We are living in an era of a tech driven world. In this tech-driven world, artificial intelligence plays a vital role.
Nowadays, AI is not just a tool or computer programme that is dependent on human commands and intervention. It has been revolutionised in such a manner that it can make an independent and creative decision without any human intervention. This dynamic and revolutionary version of AI is now used in various fields. Creators have started using AI to produce and generate excellent and unique work in the entertainment field like movies, music, paintings, journalism, gaming, etc. By using this revolutionised version of AI technology, creators have started exploiting the same.
Now the question is raised: is the work protected by AI?
Any literary or artistic work, like music, paintings, movies, etc., created by the owner is protected under the Copyright Act. But the main thing is that protection from infringement is only provided to humans. The Act is completely silent about protecting against infringement by intelligence, robots, or any work created without human interference.
Considering the above-mentioned scenario, the question arises, does the Copyright Act protect the works generated by AI? If yes, then who owns the authorship of the work generated by AI? And what issues will give birth to new challenges?
The intersection of AI and copyright law
The intersection of AI and copyright law presents a complex situation, raising various legal and ethical considerations. The intersection of AI-generated work and copyright law poses several challenges.
Use of copyrighted material in AI training
Various AI systems often require large amounts of data to train their algorithms effectively. This data is the fuel for AI systems, without which the system cannot work efficiently.
This used data includes copyrighted material such as images, texts, and music, which may raise copyright infringement concerns.
AI technologies can be used to replicate existing copyrighted works. The algorithms can analyse and generate content that closely resembles protected works, which can raise questions about the legality and ethical implications of such replication.
In the realm of intellectual property, the interplay between artificial intelligence (AI) and copyright protection has sparked a complex and multifaceted debate. As AI technology rapidly advances, it raises profound questions about the nature of authorship, originality, and the boundaries of copyright law. This critical analysis delves into the nuances of this evolving relationship, examining the challenges and opportunities presented by AI in the context of copyright protection.
AI as a creative force:
Emergence of AI-generated works is blurring the lines between human and machine creativity.
Legal implications of AI’s ability to create original works and hold copyrights.
Ethical considerations regarding the recognition of AI as an author.
Authorship and originality:
Challenges in determining authorship when AI contributes significantly to a work’s creation.
Assessment of originality in AI-generated content, considering the lack of human intervention.
Implications for traditional notions of individual creativity and the human touch.
Copyright ownership and attribution:
There are complexities in assigning copyright ownership when multiple entities (AI, programmers, and users) are involved.
Attribution issues and the need for transparency in identifying the contributions of AI to a work.
Legal frameworks for addressing copyright ownership and attribution disputes.
Fair use and transformative works:
Application of fair use principles to AI-generated content, considering its potential transformative nature.
Balancing the rights of copyright holders with the need for innovation and reuse of AI-generated works.
Case studies and legal precedents related to fair use and AI.
Data rights and training datasets:
Copyright implications of using copyrighted works as training data for AI models.
There are ethical concerns surrounding the unauthorised use of copyrighted material in AI training.
Legal frameworks for protecting data rights and regulating the use of copyrighted works in AI training.
AI-assisted copyright enforcement:
Potential benefits of using AI technology to identify and enforce copyright infringements.
There are concerns regarding the accuracy and fairness of AI-powered copyright enforcement systems.
Legal and ethical implications of automated copyright enforcement.
International perspectives and legal developments:
Comparison of copyright laws and regulations governing AI in different jurisdictions.
Ongoing legislative efforts and international discussions on AI and copyright protection.
Harmonisation of international laws to address the cross-border implications of AI-generated content.
Future trends and policy considerations:
Anticipated developments in AI technology and their impact on copyright protection.
Policy recommendations for lawmakers and policymakers to strike a balance between innovation and the protection of creative works.
Ethical guidelines and best practices for the responsible use of AI in the creative industries.
This critical analysis highlights the multifaceted nature of the relationship between AI and copyright protection, presenting a comprehensive overview of the challenges and opportunities it poses. As AI technology continues to evolve, legal frameworks, ethical considerations, and policy discussions will play a crucial role in shaping the future of copyright law in the digital age.
Impact of AI on copyright laws
Generative AI – authorship and ownership issue
Defining authorship and ownership of AI-generated work is a very challenging and complex situation. In India and US jurisdiction, copyright is granted to human creators, But the question remains unanswered about the AI-generated work. Who should be considered the author?
Originality and creativity
Copyright protection requires originality and creativity, concepts usually associated with human intellectual activity. The algorithms of AI can autonomously create content without human intervention. AI-generated content challenges these notions.
AI in content creation and curation
Automated Content Creation: AI tools are progressively used for content creation, from art and music to articles and software. In this creative process, the machines play the main role. This raises questions about the role of copyright.
Content filtering and copyright enforcement
On various online platforms, AI is utilised for content filtering and copyright enforcement. The issues arise regarding the accuracy of automated systems in identifying copyright infringement, potentially leading to the suppression of legitimate content.
Data training and copyrighted material
Training AI Models: AI models frequently require vast amounts of data in their training methods. If, in the said process, copyrighted material is used without proper authorization, it could possibly lead to copyright infringement claims.
Impact of copyright law on AI
Access to data: fair use and data access
AI models benefit from access to diverse datasets. Copyright law’s fair use doctrine and limitations on data access may impact the ability to train AI models effectively.
Algorithmic transparency: Fair use and reverse engineering
AI systems, particularly those involving machine learning algorithms, may raise issues related to reverse engineering and algorithmic transparency. Copyright law’s fair use doctrine could be invoked to justify reverse engineering for purposes like interoperability and transparency.
Collaboration and licensing: licencing agreements
The development and deployment of AI often involve collaborations between entities. Licencing agreements become crucial to defining the scope of use, ownership, and compensation for AI-generated content.
Digital rights management (DRM): technological protection measures
Copyright owners may use technological protection measures (DRM) to control access to their works. The interaction between AI and DRM raises questions about the balance between protecting copyright and ensuring reasonable access for AI development.
The Hon’ble High Court of Kerala has held that fair dealing in terms of infringement of the copyrights of the work must be decided on the following factors. It is held that Hon’ble Courts may allow/permit only extracts or quotations from the work as ‘fair dealing’ in accordance with Section 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957, like the four-factor test of the US fair use doctrine mentioned below-
The nature of copyrighted work.
The amount and substantiality of the portion used in comparison to the entire copyrighted work.
The impact of the use on the potential market or value of the copyrighted work. The likelihood of competition between the two works.
The purpose for which it is taken, whether it is commercial or non-profit educational purposes.
Evolving legal framework
Regulatory adaptation
Updating Legislation: As AI technology continues to advance, there may be a need for lawmakers to adapt copyright laws to address emerging challenges and ensure a fair balance between protecting creators’ rights and promoting innovation.
Ethical considerations
Bias and Discrimination: AI systems may unintentionally perpetuate biases present in training data, leading to potential ethical concerns. Copyright law may need to consider the ethical implications of AI-generated content.
International cooperation
Global standards
Considering the global nature of AI and the internet, international cooperation is crucial in developing consistent standards and guidelines for copyright issues related to AI.
In summary, the interplay between AI and copyright law is a multifaceted and evolving area that requires ongoing legal and ethical considerations to strike a balance between fostering innovation and protecting the rights of creators and copyright owners. Legal frameworks need to adapt to the challenges posed by AI technology to ensure a fair and equitable system for all stakeholders.
If ownership is granted to the AI-generated works, what will be the issues arising out of the same?
If ownership rights are given to AI for the work generated by him and the work contains any illegal or defamatory content, it will be very challenging to hold the creator or owner liable.
Ownership
Copyright is mostly a right given to another for his original work. That work includes original artistic, literary, musical, and dramatic work. However, copyright also protects software or the coding of software as a literary work and AI (artificial intelligence) is part of the same. Although AI was created through programming, it is now quite capable and excellent at creating original works such as music, articles, lyrics, pictures and images.
Then the question is raised, will such works get copyright protection or not?
Accountability
The artwork that is created on a computer is mostly created by giving input by a coder or programmer, but nowadays artificial intelligence, machine learning software are developed in such a manner that they are able to create original work by themselves by giving data input and without any human interference. In the said process, if AI explores vast amounts of data that are accessible in the public domain, there is a high chance of infringement of copyright as the AI-generated work may contain some data from someone else’s work.
Navigating the complications of AI in copyright, accountability, and challenges ahead
United States: Navigating the delicate balance between copyright protection and fair use and its challenges
In this jurisdiction, original work is qualified only if it has a human author. In the United States, a clear precedent was set in cases like.
In this case, a British photographer named Slater requested copyright registration for a photograph taken by a monkey, but the US Copyright Office denied the application, stating that the shot was taken without human intervention. This case indicates that if the US Copyright Office declines to protect works made by natural beings, it is not likely that they will cover works generated by artificial intelligence (AI).
In the United States, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) plays a vital role in addressing copyright issues. Recent cases highlight the challenges posed by AI in navigating the delicate balance between copyright protection and fair use.
Lenz vs. Universal Music Corp., (2015)
This is a case regarding a decision given by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, holding that copyright owners must consider fair use defences and good faith activities by alleged copyright infringers before issuing takedown notices for content posted on the Internet.
The Lenz case stressed the importance of considering fair use before issuing takedown notices. AI-driven automated systems flagged a 29-second home video with Prince’s “Let’s Go Crazy.” The court ruled that copyright holders must consider fair use before sending takedown notices, indicating the need for human judgement in the process.
United Kingdom: The battle against piracy and AI-assisted infringements
The UK has been at the forefront of combating online piracy, and some of the cases reflect the challenges posed by AI-assisted copyright infringements.
This is not a copyright case, but the Cartier case focused on blocking websites selling counterfeit goods. In the said decision, the court highlighted the responsibility of internet service providers (ISPs) to take measures against infringing websites. As AI plays a role in website monitoring, the case emphasised on the need for effective AI tools in copyright enforcement.
The Cartier case stressed the role of AI in identifying and infringing on the intellectual property rights of websites. However, the questions of proportionality and the potential for collateral damage raise concerns about the broader implications of automated enforcement.
Indian court striking a balance between copyright and access to information by public
The Indian legal landscape is balancing the challenges posed by AI in copyright enforcement. The court emphasises a slight balance between copyright protection and the public’s right to access information.
Tips Industries Ltd vs. Wynk Music Ltd. (2018)
In this case, the court raised the issue of whether AI-generated playlists could be considered copyright infringement. The SAAD judgement recognised the transformative nature of AI-generated work.
This case stressed the need for nuanced approaches to AI-generated content, recognising the potential for transformative use, which may not always align with traditional copyright infringement standards.
Conclusion
As AI plays a vital role in human growth and development across various domains, we cannot go with “technological ostracism” and stop humans from enhancing productivity and innovation, improving healthcare outcomes and addressing social challenges. However, it is very important and essential that human intelligence and artificial intelligence go hand in hand.
While applying strict law for the protection of human intelligence rights, certain things, like identifying the goals and objectives of human intelligence and artificial intelligence in organisations and accessing current AI capabilities in areas of improvement, require change in the legislature and their policies. Strict guidelines must be adhered to while dealing with technologies. It is very important and essential that technologies are developed and applied responsibly with careful consideration of ethical, legal and social implications to maximise the benefit and minimise the risk.
This article is written by Tisha Agrawal. The article deals with the case of Amina vs. Hassn Koya(2003), with reference to its facts, issues raised, arguments made, the judgement, precedents referred, as well as the concerned legal provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.
Table of Contents
Introduction
The case of Amina vs. Hassn Koya (2003) deals with the legality of the marriage between the appellant and the respondent. The case traversed through lower courts and ultimately reached the Hon’ble Apex Court. The case revolved around the contention regarding the husband’s awareness of the pregnancy of his wife and the subsequent events. It was observed in this case that concealment of pregnancy alone cannot be a valid ground for rendering the marriage void.
While delivering the judgement, the court highlighted the manner in which the legality of marriage shall be decided. The case is a significant decision because of its view on Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The court delves into the evidentiary value of the ‘conduct’ of the parties as per Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and emphasises the importance of weighing and inferring conduct while examining a case like this.
Important provisions:Section 125 of CrPC, 1973, Sections 3 and 8 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
Bench: M.B. Shah, Arun Kumar, JJ
Petitioner/Appellant: Amina
Respondents: Hassn Koya
Judgement date: April 28, 2003
Facts of Amina vs. Hassn Koya (2003)
The appellant in the present case was married to the respondent on 28th December 1972. Within five months of their marriage, a girl child was born to them on 28th April 1973. In 1977, the respondent divorced the appellant, subsequent to which a petition for maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC was filed by the appellant.
In the concerned petition, she claimed maintenance for herself and her daughter at different rates per month. In a reply to the maintenance petition, the respondent admitted to the marriage but alleged that the appellant was already pregnant at the time of marriage and the child was not fathered by him. It was his case that this fact was concealed from him during the marriage and therefore, the marriage was invalid and void. He claimed that since his marriage was void, he was not liable to pay maintenance either to the daughter or the wife.
When the matter went to the Magistrate Court, the court directed payment of maintenance for the wife but denied maintenance for the child. It was believed by the Court at this stage that the child is not fathered by the respondent and thus, he is not liable to pay the maintenance. This order was challenged by both the parties.
Further, an Additional Sessions Judge held the marriage between the parties to be invalid and it was followed that the husband has no liability to pay maintenance. A revision petition was filed by the appellant against this order before the High Court of Kerala. The same was dismissed by the High Court declaring the marriage to be void. Therefore, the appellant approached the Supreme Court and hence, the present judgement.
Issues raised
The following issues were raised before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above-mentioned case: –
Whether there was a valid marriage between the parties or not?
Whether such a marriage can be said to be void or illegal if the fact about the pregnancy of the wife was concealed from the husband at the time of marriage or not?
Arguments of the parties
The main contention of the parties revolved around the validity of their marriage and the fact about the appellant’s pregnancy.
Arguments on behalf of the appellant
From the appellant’s side, relevant evidence was submitted before the court. It was their case that the respondent was aware about the pregnancy. Official records from the hospital also suggested that the respondent was attending to his wife while she was going through the delivery. Afterwards, he also gave his name as the father for paperwork at the hospital. All these actions of the respondent suggest that he had no problem with the pregnancy or the child. Even after the birth of the child, they were in their marriage for over four years before getting a divorce.
Arguments on behalf of the respondent
It was argued by the respondent’s side that at the time of their marriage, he was not aware of the fact that she was five months pregnant. This fact was deliberately concealed from him by the appellant, therefore, this shall render the contract of marriage between them as invalid.
He also declined the fatherhood of the child. He denied the claim of maintenance to the wife on the grounds of the marriage being invalid and to the child on the grounds of illegitimacy.
Legal provisions involved in Amina vs. Hassn Koya (2003)
Section 125 CrPC
Section 125 of the CrPC provides for the maintenance of the wife, children and parents by the husband. The provision of maintenance is incorporated to alleviate the agony and suffering of the distressed women. This section is applicable to individuals of all religions and has no relation with the personal laws of the parties.
When a party invokes this section, the court may order the respondent to provide maintenance to the concerned parties. However, there is an exception to the provision which says that the husband has to be financially capable enough to support his wife. Many judicial precedents have reaffirmed this position recently. Earlier, the courts used to grant maintenance even if the wife was earning sufficiently but nowadays, all these factors are weighed in by the court before granting maintenance. Along with this, the maintenance would not be granted if the wife is living in adultery or separately without any sufficient reasons.
Recently, in Badshah vs. Urmila Badshah Godse and Anr. (2013), the Apex Court ruled that the maintenance is granted with the goal of strengthening the poor and attaining social justice or for equality or dignity. The right to demand maintenance is statutory in India and it cannot be taken away by an agreement to the contrary. While passing any order under this provision, it has to be kept in mind that the husband has sufficient means to support the wife and also that the wife does not have sufficient means to support herself.
Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 provides that any fact will be relevant which shows or constitutes a motive or preparation for any fact in issue or relevant fact. The conduct of any party to a suit in reference to such suit is relevant in such a case if such conduct influences the issue or relevant fact. According to this provision, the elements of motive, preparation and conduct are relevant.
Section 8 specifies two timelines for the relevancy of conduct, i.e., previously and subsequently. The conduct of the accused is important not just in inferring and finding his guilt but also in determining the appropriate punishment and sentence.
In the present case of Amina vs. Hassn Koya, the Hon’ble Court applied Section 8 in relation to the conduct of the respondent (husband). The court analysed that his conduct infers a different situation then what he is alleging. His allegations are not supported by any evidence and his conduct indicates otherwise.
Judgement in Amina vs. Hassn Koya (2003)
Hon’ble Justice Arun Kumar while giving the judgement rejected the arguments put forth by the respondents and observed that under Muslim law, a marriage is a contract, unlike the Hindu Law wherein it is a sacrament. The respondent’s case that he was not aware of the appellant’s pregnancy cannot be accepted. The lower courts have erred in declaring the marriage as void. It is difficult to believe that a woman can hide her five month pregnancy from her husband. This is an advanced stage of pregnancy and it is very difficult to hide it at this stage. In any circumstance, this cannot be concealed therefore, if the fact was known to the respondent then the marriage cannot be said to be illegal or void.
The Court further emphasised on the conduct of the parties as per Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The court observed that the husband did not raise any objection at the time of marriage and even after marriage. As per the admitted evidence and records from the hospital, he was also present during the time of delivery of the child. He was attending Amina in the Hospital. He has also given his own name as the name of the father of the child for the official records at the hospital. All this evidence has been submitted before the court.
After the birth of the child, he continued with the marriage for more than four years. It was only when the wife claimed maintenance that he denied the pregnancy and the child. The respondent’s conduct does not show that he had any problem with the pregnancy of his wife and the child. Even if the court believes the arguments of the respondent that he was unaware of the pregnancy at the time of marriage, his conduct after the marriage does not infer the same. A normal reasonable person would have immediately left his wife as soon as he got to know about the pregnancy. The fact that the respondent continued with his marriage for more than four years and also gave his name to the girl child implies that his allegations are mala fide in nature.
Reliance was placed on the case of Kulsumbi Kom Abdul Kadir vs. Abdul Kadir Walad Saikh Ahmad (1920). This was also a case of marriage of a pregnant woman. The husband left his wife when he came to know about her pregnancy. It was held that concealment of pregnancy by the wife would not render the marriage invalid. The husband will be liable to pay dower and he cannot shrug off his responsibilities.
Therefore, the fact that pregnancy was concealed by the appellant in the present case is unacceptable. The marriage cannot be held either invalid or void. The findings of the Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court are completely unwarranted and incorrect & cannot be accepted by this court. In the present case, it is clearly evident that the respondent was fully aware of the pregnancy of the appellant at the time of marriage. He cannot now claim that the marriage was invalid or void.
The court also discussed the judgement relied upon by the Additional Sessions Judge that is, Abdulla vs. Beepathu (1967). In this case, it was held that the pregnancy of the bride at the time of marriage ipso facto invalidates marriage unless the bride proves that this was well within the knowledge of the husband. This decision supports the conclusion given by this Hon’ble Court in the present petition. It is evidently clear that the husband was aware of the pregnancy of the wife, therefore no question arises of invalidating the marriage.
Thus, the judgement of the Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court of Kerala are set aside. The appellant is entitled to costs and she can seek enhancement of the rate of maintenance from the husband.
The case has been affirmed on several occasions since then. In 2018, the Kerala High Court reaffirmed this judgement in the case of Ali vs. Ummu Selma (2018), it was observed that if the husband has known about the pregnancy then the marriage cannot be treated as illegal or void.
Conclusion
The case at hand presents a complex dispute over the validity of a marriage and the consequent obligation created upon the husband for maintenance. The initial rulings were in favour of the respondent but his arguments were further rejected by the Supreme Court. His arguments that the marriage was invalid due to the concealment of pregnancy was rejected. The case is important as it shows how the Supreme Court dealt with the case. The court analysed and scrutinised the respondent’s behaviour before and after the marriage. The court found it inconceivable that the respondent remained unaware of the pregnancy given his active participation during the birth of the child.
By remarkable observations, the earlier rulings were rejected. It also emphasised that the concealment of pregnancy alone does not render a marriage invalid, especially when the facts suggest that the respondent was aware of the situation. By overturning the prior decisions, the Court affirmed the appellant’s entitlement to maintenance.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the provision for maintenance?
Maintenance is a legal provision which allows a person to claim financial support from another person who is legally obligated to provide it. Section 125 of the CrPC provides for the maintenance.
What are the grounds for denying maintenance?
A wife is not entitled to maintenance, if she is liable for adultery, if she refuses to live with her husband without any sufficient reason or if she has divorced the husband with mutual consent.
What is a valid marriage?
A valid marriage is one that is recognized as legal and binding under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 or the Special Marriage Act, 1954.
How is conduct inferred?
Conduct means the external behaviour of an individual. As per Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the conduct of the parties can act as important evidence in determining a case. Relevant conduct of the parties in a case is taken into consideration by the court if there is no substantial evidence present. For instance, in the case of Amina vs. Hassn Koya, the conduct of the husband was taken into consideration to determine his liability and the validity of the marriage.
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In our everyday chores, we hear about a team contract, which is very frequently used both in a legal and general sense. A contract basically means an agreement between two or more people that is enforceable by the court of law. It is not a new term but has been around for ages. In early years, most agreements were oral, which is now converted into a written form. The Latin term “pacta sunt servanda” lays down the purpose of Indian contract Act, 1872.
Section 2(h) of the Indian Contract Act of 1872 states that an agreement enforceable by law is a contract. The definition contains the term agreement. An understanding of agreement lies in the fact that when one person offers to do something or abstains from doing something, the other person accepts the same, which is termed a promise. When consideration is exchanged in such promises, finally agreement is made. When it comes to enforceability, the intention to create legal relationships is very pivotal.
Illustration: A offers B to sell his house for Rs. 100,000/- and B accepts the offer given absolutely. Both parties intend to create a legal relationship. This agreement is a contract, as it is enforceable by law.
Next, A is husband and B is a daughter. A promised his daughter that if she secures rank 1 in the CLAT 2025 examination, he will give her a brand new scooter. She accepted the challenges. On the result day, it was discovered that B secured rank 1 in the CLAT exam. Her father did not buy a scooter for her. The agreement was not a contract because intent to create a legal relationship was absent because it was a social agreement and as per the facts and circumstances of the case, it was clear that intention to create a legal relationship was absent.
Pillars of contract
Two or more parties
For a contract to come into existence, there has to be at least 2 people. Moreover, it is equally important that one part tender offers and accepts the same in exchange of consideration.
Capacity of parties
To enter into any agreement, both parties must be majors, as a contract with a minor is void ab initio. Law relating to agreement with minor states states the followings-
Minor is never personally liable .
Minor can take benefits.
Rule of estoppel is not applicable to minors.
Minor can always plead minority.
Suerity is liable for minors.
Parents are not liable if minors do not act on parent’s authority.
For necessary, minors are liable, but only to the extent of estate.
Agreement cannot be ratified after attaining majority.
Offer and acceptance
In general parlance, an offer means one person, with a view to obtaining assent, expresses his willingness. Section 2{a} of the indian contract Act, 1872 states that “ when one person signifies to another his willingness to do or to abstain from doing anything with a view to obtain the assent of that offer to such act or abstinence, he is said to make a proposal.” From the definition, it can be concluded that the offer must be communicated to the offeree; communication may be expressed or implied; communication of the offer may be general or specific; and the offer must be made with the intent to create a legal relationship.
Acceptance, on the other hand, means that when a person to whom an offer is made signifies his assent to the same, he is absolutely said to accept the offer. Moreover, a valid offer has certain essentialities, which are as follows-
Acceptance shall be communicated to the offeror.
Acceptance shall be absolute and unqualified.
Acceptance shall be made in some usual and reasonable manner, unless the proposal prescribes the manner of acceptance .
Acceptance shall be made while the offer is still subsisting.
Lawful consideration
In common language, consideration means something in return, which means both parties shall get something or another thing in return. It may be cash or something else. Moreover, consideration must always be at the request of the offeror. There are certain essentialities that need to be duly complied with in order to declare the consideration lawful. They are as follows:
Consideration must move at the request of the promisor.
Consideration may come from a promise or from any other person.
It may be the past,present or future.
It may be executed or executory.
It need not be adequate.
It should not be immoral, unlawful or opposed to public policy.
Consideration is more than what the person is legally bound to perform.
It must be real.
In the case of Chinnaya vs. Ramayya, a brief fact of the case was that the old lady gifted her land to her daughter with the direction/condition that she had to pay annuity to the maternal uncle. Daughter promised to pay the annuity but after a few years, she denied paying the annuity by saying the maternal uncle is a stranger to the contract so the same cannot be enforced against her. The court held that consideration may come from either the promisee or any other person and in this case, the old lady gave consideration on behalf of the maternal uncle; therefore, the agreement is enforceable.
Lawful object
Object of the agreement shall be lawful. If the object could be discovered at the time of entering into the agreement and turns out to be illegal or unlawful, then the agreement is declared void.
Illustration: A promised B, a government official, to pay Rs,10,00,000/- if he passed his tender. B passed the tender in favour of A. After this event, a payment of Rs, 10,00,000/- to Mr. B. Now Mr. B cannot enforce this agreement as the object was unlawful.
Free consent
Presently, the most important question arises: what is consent? Section 12 of ICA, 1872, defines consent by stating that when two people agree to the same thing in the same sense, then it is called consent.
Further, free consent is obtained when the consent is free from coercion, undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation and mistake.
Case1: A made an offer to sell his flat no. 10/3, Gkuldham society, powder gali, Lalpur, Ranchi, to Mr. B for Rs. 20,000/- B accepted the offer and is ready to pay Rs. 20,000/-. Here, consent is free.
Case 2: A made an offer to Mr. B to buy his flat no. 10/3, Gokuldham society, powder gali, Lalpur, Ranchi for Rs. 20,000/-. actual price of the fault is 20,00,000/-Mr. A said to Mr. B that if he doesn’t transfer the flat, then he will kidnap Mr. B’s daughter. B accepted the offer in fear and is ready to transfer. Here, consent is taken through coercion and hence, consent is not free.
Intention to create legal relationship
Offer and acceptance, coupled with consideration, will only form an agreement if the intention to create a legal relationship is absent. The term intention to create a legal relationship means a person is willing to perform his part and expects the other party to perform his task. If any party fails to perform its part, then the aggrieved party may enforce the same through the court of law.
In social agreements, generally, it is presumed that there is no intention to create a legal relationship. For example, Mr. A, husband of Mrs. B, promises to buy diamond necklaces on their marriage anniversary. On the day of the marriage anniversary, Mr. A denied. Now Mrs. B cannot sue Mr. A for breach of contract. The reason being that it is social contact and the parties did not have the intention to create a legal relationship.
In commercial or business agreements, it is presumed that there is an intention to create legal relationships. For example,Mr. Raj promised to supply 100 litres of milk everyday for making sweets. Mr. Sonu had a sweet shop in the market and they accepted the offer from Mr. Raj. One fine day, Mr. Raj denied it without any legal cause. Now, Mr. Sonu can enforce the contract through the court of law, as Mr. Raj breached his part of the promise in the contract.
Certainty of meaning
Certainty of meaning, as defined in Section 29 of the ICA, states that the subject matter shall be certain or capable of being made certain.
Illustration: Mr. A went to a bike showroom and said, give me a red coloured Pulsar 200, 150CC engine. The owner of the showroom, Mr. B, accepted the offer and said that yes, we have a red pulsar 200, 150CC engine for Rs 2,00,000/-. This is an agreement which has a certain meaning.
Possibility of performance
In the list of essentialities, the possibility of performance is an important pillar, which states that if an agreement is of such nature that it is impossible to perform, then such an agreement is void ab initio. For example: Mr. A offers to pay Rs 10,00,000/- to Mr. B if he manages to call aliens to the earth. This agreement is impossible to perform and, hence, void.
The Indian Contract Act, 1872
The Indian Contract Act of 1872 is a landmark piece of legislation that governs the law of contracts in India. It is considered to be one of the most comprehensive and well-drafted contract laws in the world. The Act has 238 sections, each of which deals with a different aspect of contract law. The Act has also been adopted by several other countries, such as Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka.
Some of the key sections of the Indian Contract Act are:
Section 2(h) defines a contract as “an agreement enforceable by law.” This means that a contract is a legally binding agreement between two or more parties that creates, modifies, or terminates a legal relationship. For an agreement to be considered a contract, it must meet certain requirements, such as offer, acceptance, consideration, and legality.
Section 7 lays down the essential elements of a valid contract.
Section 10 provides for the classification of contracts based on their enforceability. The four main types of contracts are:
Void contracts: Void contracts are contracts that are not legally enforceable because they lack one or more of the essential elements of a valid contract.
Voidable contracts: Voidable contracts are contracts that are valid but can be canceled by one or both of the parties under certain circumstances, such as fraud, mistake, or duress.
Valid contracts: Valid contracts are contracts that are legally enforceable and binding on the parties.
Illegal contracts: Illegal contracts are contracts that are void because they violate the law.
Section 23 states that a proposal may be revoked at any time before it is accepted. This means that the party making the offer can withdraw the offer at any time before the other party accepts it.
Section 30 provides for the rules governing the communication of acceptance. Acceptance of an offer must be communicated to the party making the offer. Acceptance can be communicated orally, in writing, or by conduct.
Section 45 defines consideration as “something which is of some value in the eyes of the law.” This means that consideration can be anything that is of value to the parties to a contract, such as money, goods, services, or a promise to do something.
Section 56 lays down the rule that agreements without consideration are void. This means that a contract that lacks consideration is not legally enforceable.
Section 72 provides for the consequences of a breach of contract. A breach of contract occurs when one party to a contract fails to perform their obligations under the contract. The consequences of a breach of contract can include damages, specific performance, and rescission of the contract.
Section 73 states the rule that the measure of damages for breach of contract is the loss directly and naturally resulting from the breach. This means that the party who has been injured by a breach of contract is entitled to recover damages for the losses that they have suffered as a direct result of the breach.
Section 75 provides for the rule of mitigation of damages, which states that a party who has been injured by a breach of contract must take reasonable steps to minimise the loss suffered. This means that the party who has been injured by a breach of contract cannot recover damages for losses that they could have avoided by taking reasonable steps to mitigate the loss.
It has been in force since 1872 and has undergone several amendments over the years to keep pace with changing legal and economic conditions. The most recent amendment to the Act was made in 2015. The 2015 Amendment introduced significant changes to the Indian Contract Act, including:
The introduction of a new chapter on electronic contracts, which provides a legal framework for the formation and enforcement of contracts entered into electronically.
Amendments to the provisions on arbitration, which streamline the arbitration process and make it more efficient.
Changes to the rules on limitation extend the time period within which a party can file a suit for breach of contract.
The 2015 Amendment to the Indian Contract Act is a welcome step that brings the law in line with modern commercial practices and international standards. It is expected to have a significant impact on the way contracts are formed and enforced in India.
In addition to the changes introduced by the 2015 Amendment, the Indian Contract Act has also been amended on several other occasions. These amendments have addressed a wide range of issues, including:
The addition of new provisions to protect consumers from unfair contract terms.
Changes to the rules on liquidated damages.
Amendments to the provisions on specific performance.
Landmark case laws
Super Cassettes Industries Ltd. vs. M/s. Entertainment Network (India) Ltd. (1999)
This landmark Indian case established the legal principle of anticipatory breach of contract. Central to the case were the actions of Super Cassettes Industries Ltd. (SCIL), a renowned music company, and M/s. Entertainment Network (India) Ltd. (ENIL), a music distribution company. SCIL had entered into an exclusive distribution agreement with ENIL for the sale and distribution of its music cassettes.
However, before the agreement’s stipulated performance period commenced, SCIL informed ENIL of its intention to terminate the contract. ENIL promptly filed a suit against SCIL, alleging an anticipatory breach of contract. The court, in its judgement, held that SCIL’s premature repudiation of the contract constituted an anticipatory breach.
The Court recognised that anticipatory breach occurs when one party, prior to the time of performance, clearly and unequivocally expresses an intention not to fulfil their contractual obligations. The innocent party, in this case, ENIL, is entitled to treat the contract as discharged or wait until the performance date arrives and then seek damages for the breach.
State of Maharashtra vs. M/s. Hanmantrao Bhagwantrao Shelke & Ors. (2006)
The Indian legal framework surrounding the concept of frustration of contract was significantly shaped by this pivotal case. At the heart of the dispute was a contract entered into between the State of Maharashtra and M/s. Hanmantrao Bhagwantrao Shelke & Ors. for the construction of a bridge.
During the course of the project, unforeseen circumstances arose. A substantial change in the river’s course, attributed to natural causes, rendered the construction of the bridge impracticable and financially unviable. Consequently, the State of Maharashtra sought to terminate the contract on the grounds of frustration.
The Court, in its ruling, acknowledged the doctrine of frustration of contract. It held that when, after the formation of a contract, a change in circumstances occurs that makes it impossible or unlawful to perform the contract, the contract is discharged by frustration. The court emphasised that the change in circumstances must be unforeseen, fundamental, and beyond the control of the parties involved.
Mohori Bibee vs. Dharmodas Ghose (1903)
The landmark case of Mohori Bibee vs. Dharmodas Ghose, decided in 1903 by the Privy Council, established the fundamental principle of void contracts in Indian contract law. This principle holds that a contract entered into by a minor is void ab initio, meaning it is considered legally invalid from the very beginning. The case has served as a precedent in numerous subsequent cases involving the validity of contracts.
Facts of the case
Mohori Bibee, a minor, executed a mortgage deed in favour of Dharmodas Ghose to secure a loan.
The mortgage was executed without the consent or knowledge of Mohori Bibee’s guardian.
Dharmodas Ghose, aware of Mohori Bibee’s minority, proceeded with the transaction.
Mohori Bibee later repudiated the mortgage, arguing that it was void due to her status as a minor.
Legal issues
The primary legal issue in this case was whether a contract entered into by a minor is valid and enforceable.
The court had to determine the legal consequences of a contract involving a minor and the rights and liabilities of the parties involved.
Judgement of the Court
The Privy Council, the highest court of appeal for India at the time, held that the mortgage deed executed by Mohori Bibee was void.
The court emphasised that a minor is not competent to enter into a legally binding contract, and any such contract is void from the outset.
The court reasoned that allowing minors to enter into contracts would leave them vulnerable to exploitation and deprive them of the protection afforded by the law.
Significance of the case
Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose established the principle of void contracts, which has become a fundamental tenet of Indian contract law.
The case serves as a cautionary reminder that contracts involving minors are generally not enforceable, safeguarding minors from potential legal and financial consequences.
The principle of void contracts has been applied in various contexts, including employment contracts, property transactions, and financial agreements involving minors.
The case has contributed to the development of laws and regulations aimed at protecting the rights and interests of minors in contractual matters.
Subsequent developments
The principle established in Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose has been affirmed and reinforced in subsequent case law in India.
The Indian Contract Act, 1872, which governs contract law in India, specifically states that a minor is not competent to contract (Section 11).
The Indian Majority Act, 1875, defines the age of majority as 18 years, and individuals below the age of 18 are considered minors.
The principle of void contracts has been extended to other types of agreements, such as guarantees and promissory notes, entered into by minors.
Conclusion
Whenever any agreement is coupled with the intention to create a legal relationship, that will be converted into a contract. A contract is a term that has a vast general use. In our day-to- day lives, we encounter them very frequently. Promises have many essentials that are finally able to provide the same status as a contract.
Contract is a term that is not new to the human being but has been around for ages. Almost all business runs on the basis of some or other forms of contract. For an agreement to become a contract, there are several essentialities that need to be complied with. Section 10 of the ICA, 1872, is among the most important compliances to convert an agreement into a contract.
This article is written by Almana Singh. It deals with a thorough analysis of the judgement given in the case of Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar with reference to its facts, issues raised, arguments made, as well as the concerned legal provisions of the Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952, and the Constitution of India.
Table of Contents
Introduction
The article deals with the issues raised, arguments advanced and judgement pronounced in the case of Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar & others (1958). In this case, concerns were raised regarding the constitutionality of the Commission of Inquiry Act, of 1952 (herein referred to as “Act”). It was argued that this Act grants the government extensive powers to investigate the affairs of private individuals and companies under the guise of addressing matters of “public importance”, potentially infringing upon Article 14 of the Constitution. Despite these contentions, the court upheld the validity of both the Act and the notification dated 11th December 1956 in question.
Details of the case
Case name- Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar & Ors.
Petitioner- Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia
Respondent- Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar
Court- Supreme Court of India
Type of case- Civil Appeal Nos. 455 to 457 and 656 to 658 of 1957
Date of Judgement- 28.03.1958
Bench- The then Chief Justice of India Sudhi Ranjan Das, Justice A.K. Sarkar, Justice B.P. Sinha, Justice S.K. Das, and Justice T.L. Venkatarama Aiyyar
Facts of Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia vs. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar & Others, 1958
Six appeals were made against a common judgement pronounced by the Bombay High Court. Three miscellaneous applications were filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, namely:
No. 48 of 1957, filed by Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia;
No. 49 of 1957, filed by Shri Shriyans Prasad Jain and Shri Sital Prasad Jain; and
No. 50 of 1957, filed by Shri Jai Dayal Dalmia and Shri Shanti Prasad Jain.
Under these miscellaneous applications, the plaintiffs prayed for quashing of notification number S.R.O. 2993 dated December 11, 1956, issued by the central government in exercising powers conferred on it by Section 3 of the Commissions of Enquiry Act of 1952. The High Court held the notification legal and constitutionally valid except the last part of clause (10) of the said notification.
Notification in question
The powers conferred to the Central Government under Section 3 of the Act, an inquiry commission was formed, the notification of which was published in the Gazette of India on 11th December 1956. A brief explanation of the notification is given below for thorough perusal:
Several companies and firms were established or influenced by individuals such as Ramkrishna Dalmia, Jaidayal Dalmia, Shanti Prasad Jain, Sriyans Prasad, and Shital Prasad Jain, along with their relatives or employees closely associated with them. These companies attracted substantial investments from the public. However, investigations revealed significant irregularities in their management, including financial manipulation. It became evident that a considerable portion of the funds raised by the public were diverted for personal gain rather than the benefit of the companies. Consequently, the investing public suffered substantial financial losses as a result of these actions.
The central government was of the opinion that there should be a full inquiry into these matters which are of public importance. Therefore, a Commission of Inquiry (herein referred to as “Commission”) was constituted consisting of the following persons, namely:
Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar, Judge of the High Court at Bombay, Chairman;
Shri N.R. Modi of Messers A.F. Ferguson & Co., Chartered Accountants, Member; and
Shri S.C. Chaudhuri, Commissioner of Income-tax, Member.
11 points were given under this notification on which the Commission was supposed to inquire and report. Out of these 11, clause (10) was the most controversial one which attracted the Bombay High Court’s attention. Clause 10 before the High Court’s judgement was pronounced as:
“(10) Any irregularities, frauds, or breaches of trust or action in disregard of honest commercial practices or contravention of any law (except contraventions in respect of which criminal proceedings are pending in a Court of Law) in respect of the companies and firms whose affairs are investigated by the Commission which may come to the knowledge of the Commission and the action which in the opinion of the Commission should be taken as and by way of securing redress or punishment or to act as a preventive in future cases.”
Bombay High Court held the notification valid except for the last part of clause (10) from “and the action” to the words “in future cases” and directed the Commission not to proceed with the inquiry to the extent that it related to the aforesaid last part of clause (10).
A schedule was attached along with the notification which had the names of 9 companies and firms that were under scrutiny. A few of the companies were Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd., Dalmia Jain Aviation Ltd., Sir Shapurji Broacha Mills Ltd., Allen Berry and Co. Ltd., and so on.
The initial notification did not specify any time for the completion of the inquiry by the Commission. However, on 9 January 1957, the Central Government issued another notification providing that all provisions of Section 5 of the Commission of Inquiry Act, of 1952 conferring a plethora of powers to the Commission shall be applicable. Subsequently, on 11 February 1957, a third notification was issued specifying two years from the date as the timeframe within which the Commission was to submit its report.
Laws involved in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia vs. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar & Others, 1958
The Commission of Inquiry Act, of 1952 received the assent of the President on August 14, 1952, and was after that brought into force by a notification issued by the central government. The Act provides for the appointment of a commission of inquiry and for vesting such commission with certain powers. Relevant provisions of the aforementioned Act have been briefed below:
Section 3
3(1) An appropriate government having the authority and if it deems it necessary can appoint a commission for inquiry and it must do so after a resolution is passed in either Lok Sabha or Rajya Sabha. The Commission is tasked with investigating specific matters of public importance within a defined time frame. However, there are certain conditions if multiple commissions are appointed for the same matter, If the central government appoints a commission, no state government can appoint a commission on the same matter and if the state government appoints a commission, no central government can appoint a commission on the same matter unless it believes that the investigation should extend to multiple states.
3(2) The Commission may consist of one or more members appointed by the appropriate Government, and where the Commission consists of more than one member, one of them may be appointed as the Chairman.
3(3) The appropriate government at any given time may fill the vacancy which may have arisen in the Commission.
3(4) The relevant government is required to present the report of the Commission detailing the actions taken in response to the inquiry, to either of the houses, within 6 months of submission of the inquiry by the Commission to the appropriate government.
Section 4
Section 4 vests in the Commission the powers of a civil court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of the several matters specified therein, namely, summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath, requiring discovery and production of any document, receiving evidence on affidavits, requisitioning any public record or copy thereof from any court or officer, issuing commissions for examination of witnesses or documents and any other matter which may be prescribed.
Section 5
Section 5 provides additional power to the Commission:
If the appropriate Government believes that certain provisions should apply to a Commission due to the nature of the inquiry or other circumstances, it can issue a notification to that effect. The specified provisions will then apply to the Commission as prescribed under the notification issued.
The Commission can require any person to provide information relevant to the inquiry. The person is legally bound to provide the information.
The Commission or an authorised officer can enter buildings to find and seize documents and take extracts related to the inquiry, subject to the provisions of section 102 and section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.
The Commission is considered a civil court, If someone commits specific offences in the presence of the Commission, it may after recording the facts constituting the offence and the statement of the accused as provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, forward the case to a magistrate having jurisdiction to try the same and the magistrate to whom any such case is forwarded shall proceed to hear the complaint.
Any proceeding before the Commission shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code.
Section 6
Section 6 provides that no statement made by a person in the course of giving evidence before the commission shall subject him to, or be used against him in, any civil or criminal proceeding except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such statement provided that the statement is made in reply to a question which he is required by the Commission to answer or is relevant to the subject matter of the inquiry.
Section 7
The appropriate government may under this section issue a notification declaring that the Commission shall cease to exist from such date as may be specified in the notification.
Section 8
No legal action can be taken against the government, the commission, its members, or anyone acting under their directions for any action taken in good faith under this Act or any related rules or orders.
Article 14 of the Constitution of India
Article 14 pertains, to equality before the law;
The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.
Parliament has the exclusive authority to legislate on matters listed in the Union list regardless of any conflicting provisions in clauses (2) and (3) of this Article.
While Parliament retains the exclusive authority over the union list, it also shares legislative powers with the State Legislature for matters listed in the concurrent list. However, Parliament’s authority takes precedence over that of the state in case of conflict.
The State Legislature possesses exclusive authority to legislate on matters listed in the State list, provided there is no conflict with the legislative authority of parliament or any concurrent legislative powers
Parliament has the power to make laws concerning any matter for any part of the territory of India not included in a State notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in the State List.
Issues raised
The court discussed a few major and minor contentions. Major contention dealt with the constitutionality of the Act.
Whether the notification exceeds the scope of the Act or not?
Whether the Act itself is ultra vires to the Constitution?
Whether the notification issued by the Government for the appointment of a commission exceeds the bounds of delegated authority or not?
Whether the Act and/or the notification is violative of Article 14 or not?
Whether the petitioner’s company is arbitrarily singled out by the Government or not?
Arguments of the parties
Petitioners
The petitioners contended that the notification passed by the central government had gone beyond the scope of the Commission of Inquiry Act, of 1952.
The petitioners contended that the Act itself is ultra vires in two ways. Firstly, that it was beyond the competence of the Parliament to enact a law conferring such wide sweeping powers, and secondly, that the inquiry is a clear usurpation of the functions of the judiciary.
The government did not properly implement the policies and guidelines it was granted by the Act and has overstepped.
The government has discriminated against and isolated the petitioners and notification was made with mala fide intention specifically to single out the petitioner.
The notification and the Act are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Respondents
The notification does not go beyond the powers outlined under Section 3 of the Act. The Act is not violative of Article 14 as it is enacted within the scope of Article 246. There have been no inquiries taken by either parliament or government, hence there is no usurpation of judicial functions.
Judgement in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia vs. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar & Others, 1958
Issue-wise judgement is given below for a thorough perusal:
Whether the notification has gone beyond the Act
Petitioners avered that Section 3 empowers the appropriate government in certain eventualities to appoint a commission to inquire into matters of public importance and for no other purpose. The contention is that the conduct of an individual person or a company cannot possibly be a matter of public importance. This contention was rejected and the court observed that the failure of big banks resulting in the loss of life saving of the general public is certainly a matter of public importance and the conduct of the persons in charge and the management of such a bank which brought about its collapse is equally a matter of public importance. Quite conceivably the conduct of an individual person or company or a group of individual persons or companies may assume such a dangerous proportion and may so prejudicially affect or threaten to affect the public well-being as to make such conduct a definite matter of public importance urgently calling for a full inquiry. The court held that notification was well within the powers conferred on the appropriate government by Section 3.
Whether the Act is ultra vires the Constitution
It was contended that the Act had provided the government the powers beyond the scope outlined in the Constitution of India. The validity of the Act was questioned in two ways.
Firstly, It was beyond the legislative competence of Parliament to enact a law conferring such a wide sweep of powers. The petitioner’s counsel contends that if the notification aligns with the provisions of the Act, then the Act itself breaches constitutional boundaries. Parliament enacted the Act under its legislative authority as per Article 246, read with entries 94 in List I and entry 45 in List III of the seventh schedule. These entries pertain to “inquires”, allowing parliament to legislate on matters within its jurisdiction. However, the counsel argues that Parliament’s power should be limited to conducting inquiries and not extend to conferring additional functions. While acknowledging the broad interpretation of the Constitution, petitioners stress that laws concerning inquiries should serve the purpose of aiding future legislation within the relevant lists. The counsel asserts that inquiries should facilitate the gathering of information to formulate new laws for public benefit or to prevent harm. Administrative inquiries or those aimed at punishing individuals should not fall within the scope of these entities, as that would amount to overstepping the domain. The court rejected this argument and observed, that the words “for the purpose of” indicate that the scope of the inquiry is not necessarily limited to the particular or specific matters in any of the entries in the list concerned but may extend to inquiries into collateral matters that may be necessary for the purpose, legislative or otherwise, of those particular matters.
Secondly, the petitioners contended that the inquiry was neither for any legislative nor for any administrative purpose but was a clear usurpation of the functions of the judiciary. It was contended that Parliament cannot undertake to inquire or investigate into alleged individual wrongs or private disputes because such inquiry or investigation is clearly not in aid of legislation. It was argued that if a criminal prosecution is to be launched, the preliminary investigation must be held in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure(CrPC) and it should not be open to any legislature to start an investigation on its own and thereby deprive the citizen of the normal protection afforded to him by the provisions of the CrPC. This argument found favour in the High Court and the portion of clause (10) of the notification which was ultra vires was removed. The Apex Court agreed with the conclusion of the High Court however, the line of reasoning on which the conclusion was based was rejected. The court observed that neither the Parliament nor the government has undertaken any inquiry at all. Parliament has made a law concerning inquiry and has left it to the appropriate government to set up a Commission of Inquiry under certain circumstances referred to in section 3 of the Act. The Central Government, in its turn, has, in exercise of the powers conferred on it by the Act, set up this Commission. It is, therefore, not correct to say that Parliament or the Government itself has undertaken to hold any inquiry. Subsequently, the contention that the powers given to the commission hinder the powers enshrined in the judiciary was categorically rejected. The concerned commission is merely constituted to investigate and record its findings and recommendations without having any power to enforce them, the inquiry or report cannot be looked upon as a judicial inquiry in the sense of its being an exercise of the judicial function and consequently, the question of usurpation by Parliament or the Government of the powers of the judicial organs of the Union of India cannot arise on the facts of this case.
Whether the Act and/or the notification is violative of Article 14
Article 14 says the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. The court referred to the judgement in the case Budhan Choudhry v. The State of Bihar (1954) to explain the true meaning of Article 14. The court observed that while Article 14 does not allow unfair treatment based on certain factors like race or religion, it does permit reasonable distinctions for the purpose of legislation. To be considered reasonable, these distinctions must meet two conditions:
that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia that distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together, from others left out of the group, and
that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question.
The court in the Budhan Choudhry case observed that what is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the act under consideration.
The court at hand stated 5 categories under which a law whose validity is questioned under Article 14 would fall. The 5 categories have been briefed below for a thorough perusal:
A law can specify who it applies to and why certain people or things are included while others are not. This classification can either be stated directly in the law or inferred from the context surrounding it. When deciding if such a law is valid, the court looks at whether this classification is reasonable and relevant to the law’s purpose. It does not matter if the law targets specific individuals or a group; what matters is if the classifications meet these criteria. If it does, the court shall consider the law valid. The court then cited the case of Chiranjit Chowdhri v. The Union of India (1950), in which it upheld the Sholapur and Weaving Company (emergency provisions) Act, ruling that it did not violate the constitutional rights and merely managed the shareholders powers.
Sometimes, a law may target one person or thing or several individuals or things without any clear or reasonable basis for the classification evident in the law itself or from surrounding circumstances. In such cases, if the court cannot find a reasonable justification for the classification, it will declare the law discriminatory. Court referred to the case of Ameerunnissa Begum and Ors. vs. Mahboob Begum and Ors (1952), which concerns the constitutional validity of Waliuddowla Succession Act, 1950 which the Supreme Court found unconstitutional due to its discriminatory nature and misuse of authority.
Sometimes, a law might not specify who it applies to, leaving it up to the government to decide. In such cases, the court won’t automatically strike down the law just because it includes a classification or gives the government discretion. Instead, the court will examine whether the law establishes any principles or guidelines for the government to follow when making decisions. If the court finds that the law doesn’t provide any such principles and gives the government arbitrary power to discriminate, it declares the law invalid. The court referred to the case of State of West Bengal v.Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952), in which the Supreme Court invalidated the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950, on the grounds of unconstitutionality and the court held that the provisions under this act granted the State Government unchecked authority to categorise cases without clear guidelines.
Sometimes, a statute may not make a classification of the persons or things for the purpose of applying its provisions and may leave it to the government to classify the persons or things. However, it may at the same time lay down a policy or principle for the government for classification, and the court will uphold the law as constitutional.
Sometimes, a law may not specify who it applies to, leaving it to the government’s discretion to decide based on principles or policies outlined in the law itself. If the government doesn’t follow these policies when making its decisions, the court will hold the government’s actions invalid and not the law itself as it did in the case of Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra (1952).
Now, the question arises under what category does the impugned Act or the notification fall?
The Act’s purpose, as evident from its title, is to establish Commissions of Inquiry and grant them specific powers. Section 3 of the Act empowers the appropriate Government to appoint a commission of Inquiry under certain circumstances to investigate a specific matter of public importance. It’s emphasised that this inquiry should be ancillary to the main purpose and cannot be independent. The scope of this power is limited to inquiries into matters of public importance, indicating a clear classification. It was argued that the Act falls within the ambit of above-mentioned 4th category, if not 1st, and does not delegate arbitrary power to the government making it constitutionally valid based on existing legal precedents.
Whether the notification issued by the Government for the appointment of a commission exceeds the bounds of delegated authority
The petitioners contended that even if the Act might be considered valid, the government has not properly exercised its discretion based on a reasonable classification meaning the Act has set out clear guidelines, and the government has not followed them appropriately when exercising its authority. This contention stems from the sequence of events following the appointment of Shri Tricumdas Dwarkadas and Shri Thiruvenkatachari to assess the Indian Companies Act. Despite subsequent inquiries and reposts, including those by the Bhaba Committee, which contributed to the overhaul of the Companies Act, petitioners question the necessity for further inquiry. They argue that since no significant developments have occurred since the Committee’s report, there is no apparent need for additional investigation. The court disagreed with the contention on two bases, First, the Bhaba Committee on page 29 of its report recommended that further inquiries may, in the future, have to be made regarding some matters relating to companies, and therefore the possibility of fresh inquiry cannot be ruled out. Second, the appropriate government is empowered to appoint a commission of inquiry if, in its opinion, it deems it necessary.
Whether the petitioner’s companies have been arbitrarily singled out for inquiry
The petitioners argue that they and their companies have been unfairly targeted for discriminatory treatment and subjected to a burdensome inquiry. According to the petitioners, discrimination began at the outset when the government decided to issue the notification. They point to a memorandum filed by the Bombay Shareholder’s Association before the Bhaba Committee, which raised similar allegations against other businessmen and companies. Despite these similarities in allegations, the Government selectively applied the Act to the petitioners and their companies issuing the notification against them while excluding others. While the notification primarily affects the petitioner and their companies, the petitioner argues that parliament entrusted selective application of the Act to the discretion of the appropriate government. Therefore, the Government’s decisions must be based on available evidence and formed opinions, but the petitioners contend that their treatment was arbitrary and unfair. However, the court observed the appropriate government is not expected to conduct a judicial inquiry into the truth of the materials presented before it. Instead, it must rely on the available information and exercise its discretion in good faith. While wide discretionary powers may raise concerns of misuse, they can be addressed in court if the law is administered unfairly or for unworthy purposes. In this case, the central government appointed investigators and had access to various reports and memoranda before concluding that inquiry into the petitioner’s conduct was necessary due to its perceived public importance. The court indicated that there’s no requirement for legal proof of allegation, the key question is whether the allegations, if believed in good faith, constitute a matter of public importance and the court concluded that in this case, indeed they do. Moreover, the court observed that it is for the petitioners to allege and prove beyond doubt that other persons or companies have been left out and the petitioners and their companies have been singled out for discriminatory and hostile treatment. The petitioners, however, in the court’s opinion failed to discharge the onus.
Eventually, the court held both the notification and the Act valid. However, the court stated that the words “by way of redress or punishment” occurring in the latter portion of clause (10) would be deleted and will read as: “and the action which in the opinion of the Commission should be taken….. to act as a preventive in future cases”.
Rationale behind the judgement
In this case, the court’s rationale behind the judgement can be understood through several key aspects, including the doctrine of severability and the analysis of the alleged violation of Article 14.
Firstly, the court addressed the doctrine of severability in Paragraph 12 of the judgement, particularly concerning the deletion of certain words from clause (10) of the notification. The court agreed with the high court’s reasoning that the efficacy of notification remained intact despite the removal of words. It concluded that the deleted words did not impact the functionality of the notification. Furthermore, the court extensively deliberated on the alleged violation of Article 14 through a thorough examination of relevant cases, laws, and legal principles, the court concluded that the Act including the provision of appointment of Commision of Inquiry did not infringe upon the fundamental rights enshrined in Article 13. The court emphasised that the government’s decision to establish a commission was justified and conducted in accordance with established guidelines and legal principles. This reflected a balanced approach towards legal interpretations, ensuring the preservation of legislative intent and upholding constitutional principles of equality and due process.
Precedents referred
Budhan Choudhry v. The State of Bihar (1954) was an appeal from a judgement of the High Court at Patna which raised a question of law regarding the Constitution. The appeal arose out of a criminal trial held in Bihar. The case against the appellants was investigated by the local police and they were then tried under Section 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which permitted the appellants to be tried by a Section 30 Magistrate and not by a Court of Session, and convicted on charges under the Indian Penal Code. The appellants appealed to the High Court at Patna on the basis of violation of the Constitution. The appeal was dismissed on the grounds that Section 30 did not violate Article 14 of the Constitution (non-discrimination). The High Court upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence. The Court granted leave to appeal to the Indian Supreme Court. In the case at hand, the court referred to the judgement to understand the true meaning of Article 14 in Para 13.
The court then examined the alleged violation of Article 14 and delineated 5 categories to assess whether a law could potentially violate this constitutional provision. The court cited several case laws for each of the categories which have been briefed below:
Under the first category, a statute may explicitly specify the individuals or things to which its provisions apply and the rationale behind it and it will be held valid. For this, the court referred to the judgement ofChiranjit Chowdhri v. The Union of India (1950). In the case of Chiranjit lal Chaudhari, a shareholder of the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company Limited, filed a petition. The company, governed by the Indian Companies Act, faced closure in August 1949 due to reasons cited as mismanagement and the necessity to produce essential commodities. Subsequently, the government enacted the Sholapur and Weaving Company (emergency provisions) Act, granting it extensive powers to regulate the company’s affairs. This included appointing new directions, curtailing shareholders voting rights, and modifying provisions of the Indian Companies Act applicable to the company. Chaudhari contested the constitutionality of both the ordinances and the act alleging Articles 14, 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Indian Constitution. The Supreme Court ruled in favour of upholding the act and concluded that it did not infringe upon the petitioner’s fundamental rights. The line of reasoning given was the act did not entail the acquisition of the company’s property nor did it deprive the petitioner of the enjoyment of his basic rights. While the act curtailed the voting rights it did not impede their ability to hold shares and derive income and the appeal was dismissed.
Under the Second category, a statute may target specific individuals or thighs without a discernible rationale for the classification. If the law lacks a reasonable basis for differentiation and seems to unjustly discriminate, the court may find it unconstitutional. The court cited the case of Ameerunnissa Begum and Ors. vs. Mahboob Begum and Ors (1952), which concerns the constitutional validity of the Waliuddowla Succession Act, 1950. This legislation was enacted to regulate the succession of the personal estate of Nawab Waliuddowala. The act aimed to dismiss the succession claims put forward by two wives of the late Nawab, Mahboob Begum and Kadrian, and their children. The dispute arose regarding the legitimacy of the marriages and the entitlement to Nawab’s property. The act was challenged for being discriminatory and for cursing the Rajpramuk authority. The Supreme Court analysed the constitutional provisions and found the act unconstitutional due to its discriminatory nature and misuse of authority.
Under the third category, a statute may grant discretion to the government to select individuals for its applications. The court will examine if the statute provides a principle or policy guiding this discretion; if not, it may be struck down for enabling arbitrary discrimination by the government. The court referred to the case of State of West Bengal v.Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952), in this case, the Supreme Court invalidated the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950, on the grounds of unconstitutionality. The court held that the provisions under this act granted the State Government unchecked authority to categorise cases without clear guidelines. Despite acknowledging the necessity for prompt trials, the courts concluded that the act’s language permitted arbitrary classification, lacking a discernible connection between the classification and the act’s purpose. The act’s deficiency in categorising offences and its failure to incorporate the classification principle of CrPC made it constitutionally invalid.
For the fourth and fifth categories, the court referred to the case of Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra (1952). The appellant, in this case, challenged the constitutionality of the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures Ordinance, which allowed for the establishment of special courts for expedited trials of specific serious offences. Despite the appellant’s arguments that law satire violated Article 14 by creating arbitrary classification, the Supreme Court upheld the ordinance;’s validity. The Court reasoned that the classification of offences and individuals for trial by special courts was based on reasonable differential and served the legitimate objective of maintaining public order and safety. Drawing a parallel with the Anwar Ali Sarkar case, where a similar law was struck down because of lack of nexus, the court found that challenged law in Kathi’s case had clear basis and justification for its classification.
Critical analysis of Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia vs. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar & Others, 1958
The judgement, in this case, highlights several key points regarding the role and function of a commission of Inquiry under the Commission of Inquiry Act of 1952. The counsel for petitioners argued that while the Commission may gather facts and conduct inquiries, it cannot suggest legislative or executive measures to the government. However, the court disagreed, emphasising the importance of the commission’s recommendation in aiding the government’s decision-making process regarding legislative or administrative actions to address identified issues. Despite the Commission’s lack of judicial powers and the purely recommendatory nature of its reports, the court acknowledged the significance of its recommendations in guiding government actions. Along with this, the judgement reaffirmed the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution. It underscored that the legislature, executive, and judiciary are distinct organs of government, each entrusted with specific functions. The court applied this doctrine restrictively, emphasising the distinct roles of each organ and rejecting any encroachment upon the domain of another.
In this writ petition, 28 brickkiln owners contested various aspects of the Delhi Bricks Control Order, 1963, and associated directives, alleging their violation of constitutional provisions. Although initially challenging multiple provisions, the focus shifted during proceedings. The court clarified that while there was a restriction on selling bricks to non-consumers, it didn’t impose an absolute prohibition. Moreover, it found the price fixation reasonable, considering periodic reviews and factors like cost escalation. Regarding clause 6, the court reasoned that it operated within the framework of the law and didn’t grant unfetter power. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition, instructing each party to cover their respective costs. The court emphasised that while Clause 6(1) initially appeared to grant unchecked authority, its interpretation within the broader context of the Order and the Act revealed that the directions it authorised must align with the legal framework governing the brick distribution, sale, and movement. This interpretation was supported by the Ram Krishna Dalmia case. The court found that clause 6 operated within the bounds of law.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar & Ors. presented complex legal questions regarding the constitutionality of the Act and the validity of the notification issued by the government in this regard. Through a meticulous examination of various legal principles, including the doctrine of severability and the alleged violation of Article 14, the court upheld the validity of both the notifications and the Act. The court’s decision outlined the importance of maintaining a balance between legislative intent and constitutional principles. The court referred to several cases to invalidate the alleged violation of Article 14 which was categorically denied at the end.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
What does the phrase “usurpation of judicial powers” mean?
The constitution of India follows the principles of separation of powers, ensuring distinct roles and responsibilities for each branch of the government. This doctrine, rooted in democratic principles, aims to prevent the misuse of authority by delineating specific powers to each government. It mandates that no branch can exceed its designated authority. In the present case, the petitioner argued that granting the inquiry Commission the authority to investigate private disputes and individuals and to recommend punishment based on their findings constitutes a violation of the principle of separation of powers and overstepping the bounds of judicial powers.
What is the doctrine of severability?
The doctrine of severability means that when some particular provision of a statute offends or is against a constitutional limitation, but that provision is severable from the rest of the statute, only that offending provision will be declared void by the Court and not the entire statute. If good and bad provisions are joined together by using the words ‘and’ or ‘or’ and the enforcement of a good provision is not made dependent on the enforcement of the bad one that is the good provision can be enforced even if the bad one cannot or had not existed, the two provisions are severable and the good one will be upheld as valid and given effect to.
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The article has been written by Samiksha Singh. This article deals with the law relating to permanent injunctions. The article highlights the meaning and the provisions relating to a permanent injunction. The article, thus, comprehensively delves into an understanding of permanent injunctions as provided under the Specific Relief Act, 1963.
Table of Contents
Introduction
The term “injunction” is derived from the Latin term “injungere” which translates “to enjoin” or to “issue an authoritative command.” It is a form of preventive or mandatory relief and is codified under the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as “SRA, 1963”). Injunctions are generally categorised into two types: temporary (interlocutory) andpermanent (perpetual). As the very expression denotes, a “temporary” injunction is one that is in force for a limited duration of time, whereas a permanent injunction is one that remains in force forever. Temporary injunctions are governed in accordance with Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. As opposed to this, permanent injunctions are governed in accordance with the SRA, 1963.
Thus, the idea behind the grant of a permanent injunction is essentially based on the principle of equity. One person, in whose favour the right exists, must not be forced to bring legal action again and again for every breach of a right or obligation owed to him. Hence, the idea behind the grant of a permanent injunction is to permanently settle the right and relieve the party in whose favour the right exists.
What is permanent injunction
Section 36 of the SRA, 1963, specifies that an injunction may be either temporary or permanent. As the very term specifies, a “permanent” injunction is one where one party (or the defendant) is permanently restrained from doing or not doing an act that would go against the other party’s right (or the plaintiff). Meaning thereby, once a permanent injunction is granted against any defendant, that defendant is then permanently restrained from claiming any right or doing any act or omission that would go against the plaintiff’s right. Since it is a final or permanent remedy, the court can grant a permanent injunction only after it has heard both parties on the merits of the dispute and decides to pass a decree on the merits of the dispute. For this reason, as specified in Section 37(2) of the SRA, 1963, a “perpetual” or “permanent” injunction would only be granted by virtue of a decree that too “upon the merits” of the dispute.
Provisions dealing with permanent injunction
The law related to permanent injunctions is provided under the SRA, 1963. The following provisions deal with permanent injunctions.
Section 36 of the SRA, 1963: This section specifies that the Court may grant an injunction, which could be either a temporary injunction or a permanent injunction.
Section 37 of the SRA, 1963: This section defines the two types of injunction: temporary and permanent. In doing so, it provides that “temporary” injunctions are those injunctions that last only until a specified point of time or until the final order is passed. As opposed to this, permanent injunctions are those that permanently restrain the defendant from either claiming a right or committing any act that would go against the rights of the plaintiff.
Section 38 of the SRA, 1963:Section 38, in turn, specifies the circumstances under which a permanent injunction would be granted. It specifies that in instances where the injunction has to be granted in order to prevent any breach of obligation mentioned in a contract, the Court is to be guided by the provisions provided under Chapter II of the SRA, 1963. Additionally, Section 38 of the SRA, 1963, also lays down four circumstances where a permanent injunction may be granted in order to safeguard a right relating to property. The four circumstances under which a permanent injunction in relation to property may be granted are as follows:
When the defendant acts in the capacity of a “trustee” to the plaintiff’s property;
When the damage caused or likely to be caused cannot be determined;
When compensation would not be an “adequate” remedy;
When an injunction is required to prevent “multiplicity of proceedings”
Section 40 of the SRA, 1963: Section 40 provides that a plaintiff seeking permanent injunction is also free to additionally claim damages. Thus, the plaintiff may seek damages “in addition to” a grant of permanent injunction. Alternatively, the plaintiff may also seek damages “in substitution for” a decree of a permanent injunction. The court may then award such damages if it considers it fit.
Section 41 of the SRA, 1963: Section 41 provides the circumstances in which a permanent injunction would be refused. Section 41 lays down ten circumstances in which a permanent injunction would not be granted, as discussed below.
Scope of Sections 38 and 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
A determination of a probable right to injunction cannot be made based solely on Section 37 of the SRA, 1963. It must be determined in the context and with reference to Sections 38 and 41 of the SRA, 1963. Sections 38 and 41 of the SRA, 1963, are ‘supplementary’ in nature. For this reason, these sections must be read in the context of each other. While Section 38 of the SRA, 1963, lays down the situations for the grant of an injunction, Section 41 defines when an injunction would not be granted.
When a permanent injunction is granted
Principles regarding grant of a permanent injunction
The principles based on which the Court grants a permanent injunction have been provided under Section 38 of the SRA, 1963. Accordingly, the following is clear:
For contracts: Section 38(2) + Chapter II of the SRA, 1963.
For other actionable wrongs: Section 38(3) of the SRA, 1963.
Requirements for issuing a permanent injunction
In order for a plaintiff to be qualified to get a permanent injunction against the defendant, there are certain prerequisites. These are:
Firstly, the plaintiff has to show that there is some legal right or obligation that exists in his favour. Here, the expression “obligation” would have the same meaning as specified under Section 2(a) of the SRA, 1963. For example, if the plaintiff files a suit for recovery of possession of some property, he has to establish that he has an interest or legal right in the property.
Secondly, the plaintiff has to establish either of the two things: that is, the plaintiff has to show that the defendant has either already committed or is threatening to commit a breach of such a legal right that exists in the favour of the plaintiff. If there is no commission or threat to commit a breach of such a legal right, there can be no suit for injunction. In the case of Arulmighu Parasunathaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others (2021), the Madras High Court observed that since the plaintiff was in lawful possession of the property and such lawful possession was threatened by the government through the issuance of pattas, the plaintiff ought to be granted relief by way of an injunction.
Thirdly, since the very purpose of an injunction is prevention, the plaintiff has to show that an injunction is necessary to prevent the breach of a right or obligation that exists in his favour. However, it is necessary for the plaintiff to show that an obligation is owed to him by the defendant. If there is no obligation per se, there can be no injunction. In the Bombay High Court judgement in the case of Mukesh v. Charan (2017), the applicant sought permanent injunction against the respondents on the basis of a lease deed. Herein, the fact that the lease deed existed was in itself in question. The Bombay High Court observed that in order for an injunction to be granted, it must be shown that there is an obligation owed to the applicant. Since the applicants asserted that their possession was legitimate on the basis of a lease deed, and that lease deed, whether it existed or not, is in itself questionable, there can be no permanent injunction.
Ingredients of Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
Section 38 of the SRA, 1963, lays down the circumstances under which a permanent injunction may be granted. Accordingly, the following essentials are specified under Section 38 of the SRA, 1963, regarding the grant of a permanent injunction.
Why granted: Section 38(1) of the SRA, 1963, essentially answers “why” or “for what reason” a permanent injunction is granted. It, therefore, provides that in order to prevent a breach of any obligation that is “existing” in the favour of the plaintiff, he may be granted a permanent injunction.
Course of action when obligation arises from a contract: There may be situations where the obligation that exists in favour of the plaintiff stems from any contract. Thus, in cases where any such obligation arises out of a contract, Section 38(2) specifies that the Court, while deciding to grant a permanent injunction, shall have regard to the provisions specified under Chapter II of the SRA, 1963. For the purpose of clarity, Chapter II of the SRA, 1963, containing Sections 9-25, deals with the provisions relating to “specific performance of contracts.” Accordingly, when the Court is faced with a question regarding the grant of any permanent injunction where the plaintiff derives the right or obligation from a contract, the Court, while deciding whether to grant an injunction or not, would have to give regard to the provisions specified under Chapter II of the SRA, 1963.
Permanent injunction in relation to the right or enjoyment of property: Permanent injunctions may also be granted when the acts of the defendant interfere with the plaintiff’s right over property. These instances may include situations where a defendant has either already invaded or such defendant “threatens to invade” the right of the plaintiff in relation to either a “right to property” or the “enjoyment of property”. In such situations, Section 38(3) of the SRA, 1963, lays down four instances where a permanent injunction may be granted:
First, in cases where the defendant acts in the capacity of a “trustee” to the plaintiff’s property and causes or is likely to interfere with the plaintiff’s right over the property or enjoyment of such property, a permanent injunction may be granted.
Second, if there is some “actual damage” that has already been caused or is “likely to be caused” and such damage cannot be determined, then the Court is also empowered to grant a permanent injunction.
Third, there may be situations where a grant of compensation would not ensure proper or adequate relief for the plaintiff; in such cases as well, a permanent injunction may be granted.
Fourth, if the grant of an injunction is required in order to prevent “multiplicity of judicial proceedings,” a permanent injunction may be granted.
It must, however, be borne in mind that Section 38 of the SRA, 1963, does not provide an exhaustive list as to when an injunction may be granted. Thus, even for those circumstances that are not expressly mentioned under Section 38 of the SRA, 1963, a permanent injunction may be granted by the Court. Thus, it is safe to conclude that the intent of Section 38 is only to “recognise” the Court’s power to grant an injunction in respect of the circumstances mentioned under it and not to “restrict” the Court’s power. This observation was also made by the Bombay High Court in the case of Janglu v. Shahaji (2008).
Permanent injunction in cases of obligations under a contract
Section 38(2) of the SRA, 1963, deals with permanent injunctions in instances of obligations arising under a contract. As already discussed, in cases of a grant of injunction for breaches of obligations arising under a contract, the courts would be guided by the provisions contained in Chapter II of the SRA, 1963. This is simply because the general rule in cases of a contract between the parties is to enable the performance of the contract itself. Injunction, therefore, is only granted in cases where the contract creates a negative obligation, that is, the contract specifies things that may or may not be done. This would be better understood with the help of an illustration.
For example, one S lets out a part of his land to one Y. Herein, Y, in turn, contracts that he will not dig out the sand or construct a well. In this case, an injunction may be granted to restrain Y from digging out sand or constructing a well, which would go against the terms of the contract. This is because in this case, if the court decides to award any compensation, any such compensation would not be construed to be an adequate remedy. Thus, in this case, in order to give effect to the contract, the court would be more inclined to issue an injunction against Y.
However, it must be borne in mind that there can be no injunction in cases where there is no obligation in the first place. An illustration can be found in the judgement of the Madras High Court in the case of State Bank of India, Main Branch v. J.S. Ramamoorthy (1981). In this case, the plaintiff had sought an injunction against the bank, seeking all possible help in keeping the plaintiff’s industry running. The claim included granting loans as many times as the plaintiff required and getting all possible help from the bank in running the industry. In this case, the Madras High Court, while rejecting the contention, observed that a permanent injunction can only be sought on the basis of an obligation. It was noted that the bank was under no obligation to either lend money as much or as many times as the plaintiff desired or to keep the industry in running condition.
Permanent injunction for the right to or enjoyment of property
Section 38(3) of the SRA, 1963, provides for the power of the Court to grant permanent injunction in cases relating to either the “right to property” or “right to enjoyment of property.” Herein, the expression “property” denotes both “movable” and “immovable” properties. In instances of movable property, the court would grant a permanent injunction only if the property is of such value that damages would not constitute a proper or “adequate” remedy. For example, illustration (y) to Section 54 of the repealed Specific Relief Act, 1877, highlighted a circumstance where an injunction may be sought to protect movable property. As per that illustration, if there is one A who writes letters to one B, and upon both of their deaths, let’s say, C decides to publish them. However, if one D has some property in those letters, then D may seek an injunction against C to prohibit C from publishing those letters. This is because, in this case, damages may not constitute an adequate remedy. Similarly, an injunction may additionally be granted where the plaintiff seeks to protect his right to enjoyment of his property. The following four circumstances are provided under Section 38(3) of the SRA, 1963:
Defendant acts in the capacity of trustee of the property
The expression “trustee” translates to a person who looks after the property of another person for that person’s benefit. Given that the defendant acts in the capacity of a trustee, if he does something or is about to do something to the detriment of the plaintiff’s property, the plaintiff may seek an injunction to safeguard his interests. This may be better understood with the help of an illustration. For example, if Y acts in the capacity of a trustee for one S. Here, if Y decides to sell a part of S’s property, S may seek an injunction to prevent Y from making the sale.
It is not possible to ascertain damage
The objective of an injunction is to safeguard the interests of the plaintiff. In a given scenario, if the court is faced with a situation where it cannot determine what amount of damage is caused or may be caused, it would be more inclined to issue an injunction in respect of the plaintiff’s property.
Compensation would not be an adequate remedy
If the wrong caused or likely to be caused to the plaintiff cannot be made good with compensation, in those cases also, an injunction may be granted. For example, if one person, S, lives alongside the house of one Y, and Y, day in and day out, hammers his wall for 7 hours a day, then merely paying compensation to S would not constitute an adequate remedy. In this case, an adequate remedy in favour of S would be an injunction restraining Y from hammering his wall day in and day out.
Without an injunction there would be multiple legal actions
The Court may also grant an injunction in those cases where, unless an injunction is issued, the plaintiff would be forced to file multiple legal actions. It is important to understand that the very object of the issuance of a permanent injunction is based on the idea of equity. Meaning thereby, it is to relieve a plaintiff from being forced to resort to legal proceedings again and again in respect of a right that exists in his favour. Therefore, the intent of this provision is to prevent multiple proceedings.
When permanent injunction can be refused
Section 41 of the SRA, 1963, contemplates ten scenarios in which a permanent injunction would not be granted. However, while there is a list provided under this section, it must be borne in mind that “injunction” per se is a discretionary relief. Thus, courts may refuse to grant a permanent injunction even in those instances that are not expressly provided under Section 41 of the SRA, 1963. The ten grounds mentioned under Section 41 of the SRA, 1963, for refusal of the grant of a permanent injunction are as follows:
Section 41(a): To restrain from continuing with a judicial proceeding: In case where a judicial proceeding has already been started and is pending, an injunction seeking to restrain that person from carrying out that judicial proceeding would not be granted. However, if restraint by way of injunction is sought to avoid a ‘multiplicity of proceedings’, in those cases, an injunction may be issued.
Section 41(b): To restrain from taking action in a superior court: Essentially, if an injunction is sought that would have the effect of restraining any person from instituting proceedings before a higher court, such an injunction would not be granted. However, a court of superior jurisdiction may issue an injunction restraining a person from prosecuting a proceeding before a subordinate court.
This point may be better understood through the judgement of the Calcutta High Court in Indian Bankv. Euro International (P) Ltd. (1998). In this case, the prayer for injunction was made in order to prevent the defendants from seeking enforcement of claims based on bills of exchange “in any manner whatsoever.” It was observed by the Calcutta High Court that the term “any manner whatsoever” was wide enough to include both the courts of superior jurisdiction and co-ordinate jurisdiction. To that extent, this prayer was held to fall under Section 41(b) of the SRA, 1963, thereby being bad in law.
Section 41(c): Prevention to apply to a legislative body: An injunction would not be granted if the effect of the injunction was to prevent a person from “applying to any legislative body.”
Section 41(d): Prevention for restraining a person from carrying on a criminal action: An injunction would also not be granted if the effect of that injunction was to prevent any person from taking or carrying on with a criminal action. For example, a person cannot seek an injunction to prevent another person from filing an FIR.
Section 41(e): Contracts that cannot be specifically enforced: This clause essentially provides that if there is a contract which cannot be specifically enforced, then for those contracts, an injunction would not be issued to prevent their breach.
Section 41(f): Nuisance as a ground to reject permanent injunction: An injunction would be granted only if the act of the defendant actually amounts to a nuisance. If the defendant’s act cannot clearly be termed as “nuisance”, then an injunction would not be granted. This is because everybody is permitted to use his premises in a way that he wants.
Section 41(g): Plaintiff’s acquiescence: If the plaintiff remains a passive spectator when the defendant’s acts infringes on the plaintiff’s rights, in those cases too, an injunction would not be granted. Thus, if the plaintiff silently acquiesces to the defendant’s continuing breach of the plaintiff’s rights, then too, an injunction would not be granted.
Section 41(h): Availability of another equally efficacious remedy: In cases where there is another equally adequate remedy available, in those cases too, an injunction would not be granted. However, this is not applicable in cases of a breach of trust.
Section 41(i): Conduct of the plaintiff: While granting an injunction, the courts take into account the conduct of the plaintiff. If the plaintiff exhibits such conduct that would deprive him of the remedy, then he would not be granted the relief of an injunction.
Section 41(j): Absence of personal interest: A permanent injunction is a preventive relief granted in favour of a plaintiff to safeguard his rights. If there is a case where the plaintiff himself either has no locus standi or interest in the matter at hand, he would not be granted a permanent injunction. The plaintiff must be interested in the matter so as to be granted a permanent injunction, if the court deems fit.
Permanent injunction is a discretionary relief
An injunction, regardless of whether it is temporary or permanent, is a discretionary relief. This means that it is at the discretion of the Court to either grant or not grant a permanent injunction. While Section 38 of the SRA, 1963, does not expressly use the term “discretion”, yet such understanding can be derived from Section 36 of the SRA, 1963. Accordingly, Section 36 states that the court is empowered to grant preventive relief by way of an injunction upon its “discretion.”
Plaintiff to approach the court with “clean hands”
If the plaintiff approaches the court to seek an injunction, he must come with “clean hands”. It is well established that one cannot use judicial proceedings as a medium to protect the wrongs committed by us. Thus, the person seeking preventive relief by virtue of an injunction must approach the court with clean hands. In the case of Khatri Hotels (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (2011), the Supreme Court, while dismissing the appellants’ appeal, took into consideration that the appellants approached the court with unclean hands. This was because not only did the appellants suppress information from the Supreme Court, but they also raised some illegal construction, regardless of the fact that the Delhi High Court had issued an interim injunction against such construction. In this light, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of the appellants while also observing that the trial court and the High Court were correct in declining a permanent injunction against the appellants, who had approached the court with unclean hands.
Plaintiff must not acquiesce in the defendant’s breach
The term “acquiesce” implies acceptance. This acceptance may be reluctant in nature. However, if the plaintiff essentially acquiesces to the wrongful act of the defendant, he will be refused an injunction. This would be better understood with the help of an illustration. For example, if there is one S (the plaintiff) and one Y (the defendant). In this example, let’s assume that the housing structure of both parties is such that rainwater flows from Y’s land to S’s land. Herein, it is so that the plaintiff, S, does not oppose this despite being troubled by the rainwater flowing from Y’s land to S’s land for 20 years. S would not later be granted an injunction restraining Y from letting rainwater flow from Y’s land to S’s. The reason for this is simple. S, by not seeking any relief and allowing for such an act to continue for a period of 20 years, acquiesced in the act of Y.
Public interest may be a ground to not grant a permanent injunction
Public interest may be a ground to refuse an injunction against the plaintiff. If a larger public interest is involved, the court may be more inclined to award compensation to the plaintiff in place of an injunction. In the case of Executive Engineer, Lower Vana Project, Irrigation Department, Wardha v. Maruti Bapurao Auchat and Others (2012), a similar stance was taken by the Supreme Court. In this case, the plaintiff had successfully established that the government (the defendant) had disproportionately favoured other landowners. The plaintiff established that the construction of the canal was altered and made in such a way that the canal ran through the plaintiff’s land. Herein, while the Supreme Court acknowledged that the government’s actions were illegal, it was observed that if the direction of the canal was now changed, then it would affect 635 farmers. For this reason, instead of a permanent injunction, the plaintiff was awarded compensation of Rs. 7.5 lakh.
Case laws
Jai Dayal v. Krishan Lal Garg (1996)
Facts
In this case, a permanent injunction was sought and issued against the Respondent to prevent the respondent from blocking the passage between his house and that of the appellant. Further, a mandatory injunction was sought and granted to remove the obstruction in the passage. This injunction was issued by the trial court and subsequently upheld by the appellate court. This obstruction was cleared by the Respondent. At the time when the execution was sought by the appellant, it was observed that the Respondent had already cleared the obstruction. Thus, the execution case was dismissed.
However, subsequently, a shop was constructed at that place, which again had the effect of blocking the passage ahead of the appellant’s house. Upon learning this, the appellant again filed an execution application. This time, the executing court granted an injunction against the respondent for failing to disobey the mandatory injunction that was issued against him previously. However, this issuance of a mandatory injunction was through the attachment of the Respondent’s property. Further, the injunction also highlighted that if the Respondent failed to remove such obstruction, he would be detained in prison. This order of the executing court was upheld by the Additional District Judge. Upon a second appeal, however, the Allahabad High Court, while reversing and remitting the decree, observed that such obstruction must be viewed in the light of Section 22 of the Easement Act, 1882. Thus, it was observed by the Allahabad High Court that the courts must find out whether the obstruction was actually causing an enjoyment of easement. This order of the Allahabad High Court was challenged before the Supreme Court.
Held
In this case, the Supreme Court observed that the question of whether Section 22 of the Easements Act, 1882, applies or not must be determined at the time when such a question arises at the first instance. Herein, not only has a permanent and mandatory injunction been issued against the Respondent, but these injunctions have also become “final.” It is not permissible for the Respondents to now make arguments that would have the effect of circumventing the injunction. Further, it was observed that if the Respondent failed to comply, the same would be construed as a “continuing disobedience” thereby making the Respondent liable for penal consequences.
Padhiyar Prahladji Chenaji v. Maniben Jagmalbhai (2022)
Facts
In this case, an appeal was filed before the Supreme Court, thereby challenging the judgement rendered by the Gujarat High Court. The Gujarat High Court confirmed the judgement of the trial court and the first appellate court that issued an injunction against the defendant, thereby restraining him from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff. In this case, the suit was the first instance filed by the plaintiff for cancellation of the registered sale deed, a declaration that the sale deed did not bind the plaintiff, and a permanent injunction seeking a return of the land that was in the possession of the defendant. On a perusal of the evidence before it, the Trial Court did not cancel the registered sale deed and also denied to grant a declaration as prayed by the plaintiff. The effect of this was that the plaintiff was construed to have no title over the suit property. However, the Trial Court did issue a permanent injunction against the defendant, restraining him from interfering with the possession of 5 acres of land by the plaintiff. The question before the Supreme Court thus was: if a plaintiff loses insofar as the plaintiff’s title over the property is concerned and it is also declared that the defendant is the true owner of the property, can there be a permanent injunction in favour of the plaintiff?
Held
The Supreme Court observed that the Trial Courts and the High Courts have erred in granting permanent injunctions in favour of the plaintiff. The Supreme Court noted that upon an adjudication of the rights of the parties and a declaration that the defendant was indeed the true owner, there can be no injunction against the defendant, who is the true owner of the property.
Balkrishna Dattatraya Galande v. Balkrishna Rambharose Gupta (2019)
Facts
In this case, an appeal before the Supreme Court was filed to challenge the judgement of the Bombay High Court. Herein, the Bombay High Court affirmed the judgement of the first appellate court, whereby a permanent injunction was granted in favour of the first respondent. The first respondent (tenant), while asserting that he was a tenant, sought a permanent injunction against the landlord (the appellant), thereby restraining the landlord from disturbing the tenant’s peaceful possession of the property. Upon a perusal of the evidence (both oral and documentary), the trial court dismissed the suit, thereby observing that the first respondent could not show that he was a tenant. The first appellate court, however, observed that the Trial Court had erred in its finding that the first respondent was not a tenant. It was observed that the record did not show that the first respondent had vacated the property after the withdrawal of the suit. The Bombay High Court affirmed the judgement of the first appellate court. The question before the Supreme Court was this: since the first respondent claimed that he was a tenant, however, he could neither establish his actual possession nor prove that he paid rent for more than 15 years, then in these circumstances can he claim and be granted a permanent injunction?
Held
It was observed by the Supreme Court that in any suit filed under Section 38 of the SRA, 1963, a permanent injunction would only be issued to that person who is in “actual possession” of that property. If such a person is unable to show that he was in actual possession of such property on the date of the suit, then there can be no permanent injunction in that case. In this case, the Supreme Court observed that the trial court was correct in its finding that the first respondent could not prove his actual possession of such property as on the date of the suit. In this light, the Supreme Court set aside the judgement of the Bombay High Court.
Conclusion
The grant of a permanent injunction is a mode of securing and safeguarding a plaintiff’s rights. Yet, it is a discretionary remedy. For this reason, while granting or refusing to grant a permanent injunction, the court would take into account a balance of convenience. It will also take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff to see whether the plaintiff actually requires the permanent injunction to safeguard an existing right. In doing so, the courts may also consider whether the plaintiff is essentially seeking to further a wrong that he himself committed under the garb of an injunction. The doctrine of “clean hands” in this regard has been greatly emphasised by the courts. However, there may even be circumstances where the plaintiff successfully establishes an existing right and a breach of that right is caused by the act of the defendant. Yet, in the light of the larger public interest, the courts may be more inclined to remedy the plaintiff through the payment of adequate compensation by the defendant. Thus, while an injunction is a preventive, discretionary remedy, its grant is based on a balance of convenience.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
What is meant by the term “preventive relief”?
Section 36 of the SRA, 1963, provides that a court is empowered to grant preventive relief by way of an injunction. An injunction, for this purpose, may either be temporary or permanent. An injunction is construed as a form of “preventive relief” because the basic object of an injunction is to restrain a party from doing something. This restraint could be in order to prevent, let’s say, a party from interfering with the rights of the other party.
What is meant by the term “mandatory relief”?
Mandatory injunctions are defined under Section 39 of the SRA, 1963. Unlike preventive injunctions, where an injunction is granted to restrain a defendant from doing something, mandatory injunctions may be granted in order to compel the defendant to do something. The aim of mandatory injunctions is to compel the defendant to perform certain acts in order to restore the status quo. For example, if there is a property that belongs to both R and S and the property has not yet been partitioned. In this case, both R and S are co-owners of that property. Herein, let’s assume R does some form of construction on the property, that too without the consent of S and despite various protests by S. The Court may grant a mandatory injunction against R to demolish the construction in order to restore the status quo.
Is there any period of limitation for the execution of a decree that grants permanent injunction?
No, there is no fixed period of limitation within which an application seeking the enforcement or execution of a decree that grants a permanent injunction must be made. The proviso to Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963, provides for the same.
What is the difference between a permanent injunction and a temporary injunction?
The difference between a permanent and temporary injunction is encapsulated in Section 37 of the SRA, 1963. As the very expression denotes, “temporary” injunctions only last for a specified period of time. For this reason, it is only a temporary or provisional remedy. Further, given they are temporary in nature, such injunctions may be granted at any time, so to say, during any stage of the suit. However, “permanent” injunctions, once granted, permanently restrain the defendant from claiming any right or doing or not doing an act. For this reason, it is granted only in the form of a decree and is based on the merits of the suit. Thus, while temporary injunctions only last until the time that the court specifies, permanent injunctions continue forever.
Can a permanent injunction be sought on contradictory grounds regarding the plaintiff’s title over a property?
If the plaintiff seeks permanent injunction on the basis of two contradictory grounds concerning his title to property: one, on the basis of a registered sale deed; and second, on the basis of adverse possession, the same would not be allowed. In the case of Kesar Bai v. Genda Lal and Another (2022), the Supreme Court made a similar observation. It was observed that a claim on title based simultaneously on two contradictory grounds, where one is on the basis of a registered sale deed and the other is based on adverse possession, is untenable. Hence, the Supreme Court quashed the judgement of the Madhya Pradesh High Court and the first appellate court, which had issued a permanent injunction on the basis of adverse possession after the claim of “registered sale deed” was dismissed.
What is an anti-suit injunction?
Any injunction that is issued to prevent a party from carrying on with a case outside the jurisdiction of that particular court may be termed as an anti-suit injunction. Anti-suit injunctions may be issued to prevent a party from initiating cases in another court or a foreign court. In the case of Dinesh Singh Thakur v. Sonal Thakur (2018), the Supreme Court reiterated that Indian courts can issue anti-suit injunctions in such cases and to such a party over whom that court has “personal jurisdiction.”
What is the implication of the use of the term “plaintiff” under Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 as far as the mode of the initiation of the proceeding is concerned?
Since Section 38 of the SRA, 1963, directly uses the expression “plaintiff”, it only means that a permanent injunction can only be granted by virtue of a “plaint” filed in this regard. The reason this question becomes important is because the earlier Section 54 of the repealed Specific Relief Act, 1877, used the expression “applicant.” Thus, the earlier Act provided a scope for there to be a proceeding instituted on the basis of an “application” and not only a “plaint”. However, since the SRA, 1963, directly uses the term “plaintiff’, the proceedings for the grant of a permanent injunction have to be commenced on the basis of a suit filed for that purpose.
Avtar Singh’s Law of Contract and Specific Relief by Rajesh Kapoor (13th edition, 2022)
Sarkar Specific Relief Act by Sudipto Sarkar & Aditya Swarup (18th edition, 2020)
Pollock & Mulla, The Specific Relief Act, 1963 (16th edition, 2022)
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The ever-increasing scope of intellectual property rights is not an unknown phenomenon anymore. The importance of IP law and the protection of the same is the paramount reason for the success of any organisation. Without the implementation of IP law, a business can face setbacks in any form, be it financially or in reputation. The importance of intellectual property rights is very vast, from the protection of innovations to the preservation of competitive advantage.
Intellectual property Rights, such as copyrights, patents, and trademarks, protect a company’s innovations, inventions, and creative works from unauthorised use or exploitation by competitors. This protection encourages companies to invest resources in research, development, and innovation, knowing that their intellectual property will be safeguarded and they can reap the benefits of their investments. If there is no protection given to the creative mind about his creativity, he will lack motivation for further innovations. Thus, IP rights provide benefits to the inventor in many forms, be it monetary, social recognition, royalty, etc. Intellectual property rights allow companies to maintain a competitive edge in the marketplace by preventing competitors from replicating or imitating their products, services, or brands. By securing exclusive rights to their innovations and branding elements, companies can differentiate themselves from competitors and command higher prices for their unique offerings.
Employee invention agreements: meaning and use
It can very much happen in any business that an employee switches jobs and begins to work for a company that is a competitor of the previous employer. Since the employee knows every detail of his previous company, the same can be disclosed to the new employer, which can cause heavy losses to the company whose trade secret has been disclosed by its ex-employee. To combat the same situation, companies usually have to enter into employee invention agreements. This article seeks to shed light on the details regarding employee invention agreements.
Employee invention agreement
Definition
An Employee Invention Agreement (EIA), also known as an Intellectual Property (IP) agreement or invention assignment agreement, is a legal contract between an employer and an employee regarding ownership and control of intellectual property created during the course of employment. Generally, in an employee invention agreement, the terms of the agreement are made in such a way that the work done by the employee during his course of employment shall exclusively belong to the employer and not to the employee.
Purpose of the EIA
The purpose of an EIA is to establish clear guidelines and obligations related to intellectual property rights, ensuring that inventions, innovations, and creative works developed by employees within the scope of their employment belong to the employer rather than the individual employee.
Key Components of the EIA
Confidentiality Obligations: The agreement typically includes provisions requiring employees to maintain confidentiality regarding proprietary information and trade secrets of the employer. This helps prevent the unauthorised disclosure or misuse of sensitive company information, protecting the employer’s competitive advantage.
Remedies for Breach: The EIA outlines the consequences of breach, including termination of employment, injunctive relief, and legal remedies for the unauthorised use or disclosure of confidential information. By specifying the potential consequences of non-compliance, the agreement encourages employees to adhere to its terms.
Assignment of Rights: The assignment clause stipulates that the employee agrees to assign all rights, title, and interest in their inventions to the employer. This ensures that the employer has the legal authority to exploit, licence, or enforce intellectual property rights as needed.
Ownership of Intellectual Property: The ownership clause specifies that any inventions or intellectual property developed by the employee during their employment belong to the employer. This clause ensures that the employer retains full control and ownership of the intellectual property.
Legal framework governing the EIA agreements
The legal framework governing the employee invention agreement differs from nation to nation as it should adhere to the law of the land where the agreement is made and executed, so it is pertinent for the business to make sure the agreement entered into should comply with the appropriate legislature; it can be a federal or state law or a union law. Also, the industry-specific rules and code of conduct determine the outline and content of the employee invention agreement. EIAs are generally governed by employment law, which regulates the relationship between employers and employees. Employment laws may address issues such as the rights and obligations of employers and employees, termination of employment, non-compete agreements, and confidentiality provisions. Some relevant legislation governing the employment laws in India include the Minimum Wages Act, 1948;the Factories Act, 1948; and many more.
Copyright Act, 1957
The Copyright Act, 1957, prescribes certain provisions for a valid assignment of copyright developed in India. Under the Act, the deed of assignment of copyright must identify the work and specify the duration, territorial extent, and nature of the rights assigned to the assignee. If the duration is not specified, the term will be limited to five years from the date of assignment. Whereas, if the territory is not identified, the assignment will only be valid for the Indian territory. So, the deed must specify that it is a worldwide and perpetual assignment.
Further, if the assignee does not exercise his rights within a year from the date of assignment, the assigned rights will lapse, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties. Hence, the deed must specify that the assignment won’t lapse even after a year of non-use. The assignment of copyright to future works will only take effect when the work comes into existence. To avoid future disagreement, the future work to be assigned should be identified in the deed and agreements at the time of the commencement of the project.
Intellectual property (IP) laws play a significant role in EIAs, as they govern the ownership, protection, and exploitation of intellectual property rights. Specific laws and regulations apply to determine the ownership, disclosure requirements, and enforcement mechanisms, depending on the type of intellectual property involved. In the case of Thomas v. Manorama, it was held that the employee is entitled to the ownership of works created by him after his employment is terminated by the employer, and in such a case, the previous employer has no copyright over the subsequent work so created.
Patent Act, 1970
Under the Patent Act, 1970, patents are granted for inventions. It governs the requirements for patentability, the process of patent application and examination, and the rights and obligations of patent holders. EIAs often include provisions related to the assignment of patent rights to the employer and the employee’s obligation to assist in patent prosecution. In the course of their employment, the employee owns any invention created by them in the absence of a clause regarding assignment. Section 6 of the Patents Act, 1970, provides for the persons who can apply for patents. They are:
The first and true inventor.
An assignee claiming rights.
A deceased inventor’s legal heir. But there are no provisions vesting title in the favour of employers under the Patent Act, 1970.
Contract Act, 1872
EIAs are contractual agreements between employers and employees, and as such, they are subject to contract law principles. The Contract Act, 1872, governs the formation, interpretation, and enforcement of agreements, including issues such as offer and acceptance, consideration, mutual assent, and contract remedies.
Benefits of an employee invention agreement
An employee invention agreement offers multiple benefits to both the employee and employer, as it builds trust and harmony between the two by ensuring the protection of IP rights while promoting innovation. It assures the employer about the protection of his IP rights and also the employee that the work created by him during his course of employment shall have the exclusive ownership of the employer and not him, owing to the very nature of EIA. This also helps in avoiding any future disputes. Here are several other benefits of an employee invention agreement:
Protects the company’s intellectual property: EIAs protect a company’s intellectual property by ensuring that inventions, innovations, and other creative works developed by employees belong to the company. This protection prevents competitors from exploiting or misappropriating company-owned intellectual property, preserving the company’s competitive advantage and market position.
Promotes innovation and creativity: By providing a framework for the protection and recognition of employee inventions, EIAs promote a culture of innovation and creativity within the company. Employees are encouraged to pursue new ideas and solutions, knowing that their contributions will be valued and protected by the company.
Encourages disclosure of inventions: EIAs typically include provisions requiring employees to promptly disclose any inventions or innovations to the company. This encourages open communication and transparency between employees and management, facilitating the timely evaluation and protection of valuable intellectual property.
Challenges and considerations
Employee invention agreements are very essential for upholding intellectual property rights and supporting innovation in any business, yet they also come up with some challenges and considerations that both parties should have agreed to in the same consensus so as to avoid disputes arising in the future.
Scope of employment: Determining the scope of employment covered by the EIA can be challenging, especially in roles where employees may engage in creative or innovative activities outside of their primary job duties. Employers must clearly define the scope of employment to ensure that the agreement covers all relevant activities and inventions developed by employees during their tenure.
Acknowledgement of employee contribution: The scope and purpose of EIA itself can make an employee feel unmotivated to not contribute enough to the new innovations, so an employer should make enough efforts and try to recognise the efforts made by the employee to keep him in the loop and make him feel motivated for further innovations.
International challenges: Employers with businesses in multiple nations may find it difficult to adhere to specific legal requirements or cultural practices that obviously differ from nation to nation. Therefore, an employer should always seek legal advice from the local legal advisor before entering into the EIA.
Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: EIAs should include provisions for resolving disputes that may arise between employers and employees regarding intellectual property ownership, disclosure obligations, or breach of contract. Employers and employees should consider ADR mechanisms, such as arbitration or mediation, to resolve the conflicts cost effectively and efficiently.
Confidentiality and Trade Secrets: EIAs often include confidentiality provisions requiring employees to maintain the confidentiality of proprietary information and trade secrets. Employers must take appropriate measures to ensure that the employees know their duties regarding non-disclosure and confidentiality to safeguard sensitive information.
Important case laws
Chidambaraiyer and Others vs. P. S. Renga Iyer and Others (1965)
In this case, it was held that when a person rests under an obligation to do something in the discharge of such obligation, he transfers a certain interest for valuable consideration. It was further held that in cases where an author created a work as part of their employment/ apprenticeship, the employer owns the copyright as the first owner by default under Section 17(c) of the Copyright Act. If an author creates a work independently, or if he creates a work under a contract for service, he will hold the copyright.
V.T. Thomas & Ors. vs. Malayala Manorama Co. Ltd. (1987)
In this case, an employee created a cartoon named Boban and Molly, which was created before the start of his employment at Manorama. Thus, the copyright is absolutely held by the author, that is, VT Thomas, and not the employer.
Charian P. Joseph vs. K. Prabhakaran Prabkaran Nair (1967)
It was held in this case that when the work is not a literary, dramatic, or artistic work made by the author in the course of employment by the proprietor or newspaper, magazine, or similar periodical, or in the case of a photograph taken or painted, or portrait drawn, or an engraving or cinematograph film made for valuable considerations at the instance of the person, but is the kind of work made in the course of the author’s employment under a contract of service or apprenticeship, the employer shall be the first owner of the copyright therein. But the provision would be applicable only when there is no agreement to the contrary.
University of London Press Ltd. vs. University Tutorial Press Ltd. (1916)
In this case, it was held that an employee is someone who follows the employer’s commands in the manner in which he shall work. The direct control of the employer, the independence of the person who renders services, and the place where the work is done determine whether there is a contract of service between the employee and employer.
Microsoft Corporation vs. Deepak Raval (2016)
In this case, Microsoft Corporation, a US-based company, sues for copyright infringement against defendants in India. Plaintiff’s software and hardware, including Microsoft Windows and Office, are protected under Indian law via international copyright conventions. Plaintiff seeks injunctions against copying, manufacturing, and selling unlicensed versions of their software and hardware. They also requested the delivery of infringing copies, accounts of profits, and damages. The Court grants injunctions and awards damages of Rs. 5 lakhs, limited to a higher estimate, acknowledging the defendant’s lack of knowledge.
Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. and Mr. Santosh V.G. (2009):
This case involves a dispute over the distribution of films by the plaintiffs and their licencing agreements. Plaintiffs release films in the USA first, possibly on home video, before theatrical releases in other countries. Defendants argue for broader freedom of speech and expression in providing entertainment, citing their role as a film club promoting discussion and appreciation of cinema. They claim prominent members and societal value in their activities. The case raises issues of copyright infringement and the balance between commercial interests and fundamental rights to free expression.
Conclusion
Employee Invention Agreements (EIAs) play an important role in safeguarding intellectual property rights and fostering innovation. These agreements establish clear guidelines for ownership and control of inventions and creative works developed by employees during their tenure. By ensuring that intellectual property belongs to the employer, EIAs protect the company’s competitive advantage and promote a culture of innovation. However, challenges such as defining the scope of employment, acknowledging employee contributions, and navigating international legal requirements must be addressed to mitigate potential disputes. Overall, EIAs offer numerous benefits to both employers and employees, promoting trust, transparency, and the effective management of intellectual property assets.
In the current world of making things like art and writing, it’s really important to keep your arts and inventions safe from being copied by others. Copyright registration helps with that. It’s like a super-strong lock that gives you, as the creator, special rights to your work. This article will explain all about copyright registration, from the simple stuff to the more complicated parts.
You must have heard about the word “copyright” numerous times, especially in the world of digital media. Let us assume that you are a Youtuber and have been posting daily content on your Youtube channel, and one fine day it comes to your attention that one of your videos is being copied and posted entirely on some other channel. You will surely be shocked & amazed. But what will be your next step? How will you stop such channels from publicly broadcasting your video on their channel any further? Well, this is where copyright comes into the picture, and in order to understand how copyright plays a vital role here in protecting one’s original content from being copied, we need to first understand what copyright actually is.
Historical background of copyright
The concept of copyright emerged with the invention of the printing press. In 1710, the Statute of Anne in England was often considered the first copyright law. Copyright laws spread to other countries vastly during the coming centuries. In India, the evolution of copyright law started way back in 1914, during the British regime. This is when the first copyright law in India was enacted, though it was a complete replica of the English copyright law of 1911. This Act, post-independence, became the Copyright Act, 1957. As time progressed, India became a member of the Berne Convention, Rome Convention, UCC, TRIPS, WIPO, etc. for the sole purpose of giving international recognition to copyright laws. Thereafter, the Copyright Act, 1957, was amended to suit the needs of Indian complexities and culture, with the latest amendment being made in 2012.
Understanding copyright
Before we dig into the actual registration process, it’s essential to grasp the fundamentals of copyright. Copyright, in simple terms, means “the exclusive right to publish or record a work.” It is basically the right to copy, i.e., the owner has an exclusive right to his work and is entitled to make copies of the same. Copyright is a form of intellectual property protection granted to the creators of original works, encompassing a wide range of creative expressions such as literary works, music, art, and more. As soon as a work is created and fixed in a tangible medium, copyright protection is automatically granted. Section 13 of the Copyright Act, 1957, enumerates the various types of works in which a copyright exists:
Original literary, dramatic or musical works;
Original artistic work;
Cinematograph films;
Sound recordings;
Computer programmes.
Rights conferred by a copyright
Section 14 of the Copyright Act, 1957, states the various rights that are conferred upon the copyright owner. These rights are exclusive and empower the copyright holder to exercise control over their work. Some of these rights include:
Reproduction of the work: The copyright owner has the exclusive right to reproduce the work in any material form. This means they have the sole authority to make copies of their original work.
Issuing copies to the public: The copyright holder has the exclusive right to issue copies of the work to the public. This includes the distribution of physical copies as well as making the work available to the public through electronic means.
Public performance: The right to perform the work in public is vested in the copyright owner. This is particularly relevant for works like plays, musical compositions, and other performance-based creations.
Public display: The copyright holder has the exclusive right to display the work in public. This applies to visual arts, sculptures, and other works that are meant to be visually experienced.
Adaptation and Translation: The right to make adaptations or translations of the work is within the purview of the copyright owner. This ensures that any modification or translation of the original work requires the copyright holder’s permission.
Broadcasting: The exclusive right to communicate the work to the public by broadcasting is granted to the copyright owner. This includes both radio and television broadcasts.
Communication to the public: This right encompasses the communication of the work to the public, covering modes beyond broadcasting. It recognises the evolving nature of technology and includes activities such as making the work available online.
Commercial rental: The right to commercially rent or lend the work is also reserved for the copyright owner. This is particularly relevant to the rental of physical copies of works like books, sound recordings, or computer programmes.
The benefits of applying for copyright registration
Copyright is established the moment a work is created, and no formalities are necessary for its acquisition. However, registering your copyright with the appropriate authorities offers many benefits. These include:
Legal Presumption of Ownership: Registration creates a legal presumption of ownership, making it easier to assert your rights in cases of legal disputes. The certificate of copyright registration and the recorded entries therein act as prima facie evidence in legal proceedings, particularly in disputes concerning copyright ownership.
Public Notice: Registration puts the public on notice that your work is protected, deterring potential infringers.
Access to Legal Remedies: Registered works are eligible for statutory damages in cases of infringement, providing more robust legal remedies.
International Protection: Registration with certain offices can facilitate protection in multiple countries through international treaties.
Enhanced Market Value: A registered copyright can enhance the market value of your creative work, making it more attractive to potential buyers, licensees, or collaborators who may see the formalised protection as a valuable asset.
Registration of Copyright
Now that we have come across the need to get the copyright registered, we shall further study the procedure for applying for and acquiring the registration of copyright. Section 44 to 50A of the Copyright Act, 1957, deals with the provisions relating to the registration of copyright. Let’s assume that a person has written a book and wishes to obtain a copyright for it.
Creation of the work: The work must be in its final form before applying for copyright registration. Considering our example, the book should be in its final form, whether published or unpublished.
Determine the type of work: Ensure that the work falls under the categories eligible for copyright protection, such as literary works, artistic works, musical works, cinematographic films, sound recordings, etc. A book shall fall under the category of “literary work.”
Online registration & filing of applications: Copyright registration needs to be done online through the e-filing facility provided by the Copyright Office. After the work is ready, navigate to the official website of the Copyright Office, viz., www.copyright.gov.in. Now, create an account and login.
Fill out the application form: Complete the online application form. The form requires details about the work, the author, the title of the work, a statement of particulars, and other relevant information.
Upload Work: Upload a copy of the work to be registered. The format and requirements for the deposit may vary depending on the type of work.
Fee Payment: Pay the prescribed copyright registration fee. The fee can be paid online through the designated payment modes.
Submission of Hard Copy: After successful online submission, a hard copy of the application form, along with the requisite documents, needs to be sent to the Copyright Office in New Delhi within 30 days of online filing.
Copyright Journal: Once the application is submitted to the Registrar of Copyrights, the same shall be published in the Copyright Journal, which is open for a period of 30 days, whereby objections from the public may be filed against the claim of the author/applicant. If any such objection is filed by any person, the Registrar of Copyrights shall hear both parties & decide whether or not to process the application further for registration.
Processing and Examination: The Registrar of Copyrights, if no objections are received or all objections are rejected, will process the application further once the period of 30 days is over. The Registrar may issue queries/objections or ask for any additional information from the author/applicant.
Issuance of Registration Certificate: Once the Registrar of Copyrights is completely satisfied, the application is approved, and all formalities are considered completed. The Copyright Office shall enter the particulars of the copyright in the Register of Copyrights and issue a certificate of registration of copyright. This entire process may take several months or years, depending on the case, and it’s essential to keep track of the status of application on the Copyright Office’s website.
Term of Copyright
Once the registration has been acquired, the copyright is valid & subsists for a certain period of time only, after which it comes into the public domain. The general term for copyright for literary, dramatic, musical, and artistic works is the lifetime of the author plus 60 years after his death. In the case of cinematographic films, sound recordings, photographs, posthumous works, and anonymous and pseudonymous works, the duration varies. The exact terms in detail can be found in Sections 22 to 29 of the Copyright Act, 1957.
Important case laws
There are various case laws relating to the registration and infringement of copyright; here are some of them:
Sanjay Soya Private Ltd. v. Narayani Trading Company (2021)
In this case, it was held by the Bombay High Court that the registration of a copyright is not mandatory in India under the Copyright Act, 1957. The Court took into consideration the Berne Convention and TRIPS agreement to come to this conclusion. The Court took a literal rule of construction by understanding the language used in Section 45(1) of the Act, where the word “may” has been used, and hence, the Court held that it is not mandatory for a copyright to be registered. It was further observed that under Section 51, infringement of copyright is not limited to registered work.
Shree Venkatesh Films Pvt. Ltd. v. Vipul Amrutlal Shah and Ors (2009)
In this case, the issue was regarding the infringement of copyright on the film Namastey London (in Hindi), produced and directed by Vipul Amrutlal & Ors., but Shree Venkatesh Films in 2009 produced an imitation of the original film and titled it “Poran Jaye Joliya Rae” (in Bengali) and released it. The parties tried to negotiate the same, which was a failure. After 10 days of the Bengali film’s release, a copyright infringement suit was filed by the plaintiff/respondent. The Court held it an infringement under Section 14(d)(i) of the Copyright Act, 1957, and passed an injunction against exhibiting the film. On appeal, the High Court upheld the injunction against exhibition of the film, holding it as an infringement of copyright, and stated that “copy” as per Section 14(d)(i) of the Copyright Act, 1957, is not just limited to the duplication of the film but also includes the making of another film that substantially resembles the original film. Here, the Calcutta High Court gave a broader view of Section 14(d)(i) of the Act.
Conclusion
In a world where people love new ideas, it’s super important to keep your creations safe. Copyright registration helps creators by giving them legal rights to their work. It stops others from copying it without permission and helps you take legal action if needed. Knowing how to register your copyright helps you protect your ideas and feel more secure about your creative work. It’s like adding a strong lock to your creations, making sure they stay yours for a long time.
References
Jhabvala Law Series: Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) by Adv. Simran Gurnani
Neighbouring Rights under Copyright Law by Rajnish Kumar Singh
This article is written by Avneet Kaur. This article deals with a case analysis of the landmark case of the State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar. It aims to provide a wide exploration of several legal aspects involved in the case along with its detailed judgement.
Table of Contents
Introduction
Suppose ‘A’ commits an offence of robbery and murders certain foreigners and ‘B’ commits the same offence but ends up murdering Indian citizens. However, during trial, ‘A’ is subject to a different procedure than is generally applicable and to which ‘B’ is subject. The procedure under which ‘A’ is being tried takes away a lot of his rights and defences whereas ‘B’ has access to those rights and defences. In such a case, a question may arise whether prejudice against the rights of ‘A’ is justified, even though both ‘A’ and ‘B’ were placed under similar circumstances.
Similar is the case of State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952), wherein an Act permitting such classification was enforced in the State of West Bengal. The judgement in this case paved the way for a new interpretation of legislative enactments in light of the right to equality under Article 14.
Details of the case
Name of the case: The State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar
Date of judgement: 11.01.1952
Bench: Justice M. Patanjali Sastri, Justice Saiyid Fazal Ali, Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan, Justice B.K. Mukherjee, Justice N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar, and Justice Vivian Bose
Equivalent citations: AIR 1952 SC 75; [1952] 1 SCR 284
Facts of State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952)
The West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950 was enacted for speedier trials of certain offences. By virtue of Section 3 of the Act, the State Government was empowered to constitute special Courts for the above-stated purpose. Section 5 of the Act laid down the jurisdiction of the Special Courts upon such offences or classes of offences as the State Government may, by order, specify. The procedure for trial of offences laid down in the Act was also different from the general procedure for trials laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
The respondent, along with forty-nine others, was charged with the commission of several offences in the course of committing a raid as an armed gang in a Factory. These cases were tried before the Special Court under Section 5(1) of the Act upon notification from the State Governor regarding them. The Special Court convicted the respondents and subjected them to different terms of imprisonment. The respondents approached the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta and sought under Article 226 of the Constitution the issue of a writ of certiorari to nullify their conviction. The respondents contended that the Special Court had no jurisdiction to try their case and that Section 5 of the Act was also unconstitutional because it denied them their right to equality under Article 14.
The High Court quashed the order of conviction of the respondents and ordered that the trial of the respondents should take place again according to the law. Aggrieved by this decision of the High Court of Calcutta, the State of West Bengal filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.
Legal aspects involved in State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952)
The West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950
The West Bengal Special Courts Ordinance was promulgated in 1949 and was later replaced by the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950. The Act is almost identical to the Ordinance with minimal changes. The Preamble to the Act states that its purpose is to provide a speedier trial for offences. Section 3 of the Act empowers the State Government to constitute Special Courts of criminal jurisdiction. Section 4 of the Act mentions the appointment procedure and qualifications of the Special Judge to preside over Special Courts. Section 5 lays down that the Special Courts should try such cases or offences or classes of cases or offences which the State Government shall specify by order. Sections 6 to 15 lay down the trial to be followed by the Special Courts. The trial procedure laid down in the Act is much different than that laid down in the CrPC. Some characteristics of the new trial procedure laid down under the Act, which were subject to criticism, are given below.
Trials are not to be conducted with the help of a jury and assessors
Restriction on the power of Special Courts to grant adjournments
The right to review by the High Court has been omitted
Constitution of India, 1950
Several provisions of the Constitution of India also hold significance in this case such as Articles 13, 14, 21, 132 and 226.
Article 14
Article 14 guarantees every person equality before the law and equal protection of the law. It prohibits discrimination between two persons or classes of persons who are placed under similar circumstances. Yet, it allows for protective discrimination. For example, Article 15(4) is also one such provision that allows for the making of special provisions for the empowerment of any socially or educationally backward classes or the Scheduled castes or tribes, There might be situations where the same law cannot be applied to all persons. In such situations, classification can be made to achieve the desired purpose. Such classification should have a logical basis and should be formed on the basis of common characteristics between those who fall into a class and those who do not. Therefore, it forbids class legislation but not reasonable classification.
Article 21
Article 21 encompasses the right to life and personal liberty. It provides that no law should take away the right mentioned under Article 21 except by procedure established by law. The term ‘law’ not only includes central or State legislation but also administrative decisions, executive orders, notifications, rules and regulations. Therefore, it helps in preventing arbitrariness in the administrative as well as legislative spheres. The phrase ”right to life and personal liberty” includes within its ambit a number of implied rights as well, such as the right to information and the right to live in a clean environment, the right to free and just trial, etc.
Article 13
Article 13 of the Constitution declares any law void if it contravenes any of the fundamental rights of a person given under Part III of the Constitution. The Section encompasses, within its scope, pre-constitutional as well as post-constitutional laws. It also poses a duty on the State to not make any law which is inconsistent with or derogatory to the fundamental rights of people. Like Article 21, the meaning of law under Article 13 also includes ordinance, order, bylaws, rules and regulations.
Article 226
This Article provides the right to a citizen to approach the High Court by way of filing a writ petition for the enforcement of his/her fundamental rights. It Acts as a safeguard against the violation of the rights of an individual. The High Court can grant reliefs in the nature of habeas corpus, quo warranto, certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. This Article can be used to issue orders against any person or authority, including the Government.
Issues raised in State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952)
Whether Section 5 of the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950 and the notification issued under it are violative of the right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India?
Whether the special trial procedures under the Act are valid or not?
Whether the classification made under the Act is reasonable or not?
Arguments of the parties in State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952)
Appellant
The counsel on behalf of the appellant contended that the use of the word ‘cases’ in Section 5 of the Act implies those cases that require a speedier trial and, therefore, the classification of such cases by the State Government is for the expedition of justice and it is on this basis that the special procedure of trial under the Act is applicable.
It was also argued that the State has a duty to ensure the efficient administration of justice. In order to fulfil its duty, the State has full control over the Court procedures in both civil and criminal matters.
The Act in question only regulates the procedure of trial in certain circumstances, and the changes in such procedure are only of a minor nature; therefore, the Act cannot be termed discriminatory, hostile or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
The counsel put forward that the difference in the procedure of trial is made only on the basis of a justifiable classification. And, even if there is scope for the arbitrary exercise of the power conferred by the Act, the whole legislation cannot be deemed invalid in its entirety.
Mere contention that the Act gives unregulated discretion to the State forms no valid ground for challenging it as violative of the rule of equality.
The counsel proposed an alternative test regarding the reasonableness of classification under the Act by stating that, if inequality is suffered by any person for the purpose of the general interest of administration and not of any special prejudice, then there is no violation of Article 14. Therefore, if the object of legislation is of general importance and discrimination is a by-product of the same, then it is not a violation of the equality rule.
Respondent
The respondent argued that the Act in question gives unfettered discretionary power to the State in the name of better administration of justice. There are no rules or procedures in existence to guide the use of such power. Hence, it is arbitrary to Article 14 of the Constitution.
Another feature of the Act was that an application for bail cannot be made before the High Court if it has already been rejected by the Special Court. Such features imply that there has been substantial curtailment of the rights of the accused. The discrimination arises because rights are restricted only in certain situations, while there is no such restriction in other situations of similar nature. Therefore, it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
The counsel put forward that there is no restriction on the classification power of the State Government. Therefore, the appellant cannot seek aid from the Preamble of the Act to justify otherwise, as the Preamble cannot change the meaning of the provisions of the Act.
The respondents put forward an example to justify that the classifications are discriminatory. It was put forward that under the Indian Penal Code, 1860, there are different chapters relating to offences of different natures. One such chapter relates to offences against property, which mentions offences such as theft, theft in a dwelling house, theft by a servant, etc., and, if we go by the language of the Section, the State may direct cases of theft in a dwelling house to the Special Courts, while cases of theft by servant may be left with ordinary Courts. The basis of the argument is that, although there is no valid reason that theft in a dwelling house should require a speedier trial than theft by a servant, there is a possibility that the State Government may do the same by directing such a case to the Special Court.
Judgement in the case
Scope of Section 5
During a careful perusal of the Act, the Supreme Court held that the purpose of Section 5(1) is to lay down the jurisdiction of the Special Courts and not the extent of the State Government’s power to refer cases. The preamble reflects that the objective of the Act is to create machinery for a speedier trial of certain offences. Therefore, the extent of power needed to set that machinery into motion should be restricted to its end and should not go beyond to confer arbitrary power on the State Government. The Supreme Court also relied on the principle of construction laid down in Carroll vs. Greenwich Insc. Co. (1905), an American case wherein it was held that the general language of any Act is to be construed and restricted by the provisions of the Act and to its specific end. In other words, the intent of the Act should be used to interpret the provisions of the Act. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the power of the State Government to refer cases should be limited to the purpose of having a speedier trial of offences, rather than allowing for unfettered discretion.
By application of the test of reasonable classification, the Supreme Court held that the need for a speedier trial in certain cases can form the basis of reasonable classification. Section 5 of the Act is not discriminatory in so far as it empowers the State to direct certain offences requiring a speedier trial to the Special Courts. But the provision becomes discriminatory and violates Article 14 so far that it vests unregulated arbitrary power upon the State to direct to the Special Courts “any cases”. The Supreme Court held that when an Act endows certain powers that can be used in a bona fide as well as mala fide manner, then the Act is ultra vires.
Validity of Section 5
The most important issue in this case was whether Section 5 of the West Bengal Special Courts Act is violative of the right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution. In this regard, the Supreme Court held that, though it is established that Section 5 is well-intentioned, a part of the Section that is concerned with the power of the State Government to direct cases or classes of cases to the Special Courts established under the Act in this appeal is void. The Supreme Court held that the Act has been made on a pre-constitutional basis and needs to be reformed. The provisions of this Act have merely been copied from the West Bengal Special Courts Ordinance, 1949, which was made at a time when there was no provision similar to Article 14 in the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court, thus, held that Section 5 of the Act is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, which can be seen through the following points-
A speedier trial of offences can be the motive of the legislation but there is no basis for classification as to what kind of cases or classes of cases should be subject to the Special Courts. The need for a speedy trial is too vague and the criteria for a reasonable classification on the basis of the need for speedy trial of certain cases under Section 5 is also uncertain because they rest at the discretion of the State Government to decide which cases or classes of cases need speedy trial.
The Supreme Court held that though a competent legislature has the power to alter procedures regarding criminal matters, it is a valid and binding law that does not infringe the fundamental rights of the citizens guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution. A procedural law is also within the purview of Article 14, like a substantive law. Therefore, all those who are similarly placed should have access to the equal protection and defence available under the law.
The Section is void insomuch as the procedure laid down to try cases under it is substantially different from that of the Code of Criminal Procedure without any logical classification or ground to ascertain which class of offences requires a speedier trial.
The Supreme Court explained the extent of arbitrariness that can result from the unregulated discretion conferred upon the State Government to direct cases to the Special Court. The Supreme Court stated an example that the State may direct a case involving the use of firearms and murder, where the persons killed are foreigners, to be tried by the Special Court, whereas an exactly similar case where the persons killed are Indians may be tried under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The Supreme Court also held that Section 5 is void as far as it empowers the State Government to direct particular or individual cases to be tried by the Special Courts instead of ‘classes of cases.’ The Supreme Court further held that, if making an amendment to correct the situation was considered, then it would imply deletion of the word ‘cases’ from Section 5. However, the Court observed that the whole Act is violative of Article 14 and merely deleting a term from it would not save it. The Court also noted that Section 5 is the key operative of the entire legislation because the State Government draws its power from it and the jurisdiction of the Special Courts is also found from it. Therefore, as per the Supreme Court the invalidity of Section 5 will also make the entire Act invalid, as the doctrine of severability does not allow the saving of the rest of the Act in this situation. The doctrine states that, if any provision of a statute is against any constitutional limit, then only that part or provision should be rendered void. However, when such provision or part forms a significant part of the statute on which the rest of the Act depends, then the entire statute or Act should be considered void.
Scope of Article 14
The Supreme Court held that Article 14 consists of two parts
The first part enshrines a declaration of equality of all persons within the territory of the country. This part is inspired by the Irish Constitution. And regarded as the basic principle of republicanism in American jurisprudence.
The second part enshrines equal protection to all persons in the enjoyment of their rights and without any discrimination. This part is inspired by the Fourteenth Amendment in the American Constitution and is regarded as a pledge of equal protection of laws.
Furthermore, the prohibitions under Article 14 are directed against the State as defined under Article 12 of the Constitution. The purpose is to save the people from being subjected to the arbitrary application of laws under similar circumstances. This also Acts as a corollary to Article 13, which renders void any law, order or notification if it violates any of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution. This trilogical relationship between Articles 12, 13 and 14 ensures that the administrative and legislative arenas remain free from discrimination and arbitrariness. The Supreme Court also relied on the judgement in the case of State of Bombay & Anr. vs. F.N. Balsara (1951), wherein while examining the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 it was held that the essence of Article 14 is to prevent any person or class of persons from being singled out and subjected to discrimination for the reason of hostile legislation. But at the same time, it also does not insist on abstract symmetry. The Act imposed restrictions on the consumption and sale of liquor but allowed certain individuals like foreigners to obtain permits for consuming the liquor. This distinction was recognized as arbitrary and discriminator. Therefore, a reasonable standard should be set to deal with such situations.
Reasonable classification test
The Supreme Court held that despite the principle of equal protection of laws under equal circumstances incorporated under Article 14, there cannot always be laws of general character and universal application. In order to achieve certain welfare ends or fulfil policies, the State is empowered in the exercise of its Governmental functions, to make different laws for different persons or classes of persons. Therefore, it should be possessed with such power so as to enable it to make a classification. The Supreme Court explained in the present case that classification implies the systematic arrangement of people or things into certain groups or classes in accordance with some definite scheme.
In this regard, the Supreme Court held contrary to the view given in Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co. vs. Matthews (1899), wherein it was held that the concept of classification implies inequality and discrimination between those who are members of a class and those who are not. And referred to the decision in Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co. (1902), wherein it was held that the duties of a modern welfare Government are not limited. It has to deal with issues resulting from an infinite array of relations for which classification may be necessary. The Supreme Court, thus, held that classification need not be based on accurate scientific standards and, if the classification is not arbitrary on the face of the record, then it is justified.
Though there is nothing sacred about the test of reasonable classification, it serves great purposes in meeting attacks on the law on grounds of discrimination. Therefore, one of the ways to save legislation permitting classification is to prove that it is a reasonable classification of persons or offences in respect of which the law laid down is to apply.
Therefore, the Supreme Court recognised that neither Article 14 implies universal application nor does it take away the State Government’s power to make classifications for the purpose of legislation. However, it should be ensured that the classification is reasonable and fulfils the following two conditions-
The classification should be based on an intelligible differentia, which justifies the distinguishment of those persons or offences who are put in a class as compared to those who are not. The term “intelligible differentia” means the existence of a logical basis or common characteristic for classifying people or offences into different groups for the purpose of legislation.
Secondly, the differentia must have a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the legislation.
The Supreme Court held that classifications of offences on the need for a speedier trial are too vague, inaccurate and thus unreasonable. The classification does not fulfil the criteria of intelligible differentia for the purpose of classification. The Act has laid down no yardstick to measure by which the classification of persons, offences or cases under the Act could be distinguished from those who are outside of its purview. The Act has left this part to the unregulated discretion of the State Government. Hence, the State Government may direct an offence or case or classes of cases to be tried by the Special Courts, while other offences or cases of similar character could be left to be dealt with under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Difference in trial procedure
The Supreme Court held that, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, the procedure for trial of offences was classified into four different sets. Those are-
Summary trials
Trial of summons cases
Trial of warrant cases
Trial of cases triable by Sessions Court.
This classification is made on the basis of the gravity of offences. The framers of the code were of the view that the more grave the offence, the more elaborate should be its trial procedure. However, the Supreme Court held that the Act in question has ignored the principle of classification of trial procedures behind the CrPC. The Act has laid down a new trial procedure without any logical classification of persons, cases or offences to which it should apply. The criteria for making classification under the Act is the offences which require a speedy trial. However, as held by the Supreme Court, this criteria is vague and creates uncertainty. The Court also observed that the Act imposes greater liability on the accused than that mentioned in the CrPC. The Act has deprived the accused of the safeguard of committal proceedings, trial with the help of the jury and assessors, and the right to a de novo trial in cases of transfer. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the rights and liberties of the accused have been cut down. Some other provisions of the Act which discriminate against the accused in this regard are-
The Special Court is empowered to convict a person of an offence even though he/she has not been charged with it, if it is shown as evidence suggests otherwise. It is immaterial whether the offence is minor.
The right of revision to the High Court’s decision or order has been done away with.
The right to ask for re-examination of witnesses or the opportunity of getting re-hearing when the case shifts for disposal from one magistrate to another has also been taken away.
The Supreme Court held that these provisions are clear examples of the inequality brought about by the Act as it allows a substantial inequality of treatment against those persons whose cases are directed to be tried by the Special Courts. The Supreme Court also highlighted the possible consequences of such varied procedures-
There is a high possibility that an offence of a grave nature could be tried under the Act, whereas a less grave offence could be tried under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
A person charged with an offence may be directed to be tried under the Act, whereas another person charged with the same offence could be tried under the CrPC.
Some offences belonging to a particular category of offences could be tried under the Act, whereas other offences belonging to the same category could be tried under the CrPC.
Rationale behind the decision in State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952)
The judgement in this case dealt with various aspects of constitutional provisions and the interpretation of statutes. One of the main considerations of the Supreme Court behind this decision was based on the judgement in Romesh Thapar vs. State of Madras (1950), wherein it was held that, when an Act can be used beyond constitutional limits, then it should be considered void, irrespective of the fact that it can be used without violating those limits as well. Apart from that, the Supreme Court delved into laying down the conditions of a reasonable classification under Article 14. The Supreme Court held that when an Act permits classification, it should be observed that the classification is made on a logical differentia and it has a nexus with the purpose of the Act. The Court emphasised that, though universal application of laws is not possible and there might arise situations where classification has to be made, yet it must be ensured that such classification does not result in any hostility or prejudice against a particular person or group of persons. While making a classification, it must be ensured that it is based on the characteristics of the person or classes of persons and should also have a nexus to the object for which it is made.
The Supreme Court also highlighted the consequences of the difference in trial procedures under the Act. The difference or inequality in the availability of rights, defence or protection to accused placed under similar circumstances violates the principles of natural justice. Therefore, the decision emphasised the significance of upholding equality in the protection of laws towards all people and compliance with natural justice principles for ensuring fair and just trial proceedings.
Precedents referred in the case
Chiranjit Lal Chaudhary vs. Union of India & Ors. (1950)
Facts
Chiranjit Lal was a shareholder of a weaving company governed under the provisions of the Indian Companies Act, 1913. In 1949, the mill was shut down by an ordinance stating the reason as mismanagement. Later, the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1950 was enacted to regulate the company’s affairs. This Act enabled the Government to regulate the company’s affairs, change voting rights, appoint new directors, etc. The Act bore a resemblance to the Ordinance. Both of these were challenged as violative of Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution.
Judgement
The Supreme Court, in Chiranjit Lal Chaudhary vs. Union of India & Ors. (1950), held that the rights of the petitioner under Articles 14, 19 and 31 had not been infringed. The Act in question merely curtails voting rights and provides for the appointment of directors. However, it does not prevent the petitioner from having the right to hold and earn income from his shares. Therefore, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.
Reference in the case of State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952)
In the Chiranjit Lal Chaudhary case, the Supreme Court held that the State while carrying out its government duties, might need to create laws or provisions that treat different groups or classes of people differently to achieve specific objectives and implement its policies. This implies that the authority of the government extends to classifying those things or people who will be subjected to such laws or provisions. However, it should also be noted that no person suffers extensive prejudice because of the classification. This principle was established in the case of Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury vs. Union of India and was applied and referred to in the Anwar Ali Sarkar case.
State of Bombay & Anr. vs. F.N Balsara (1951)
Facts
The petitioner filed a writ of mandamus before the Bombay High Court against the State of Bombay and the Prohibition Commissioner ordering them to prevent enforcement of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 against him. The petitioner wanted to prevent enforcement of provisions regulating and restricting his right to use, import, export and purchase certain articles like whiskey, brandy, wine, beer, medicated wine, foreign liquor, etc.
Judgement
The Supreme Court held some provisions of the Act to be valid while others were invalid. Therefore, it was one of the significant cases in the application of the doctrine of severability. The provisions with regard to the consumption and sale of alcohol mixed medicines and toilet goods were regarded as invalid. Therefore, the appeal by the State of Bombay was allowed.
Reference in the case of State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952)
In this case, the Supreme Court recognised the nature of the right to equality under Article 14. It was held that all those who are similarly situated in a situation should be treated similarly also. Thus, if the circumstances are uniform, so should the application of laws and provisions. The Anwar Ali Sarkar case, subsequently, relied upon this principle established in the Balsara case.
Chintaman Rao vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (1950)
Facts
An order was issued under the Central Provinces and Berar Regulation of Manufacture of Bidis (Agricultural Purposes) Act, 1948 prohibiting residents of several villages from manufacturing bidis. Subsequently, a petition was filed under Article 32 challenging the validity of the order as violative of the petitioner’s freedom of occupation and business.
Judgement
While evaluating restrictions on fundamental rights, the Supreme Court, in Chintaman Rao vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (1950), held that the limitations on personal enjoyment should be reasonable. It was held that the order resulted in the cessation of business during specific agricultural seasons. It was an extreme regulatory measure. Though the Act permits making such orders, a balance should be struck between the freedom mentioned under Article 19(1)(g) and the permissible restrictions under Article 19(6).
Reference in the case of State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952)
In the Chintaman Rao vs. State of Madhya Pradesh case, the Supreme Court held that a law can be deemed unconstitutional if it has the potential to be applied in an unauthorised and arbitrary manner. In other words, if there is a risk that the law could be enforced in a manner that violates the principles of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness, it would be considered unconstitutional by courts. Thus, even if a law itself may be valid, its application must adhere to these constitutional principles. This principle was referred to in the Anwar Ali Sarkar case.
Romesh Thapar vs. State of Madras (1950)
Facts
The petitioner was the author and editor of a journal called “CrossRoads”, published in Bombay. He wrote a few articles describing his scepticism about Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru’s ideologies. Subsequently, under Section 9(1- A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949, an order was issued that banned the circulation of the Journal in Madras. In response to the ban, the petitioner filed a writ petition before the Supreme Court challenging the validity of the Act on the ground that it places excessive and unreasonable restrictions on the enjoyment of the right to freedom of expression guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution.
Judgement
The Supreme Court held that the rights under Article 19 can be subject to reasonable restrictions, such as the security of the State. However, in the present case, the Act in question produced much wider restrictions on freedom of expression than are constitutionally permissible. Accordingly, Section 9(1-A) was held unconstitutional. It was also expounded that when the implementation of an Act poses the possibility of its use beyond constitutional limits as well as within those limits, then the Act should be deemed void.
Reference in the case of State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952)
In this case, the Supreme Court examined the validity of an order made by the State Government to regulate the circulation of news sheets to maintain public order and safety. The Supreme Court recognised that freedom of speech can be restricted on the ground of the security of the State and, since the impugned law went beyond that by allowing restrictions on grounds of public order and safety, it is deemed void. The Supreme Court in the Romesh Thapar case held that, when a law gives the Government the power to impose restrictions on the fundamental rights of citizens, it cannot be upheld irrespective of the fact that it may have some valid application. This principle was also reiterated in the Anwar Ali Sarkar case.
Critical analysis of State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952)
The Supreme Court in this decision provides a remarkable analysis of the right to equality, yet there have been debates regarding its implications as well. Making a classification by the State Government may be necessary for the purpose of legislation and it should be recognised that some inequality resulting from that is its by-product. However, if in every instance such a consequence is termed arbitrary use of power, then it would not be possible to have the desired results of legislation. In this regard, the judgement has narrowed the scope of the legislature’s power to enact laws permitting classification as well as the extent of a Government’s power to ensure efficient administration. This approach may hamper reformist legislation. The State Government also needs to have some discretion in respect of its powers to fulfil its duties as a modern welfare state. The observation of the Supreme Court that, if an Act, though seems to be fair, has the potential of being misused, then it should be declared void. However, this approach may also hinder the Legislature’s ability to make certain laws. If the essence of the legislation is just and fair, then the entire Act should not be subject to invalidity on the ground that the implementation of the Act by public authorities might result in a violation of rights. Therefore, what is needed is a balance between the state’s duty to ensure effective administration and the upholding of individual rights. Furthermore, though the Supreme Court recognised the extent of the arbitrariness of the State Government while referring cases to the Special Court, it did not take any steps to consider the extent of the Special Court’s power to accept or reject such directions from the State Government.
Judgements for which this case was relied on
Kathi Raning Rawat vs. The State of Saurashtra (1952)
In the case ofKathi Raning Rawat vs. State of Saurashtra (1952), the question of the validity of special criminal courts for a specific community set up under the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures (Third Amendment) Ordinance, 1949 was involved. The Supreme Court while deciding the case relied on the judgement in State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952) and held that the establishment of exclusive courts for only a specific community is unconstitutional as such practice violates the rule of equality before the law provided under Article 14 of the Constitution. Classification on the basis of community could lead to adverse social costs. Therefore, the Supreme Court reiterated the notion that any classification should have a rational basis and should not palpably discriminate against any particular community.
The case of Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia vs. Shri Justice S.R Tendolkar & Anr. (1958) involved a legal dispute between Ram Krishna Dalmia, a prominent industrialist, and Justice Tendolkar, who was appointed to investigate certain financial irregularities. The matter revolved around the powers of the investigating authority and the scope of judicial review. Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled in favour of Ram Krishna Dalmia, stating that the investigating authority had exceeded its jurisdiction. In this case, the Supreme Court relied on the judgement in the State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952) and reiterated that, when a statute vests power in the Government to classify things or people for application of its provisions, then the Court will have to consider whether there is any principle to guide the Government’s discretion in the classification process. If there is no provision or principle to guide the State or maintain a check on its power, then the Court may strike it down as it might lead to arbitrariness and discrimination between similarly placed people or things.
Ramesh Chandra Sharma vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2023)
In the case of Ramesh Chandra Sharma vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2023), the main issue involved was the difference in compensation rates for the “Pushtaini” landholders and the “Gair-Pushtaini” landholders. The appellants felt that they were being compensated at a lower rate compared to the other “Pushtaini” landholders. While delivering the judgement in this case, the Supreme Court recognised the twin test for reasonable classification laid down in the case of State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952). The Supreme Court held that the classification between “Pushtaini” and “Gair-Pushtaini” shareholders is unreasonable as there is no intelligible differentia existing. The Supreme Court held that the classification should not only be rational and have a nexus with the law but should also not result in prejudice against anyone.
Conclusion
The case of State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952) is a landmark judgement as it directly affects the people because it gives a detailed analysis of the right to equality of all persons and the upholding of principles of natural justice. The Act was declared unconstitutional because when people accused of committing heinous offences are called upon to defend themselves, a few of them may be picked out and subject to the new procedures, which, though giving them few crumbs of benefits, leave them deprived of their substantial rights and liberties. Those subject to such disadvantages are concerned about whether it was done for the benefit of the State or the convenience of the Government. The Fact that matters is that those included in such a class suffer unreasonably, even when they are placed similarly to those who are not included in that class. Therefore, this decision has affirmed the role of the judiciary as a guardian of the fundamental rights of people.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
What is a reasonable classification test?
The test specifies the conditions to determine the reasonableness of a classification made by the Legislature in a statute. The reasonable classification test states that, whenever legislation permits classification, it must be ensured that the classification has valid reasoning to differentiate between those who are put in a class as opposed to those who are not. The test lays down that a classification should have an intelligible differential or logical basis and this differential should have a link to the object of the law. Further, it must be ensured that the classification is made solely for the object of legislation and does not result in a particular prejudice against any person.
What are the constituents of Article 14?
Article 14 deals with the right to equality and has two constituents. The first is the rule of equality before law and the second is the equal application of the law to all persons without any discrimination.
What are the types of trials under the CrPC, 1973?
The CrPC mentions four different kinds of trials. Section 225-237 deals with the trial of warrant cases by the Session Court. Section 238-250 relates to the trial of warrant cases by the Magistrate. Section 251-259 gives the procedure for the trial of summons cases by the Magistrate and Section 260-265 deals with summary trials.
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This article is written by Harshita Agrawal. The article highlights the conclusions and rulings in the case of Mahesh Kumar Chaudhary v. State of Jharkhand, 2022. It provides an in-depth analysis of the case’s factual backdrop, legal principles, and the arguments presented, along with the pertinent and noteworthy rationales. Moreover, it explains the judgements considered by the court and its subsequent decisions, coupled with various statements and arguments pertinent to legal precedent.
Table of Contents
Introduction
In the case of Mahesh Kumar Chaudhary v. State of Jharkhand,(2022), there was an FIR lodged against the petitioner Mahesh Kumar Chaudhary and other co-petitioners by Priyanka Jaiswal, who alleged the mistreatment and abuse by her husband, Prem Chandra Shekhar. She met with him through an online matrimonial platform, and he assured her of her independence and a dowry-free marriage. She also mentioned in the FIR about all the verbal abuse and manipulation she had faced, leading to her return to India. The police arrested the husband (Prem Chandra Shekhar) and non-bailable warrants were issued against him and other co-petitioner. After the arrest, the court deemed it improper and noted a lack of jurisdiction. There were several guidelines formulated by the State of Jharkhand to prevent unwarranted arrests and the guidelines were based on those established by the Delhi Police, and it was necessary to communicate them to senior authorities for compliance. With these decisions and directives, the petition is granted and the dismissal of an FIR and non-bailable warrants issued against the petitioners was revoked.
Details of the case
Name of the case
Mahesh Kumar Chaudhary v. State of Jharkhand, 2022
Citation
Cr.M.P. No. 1291 of 2021
Name of the court
Jharkhand High Court
Date of judgement
16 June, 2022
Type of case
Civil Writ Jurisdiction
Bench
Justice Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi
Authored by
Justice Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi
Names of the parties
Appellant: Mahesh Kumar Chaudhary, Mina Devi, Prem Kant Shekhar, Nishant Shekhar, Sania Shekhar, and Prem Chandra Shekhar
Respondent: State of Jharkhand, State of Jharkhand (Ranchi), Priyanka Jaiswal
Statutes and laws involved in the case
There were several statutes and laws that were implicated, as well as various legal matters that were addressed in the case of Mahesh Kumar Chaudhary v. State of Jharkhand, 2022. Among the commonly cited statutes and laws in cases concerning unwanted arrests, misappropriate use of law or violations of the legal rights of any party are:
Facts of Mahesh Kumar Chaudhary vs. State of Jharkhand, 2022
In the case of Mahesh Kumar Chaudhary v. State of Jharkhand, 2022, Priyanka Jaiswal filed a First Information Report (FIR),claiming that during her tenure as a freelance artist, she registered on an online matrimonial platform where Prem Chandra Shekhar initiated communication with her. He persuaded her for marriage with the tales of his successful career in Frankfurt, Germany and also claimed to earn Rs 70-80 lakhs annually. The appellant reassured her of her independence post-marriage as she was reluctant to leave her job in Mumbai for Germany and also tried to convince her to accept his marriage proposal, promising her a dowry-free marriage.
The marriage was held on 5th October, 2018 under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, in Kolkata, followed by a public ceremony on 18th January, 2019 in Jamshedpur, during which the total expenses of Rs. 60 lakhs were incurred by her parents.
After the wedding on 3rd February, 2019, she travelled to Mumbai along with her husband, where he forced her to obtain a visa for Germany and depart for Frankfurt. On 10th February, 2019, when she visited her in-laws in Kolkata, she faced derogatory remarks about the lack of dowry. She shared all the incidents with her husband and he remained silent.
Despite the verbal abuse, she acquired her visa and went to her husband in Frankfurt on 18th April, 2019. However, his behaviour changed drastically, citing the non-fulfilment of dowry demands by her parents. He demanded 50 lakhs cash, one car and one flat in Kolkata. He also started to maintain a distance from her. He exploited her ambition to pursue her career and also threatened to end the relationship.
Consequently, for some mental peace, she returned to India on 5th December, 2019 experiencing further mistreatment from her in-laws. The appellant further apologised and promised to protect her from his parent’s demands. The abuse continued after her return to Frankfurt in February 2020 and all the violence and emotional trauma left her mentally and physically broken, forcing her to lead her life in isolation and hunger. He left her on 2nd October, 2020 and also blocked all communication, leaving her to look for herself. She also stated that she endured starvation and illness alone, and thus requested help from her husband for tickets to India for her brother’s wedding. After returning to Kolkata on 2nd November, 2020, she again met with physical assault and was detained by her in-laws, prompting her parents to rescue her. Since then, she has been residing in Jamshedpur and occasionally visits her parents.
After the complaints, an FIR was filed and non-bailable warrants were issued against the petitioner by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Jamshedpur along with other co-petitioners. This petition was filed by the husband (petitioner) to quash the FIR.
Issues raised
Whether a non-bailable warrant of arrest can be issued without serving notice under Section 41-A of the Cr. P.C. in Section 498-A case?
Whether the Jamshedpur Court lacks territorial jurisdiction due to the alleged occurrences that happened in Kolkata or Germany?
Whether there was any misuse of law to settle personal scores or gain advantages in dispute?
Whether the rights of the petitioner were violated in any manner?
Whether the burden of proof lies on the accused under the case law of Mahesh Kumar Chaudhary v. State of Jharkhand, (2022) ?
Arguments of the parties
Petitioner (husband)
The legal representative of the petitioner argued to the fact that the non-bailable warrants were issued against the petitioner without complying with the procedures and without serving proper notice under Section 41-A of the Cr.P.C. and it was also contended that the allegations alleged were indiscriminate against all the petitioners.
He also emphasised the point that the jurisdiction of the Jamshedpur Court was territorial and the alleged incident occurred either in Kolkata or Germany.
On the point of territorial jurisdiction, he cited the case of Manoj Kumar Sharma v. State of Chhattisgarh (2016), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held after the statements of the senior counsel of the petitioner that the Police Station Bhilai Nagar, Durg, where the FIR was filed lacked territorial jurisdiction to investigate the alleged offences under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC. They also pointed out that none of the offences that are alleged occurred within the jurisdiction of the police station. The authority to investigate cognizable cases within the jurisdiction of the police station is granted under Section 156(1) and the validity of such investigation that cannot be challenged later falls under Section 156(2). The completion of the investigation necessitates the submission of its results as outlined in Sections 168, 169 and 170 of the Cr.P.C. He relies on this judgement to argue that since the cause of action did not occur in Jamshedpur, registering the FIR there was unnecessary.
He argued that the accusations against petitioners apart from the husband are vague and sweeping in nature.
Respondent (wife)
The legal representative of the respondent countered the arguments stating that all necessary procedures were followed, whether arrest or territorial jurisdiction.
In her statement, she stated that it was the fault of the security guard of the relevant apartment for not receiving any help from the Jamshedpur police. The local police also paid minimal attention and had not addressed the matter properly.
The investigation was conducted legally with all the nuances and principles laid thereupon and to support her statement of maintaining territorial jurisdiction, the learned counsel cited the case of Rupali Devi vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2019).
As per the case law of Rupali Devi vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2019), the Supreme Court held that when a woman faces cruelty from her husband or other in-laws, she may file a complaint not only in the place where the incident has occurred but also in the place where she is residing. The court concluded that cruelty affects adversely and continues to make an impact on her life resulting in the place within territorial jurisdiction as it is her right to seek legal remedy from any of her residence. This judgement broadens the view of the judiciary in India providing the victim more convenience and protection.
Laws discussed in Mahesh Kumar Chaudhary vs. State of Jharkhand, 2022
Article 21 of the Indian Constitution
Article 21 confers on every person the fundamental rights to life and personal liberty . It says that “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedures established by law”.
The right to life includes those things which make life meaningful. The right of life enshrined in Article 21 guarantees the right to live with human dignity. That the expression ‘personal liberty’ is not limited to bodily restraint or to confinement to prison only which is well illustrated in the case of Kharak Singh vs. State of U.P. (1963). Under this case the question raised was of the validity of the police regulations authorising the police to conduct what are called as domiciliary visits against bad characters and to have surveillance over them. The court held that visits were an invasion on the part of the police of the sanctity of a man’s home and a intrusion into his personal security and his right to sleep and therefore violative of the personal liberty of the individual unless authorised by a valid law. As regards the regulations authorising surveillance over the movements of an individual the court was of the view that they were not bad as no right to privacy has been guaranteed in the Constitution.
Article 226 of the Indian Constitution
As per Article 226 of the Indian Constitution, which states the power of the High Court to issue certain writs. Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power within its jurisdiction to issue directions, orders or writs, including those akin to Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, Prohibition, Quo Warranto, and Certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part 3 or for any other purpose.
The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any government, authority or individual may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction over the territories where the cause of action, either entirely or partially, originates for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of the respective government or authority or the residence of the individual is situated outside those territories.
In cases where an interim order, whether in the form of an injunction, stay, or otherwise, is issued against a party in proceedings concerning a petition under clause (1) –
has not been provided with copies of the petition and all supporting documents for the interim order, and
has not been granted an opportunity to present their case
makes an application to the High Court to revoke such an order, providing a copy of the application to the party in whose favour the order was issued or their legal representative, the High Court must resolve the application within two weeks from its receipt or from the date the copy is furnished, whichever is later. If the High Court is closed on the last day of this period, the application must be resolved before the next open day; otherwise, the interim order stands vacated upon the expiration of the specified period.
The power conferred on a High Court by this Article shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of Article 32.
In the case of State of Madras v. Sundaram (1964), it was established that if the contested conclusions lacked evidential support, a High Court, when exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution, cannot act as an appellate authority over the factual determinations made by a competent tribunal during a duly conducted departmental inquiry. When exercising its authority under Article 226, the High Court does not adjudicate on the sufficiency of evidence to substantiate the allegation.
Section 498 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
Section 498 pertains to enticing, taking away or detaining with criminal intent a married woman. As per this Section, anyone who takes or entices away a woman, knowing or having reason to believe to believe she is married to another man, from her husband or anyone entrusted with her care by her husband, intending for her to engage in unlawful intercourse with someone else, or who hides or detains such a woman for that purpose, shall be subject to imprisonment for a term of up to two years, a fine, or both.
To uphold a conviction under Section 498, it must be proven that the woman was enticed or taken away from her husband’s residence and detained for the purpose of engaging in unlawful intercourse, as determined in the case of Prem Nath Laroiya v. The State (1972). A mere observation of the woman outside the accused’s residence is insufficient evidence. The accused’s intent is crucial under this provision.
Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
As per Section 498A of the Code and (Sections 85 and 86 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023), any husband or relative of the husband who inflicts cruelty upon a woman shall be punishable by imprisonment for up to three years and may also be fined.
For the purpose of this Section, cruelty refers to:
any deliberate behaviour likely to compel the woman to contemplate suicide or to cause serious injury or endanger her life, limbs or health (be it mental or physical), or
harassment aimed at coercing the woman or her relatives to comply with unlawful demands for property or valuable assets, or is due to their failure to meet such demands.
In the landmark judgement ofManju Ram Kalita v. State of Assam, (2009), the High Court of Guwahati held that ‘cruelty’ in the context of Section 498A IPC should be interpreted within the specific framework of that Section, which may differ from other legal statutes. It requires an examination of the man’s behaviour, assessing the severity of his actions, and determining whether they are likely to drive the woman to commit suicide, among other factors. It must be taken into consideration that the women have faced cruelty either in a repeated manner or in close proximity to the time of filing the complaint. The Court also clarified that minor disagreements or disputes cannot be classified as ‘cruelty’.
Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961
As per Section 4 of the said Act, anyone who directly or indirectly seeks dowry from the parents, relatives or guardians of the bride or groom shall be subject to imprisonment for a term of not less than six months, up to two years, and a fine of up to ten thousand rupees. Provided that the court may, under the special circumstances mentioned in the judgement, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months.
As the judgement passed in the case law ofVipin Jaiswal v. State of Uttar Pradesh(2013), the accused in the said case was charged under this Section for demanding dowry. The Court also observed that it is the burden of the prosecution to prove the fact that the accused had made a specific demand for dowry in order to secure a conviction and charges at him. There are certain allegations of harassment or unsupported dowry demands have surfaced, but they lack sufficient evidence for conviction.
Judgement in Mahesh Kumar Chaudhary vs. State of Jharkhand, 2022
The arrest of the petitioners was conducted without proper adherence to legal procedures and the Jamshedpur Court where the case was filed also lacks jurisdiction in this matter, resulting in the issuance of six non-bailable warrants against the petitioners, which are also hereby annulled. Since the arrest of petitioners was not processed in a proper manner, the court ordered the State of Jharkhand to formulate their guidelines to prevent unwarranted arrests and repeat the same in the future, ensuring the protection of innocent persons. The State is encouraged to refer to the guidelines established by the Delhi Police and upheld by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, with the aim of modelling the Jharkhand Police accordingly. The order is to be conveyed to the Chief Secretary, Home Secretary and Director General of Police, Jharkhand, for their consideration and potential adoption of such guidelines, hoping that the authorities of the State of Jharkhand will assess these suggestions in a positive manner and also take appropriate action. With the aforementioned observations and conclusions, this petition is granted, stating that any interim orders that are previously issued are hereby revoked.
Rationale behind
In view of the submission made by both the legal representatives, the court has reviewed the documents and records presented before it. It is clear that the notice under Section 41-A of the CrPC was not served on the petitioners, as the evidence recorded clarified that the doors at both the addresses were locked. When the police verified the addresses for passport verification earlier, they found that there were two addresses, one in Bihar and other one in Kolkata. As per the data provided to them the notice was sent to Bihar address and the old address of Kolkata and they both were locked since the residents moved to a different place. However, it was the duty of the police to take care of this matter and at least post the notice of non-bailable warrants of arrest under Section 41-A CrPC in a prominent location if it was returned, which was not done in this case.
In a repeated manner, both the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the High Courts have issued guidelines on how to proceed further in the cases under Section 498-A. The principle that ‘bail is the rule and jail is the exception’ has been completely reversed by the police wherein the fact is ‘jail is the rule and bail is the exception’. Nowadays, the police have the power to arrest people without the proper compliances especially in cases related to Section 498-A IPC. In such a scenario, the importance of Article 21 of the Indian Constitution becomes evident.
The Supreme Court, in its order, states that it is the right of a wife to file a case even if she resides with her parents after being outcasted from her marital home. In this case, the complainant resides in Germany with her husband and all the expenses are covered by him. The complaint contains false allegations mainly relating to events in Kolkata or Germany, indicating jurisdiction lies there, and she also sent a letter to her CEO, which indicated her idea of filing a case in Jamshedpur, although she resides in Germany. The allegations made by her are entirely ambiguous concerning all the petitioners except her husband. The reliability of Section 498-A of the IPC is questioned, since the husband of the complainant was absent where the complainant resides in her marital home in Germany.
The court held inquiry for the delayed production after the arrest of the elderly couple and the State’s counsel failed to provide a satisfactory response. The fact that these individuals were detained in Kolkata by Jamshedpur Police without involvement of the local authorities raised a concern of violating the procedural norms. The fact that the petitioner were detained highlights the need of Constitutional courts to step in firmly and also the issuance of non-bailable warrants without proper legal justification and not presenting them before court within 24 hours as required, but also after 48 hours after the bail application was passed, makes the situation even more questionable.
The court expressed concerns over the trend of implicating husbands and relatives in such cases, especially with vague allegations. The FIR also contained allegations lacking specificity and distinct charges against the petitioner. Consequently, the court orders the judgement in favour of the husband and also questions the fairness of subjecting the petitioners to trial based on vague allegations.
Issue wise judgement of the case
Whether a non-bailable warrant of arrest can be issued without serving notice under Section 41-A of the Cr. P.C. in Section 498-A case?
Under Section 41A of the CrPC, a notice of appearance should be served to the accused within two weeks from the date of initiation of the case and if any person fails to do so, he shall be liable for imprisonment up to seven years. However, the time limit may be extended by the Superintendent of Police and the reasons should be recorded in writing. The accused should appear before the police and also cooperate with the investigation. The provision aims to prevent unnecessary arrests and the option should be used as a last resort.
As per the case of Mahesh Kumar Chaudhary v. State of Jharkhand, (2022), the court emphasised that the issuance of non-bailable warrant should be an exception and not a rule. The court also highlighted the importance of adhering to the procedures laid in Section 41-A of the CrPC, especially in Section 498-A IPC cases which deal with cruelty.
The police should follow all the mandatory regulations regarding the issuance of non-bailable warrant and if the accused fails to comply with the notice or does not appear or cooperate with the investigation, the authorities can proceed with a non-bailable warrant.
In this case law, the petitioner was illegally arrested from Kolkata without serving a proper notice under the above mentioned Section which clearly indicates violation of rules resulting in the annulment of the proceedings by the High Court.
Whether the Jamshedpur Court lacks territorial jurisdiction due to the alleged occurrences that happened in Kolkata or Germany?
As per the documents filed before the High Court and the statement made by the respondent itself that she is a resident of Frankfurt, Germany and the allegations made in the complaint revealed that the incidents had taken place either in Kolkata or at Germany narrated the fact that the Jamshedpur Court did not hold any jurisdiction regarding the case. Since no part of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of Jamshedpur Court, the High Court abolished all the claims made by the petitioner regarding the territorial jurisdiction and the court suppressed any such order made in accordance.
Whether there was any misuse of law to settle personal scores or gain advantages in dispute?
The legal representative of the petitioner argued that the allegations are completely vague and general, dragging the entire family, which is against the law. He further stated that nowadays a trend has developed into matrimonial disputes unnecessarily dragging the entire family, including elderly parents. He asserted that this case follows the pattern of dragging the elderly parents-in-law into a Section 498-A case without a prima facie. After considering the above point, it was concluded by the judges that the courts should not encourage these kinds of disputes, and therefore it is legally appropriate to quash the proceedings where there was a misuse of law to settle any personal scores or gain advantages. Any kind of general allegation would be taken as physical and mental torture and hence the Supreme Court in this case set aside the criminal proceedings against the petitioners and therefore the order passed by the High Court stand overruled.
Whether the rights of the petitioner were violated in any manner?
Under this case, with the evidence presented, and the arguments stated before the court along with the relevant papers, it was held that the FIR and the contents of the charge-sheet were not furnished on the legal basis to take the offence as a cognizable one. The judges learned the fact that the alleged offences mentioned in the contents of the charge-sheet against the petitioner, especially the elderly couple could not be held under the Sections mentioned in the Act and not to have been relegated to the ordeal of the trial. Accordingly, the proceedings against the petitioners were overturned.
Whether the burden of proof lies on the accused under the case law of Mahesh Kumar Chaudhary v. State of Jharkhand, (2022) ?
In the case law of Mahesh Kumar Chaudhary v. State of Jharkhand, (2022), it was held that the burden of proof does not necessarily lie solely on the accused as it depends on various factors, including the nature of the case, the evidence presented before the court, the documents taken in consideration, the arguments stated by both the parties and the legal principles applied thereafter.
Critical analysis of Mahesh Kumar Chaudhary vs. State of Jharkhand, 2022
Any action that would cause injustice and create obstacles in the promotion of justice would be considered an abuse of the court’s proceedings. The court holds the authority to terminate such proceedings, as the initiation or continuation of such abuse would create problems in serving justice. Where the complaint fails to disclose an offence, the court may examine the facts presented. When a complaint is considered to be dismissed, the court allows the officials to review the evidence to determine whether any offence is evident, even if the allegations are fully accepted. It is prudent for the legislature to reconsider the entire provisions since most of the complaints contain larger versions of incidents and there is a prevalent tendency to over-implicate individuals in certain cases. The process of criminal trials entails significant suffering for all parties involved, and it is also regretful that an overwhelming number of these complaints overburden the courts and contribute to social injustice, resulting in disrupting peace, harmony and societal well-being. Therefore, it is essential for the authorities to pay attention and also inform the public about making necessary amendments to the existing laws to address these issues effectively.
Cases cited by the legal representative of the petitioner in favour of his argument
To reinforce the arguments, the legal representative of the petitioner cited the case of Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar(2014), in which the Supreme Court in its judgement held that arrest carries profound consequences, including humiliation and loss of freedom, leaving lasting scars. The police continue to misuse their power of arrest and are often harassed rather than genuine law enforcement even after repeated judicial reminders. The misuse of power through police corruption undermines public trust. To address these issues, the court passes the following directions-
The State Government must instruct police officers to assess the necessity for arrest based on specified criteria and not to make arrests under Section 498-A IPC
The police must provide all the documents, including a filled checklist and should also justify the arrest with reasons and evidence before the accused were presented before the magistrate.
The magistrate, before authorising detention, must review the police report and satisfy themselves of what is necessary for detention.
The decision to not arrest should be communicated to the magistrate within two weeks of the case’s filing, with reasons provided.
Notice of appearance under Section 41-A Cr.P.C. must be served on the accused within two weeks of case filing, with reasons recorded for any extensions.
If these directives lead to failure to comply, it may result in departmental action against police officers and contempt of court proceedings before the relevant High Court.
The legal representative of the petitioner countered that individuals are being arrested without proper follow-up and compliance of legal guidelines. The judgement given by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in pursuance of the similar legal correspondence cited in the case of Amandeep Singh Johar v. State of NCT of Delhi, (2016), there were certain guidelines established on handling the cases:
Police officers should be mandatorily required to issue notices under Section 41A of the Criminal Procedure Code, as per the prescribed format, and they must be issued and served formally in accordance with the provisions outlined in (Chapter VI) of the Code. The suspect or accused must comply with the notice under Section 41A of the CrPC by attending at the specified time and place. If unable to attend, they should promptly notify the investigating officer in writing, proposing an alternative time within four working days, unless a valid reason for the delay is provided. The investigating officer allows rescheduling and if the officer suspects any more delays in the procedures, they have the right to deny the request and also to mandate attendance. After receiving the notice and appearing for interrogation, an acknowledgement may be requested by the suspect. If the suspect is also directed to appear elsewhere other than the place they need to appear in that case, they can get the receipt attested by an independent witness. It is the duty of the SHO to issue booklets of notices and to maintain proper records. If, in any manner, these procedures result in failure to adhere, it can result in disciplinary action. Also, various public awareness campaigns should be conducted to disseminate information about rights and legal procedures. Training programs for police and judicial officers should emphasise compliance with relevant CrPC sections.
The case of State through CBI v. Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar (2002) was also cited by the legal representative of the petitioner, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held Section 73 of the Cr.P.C. applies generally and allows courts to issue warrants to apprehend individuals accused of non-bailable offences evading arrest. We must address whether such warrants can be issued for their production before the police to aid investigation. While magistrates frequently play a role in investigations, such as conducting identification parades or recording statements, they do not exercise judicial discretion in these actions as they would when dealing with an accused presented before them under a warrant of arrest issued under Section 73. In such cases, the court may grant bail or authorise detention under Section 167 of the Code. Whether a magistrate will grant police custody upon the request of the investigating agency is solely at their discretion, which must be judicially exercised according to Section 167(3) of the Code. It is concluded that the warrant issued is only for appearance before the court and not before the police. The authorization for police custody requires the exercise of judicial discretion based on evidence placed before them. Thus, it is also not correct to assert that warrants can be issued solely for the production of the accused before the police to pursue an investigation.
Conclusion
The court finds the arrest of the petitioner was not done properly and the Jamshedpur Court doesn’t have jurisdiction. The six non-bailable warrants against the petitioners are also cancelled by the court and to prevent any unauthorised arrest, the court suggests the State of Jharkhand create guidelines in view of Delhi Police guidelines. The guidelines and fundamental principles should be sent to higher state authorities for consideration and adoption wherever required. The court also mentions that the authorities indulged in these cases and the formulation will act positively on these suggestions made to them. With these decisions and guidelines, the petition is granted and concluded, and any previous interim orders passed are to be cancelled.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
What is cognizable and non-cognizable offence?
As per Section 2(c) of the CrPC, cognizable offence means an offence for which, and cognizable case means a case in which a police officer may, in accordance with the First Schedule or under any other law for the time being in force, arrest without warrant. In order to be a cognizable case under the said Section of the Code, it would be enough if one or more (not ordinarily all) of the offences are cognizable. Examples of cognizable offences include murder, rape, theft, kidnapping and dowry death, which can be both bailable and non-bailable.
As per Section 2(l) of the CrPC, non-cognizable offence means an offence for which, and non-cognizable case means a case in which a police officer has no authority to arrest without a warrant. Thus, a non-cognizable offence needs special authority to be arrested by the police officer. Offences listed in the first schedule of the Indian Penal Code, include acts like assault, cheating, forgery, defamation and public nuisance, and are generally bailable.
What do you mean by territorial jurisdiction?
Order 7 Rule 7 of CrPC states about the territorial jurisdiction of courts, where a court can exercise its authority defining the geographic area. The suit must be filed in the court where the property is located, which mostly concerns immovable property, such as recovery, rent, partition or determination of property rights. If the property is located in multiple jurisdictions, a suit can be filed in any court covering any portion of the said property.
In cases involving movable property or civil wrongs, the suit can be filed either where the wrongdoing occurred or where the defendant resides. Similarly, for disputes arising from business agreements or civil matters, the suit can be filed where the defendant resides, where they conduct business or where the cause of action arose.
Summon and warrant under CrPC
A summons is issued either for appearance or for producing a document or thing, which may be issued to an accused person or witness. Every summons issued by the Court shall be in writing, in duplicate, signed by the Presiding Officer of such court or by such officer as is authorised by the High Court and shall bear the seal of the court. The summons should be clear and specific in its terms as to the title of the court, the place at which, the day and time of the day when, and the attendance of the person summoned.
The summons shall be served by a police officer, an officer of the court, or another public servant. In case the service cannot be affected by the exercise of due-diligence, the serving officer can perform substituted service by affixing one of the duplicates of the summons to some conspicuous part of the house or homestead in which the person summoned ordinarily resides, and thereupon the court, after making such enquiries as it thinks fit, may either declare that the summons has been duly served or order fresh service, as it considers proper.
Every warrant of arrest issued by a court under this Code shall be in writing, signed by the Presiding Officer of such court, and shall bear the seal of such court. Such a warrant shall remain in force until it is cancelled by the court that issued it or until it is executed. The form of warrant of arrest is Form No. 2 of the Second Schedule. The requisites of a warrant are as follows:
It must be in writing
It must bear the name and designation of the person who is to execute it
It must give full name and description of the person to be arrested
It must state the offence charged
It must be signed by the Presiding Officer
It must be sealed.
Such a warrant is only for the protection of a person before the concerned court and not before the police officer.
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This article has been written by Soumyadutta Shyam. This article analyses in detail Article 23 of the Indian Constitution as well as various related aspects like forced labour, trafficking in humans, the begar system, legislations enacted to achieve the objective of Article 23 and landmark judgements.
Table of Contents
Introduction
Humans exploiting other humans for gain or pleasure is an unfortunate reality of our society. Exploitation of humans has existed since the beginning of recorded history. It exists in various forms like slavery, compulsory labour, sexual slavery, commercial sexual exploitation, sex trafficking etc.
Human trafficking and forced labour are major human rights concerns. Article 4 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights restrains slavery or servitude. However, human trafficking and various kinds of forced labour including bonded labour and slavery still exist in various corners of the world including India. Even today, individuals are exploited for personal or commercial benefit. There are various forms of exploitative practices like debt bondage, child labour, domestic servitude, forced prostitution and other forms of servitude where people are forced to provide labour or service against their will.
Article 23 of the Indian Constitution forbids traffic in human beings and begar and other similar kinds of forced labour and declares any infringement of this right as a punishable offence. Article 23 comes under Part III of the Constitution and therefore, no individual can be exploited or deprived of their basic human dignity. This provision not only protects the individual against the actions of the State but against private individuals too.
Right against exploitation under Article 23 and 24 of the Indian Constitution
The right against exploitation is one of the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution under Articles 23 and 24 of the Indian Constitution.
Article 23(1) prohibits traffic in human beings, begar and other similar forms of forced labour. This Article declares that any contravention of this provision shall be an offence punishable under law. Clause (2) however, permits the state to impose compulsory services for public purposes provided that in making so it shall not make any discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, class or any of them.
This provision of the Constitution recognises the intrinsic dignity of individuals and emphasises the significance of protecting individual freedom, making sure that no one is subjected to exploitation or degrading conditions of work. The purpose of this provision is to eliminate practices that exploit and repress individuals, especially marginalised sections of society.
Begar system and Article 23 of the Indian Constitution
Begar is strictly forbidden by Article 23. “Begar” means involuntary labour without payment. It is a kind of forced labour in which a person is forced to work devoid of payment. The Begar system of forced labour is known by different names such as ‘Veth’ and ‘Reet’. The roots of this system can be traced back to the pre-historic period when labour was seen as an important item of exchange. The land of the king, his nobles and priests was cultivated by peasants in return for some tenurial rights in land bestowed by the king. As the state became more complex later, the lands of the ruling class were worked by their subjects. Serving the priestly class without any remuneration was considered a religious duty. Villagers also gave free labour in working temple lands. Under the British rule, this system continued and became even more repressive.
A popular movement called the “Coolie-Begar Movement” against the begar system was launched by Badri Dutt Pandey and Hargovind Pant in 1921 in the Kumaon region of present-day Uttarakhand. During the movement the labourers went on strike in January 1921, refusing to carry luggage or to give provisions to the British officials and tourists. With this movement, the people of Kumaon abolished the begar system themselves.
In Dubar Goala v. Union of India (1952), the petitioners who worked as licensed porters at Howrah Railway Station, willingly engaged in an agreement to provide two hours additional work for the railway administration. They were given some remuneration for their two hours of service. They disputed the legality of the agreement and pleaded with the Court to restrict the railway administration from forcing the porters to perform begar or forced labour. The Calcutta High Court ruled that” the petitioners could not be said to be doing begar or forced labour within the meaning of Article 23.”
The fact that the petitioners had intentionally conceded to do additional work by engaging in a contract for that purpose, dismisses the contention of their work being compulsory labour. There was an absence of any component of coercion or illegality in the system of licences or in acquiring the fees for those licenses. The Railway administration possessed the authority to regulate the use of the station. The petitioners were paid some remuneration for their two hours of service. Also, they get the advantage of the diminished license fee and they were also permitted the privilege of free use of the Railway premises for obtaining their earning. In this situation, the additional work carried out by them was not forced labour within the definition of Article 23(1) of the Constitution.
Trafficking in human beings and Article 23 of the Indian Constitution
Article 23 expressly forbids traffic in human beings. Traffic in human beings connotes the selling and purchasing of men and women as commodities as well as comprises immoral trafficking of women and children for immoral objectives. It is partly because of the hierarchical social organisation and partly because of the patriarchal structure of the society. In furtherance of the objective of this provision, the Parliament has laid down The Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 to suppress trafficking in human beings.
Trafficking in humans or human trafficking means forcing a person to provide labour or services, or to engage in commercial sexual acts. It also includes recruitment, transport and trade of humans for exploitation. Men, Women and children of all age groups and from different backgrounds may become targets of this crime. Human traffickers often use violence or deceitful means to entice or force the victims. The purposes of trafficking can be forced labour, organ trade, forced prostitution etc. The victims of trafficking are subjected to inhuman conditions and violence. Though human trafficking is considered a rising global phenomenon, it has a long history. Human traffickers operate across international borders. Some of the root causes of human trafficking are lack of employment opportunities, poverty, wars and natural disasters.
Sex trafficking is a widely prevalent form of human trafficking. Sex trafficking denotes the recruitment, transportation, trade or solicitation of a person with the motive of commercial sexual exploitation. Victims are often deceived, forced or defrauded into trafficking. Sometimes, the victims are sold internationally. Sex trafficking is among the most widespread types of human trafficking. It is a type of modern-day slavery. Every year millions of women and minors are sold in the commercial sex industry. This is one of the fastest-increasing organised crimes in the world. Women and even minor girls are vulnerable to sex trafficking. Minorities and women from impoverished communities are especially susceptible to sex trafficking.
Human trafficking situation in India
Human trafficking is one of the burning socio-legal issues in India. Though, there are many kinds of human trafficking the trafficking of women and girls for sexual exploitation and domestic work is the most prevalent one. Human traffickers often entice their victims by promising lucrative jobs, which also brings the false promise of independence and freedom for young girls.
The victims of human trafficking are generally from poor marginalised communities. Often women and girls are lured with deceitful assurances of job opportunities; kidnapped or abducted; and in some cases even sold by their relatives, husbands or romantic partners into human trafficking.
India is used as a source, destination and transit by human traffickers. The women, children as well as men are trafficked for coerced labour as well as commercial sexual exploitation. The targets are sold into brothels or as domestic servants, factory workers, beggars and agricultural labourers. Many victims also face forced labour in brick kilns, rice mills and embroidery factories. Women and girls from Nepal and Bangladesh are also smuggled into India for sex trade. Indian women are also sold into the Middle East for commercial sexual exploitation or forced labour. According to the National Crime Records Bureau data, a total of 2,189 cases of human trafficking were filed in 2021 as compared to 1,714 cases in 2020, showing an increment of 27.7 per cent.
Despite the legal prohibitions, trafficking in humans still continues to be a problem in India. This problem needs both attention from national and international authorities as well as awareness at the societal level.
Forced labour and Article 23 of the Indian Constitution
Article 23 forbids other similar forms of forced labour excluding human trafficking and the begar system. Forced labour can be defined as labour carried out involuntarily and under coercion. Forced labour is distinguishable from slavery in that it involves not the ownership of a person but the forcible exploitation of one’s labour.
Forced Labour exists in almost all regions of the world, in one form or another. According to the International Labour Organisation (ILO), Asia-Pacific has over half of the global figure (15.1 million), and after that Europe and Central Asia (4.1 million), Africa (3.8 million) and the Arab States (0.9 million). When measured with reference to the percentage of the population, forced labour is maximum in the Arab States (5.3 per thousand), after that Europe and Central Asia (4.4 per thousand), the Americas and the Asia-Pacific (both at 3.5 per thousand), and Africa (2.9 per thousand). Despite the fact that Article 8 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights forbids forced or compulsory labour, it still exists in many countries in the world and in many cases undocumented.
In India, socio-economic inequality and the caste system can be blamed for the prevalence of forced labour. Some industries where the worst forms of forced labour exist in India are Agriculture, brickmaking and carpet weaving. The victims of forced labour generally belong to socio-economically disadvantaged communities having low caste status.
The socio-economic exclusion of weaker sections of society and their inability to move out of their group makes them specifically susceptible to forced labour. This is especially true for informal and unregulated sectors. Victims of forced labour are exploited in a number of ways such as non-payment or underpayment for their work, long hours of work and sometimes physical abuse. Poverty and lack of education are also a problem for these labourers.
In State through Gokul Chand v. Banwari (1951), the respondents disputed the legality of the U.P Removal of Social Disabilities Act. The appellants who were barbers and dhobies had declined to shave and wash the clothes of Harijans. They were thus sentenced as per Section 6 of the abovementioned Act. It was ruled that the Act did not breach Article 23. The Court said that when a person is restricted from declining to provide services just for the reason that the person demanding it comes from a Scheduled Caste community, he is not therefore put through forced labour.
Bonded Labour and Article 23 of the Indian Constitution
Article 23 forbids the custom of ‘bonded labour’ as it is a type of forced labour within the purview of this Article. Bonded labour is a kind of forced labour in which a debtor undertakes an agreement with the creditor to render services to the creditor without wages or minimum wages in lieu of the debt. It is also called Debt Bondage.
Bonded labour exists in different parts of India even in the present era. Under this system, the debtor or their heirs have to work for their creditor without adequate wages or sometimes no wages. This system has origins in the hierarchical social structure characterised by feudal and semi-feudal systems. As a result of specific types of indebtedness, like customary obligations, forced labour has been prevalent for a long period in our country. Certain economically exploited, vulnerable and disadvantaged classes have been especially victimised by this system. They have to offer compulsory labour to the creditor in return for the debt. There are cases where several generations have to work as bonded labourers to pay off the debt of their ancestors. Bonded labour is a violation of fundamental human dignity.
The issue of bonded labour is intricately connected to larger socio-economic issues like inadequate economic opportunities, landlessness, irregular and low wages, the poor state of agricultural land, caste-based discrimination as well as an exploitative sharecropping system.
In order to curb the evil practice of bonded labour, The Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976 was passed. By virtue of this Act, all the bonded labourers have been liberated and discharged from the burden of rendering bonded labour. The duty to repay the bonded debt has also been cancelled because of this legislation.
Compulsory service for public purposes [Article 23 clause (2)] of the Indian Constitution
Clause (2) is an exception to the general principle contained in Article 23. Under this clause, the State has the authority to enforce mandatory service for public purposes. However, while enforcing such mandatory service, the State is not permitted to discriminate based on religion, race, caste, class or such other distinction. For instance, mandatory military service or social services can be enforced since they are neither begar nor traffic in human beings.
In the case of Dulal Samanta v. District Magistrate, Howrah (1958), an order was issued to the petitioner by the District Magistrate for compulsory conscription as a special police officer for a three-month term. The petitioner, however, said that his health was negatively affected by his duty after a few days of service. He requested for exemption from compulsory service on grounds of ill-health. But, again an order was issued for six months of compulsory service. It was without any remuneration. He again defaulted in performing his duties. The petitioner claimed that he was threatened with 20 prosecution cases for failure to perform his duties. He subsequently filed a writ of Mandamus before the Calcutta High Court as per Article 226 of the Constitution. The petitioner contended that this was an infringement of his fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(g) and Article 23. He asserted that it was forced labour. The Court, however, dismissed his appeal and said that enlistment in the services of the police could not be treated like “begar” or “any similar form of forced labour.” Thus, the notice issued for enlisting a person as a special police officer is not prohibited under Article 23 of the Constitution.
Legislations enacted to achieve the objective of Article 23 of the Indian Constitution
The Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956
The aim of this Act was to restrain the commercial evil of traffic in women, men and children for the reason of prostitution as an organised means of subsistence. The Act is a measure to eliminate the menace of trafficking in humans and was passed in furtherance of the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Person and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others ratified in New York in May 1950. It is a social legislation with penal and remedial measures. In Vishal Jeet v. Union of India (1990), theApex Court ruled that the Act deals with not only a social but a socio-economic issue as well. Thus the provisions of the Act are more preventive than penal in nature. In the case of In Re: Ratnamala and Anr. v. Unknown (1961), the Madras High Court observed that it was no doubt true that what is aimed under the Act is not the abolition of prostitutes and prostitution as such and per se make it a criminal offence or punish a woman because she prostitutes herself, the purpose of the enactment was to inhibit or abolish the commercialised vice, namely, traffic in women and girls for the purpose of prostitution as an organised means of living.
The important provisions of the Act are listed below:-
Section 3 of the Act, sets out punishment for keeping a brothel or allowing premises to be used as a brothel. Section 3(1) punishes a person who keeps, manages or helps in the management of a brothel to rigorous imprisonment for a period of not less than one year and not more than three years and also with a penalty which may be up to two thousand rupees and in case of subsequent conviction, with rigorous imprisonment which shall for a period not less than two years and not more than five years and also with a penalty with upto two thousand rupees. Section 3(2) provides punishment for any landlord, owner, lessor, tenant or any other person who knowingly uses or allows their premises to be used for prostitution. It prescribes punishment for a period extending up to two years and with a penalty of up to two thousand rupees and if it is subsequent conviction then with rigorous imprisonment which might be up to five years and also with a monetary penalty.
Section 5 of the Act, sets out punishment for procuring, inducing or taking a woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution. It stipulates a punishment of rigorous imprisonment for a period of not less than one year and not more than two years and also with a penalty which may be up to two thousand rupees. In case of subsequent conviction the prison term shall not be less than two years and not more than five years and also with a penalty which may be up to two thousand rupees.
Section 6 of the Act, lays down punishment for detaining a woman or girl in a place where prostitution is conducted. It prescribes a punishment of rigorous imprisonment for a period of not less than one year and not more than two years and also with a penalty of up to two thousand rupees. If it is the subsequent conviction the punishment shall be rigorous imprisonment for a period of not less than two years and not more than five years and also with a penalty which may be up to two thousand rupees.
Section 10 of the Act is remedial in nature. Section 10(1) provides –
A person convicted for the first time for an offence under sub-section (2) of the Act, or under Sections 4, 5, 7 or 8 may after consideration of the age, character, previous conduct and the circumstances in which the offence was committed, be released by the court before which he is convicted on probation for good conduct.
A person convicted for the first instance for any offence under Section 7 or 8 may after consideration of the age, character, previous conduct, antecedents and the circumstances in which the offence was committed, also be released with reprimand.
Section 10(2) stipulates that if a female offender is found liable for an offence as per Sections 7 or 8 and the character, age, state of physical and psychological health of the offender and other conditions of the case are such that it is suitable, it shall be valid for the court to pass alternatively an order for detention in a corrective facility for reformation for not less than two years and not more than five years. But, the court shall after giving a chance to the offender to be heard, record reasons for such order.
Section 19 is rehabilitative in character. Under Section 19(1) a woman or girl who is engaged in or made to engage in prostitution can make an application to the magistrate within whose jurisdiction she is engaged in or made to engage in prostitution, for an order that she may be placed in a protective home. According to sub-section (2) the magistrate after hearing the applicant and making the necessary inquiry may make an order for the applicant to be placed in a protective home for a period as may be specified in the order.
The Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976
The Act was made to eliminate the problem of bonded labour tradition in India. After the commencement of this Act, all the bonded labourers were liberated from the obligations of the bonded labour system. This was a milestone in abolishing the oppressive tradition of bonded labour. The liability of repayment of debt incurred under debt bondage has been suspended and the creditor can no longer compel the worker to pay the debt (Section 6). Any property of the bonded labourer which was captured by landlords and was under mortgage, lien or other encumbrances shall be given back to the labourers and the debt related to the same shall be discharged (Section 7). Any freed bonded labourer cannot be evicted from their residence as consideration for the debt (Section 8).
Minimum Wages Act, 1948
The Minimum Wages Act, 1948 stipulates for full-fledged machinery to fix the minimum rates of wages in the industries stated in the schedule attached to the Act. The Act is a welfare legislation and is an essential measure for the economic upliftment of the workers. The aim of the enactment is to safeguard the interest of industrial workers. By enacting the Minimum Wages Act, the Government has endeavoured to discharge its Constitutional obligation in Article 43 of the Directive Principles of State Policy.
The Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970
During the pre-independence era, contract labour was characterised by the poor economic situation of the workers, the casual nature of employment, the absence of job security etc. Thus, The Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, of 1970 was enacted to oversee contract labour and to stop the abuse of contract labourers. The aim of the Act was also to provide proper and habitable working conditions. The Act also stipulates for the setting up of Central and State Advisory boards for the regulation of contract labour.
The Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986
Even subsequent to passing some laws comprising sections to regulate child labour, it was quickly realised that child labour was an issue. Taking this factor into account attempts were made to regulate the conditions of child labour for the purpose of avoiding exploitation in industries where child labour could not be prevented. The Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986 revoked the Employment of Children Act, 1938. The most important objective of this Act was to identify more dangerous works and industries with the aim of stopping child labour in these industries and regulating conditions for children in non-hazardous vocations.
The major purposes of the Act are:-
To bring conformity in the definition of child in the related laws;
To prevent the recruitment of children in some particular occupations and processes;
To revise the extent of prohibited industries and vocations by setting out a process;
To regulate the conditions of service for children where they are not prevented from working; and
To set down punishment for violators.
Landmark judgments surrounding Article 23 of the Indian Constitution
People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India (1982)
Facts of the case
In this case, a writ petition was brought through a public interest litigation in order to ensure conformation to the provisions of various labour laws in respect of the workmen employed in the construction work of various projects connected with the Asian Games. The issue was brought to the notice of the Supreme Court by the 1st petitioner, which was a social organisation for the protection of democratic rights by letter addressed to Justice P.N Bhagwati. The letter was based on the report of a team of three social scientists who were recruited by the 1st petitioner to investigate the conditions of the workmen engaged in Asiad Projects. As the letter addressed by the 1st petitioner based on the report of the social scientists, it was treated as a writ petition by the Supreme Court. Subsequently, notices were sent to the Union of India, Delhi Development Authority and Delhi Administration.
Issues
1. Were the working conditions of the workmen in the Asiad projects in violation of their fundamental rights under Article 23 of the Constitution?
2. Whether the Union of India, Delhi Development Authority and Delhi Administration were liable to ensure compliance of the labour laws by the contractors?
3. Whether the workmen have a cause of action against the Union of India, Delhi Development Authority and Delhi Administration, in case of non-compliance with labour laws by the contractors?
Judgement
The Supreme Court examined the purview and extent of Article 23 thoroughly. The court ruled that the extent of Article 23 is broad and hits at “traffic in human beings” and “begar and other forms of forced labour” anywhere they are detected. It is not just “begar” that is forbidden by Article 23 but also all other types of forced labour. “Begar” is a kind of forced labour under which a person is forced to work devoid of remuneration. This provision hits at forced labour in whichever guise it may appear since it is in contravention of human dignity opposed to basic human dignity and against fundamental human morals. The system of forced labour is denounced in almost all international instruments dealing with human rights.
All kinds of forced labour whether “Begar” or any other kind, is forbidden by Article 23 and it makes no distinction whether the person who is coerced to give their labour or service to another is given remuneration or not. Despite the fact, that remuneration is being paid, labour or services given by a person would be in contravention of this provision if it is forced labour i.e., involuntary labour performed under coercion. This provision hits at every kind of compulsory labour even if it is the result of a volitional contract. If a person has entered into a contract with another to give service and there is a consideration for that service in the form of repayment of debt or even remuneration he cannot be compelled by force of law or in any other manner to continue to perform that service as it would be forced labour under the purview of this provision. No one can be compelled to provide labour or service against their own volition although it may be under a contract of service.
The term “force” was elucidated by the Court broadly. Justice Bhagwati said, “The word ‘force’ must therefore be construed to include not only physical force or legal force but also force arising from the compulsion of economic circumstances which leaves no choice of alternatives to a person in want and compels him to provide labour or service even though the remuneration received for it is less than the minimum wage.” Thus a person who gives labour or service to another for remuneration which is below the minimum wage is forced labour under Article 23.
In this case, it was ruled that the subtraction of Re.1 per day by the Jamadars from the wages of the workers hired by the contractor for Asiad Projects in Delhi, because of which the workers did not receive the minimum wage of Rs.9.25 each day was in infringement of Article 23 of the Constitution. The Court instructed the Government to take essential steps for penalising the infringement of the fundamental rights of citizens given by Article 23.
Sanjit Roy v. State of Rajasthan (1983)
Facts of the case
In this case, a writ petition was filed by the petitioner for redressal of violations of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 by the Public Works Department of the State of Rajasthan. The Public Works Department was constructing a road close to Tilonia Village in Ajmer District and according to the State Government, it was a part of famine relief work undertaken to provide relief to persons affected by drought and famine conditions. It was known that the minimum wage for a construction worker in Rajasthan was Rs.7 per day. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner and not disputed by the State that the notification fixing the minimum wage of Rs.7 per day did not fix any fixed quantity of work to be performed in order to secure minimum wage. In the event, any group rendered less work, the wage of the group was proportionately reduced and the wage earned by each worker was reduced below Rs.7 per day. There was considerable resentment among women workers belonging to Scheduled Castes who were engaged in the construction work.
Issues
1. Whether the reduction of the daily wage of the workers violative of the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and Article 23 of the Constitution or not?
2. Whether the labour rendered by the workers amounted to “forced labour” within the ambit of Article 23 or not?
Judgement
The Supreme Court ruled that the payment of wages lesser than minimum wages to the individual engaged in Famine Relief Work is an infringement of Article 23. When any labour or service is utilised by the State from any person devastated by drought, the State cannot pay him less wage than the minimum wage for the reason that it is given to them as an aid to relieve the famine condition. The State has no authority to exploit their vulnerable condition.
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (1983)
Facts of the case
The petitioner in this case was a non-profit organisation “Bandhua Mukti Morcha” which is dedicated to the cause of release of bonded labourers in the country. The petitioner surveyed some stone quarries in Faridabad District near Delhi and found there were a large number of labourers from Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan who were working in the stone quarries under inhumane conditions and many of them were bonded labourers. These labourers were not permitted to leave the stone quarries and were providing forced labour. They had to drink dirty water and lived in small huts.
Issues
1. Whether the system of bonded labour was incompatible with the new egalitarian socio-economic order and violative of the Constitutional values?
The Supreme Court said that when a suit is initiated in the court through PIL claiming the presence of bonded labour the Government ought to appreciate it as it may give the Government a chance to determine whether the bonded labour system is still in existence and also to take suitable measures to eliminate that system. It is the Constitutional duty of the Government under Article 23 which forbids forced labour in any form. Article 23 has outlawed the practice of bonded labour but regrettably, no significant endeavour was made to implement this provision. It was just in 1976 that Parliament made the Bonded Labour (Abolition) Act, 1976, providing for the eradication of the bonded labour system with the purpose of stopping the financial and physical exploitation of the weaker classes of the people.
The Supreme Court held that the Minimum Wages Act, 1948; the Inter-State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1979 and the Mines Act, 1952 were applicable to stone quarries. The Government of Haryana was directed to draw up a scheme programme for “a better and more meaningful rehabilitation of freed bonded labourers” in light of the guidelines framed by the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Labour in his letter dated 2nd September 1982. The Court deemed it necessary to direct a further inquiry for the purpose of determining whether any of the labourers working in the stone quarries and stone crushers in Faridabad District were bonded labourers or not in furtherance of this judgement. The Government of Haryana was instructed to constitute a vigilance committee in each sub-division of a district in compliance with the requirements of Section 13 of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976.
Importance of right against exploitation vis-a-vis Article 23 of the Indian Constitution
The right against exploitation is a significant fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution which provides protection to individuals against exploitative practices like human trafficking, begar, forced labour, child labour and forced prostitution. Article 23 prohibits exploitative practices like trafficking in humans, begar and other similar kinds of forced labour. Article 24 prohibits the employment of children in factories and hazardous employment. Right against exploitation protects individuals against abuse and exploitation. It ensures that no one is forced to engage in work that is violative of their basic human dignity.
Article 23 imposes a positive obligation on the State to take steps to abolish evils of “traffic in human beings,” begar and other similar forms of forced labour, wherever they are found. It is pertinent to note that in furtherance of the objective of this provision many legislations like the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1976; The Bonded Labour (Abolition) Act, 1976; Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and others which prohibit various exploitative practices and protects individuals against abuse both at the hands of the State as well as private individuals.
The Supreme Court in landmark judgements such as People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India (1982), Sanjit Roy v. State of Rajasthan (1983) and Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (1983) where the Supreme Court highlighted the significance of Article 23 and directed the State to protect this important fundamental right.
Conclusion
Exploitation may exist in different forms such as sexual exploitation, forced or compulsory labour, child labour and many other forms. Exploitation may be motivated by different factors such as monetary or sexual gratification. In some cases, class-based exploitation may be embedded in the customs or traditions of a society.
In due course, various legislations were passed both nationally and internationally to deal with exploitative practices like human trafficking, forced or compulsory labour, slavery, child labour, prostitution etc. When the Constitution of India came into force, the right against exploitation became a fundamental right. Right against exploitation i.e., Articles 23 and 24 of the Indian Constitution prohibits exploitation of human beings. Article 23(1) lays down the provision to expressly forbid traffic in human beings, begar and other equivalent kinds of forced labour. In furtherance of this provision, several legislations have been passed.
Despite the various legislations and prohibitions many forms of exploitation like human trafficking and compulsory labour still exist in India. Some sections of society are still deprived of basic freedoms and rights that other people enjoy. The vulnerable and disadvantaged sections of society are still exploited on a daily basis. Human trafficking which is a scourge to the modern civilised society still exists in India. To eliminate the problem of human trafficking both national and international co-operation is required. Forced labour or labour at less than minimum wage even exists in the present time. To remedy the problem of exploitation the strict enforcement of relevant laws and awareness at the societal level is necessary. The socio-economic conditions of the underprivileged classes also need to improve, in order to eradicate the exploitation of human beings.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
What is exploitation?
The word ‘exploitation’ means the use of someone or something for one’s own benefit. In relation to humans, it means, any act of treating someone unfairly or victimising someone for one’s own benefit. Right against Exploitation as provided under Articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution affords protection against exploitation to both citizens as well as non-citizens in India.
Which international organisations are dedicated to the protection of the rights of labourers?
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) is the primary organisation dedicated to the protection of the rights of labourers at the international level. Besides, the World Trade Organisation also deals with various labour standards meant to protect the rights of labourers.
How is Article 24 of the Constitution crucial in protecting the children against exploitation?
Article 24 of the Constitution prohibits the employment of children below 14 years of age in factories and hazardous employment. This provision is in the interest of the welfare and safety of children. Article 39 of the Constitution also imposes an obligation upon the state to ensure that the health and strength of workers, men and women, and the tender of children are not abused and that children are not forced by economic necessity to enter avocations unsuited to their age or strength.
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