandates that upon receiving information about an accident, whether from the claimant through an accident information report or by other means, the insurance company must appoint an officer to manage the claims related to the reported accident.

Section 149(2) of the said Act specifies that an officer appointed by the insurance company under the preceding subsection has the responsibility for processing the compensation claims and may present a settlement offer to the claimant before the Claims Tribunal. This must be completed within thirty days and in accordance with the procedures prescribed by the Central Government.

Section 149(3) of the said Act provides that, if the claimant to whom the offer is made under sub-section (2) of Section 149:

  1. Accepts the offer-
  1. The Claims Tribunal shall record the settlement, and the claim shall be presumed to have been settled by the consent of the claimant;
  2. Within a maximum period of thirty days after the consent is given by the claimant, the insurance company must make the payment.
  3. Rejecting the offer, a next date of hearing shall be fixed by the Claims Tribunal to decide the claim on merits of the case.

Submission of special certificates, licences, and permits in certain cases

Under Section 158(1) of the said Act, any person driving a motor vehicle in a public place must, upon request by a uniformed police officer authorised by the State Government, produce the following documents:

  1. Insurance Certificate;
  2. Registration Certificate;
  3. Certificate of pollution under control;
  4. Driving Licence;
  5. For a transport vehicle, under Section 56 of the said Act, the certificate of fitness and its permit;
  6. Under this Act, any certificate or exemption authorisation in relation to the use of the vehicle.

Section 158(2) provides that if an accident has been caused and death or bodily injury has occurred in the presence of a motor vehicle in a public place and the driver is not able to produce the requisite certificate, driving licence, and permit to a police officer at the time when the incident took place, it is necessary for the driver or the owner of the vehicle to produce these documents at the police station where the driver reports the incident under Section 134.

Section 158(3) provides that no person shall be convicted for offences under subsections (1) and (2) of Section 158 as a consequence of failing to produce the required certificate. This condition will be met only if the person presents the certificate at the police station specified by them to the requesting police officer, the police officer who was present at the site of the accident, or the officer-in-charge of the police station within a period of seven days from the date it was asked under sub-section (1) or from the date on which the accident took place.

Section 158(4) provides that it is an obligation of the owner of the motor vehicle to provide any information as requested by or on behalf of a police officer authorised by the State Government. This information is essential as it assists in verifying whether the motor vehicle was being driven in violation of Section 146 and whether the driver of the motor vehicle was obligated to furnish the certificate of insurance.

Section 158(5) defines the term “produce the certificate of insurance.” It means presenting the pertinent certificate of insurance for scrutiny or any other credible evidence demonstrating that the motor vehicle was not being driven contrary to the provisions of Section 146 of the said Act.

Information to be provided about the accident

Section 159 of the said Act requires that a police officer, when investigating an accident, must prepare a report aimed at facilitating the settlement of claims. The report format must adhere to the prescribed guidelines, including essential details, and be submitted to the Claims Tribunal and any other designated authority within a period of three months.

Golden hour scheme

Section 162(1) of the Act introduces the golden hour scheme, requiring general insurance companies operating in India to provide treatment to road accident victims during the critical golden hour period, as outlined in the provisions of the said Act, irrespective of the General Insurance Companies (Nationalisation) Act, 1972, or any other existing laws or legal documents.

Section 162(2) of the said Act mandates that the Central Government establish a scheme for the cashless treatment of victims of accidents during the golden hour, which may involve setting up a dedicated fund for this purpose.

Compensation payment in cases of death or grievous hurt, etc.

Under sub-section (1) of Section 164 a provision for payment of compensation in case of death or grievous hurt, etc. is provided. Notwithstanding any provisions in the Motor Vehicle (Amendment) Act, 2019, any other current law or any other law for the time being in force or any instrument having legal enforceability and validity, the owner of the motor vehicle or the authorised insurer shall be bound to pay the amount of compensation at the time of death or grievous hurt caused resulting from an accident involving the use of a motor vehicle. The amount of compensation payable shall be rupees five lakhs in case of death and rupees two lakh fifty thousand shall be payable in case of grievous injury, payable to the legal heirs of the deceased or the victims, as the case may be.

Sub-section (2) provides that at the time of claiming compensation under the preceding sub-section, the claimant is not required to plead or prove that the death caused or grievous injury incurred was due to any wrongful act, neglect, or default of the owner of the vehicle, the vehicle itself, or any other person.

Sub-section (3) specifies that the compensation amount payable under this Section will be reduced by any compensation that has already been paid to the claimant under another existing law for death caused or injury resulting from a motor vehicle accident.

Scheme for interim relief for claimants

Section 164A(1) makes a mandate upon the Central Government to establish schemes for providing interim relief to claimants seeking compensation under Chapter XI of the Motor Vehicle (Amendment) Act, 2019.

Section 164A(2) provides that the scheme established under sub-section (1) of Section 164A must outline the procedure for recovering disbursed funds from the owner of the motor vehicle in cases where the claim stems from the use of that motor vehicle, or from other specified sources as determined by the Central Government.

Motor Vehicle Accident Fund

The Central Government under Section 164B(1) of the said Act shall constitute a ‘Motor Vehicle Accident Fund’, which shall be credited with:

  1. The nature of payment notified and approved by the Central Government;
  2. Any grant or loan made to the Fund by the Central Government;
  3. The balance of the Fund created under the scheme framed under section 163, as it stood immediately before the commencement of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019; and 
  4. Any other source of income as prescribed by the Central Government.

Sub-section (2) of Section 164B provides that the ‘Motor Vehicle Accident Fund’ shall be established to provide compulsory insurance coverage to all road users within the Indian territory.

Sub-section (3) of Section 164B provides that the Fund established under this Section shall be used for the following purposes:

  1. To provide treatment to persons injured in road accidents according to the schemes framed by the Central Government under Section 162;
  2. To provide compensation to the legal representatives of the deceased who died in a hit-and-run motor accident according to the schemes framed under Section 161;
  3. To provide compensation to persons injured grievously in a hit-and-run accident according to the schemes framed under Section 161; and
  4. To provide compensation to such other persons as prescribed by the Central Government.

Sub-section (4) of Section 164B provides that in each case, the maximum liability amount shall be as prescribed by the Central Government.

Sub-section (5) of Section 164B provides that in all the cases provided in Section 165(B)(3)(a) of the said Act, when the amount of claim becomes payable, any amount that has been paid from this fund to a person shall be deducted from the claim received by that person from the insurance company.

Sub-section (6) of Section 164B provides that the Motor Vehicle Accident Fund shall be managed by an authority or agency specified by the Central Government, keeping in mind the following factors:

  1. The agency’s knowledge of insurance business;
  2. The agency’s capability to manage fund;
  3. Any other criteria as may be prescribed by the Central Government.

Sub-section (7) of Section 164B provides that the Central Government shall maintain proper books of accounts, relevant records and prepare an annual statement of account for the Motor Vehicle Accident Fund shall be prepared in the prescribed form. It shall be done in consultation with the Comptroller and Auditor General of India.

Sub-section (8) of Section 164B provides that the accounts of Motor Vehicles Accident Fund shall be audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India at specified time intervals.

Sub-section (9) of Section 164B provides that under this Act, the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, or any person appointed by them to audit the accounts of the Motor Vehicle Accident Fund, shall have the same rights, privileges, and authority as in the audit of government accounts. It also includes the right to demand the production of books, accounts, vouchers and other documents, as well as the right to inspect any of the authority’s offices.

Sub-section (10) of Section 164B provides that the accounts of the Motor Vehicle Accident Fund, as certified by the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India or any person appointed by them, along with the audit report, shall be forwarded annually to the Central Government. The Central Government shall then present these documents before both Houses of Parliament.

Sub-section (11) of Section 164B provides that any scheme formulated under Section 161(3) of the said Act, as it existed before the commencement of the Motor Vehicle (Amendment) Act, 2019, shall be terminated. All the rights and obligations arising from such schemes shall be fulfilled using these funds from the Motor Vehicle Accident Fund from the date of commencement of the Motor Vehicle (Amendment) Act, 2019, i.e., September 1, 2019.  

Motor Vehicle Amendment, 2020

The Motor Vehicle Act of 1988 underwent a substantial Amendment in 2020, effective from October 1, 2020. One notable change was that it allowed the drivers to keep a softcopy of their driver’s licence and other documents in their vehicle instead of carrying physical papers. It helped millions of people who use the roadways on a daily basis. This change was implemented by the Ministry of Road to ensure compliance with traffic regulations, promote digitalisation, and minimise unnecessary inconvenience to drivers by police officers.

Changes in the traffic rules under the Amendment of 2020

  • The Amendment of 2020 allows individuals to keep documents on their mobile devices, sparing them the burden of carrying physical copies. If requested by the police officer, drivers can now present soft copies of their driver’s licence and other related documents.
  • The documents of the motor vehicle will no longer undergo physical inspection. The authorities have the power to cancel a driver’s licence through an updated website.
  • The behaviour of the driver will be monitored and the identity of the police officer will be updated on the site as per the official announcement. The site will be regularly updated with information from every driver or vehicle inspection. Driver’s licence and registration certificates can be stored online on the government’s DigiLocker or m-Parivahan platforms.
  • On the government’s DigiLocker or m-Parivahan, driver’s licences and other papers, such as registration certificates, can be kept online.
  • To ensure drivers maintain focus, portable communication devices like cell phones can only be used for navigation. The Motor Vehicle Act of 1988 includes fines for traffic law violations, reducing the need for frequent checks and easing traffic congestion. Violators will receive an e-challan via the government’s digital platform.
  • After a driver’s licence is cancelled, offenders must report to Parivahan Sarathi website.

Recent Supreme Court judgements on Motor Vehicle Act, 1988

United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Sunil Kumar and Anr., (2017)

The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in this case that an insurer cannot raise any defence of negligence on the part of the victim as provided under Section 163A(2) of the Act of 1988 and is not entitled to file a claim for negligence. This landmark case interprets Section 163A of the said Act, which includes specific provisions for compensatory payments based on a structured formula. Below are the facts, issues, and the Court’s ruling in this case:

Facts of the case

  • In this case, the respondent filed a compensation claim under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, for injuries sustained in a traffic accident on November 20, 2006. 
  • Following the recording of evidence and hearing the parties, the tribunal issued a judgement dated August 16, 2011, awarding Rs. 3,50,000/- along with an interest at a rate of 7% per annum. 
  • Subsequently, the insurance company, dissatisfied with the ruling, appealed the decision, citing non-compliance with Section 170 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. The appeal was subsequently escalated to the Supreme Court for adjudication.

Issues involved

In a claim procedure under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicle Act, the issue arose in this case as to whether the insurer has the capability to raise a defence or plea of negligence?

Judgement of the case

The Court held that in cases under Section 163A of the Act of 1988, insurance companies cannot present a defence of negligence on behalf of the victim. Section 163A (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, specifically prohibits this practice. Therefore, the owner or insurance company will be liable for compensation and held the following:

  • Compensation under Section 163A is in the nature of a final award, and adjudication is made without the need for proof of negligence on the part of the driver or owner of the vehicles involved in the accident.
  • Section 163A (2) expressly states that it is not necessary for the claimant to prove fault. However, the abovementioned clause does not expressly rule out the possibility of an insurer’s defence based on the claimant’s carelessness. Nevertheless, permitting an insurer to employ such a defence under such circumstances would contradict the legislative intent behind Section 163A of the Act.

Mukund Dewangan vs. Oriental Insurance Company Limited (2017)

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in this case held that a driver holding a light motor vehicle licence can operate a transport vehicle without requiring an endorsement. Below are the facts, issues, and the court’s decision in this case:

Facts of the case

  • The licences issued in this case covered various vehicle categories, namely, light motor vehicles, medium goods vehicles, medium passenger motor vehicles, heavy goods vehicles, and heavy passenger motor vehicles.
  • To streamline the driver’s licence acquisition process, certain categories, including those mentioned above, were removed. A new category for transport vehicles was introduced following an amendment to the Motor Vehicle Act of 1989 on November 14, 1994.
  • Form No. 4 of the 1989 regulations, used for licence applications, initially listed four different categories. It was not until March 28, 2001, that Form No. 4 was amended to include the term “transport vehicle,” aligning with the 1994 Amendment to the Motor Vehicle Act of 1989.

Issues involved

  • Whether a driver holding a light motor vehicle licence needs an endorsement to operate a transport vehicle of the same class?

Judgement of the case

According to the Hon’ble Supreme Court it was held that if a driver holds a light motor vehicle licence and operates a transport vehicle of the same type, no additional endorsement is required.

Pappu Deo Yadav vs. Naresh Kumar and Ors. (2020)

The Hon’ble Supreme in this case held that accidents causing permanent disability, regardless of the percentage of disability, if a person becomes permanently incapacitated from continuing their previous profession, vocation, or business and their income-generating capacity has been affected adversely, future prospects shall be awarded.

Facts of the case

  • The appellant was travelling to Hapur by bus. The bus reached Sidakpur, where the driver of the offending bus overtook the bus in which the appellant was travelling. The offending bus was coming from the wrong side and dashed the appellant’s bus, scratching it. 
  • The incautious and careless act of the offending bus caused a dent in the bus where the appellant was seated and he suffered injuries.
  • The appellant asked for compensation claims against the vehicle owner, driver, and insurer. At the same time, he also applied for assessment of his disability while the case was ongoing before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal.
  • He applied for compensation under Sections 140 and 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. He claimed Rupees Fifty Lakhs with an interest of twelve percent per annum against the first respondent (the driver of the bus at the time of accident), the second respondent (the owner of the vehicle) and the third respondent (the insurer).
  • The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal rejected the appellant’s objection regarding its jurisdiction and held that the appellant had suffered injuries as a result of incautious and careless driving of the respondent.

Issues involved

  • Whether in case of permanent disablement caused due to a motor accident, the claimant can seek compensation beyond the future loss of income, amounts for future?
  • What is the extent of permanent disability?

Judgement of the case

  • The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that in determining the amount of compensation to the accident victims who are disabled, either temporarily or permanently, efforts should be made to award adequate compensation not only for the physical injury and treatment but also for the loss of earning capacity and the inability to live a normal life.
  • The extent of permanent disability is typically determined by doctors with reference to the whole body or, more commonly, with reference to a specific limb. If the claimant suffers permanent disabilities due to the injuries caused, the assessment of the amount of compensation for loss of future earnings depends on the effect and impact of such permanent disability on their earning capacity.

Joginder Singh vs. ICICI Lombard General Insurance (2019)

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in this case held that the age of the deceased has to be taken into consideration while computing the amount of compensation payable, not the age of the dependents of the deceased.

Facts of the case

  • The deceased, Ambika Thakur, was twenty years of age at the time of her death. She was travelling in her car with registration number ‘CH-04-H-0297’ from Chandigarh to Bathinda. Her vehicle collided with a Tata Ace registered under ‘PB-03T-4804’. The Tata Ace was being driven rashly and negligently. 
  • The offending vehicle abruptly came to a halt in front of her car, causing a head-on collision that tragically resulted in Ambika Thakur’s death.
  • The offending vehicle was insured with the Respondent – Insurance Company.

Issues involved

  • Whether the multiplier for computing the amount of compensation in case of a bachelor should be based on the age of the deceased or the age of the parents?

Judgement of the case

  • The Hon’ble Supreme Court in this case held that the age of the deceased, not the age of the parents, should be considered when determining the appropriate multiplier to be applied.

Kirti vs. Oriental Insurance Company Limited (2021)

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in this case held that the issue of granting future prospects is no longer unsettled and is now firmly established.

Facts of the case

  • On April 12, 2014, around 7 AM in Delhi, Vinod and Poonam, a couple commuting on a motorcycle, were involved in a collision at an intersection with a car registered as ‘DL 7CA 1053’. The impact incapacitated them instantly, leading to their deaths due to cranio-cerebral damage and hemorrhagic shock from the blunt-force trauma of the accident.
  • Under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, a claim petition was filed by the two young daughters and elderly parents of the deceased.
  • The driver and owner of the offending vehicle contended that the deceased couple were driving negligently and that the accident was a result of their own actions.
  • Two witnesses were examined from the side of the  claimants (the appellant), while none were presented from the side of the respondents.

Issues involved

  • Whether the deduction for personal expenses should be calculated taking into account the death of the mother?
  • Which tier of minimum wages should be used for evaluating income?
  • Whether compensation should be granted for the deceased’s potential future earnings in the absence of employment records or a steady income source?

Judgement of the case

  • The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the justification for including future prospects in compensation awards is no longer restricted to the nature of employment, whether permanent or otherwise, although the percentage awarded is still a considerable factor.
  • Incorporating future prospects is now integral to the Court’s responsibility to ensure fair compensation, taking into account real-life factors such as inflation, individuals’ efforts to enhance their and their families’ lives, increasing wage levels, and the impact of experience on work quality.

Key takeaways from this case

The following considerations must be taken into account when calculating notional income for homemakers and granting compensation for their future prospects:

  • It is a well-established principle to award compensation to homemakers based on financial considerations.
  • Recognizing the gendered nature of household responsibilities, where a significant majority of women are typically involved compared to men, calculating a notional income for homemakers holds significance. This practice acknowledges their contributions, labour, and sacrifices, reflecting the positive, changing societal attitudes. It also aligns with our country’s international legal obligations and constitutional principles of social equality and ensuring dignity for all.
  • The Court may calculate the notional income of a homemaker on the basis of their work, labour and sacrifices on the basis of each case.
  • When selecting a method and assessing notional income, the Court should be fair in considering the particular circumstances of the case and avoiding both extremely conservative and generous estimates of the amount of compensation.
  • It should also include future prospects based on the calculated notional income, which is a crucial aspect of ensuring just compensation in such cases.

Penalties under the New Motor Vehicle Act, 2019

The following are the penalties under the New Motor Vehicle Act, 2019:

S. NoViolation Legal Provision under the Act of 2019New penalty from September 2019
1.Driving/ Riding without licenceSection 181₹5,000 and/or community service.
2.Driving/Riding under the influence of an intoxicating substanceSection 185₹10,000 and/or 6 months prison| ₹15,000 and /or 2 years jail for the repetitive violation.
3.Overspeeding Section 183Light motor vehicle: ₹1,000- ₹2000MPV/HPV: ₹2,000-₹4,000 (+licence seizure).
4.Driving without a seat beltSection 194B₹1,000 and/or community service.
5.Driving/Riding without insuranceSection 196₹2,000 and/or 3-months prison, community service | ₹4,000 for a subsequent offence.
6.Violating road regulationsSection 177A₹500- ₹1000
7.Dangerous driving/riding and jumping red lightSection 184₹1,000- ₹5,000 and/or 6-months to 1 year in prison, licence seizure.
8.Driving/Riding while on the mobile (handheld)Section 177₹5,000
9.Speeding, RacingSection 189₹5,000 and/or 3-months prison, community service | ₹10,000 for subsequent violation and up to 1 year in prison, community service.
10.Not giving way to emergency vehicles like ambulances, fire engines, etc.Section 194E₹10,000 and/or community service.
11.Riding without Helmet (rider and pillion rider)Section 129₹1000, and or licence disqualification, community service for 3-months.
12.Overloading Two-WheelersSection 194C₹2,000 and licence disqualification and/or 3-months of community service.
13.Juvenile OffencesSection 199A₹25,000 with 3-years prison, cancellation of registration for 1-year, juvenile ineligible for licence until 25 years of age.
14.Driving/Riding despite disqualificationSection 182₹10,000, and/or community service.
15.Overboarding PassengersSection 123₹200 for every extra passenger and/or community service.
16.Driving/Riding without ticketSection 178₹500
17.Offence committed by enforcing authorities such as offering bribesSection 210BTwice the penalty (varies according to traffic rules violated).
18.Unauthorised use of vehicles without licenceSection 180₹1,000- ₹5,000
19.Disobedience of orders of the authoritiesSection 179₹2,000
20.Vehicles without permitSection 192₹10,000 and/or up-to 6-months prison, community service.
21.Oversized VehiclesSection 182B₹5,000 to ₹10,000 and/or community service.
22.OverloadingSection 114₹20,000 + ₹2,000 for every extra tonne and/or community service.
23.Driving/Riding without licence (for aggregators)Section 36₹25,000 to ₹1,00,000
24.Driving/Riding without registrationSection 192₹5,000 | ₹10,000 for a subsequent offence.
25.Using horn in silent zoneSection 194F₹2,000 | ₹4,000 for a subsequent offence.

Central Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989

The Ministry of Road, Transport, Highways, and Shipping introduced the Central Motor Vehicle Rules in 1989, which regulate various aspects of vehicle-related activities. These include driver licensing, traffic inspections, manufacturing and maintenance of motor vehicles, as well as the licensing of automotive components and entire vehicles.

Rule 3 of Central Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989 states that this rule does not apply to individuals who are receiving driving lessons or gaining driving experience while undergoing a test of competence to drive, provided the following conditions are met:

  • The person holds a valid learner’s licence issued in Form 3 for driving the vehicle.
  • The person is accompanied by an instructor who holds a valid driving licence for the vehicle being driven, and the instructor is positioned to control or stop the vehicle.
  • The letter ‘L’ is prominently displayed in red on a white background on both the front and rear of the vehicle, or on a plate or card affixed to the vehicle

Rule 4 of Central Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989 states that every applicant of a motor vehicle licence must provide evidence of their address and age by submitting one or more of the following original documents or relevant self-attested extracts:

  • Electoral Roll;
  • Life Insurance Policy;
  • Passport;
  • Pay slip issued by any office of the Central Government, State Government, or local authority;
  • School Certificate;
  • Birth Certificate;
  • Certificate issued by a registered medical practitioner, not below the rank of Civil Surgeon, verifying the applicant’s age;
  • Any other document(s) that may be prescribed by the State Government under clause (k) of section 28 of the Act of 1988;
  • Proof of legal presence in India, along with proof of residence for foreigners.

In cases where the applicant has sufficient reasons for not possessing any of the above-mentioned documents, the licensing authority may accept an affidavit sworn by the applicant before an Executive Magistrate, First Class Judicial Magistrate, or Notary Public as proof of age and address.

Rule 5 of the Central Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989 states the following:

  • When an applicant applies for a learner’s licence, driving licence, adding another class or category of motor vehicle to a driving licence, or renewing a driving licence to operate a non-transport vehicle, they must include a self-declaration of physical fitness in Form 1. The application for a licence to drive a transport vehicle must be accompanied by a medical certificate in Form 1A issued by a registered medical practitioner as specified in sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the Act of 1988;
  • An application for a medical certificate must include a declaration in Form 1;
  • A medical certificate issued in Form 1A shall be valid for a period of one year from the date of issue. It must also include a passport-sized photograph of the applicant.

Rule 6 of Central Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989 provides for a condition when an applicant is exempted from the requirement of submitting a medical certificate. Any applicant who has submitted a medical certificate for obtaining a  learner’s licence or driving licence for the purpose of initial issuance, renewal or adding another class of motor vehicle to their licence will not need to provide a medical certificate again, except when applying for the renewal of a driving licence.

Central Motor Vehicles (Second Amendment) Rules, 2022

On February 15, 2022, the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways released the Central Motor Vehicles (Second Amendment) Rules, 2022, to amend the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989. In the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, after sub-rule (6) to Rule 138, the following sub-rule (7) has been added: 

After one year from the date of publication of the Central Motor Vehicles (Second Amendment) Rules, 2022, the driver of a motorcycle should also ensure the following safety measures while carrying a child between the ages of nine months and four years as a rider, namely: 

  1. For children under the age of four years, a safety harness shall be used to attach the child to the driver of the motorcycle. The safety harness should include the following:
  • Lightweight, adjustable, waterproof, and durable;
  • Made from heavy nylon or multifilament nylon with high-density foam; and
  • Designed to support weights of up to 30 kg.
  1. It is the duty of the driver to ensure that any child pillion passenger between the ages of nine months and four years wears a properly fitting crash helmet or a bicycle helmet that meets the standards of ASTM 1447] or [European (CEN) BS EN 1080/BS EN 1078], until specific guidelines are established by the Bureau of Indian Standards under the Bureau of Indian Standards Act, 2016.
  2. The motorcycle’s speed with a child up to four years old riding as a pillion must not exceed 40 km/h.

Difference between the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019

  1.  Safety of pedestrians and non-motorized transport
  • There were no provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for the safety and security of pedestrians and non-motorised road users.
  • Section 138(1A) of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019 empowers the State Government to regulate the activities of pedestrians and non-motorised road users in public places. It also suggests that the State Government should regulate the activities of pedestrians and non-motorized road users.
  1.  Safety of children at the time of commute
  • There were no provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for the safety of children during a commute.
  • Section 194B of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019 makes it compulsory that every child must be secured by either a safety belt or a child-restraint system. It imposes a fine of Rs. 1000 on adults who fail to seat children safely. 
  • The amendment to Section 129 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, provides that every child above the age of four years, riding on a motorcycle, must wear a helmet conforming to design and specifications prescribed by the Central Government. Additionally, under Section 137(aa) of the said Act, the Central Government is empowered to establish standards for protective gear and safety measures for children under four years of age, as stipulated under Section 129 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
  1.  Recalling of vehicles
  • There were no provisions in the Act of 1988 for recalling vehicles that are old, harmful to the environment, or fail to meet safety standards.
  • Sections 110A and 110B of the Act of 2019 authorises the Central Government  to recall vehicles that do not meet safety standards and also establish testing agencies responsible for issuing certificates of approval.
  1. Severe penalties for inadequate road design, engineering, and maintenance
  • The Motor Vehicles Act of 1988 originally lacked provisions to hold road contractors and civic agencies responsible for faulty road design and neglecting maintenance, potentially causing accidents.
  • However, Section 198A of the Motor Vehicle (Amendment) Act, 2019 addresses this gap by aiming to enforce accountability among road contractors, consultants or concessionaires for flawed road design, construction, and maintenance. Violation of these standards could incur fines of up to Rupees One Lakhs. 
  1.  Transparent, centralised, and efficient driver’s licensing system
  • The Motor Vehicles Act of 1988 did not have a centralised database for all licences and motor vehicles across the territory of India. Due to this, there were a number of cases where individuals possessed multiple licences issued by different States.
  • Second proviso to Section 9(3) Motor Vehicles Act of 1988 exempted driver’s licence applicants from the competence test if they had a driving certificate issued by a State-recognized institution.
  • A minimum level of educational qualification was mandatory under Motor Vehicles Act of 1988 for applicants seeking to drive transport vehicles.
  • The Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019 digitalized the licensing system and applicant identification will now be linked using the Unique Identification Number (UID) mechanism.
  • Section 9(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1988 has been omitted under the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019, which provided for the requirement for minimum educational qualifications for transport drivers.
  • Section 12(5) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988,  removes the requirement for applicants to hold a light motor vehicle licence for at least one year before applying for a learner’s licence to drive a transport vehicle. Applicants can now directly apply based on training received from an accredited school.
  • Under Section 14(2)(a) of the Act of 1988, the renewal period for transport licences has been extended from three years to five years. Specifically for transport licences involving vehicles carrying hazardous goods, the renewal period has been extended from one year to three years, subject to specified conditions set by the Central Government.
  • To enhance transparency and efficiency in licence issuance, Section 25A has been introduced under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. This section mandates the establishment of a National Register for Driving Licences, consolidating data on all licences issued across India. It also stipulates that no driving licence is valid unless it has been issued a Unique Driving Licence Number under the National Register of Driving Licences.
  • The exemption from the competence test, as provided in the second proviso of Section 9(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, has been removed by the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019.
  • Under the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019, licence renewal intervals are set at 10 years after reaching the age of 40 and 50, following 30 years of age. After reaching 55 years of age, renewal intervals are set every 5 years.
  • An amendment to Section 19 grants the licensing authority the power to disqualify individuals from holding a licence and to publicly disclose their names, unless they successfully complete a driver refresher training course from an accredited school after committing a specified number of offences.
  • Under Section 27 of the Act of 1988, certain provisions have been added by the Act of 2019, which are as follows:
  1. The format and procedure for issuing licences by the licensing authority;
  2. The curriculum and training modules for regulating schools and establishments mentioned in Section 12;
  3. The process of publicly disclosing a licence holder’s name for disqualification following a specified number of offences;
  4. The content, syllabus, and duration of driver refresher training courses;
  5. The topics specified in Section 25A, which include the maintenance of National Registers for driving licences.
  6. Registration of new motor vehicles by vehicle dealers
  • Under Section 41 of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1988, vehicle dealers were not authorised to conduct motor vehicle registrations.
  • The Amendment under Section 41 of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019 authorises vehicle dealers to register new vehicles. The newly registered vehicles now provide distinct registration marks. There is also a provision for imposing penalties on dealers who neglect to correctly register a vehicle or fulfil their responsibilities.
  • It is provided under Section 192B (2) of the Act of 2019 that any dealer who fails to apply for the registration of a new motor vehicle as required by the second proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 41 of the said Act will face a fine equal to fifteen times the annual road tax or the lifetime tax of the vehicle, whichever amount is greater.
  1.  Revision of fines
  • Under the Motor Vehicles Act of 1988, there was no provision for systematically increasing fines to keep pace with inflation levels over time.
  • Section 199B of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019 now provides that there shall be a fixed annual increase of all fines by 10% starting from the 1st day of April each year.
  1.  Electronic monitoring and enforcement of road safety
  • Since enforcement of motor vehicles laws was under the purview of the State. Under the Motor Vehicles Act of 1988,  the implementation of electronic enforcement varied amongst different states.
  • Section 136A of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019 assigns the responsibility to the Central Government to establish rules for electronic monitoring and enforcement of road safety. The State Governments are mandated to ensure compliance with these rules.
  1. National Road Safety Board
  • The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 did not include provisions for a National Road Safety Board.
  • However, under Section 215B of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019, a National Road Safety Board has been established. This Board is responsible for advising both the Union and State Governments on a wide range of road safety and traffic management issues. This includes setting standards for road design, vehicle maintenance, road maintenance, sustainable use of road transport, safety for vulnerable road users, road construction technology, and motor vehicle standards.
  1. Transport aggregators
  • The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, did not have provisions for recognizing transport aggregators such as cab service providers, etc.
  • However, under Section 93 of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019, statutory recognition is given to transport aggregators.
  1.  National Transportation Policy
  • There were no provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for developing a unified transportation policy for the country.
  • Sections 66A and 66B of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019 empowers the Central Government to establish a National Transportation Policy in consultation with the States.
  1. Penalty multiplier
  • There were no provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for the State Governments to increase any penalties under the current regulations in force then.
  • Section 210A of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019 empowers the State Governments to determine a “multiplier” (ranging from one to ten) to be applied to each fine.
  • Section 210B of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019 stipulates that any enforcing authority under the said Act will be liable to pay twice the penalty applicable for the offence under the Act.

Central Motor Vehicles (Fifth Amendment) Rules, 2022

On April 1, 2022, the Central Motor Vehicles (Fifth Amendment) Rules, 2022, came into effect. These rules introduce a revised process aimed at promptly investigating and resolving Motor Accident Claims. They stipulate that all such claims should be investigated and adjudicated within a timeframe ranging from six months to one year. The new Rules have significantly transformed the jurisprudence of motor accident compensation by ensuring that claimants receive compensation within one year of the accident. These Rules are modelled after the framework established by the Delhi High Court in the case of Rajesh Tyagi & Ors. vs. Jaibir Singh & Ors. (2021). 

The new Rules have established specific timelines for various stakeholders to expedite the settlement of Motor Accident Claims:

  • The police must submit Form-I of the First Accident Report (FAR) to the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT) within 48 hours of the accident;
  • The police are required to notify the victims of their rights using Form-II within 10 days of the accident;
  • The driver of the vehicle involved in the incident must submit Form-III (Driver’s Form) to the police within 30 days of the accident;
  • The owner of the vehicle involved in the incident must submit Form-IV (Owner’s Form) to the police within 30 days of the accident;
  • Upon verifying the Driver’s and Owner’s Forms, the Police must submit the Interim Accident Report (IAR) to the MACT within 50 days of the accident;
  • The victims are required to submit Form-VI and VIA (Victim’s Forms) to the Police within 60 days of the accident;
  • The Police must submit Form-VII, the Detailed Accident Report (DAR), to the MACT within 90 days of the accident;
  • Upon verifying Form-VI submitted by the victims, the Insurance Company must submit their response and settlement offer to the MACT within 30 days of receiving the Detailed Accident Report (DAR);
  • If the Insurance Company acknowledges liability and presents a fair and acceptable compensation offer to the claimants, the Claims Tribunal will issue a Consent Award within 6 months of the accident;
  • If the Insurance Company admits liability but the offered amount is deemed unfair or unacceptable by the claimants, the Claims Tribunal will conduct a hearing on the compensation amount and issue an award within 9 months of the accident;
  • If the Insurance Company contests the liability, the Claims Tribunal will conduct an inquiry that must conclude within 12 months of the accident.

Conclusion 

The Motor Vehicle Act aimed to provide safety to all citizens in the country, protecting them from harm and avoiding traffic congestions. This legislation requires adherence to the laws across all of India and imposes fines for any violation. Both the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 and the Motor Vehicle (Amendment) Act, 2019 ensure the safety of vehicle owners, drivers, and all road users nationwide. The citizens are expected to adhere to these laws, which are made to promote their own safety and well-being as well as that of others. The Act promotes uniformity across the country to mitigate traffic congestion and reduce accidents. In cases where an unavoidable accident leads to death, permanent disability, or minor injury, victims and their families have the right to seek compensation from the responsible parties or drivers of the vehicle involved. Therefore, it is crucial for everyone to comply with the laws and regulations outlined in the Act to contribute to a safer and better living environment in India.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

What is the minimum age limitation criteria for obtaining a two wheeler driving licence in India?

To apply for a driving licence in India, it is important that the minimum age limitation criterion based on the type of vehicle being driven is met. For two-wheeler Licence,  Section 4 of the Act of 1988 provides that a driver must be at least 16 years old for scooters under 50 cc and 18 years old for motorcycles and scooters over 50 cc. Section 7(2) of the said Act also provides that no person below the age of 18 years shall obtain a learner’s licence to drive a gearless motorcycle unless they have written consent from their guardian or caregiver.

Which form needs to be filled in case of transfer of ownership of the vehicle?

Form 29 needs to be filled in case of transfer of ownership of the vehicle.

Under which Section is it required to present the vehicle physically  before registration?

Under Section 44 of the Act of 1988, it is required to present the vehicle physically before registration. It is provided that, excluding transport vehicles, before registering a motor vehicle or renewing its registration certificate, the registering authority must require the applicant to present the vehicle either before itself or before an authority designated by the State Government. It ensures that the information in the application is correct and meets the requirements of the said Act and its connected rules.

Whether the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is a court of record ?

The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is not a court of record. It is a Civil Court of limited jurisdiction, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Urvibem Chiragbhai Sheth vs. Vijaybhai Shambhubhai Joranputra & Ors. (2011).

Does the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 prohibit riding without a helmet?

Yes, riding without a helmet is punishable under Section 129 of the Act of 1988.

What is ‘just compensation’ for the purpose of payment to victims?

Section 168 of the Act of 1988 provides for the payment of compensation to the victims of the accident or to the legal representatives of the deceased. It provides that the payment of compensation must be ‘just compensation’. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana vs. Jasbir Kaur (2003) held that the expression ‘just’ denotes an equal, fair, reasonable and non-arbitrary award of compensation.

Who shall be the members of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal?

Section 165(2) of the Act of 1988 provides that the State Government shall decide the number of members of the Claims Tribunal as it may think fit. Where there are two or more members in the Claims Tribunals, one of the members shall be appointed as the Chairman thereof.

Section 165(3) of the Act of 1988 provides that the following persons shall be qualified for appointment as members of the Claims Tribunal:

  • Any serving or retired High Court Judge; or
  • Any serving or retired District Court Judge; or
  • Any person who is competent to be appointed as High Court Judge or as a District Court Judge.

Who is eligible to claim compensation under the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal ?

Section 165 of the Act of 1988 provides that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal adjudicate upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving:

  • Death or bodily injury caused to the person; or
  • Damage to any property of a third party; or
  • Both.

How shall the award of interest be calculated in relation to the amount of compensation ?

Section 171 of the Act of 1988 provides that where any court or Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal allows a claim for compensation, such Court or Tribunal may direct that, in addition to the amount of compensation, simple interest shall be payable from such date, not earlier than the date of making the claim, as it may specify on this behalf.

What are the penalties for participating in a motor vehicle race or speed trial on a public road without the State Government’s consent ?

Section 189 of the Act of 1988 provides that any person who, without the written consent of the State Government, permits or participates in a race or speed trial of any kind between motor vehicles in any public place shall be punished with an imprisonment for a term of up to three months, a fine of Rupees Five Thousand, or both. For a subsequent offence for the same offence, the punishment shall be imprisonment for a term of up to one year, a fine of Rupees Ten Thousand, or both.

References 

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Nambi Narayanan v. Siby Mathews and Others (2018)

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Nambi Narayanan
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This article has been written by Priyamvada Singh and further updated by Sneha Arora. It is a case analysis of S. Nambi Narayanan v. Siby Mathews and Others (2018), focusing on the arbitrariness of the police and examining whether reputation is considered a part of an individual’s fundamental right to life and liberty.

Introduction

Few stories like that of the renowned scientist Nambi Narayanan highlight the alluring account of the violation of rights and stirring events. An eminent aerospace engineer and recipient of the Padma Bhushan name Narayanan, born on 12th December 1941, rose to prominence as a leader in the cryogenics divisions of ISRO. His career, marked by his dedication and innovation, took a drastic change in 1994 when he was charged with espionage. Although the allegations were proved to be mischief by the Supreme Court, the trajectory left a dramatic and lasting impact on his life. The case of Nambi Narayanan v. Siby Mathews and others (2018) provided him with compensation for the sufferings he endured. This legal battle aims at rectifying the injustice by granting and securing compensation for Narayanan. Before delving into the case analysis, let us try to understand the early life and career of Nambi Narayanan.

Early life and career of Nambi Narayanan

A native of Tamil Nadu, Nambi pursued his early education in Kanyakumari and went on to complete his degree in Masters of Technology at the College of Engineering, Thiruvananthapuram. His intention behind pursuing this degree was to get hired by Vikram Sarabhai at ISRO, of which Sarabhai was the chairman. After getting noticed, Mr. Sarabhai offered him a leave for his education at one of the Ivy League colleges in the USA. Eventually, NASA offered Nambi a fellowship, and he also secured admission to the prestigious Princeton University. He studied chemical rocket propulsion there and created a record by completing his masters in merely 10 months. Needless to say, the administration noticed his intelligence and offered him a job in the United States. However, Nambi longed for his homeland. He turned down the job and returned to India.

At a time when ISRO was dependent on solid propellants in rocketry, Nambi returned with knowledge of liquid propellants. In the 1970s, APJ Abdul Kalam was working on solid motors. He was joined by Nambi, who introduced liquid fuel rocket technology to the Indian rocketry scenario. For this, he was provided with an incentive by the then ISRO chairman, Satish Dhawan, who recognised the spark in his ideas. Eventually, India witnessed its first successful thrust engine in 1975. Nambi Narayanan proved to be a great asset to the organization and, in turn, to the country. In 2019, he was awarded the Padma Bhushan.

Background of the case

In 1992, India agreed to pay Russia a hefty sum of Rs. 235 crore for the transfer of technology on how to produce cryogenic fuel-based engines. Cryogenic fuels are those that require very low temperatures to keep them in a liquid state. It was decided that Russia would provide two such engines in working condition, along with the technology. However, the then President of the United States of America, George W. Bush, decided to write to Russia about his objections regarding the same. The President of Russia at that time, Boris Yeltsin, feared getting sanctioned by the G5 group and, hence, refused to provide India with the technology. The United States had seemingly won this war of monopolies.

In another attempt at the battle, India suggested a strategy whereby no formal technology transfer would occur, and instead, four cryogenic engines would be replicated. Despite initiating the plan, it failed to yield the intended outcomes due to the spy scandal involving Nambi in 1994.

Details of the case

  1. Case Name: S. Nambi Narayanan v. Siby Mathews 
  2. Appellant: S. Nambi Narayanan
  3. Respondent: Siby Mathews 
  4. Bench: Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, Justice A.M. Khanwilkar, and Justice Dipak Misra
  5. Case Type: Civil Appeal 
  6. Date of Judgement: 14 September 2018
  7. Citation: SC (2018) 10 SCC 804

Facts of the case

In October 1994, intelligence officials arrested two Maldivian women, Mariam Rasheeda and Fauzia Hassan, for overstaying their visas in India and alleging that they were spies. This led the officials to Nambi. However, upon searching Nambi’s residence, no incriminating evidence was found, and the police left empty-handed.

In November 1994, Nambi Narayanan, along with four others, was arrested for leaking vital rocket information to Pakistan. Within 24 hours, Nambi was presented in front of a Magistrate, who asked him to confess to his crimes. Nambi refused to do so and was sent to custody for 11 days. In total, Nambi was made to spend 50 days in judicial custody with a hardened serial killer. Furthermore, people gathered in front of the station to shout slurs such as “traitor” and “spy”. He was subjected to third-degree torture. He was brutally beaten. He was even made to stand for 30 hours to force him to confess to his crimes and falsely accuse higher officials of helping him through the espionage. In January 1995, all the accused scientists were released on bail. In April 1996, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) asserted before the Kerala High Court that the espionage case was false and that there was no evidence to support the charges, and in May 1996, all the accused were discharged.

Two years later, in 1998, the charges were dropped when the CBI decided to step in. However, Nambi had to leave his job of working on the cryogenic fuel motor and was forced to take up a desk job. The phoney case had cost him his career and the country a significant development in rocket science. In May 1998, the Supreme Court awarded compensation of Rs. 1 lakh to Mr. Narayanan and the others concerned. The brunt of the compensation was to be borne by the Government of Kerala by way of vicarious liability.

In 1999, the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) asserted that the government of Kerala had damaged Narayanan’s distinguished career in space research. The NHRC ordered the Kerala government to pay Nambi Rs. 1 crore in damages for hurting his reputation. The NHRC claimed that the government of Kerala was vicariously liable for the actions of its police officials. However, the Kerala High Court only agreed to a compensation of Rs. 10 lakh. After 11 years, a probe revealed that even this Rs. 10 lakh had still not been paid to Nambi. Meanwhile, Siby Mathews, the official involved in the false implications, was appointed as the Chief Information Commissioner of Kerala.

Legal aspects involved 

Malicious prosecution

Malicious prosecution refers to the wrongful initiation of criminal or civil proceedings against an individual with malice or without reasonable or probable cause. It certainly involves the malicious intent of an individual towards another person to harm, harass, or unfairly target someone by exposing an individual to legal proceedings. In a malicious prosecution claim, the burden of proof falls upon the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s allegations are false and wrongful legal action was initiated against him.

In Madan Mohan Singh v. Bhrigunath Singh and Ors. (1952), it was held that no person shall be jailed on the basis of false charges. In this case, a person was jailed for 40 days due to false allegations. It was held by the Supreme Court that this was a matter of malicious prosecution. 

Reputation as a part of the right to life and liberty

The Constitution of India guarantees each citizen a fundamental right to life and liberty under Article 21. This right has been, time and again, expanded to include many elements of a human being’s life. In the case of Kharak Singh v. State of UP and Ors. (1962), the Supreme Court ruled that the concept of “life” means something more than biological survival. It involves all the enjoyment and facilities that an individual requires for a good life. Therefore, any action that deprives an individual of the enjoyment of his rights and life is prohibited by the law. This includes everything that is physical harm, mental harm, amputation or mutilation, or any damage to the organ of an individual through which a person interacts and works with the external world, to be safeguarded by the law.

The reputation of a person is directly and proportionately related to the quality of his life. The right to life is a fundamental right guaranteed under the constitution, and the reputation of a person is an unmissable facet of the same. The right to the enjoyment of a private reputation, unassailed by malicious slander, is of ancient origin and is necessary to human society. As reputation is an essential part of an individual’s life, it is the duty of the government and the state to ensure that no individual is restricted from protecting his reputation. In the present case, the reputation of the former scientist was tarnished due to forged and fabricated accusations against him by the Kerala police. In State of Bihar v. Lal Krishna Advani and Ors. (2003), in order to discuss the communal disturbance that took place in Bhagalpur, Bihar, a committee of two members was appointed for the same purpose. The remark made by the committee in their report challenged the reputation of the respondent in the eyes of society. The respondent was not given a fair chance to prove his innocence and to maintain his reputation. The Supreme Court held that the rights of the respondent had been infringed; thereby, he was entitled to the right to reputation under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. Additionally, the court granted him compensation for the violation of his fundamental rights. Furthermore, in the case of State of UP v. Mohammad Niam (1963), it was held that the following tests are to be laid down while dealing with the question of a defamatory statement against any other person.

  • Whether the party whose conduct is in question before the court had sufficient opportunity to prove his innocence.
  • Whether there is credible evidence regarding the disgraceful remarks against that person or party.
  • Whether the outcome of the case must consider and address the mentioned conduct as an essential aspect. 

In the present case, Nambi Narayanan’s reputation was severely impacted and tarnished, which not only affected him but also his family, who suffered from the critical consequences. Apart from that, he was also not provided with sufficient opportunity to prove his innocence.  

Arguments of the parties 

Appellant

The appellant in this case asserted several arguments stemming from the accusations of malicious prosecution by the Kerala Police in the espionage charges. 

The appellant claimed that the Kerala Police’s prosecution against him was malicious on the following grounds: it led to a severe blow to his career and standing as a renowned ISRo scientist, which affected his work, savings, honour, and ultimately, the peace of his family. It also created severe complications in terms of the technological advancement of India’s space research.

It was also pointed out that the CBI, who took over the investigation of the case after looking into it for 18 months, recommended the case against the appellant be closed since there seemed to be no justifications behind the allegations. The CBI report also highlighted lapses in duty by the Kerala Police and recommended the Government of Kerala to take action against the concerned officers for the same. Notwithstanding these findings, the Government of Kerala failed to take action against those erring officials and instead directed all their attention towards investigating the appellant and even constituted a Special Investigation Team for the purpose.

The appellant highlighted that this Court had, at an earlier instance, agreed that the prosecution against him was malicious. The National Human Rights Commission had also criticised the actions of the government of Kerala. The appellant held that the High Court of Kerala was wrong in supporting the government. Moreover, the appellant sought compensation for a constitutional tort and requested the formation of a committee to address the actions of the officials accountable for the misconduct.

Respondents

The respondent, Siby Mathews, firstly contended that the appellant’s claim of the country being stripped of its benefit, since he would have made notable contributions to cryogenic technology, is not credible. This is due to the fact that, immediately after Mariam Rasheeda’s arrest, the appellant resigned on his own will. Hence, these claims made by him must be purely for the purpose of gaining sympathy.

The respondent stated that the investigation was monitored by high-ranking officials, and he was kept well-updated regarding the same too. The respondent also added that on the day of the appellant’s arrest, he had requested the case be transferred to the CBI, which implies a lack of prejudice. The investigation was conducted in a just manner, and all the evidence pointed towards the appellant being engaged in espionage activities.

It was firmly held by the respondent that neither he nor any of the other police officers tortured the appellant. Previous High Court rulings on this matter stand as evidence. The respondent transferred the case to the CBI instead of conducting the investigation himself, which quashes any claims of torture by the police. Furthermore, the Intelligence Bureau was involved in the case before the Special Investigation Team was constituted.

It was stressed that there existed sufficient evidence to prove that the appellant was engaged in espionage activities. Furthermore, his arrest had become necessary because, after his voluntary retirement, he intended on leaving the country. Referring to the CBI’s report, which stated that no incriminating evidence was found, the respondent mentioned that 235 documents had been recovered from the homes of the accused, and these need to be investigated further.

The respondent further stated that he had conducted the investigation for a mere 17 days before transferring it to the CBI, and hence, the onus of updating the media was on them. Holding the Special Investigation Team responsible for any misconduct in the investigation after it was transferred to the CBI is not reasonable.

The Intelligence Bureau officials, who were primarily accused of torture, escaped accountability. Consequently, the respondent argued that accusing him and the Kerala police of torture would not be just. Moreover, the High Court had merely directed the state government to reconsider the matter and had not mentioned anything specifically about torture. The appellant had also not raised any complaint of torture before the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Moreover, of the 50 days the appellant spent in custody, he was under police custody for only 5 days, with the remaining 45 days being under the custody of the CBI.

Central Bureau of Investigation

The respondent on behalf of the CBI contended that although the shortcomings of the Kerala police with respect to the investigation were highlighted, the Government of Kerala failed to take any action against them. The CBI held that it would be a grave mistake if the government was not called out for this failure. It was argued that the Kerala police’s actions were criminal in nature. Although the report was merely a recommendation, the Government of Kerala should have taken it into serious consideration and taken the necessary steps that would respect a person’s rights as well as the essence of the Constitution of India. They referred to the case of Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty (2007) and stated that the Government of Kerala could not hide their lack of action under the disguise of a delay. Ensuring justice for the appellant would include both paying compensation and dealing with the police’s conduct.

In Punjab and Haryana High Court Bar Association v. State of Punjab and Ors (1994), the court stressed the significance of carrying out investigations to instil people with a sense of faith in the justice system. On the basis of this, the CBI stressed that the Kerala police’s conduct must be thoroughly investigated.

Judgement in Nambi Narayanan v. Siby Mathews and Others (2018)

The Supreme Court, upon reviewing the CBI’s closure report, noted that the appellant had been arrested and detained for nearly 50 days. Therefore, the Court should consider the issue of granting compensation. The report submitted by the CBI commented that, as the accused denied any involvement in the espionage activities, there was no such evidence found to indicate that the accused was a mischief or that he was trying to gain sympathy out of the services he provided to the nation as contented by the respondent. Also, the CBI report submitted many lapses, errors, and omissions on the part of the Kerala Police in their investigation process. Therefore, allegations of espionage were not truly proven, and so it was directed for the discharge of the accused and the return of the seized documents. From the closure report provided by the CBI, the Supreme Court was of the view that harassment and the mental torture endured by the appellant were obvious.

Rationale behind the judgement

The Court accepted the CBI report under K. Chandrasekhar, Mariam Rasheeda, v. the State of Kerala & Ors, (1998), and observed that the ISRO did not have a system of classifying documents and followed an open door policy for access to documents. During the investigation, it was found that documents were regularly issued to various divisions, and after a scientist’s transfer, all copies of the drawings remained intact. Senior scientists like Nambi Narayanan had access to these documents, but there was no evidence of them being issued to him or being passed on to third parties. Therefore, there is no basis for further investigation into alleged espionage activities within ISRO, as no classified documents were found to be stolen or missing. The jurisdiction for any investigation into this matter would lie with the Kerala Police.

The Court further stated that the prosecution by the state police was malicious and led to harassment and anguish for the appellant. The state police transferred the case to the CBI after arresting the appellant and others. Despite the transfer, the initial prosecution lacked proper grounds and was baseless, unlike a case where the accused is eventually not found guilty after the trial. The Court held that the actions of the state police were unjustified. It severely jeopardised the liberty and dignity of the appellant, as under Article 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, compensation was deemed to be required for such a violation.

The case of DK Basu v. State of West Bengal (1996) was referred to, wherein it was stated that “torture” does not merely include physical pain but also mental agony inflicted upon an individual. It includes psychological trauma, which could, in turn, hamper a person’s personality and dignity. The Court stated that custodial torture must be considered as grave as any other physical or mental torture. It is a violation of human dignity as well as a step backwards in terms of the standards of human morality. The Court observed that the mental trauma experienced by the appellant under police custody is of significant concern, even if no physical harm was caused to him.

In the case of Jogendra Kumar v. State of UP (1994), the court emphasised the growing scope of human rights and the increasing crime rate. It stresses upon the need to strike a balance between individual rights and collective societal interests with respect to the concept of arrest. Therefore, the court emphasised the importance of upholding human rights while also ensuring public safety.

The Court was of the view that reputation is an important aspect of personal security and is protected under the Indian Constitution. It referred to Kiran Bedi and Ors. v. Committee of Inquiry and Ors. (1998), wherein it said that the right to a good reputation without being subjected to malicious and false talk has been a vital part of society. A good reputation falls under the ambit of personal safety and is protected under the Constitution. The same was reiterated in Vishwasnath Agarwal v. Sarla Vishwasnath Agrawal (2012).

The Court condemned the excessive use of force by the police and referred to the case of Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat (2019), wherein the functions of the police were stressed. These include the investigation of crimes, the apprehension of offenders, and maintaining law and order. Despite this, police misconduct is witnessed. While the police hold the authority to arrest without a warrant, they must do so without violating the fundamental and constitutional rights of a person.

In Sube Singh v. State of Haryana (1993) and Hardeep Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2011), the Supreme Court affirmed the award of compensation as an appropriate remedy for infringement of fundamental rights under Article 21. The amount of compensation depends on the circumstances of the case and does not prevent the person who has been wronged from pursuing further compensation through criminal or civil proceedings.

Considering these principles, it is evident that the appellant, a renowned scientist at ISRO, endured immense humiliation. Such a treatment not only violates his fundamental rights, notwithstanding the existing civil suit, but also warrants compensation under public law. The wrongful imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and humiliation faced by the appellant must be taken into consideration. 

Final verdict

In light of the CBI report in K. Chandrasekhar v. State of Kerala (1998), the Supreme Court deemed it necessary to award compensation to Nambi Narayanan. Accordingly, it ordered the Government of Kerala to pay compensation of Rs. 50 lakh to Nambi Narayanan within eight weeks. The appellant was also allowed to pursue the civil suit filed for additional compensation. Additionally, on the basis of the appellant’s recommendations, the Court constituted a committee headed by Justice D.K. Jain with the aim of dealing with the accountability of the officials responsible. This Committee, with representatives of the Central and State governments, shall operate from Delhi but may hold meetings from Kerala as needed. The Central Government shall provide funding for the logistical support and functioning of the committee. 

Impact of the judgement 

In recent developments with regard to the case law S. Nambi Narayanan v. Siby Mathews, there has been increased inspection and scrutiny of the accountability of the government and safeguarding individual rights. Following the Supreme Court landmark judgement in 2018 to award compensation to the Nambi Narayanan for the wrongful arrest and accusations against him, there have been certain provisions and reforms so as to avoid future miscarriage of justice. Additionally, there have been certain discussions so as to preserve and protect individual rights and to ensure the integrity of investigations and the accountability of the investigating officers and the government officers. This case continues to serve as a catalyst to frame the legal system and machinery in an organised form and to ensure that every individual receives fair and just legal services and assessments. 

Critical analysis

The ISRO espionage case, also known as the S. Nambi Narayanan case revolves around the wrongful arrest and retention of two scientists, S. Nambi Narayanan and D. Sasikumaran, in 1994 on charges of espionage. The case involves serious complexities and controversies, with forced charges, fabricated evidence, and political interference. In 1996, the Kerala High Court dismissed the case, stating that it involved many procedural irregularities. In 1998, the Supreme Court upheld the case and directed the Kerala government to pay for the damages caused to Narayanan’s reputation. 

This case raised several legal and ethical controversies, including the misuse of power by enforcement agencies and investigating officers. It highlighted the importance of due process of law and the need for transparency and accountability of the government in its actions. Furthermore, the fabricated evidence and tormentation as seen with respect to Nambi Narayanan highlight the dangers of a criminal justice system that prioritises convictions over the just and fairness of the case. 

Therefore, the ISRO espionage case is a stark reminder of the challenges faced by a society with respect to maintaining justice. It underscores the significance of a fair and impartial criminal justice system to safeguard individual rights while also upholding public security.

Conclusion

Even though Nambi has been paid his damages monetarily, the past 24 years of his life cannot be retrieved. The country suffered great damage at the hands of a few police officials, whose actions severely affected Nambi, his family, career, reputation, and self-respect. Those who caused it were free to go without any repercussions.

It is imperative that the arbitrary use of power at the hands of the police be curbed. There must be a clear code for them to follow, and evidence must be taken into serious consideration before subjecting a person to humiliation and torture, both physically and socially. A learned and reputable man such as Nambi certainly did not deserve his fate. It must be ensured that no one else suffers anything inhumane like this again. The damage to reputation he suffered during the prosecution severely affected his career and his fame. An individual’s reputation is an integral part of their right to live with dignity. 

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

Who were the two other accused in the ISRO spy case? 

The ISRO case involves the scientists S. Nambi Narayanan and D. Sasikumaran. The other accused in the case include former IB officers CRR Nair, GS Nair, KV Thomas, PS Jaiprakash, John Punnan, Baby, Dinta Mathiyas, VK Maini, Mariam Rasheeda, Fauzia Hassan, and SK Sharma.

What was the evidence presented against the other accused in the ISRO case? 

The evidence presented against the other accused in the case included a diary written in Dhivehi, leakage of information with the foreign national, and alleged involvement in logistics and payments for the transfer of the documents. 

What was the role of the Indian media in the ISRO spy case?

The Indian media played a significant role in the ISRO spy case, with many news organisations sensationalising the allegations made against the scientist. The ISRO spy case was covered by various media outlets, including the Malayala Manorama, Mangalam Mathrubhumi, and Asianet. 

References

https://www.oneindia.com/india/what-is-article-21-of-the-indian-constitution-2528713.html#:~:text=The%20Supreme%20Court%20held%20that,to%20procedure%20established%20by%20law.&text=The%20right%20is%20available%20to%20every%20person%2C%20citizen%20or%20alien

https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2018/09/17/former-isro-scientist-ordered-for-compensation-of-rs-50-lakhs-committee-constituted-for-taking-action-against-erring-police-officers-sc/ 

https://www.outlookindia.com/newsscroll/sc-awards-rs-50-lakh-compensation-to-exisro-scientist-nambi-narayanan-in-espionage-case/1383302 

https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/sc-awards-rs-50-lakh-compensation-to-space-scientist-nambi-narayanan-in-isro-espionage-case-118091401040_1.html

https://www.financialexpress.com/india-news/isro-spy-case-sc-awards-rs-50-lakh-damages-to-ex-scientist-narayanan/1314152/

https://www.pathlegal.in/SC-Judgement-S-Nambi-Narayanan-Siby-Mathews–blog-1989738

 

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AI in waste management strategies : tips and techniques

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Proliferation, Regulation and Implications

This article was written by Anu Singh, pursuing the Training program on Using AI for Business Growth Course from Skill Arbitrage, and edited by Koushik Chittella.

Introduction 

This article aims at compiling and presenting everything that one needs to know about waste management, including the importance of waste management, different ways to manage waste, and the hindrances faced by the waste industry. This article also discusses the need for using AI in waste management and how AI is revolutionising waste management via the latest technologies. In essence, the emphasis is to look at waste management in totality and as a resource that needs to be managed in a competitive and innovative way for the benefit of the environment and humanity as a whole.

Waste management: meaning

Waste management refers to all the methods and processes of dealing with waste at every stage, from generation, collection, transportation, treatment, and disposal. Managing waste is a complicated process, as each stage is important and comes with its own problems. Waste management is divided into formal and informal waste management. 

Formal waste management

Formal waste management refers to the management of waste by both public and private service providers that handle waste from the time it is discarded to the time it is managed. These service providers are registered and regulated bodies that comply with the laws and rules set by their respective governments. 

Informal waste management

Individuals such as ragpickers and organisations that are not registered and which do not adhere to government rules and regulations come under the category of informal waste management. These individuals often face health hazards due to the lack of proper working conditions and technical know-how. There are approximately 15 million people around the world who are involved in informal waste recycling. Unlike formal waste management, this can be detrimental for our environment as most of these workers and organisations are not aware of the proper methodology and technology to segregate and manage waste.

Methods of waste management

There are many beneficial ways to handle waste, and some are better than the others.

  • Recycling: Recycling refers to the conversion of waste into products that can be used again and again instead of being discarded after just one use. Most people prefer this method over disposal, as it not only leads to less waste generation but also saves the resources needed to produce more goods. Yet, only 9% of plastic is recycled worldwide. Recycling is more common in wealthier countries, as the literacy rate is high in these countries and the general public is more aware of environmental degradation being caused by plastics.
  • Incineration: In this process, waste, which is dangerous, is burnt at high temperatures to free them from pollutants. It is a powerful method for waste management as it not only reduces the amount of waste generated but also leads to heat generation, which can further be utilised for energy production.
  • Landfills: Landfilling is a traditional method. In this method, waste is discarded into areas called landfills. This discarded waste is then covered with soil to prevent any leakage of harmful materials into the surroundings. This involves careful planning and implementation.
  • Composting: Composting is a natural process wherein natural and biotic waste is converted into a source of nourishment for the soil. This not only promotes healthy growth in plants but also paves the way towards sustainability. It is the biological decomposition of organic matter under controlled conditions.
  • Waste-to-energy: In this process, non-dangerous waste is burnt to generate energy in the form of electricity or steam. rather than dumping it in a landfill. Currently, many developed countries are using the waste-to-energy method. As per a report by Grandview Research, in Europe, the waste-to-energy market size was estimated to be $13.88 billion in 2022 and is expected to grow at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 14.4% from 2023 to 2030.

Importance of waste management

As per a report, over two billion metric tonnes of MSW are generated globally every year. This is projected to grow by about 70% by 2050. Till the time waste is being generated recklessly, its management is going to be of paramount importance. Waste management helps in creating a circular economy, in which commodities and their substances are used and reused instead of being discarded after just one use. 

Public Health

Waste management is proportionally related to public health and the general well-being of individuals. Proper waste management ensures that our air, groundwater, and soil are not contaminated, leading to a higher quality of food products and a healthier human and wildlife. Efficient waste management practices reduce the occurrence of diseases, leading to greater life expectancy and low mortality rates among workers and communities handling waste.

Conservation of Resources

Waste management leads to resource optimisation, reducing the pressure on natural resources that are finite. This also leads to greater imagination and vision among those who are dedicated towards finding new and groundbreaking solutions to the existing problem of environmental degradation. By controlling the emission of greenhouse gases and creating energy in the form of electricity or steam through waste, waste management also helps in protecting our environment.

Economic Benefits

Waste management provides employment in various sectors, such as recycling, collection of waste, and its sorting. Moreover, the retrieval of substances from waste management contributes towards greater economic development as these are in turn supplied to various industries, enhancing their productivity and cost reduction. 

Challenges faced in managing waste

  • The World Bank estimates that at least 33% of today’s waste is not managed properly because of dumping and burning, leading to adverse effects on soil, groundwater, and the atmosphere. The fact that our food, in terms of crops and livestock, comes from contaminated sources is a matter of great concern.
  • Since building a proper system for waste management is cost-intensive, many developing countries are not able to invest in it. This leads to reduced efficiency and increased operational costs with limited availability for service expansion. Lack of adequate infrastructure leads to illegal dumping and littering, causing health concerns and greater contamination.
  • In the realm of rising population and increasing industrialisation, waste materials generated are more than that can be managed by manual labour alone. If left uncared for, this leads to serious health hazards; hence, automation is the need of the hour.
  • There is a lack of general understanding and proper education about waste disposal among the citizens. Due to which unknowingly people mix polluted and non-recyclable items with the recyclable ones, reducing their quality and increasing their processing costs. The average recycling contamination rate is 25%, or 1 in 4 items.
  • There is a shortage of a technically educated and experienced workforce, required for a lot of sensitive and dangerous tasks. As a result, there is also a dearth of people who can handle and manage complicated machinery. This leads to greater costs of operation, mismanaged collection, lower productivity, and reduced resource optimisation in the waste management sector.

Artificial Intelligence

Artificial intelligence (AI) refers to computer systems capable of performing complex tasks that historically only a human could do, such as reasoning, making decisions, and solving problems. Artificial intelligence not only leads to a more changed and revolutionised world but also makes operations more cost-effective. Less human involvement also reduces the scope of mistakes and errors.

AI in waste management

Human beings are having a negative and poisoning impact on oceans and the environment as a whole. We need a solution to creating or recreating the clean oceans that we had. Ecosystems are very complex, wherein everything interacts with everything, and we don’t know the impact of putting things into the atmosphere and the resulting changes thereafter. There is a need for running large geoengineering experiments on a global scale to understand how a whole ecosystem works. AI, with the help of sensors and better machine learning, can do this in a way that experiments can be conducted, inferences can be drawn, and better decisions can be taken. Artificial intelligence is prevalent across many industries, from healthcare to advertising. When implemented properly, AI can be very beneficial in waste management. According to the World Bank, annual waste management is expected to rise by 73% to about 3.88 billion metric tonnes from 2020 to 2050. This is a staggering figure, and the clock is ticking. The world cannot afford to wait any longer for efficient waste management if we want a sustainable future for generations to come. All over the world, waste management has predominantly been labour intensive, but this is changing as a result of AI. Most countries are now waking up to the advantages of incorporating AI into the processing and management of waste. Countries like South Korea, Finland, and Australia have begun tackling 3 out of the 4 steps required in managing waste with the help of AI. AI can be employed in waste management to enhance efficiency, optimise processes, and contribute to sustainable practices.

Ways in which AI can be utilised in waste management

AI can be utilised in waste management in the following ways:

  • Smart Bin Technology: This technology installs sensors in waste bins to monitor and measure the level of waste. It uses AI algorithms to analyse this data and predict fill times. Hence, this results in less distance travelled, leading to optimisation of routes, reduction in fuel consumption, and carbon emissions causing significant cost savings. It sorts garbage soon after disposal via cameras, leading to no human intervention and very little or no contamination. It is preferred in places with a greater footfall of people, like hospitals, airports, stadiums, and commercial buildings. A very good example of this technology is TrashBot.
  • Material Recovery Facility: A material recovery facility (MRF) is a unique system used for sorting and recycling of waste. Here sorting is done in a phased manner so that each item that is reusable can be sold to manufacturers, leading not only to reduced garbage ending up in landfills but also to greater resource optimisation and cost reduction for industries. Firstly, the items that cannot be recycled and are dangerous and contaminated are removed and sent for disposal. Secondly, cardboards are separated from jars, and papers are separated by blowing air on the conveyor belt. Thirdly, metals are separated with the help of electromagnets, and glasses are crushed for easy transportation. Lastly, plastics are separated using infrared technology. 
  • Automated Sorting: In the past, sorting recyclable materials has relied heavily on manual labour, leading to errors and wastage of time. But with AI-powered sorting systems that utilise mind-boggling computer vision and machine learning algorithms, things have changed for good. These systems accurately identify and categorise recyclables with unmatched precision and efficiency. Now high-resolution cameras capture vast amounts of visual data, enabling AI algorithms to distinguish plastics, paper, glass, metal, and other materials effortlessly. This innovative technology ensures efficient segregation at recycling facilities. AMP Robots have taken recycling to the next level with their AI-guided robotic systems. Over time, they adapt and improve their accuracy in identifying new objects. AI-powered image recognition systems are being employed to automatically sort waste into categories such as recyclable, organic, and non-recyclable. Robotic systems equipped with AI vision are used to sort items on conveyor belts at recycling facilities apart from cleaning and maintenance of waste facilities. These systems not only streamline recycling but also reduce contamination, ensuring high-quality recycled materials that are ready for a second life.  
  • Automated Waste Collection Systems (AWCS): These state-of-the-art systems employ a network of underground pneumatic tubes, enabling the transportation of waste from various establishments directly to centralised collection facilities, eliminating the conventional reliance on collection vehicles.
  • Landfill Technologies: Landfill technologies have undergone significant advancements. Today’s advanced landfill technologies include enhanced liner systems to prevent leachate leakage, efficient gas collection systems to capture and utilise methane emissions, and optimised landfill covers to control odour and manage gas emissions.
  • E-waste Management Technologies: Modern e-waste management technologies facilitate the efficient collection, sorting, and processing of electronic waste, enabling the recovery of valuable materials and the safe disposal of hazardous components. Such technologies encompass advanced processes like hydrometallurgical and biotechnological methods.
  • Hazardous Waste Management Technologies: Hazardous Waste Management Technologies manage, treat, and dispose of hazardous waste with utmost precision and care. Innovative technologies in this sector range from advanced thermal treatment processes to sophisticated chemical stabilisation techniques. These processes are aimed at neutralising the harmful effects of hazardous waste, facilitating its safe disposal, and minimising risks.
  • Predictive Analytics: AI is used to analyse historical data and predict future waste generation patterns, optimise collection schedules, and allocate resources based on predictive analytics.
  • Monitoring and Reporting: AI can be used in monitoring landfill sites for environmental compliance and potential issues, generating real-time reports on waste generation, recycling rates, and landfill usage.
  • Optimising Recycling Processes: AI can improve recycling efficiency by identifying and extracting recyclable materials from complex waste streams. It enhances the operations at a recycling facility by automating tasks such as quality control and material separation.
  • Demand Forecasting and Supply Chain Optimisation: AI algorithms can optimise the supply chain for waste management by analysing historical data, market trends, and environmental factors to forecast the demand for recycling materials. This information helps businesses to make informed decisions about production, inventory management, and resource allocation. Companies can now track the origin, composition, and processing history of recycled materials throughout the supply chain. Transparency becomes the new norm, promoting trust and ethical practices.
  • Smart Waste Management Platforms: AI can help in developing platforms that integrate data from various sources, including sensors, IOT devices, and waste management facilities, to provide real-time insights and analytics for better decision-making.
  • Blockchain for Waste Tracking: AI can implement blockchain technology to create a transparent system for tracking waste from its source to its final disposal, assisting in education and outreach.
  • AI-powered Chatbots for Virtual Assistance: AI-powered chatbots can help in providing information and guidance on proper waste disposal and recycling in an easy-to-understand way. They can assist municipalities and organisations to take informed, data-driven decisions leading to improved efficiency, reduced operational costs, and better outcomes across various departments.
  • Predictive Maintenance: Waste management machines are subject to a lot of wear and tear, which can result in breakdowns and failures. AI-powered machines can predict when a machine is likely to fail and notify the maintenance team to perform preventive maintenance.
  • Waste Reduction: AI can identify areas where waste can be reduced, such as packaging, production, and consumption. By analysing data, AI can help companies identify areas where waste is being generated and develop strategies to reduce waste.
  • Energy Recovery: AI-powered machines can monitor the waste-to-energy process and optimise it to produce more energy while reducing waste.

Incorporation of AI in waste management

Countries across the globe are making substantial investments in research and implementation of AI in the area of waste management. This is because they are aware of its advantages and importance. China has set a goal of becoming a $150 billion AI global leader by 2030. The United States of America has channelled $10 billion in venture capital funding towards AI. UK has channelled almost 38% of the entire venture capital into AI. Canada has committed $125 million for research in AI. Russia is investing $12.5 million annually into AI.

  • IBM, with their groundbreaking recycling technology called VolCat, is a game changer. It leverages AI and machine learning algorithms to analyse the chemical properties of plastic waste and then recommends the most effective recycling methods, revolutionising the field of plastic recycling and leading to environmental conservation.
  • Zen Robotics, a Finnish company, has harnessed the power of AI to revolutionise recycling in the construction and demolition industry. Their AI-powered robotics system identifies and sorts different materials like wood, concrete, and metals, improving recycling efficiency and reducing the need for manual labour.
  • Tomra, a German company at the forefront of recycling technology, has introduced a cutting-edge AI-powered system known as Autosort. It identifies and eliminates contaminants from recycling streams with unparalleled precision, apart from separating various materials like plastic, metals, and paper. It detects and removes non-recyclable materials and hazardous substances.
  • Pellenc ST, a French company, identifies and separates different types of plastics based on their chemical composition and colour. The result is high-quality recycled plastics ready to be transformed into a myriad of new products.

India and AI in waste management

Looking at the global trend and the extent to which a populated country like India contributes to waste generation, it has started making advancements to incorporate AI in waste management. Products like waste sorters are being developed and manufactured. A lot of startups have also come up to help people and organisations to manage waste scientifically. Here are a few examples.

  • NAMO E-waste Company collects and segregates e-waste from different states and union territories in India. They also sell refurbished devices online. Waste that cannot be used is broken down, and materials like copper, iron, and aluminium are sold to factories. 
  • The GEM Enviro Management company collects plastic used for wrapping and packing goods from various organisations and offices. This plastic is then used to produce consumer goods like caps, bags, and apparel.
  • ExtraCarbon waste management company deals in scrap services contributing towards recycling and a sustainable lifestyle.
  • Scarpshala helps in recycling trash. They use trash to make home utility and decorative products. They sell these products both online and offline.
  • Paperman is a Chennai-based organisation. They not only collect items that can be recycled but also spread awareness among students in schools through programs.
  • Ishitva Robotic Systems (IRS) is an Ahmedabad-based startup. They have come up with an IOT-enabled device called Sanjivani. It is capable of differentiating between recyclable and non-recyclable waste.

Challenges and hindrances

  • AI requires very high initial investments, and not all countries, especially the third-world countries, can afford to set aside huge sums of money for technological innovations.
  • AI-powered technologies are complicated and require technically skilled personnel to manage, interpret, implement, and maintain them. Developing countries, where providing basic education to its citizens is a challenge, find it difficult to hire such a trained and educated workforce.
  • Many labour-intensive countries also find it difficult to implement AI systems in different sectors of governance and management, as there is a risk of potential resistance and backlash from the general public regarding job replacement.
  • AI uses complex algorithms and substantial data for its functioning, leading to concerns pertaining to privacy and security within organisations and departments.

Suggested tips and techniques

As the current era is marked by rapid technological advancements, these latest waste management technologies provide us with hope and innovation. They promise a future where waste management will align with the global aspirations of sustainability and environmental preservation so as to bring harmony between technology and ecology. Below are a few suggestions that could lead to responsible planning and implementation of waste management methods and technologies.

  • Prevention is better than cure; hence, the “Three Rs” – reduce, reuse, and recycle, should be strictly adhered to. When we restrict ourselves from using items that are meant for single use, we reduce waste generation. Usage of products multiple times leads to resource optimisation and a cleaner environment.
  • Regulation and monitoring are a must in any sector of a country. This not only holds the departments accountable but also leads to greater operational transparency, prompt decision-making, and increased efficiency.
  • Governments and organisations should initiate pilot projects to check and showcase the feasibility and benefits of AI-driven waste management solutions. This will help in building public awareness and in assessing its economic and environmental impacts.
  • Training programs and capacity-building initiatives should be offered to waste management professionals to enhance their understanding of AI technologies leading to their effective implementation.
  • Continued research and innovation should be carried out in collaboration with researchers and academicians to keep up with the rapid advancements in AI technologies. This will lead to finding need-based models and algorithms suitable for specific waste management challenges.
  • Governments, waste management agencies, and organisations should invest actively in building required infrastructure like smart sensors, IoT devices, and other technologies to support AI-driven waste management solutions.
  • Efforts should be made to collect, share, and maintain high-quality waste-related data for accurate predictions and informed decision-making. As AI systems rely on data, it is crucial to address privacy concerns associated with data collection, processing, and storage.
  • Governments, companies, and organisations should initiate public awareness campaigns via social media, print media, and workshops to educate the general public about proper waste disposal practices in order to reduce human intervention in the contamination of waste. 

Conclusion

It is clear that AI has immense potential for revolutionising the waste management industry. The challenges faced require innovative solutions, and AI can help provide them and contribute to a cleaner and healthier future. With research, collaboration, and innovation, the mammoth task of recycling can be eased. By introducing more AI technologies, data analysis, and machine learning, recycling can be developed into a joyful task rather than just a mundane responsibility. The conscious decisions taken today will play an important role in reducing waste, preserving resources, and building a sustainable world for generations to come. Thus, finding innovative answers to the coming challenges and effective usage of the latest waste management practices is not just crucial but vital.

References

  1. Visual Feature | Beat Plastic Pollution (unep.org)
  2. Is only 9% of plastic is recycled? (bpf.co.uk)
  3. Circular economy: definition, importance and benefits | Topics | European Parliament (europa.eu)
  4. ‘There Is A Lot You Can Do With Waste’: Startups In India Giving A Unique Spin To Waste Management | Independence Day Special (ndtv.com)
  5. Plastic Ban: What India Can Learn From Other Countries | Plastic Waste (ndtv.com)
  6. Are Humans the Biggest Barrier to Recycling? How Does AI Help? – CleanRobotics
  7. Solid Waste Management (worldbank.org)
  8. Artificial intelligence for waste management in smart cities: a review | Environmental Chemistry Letters (springer.com)
  9. 5 Waste Management Terms Everyone Should Know About | Waste Management (ndtv.com)
  10. Artificial Intelligence in Waste Management – Artificial Intelligence + (aiplusinfo.com)
  11. 4 ways AI can revolutionize waste management | Smart Cities | (allerin.com)
  12. Smart waste management: A paradigm shift enabled by artificial intelligence – ScienceDirect
  13. Overcoming 8 Waste Management Challenges in 2024 (upperinc.com)
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Intellectual property and social justice : an insight

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This article was written by Shweta Sharma, pursuing the Diploma in Intellectual Property: Prosecution, Licensing, and Litigation Course from LawSikho, and edited by Koushik Chittella.

Introduction 

A fascinating concept is the intersection of intellectual property and social justice. The most challenging work for makers of intellectual property law was to strike a balance between both. Intellectual property and social justice are the backbones of a developed society. The intellect of humans creates intellectual property. It includes innovations, artistic work, designs, etc., whereas social justice deals with equality and fair treatment among the people of society. It helps to maintain a just and fair environment in society, so every person can have equal rights and be protected from unfair treatment. Many scholars have criticised intellectual property laws and stated that intellectual property law restricts the rights granted by social justice, whereas, in contrast, other scholars believe that there is a harmonious balance between intellectual property and social justice. Still, a few questions arise: How do intellectual property and social justice intersect with each other? What impact do intellectual property rights have on social justice? And how do lawmakers try to balance both? Let’s dive into the article and find the answers to these questions. 

Intellectual property rights and social justice

The intellectual property rights and rights granted under social justice are poles apart, yet they intersect with each other at a point. Intellectual property laws focus on the rights of individuals, ensuring that the creator of the intellectual property gets due credit. Contrary to this, social justice focusses on the rights of society at large, emphasising that every individual can get equal treatment and opportunities. If any state or country withholds the due credit of the creator of intellectual property based on colour, race, gender, habitat, etc., then social justice steps in to give credit to the creators of the intellectual property without any discrimination and protects them from unfair treatment. At this point, intellectual property rights and rights under social justice intersect, as the aim of both is to protect individuals from unfair treatment and ensure that every person gets treated equally, and no one should be deprived of their credit for the work they have done. 

For many generations, black artists faced discrimination in various aspects; they were denied the fruits of intellectual property protection relating to copyright royalties and fair compensation. Institutional discrimination, teamed with intellectual property and contract law, resulted in the widespread under-protection of black artistic creativity. Similarly, black inventors created technical and scientific works that impacted early American industries. Evidence exists that black inventors also faced similar divestiture in the industrial marketplace. 

Impact on social justice

Intellectual property rights are monopolist in nature. It grants the creator of intellectual property all rights to create and distribute the intellectual property. Intellectual property rights prevent third parties from using the intellectual property of the creator without his consent; thus, the creator maintains a monopoly over that intellectual property. Therefore, when the government grants an inventor a patent on an invention, the inventor has a monopoly over that invention. Due to this, the industrialist quotes a higher price for their patented product as, firstly, there is no competition in the market; secondly, the industrialist has a monopoly over that product as a third party cannot use the patented product without the creator’s consent. Unauthorised work is prohibited under the intellectual property law. Therefore, developing countries or poor countries find it difficult to access that product due to its high prices. Many patents are granted to pharmaceutical companies, and these companies quote the higher prices for the medicines they sell, due to which a normal person cannot afford those medicines; thus, these medicines are only accessible to a section of people in the society.

For example, Revlimid is a cancer drug. Which is the most expensive drug available in the market, priced at over $125,000 per year. Celgene has sought 105 patents on Revlimid, many of which have been granted, extending its monopoly until the end of 2036. That gives the Revlimid patent portfolio a lifespan of 40 years, which is being used to block or deter generic competitors from entering the market.

Environmental rights and social justice

Social justice is part of the broader concept of justice. Social justice includes not only the social aspects but also economic, political, environmental, and cultural aspects. Therefore, social justice is a wider phenomenon. Environmental rights are also part of social justice. Many diseases are spreading in agricultural areas, of which the most chronic diseases are related to breathing and kidneys. The main reason for the spread of these chronic diseases is the vast usage of agrochemical products. Sri Lanka is a country that has faced this disaster. Most of the agro-chemical products are manufactured by patented multinational companies. However, these products are virtually not environmentally friendly. Therefore, the environment and health of the people are seriously damaged in the agricultural lands. When the patent is granted, the emphasis is not given to the fact that the patent may seriously harm people and the environment.

Artificial intelligence and social justice

As social justice is a wider phenomenon, it includes the privacy rights of individuals. The UAE on 30th July 2024 issued a charter for the development and use of artificial intelligence, out of which the one principle is related to data privacy, as they recognised that data privacy is the top priority for the public. IP protection should not be extended to AI programs doing dangerous or very important work, such as medical diagnosis, facial recognition, or driving a car, unless the AI program is fully transparent or XAI compliant. Even in non-intrinsically important matters such as online shopping, online searching, social media interactions, and other settings, important privacy concerns arise from the use of AI programs gobbling up the data points from each interaction. The acquisition, accumulation, or use of user data by the AI programs in such settings should not be afforded IP protection unless they are XAI compliant such that users and regulators can effectively understand and make judgements about which sorts of intrusions should be allowed or which should be limited.

The balance between intellectual property rights and social justice

The intellectual property law is enacted by keeping in mind all the relevant aspects. The lawmakers tried to maintain a balance between intellectual property and social justice so that neither the individual’s rights under intellectual property nor the societal rights of people under social justice are harmed. To maintain the balance, lawmakers have put a time cap on the rights granted under intellectual property.

Patents under the Patents Act, 1970

  1. As per Section 53 of the Patents Act 1970, a patent in India is granted to the creator for twenty years. After that, the patented intellectual property will fall under the public domain, which means that after the expiry of twenty years, any person can use the subject of intellectual property.
  2. Section 84 of the Patents Act 1970, prevents exploitation by the industrialists. It mentions that after the expiry of three years from the date of grant of a patent there are certain grounds upon which any person can apply to the Controller for the grant of compulsory license on that patent. The following are those grounds:
  • that the reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the patented invention have not been satisfied, or
  • as the patent invention is not accessible to the public at a reasonably affordable price or
  • that the patented invention has not worked in the territory of India.

Copyright under the Copyright Act, 1957

  • As per Section 22 of the Copyright Act, 1957, copyright is granted for a lifetime of the author and sixty years after the death of the author; after the expiry of sixty years, the copyrighted work falls under the public domain; thus, after falling in the public domain, any person can use that work.
  • There are certain exceptions mentioned under Section 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957, where under these exceptions using copyright work does not amount to infringement, and copyright work can be used without obtaining consent from the original author.

As per Section 52(1)(a) of the Copyright Act, 1957, the copyrighted work can be used for research, criticism, educational purposes, etc. For this, no license or consent is required from the original author of the copyrighted work.

Thus, by incorporating these sections of limitations, the lawmakers try to protect the rights guaranteed under social justice without harming the rights of intellectual property owners. Intellectual property rights are not in perpetuity, as lawmakers had put a cap on the time period for the usage of intellectual property by considering all the aspects.

Conclusion

Intellectual property law has its pros and cons like any other law, but it is the most essential law for the creators and inventors of intellectual property. It is requisite to grant intellectual property rights to the creator of an intellectual property. This helps to give credit to creators/inventors for the hard work they have done by creating new inventions and artistic works, and it acts as an encouragement for creators to contribute more to society. If these rights are not granted to the creators, then the creators will lose their will to create intellectual property, and it also leads to injustice to them as they will not get the due credit for their work, and some other persons might copy their work and get all the benefits. Thus, it is important to grant intellectual property rights as it prevents the unauthorised use of intellectual property. It is also essential to limit intellectual property rights so that other rights under social justice might not be harmed and every individual shall benefit from it. Therefore, there is a time limit on the intellectual property, as creators cannot claim monopoly after the expiry of that period. Striking a balance between social justice and intellectual property is difficult but not impractical; lawmakers should keep in mind the social justice aspects while framing new laws related to intellectual property.

References

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B.P. Singhal vs. Union of India (2010) 

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This article is written by Gargi Lad. The article provides a detailed analysis of the landmark case of B.P Singhal vs. Union of India (2010). The article further elaborates on the facts of the case, issues, as well as the arguments made by both parties. It refers to various committee reports and forms a critical analysis of the case. The article also looks into the rationale behind the judgement and future implications of the case. It delves into the powers bestowed upon the President and how the same should be exercised with regards to the removal of the Governor. 

Table of Contents

Introduction

Governors, usually called the nominal heads of the State, are individuals who represent the State before the Central Government. The role that a Governor plays is quite vital for maintaining balance between the states and the Centre. A Governor is appointed by the President, but he is not an employee of the centre. He works for the State. However, his functions are of such a nature that they work for both the Centre and the State. There is no master-servant relationship between the President and the Governor, even though the Governor’s appointment was made by the President.

The B.P. Singhal vs. Union of India (2010) case laid down a list of binding principles and a skeleton for what the doctrine of pleasure is, by comprehensively interpreting Articles 155 (appointment of Governor) and 156 (term of office of Governor) of the Indian Constitution. The case upholds constitutional principles and limits the President’s powers granted by the Constitution itself. Since the phrase “pleasure of the President” was interpreted in manners favouring the President, the Court set a framework via this case, regarding when the Governor would be removed by the President and what the term would be otherwise. The interpretation of the doctrine of pleasure here was narrowed down by the courts to avoid misuse and arbitrariness.

Details of the case

Name of the case

B.P. Singhal vs. Union of India 

Parties

Petitioner: B.P. Singhal

Respondent: Union of India

Court

Supreme Court of India

Case Type

Civil Original Jurisdiction

Constitutional Bench

Chief Justice K G Balakrishnan, Justice P Sathasivam, Justice B Sudershan Reddy, Justice R. V. Raveendran and Justice S H Kapadia

Date of Judgement

May 7th, 2010

Citation

2010 6 SCC 331

Background of the case

Governor

A Governor is the nominal head of a State, who has the role of overlooking the functioning of the State and its organs. He works in accordance with the advice of the council of ministers. The Governor is a vital link between the State and the Centre, as he reports directly to the Central Government, raises any concerns that the State has with the Centre, and is the face of that State. According to Article 153, every State ought to have a Governor. However, there exist certain exceptions wherein two states have one common Governor, such as Mr. Devanand Konwar, who served as a Governor for both Bihar and West Bengal.

Governors are appointed by the President and their term of holding that public office is mentioned under Article 156. According to Articles 155 and 156 of the Constitution of India, the President appoints the Governor for a period of five years and the Governor holds office only at the pleasure of the President. The responsibility of nominating a Governor for each state has been given to the Central Government. It is pertinent to note that the office of the Governor is an independent constitutional office and the Governor does not work under the Union Government. 

Qualifications of the Governor- Only a person who is an Indian citizen and has completed at least 35 years of age is eligible to become a Governor, as per Article 157 of the Indian Constitution. It is important to note that the Governor should not be a member of the House of Parliament or the House of Legislature and should not hold any other office of profit. 

Resignation by the Governor- The Constitution also lays down that the Governor holds office at the pleasure of the President. According to Article 156(2), the Governor can resign from his office by writing to the President of India.

Committee Reports

Sarkaria Commission

This Commission was also known as the Commission on Centre-State Relations. It was established to distribute powers and responsibilities amongst the State and the Centre and to avoid any interference that may lead to disputes between them. The Government of India set up this Commission in 1983, with the aim of overseeing and recommending changes that were needed for the proper functioning of both Central and State Governments and enhance their efficiency by effectively distributing their powers. The chairman of this Commission was R.S. Sarkaria, along with two other members, namely, Shri B. Sivaraman and Dr. S. R. Sen. 

The Commission observed that in cases where there is an unstable State government, a state emergency is proclaimed. Here, the Governor plays a role of high importance and impact. These scenarios highlighted that a Governor played important roles in maintaining Centre-State relations and adequately exercising the powers given to him. Further, the Commission separately dealt with Governors under Chapter 4 of the report, which delved into the appointment, removal, significance and role of the Governor, in detail. The Commission recommended the following to remove an aspect of partiality in the actions of the Governor towards the centre and to maintain a harmonious relationship between the State and the Centre:

  •  A Governor shall be an eminent individual from outside the State.
  • He shall not be actively involved in any kind of local politics.
  • He shall not have been an active part of any recent political acts.

Along with this, the Commission received a list of suggestions regarding what the removal process for the Governors of each state could be:

  •  Inquiry by the Supreme Court
  •  Investigation into his conduct by state committee
  •  Process similar to that of a Supreme Court judge
  •  Impeachment  

The removal of a Governor cannot be done in the manners stated above, as a Governor is a member of the executive and dispenses multifaceted functions. His powers are diverse and he works for both the Union and the State. The committee gave its recommendation on the list given above, stating:

  • There can be no inquiry held by the Supreme Court for the decision to remove a Governor, as this involves interference by the judiciary in the functioning of the executive. If the inquiry is held by the Supreme Court, the decision might be of a nature that is in favour of the judiciary.
  • State committees might have a negative bias towards the Governor if it is assumed that a Governor dispenses functions for both the Union and the State. The state committee might find the Governor to be biassed and in turn, remove him from the post.
  • Removal processes similar to those of a Supreme Court judge cannot be followed, as the functions, role and power of a Supreme Court judge and that of a Governor are completely different and thus the procedure for the removal of both cannot be the same.

The Commission, in further paragraphs, also mentioned that the Governor shall not be removed without giving any adequate reasons or grounds. He shall be given a guarantee of serving for the term defined in the Constitution of India, which is, 5 years, to serve the country impartially. As under Paragraph 4.7.08 of the report, the Commission stated clearly that the term of the Governor shall not be disturbed by anyone until a rare and compelling reason exists. Once they believe that such reasons exist, the Union shall lay a statement before both houses of Parliament, and the Governor shall be given a chance to be heard and to show cause against his removal.

Venkatachaliah Commission

The Commission was established in the year 2000. It was also known as the National Commision to review the working of the Constitution and was headed by former Chief Justice of India Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah. Soli Sorabjee and B. P. Jeevan Reddy were some of the members of this committee. It aimed to establish a fair appointment procedure for Governors and also accurately determine his/her role.

The Governor of any state shall be appointed by a committee composed of the Prime Minister, the speaker of the Lok Sabha, the Home Minister and the Chief Minister of the State where the Governor is being appointed. Governors should be allowed to complete a 5-year term. If any removal has to take place, the Central Government shall do it with advice from the Chief Minister. The role of the Governor is to act as a friend, philosopher and guide to the State Government and to use the discretionary powers bestowed on him in rare cases only. He or she shall not interfere in the daily administrative functioning of the State.

Punchhi Commission

This Commission, established in 2007, consisted of Justice Madan Mohan Punchhi (former Chief Justice of India), as chairman. Some of the notable members were Mr. Dhirendra Singh (former Secretary to the Government of India) and Mr. Vijay Shankar (former director of the Central Bureau of Investigation) as member secretary. The Commission, in the report submitted in 2010, recommended that the phrase “during the pleasure of the President”, be deleted from the provision altogether, as it was deemed to be violative of the Governor’s right to hold the post and also prevents him from exercising his duties properly. It implies that a Governor can be removed at any time at the will of the Central Government, and this may impact his decision making power, since he might be biased towards making decisions as per the Union Government’s ideas. The Commission laid down a solution for this, in its further recommendations- it suggested that the removal of the Governor may instead happen by way of a resolution in the State Legislature, as it would ensure stability in his term as Governor and would also be fair, rather than arbitrary. His decision making power would not be impacted.

Doctrine of pleasure

Scope 

The Privy Council, in the case of Shenton vs. Smith (1895), highlighted the importance of the doctrine of pleasure. The Council stated that this doctrine holds a lot of importance because, in the absence of it, the removal of a civil servant who might have a negative effect on the State, would become difficult. 

This doctrine was also upheld in the case of Dunn vs. Queen (1896). The Court was of the opinion that civil servants have no fixed tenure and the Crown may decide their term or tenure on the basis of its discretion. The Crown has the right to exercise its discretionary power with regards to the term, as the servants work under it and hence shall work in accordance with its rules. If that is not the case, the civil servant may be terminated from the post, and his tenure would end there. The Court also referred to the common rule and was of the opinion that because such public servants are employed for public good, such employment should be determined by the Crown itself. However, in certain exceptional circumstances, for the welfare of the people, certain restrictions could be imposed on the powers that were given to the Crown.

History of the doctrine of pleasure

In India

The President is considered to be the head of the Executive Union and holds the same position as that of the Crown. Hence, the President has been given the power to remove a civil servant under the doctrine of pleasure. Similarly, a civil servant of the State is considered to work at the pleasure of the Governor.  It is pertinent to note that even though this doctrine is followed in India, it was accepted only after certain modifications were made to the original concept as introduced in England. 

In England

As the East India Company entered India, they brought the concept of the doctrine of pleasure along with them. It is derived from the Latin phrases, durante bene placito and durante bene placito regis, which mean “during good pleasure of” and “during good pleasure of the King” respectively. Any decision that was made by the King could not be questioned because he was considered to be the representative of God. Even after independence, this doctrine was considered important, as English law still has a major impact on the Indian legal system. It states that the employees of the Government are similar to the civil servants of the Crown. The application of the same can be seen during the appointment and termination of posts of the Government wherein members are chosen as per the discretion of the Union Government, and removed as per the will of the President.

Facts of B.P. Singhal vs. Union of India (2010)

B. P. Singhal, a former member of the Parliament, filed a public interest litigation under Article 32 (remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part), which highlighted the need for interpretation of Article 156 of the Constitution of India, which deals with the term of the Governor. On the advice of the Union Council of Ministers, the President of India, on July 2, 2004 removed the Governors of four states- Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Goa and Gujarat. The petitioner sought a writ of certiorari for quashing the removal of the four Governors by the President of India and also a writ of mandamus in order to allow the Governors to complete their remaining terms.

Issues raised

  1. Whether the petition is maintainable?
  2. What is the scope of doctrine of pleasure?
  3. What is the position of the Governor as per the constitution?
  4. Whether there are any express or implied limitations/restrictions on the power given under Article 156(1) of the Constitution?
  5. Whether the removal of Governors in exercise of the doctrine of pleasure is subject to judicial review?

Laws Involved in the case

Article 156 of the Indian Constitution

Article 156 was discussed and interpreted comprehensively in this case. The doctrine of pleasure, as stated under this provision, was interpreted by the Court, in a manner that does not involve granting unlimited power to the President.

Article 156(1) of the Indian Constitution

Clause (1) concerns itself with how the term of the Governor shall be operative at the “pleasure of the President.” When there is a mention of the doctrine of pleasure, it can be seen that this provision gives the President unlimited power to remove the Governor from his office, without any reasoning, on the mere basis of his wish. This shows an absolute use of power by the President, over the public office of the Governor and how the Centre controls the State Government. The provision lacks words such as, “on reasonable grounds” or “with proper reasoning.”

Article 156(2) of the Indian Constitution

This provision states that a Governor may resign from his office, by writing to the President.

Article 156(3) of the Indian Constitution

According to Article 156(3), the Governor’s term would be five years, which is equal to the term of the President. This provision is also an implied provision of the doctrine of pleasure, as the Governor shall continue to hold the office until the term of the President is in place.

Article 32 of the Indian Constitution

This provision is also called the heart and soul of the Constitution, by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, as Article 32 provides for protection against actions of the State, that lead to violations of the fundamental rights of the people. The right to Constitutional remedies as guaranteed under Article 32 itself is a right, and hence a writ petition arising out of a violation cannot be denied by the Apex Court. Under Article 32, the aggrieved, whose fundamental right is violated, can approach the Supreme Court and seek remedy for the violation. The remedy can be sought through a writ petition, and as the article states, there are five types of writs that one can file before the Supreme Court of India:

  • Mandamus
  •  Habeas corpus
  • Certiorari
  • Quo warranto
  •  Prohibition

An aggrieved person is usually the one who files a writ petition in the Supreme Court, but this can also be done by a person who is not a complete stranger to the case, such as a relative or a friend of the aggrieved, in situations of habeas corpus. Writs can also be filed in the public interest and are called public interest litigations. They are a collection of writs filed for the same cause or subject matter. In this matter, writs of mandamus and certiorari, were filed against the Central Government for the removal of four Governors, of the states of Haryana, Goa, Gujarat and Uttar Pradesh.

Article 74 of the Indian Constitution

Article 74 of the Indian Constitution delves into the duty of the Council of Ministers. The President is required to act on the advice of the Council and take their aid when it comes to necessary decisions made for the functioning of the government. The Council of Ministers shall advise the President on all matters and the President shall exercise his powers in accordance with the advice received. In cases with respect to removal of Government posts and removals from public offices, the Council shall advise the President regarding the same and he may then take further action by exercising the power given to him under the Constitution.

Arguments of the parties

Petitioners 

Maintainability of the petition

The petitioners asserted that the petition is maintainable, while relying on the judgement of S.P. Gupta vs. Union of India (1981), The court in this case, answered the question of whether a petition against public injury exists and who could file the same. The court opined that there might be an injury to the public interest (also termed a public injury) when the State or a public authority acts in violation of a constitutional obligation. Any member acting bona fide for the benefit of the public and having interest in the case may file a petition and maintain action for redressal. 

Scope of doctrine of pleasure

Regarding the term of the Governor, the petitioner was not adamant on an irrevocable tenure, but contended that there should be certainty in the term, in order to let the Governor efficiently discharge his duties. Constantly keeping the Governor under the threat that he may be removed from his position by the President, may make him a servant of the Union Government, as he would constantly try to be in the good books of the President to avoid his removal. There ought to be certain fixed rules regarding the removal of the Governor. 

Position of the Governor

The Governor is considered to be a very crucial part of the legislature of a State. The Governor, also called the head of the State, holds high constitutional values and duties. Each and every action that is taken by the government is taken in the name of the Governor. All the bills that are passed by the House of Legislature, are passed by the Governor before it becomes a law. The Governor generally is known for carrying out crucial constitutional functions. One of the major functions of the Governor is to act as a link between the Union Government and the State Government. When required, he also acts as an umpire who is unbiased and takes decisions on behalf of the State.

The fact that he is appointed by the President and holds his term according to the President’s pleasure, does not make him a servant of the Union and he is not accountable to the Union for any actions that are taken by him during this term. They also contended that his post is not subordinate to that of the Union and that his office as Governor, is independent. They stated that there are certain norms that should be followed in order to remove a Governor. The norms are as follows:

  • Norm 1- Removal can take place only when the Governor is deemed to be unfit.
  • Norm 2- Informing the Governor regarding the removal.
  • Norm 3- Judicial review of the removal.

Express or implied limitations/restrictions on the power given under Article 156(1) of the Constitution of India 

It was argued by the petitioner that there are certain restrictions under the doctrine of pleasure. There is a clear difference between Article 75(2), Article 76(4) and Article 156(1). Articles 75 and 76 provide for no restrictions on the doctrine of pleasure and Article 156 lays down certain restrictions on the same. The petitioner also interpreted the two provisions of the Constitution and opined that although the Governor holds office for five years, before expiry, he can resign voluntarily or be removed by the President. The most important restriction is that no employee shall be dismissed until and unless an inquiry has been made and the employee has been informed about the charges. The petitioner relied on the Report of the Sarkaria Commission on Centre-State Relations to support his arguments that removal can only be done after reasons for the same have been mentioned.

Removal of Governors in exercise of the doctrine of pleasure is subject to judicial review

It was contended that in a democracy where the rule of law prevails and there is no supreme authority beyond the Constitution, nobody has unlimited powers, and the removal of a constitutional post like that of a Governor is subject to judicial review. According to the rule of law, all powers vested in authorities by the Constitution should only be used for the public interest. Any order of removal of the Governor before his term ends shall be subject to a review.

To summarise, the petitioner sought three reliefs from the Court. Firstly, they sought a direction to the Union Government, to produce documents and files that form the basis of the order passed by the President on July 2, 2004. They also sought a writ of certiorari to quash the removal of the four Governors, and lastly, a writ of mandamus to allow the said four Governors to complete their terms.

Respondent

Maintainability of the petition

The respondents argued that the petition must be held as non-maintainable, since the aggrieved party did not approach the court for relief. They relied on the S.P. Gupta vs. Union of India (1981) judgement for the same, citing that the complaint of a member of the public, for a secondary public injury, cannot be maintained if the specific group of persons who are primarily injured, do not claim any relief. Hence they contended that Mr. B.P. Singhal had no locus standi to maintain this petition on behalf of the concerned Governors who were removed from office. The Governors belong to a respectable and known part of society and are not individuals deprived of the ability to seek relief and hence, a petition on their behalf shall not be held to be maintainable. 

Scope of doctrine of pleasure

The respondent was of the clear view that the Governor shall hold the office at the pleasure of the President and his removal shall not be due to a reason, such as, the Governor is unfit to hold the post or there exists corruption, etc. The Governor can be removed from his post at any time, as per the discretion of the President. This is because the President is the head of the country and he gets to choose and appoint a Governor of his choice for the betterment of the states and the proper functioning of the country. This upholds the concept of doctrine of pleasure, by stating that if and when situations of loss of confidence or lack of trust arise, a President has free will to remove a Governor from his post and terminate his office with immediate effect. The act of doing so, upholds the principles of the English law. There, it is the rule of the Crown that prevails, and here, it is the will of the President.

Position of the Governor

The respondent maintained a strict opinion that the position of the Governor in the country and a State, is that of an employee of the Union Government and that he does not hold any individual post that is independent of the government. They stated that the Governor ought to be in sync with the ideas and ideologies of the Union Government and hence, shall be removed if his ideas do not match that of the Union Government. The Governor is a person who imagines what a State must be like, and acts in a way that benefits the State government. However, the Governor also acts under the President, as the State and the Union government must work in symphony. Hence, his ideas shall be in consonance with those of the President. If the President finds any discrepancy in his opinions or finds that his ideas have no sync with the ideas of the Union, he may terminate him from the post of the Governor. The Governor relies on the confidence laid in him by the President. In case there is a loss of confidence in the Governor, the President may terminate him from his position.

Express or implied limitations/restrictions on the power given under Article 156(1) of the Constitution of India

The respondent argued that the Governor can also be removed if there is a loss of confidence in the Governor or if the ideologies of Governor and the Union Government do not match. As Article 156 clearly states, he shall hold the post at the pleasure of the President. There are no limitations on that power. They stated that ministers also hold posts as per the pleasure and discretion of the President and the same shall be applied to the post of Governor in the interest of the public.

Removal of Governors in exercise of doctrine of pleasure is subject to judicial review

It was put forward by the respondent that the removal of a Governor takes place by order of the President. The order depends on the discretion of the President, who forms his opinion based on the advice that is tendered to him by the ministers. As per the provisions of the Constitution of India, the aid and advice given by the ministers cannot be inquired into, by any court of law. This is where the doctrine of separation of powers comes into play, and hence, judicial review of a President’s action shall not take place.

Judgement in B.P. Singhal vs. Union of India (2010)

Rationale behind the judgement

Maintainability of the petition

The Court relied on the case of Ranji Thomas vs. Union of India (1990), in which a public interest litigation was filed for intervening to restrict the President of India from extracting resignation of various Governors. The court in this case had held that the Governors who were asked to resign, had not contended against it. Hence, the petitioner cannot challenge or protest the decision of the President because the party that had been affected, had no intention to challenge the same in the first instance. The court minutely observed and heard arguments from both sides and decided the case. However, it must be noted that though the aggrieved Governors had not approached the court to challenge their removal, the petition was still maintainable on the grounds that it gave rise to a public injury or harmed the public interest. The court couldn’t deny the fact that the public’s interest was at stake and merely because the aggrieved hadn’t challenged their removal, the petition couldn’t be sidelined. 

Scope of doctrine of pleasure

The Court relied upon varied cases that interpreted the need, scope and significance of the doctrine of pleasure to decide on the scope of this doctrine that would be applicable in the current times. 

The Court referred to the State of Bihar vs. Abdul Majid (1954) case, which upheld the doctrine of pleasure. The case dates back to 1954 and dealt with the English principle that civil servants are bound to a term as per the pleasure of the Crown and that they cannot enforce any special contract that states the opposite. However, the Supreme Court in the current matter also looked into whether a civil servant could file a case against the State or the Crown, for recovery of arrears of his rightful salary, as he held office at the pleasure of the Crown/State. The Court was against this principle and stated that it would not be applicable to India.

The Court interpreted the doctrine of pleasure by distinguishing between how the pleasure of the President is used among three sets of public posts and how the doctrine is applied with or without restrictions. Further, looking at the constitutional debates, it can be seen that varying levels of protection against the removal of servants were adopted.

  • At the pleasure of the President (absolute power without restrictions)- applies to ministers, Governors, Attorney General and Advocate General.
  • At the pleasure of the President (with certain restrictions)- applies to members of the defence and civil services, holders of posts connected to the civil or defence of the Union.
  • No doctrine of pleasure applies to the President, Judges of the Supreme Court, or of High Courts.

Position of the Governor

The position of a Governor was described specifically in the case of State of Rajasthan vs. Union of India (1977). The Governor is considered to be the constitutional head of the State and is also a channel of communication between the Union and the State. Additionally, the Governor is bound by the advice given to him by the Council of Ministers. However, the Governor is also given certain discretionary powers, which allow him to act independently. One of the independent functions he performs is making reports to the Union Government. He is also required to supervise the working of each organ of the government in the State.

The status of a Governor was also discussed in the case of Hargovind Pant vs. Dr. Raghukul Tilak (1979). It was held that the Governor is not an employee or a servant of the Government, even though he is appointed by the President. It is not necessary that every person employed by the President is an employee of the Government. For the above mentioned reasons, the Governor is also not accountable for the way in which he carries out his functions. The office of the Governor is not subordinate to that of the Government of India. The Governor, being the head of the State, has the authority to approve state legislations and also holds powers related to the executive. 

Express or implied limitations/restrictions on the power given under Article 156(1) of the Constitution of India

The Court relied on the petitioner’s contention regarding the removal of a Governor, which was based on the Report of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution and the Report of the Sarkaria Commission on Center-State Relations. The Court observed that the security of tenure of a Governor and a Supreme Court Judge is different, due to a difference in the scope of position and work. The Commission recommended that the Governor cannot be removed without a cause shown. The Commission also stated that the grounds for removal should be communicated to the Governor before he is terminated from his post. The Court relied on the above stated Commission findings to decide on this matter. 

Application of judicial review to the removal of Governors in exercise of doctrine of pleasure 

The Court referred to the case of R. Bancoult  vs. Foreign Secretary (2008). This case was related to an appeal against the judgement, which held Section 9 of the British Indian Ocean Territory to be invalid. The judgement was delivered by a Divisional Court and was further upheld by the Court of Appeal. In the appeal, the court held that on principles of rationality and legality, judicial review of the exercise of prerogative power can take place.

Further, the Court turned towards Epuru Sudhakar vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh (2006). In brief, a person was accused of murdering a political opponent and hence, was awarded the death sentence. The Governor had granted him pardon, but the Supreme Court quashed this pardon and stated that any pardoning power of a Governor can be quashed if such decision has been made on the basis of caste or religion. The Court, while deciding on the current case, was of the opinion that the subject matter is the main factor which determines whether prerogative power is subject to judicial review or not. The basic factor of evaluation of every decision is rule of law and every prerogative power should be subject to it. Prerogative power should only be exercised in a manner which is fair and certain. 

The Court also cited the cases of State of Rajasthan vs. Union of India (1977) and Kihota Hollohon vs. Zachilhu (1992). Questions were raised regarding the validity of the Tenth Schedule of the Indian Constitution. The court ultimately held that anti-defection laws do not violate any free speech rights. It was observed that regardless of any finality clause, the courts have the power to determine whether the actions of the authority are ultra vires the powers that have been vested in them. Any action which is malafide or is in contravention of any mandatory provision can be considered to be ultra vires.

Issue-wise judgement

Maintainability of the petition

The petitioner had no locus standi for relief being sought from the court. However, he had sufficient locus standi for maintaining his writ petition with regards to the scope of Article 156(1) and the doctrine of pleasure. 

Scope of doctrine of pleasure

In the current scenario, the use of this doctrine is different from the use of the doctrine of pleasure in earlier times, and there ought to be a distinction drawn between the two. The doctrine is used in democratic situations in a country like India, where the rule of law prevails over everything and the government has no right to act as it pleases or in an arbitrary manner. 

This doctrine is not a licence given to the government to act according to its whims and fancies. The doctrine shall be exercised in the interest of the public only, since this is a discretionary power. The Court was of the opinion that in India, the power to use the doctrine is not absolute and unfettered, but rather moderately restricted by the provisions present in the Constitution itself. Article 310(2), Article 311(1) and Article 311(2) contain the restrictions imposed on this power, so as to avoid any arbitrariness.

Direction given by the Court regarding the provision containing the term “at the pleasure” has no express limitations on the same and shall be read in accordance with the fundamentals of constitutionalism. There shall exist a valid reason to exercise the power, like in the public interest and not as per the mere wish of the Government. Along with this, the Court established that the degree of need for giving a reason for removal may vary depending on the circumstances of the case, but the need for giving a reason always exists.

Position of the Governor 

Since the initial stages of the establishment of the Constitution, the State and Centre had the same political parties in power. However, this has changed with time. The emerging concept of coalition politics has changed this view, wherein the regional parties share power along with the Union. The Court hence opined that the role of the Governor is that of a dual nature. The Governor, firstly, is the constitutional head of the State when he acts in accordance with the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers. Secondly, he also functions as a link between the Centre and the State. In some situations wherein the circumstances are such that the Governor is expected to discharge a function that he does not always discharge, he may step into the shoes of a special representative of the Union Government. However, this neither makes him the servant of the Union, nor the agent who discharges functions on behalf of the party holding majority.

Express or implied limitations/restrictions on the power given under Article 156(1) of the Constitution

There is no instance that shows that clause (1) of Article 156 is treated with any express limitation or restriction, and it is not accepted that clause (1) is subject to any express restriction imposed by clause (3). Removal of offices of ministers or the Attorney General of India, without any restriction, is permitted, as the intention of their office is to serve society, and when they assume office, they are made aware that their post is subject to the pleasure of the President. This is possible because the relationship between a President and the minister is purely political and different from the relationship between the President and the Governor. Reasons like loss of confidence in the Governor or his ideologies not being in support of those of the Union, cannot be used as reasons for his removal from the post of Governor, that is, because the Governor is an independent individual and not a servant of the Union. Ministers who have a different approach or idea than that of the Union might be harmful, as the primary purpose of their appointment is to serve the Union and be in sync with their ideologies. 

Application of judicial review to the removal of Governors in exercise of doctrine of pleasure 

There is a vast difference between the need for a cause and the need for disclosure of that cause. Courts have a limited power of judicial review in such cases. The Court elaborately identified situations wherein they can interfere in the removal of Governors, and when they cannot. In instances where the President has provided reasons for the removal of the Governor, the court can interfere if the reason that the President has provided is irrational or irrelevant. In cases where there is no reason provided by the President for the removal of the Governor from his post before his term ends, the court has a limited power of judicial review. The power can be exercised when the decision of removal is deemed to be either arbitrary, discriminatory or malafide. The extent of the power to excuse judicial review depends on the matter. Grounds like loss of confidence in the Governor cannot  be held as valid grounds and hence, would require judicial review.

Analysis of B.P. Singhal vs. Union of India (2010)

The case of B.P. Singhal vs. Union of India (2010) highlights that the President, without giving any reason or justification, can remove the Governor from his post. On the other hand, this case also lays down that the removal of the Governor should not be unreasonable. This creates a loophole, as the President can state any reason for the removal of any such Governor and whether his actions were reasonable or not depends on the facts of each case. This loophole also creates a situation wherein the President might get away with the decision that was made for such removal, even when it was not justified. 

This case has failed to provide clarity with respect to the burden of proof. Ideally, the President should prove that his decision was justified and not biased towards a political party. Instead, the Governor has been asked to prove that the removal was malafide. The right to be heard, which is an important aspect of natural justice, is also violated in case the President removes the Governor without any justification. Further, when the President removes the Governor, it also narrows down the court’s power of judicial review, as the President is not bound to give any reasons for the removal. It is also pertinent to note that such an act forces the Governor to please the President while performing his duties.

The laws in India are heavily influenced by the laws already existing in England. However, more clarity regarding when and how to use the doctrine of pleasure, is required. The major difference here is that India runs on a democratic system, whereas England doesn’t. Democracy on its own creates a responsibility to act for public good and interest and hence, the constant use of the doctrine of pleasure might not really be well suited for India.

Further implications of the case 

Rajendra Prasad Baudh vs. State Of U.P. Thru Secy. Housing And (2016)

The Court in the case of Rajendra Prasad Baudh vs. State of UP Thru Secy. Housing and Urban Planning (2016), also applied the principles that were laid down in the case of B.P. Singhal vs. Union of India (2010), which held that while exercising its power of nomination, the Government also has the power to exercise its discretion, but such discretion is not unfettered. The Court held that they would not interfere just because a different view of the action taken is possible. Any interference would only be done by the Government when the action taken is malafide or arbitrary in nature and absolutely requires interference.

Sunny K. George vs. State Of Kerala (2016)

In the case of Sunny K. George vs. State of Kerala (2016), the court referred to the case of B.P. Singhal vs. Union of India (2010), which has already discussed what amounts to the pleasure of the government and what does not. The petitioner also referred to this judgement, where it was laid down that the doctrine of pleasure as it existed a few years ago, and the doctrine that exists along with the concept of the rule of law, are very different. It was also held that this doctrine does not allow any authority to act arbitrarily. However, the court was of the opinion that a nomination of a member of a syndicate and the appointment of a Governor, as discussed in the B.P. Singhal case, are not the same.

Union Of India And Ors vs. Major S.P. Sharma And Ors (2014)

B.P. Singhal vs. Union of India (2010) was referred again in the case of Union of India And Ors. vs. Major S.P. Sharma and Ors. (2014), wherein the court discussed that in a place where rule of law exists, there does not exist a concept of unaccountable actions. This case discussed and held that the doctrine of pleasure does not give a person the power to remove a person from his post without any valid reasons. It also upheld that judicial review cannot be removed completely, but the degree of scrutiny may vary in different cases.

Conclusion

This landmark case of B.P Singhal vs. Union of India (2010), sums up how the power given to the President is discretionary and shall be used sparingly in rare and special circumstances, wherein the continuation of the office might lead to harm to the public interest. The Court clearly highlighted that the Governor is the Constitutional head of the State and should not work for the benefit of a political party. The case also gives clarity on the fact that the President has the power to remove the Governor at any point in time, but such removal should not be unlawful or unreasonable. Such removal can only take place in exceptional circumstances. Further, because the post of the Governor is a non-political one, he cannot be removed merely because the cabinet does not have faith in the Governor or if there is a change of Central Government. This case also points out that the burden of proof to show that his removal was arbitrary and malafide, is on the Governor.  This case clarified varied doubts regarding the exercise of power granted to the President, as well as the use of the doctrine of pleasure.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

What is a public interest litigation (PIL)?

It is a case filed for the protection of the interests of the public at large, wherein a significant number of people’s interests are at stake. Such interests can be pecuniary or constitutional. PILs are extensions of writ jurisdictions and hence, can be filed before either the Supreme Court or any High Court.

What is the writ of Mandamus?

Mandamus means “we command.”. This writ is issued as a command by a superior court to an inferior court or an individual holding a public office to perform its official duties or to correct any act that was an abuse of the discretionary power given to them.

What is the writ of certiorari?

Certiorari means “to be made more certain.” The writ of certiorari is used by a higher or superior court to review the cases tried in the lower courts. The higher court investigates such matters and further passes its opinion on them. It can quash any order passed by a lower court or also transfer it to any other judicial authority for consideration.

What is the doctrine of pleasure?

According to this doctrine, at any given point in time, the Crown has the power to terminate the services of a civil servant without any proper notice of termination. This is because it is considered that civil servants work at the pleasure of the Crown. If the Crown feels that keeping a civil servant is against public policy, then the Crown has the power to remove them.

Who is a Governor?

A Governor is the nominal head of the State who has the role of overlooking the functioning of the State and its organs. He is a vital link between the State and the Centre, as he reports directly to the Central Government, raises any concerns that the State has with the centre, and is the face of that State.

What are the roles and functions of the Governor?

The role of the Governor is to act as a friend, philosopher and guide to the State government and to use discretionary powers bestowed on him, in rare cases only. The Governor takes decisions for the State and acts in representative capacity for the State.

Does the Governor have the power of exercising his pleasure?

The Governor of a State is granted powers under Article 310 of the Constitution, wherein he can remove a person holding the post of  civil service under the State or any civil post in the State, if he deems that person to be unfit for the post. This is when he may exercise his pleasure in determining who is capable of holding the post and who is not. Exercising his power in this manner, is the right way to exercise the power granted to him and the correct use of the doctrine of pleasure. He may not be compelled to give reasons for the removal of that person, as it is his discretion to keep a person in that post or not.

References

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Bennett Coleman vs. Union of India (1973)

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Cossijurah case

This article is written by Arya Senapati. It attempts to analyse the facts, issues, arguments, judgements, and other finer points related to the case of Bennet Coleman v. Union of India (1973), which is a landmark case on freedom of the press in India. It also attempts to analyse the legal provisions, principles, and developments in the field of press freedom in India. 

Table of Contents

Introduction

In recent times, it has been common to come across headlines regarding the poor performance of India on press freedom indices maintained by global organisations. Many on the western side of the world view India as a nation that curbs its press freedom by imposing multiple restrictions, and they continue to voice their concerns over it. While the truth of the matter is debatable, it is essential to revisit the history of freedom of the press in India to understand its importance and significance in today’s world. The Constitution of India, by virtue of Part III, guarantees certain fundamental rights to its citizens. Article 19(1)(a) is a fundamental right that specifically addresses the freedom of speech and expression. It guarantees the liberty of free speech and expression to all citizens with reasonable restrictions based on the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the state, friendly relations with foreign states, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to an offence. 

These restrictions are imposed in matters of severe necessity and should not be imposed casually so as to allow complete realisation of fundamental rights. Every fundamental right has been interpreted by courts to include many others under its ambit. Freedom of speech and expression is a broad right that encompasses the freedom of the press. Therefore, free speech and free press are constitutional guarantees that ensure that every citizen gets their information from free sources. It also implies that the press shouldn’t have to compromise on their integrity and transparency due to undue interference from political elements. Free will is very important for a healthy democracy to function efficiently. These freedoms also include the power to criticise the state’s actions on reasonable grounds, to lay allegations against political parties and their representatives for misconduct, and to ensure that citizens are aware of all these occurrences so as to enable them to vote and choose their representatives wisely. 

Many political parties and representatives do not take such criticisms fairly and resort to force or undue pressure to control the voice of the press and get away with their actions. Thereby misleading the masses and controlling the way information is spread or disseminated. Therefore, it is highly important to preserve the sanctity of the media, as it is referred to as the fourth pillar of democracy or the watchdog of democracy. The term watchdog simply means that it oversees how democracy is protected or hampered by the actions of people and creates awareness regarding the same to protect the essence of democracy from being diluted in any manner. It is, therefore, the prerogative of the state to ensure non-interference when it comes to the press exercising its freedom to report an incident as it is. Owing to this ideology, there have been many cases in India regarding the protection of fundamental rights of the press. The most prominent one was Bennet Coleman v. Union of India (1973), which heralded an era of activism towards press freedom. Therefore, it is important to revisit this case while studying the freedom of the press in India.

Details of the case

  1. Name of the case: Bennett Coleman and Co. & Ors. v. Union of India
  2. Name of the petitioners: Bennett Coleman and Co., The Hindustan Times Ltd., The Indian Express
  3. Name of the respondent: Union of India
  4. Citation: AIR 1973 SC 106
  5. Date: 30.10.1972
  6. Court: Supreme Court of India
  7. Bench: S.M. Sikri, A.N. Ray, P. Jaganmohan Reddy, K.K. Mathew, and M. Hameedullah Beg
  8. Statutes referred: Constitution of India: Article 14, Article 19, Article 32; Import Control Order, 1955; Imports and Exports Control Act, 1947; Newsprint Control Order, 1962, Essential Commodities Act, 1955.

Facts of Bennett Coleman vs. Union of India (1973)

  • The petition was filed challenging the import policy for newsprint for the years 1972-1973, which was impeached as a consequence of the case as it was infringing upon the fundamental rights, i.e., Article 19(1)(a) and Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Certain provisions of the Newsprint Control Order 1962 were also challenged as they were violating Article 19(1)(a) and 14 of the Constitution. 
  • The primary impugned legislation that was challenged was the Import Control Order, 1955, passed under the Imports and Exports Control Act, 1947. This legislation dealt with import restrictions on newsprint. The sale, acquisition, and consumption of newsprint within the country were controlled by the Newsprint Control Order, 1962, which was passed under the validity of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, which was also challenged.
  • The order stated that no consumer, other than an importer, should be able to acquire newsprint without the authorisation of a controller, and no consumer must consume newsprint more than the quantity set by the controller. 
  • It also stated that no consumer of newsprint other than the publishers of textbooks or any books shall be allowed to use any kind of paper other than newsprint without the written permission of the controller. 
  • The Newsprint Policy of 1972-73 was also imposed, which stated that:
  1. The entitlement of every newspaper towards newsprint shall be determined based on its level of consumption by considering the average circulation or average page area in the years of 1970-71 or 1971-72, whichever is less. This shall not apply to daily newspapers that had more pages than an average of 10 in either of the years given. 
  2. For daily newspapers that had a circulation of up to 100,000 copies, the policy allowed a 10% increase over the basic entitlement of importing newsprint, and a 3% increase over the basic rights of imported newsprint was allowed for daily newspapers with more than 100,000 copies.
  3. No new newspapers were allowed to be initiated by media houses that already owned more than two newspapers, at least one of which was a daily newspaper.
  4. The total number of pages in a newspaper was not allowed to be more than 10.
  5. The increase in the number of pages for newspapers with less than 10 pages should be less than 20%.
  6. The newsprint limit cannot be interchanged between establishments or between different editions of the same paper. 

These restrictions and policies severely affected media houses, who are the petitioners in this case, mainly three media houses: Bennett Coleman and Co., The Hindustan Times Ltd., and The Indian Express, as they led to the following consequences: 

  • The petitioners were restricted from making adjustments to circulation as the newsprint policy made restrictions on the same. The adjustments were restricted even if they were within the limits imposed by the policy. This was challenged as a violation of Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution. 
  • It was the feeling of the petitioners that such a restriction would curtail the growth of big newspapers, and the fixation of a page limit hampers the right of media outlets to print news comprehensively, thereby curtailing their freedom of speech. 

The three leading media houses therefore approached the Supreme Court of India by virtue of a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India to protect their right to free speech and expression. 

Issues raised

  1. Can the petitioners, being corporate entities, invoke the protection afforded by fundamental rights?
  2. If Article 358 of the Indian Constitution serves as a bar to challenge the petitioners on violations of fundamental rights?
  3. If by imposing restrictions on newsprint import, the state is violating Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution?
  4. Is the newsprint policy valid, and does it fall under clause 5(1) of the Import and Control Order of 1955?
  5. If clauses 3 and 3A of the 1962 Newsprint Order are violative of Article 19(1)(a) and Article 14 of the Indian Constitution?

Petitioner’s arguments

Violation of freedom of speech and expression, i.e., Article 19(1)(a)

The first and foremost argument raised by the petitioners was that the provisions of the Newsprint Control Order and the Newsprint Policy are deemed to be imposing unreasonable restrictions on the circulation of the newspapers. Such restrictions on page numbers, the limit on importing newsprint, and others are unreasonable and violative of Article 19(1)(a), which protects and safeguards the fundamental right to speech and expression, and by imposing such restrictions, the government is trying to curb the free speech that the newspaper publishes. These restrictions, as per the petitioners, are a major obstacle to their right to freely disseminate any idea, information, or knowledge and therefore are violative of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. 

Violation of the right to equality before law (Article 14)

The second argument raised by the petitioners is that by setting newsprint import allocation quotas, the state is trying to establish differential treatment. It is an established principle that wherever differential treatment exists, there must be some reasonable classification to justify such treatment so as to reasonably restrict the application of the right to equality and equal treatment. The petitioners further state that such a quota is violative of Article 14, i.e., the right to equality as a reasonable classification does not exist to justify the differential treatment afforded to newspaper publishers by imposing quota limits. They further state that the arbitrary allocation of quotas results in government newspapers being more favoured and independent ones falling on the disadvantageous side. There is no legitimate state interest to justify such an allocation of quotas, and such discriminatory practices lead to an uneven playing field in the newspaper industry, thereby violating the right to equality. 

Distortion of competition in the media industry

The petitioners further argued that by the existence of arbitrary allocation of quotas, certain publishers find themselves in an advantageous position as compared to others who suffer from such a restriction. This creates a stifled competitive atmosphere, which hinders the progress of pluralistic voices and the diversity of opinions offered by independent newspapers. 

Monopolistic control over newsprint

The petitioners believe that the provisions of the policy and order attribute monopolistic control of newsprint to the state, and such monopolistic control leads to an unfair competitive market and prevents the growth of a diverse media, which is necessary for a diverse democracy like India to function effectively. 

Inapplicability of Article 358

The petitioners argued that Article 358 would stand inapplicable to this case as it generally is not applied to law or executive action that has been taken prior to the proclamation of an emergency. As per the petitioners, the newsprint policy is an old policy that has continued on a year-to-year basis until the proclamation of an emergency in 1971. 

Newspaper control policy

The petitioners argued that the newsprint control policy is actually a newspaper control policy as it hampers the circulation of newspapers, and the existence of a newspaper control policy is violative of the Import Control Act and Import Control Order and thereby ultra vires. The counsel for the petitioner also argued that the prevention of adjusting the newsprint quota within common ownership units is also violative of free speech and that the newsprint policy doesn’t fall under the ambit of Clause 5(1) of the Import Control Order of 1955 and therefore is not validly legislated. 

Inequitable distribution

The petitioners stated that, firstly, the prohibitions will not increase circulation but rather decrease it consequentially. Secondly, equating larger English dailies with smaller dailies, which require less than 10 pages, almost negates the idea of equitable distribution and exhibits an unreasonable and discriminatory treatment towards daily newspapers. 

Notional circulation

The petitioners contend that the quotas, in reality, are not based on the actual circulation of the newspapers but are rather based on the notional circulation, i.e., the circulation with permissible increases year on year will not correspond to the permissible circulation on which the quota was originally based. Therefore, creating an unreasonable method for the allocation of quotas can lead to the extremely arbitrary imposition of limits on newspapers. 

Respondent’s arguments

Corporate status of the petitioners

The first and primary argument of the Additional Solicitor General, who represented the respondents, was that the petitioners are companies, and fundamental rights as enshrined in the constitution only apply to citizens, who are human individuals, and therefore, they cannot afford the protection of fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the Indian Constitution. 

State of emergency

The second contention raised by the Additional Solicitor General was regarding the maintainability of the petition. He stated that the petition is not maintainable as Article 358 of the Indian Constitution prohibits the petitioners from challenging the violation of a fundamental right during a period of emergency. The respondents argued that the core principle, which is that nothing contained in Article 19 shall prevent the power of the state to carry out executive action and enact laws that it would be competent to do had there been no emergency, still holds effect, and by utilising the same power, the newsprint policy was formulated. Therefore, it is the contention of the respondents that the 1972 and 1973 Newsprint policies cannot be challenged as long as the emergency persists.

Right to import is not a common law right

The next contention raised by the respondents was that the right to import and use newsprint is not one of the common law rights but rather is a distinct right that is afforded protection by virtue of various statutes. He states that the Newsprint Order and Policy don’t affect fundamental rights, as the subject of the provisions, the effect, and the outcomes do not intend to do so, nor do they mention it. Even if it indirectly affects the fundamental right to speech, it is not the primary goal of the legislation and is therefore insignificant. 

No infringement of fundamental rights

The Additional Solicitor General representing the respondents went ahead to contend that the policy and the order do not violate fundamental rights. He relied on American principles to state that the right to a free press stays unaffected until the rights of the citizens are not infringed, and in this case, the impugned legislation doesn’t affect the rights of the citizens in any way. The respondents also argue that they understand that monopolistic attitudes in the market can lead to unfair competition and harm democracy, but they also contend that neither the order nor the policy lead to a monopolistic market, and the press is not vulnerable to monopolistic combination harm. 

Public interest necessity

The respondent argued that the Newsprint Control Order was enacted to ensure that the public interest is protected by managing the distribution and costs of newsprint, which will eventually lead to the equitable distribution of newspapers to all citizens of India and protect their right to information. The respondents also note that such restrictions can prevent a monopolistic setup in the media industry, which is harmful to citizens’ right to free and true news. They also argued that such economic measures in the form of restrictions are allowed by Article 19(6) of the Indian Constitution, as it empowers the state to impose reasonable restrictions for the interests of the public. 

International obligations 

The respondents contended that India is under international obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), which recognises the right of the state to regulate its media for the purposes of public interest, national security, and public order. Therefore, the Newsprint Control Order and Policy rolled out by the state are consistent with its international obligations to strike a balance between the rights of the press and the interests of the general public at large. 

Judgement in Bennett Coleman vs. Union of India (1973)

The majority bench (Sikri. C.J., Ray A.N., and Jaganmohan Reddy, JJ.) delivered the following points as the judgement:

  1. On the issue of whether companies can seek the protection of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court held that, as per the precedent set by Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India (1970) (Bank Nationalisation case), it is clear that citizens do not give away their fundamental rights when they enjoin themselves to create an association like a company. A company has its own juristic identity, is therefore considered a juristic person in the eyes of the law, and is therefore afforded the same protection of fundamental rights as any human or citizen of India. Their fundamental rights can be hampered by the actions of the state, and they deserve equal protection as other citizens of India. The rationale behind this is that the citizens are the shareholders of a company when it is formed, and when the rights of a company are violated, the fundamental rights of the citizens forming the company are violated as a consequence. Therefore, the concerns over the violation of Article 19(1)(a) by the legislation rolled out by the state in the form of the Newsprint Order and Policy are projected as the rights of the citizens who have associated themselves with the newspaper publishing company. Therefore, they have the same rights as other citizens and have the locus standi to challenge the violation of their fundamental rights through a writ petition, which is a right guaranteed to them by virtue of Article 32 of the Indian Constitution, i.e., the right to seek constitutional remedy in case of violation of fundamental rights guaranteed by virtue of Part III of the Indian Constitution. By applying the said principle, it can be rightfully said that the petition filed by the petitioners is absolutely maintainable in court of law. Especially after the ruling in the Bank Nationalisation case, the locus standi is even more solid and prominent in its position. The existence of a company doesn’t bar citizens from exercising their right to relief.
  2. The next question was whether Article 358 will be applicable to the instant case or not, and as a consequence, whether a petition challenging the action of the executive or state during a period of emergency will be entertained or not. The Supreme Court stated that the current petition in question challenges the 1972-73 Newsprint Policy. This was done after the amendment to the original petition, which challenged the 1971-72 policy. Therefore, the Hon’ble Court is of the opinion that Article 358 does not bar the entertainment of petitions filed on executive actions and state actions when they are a continuance of an action taken before the period of emergency. In the instant matter, the 1972-73 Newsprint Policy is a continuation of the policy that was initiated before the declaration of emergency. It would be unconstitutional and a violation of Article 19 if such a petition were not entertained. It would be detrimental to fundamental rights if a bar on the entertainment of the petition is taken on the basis of a law drafted prior to the proclamation of emergency. 
  3. Further, the Apex Court stated that it is undeniable that the government has the power to import newsprint as well as control the distribution of newsprint amongst publishers. Therefore, the policies and orders were made with valid legal authority, and the court cannot scrutinise them unless mala fide intention appears in the formation of the legislation. The policies were therefore validly brought into application as per the opinion of the court. 
  4. Opening on the interpretation of Article 19(1)(a), the court states that even though there is no explicit mention of freedom of the press under Article 19(1)(a), it has been settled through various decisions that the said article will include freedom of the press under its ambit. As per the court, the freedom of the press is a natural manifestation of freedom of speech and expression, which is an explicitly mentioned fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a). Therefore, the press has fully attributed the right to freely propagate newspapers and information, as well as their right to free circulation of newspapers without any prior restraint, which is also a well-recognised right under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. Coming to the question of whether the law violates Article 19(1)(a), the court states that if a law is created in such a way that it singles out the press by imposing multiple prohibitions and restrictions on the same and that leads to a reduction in circulation, a reduction in the number of personnel, and obstacles in starting a new newspaper, which in turn forces the publishers to resort to the aid of the government, then in such a case the law is violative of Article 19(1)(a) and falls outside the ambit of protection offered by Article 19(2). The court also goes on to state that the American rationale and principles put forth by the respondents wouldn’t be applicable in an Indian context because the First Amendment provision of America has no such exceptions as does our Constitution under Article 19(2). Therefore, to equate both of these laws to justify the violation of fundamental rights is futile and non-maintainable. The court has established that the press has a right to free speech and expression, and no policy, especially the impugned policy in the case, can take away the said right in any manner. 
  5. The court also goes ahead to state that the Newsprint Control Policy is in reality a Newspaper Control Policy, and such a policy that controls or curbs the circulation of newspapers and imposes extreme regulation on them cannot be acceptable. 
  6. The court refers to its judgement in the Bank Nationalisation Case, wherein it laid a principle that stated that the court can grant relief in cases where the object of the law-making authority is not to directly violate the rights of citizens but the consequence of such a law effects in such a violation, which affords jurisdiction to the court and the court is empowered to grant relief in such situations. In the instant matter, the consequence of the Newsprint Policy is that the growth and circulation of newspapers are effectively curtailed, they are made vulnerable to financial loss, and their freedom of speech and expression is also infringed. Therefore, the court has the right to jurisdiction and the right to grant relief. 
  7. In terms of Article 14, the court states that the policy is violative of Article 14 as it treats newspapers that are not equal as equals while ascertaining the requirements of the newsprint for the same. There exists no intelligible differentia, and therefore the restrictions are unreasonable as per established principles. 
  8. Talking about Remark V (which sets a basic entitlement of newsprint quota for newspapers operating with more than 10 pages) of the Policy, the court says that it violates Article 19(1)(a) in the context of those newspapers operating above a page limit of 10 by restricting them to a maximum of 10 pages. The forced reduction of news pages is a violation of free speech and expression, as per the court’s opinion.
  9. Moving on to Remark VII(C) (which stated that those newspapers within the ceiling of 10 pages get a 20 percent increase in the number of pages), the court states that when newspapers get a 20 percent increase under the ceiling limit of 10, they will eventually require more circulation due to demand and an increase in pages, but the effect of the policy is such that the circulation will be curtailed. Even the larger English dailies, which require a larger number of pages, are not being provided with the same, which affects their freedom of circulation. For those dailies that do not require an increase in page number, their circulation is hampered by the policy. Therefore, considering all these aspects, the newsprint control policy is in reality a newspaper control mechanism that cannot be allowed to operate. 
  10. The discriminatory allocation of increase in circulation is clearly apparent in Remark VII (which stated that newspapers with less than 1,00,000 circulation have been given a 10% increase in circulation whereas those with more than 1,00,000 circulation have been given only a 3% increase in circulation), wherein, as per the Newsprint Policy, for the year 1972-72, it is clear that those newspapers with less than 1,00,000 circulation have been allotted a ten percent increase in circulation and those with more have been allotted only a three percent increase, which is a violation of the right against discrimination and the right to equality guaranteed by the Constitution of India. 
  11. Coming to Remark VIII (which prevented common ownership units from adjusting  between them the newsprint quota allotted to each of them), it largely prohibits the increase in the number of pages by lessening the circulation of the newspaper. Earlier, the process of adjusting pages and circulation was allowed. The prohibition of such flexibility and adjustment leads to a reduction in the quality, range, and standards of daily newspapers, and therefore it affects the freedom of the press. The treatment of larger dailies with the smaller ones as equals leads to a clear violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 
  12. Ultimately, the court holds that the free press is essential for a healthy and functional democracy, and any form of action that hampers its freedom can have detrimental consequences for society. Therefore, active action must be taken to prohibit such impositions and create better avenues for press freedom.

Concurring judgement in the case

In this matter, Justice M. Hameedullah Beg also authored a concurring judgement. The notable points of the judgement are as follows:

  1. The challenged state action in this case is the Newsprint Policy 1971-1972. The challenged remarks concern themselves with the import of quotas for newsprint assigned to licensees, and they have to be adhered to if the licensees want their quota, which implies that the licences could be revoked if the terms specified in the policy are not adhered to. It is alleged that the terms specified infringe upon the fundamental rights of the petitioners to express themselves freely, but if the terms of the provisions do not fall under any provision of law, the need for testing their reasonability will not arise. 
  2. If a state action is termed as policy, it can only be justified if it shows the nature of a “law”. As per Article 13(3)(a), the law includes ordinances, orders, by-laws, rules, regulations, notifications, customs, and usage. The policy cannot bind citizens unless they acquire the forces of law. The intention behind the newsprint policy is to make it binding upon the petitioners to adhere to the conditions laid out in the remarks column of the policy. Therefore, they have to be brought under certain legal provisions to authorise the imposition of such binding conditions on newspapers. Such restrictions have to be removed by the court as they have infringed upon the fundamental rights of the petitioners, and the petitioners have incurred heavy losses owing to the restrictions, and they might be forced to discontinue their business if such restrictions are continued. 
  3. One must over-emphasise the significance of a free press for the functioning of a healthy democracy, as it is one of the important pillars of the state. Popular sovereignty prevails in a nation only because the media has the consent of the people to remain as a functional pillar of a democracy.
  4. It is a lesson from political philosophers and historians that our society has intellectually advanced only because of the existence of freedom of speech and expression. Political democracy entails that such freedoms must be protected at any cost. 
  5. Even though freedom of the press is not mentioned as a separate constitutional guarantee in our constitution, it is a part of freedom of speech and expression enshrined under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The press is an instrument for citizens to express their opinions and therefore must be afforded strong protection. 
  6. Our constitution also mentions the permissible grounds on which freedom can be restricted under Article 19(2), and any state action in the shape of a law that doesn’t abide by it will infringe upon the fundamental rights of the citizens. Even when such restrictions are imposed on reasonable grounds, they must not be excessive and must not go beyond the purpose for which they are imposed. 
  7. In terms of the contention regarding the power to control the licensing of newsprint under the Imports and Exports Control Act, it is to be observed that the Act certainly confers the power to determine the licence for imported newsprint, and Clause 3 of the Imports Control Order has been made in exercise of the powers conferred by Sections 3 and 4A of the Imports and Exports Control Act. On the contrary, it is worth noting that the ambit of the conditions in a licence cannot extend to determining how newsprint is utilised after it has been imported, as this would lead to control of the supply of news by means of newsprint. 
  8. In this instant case, it is impossible to find out the true purpose behind the restriction imposed by the impugned Newsprint Policy. It is not necessary for the court to ascertain whether the restrictions are reasonable, as they should first possess the authority of some law to consider their effectiveness. Thereby, Justice Hameedullah Beg concurs with the judgement given by Justice Ray and decides in favour of the petitioners. 

Dissenting judgement in Bennett Coleman vs. Union of India

In this case, a dissenting judgement was authored by Justice Matthews. Some of the notable points of the judgement are:

  1. The writ petitions filed before the court challenge the validity of Subclauses (3) and (3A) of Clause 3 of the Newsprint Control Order, 1962, passed by the Indian Government under the authority of Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, and the impugned newsprint policy 1972-73. 
  2. It is important to note that the production, supply, and distribution of newsprint have been controlled since 1939, and Article 369 of the Constitution empowers the parliament exclusively to exercise such control for five years since the effect of the Constitution comes into play. Newsprint is also an essential commodity under the Essential Commodities Act. The majority of newsprint has to be imported from foreign countries, and the Indian government has restricted such imports since 1943. The imported newsprint, along with the ones produced in the country, has been proportionately divided among the newspaper publishers in India. 
  3. In the years 1972-72, due to the suspension of U.S. aid, there was a decrease of 11,000 tonnes of newsprint imports, and therefore, the availability was less than in 1971-72. 
  4. The contention raised by the petitioners is that the government should give higher priority to importing newsprint to meet the demand of all newspaper publishers to the greatest extent possible. This is a matter that concerns national policy and falls outside the jurisdiction of the court. 
  5. Talking about freedom of the press being a fundamental right, it is worth noting that it does emanate from freedom of speech, which is guaranteed by the Constitution. It is a misconception to state that freedom of speech and expression cannot be restricted or regulated. No matter how absolute freedom is, it cannot be free from state regulation. 
  6. In cases like Sakal Papers v. Union of India (1961), the infringement of freedom of speech can be directly linked to state action. In that case, the legislation directly affects the circulation of newspapers. In this instant case, the effect of the policy directly affects speech in general, but it cannot be said to directly affect freedom of speech.
  7. To interpret the contention regarding the inefficacy of allotting page limits based on the circulation of a newspaper, it is worth noting that such a system will only allow the growth of various ideas from different newspapers and prevent the monopoly of big players in the market. Considering that India is a free market, any scheme that deals with the distribution of newsprint in an equitable manner would make freedom of speech more feasible and accessible to all newspaper publishers in a rational manner. This would in turn lead to a free flow of ideas into the market and help enrich freedom of speech. This observation is made in reference to the American case of Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States (1969). 
  8. It is a well-settled principle, as per the decision of the Court in Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India (1959), that advertisements of a commercial nature do not fall under freedom of speech, and therefore, it is necessary to assume that the rationing of newsprint doesn’t affect freedom of speech directly, and therefore, there is no abridgement of the same. 
  9. To look at the matter from a different angle, it can be said that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech in relation to the free press connotes a right to read for the benefit of the public and not for the benefit of media houses. Therefore, the present level of circulation being maintained doesn’t affect the public’s right to read and receive information but only enlarges it as they get access to more ideas from different newspapers. 
  10. To talk about the adjustment of quotas in common ownership units, it is fair to note that by allowing such an adjustment, it would frustrate the entire objective of the policy in the first place, and therefore such restrictions are necessary for the successful working of the rationing system.  
  11. The argument that an unregulated discretion is conferred under sub clause 3 and 3(a) of clause 3 of the Order is not sustainable, as the preamble and provisions of the Essential Commodities Act provide enough guidance for the exercise of the given powers. Therefore, the petition is dismissed without any order of costs.  

Critical analysis of the judgement

Freedom of Speech and Expression as enshrined under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution has been recognised as a globally significant right that finds its mention in multiple international legal documents like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). It has been sacrosanct to many evolving democracies and is deemed to be necessary for the functioning of representative democracies. Therefore, it is imminent to recognise the freedom of the press or the right of the press to free speech and expression under the ambit of fundamental rights and prevent the infringement of such rights by state actions or executive actions. Due to this principle, the judgement of Bennett Coleman v. Union of India is significant to the realm of Indian democracy as it sought to protect freedom of the press for times to come. Dissent and criticism of the government are extremely important so as to truly utilise the essence of democracy, where the voice of the people dictates all actions of their representatives in the government. 

The judgement recognised that dissent as well as the dissemination of truthful information through newspapers is important for democracy to sustain, and therefore, any action that harms the functioning or circulation of newspapers is extremely dangerous to a society and must be curbed effectively. The judgement is also significant as it heralded an era of judicial activism to protect the rights of the press. It also became a precedent that was followed in multiple cases to uphold the rights of the press through constitutional means. Therefore, the judgement serves as a landmark piece of precedent and highlight’s Indian judiciary’s commitment towards the protection of freedom of the press at a time when many western nations attacked India’s press freedom positions. To have an effective safeguard for the press in terms of protecting them from unconstitutional burdens, such a precedent is eternally significant and must be analysed thoroughly for generations to come.

Laws involved

The case of Bennett Coleman v. Union of India dealt with various legal provisions. The notable ones are: 

Article 14 of the Constitution

Article 14 of the Indian Constitution guarantees the right to equality, which extends to equality before law and equal protection of law. This right is meant to protect the existence of the rule of law in society and to ensure that each and every citizen is treated equally when it comes to the application of law and that no one citizen is treated in a more advantageous way than the other. Article 14 is available to both citizens and non-citizens who are present on Indian soil. The importance of Article 14 was upheld in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978), wherein it was held that equality is a transformative concept and cannot be limited to traditional ideas and understanding. Article 14 therefore attempts to tackle the arbitrary exercise of power by that state through executive actions to protect the interests of the citizens. 

Although Article 14 talks of equal treatment, it allows the state to create certain classes for affording special or differential treatment. This is governed by the doctrine of reasonable classification, which states that whenever the state creates a class of persons, there has to be some rational connection between the creation of the class and the purpose that the legislation is attempting to fulfil. In the case of Budhan Chaudhary v. State of Bihar (1995), it was held that the classification cannot be arbitrary and there must be some reasoning behind the distinction drawn between people who fall within the class and the ones who do not. There has to be a nexus between the classification and the purpose of the legislation that is creating such a classification. The creation of separate schemes for the empowerment and upliftment of women is an instance of the creation of a class based on gender to fulfil the feminist interests of society.

Article 19(1)(a) 

Article 19(1)(a) deals with the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression. This particular right is only available to Indian citizens and not to foreign nationals. It consists of the right to express your opinion in a free manner on any matter through any medium of your choice. For example: newspaper articles, digital posts, speeches, television, movies, art, written mediums, etc. In an ideal democracy, which runs on the active participation of citizens, it is extremely important to uphold the freedom of speech and expression. This allows citizens to constructively criticise the actions of the government that they elect to power and demand accountability and transparency in cases of deficit action. The right is, however, not absolute and is subject to certain restrictions. These restrictions are mentioned in Article 19(2), and this provision empowers the state to create legislation restricting the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression on reasonable grounds. The reasonable grounds are “interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the state, friendly relations with foreign states, public order, decency and morality, contempt of court, defamation, and incitement to an offence.” In the case of Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms (2002), it was held that the right to freedom of speech and expression includes the right to information as a fundamental right. The right to impart information as well as receive it has been recognised as a fundamental right emanating from Article 19(1)(a). 

Article 32  

While Part III of the Indian Constitution guarantees certain fundamental rights to the citizens of India, which cannot be infringed by the state unless done through reasonable grounds mentioned in the provisions present in Part III, it is also important to provide a redressal mechanism in case of a violation of fundamental rights to seek an appropriate remedy for the same. Article 32 of the Indian Constitution provides the right to seek constitutional remedies for the violation of fundamental rights by the actions of the state. Every citizen has the right to approach the Apex Court with a writ petition claiming that their fundamental right has been violated by a specific action of the state and seek remedies for such violations.

Cases preceding the decision

There have been many developments before the case of Bennett Coleman v. Union of India was decided for the courts to opine on press freedom and the fundamental rights of the press. A few of the most notable cases include:

Romesh Thappar vs. State of Madras (1950)

In this case, the Supreme Court of India dealt with the legality of prior restraint on the fundamental right of speech and expression, especially in the context of media publications and the free press. It dealt with the legality of censorship or restriction of content, specifically criticism of the government. It revolved around a magazine called “Cross Roads’ ‘, the editor of which was notable journalist Romesh Thappar. The magazine was banned in the State of Madras by the state government under the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949. Romesh Thappar challenged the validity of such a ban and stated that it is a violation of his fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression, which is guaranteed to him by Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the right to freedom of speech and expression includes and extends to the right to a free press, and if the government or the state imposes any kind of restriction on the press’s freedom of speech and expression, it should fall under the ambit of Article 19(2), i.e., it should be reasonable and rational for purposes of protecting national security, morality, and decency. Public order was later added as a ground for reasonable restriction of fundamental rights under Article 19(2) by virtue of the 1st Constitutional Amendment, 1951. The Court held that such a ban on the magazine “CrossRoads” is unconstitutional censorship and is a violation of Article 19(1)(a), and therefore the ban should be lifted. The action of the government violated the rights of the editor to free speech. 

Brij Bhushan vs. State of Delhi (1950) 

In this case, the Supreme Court dealt with the seizure of a newspaper called “Organizer” of which Brij Bhushan was the editor. The newspaper was subjected to scrutiny as it was critical of the actions of the Chief Commissioner of Delhi and its mode of administration. The newspaper was put under scrutiny by virtue of the powers conferred upon the Chief Commissioner of Delhi by Section 7(1)(c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949. The editor challenged the decision and stated that such a seizure was a violation of his fundamental right to speech and expression and also violated the freedom of the press under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution. The Supreme Court of India heard the matter and stated that the significance of the freedom of the press in a functioning democracy is highly important and must not be restrained in any manner. It is extremely harmful to exercise pre-censorship on news, as it would amount to a violation of freedom of speech and expression to a large extent. The restrictions imposed on such a serious fundamental right should always be reasonable and must fall under the ambit of Article 19(2) of the Indian Constitution. The court held that the arbitrary censorship of news and dissenting voices given through newspapers should be prevented, and freedom of the press must be protected at all costs. 

Sakal Papers vs. Union of India (1962)

In this case, the petitioner challenged the validity of the Newspaper (Price and Page) Act, 1956, and the Daily Newspapers (Price and Page) Order, 1960, which regulated the costs and the page number of newspapers in India. The petitioner was the publisher of a private Marathi newspaper and argued that such regulations impose restrictions that violate the freedom of the press under Article 19(1)(a), which deals with freedom of speech and expression. The petitioner stated that these laws prevent the circulation and readership of newspapers. They also argued that the right to publish and circulate newspapers is a right emanating from the fundamental rights of free speech and the free press. Therefore, they sought for such laws, which impose restrictions on press freedom, to be declared unconstitutional. The court held the laws to be unconstitutional as they violated the freedom of speech and expression and curtailed the free press. The consequences of the laws are such that they would lead to a reduction in the number of pages or an increase in the costs of the newspaper, which would in turn result in low circulation of the paper and hamper its rights. 

Cases succeeding the decision 

There have been many cases in which the judiciary has referred to the decision taken in Bennett Coleman v. Union of India to reach a decision. Some of the landmark cases which take the precedent forward are:

Printers (Mysore) Ltd. vs. Assistant Commercial Tax Officer (1994)

In this case, the Supreme Court held that no sales tax can be imposed on the sale of newspapers in India, but that doesn’t mean that the press is completely safe from taxation. It simply means that any form of state action that results in the reduction of the circulation of information through newspapers is an infringement of their fundamental rights. The Apex Court referred to its own judgement in Bennett Coleman v. Union of India and stated that newspapers have a vital role to play in propagating valid information and forming public opinion, and any sort of restriction on the same hampers the right to information of the general public. Due to the utmost significance of newspapers in a democratic nation, they should enjoy certain privileges and protection under the law. The court decided that the imposition of a sales tax on newspaper sales leads to a burden on the freedom of the press, which is protected under Article 19(1)(a), and held the tax to be violative of fundamental rights. This decision heralded an era of judicial activism to protect the freedom of the press, and the court referred to itself as the protector of press freedom and stated that no unconstitutional burden will be imposed on the press until the judiciary functions effectively. 

Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd. vs. Union of India (1984)

In this instant case, the Apex Court of India dealt with the taxation policy on newspapers. The petitioners challenged the import duty on newsprint, which was imposed by the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, and the imposition of auxiliary duty under the Finance Act, 1981. Before the application of this law, newspapers enjoyed exemptions from customs duty on newsprint due to their high significance. It was contended that the imposition of such duties leads to an inconsequential effect on the costs and circulation of newsprint, affects the overall freedom of the press, and is violative of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India, which safeguards the fundamental right to speech and expression necessary for a free press. They also contended that there is no public interest in the imposition of such economic burdens on newspaper publishers, and therefore such impositions cannot be termed reasonable and justified. The court relied heavily on the decisions of Sakal Newspapers and Bennett Coleman v. Union of India and attempted to strike a balance between the tax-imposing powers of the state and the freedom of the press. The court stated that “as long as the court sits, newspapermen need not have the fear of their freedom being curtailed by unconstitutional means”. Further, the court stated that as long as the tax is within the reasonable limits of the state’s power and doesn’t contravene Article 19(2) of the Indian Constitution, it is not unconstitutional. The court directed the government that whenever it is exercising its taxation power on the newspapers, it should ensure that it shouldn’t overburden them with costs and shouldn’t encroach upon the fundamental rights of newspaper publishers. 

Conclusion

For a democracy to function effectively, citizens must participate actively. The participation of citizens is only fruitful when they have access to information that is truthful and important. Newspapers play this role in ensuring that the citizens of a democracy are well-equipped with information and use the same to make the right decisions about the functioning of a democracy. In this judgement, the courts recognised the significance of protecting newspapers from unnecessary and arbitrary interference from the government and the executive so as to ensure that their fundamental right to speech and expression is duly protected. This judgement also set a precedent, which stated that the right of the press falls well within the boundaries of Article 19(1)(a). Therefore, any restrictions imposed on the newspapers must be reasonable and constitutional. This judgement serves as a reminder of the judiciary’s commitment towards ensuring that the media remains as the fourth pillar and the watchdog of democracy in India. 

Frequently Asked Questions

Which was the legislation that was challenged in the case of Bennett Coleman vs. Union of India?

The legislations that were challenged in the instant case were the Import Control Order, 1955, passed under the Imports and Exports Control Act, 1947, and the Newsprint Control Order, 1962, which was passed under the validity of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, which regulates the sale, purchase, and consumption of newsprint in the country.

What were the primary restrictions imposed on the newspaper publishers, and how did they infringe their fundamental rights?

The impugned legislation put forth a ceiling limit on the importation of newsprint and a number of pages of a newspaper based on the volume of circulation of the newspaper. They also prohibited the adjustment of pages and permissible limits within two newspapers of the same media company. All of this resulted in a decrease in circulation volume and prohibited the liberty of the newspapers to disseminate whatever information they deemed important due to the restrictions on the page limit, which led to the infringement of their fundamental rights. 

What was the ratio of the judgement given in Bennet Coleman vs. Union of India?

The primary principle of the judgement in this case is that freedom of the press is a fundamental right under the Right to Free Speech and Expression under Article 19 of the Indian Constitution, and any law that restricts this freedom without valid grounds mentioned under Article 19(2) would result in infringement of the fundamental rights of the press. 

What are the grounds for a reasonable restriction of fundamental rights under Article 19(2)?

The grounds on which a fundamental right can be restricted as per Article 19(2) are: “interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the state, friendly relations with foreign states, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to an offence.”

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Lata Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2006)    

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This case summary is written by Madhuri Pilania and has been further updated by Shefali Chitkara. This article provides a legal analysis of the landmark case of Lata Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2006). The author has tried to give a brief overview of the judgement, facts of the case, important issues raised, contentions made by the parties, and important points that were highlighted by the Court more clearly by referring to various judgements that followed the aforementioned judgement. Further, the author has tried to explore the aftermaths of the judgement, and the significance of the judgement. The author has also mentioned the judgements and the legal provisions in detail that were referred to by the Court while delivering the present judgement. 

Table of Contents

Introduction

The government bestows some rights upon its citizens as well as non-citizens. The citizens of the country are provided with some Fundamental Rights which are guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution and can be enforced under Article 32 of the Constitution. Along with it, citizens are also obliged to perform some Fundamental Duties as stated in Part IV- A of the Indian Constitution. 

When we speak about the right to life, the right to marry intrinsically becomes a right of choice as embodied under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. In India, marriage is a sacred concept and the foundation of a civilised society. Once the marital relationship is formed, the law then steps in and binds the two parties with some rights and obligations. It is believed that, “people give up some of their individual liberty in exchange for some common security”. This is known as the “Theory of Social Contract”. Hobbes, Jean Jacques Rousseau and John Locke are known to be proponents of the influential theory of the social contract, which says that human beings live in a society as per an agreement that establishes moral and political rules of behaviour. The fundamental question that this theory tries to answer is how can people be free and live together without getting influenced by the coercion of other people around them? According to Rousseau, this could be done by submitting the particular wills of an individual to the collective will of the society that is created through an agreement with others. 

The right to marry is a part of the right to life under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. Although it is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, it has been inserted in Article 21 by the Hon’ble Supreme Court by virtue of Article 32. It is also stated under the Human Rights Charter within the meaning of the right to start a family. Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 (UDHR) states that men and women have the right to marry and form a family. Further, Article 23 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 (ICCPR) also recognises the right to marry and form a family. 

The case of Lata Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2006) is one such case that talks about the right to marry and inter-caste marriage. 

The writ petition was filed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court against the order of Sessions Court and later the criminal proceedings were quashed.

Brief details of the case

Name of the case

Lata Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.

Case Number

Writ Petition (Crl.) 208 of 2004

Date of judgement

7th July, 2006

Court

Supreme Court of India

Bench

Hon’ble Justice Ashok Bhan and Hon’ble Justice Markandey Katju

Type of the case

Writ petition filed by the petitioner under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution before the Hon’ble Supreme Court

Parties of the case

Petitioner

Lata Singh

Respondent

State of Uttar Pradesh

Represented by

Advocate for petitioner

Adv. Sakesh Kumar, Adv. Yogmaya Agnihotri and Adv. Rameshwar Prasad Goyal

Advocate for respondent

Adv. Reena Singh and Adv. Jatinder Kr. Bhatia

Equivalent citations

AIR 2006 SC 2522, 2006 SCC OnLine SC 682, (2006) 5 SCC 475

Referred laws and provisions 

Historical background

The case of Lata Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh is a landmark judgement in the legal history of India. In this case, the Hon’ble Justices Ashok Bhan and Markandey Katju, allowed the writ petition under Article 32, filed by a woman named Lata Singh for enforcement of her right, which is to marry a person of her choice on her own will. The Supreme Court gave a decision in her favour and ordered police protection for her as well.

The case of Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M. and Ors. (2018) is a landmark judgement by Hon’ble Justice D Y Chandrachud, popularly known as the “Hadiya case”. It has been a significant case for women’s right to marry the person of their choice in India. Hadiya was a Hindu woman married to a Muslim man. She converted her religion and changed her name to Islam. Hence, her parents filed a writ petition of Habeas Corpus before the High Court of Kerala under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution. This marriage of Hadiya was challenged by her parents in the court of law. The High Court upheld her father’s right over her choice and gave her custody to her father despite the fact that she was 25 years old. 

The rights of women in India are still subject to ignorance, as the majority of people overlook women’s right to choose and consent when it comes to marriage. Article 21 protects the right of men and women of marriageable age to marry. On 8th March 2018, the learned judges of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, considering the arguments advanced on both sides, held that the High Court was wrong in its decision while issuing the writ for Habeas Corpus. In the facts, it is stated that the appellant admitted her marriage on 27th November 2017 before appearing in court. The judgement and the order passed by the High Court were set aside and the appeal was allowed.

The Supreme Court upheld Hadiya’s marriage to Shafin Jahan and delivered its judgement in favour of Hadiya, and hence the decision of the High Court was declared invalid. On 9th April 2018, it passed the judgement, explaining the reasoning behind its decision. It basically dealt with the freedom to choose religion and one’s choice of life partner. 

Article 32 of the constitution provides for constitutional remedies, which means that a person has a right to move to Supreme Court and High Court under Article 226 to get one’s fundamental rights protected.

The present case of Lata Singh v. State of UP (2006), the facts of which have been discussed in detail below brings out how in the name of caste, honour killing is done and women are deprived of their fundamental right to marry as per their choice, as what all traumas individuals have to go through if one marries outside their caste. This case has brought about a lot of changes by not only upholding the fundamental rights but widening the scope of Article 21 and it also acted as a precedent in many landmark cases that came before the Apex Court. Let us now look at the facts of this case which helped us in bringing the landmark and remarkable judgement. 

Facts of Lata Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2006)

The petitioner was a young woman who was a graduate. She was pursuing her masters in Hindi from Lucknow University at that time. She was about twenty seven years old. She started living with her brother Ajay Pratap Singh at the LDA colony due to the sudden death of her parents. She did her intermediate in 1997 and completed her graduation in 2000 while living with her brother. It was alleged by the petitioner that on 2nd November 2000, she left her brother’s house of her own free will and got married at Arya Samaj Mandir, Delhi, to Bramha Nand Gupta (hereinafter referred to as “husband”) and they had a child out of the wedlock.

On 4th November 2000, the petitioner’s brother lodged a missing person’s report at the Sarojini Nagar Police Station, Lucknow. After the complaint had been lodged, the police arrested two sisters of Lata’s husband, along with the husband of one of the sisters and the cousin of Lata’s husband, namely, Mamta Gupta, Sangita Gupta, Rakesh Gupta and Kallu Gupta. Mamta was arrested and detained in jail with her one-month old child. 

It is further alleged that the three brothers of the petitioner, namely, Ajay Pratap Singh, Shashi Pratap Singh and Anand Pratap Singh, were furious because the petitioner had an inter-caste marriage. They went to the petitioner’s husband’s paternal residence and beat up her husband’s mother and uncle, threw the luggage, furniture, utensils and other things from the house and locked it with their lock. One brother of the petitioner’s husband was allegedly locked in a room by the petitioner’s brothers for four or five days without any meal or water. Her brothers also cut away the crops that were grown in the field of the petitioner’s husband and sold them in the market without their permission. Later, they took physical possession of that agricultural field. A false police complaint was lodged against the husband and his relatives alleging kidnapping of the petitioner at Sarojini Nagar Police Station in Lucknow due to which his relatives were arrested and detained in the Lucknow jail. The brothers of the petitioner also took possession of the shop of the petitioner’s husband, which was at Badan Singh Market, Rangpuri as “Gupta Helmet Shop”.

It was alleged that the petitioner’s brothers were threatening to kill her husband and his relatives and threatening to kidnap and kill her as well. The family members were afraid of going to Lucknow because of fear and violence by the petitioner’s brothers. It was also alleged that petitioner’s husband and relatives have been falsely framed by her brothers who were furious because of the inter-caste marriage of Lata with her husband, Bramha Nand Gupta.

The petitioner ran from pillar to pillar to save her husband and relatives from the harassment done by her brothers. She then approached the Rajasthan Women Commission, Jaipur in the apprehending danger to her and her husband’s life. Her statement was recorded by the Commission on 13th March, 2001 and it was forwarded to the Superintendent of Police. Subsequently, a letter was written by the President of the Rajasthan State Women Commission to the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) requesting the commission and the Chief Secretary of the Government of Uttar Pradesh to intervene in the case. 

A final report was submitted by the SHO, Police Station Sarojini Nagar, Lucknow to the Judicial Magistrate. The report mentioned that none of the accused persons committed any offence and later they were released on bail on 16th May 2001 by the learned Sessions Judge, Lucknow. After that, the investigating officer recorded Lata’s statement on 28th May, 2001 and provided armed security to her. The Hon’ble Chief Judicial Magistrate recorded her statement under Section 164 of CrPC on 29th May 2001. Lata, the petitioner stated that she married Brahma Nand Gupta on her own will and under no coercion. However, the Chief Judicial Magistrate passed the committal order on 5th October 2001 even after her statement.

A protest petition was filed against the final report of the Police because the brothers of the petitioner had alleged that the petitioner was not mentally fit. However, she was medically examined and it was stated that she was not suffering from any type of mental illness.

The case was pending before the fast-track court of Lucknow and this court issued the non-bailable warrants against all four accused persons. Against this order, the accused persons filed a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC before the Hon’ble High Court of Allahabad, which got registered as Crl. Misc. No. 520 of 2003. The Lucknow High Court directed the accused persons to be present before the Sessions Judge, who would scrutinise whether they had committed any offence. This matter was still pending. The present writ petition was filed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution, issuing the writ of certiorari or mandamus for quashing the order of the Sessions Judge passed against the accused persons under Sections 366 and 368 of the IPC. 

Issues raised before the court

The following issues were raised before the division bench of the Supreme Court:

  • Whether the Writ Petition filed by the Petitioner under Article 32 for issuing the writ of certiorari/mandamus for quashing the order of Sessions Court under sections 366 and 368 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 which was registered at Sarojini Nagar Police Station in Lucknow and pending in the Fast Track Court of Lucknow maintainable?
  • Question regarding the contravention of the provisions of law through inter-caste marriages.
  • Whether the right to choose whom to marry is a part of the right to life and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution?

Arguments of the parties

Petitioner

The following points of contentions were raised by the counsel for the petitioner:

  • It was contended that her brothers have assaulted and harassed her husband, his relatives and irreparably harmed the entire family property. 
  • They were threatened to be killed by her brothers. 
  • Her brothers have forcibly taken over their properties, fields and shops, and sold the crops in their fields. 
  • They also contended that the lives of the petitioner and her husband and their relatives were in danger and she even cannot visit Lucknow due to the apprehension of danger to her life and also the lives of her husband and their small child. 
  • That the petitioner is a major and of sound mind and the same has been proved by the medical examination. The petitioner married Brahma Nand Gupta on her own will and there was no force or coercion used for the same. 
  • That the brothers of the petitioners have lodged false complaints against her husband and his family.
  • That the police personnel did not take any action against the brothers of the petitioner and instead arrested and humiliated the family members of her husband.

Respondent

On the other side, the counsel for the respondent raised the following arguments to support their contentions:

  • It was alleged that the petitioner was mentally unfit and was not able to give a valid consent for the marriage.
  • There was an instigation on the part of her husband and his family members to marry him without anyone’s consent.
  • That the accused persons have kidnapped, instigated and compelled the petitioner to marry against her will and were liable for offences under Sections 366 and 368 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. 

Laws discussed in Lata Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2006)

Constitution of India

Articles 32 and 226: The Constitution of India has provided six fundamental rights to the people that aim at protecting the interests of the public and society at large. They have also provided the right to constitutional remedies under Article 32 as a fundamental right and Article 226 as a constitutional right for the enforcement of our other fundamental rights. In Rashid Ahmad v. Municipal Board (1950), the Supreme Court held that in relation to Fundamental Rights, the availability of alternative remedy cannot be an absolute bar for the issue of writ though the fact may be taken into consideration. The petitioners were right in approaching the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution since the accused persons, the brothers of the petitioner have violated her right to choose whom to marry under Article 21. The Supreme Court issued the writ of mandamus and correctly quashed the proceedings pending against the petitioner’s husband and his relatives. 

Article 21: It provides for the right to life and personal liberty to every person and has been widened by the Supreme Court in this case to include the right to choose whom to marry. It was already clarified that the right to life is not mere animal existence but means the right to live with human dignity. This was held in a number of cases including the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978). The Supreme Court in this case held that there is a unique relationship between the provisions of Article 14, 19 & 21 and every law must pass the tests of the said provisions and these provisions are not mutually exclusive and are dependent on each other.

Article 19(1)(a): Article 19 talks about various freedoms which are granted to the citizens by the State out of which Article 19(1)(a) mentions freedom of speech and expression. It states that every citizen has a right to speak which also includes the right to remain silent and also to express their views but the same is restricted by Article 19(2) which puts few reasonable restrictions on the same. 

Article 51A(e): Part IV- A of the Indian Constitution contains Article 51A which talks about all the fundamental duties that were added by the 42nd Constitutional Amendment, it also mentions one of the duties as a duty to promote harmony, and the spirit of common brotherhood amongst all the people of India transcending religious, linguistic, regional and sectional diversities and to renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women.

Indian Majority Act, 1875

Section 3 of the Indian Majority Act, 1875, provides for the age of majority, which is above 18 years. Any person over the age of 18 is considered a major and is free to decide and choose anyone to marry and no one, including their own parents can harass or threaten them for marrying someone against their will. The age of the petitioner, who was a female in this case, was above 18 years and she was a major at all times. The Supreme Court also upheld this fact and her right to marry anyone of her choice and with her consent.

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 

In India, marriages are a sacrament and regulated by the personal laws of different religions. We have the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for governing marriages of Hindus. As per Section 5(iii) of the Act, the legal age to marry in India is 18 years for females and 21 years for males. 

Special Marriage Act, 1954

We also have the Special Marriage Act, 1954, which applies to all religions and also governs the inter-caste marriages across India. 

Indian Penal Code, 1860

Section 366 of the Indian Penal Code penalises the offence of kidnapping, abducting or inducing a woman to compel her marriage against her will or seducing her for illicit intercourse. Further, Section 368 punishes the offence wherein anyone, knowing that any person has been kidnapped or has been abducted, wrongfully conceals or confines such person. 

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

Section 164 of the CrPC talks about the confessions and statements that can be recorded by any Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate at the course of an investigation or at any time before the commencement of the inquiry or trial. Further, Section 482 of the CrPC grants the inherent powers to the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse of process of law or to secure ends of justice. 

Judgement in Lata Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2006)

Ratio Decidendi

The division bench, comprising Justice Ashok Bhushan and Justice Markandey Katju, while criticising the shocking state of affairs in this case, favoured the petitioners and allowed the writ petition. The warrants that were issued against the accused persons were also quashed and the police officials were directed to ensure that the husband and the relatives of the petitioner are not harassed or threatened at any point in time by the accused persons or anyone for their inter-caste marriage. 

The Court also directed that police protection must be provided to the petitioner and her in-laws because of the danger to their lives and that necessary action must be taken if someone is found threatening or harassing them.

Obiter Dicta

The Supreme Court observed that the social evil of the caste system is dividing the nation when unity is needed. Only inter-caste marriages can help society overcome the malpractice of the caste system and break the stigma attached to it. Every person who is a major has a right to marry a person of his own choice and will since India is a free and democratic nation. It also stated that there is no honour attached to killing someone in the name of inter-caste marriage, which is thus a barbaric and heinous offence of murder. The court finally proceeded with giving instructions to the administrative authorities to protect the couples who have undergone inter-caste marriage and take necessary actions against those who try to humiliate and harass these couples. 

Analysis of the judgement

It is rightly said that the caste system in many countries, especially India, have destroyed many marriages and relationships. Any person who has attained the age of marriage should have the right to marry a person of his/her own choice. When it comes to marriage between different castes and communities, it’s like a taboo for most of the people across the country. Marriages are considered not only a social institution in India, but also a sacrament. Caste marriages are the only way to completely eradicate caste barriers in India, whether urban or rural. They have to deal with threats and violence as happened in this case.   

The Supreme Court of India, by allowing the Writ Petition that was filed under Article 32, proved that the prevailing social evils like these are the roadblock for the growth of society and could be eradicated only when there is no abuse of power by the courts and the administrative machinery. The accused persons presented no such evidence and stated no relevant facts except for calling the petitioner a mentally unfit person, which was already proved not to be true. Also, in such cases, the statement of the woman stands as a strong proof of a valid marriage. Thus, the court rightly concluded that the family members of the husband were wrongly imprisoned by the police and set a wrong example against inter-caste marriages in India. 

Highlights and significance of the judgement

  • The court clarified that a person who is a major is free to marry or live with anyone they like and there is no bar to inter-caste marriages under any law, including the Hindu Marriage Act.
  • The court was distressed to note that the police had proceeded against the husband and family members of the husband and arrested them, instead of taking legal action against the brothers of the petitioners for the unlawful acts.
  • The court also noted that there were a lot of such cases involving harassment, violence and threats against those who marry someone outside of their caste and the court in such situations cannot remain silent because these are matters of great public concern.
  • The court called the caste system a curse and hoped for its destruction soon since it was dividing the nation when it was supposed to be united. 
  • The court further noted that the inter-caste marriages will only help destroy the caste system in the country.
  • The acts of violence and threats against those who undergo inter-caste marriage are purely illegal and must be severely punished.
  • Every major has the right to marry any person since India is a free and democratic nation and if the parents do not approve of their marriage, they can cut-off the social relations with the children but cannot make threats or harass them.
  • The court directed the police authorities to check for such acts of violence against young couples and institute criminal proceedings against those who are involved in these acts.
  • The court in this case also talked about honour killings and stated that there is no honour in killing such persons who undergo inter-caste marriage out of their own will. These killings in the name of inter-caste marriages are barbaric and shameful and amount to murder, which deserves harsh punishment. 

Judgements which referred to the case of Lata Singh vs. State of UP (2006)

This judgement became a landmark on the point of inter-caste marriages and still has a positive impact on society. The Central Government also, in 2013-14 started with the scheme, which is named “Dr. Ambedkar Scheme for Social Integration through Inter-caste Marriage” and is aimed at providing ₹ 2.5 lakhs to the couple who did inter-caste marriage and any one of them is a dalit, appreciating the bold step of undergoing an inter-caste marriage. Similar arrangements for providing assistance to such couples have been introduced in various states like Rajasthan, Haryana, Maharashtra, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu. Let us now have a look at a few recent cases wherein the court used this landmark judgement as a leading precedent: 

Simran Choudhary vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir (2019)

Facts of the case 

In the case of Simran Choudhary v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (2019), both the petitioners were majors and were in love with each other. When they disclosed this fact to their parents and requested their marriage, the parents of the female got annoyed and disapproved of the same. The father of the female even threatened the man. Both the petitioners decided to marry and performed the marriage ceremony as per Hindu rites and customs at Arya Samaj Janipur Jammu. It was stated that the parents of the female made the lives of the petitioners miserable after the marriage. There was continuous harassment from that side and the movements of the petitioners were also restricted due to this. They have also given death threats to the petitioners. Due to all this, the petitioners were forced to file the petition before the Hon’ble High Court of Jammu and Kashmir. 

Issues raised

  • Whether the petitioners were major at the time of marriage?
  • Whether the Court can order adequate protection for the petitioners from the harassment by her parents and dispose of the proceedings?

Judgement given

After considering the photo-copies of the scorecards of Secondary School Examination wherein the death of birth was mentioned, the court noted that the petitioners were major. 

It also noted that the petitioners had entered into the marriage wedlock out of their own will and thereby also highlighted the judgement of Lata Singh v. State of U.P. The court in this case also referred to the cases of Shafin Jahan v. Ashokan K.M. (2018) and K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2018) and considered the law regarding marriages in India and the importance of liberty and autonomy while taking such decisions relating to marriage. Subsequently, the court disposed of the petition and directed the police officials to ensure the protection and safety of lives of the petitioners.

Shafin Jahan vs. Ashokan K.M. (2018)

Facts of the case

In the case of Shafin Jahan v. Ashokan K.M. (2018), Hadiya was a Muslim girl aged 24 years and was a student of BHMS at a private college in Salem. A writ of habeas corpus was filed by her parents earlier and the court ordered her to stay with her parents. When she requested the court to stay in the hostel for completing her internship and course, the court allowed her plea but at that time, she got married to the appellant, which was opposed by her father, Ashokan, since it was a case of jihad. The High Court annulled the marriage of Hadiya and the same was challenged before the Supreme Court.

Issue raised

Whether the High Court was correct in nullifying the marriage of the appellant, which was done when they were major and out of their free will?

Judgement given

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and the marriage was held to be valid. It noted that there was a miscarriage of justice by the Kerala High Court and that it had committed a serious error of jurisdiction. It stated that the High Court cannot set a bad law by focusing on the social background of the petitioner. The Court also referred to the present judgement of Lata Singh and stated that every major individual has a right to choose the life they wish for and the partner they wish to marry and the Court or the State cannot put any restriction on the same. The High Court was held to be wrong in this case for favouring the father of the female and restraining her liberty. 

Bhagwan Dass vs. State (NCT) of Delhi (2011)

Facts of the case

The case of Bhagwan Dass v. State (NCT) of Delhi (2011) was related to the honour killing of a daughter by his father. The daughter left her husband and was living with her uncle in an incestuous relationship, which made her father infuriated. As a result, the father thought this conduct of his daughter to be dishonourable and thereby caused her death. The trial court convicted him and this decision was upheld by the high court. Therefore, the appellant filed the present appeal before the Supreme Court. The appellant also tried to destroy the evidence by performing the last rites of his daughter on his own. The confession made by the appellant to his mother regarding the murder was also considered by the court as an extra judicial confession. 

Issues raised

Whether the appellant was liable for the murder of her daughter in the name of ‘honour killing’?

Judgement given

The Court, while referring to the case of Lata Singh, noted that this is another gruesome honour killing case of a daughter by a father. The court also noted that the appellant tried to cremate the deceased even without the postmortem to destroy any evidence. The court also relied on the statement of the mother of the appellant when appellant told her about the murder of his daughter. This was considered to be an extra judicial confession. The court further held that this was the case of murder and the appellant was rightly convicted by the courts. Thus, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction of the appellant. 

Conclusion

In the circumstances of this case, the writ petition was allowed by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has held that people perpetrating such violence and harassment should be severely punished. It was directed that the criminal proceedings shall be instituted against the petitioner’s brothers and others involved by the concerned authorities. The court held that the petitioner is a major and was major at all times. Hence, she is free to marry anybody and there is no bar to inter-caste marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act or any other law. So, the petitioner, her husband and husband’s relatives did not commit any offence.

The court, by quashing the proceedings against the husband and the relatives of the petitioner, told the police officials to ensure that neither the petitioner nor her husband nor any relatives of the petitioner’s husband were harassed or threatened nor were any acts of violence were committed against them. 

So, it can be concluded by saying that the caste system is a hindrance to a nation’s development and has to be ended as soon as possible. This caste system acts as a bane for progressive India. Hence, by virtue of this landmark judgement, it is clear that every person has a right to choose their own life partner and marrying outside caste is not prohibited and is not illegal or immoral. Fundamental rights have always been considered as a cornerstone of the Constitution of India and definitely a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. This case had provided its citizens with the right against honour killings. It is the landmark judgement since it provided the citizens with the right to marry as per their choice under Article 21 of the Constitution, which widened the scope of the fundamental rights. 

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

What does this case deal with?

This case deals with inter-caste marriages and how, in the name of inter-caste marriages, young men and women who decide to marry of their choice are harassed, threatened and killed, and the court’s stand on the eradication of such social evil. 

Does Article 21 of the Indian Constitution include the right to marry of one’s own choice?

Yes, the right to marry a person of one’s choice is included in Article 21 of the Constitution if that person is a major. 

Who all have the right to choose whom to marry as per the law?

As per the Hindu Marriage Act, only persons who are major or above the age of 18 years, if female and above 21 years, if male have the right to choose to marry under Article 21. However, as per the Indian Majority Act, any person above the age of 18 years is a major and can marry anyone of their choice. 

Are all the fundamental rights, including the right to marry, available only to Indian Citizens?

No, only the fundamental rights given under Articles 15, 16, 19, 29 and 30 are available to Indian citizens and all other fundamental rights are available to both citizens and non-citizens. The right to marry under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution is given to citizens as well as non-citizens.

Who all are the exponents of the ‘social contract theory’?

Hobbes, Jean Jacques Rousseau and John Locke are known to be the proponents of the influential theory of the social contract. 

Under which provision does the magistrate record any statement or confession of the person?

Any Metropolitan or Judicial Magistrate has the power to record the statement and confession of a person under Section 164 of the CrPC. 

What do Sections 366 and 368 of the IPC deal with?

Section 366 covers the offence of kidnapping, abducting or inducing any woman to compel her marriage or in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with another person. Section 368 talks about the offence of wrongfully concealing or keeping in confinement a person who was kidnapped or abducted.

Which scheme has been formulated for those who will perform the inter-caste marriage?

‘Dr. Ambedkar Scheme for Social Integration through Inter-caste marriage’ has been formulated, which aims at providing ₹ 2.5 lakhs to the couple who did inter-caste marriage.

References

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